Crisis  In  International  Waters:  

How  Was  the  Mysterious  Crash  
of  Air  France  Flight  447  
Handled?    
Case  Study    
 
Julianna  Malogolowkin,  Erica  Rosenthal  and  Mallory  Shelter  
December  2009  
 

 
 Table of Contents

I. Abstract

II. Overview

III. Identification of Issue

IV. History

V. Best Practices in Airline Crisis Management

VI. Timelines

VII. Air France/Organizational Primary Responses

VIII. Long-Term Responses

IX. Current and Future State

X. Conclusion

XI. Appendices

XII. References

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 I. Abstract

On May 31, 2009, Air France Flight 447, also known as AF 447, disappeared over the

Atlantic Ocean. From June until August, investigators searched for parts of the plane to try and

determine the cause of the crash. Some parts of the plane and multiple bodies were found.

Families were also paid reparations for their losses. However, the two black boxes from the

plane have yet to be found.

This case study gives the reader an opportunity to follow Air France and its overall

handling of the crash of AF 447. It will also give students the opportunity to contemplate best

practices in crisis communication, particularly in a volatile industry.

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 II. Overview

On May 31, 2009, AF 447 disappeared somewhere over the Atlantic Ocean. The plane

was flying from Rio de Janerio, Brazil (Rio de Janerio-Galeao International Airport) to Paris,

France (Paris Charles de Gaulle International Airport). The crash was the deadliest accident in

the history of Air France, killing all 228 people on board (Watt, 2009).

The plane left Rio de Janerio sometime between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.,1 and the last

radio contact with the plane was at 10:30 p.m. (“Air France Flight,” 2009). For days, the only

clues about the crash were in the form of messages that the onboard maintenance computer

transmitted by a datalink system known as the Aircraft Communications Addressing and

Reporting System (ACARS) (Wise, 2009). This system “transmits text messages via satellite to

ground stations, which then forward them on landlines to the intended destination” (2009). On

May 31, in a four-minute time span, 24 reports were broadcasted by the plane to Air France’s

dispatch center in Paris regarding problems with the system on board the aircraft (2009). The

messages included reports that the auto-pilot had disconnected and that the flight control system

was unable to determine the aircraft’s correct speed. “The final message reported that the

airliner’s cabin either had depressurized, was moving with high vertical velocity, or both”

(2009).

Over the next month after the crash, Air France and the Brazilian, French and American

governments and investigators worked hard to locate parts of the plane, bodies and the two black

boxes. Parts of the plane and several bodies were discovered; however, the black boxes were
                                                                                                                         
1
There is some discrepancy over what time the plane actually took off. According to CBS News,
Air France claims the plane left Rio de Janerio at 7:03 p.m.; however, Brazilian Air Force and
the BEA said the plane left at 7:30 p.m.

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never found, leaving the reason for the crash still a mystery as of this writing. The first search for

the black boxes ended on July 10, 2009, approximately one month after the crash occured

(“Brazil calls off,” 2009). Another search began at the end of July, and ended on August 20,

2009 due to a lack of funds (“French end flight,” 2009).

During the investigation period, there were several possible reasons for the crash

discussed. Investigators suggested that there may have been faulty pitot tubes on the plane, an

Airbus A330-220. The pitot tubes detect the airspeed on the plane, making them an important

part of the aircraft. Investigators also suggested that the plane may have encountered severe

weather right before the crash. A terrorist attack was ruled out shortly after the investigation

began.

Air France received considerable backlash for its communication efforts following the

crash. This case study seeks to examine how Air France handled a crisis situation, and what it

attempted to do to make up for its lack of preparedness.

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 III. Identification of Issue

When AF 447 crashed, Air France was faced with a horrible situation: the loss of one of

its planes with all of its passengers and crew. In addition, Air France also suffered from a loss of

reputation due to its interactions with the victims’ families, the media and the French and

Brazilian governments. Investigators had to focus on beginning search efforts to find the plane

and determining the cause of the crash, while Air France officials worked on responding to the

media and reaching out to the families of the victims.

Overall, Air France received much criticism for its handling of the crisis. Air France

initially had strong crisis communication efforts. However, as time went on and speculation of

the cause of the crash continued to grow, Air France’s communication efforts were lacking as

they faced scrutinty from the media, families of victims and other publics. As this case will

show, Air France did little to keep the media and families of victims updated. Although

investigative efforts were out of its control, internal and external communication efforts came

into question.

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 IV. History

The Airline Industry

After World War II, the first commercial airplane routes were set up across Europe. Since

then, the airline industry has vastly grown and developed. Today, airlines facilitate “economic

growth, world trade, [and] international investment and tourism” (“Industry overview,” 2000).

Overall, the airline industry is a very competitive market that is made up of four categories:

• International—large planes that can take passengers almost anywhere. Companies in

this category have an annual revenue of $1 billion or more.

• National—Usually small planes (100-150) owned by companies that have revenues

between $100 million and $1 billion.

• Regional—Companies with revenues less than $100 million that focus on short-haul

flights.

• Cargo-Airlines that transport goods (“The Industry Handbook,” 2009).

Airlines’ profitability is closely tied with economic growth and trade. For example, in the

first half of the 1990s, the industry suffered from a recession and was further depressed by the

Gulf War. Since then, airlines have had to work hard to meet the requirements of their customers

in difficult economic times.

Industry Today

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001 there was a visible change in the airline

industry; the most noticeable of which was an increase in air passenger safety. After the 9/11, the

federal government enacted new legislation to increase safety. On November 19, 2001, President

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George W. Bush signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Blalock,

Kadiyali & Simon, 2007). The act established a new Transportation Security Administration and

mandated several important changes in civil aviation security procedures. The two primary and

visible changes in airport security were the “federalization of security screening for passengers at

all U.S. commercial airports by November 19, 2002, and the requirement to begin screening all

checked baggage by December 31, 2002” (2007). In the beginning, these screening processes

reduced passenger volume by six percent at all airports and by nine percent at the nation’s 50

busiest airports (2007). Today, passengers have become accustomed to these regulations;

however there are other factors impacting the number of travelers flying, such as additional fees

and costs.

To meet the requirements of increasingly discerned customers, airlines are beginning to

invest in the quality of service they offer both on the ground and in the air. Ticket-less travel,

new interactive entertainment systems, and more comfortable seating are just some of the

product enhancements being introduced to attract and retain airline customers (“Industry

overview,” 2000). Despite airline attempts to make traveling easier for customers, airlines are

still suffering from a loss of revenue, leading them to increase fees for things such as luggage,

food, beverages, blankets and pillows.

The airline industry, similar to other industries and organizations, is currently suffering

due to decreases in revenues and monetary resources available in order for airlines to function

effectively. Michael Cox of Seabury Airline Planning Group, LLC, which specializes in the

airline industry said, “the money out there for airlines right now is very tight right now...They

have done their work, but now they need exit financing, and it’s a tough market right now”

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(“Distressed investing,” 2009). In order to help with this economic climate, airlines have been

outsourcing to save money. “Basically all they don’t outsource are the pilots and the employees,”

Cox said (2009).

The airline industry also has incredible resiliency. According to the Boeing “Current

Market Outlook 2009-2028,” over the past 20 years the industry has experienced several

economic downturns, yet was able to grow an average of five percent per year. Boeing believes

that the continued dependence of people and businesses around the world on timely, reliable and

efficient air transportation will allow for similar growth in the future. However, for this to occur,

air transport must continue to change in response to market opportunities and challenges. The

Boeing report states, “the rise of new airline business models and rapid growth of air travel in the

world’s emerging economies are stabilizing worldwide demand for airplanes” (“Current market

outlook,” 2009).

Boeing monitors airline cost, revenue, operational strategies and data in order to

understand how markets are developing and to analyze how best to support airline customers.

After each economic downturn, growth rates rise above average for a period of time; this leads to

peak traffic levels above those suggested by the long-term trend. For airlines to continue to be

successful, future airline fleets must be numerous enough to respond to these peaks in demand

and flexible enough for airlines to adjust or relocate capacity to meet changing economic

demands (2009).

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 Despite these changes, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) reported that

losses were still growing in 2009, amounting to $6 billion in the first half of the year (“Financial

forecast,” 2009). IATA expects losses to continue into 2010. The “losses from commercial

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airline operations worldwide in 2009 will reach $11 billion, up from our previous forecast of $9

billion” (2009). When looking forward past 2010, they believe these losses will also continue the

next year. IATA states, “returns on invested capital in the airline industry may start improving

next year but, at less than 3%, will remain below sustainable levels” (2009).

Air France

Air France was founded on October 7, 1933 through a merger of four of the country’s

leading transport companies: Société Centrale pour l’Exploitation de Lignes Aériennes (founded

in 1919), Compagnie Internationale de Navigation (1920), Air Union (1923), and Air Orient

(1929), and was later joined by Compagnie Generale Aeropostal (founded in 1919) (“History,”

2009). Before World War II, Air France was able to develop into one of the most extensive

airline networks in Europe. During the war, however, Air France was nearly devastated.

After World War II, Air France pulled through, and in June 1945, French civil aviation

was nationalized. By the end of 1945, the entire French air transport network was entrusted to

Air France. Parliament then made Air France into a corporation, with the French government

owning 70 percent of the new company (2009).

On July 1, 1946, the Paris-New York tour was officially inaugurated and in 1959, Air

France was revolutionized with commercial jetliners. The Caravelle and Boeing 707 introduced

by Air France cut flying time in half. Over the following years the routes expanded, so by the

early 21st century the airline was serving more than 200 cities in approximately 80 countries

(2009).

In 1974, Air France moved into the new airport, Paris Charles de Gaulle. Faced with the

global economic slump during the ‘oil crises’ of 1973 and 1979, Air France diversified and built

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up cargo operations, and these began to boom (2009). Two years later, on January 21, 1976, Air

France launched the Concorde suspension aircraft, a joint venture of French and British

aeronautical industries, on its Paris-Dakar-Rio de Janerio Route..

Air France and the Union des Transports Aeriens (UTA) merged in 1992, leaving Air

France the owner of 72 percent of Air Inter and making it one of the largest air transport groups

in the world (2009). The group was completed in 1997 with the merger of Air France and AIR

FRANCE EUROPE (formerly Air Inter) (2009).

In the 20th century, a movement began to privatize the airline. During this time, its public

offering was a large success and investors asked for 40 times the number of shares offered. Close

to two-and-a-half million individual buyers acquired a stake in Air France, and more than 72% of

the workforce also became shareholders in the company (2009). On February 22, 1999, Air

France was listed on the primary market of the Paris stock exchange (2009).

A Global Alliance between Air France, Delta, AeroMexico and Korean Air was created

on June 22, 2000. In 2001, Air France structured its regional services around three airline

subsidiaries— Brit Air, City Jet and Regional— to expand services out of the French regions and

to acquire a firmer footing in the competitive European market (2009). In 2004, Air France made

its most recent merger with Dutch airline KLM, creating Air France-KLM, one of the largest air

carriers in the world. Despite the merger, the two airlines still operate as separate entities. Today

Air France-KLM is the world’s leading airline group. It has 110,878 employees, 74.5 million

passengers, 621 aircrafts in operation, 244 destinations and 24 billion euros, approximately 36

billion U.S. dollars, in turnover for 2008-2009 (2009).

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Breakdown  of  share  capital  at  31  March  2009  

Air France Today

Today Air France is made up of three core businesses: passenger operations, cargo

(freight transport) and maintenance (aircraft repair and maintenance).

Air France claims that its fundamental assets are: a powerful hub at Paris-Charles de

Gaulle; a balanced network; a rationalized fleet; a worldwide, well-integrated alliance (Sky

Team); an innovative product offer; an emphasis on placing the customer at the heart of its

strategy; and a strict cost control strategy (“At a glance,” 2009). It has 63,010 employees

including 19,481 flight crew, 15,106 flight attendants, 4,375 cockpit crew and 43,529 ground
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staff (“Annual report 2008-2009,” 2009). While meeting all of these aspects, the airline states on

its Web site that it is committed to developing and promoting initiatives in support of sustainable

development, human rights, work standards, environmental protection and the combat against

corruption (“At a glance,” 2009).

Today, Air France has 407 aircrafts that fly to 183 destinations in 98 countries. Each day

it has 1,700 flights. In the financial year of 2009 Air France-KLM’s consolidated results were:

(in millions) 31 March 2009

Revenues 23,970 (36,170 USD)2
Operating Income -129 (-195 USD)
Income from operating activities -193 (-291 USD)
Net income from continuing operations -807 (-1,217 USD)
Net Income -814 (-1,228 USD)
Net earnings per share (in euros) -2.76 (-4.16 USD)

Airbus

Airbus is a leading manufacturer of commercial jetliners and military airlifters. The

company was first conceptualized at a meeting in July 1967 when ministers from France,

Germany and Britain agreed that “for the purpose of strengthening European co-operation in the

field of aviation technology and thereby promoting economic and technological progress in

Europe,” the three countries needed to join forces in the development and production of an

Airbus (A bold vision,” 2009). This was an acknowledgment from these three nations that stated

                                                                                                                         
2
 Note: Dollar amounts that are reported in the case study are based on the current exchange rate

as of December 2, 2009. That exchange rate is 1 Euro = 1.5058 U.S. dollars (“Currency rates,”

2009).

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that without a joint program, Europe would be left trailing in the wake of the U.S. in the airline

industry.

The hope was to create a short-haul European Airbus and capitalize on the boom in air

travel, making it possible for people to travel for less. Roger Beteille, a French engineer, was

appointed technical director and Henri Ziegler became general manager of what eventually

became Airbus. Franz-Josef Strauss was chairman of the supervisory board. Felix Kracht, a

young German engineer, later joined the team. Beteille drew up a workshare plan which formed

the basis of the Airbus production system (2009).

In 1967, ministers from France, Britain and German met in London to sign a

memorandum which explained the launch of the first phase of development of the A300, a short-

to-medium range twin-engine aircraft. Both France and Britain would each get 37.5 percent

share, and Germany would receive 25 percent (2009).

In order to run the program, the partners decided to set up a Groupe d’Interet

Economique (GIE). This was a unique structure under French law, which allowed Sud Aviation,

HSA and Deutsche Airbus to work together on the A300 while remaining separate companies

(“Early days,” 2009).

Beteille and Kracht had a bold vision of the Airbus future. They knew that in order to

succeed they would have to build a family of aircrafts across all sectors. Their commercial target

was to win at least a 30 percent share of the market (“Revolutionary steps,” 2009). The formal

setting of the Airbus consortium did not take place until December 18, 1970 when Airbus was

officially created as a GIE. France’s Aeropatiale and Germany’s Detusche Airbus and a grouping

of four firms, Messerchmittwerke, Hamburger Flugzeugbau, VFW GmbH and Siebelwerke ATG

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each took a stake. The headquarters were in Paris and would move to Toulouse in January 1974

(2009).

The following year, Spain’s Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) was awarded the

contract to build the horizontal tailplane and took a 4.2 percent stake. Aeropataiale and Beutsche

Airbus stakes were reduced to 47.9 percent. The first flight of the A300 was a test flight that left

from Toulouse on October 28, 1972. It lasted one hour and 23 minutes (2009).

To succeed, Beteille and Ziegler would have to crack the lucrative U.S. market. Frank

Borman, a former Apollo astronaut and head of Eastern Airlines, then one of America’s “big

four” airlines took interest in the program. His support for Airbus would prove crucial to the

organization’s survival (“A market breakthrough,” 2009).

In September 1974, Korean Airlines signed a contract to buy four A300B4s, becoming

Airbus’ first non-European customer. French and German certification for the A300 was

obtained in March 1974 and on May 23 the first A300 made its initial commercial flight from

Paris to London for Air France (2009). In May 1977, Airbus struck a deal with Thai Airways.

The big breakthrough came in 1978 when Borman ordered 23 A300B4s. This was the first

contract Airbus signed with a U.S. customer (2009). After this success, a series of orders

followed which confirmed Airbus as a serious contender in the aircraft manufacturing industry.

Just 10 years after its official launch, Airbus had achieved 26 percent market share (2009).

In 2009 Airbus celebrated its 40-year anniversary. The company had been able to expand

its jetliner family, broaden its worldwide customer base and achieve innovative ways to remain a

market leader through its four-decade existence.

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The Airbus 330-200

In 1995 the A330-200 was launched. It was the newest member of the European aircraft

manufacturer’s twinjet family. The plane has a range of 12,500 km and can carry 253 passengers.

According to CNN, it is “extremely well-regarded as a medium to long-range airliner” (“A330-

200,” 2009). Today 600 A330-200’s are in service with 82 airlines worldwide, including Air

France. According to aviation expert Kieran Daly, the A330-200 is a “reliable, ultra-modern,

state-of-the-art airplane with an impeccable safety record” (2009).

The A330-200 has been part of the Air France fleet since December 2001 (“The A330-

220,” 2009). Today, the airline has 15 of these aircrafts which seat 219 passengers (40 business

and 179 economy) and 11 flight attendants. It is piloted by two to three flight deck crew

members and usually has a cabin crew of nine flight attendants (2009). Fitted with two General

Electric CF6-80E1A3 engines, it has a crusing altitude of 10,700 meters (2009).

The aircraft that was lost in the Atlantic Ocean was a four-year-old A330-200. It had

flown 18,870 hours in its lifetime (2009). The particular flight had a flight deck crew made up of

three pilots and a cabin crew of nine flight attendants.

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 V. Best Practices in Airline Crisis Management

According to Hedi Hichri, an account director for Fleishman-Hillard France, “most crises

go through three phases: emotion, controversy and reason” (Hirichi, 2009). While there is not

one best way to handle an airline crash, airlines can take proper steps to handle the situation in

the most effective way and maintain relationships with families, victims, government and the

media. In an article published in the Asian Journal of Communications about airline safety and

crisis communications, Haruata and Hallahan write,

“...providing accurate and timely information about the triggering event, and the
organization’s response to it, are key elements in most crisis communication
plans. Moreover, an underlying concern of many organizations centers [sic] upon
impression management, i.e. how people and organizations act to present
themselves in ways that garner the most favorable [sic] response from others.
Crisis managers strive to limit the potential damage to the reputation and prestige
of an organization (‘damage control’). The assumption is that organizations can
contain the impact of an unexpected disaster (Haruata & Hallahan, 2003).”

According to the article “United Airlines’ and American Airlines’ Online Crisis

Communications Following the September 11 Terrorist Attacks,” the key steps of a crisis

response include the following:

“...provide instructing communication by giving facts, state how their publics

should take action, and provide information regarding how the problem is being
corrected. Additionally, they [should] offer adjusting communication through a
series of condolence messages and links to relief organizations before
emphasizing normal operations (Greer & Moreland, 2003).”

According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), media relations after an

airline accident should cover all bases, including having consistent site security policies;

avoiding speculation about the cause of the accident; referring all media questions about the
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accident investigation to the NTSB; and retaining the responsibility for releasing the victims’

names to local authorities. Although the NTSB covers mainly crashes on American soil, its

officials still have strong communications suggestions that any airline, domestic or international,

should follow.

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 VI. Timelines

May 31, 20093

7:03 p.m. Brazilian local time (12:03 a.m. French local time): Air France says the plane takes

off from Rio de Janerio (“Air France flight 447,” 2009).

7:30 p.m. Brazilian local time: Brazilian Air Force and the French Accident Investigation

Bureau for Civil Aviation (BEA) says the plane takes off from Rio de Janerio (2009).4

8:19 p.m. Brazilian local time: AF 447 contacts air controllers in Brazil (Wise, 2009).

9:30 p.m. Brazilian local time: AF 447 passes over the city of Natal, Brazil (2009).

10:30 p.m. Brazilian local time: Air France says plane has lost contact with Brazil air traffic

control (“Air France flight 447,” 2009).

10:33 p.m. Brazilian local time: Brazilian Air Force says plane has lost contact with air traffic

control (2009).5

10:48 p.m. Brazilian local time: Brazilian Air Force says last radar contact with Brazil

indicated the plane was flying normally (2009).

                                                                                                                         
3
 On  this  day  and  time,  the  time  difference  between  Brazil  and  France  was  five  hours  (“Time  
zone  converter,”  2009)  
4
 According  to  an  article  on  CBS  News,  there  was  a  discrepancy  between  the  take  off  time  of  the  
flight.  Air  France  says  the  plane  took  off  at  7:03  p.m.,  while  the  Brazilian  Air  Force  claims  the  
plane  took  off  at  7:30  p.m.  
5
 Once  again,  there  is  discrepancy  between  the  time  of  the  last  contact  with  the  plane.  
According  to  CBS  News,  Air  France  claims  that  air  traffic  control  lost  contact  at  10:30  p.m.,  while  
the  Brazilian  Air  Force  says  it  was  at  10:33  p.m.  

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11:00 p.m. Brazilian local time: Air France says plane entered zone of storms and high

turbulence (2009).

11:10 p.m. Brazilian local time: Flight control computer receives unreliable sensor data. The

autopilot disconnects in response (Wise, 2009).

11:11-11:12 p.m. Brazilian local time: Speed-limit settings shut down, and the safeguards that

help prevent rudder damage to the plane now fail (2009).

11:14 p.m. Brazilian local time: Air France receives automatic message indicating electrical

circuit malfunction (“Air France flight 447,” 2009).

11:20 p.m. Brazilian local time: Brazilian Air Force says plane fails to make previously

scheduled radio contact with Brazil. Brazil notifies air traffic control in Dakar, Senegal (2009).

June 1, 2009

2-3 a.m. Brazilian local time: Air France says French military radar begins searching for plane

(2009).

2:30 a.m. Brazilian local time: Brazilian Air Force says it mounts search and rescue mission

using two planes (2009).

3:45 a.m. Brazilian local time (8:45 a.m. French local time): Air France informs the BEA of

the incident in accordance with proper incident procedure (“Managing incidents,” 2009).

4:30 a.m. Brazilian local time (9:30 a.m. French local time): Air France says it sets up crisis

center (“Air France flight 447,” 2009).

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6:15 a.m. Brazilian local time (11:15 French local time): Plane is scheduled to arrive in Paris,

according to Air France (“Air France flight 447,” 2009).

11:31 a.m. French local time (6:31 a.m. Brazilian local time): Air France announces the

following: “Air France regrets to announce that it has lost contact with flight AF 447 from Rio

de Janeiro to Paris-Charles de Gaulle, expected to arrive this morning at 11:15 local time (“First

press release,” 2009).

12:00 p.m. French local time: Air France toll-free number becomes operational and volunteers

take calls (“Press release N° 2,” 2009).

1:59 p.m. French local time: Air France reports that it has sent all of the information it has

regarding the flight to the BEA and to Airbus (“Managing incidents, 2009).

4:13 p.m. French local time: Air France releases a list of nationalities on board, and makes

counseling and a toll-free number for information available. The press release states that 216

passengers of 33 nationalities and 12 crew members died (“Press release N° 5,” 2009).

June 2, 2009

Air France sends a message to the press asking “all journalists, and in particular those from the

audio and visual media, to respect the privacy of the relatives currently staying in hotels at Paris-

Charles de Gaulle” (“Memo to the press,” 2009). Air France also issues the backgrounds of the

crew members (“Press release N° 7,” 2009).

June 5, 2009

22  

 
Air France announces it will rename and redesignate the route of the flight coming from Rio de

Janeiro to Paris from 447 to 445 (“Air France to give,” 2009).

June 6, 2009

First bodies and some airplane parts are found (“Maybe there’s a better,” 2009).

June 9, 2009

More bodies are found throughout this week. In addition, investigators find part of the tail from

the flight, which had Air France’s red, white and blue colors on it (“More bodies and plane,”

2009).

Throughout the month of June:

Though the search continued, discrepancies arise regarding whether the black boxes were found.

Debris and bodies are found throughout the month, and families are consoled but did not feel that

they had the full sympathy of Air France and the French government (Charlton, 2009).

June 29, 2009

Brazil calls off the search for the flight’s victims and wreckage. By this date, Brazilian officials

say they have recovered 51 of the 228 bodies. They tell reporters that the cause of the crash may

never be known since the majority of the debris lies on the bottom of the ocean (“Brazil calls

off,” 2009).

Until July 10, 2009

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Investigators continue searching for clues in the black boxes, cockpit and flight data voice

recorder on board each flight (Clark & Wald, 2009).

July 15, 2009

Wreckage from the flight is sent to France for investigation ("Air France wreckage," 2009).

July 31, 2009

Airbus announces it will fund search efforts in the Atlantic Ocean to look for parts of the plane

("Airbus will fund," 2009).

August 20, 2009

French investigators announce they have ended their search for the flight ("No sign of Air

France," 2009).

October 26, 2009

Air France releases a private memo to its employees warning its pilots to “follow safety

procedures more closely and to stop criticizing the carrier.” Pilot unions say that the memo

“underscore[d] growing tensions within the airline,” and “highlights how pilots have lost

confidence in management” (Gauthier-Villars & Michaels, 2009).

November 9, 2009

A tribute for victims of AF 447 is held by Air France in Rio de Janeiro at Penhasco Dois Irmaos

Park (“Contact with relatives,” 2009).

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 VII. Air France/Organizational Primary Responses

Below is a dissection of Air France’s response to the crash of AF 447 crash in terms of

family, employees, the media and government. In the discussion of Air France’s response to both

the Brazilian and French governments, the focus rests on what Air France communicated to each

public. The following responses are attributed to French, American and world media, including:

Agence France Presse- English, The Connexion, The New York Times, CBS News and

EuroNews.

Family

From the onset of the crash on the night of May 31 and on the morning of June 1, 2009,

Air France reached out to victims’ families in an effort to console them through the tragedy. Air

France was in touch with nearly 2,100 relatives and friends of victims during this crisis (“Contact

with relatives,” 2009). A toll-free number was set up to handle calls 24/7 and was in place until

all families had been contacted (2009). At a particular gate, the organization set up a crisis center

area to comfort the relatives. A priest was present to console the relatives as well (McNeil &

Negroni, 2009). Air France CEO Pierre-Henri Gourgeon issued a statement right after the crash

that said: “we would like to say to the relatives of the victims that we are totally with them and

will make every effort to help them” (2009). He also made the assertion that “we are without a

doubt faced with an aviation catastrophe. The entire company is thinking of the families and

shares their pain” (Jourdain, 2009). The airline flew the victims’ families to Paris Charle de

Gaulle International Airport, where AF 447 was expected to land, with Air France covering all

expenses including hotel if needed. The airline also created a memorandum on its Web site that

25  

 
expressed condolences to the families and friends of all victims, passengers and crew members

(2009).

The airline neglected to provide any information to victims’ families the day of the crash,

according to a victim’s brother identified as “Bernard,” who claims Air France had no

information to offer him. According to The New York Times, it is proven that the airline did not

supply a list of passengers and crew member’s names as of June 3. Victims’ families around the

world had already begun to talk, whether they were consoled in Paris or not. According, to CBS

News, Air France did not come out and say if there were survivors or not and instead left it to

French President Nicholas Sarkozy to address that situation (“France, Brazil scour,” 2009).

According to a quote from a lawyer in a French wire report, Agence France Presse,

“what the families want is just some legitimate answers to their legitimate questions, such as: the

plane sent out its last message at 04:10 a.m. and yet no one wondered until 06:30 a.m. why there

was no news of the crew. Why is that?” (“Air France crash probe,” 2009). By July, the families

wanted more information from the airline that they were not receiving, and so they continued to

probe for and demand answers through a letter addressed to the CEO Gourgeon on behalf of an

association of families (Jourdain, 2009). Air France and CEO Gourgeon felt that “their request

for information and transparency are legitimate and pressing, whereas the circumstance of the

accident are slowing down the progression of the inquiry and Air France does not have access to

all the information which is being collected and centralized by the French and Brazilian

Authorities” (“Contact with relatives,” 2009).

Air France published on its Web site that, “Without waiting for the conclusion of the

inquiry and in line with current international legislation, Air France’s insurers have provided
26  

 
relatives with an advance of 17,600 Euros [26,502 USD] per victim. This advance is without

counterparty and does not in any way interfere with the rights of beneficiaries to receive

compensation or bring any court action they feel needed” (“Compensation for relatives, 2009).

In addition, the family of a Texan couple who passed away on the flight sued the airline

and Airbus for negligence, according to The New York Times and Agence France Presse reports.

The family claimed “the airline and the plane’s various manufacturers knew the aircraft had

defective parts that could have caused the accident” (“US families sue,” 2009). Air France did

not publically comment on this.

According to Air France, as of June 1, 228 were confirmed dead. There were 33

nationalities on board. The largest nationalities were made up of 61 French, 58 Brazilian and 26

German (“Press release N° 5, 2009).

Employees

Air France employees suffered much anguish after the crash of AF 447. Pilots especially

were concerned about the possible cause of the crash, in particular, not-yet-updated pitot tubes

that detect air speeds. According to The New York Times, an Air France pilot, Eric Tahon, was

quoted saying: “we are trained to deal with multiple failures of the plane...We are convinced that

without the breakdown of the pitot tubes, Air France 447 that day would have set down at

[Paris’] Roissy [airport]” (Pilots question airspeed,” 2009). The pilots said they felt “angry about

what they see as an attempt to pin the crash on pilot error” (2009). However, Air France did not

believe the pitot tubes to be the cause, and disseminated this statement to the public.

27  

 
 According to Agence France Presse, “Air France warned pilots in November about ‘a

significant number of incidents’ linked to speed monitors on Airbus A330 jets like the one that

crashed last week…for one of [the pilots], the memo showed that Air France knew from

November 2008 the problems that seem to explain the catastrophe of AF 447” (“Air France

warned,” 2009). Though Air France warned pilots of these parts, Air France had not yet updated

them. As of June 11, CEO Gourgeon told pilots’ unions that the airline was replacing these parts

on all A330 and A340 jets, but with no timeline regarding the project’s completion (“Air France

scrambles,” 2009).

In July, the airline’s work absences steadily increased. According to an article in The

Connexion, the newspaper for English speakers in France, “unions blame morale at the company

following the crash of fight AF 447…a union official told the newspaper Le Figaro: ‘morale is

really low since the accident and these figures reflect the worries of some of the staff’...however

an Air France spokesman said the increase was due to ‘ordinary ups and downs’” (“Work

absences up,” 2009).

In October, a memo was sent to all employees warning pilots to “follow safety

procedures more closely and to stop criticizing the carrier” (Gauther-Villars & Michaels, 2009).

Although the memo said the cause of the crash remains unknown, many pilots took offense to

the memo and said it was putting the blame on them. Many employees also said that they felt the

memo underscored tension currently growing within the airline.

Besides the replacement of pitot tubes and training pilots in September about the

functions of these parts, there was not much else reported on how Air France as an organization

28  

 
had communicated to its employees, especially after the crash in which 12 crew members had

passed.

Media

Following a plane crash there is a dramatic increase in media coverage of an airline.

Below is a Google Trend graph that shows the amount of media coverage a company is getting.

The spike labeled by B represents when the Air France Airbus went missing.

Several causes of the crash were circulating around the media. On June 1, Fracois

Brousse, Air France’s director of communications, was quoted in Agence France Presse saying

that “the most likely thing is that the plane was hit by lightning” and further, that “the airplane

was in a stormy area with strong turbulence, which provoked problems” (Jourdain, 2009).

However, on June 2 in The New York Times, an article reported a longtime Air France pilot

saying that “lightning alone is not enough to explain the loss of this plane” and that “turbulence

alone is not enough” (McNeil & Negroni, 2009). Meanwhile, CEO Gourgeon made the statement

that several factors had contributed to the crash of AF 447 (2009). CEO Gourgeon went on to say

in an article in Agence France Presse one week later that the pitot tubes or speed probe detectors,
29  

 
that Air France pilots deem were the cause; were, in fact, not the primary cause of the crash.

According to Agence France Presse, “Asked why Air France had not been more forthcoming

about concerns over the measuring devices on the Airbus A330, CEO Gourgeon answered:

‘Because I’m not convinced the probes were the cause of the accident.’ CEO Gourgeon told

reporters it was for the official French accident inquiry to make statements on the loss of flight

447” (“Air France not convinced,” 2009). This shows that there was a considerable amount of

likely and unlikely information disseminated about the cause of the crash through the media.

On the day of the crash, the only information disseminated to the media from Air France

was by another Air France administrator, a manager in Rio de Janeiro, who stated that the two

largest nationalities on board the flight were Brazilian and French (“France, Brazil scour,” 2009).

French and Brazilian Governments

Air France worked alongside French and Brazilian governments, investigators and

officials in order to determine the cause(s) of the crash and to recover bodies of victims.

According to an article in June on CBS News, “Air France said all elements of the investigation

‘will be fully and immediately taken into account by the airline’ and that it is continuing to

cooperate with investigators with ‘a commitment to total transparency with regard to the

investigators, its passengers and the general public’” (2009). According to CBS News on the day

of the crash, CEO Gourgeon was quoted saying that “what the French government is trying to

get is any information which could have been gathered by a satellite system of US” (2009). On

the Brazilian side, Air France communicated on June 1 “To Brazilian authorities the last

information they heard was that automated message reporting a technical problem before the

plane reached a monitoring station near the Cape Verde Islands” (2009).

30  

 
 VIII. Long-Term Responses

After a crisis, there are always reactions from publics. Some reactions may be immediate,

while others may ensue during the weeks and months following a crisis. The more long-term

issues that ensued during these months are discussed below.

Replacing parts

Following the crash of AF 447 media sources reported that a possible cause of the crash

was iced-over pitot tubes. A pilot’s union accused the French and European air safety bodies of

ignoring warnings about the faulty speed probes (“Air France scrambles,” 2009). There was a

belief among pilots at Air France that withouth the breakdown of the pitot tubes, AF 447 would

not have crashed (“Pilots question airspeed,” 2009). Though the French crash probes had yet to

find a link to the faulty airspeed sensors, as of June 12, 2009, CEO Gourgeon told reporters the

devices would be replaced on all A330 and A340 planes as a precaution (“Air France crash

probe,” 2009).

Training Employees

To ensure that pilots knew how to handle all kinds of malfunctions, including

malfunctioning pitot tubes, Air France took steps to give pilots further training. According to The

New York Times, Air France started a training program for pilots on how to manage pitot tubes

malfunctioning at high altitudes, that similar to altitudes that AF 447 experienced at the time of

the crash. Before the crash, simulator training for pitot tube malfunctions on take-off and landing

were the only trainings offered. This new training resulted in anger from some pilots, however,

as they viewed this as an attempt to blame the crash on them (“Pilots question airspeed,” 2009).

31  

 
Employee Morale Boost

Following the crash, there was controversy over whether or not employee morale had

dropped. According to a report in The Connexion on July 23, 2009, Five hundred Air France

planes took off in June without a full cabin crew on board. A union official told the newspaper

Le Figaro that, “morale is really low since the accident and these figures reflect the worries of

some of the staff” (“Work absences up,” 2009). An Air France spokesman on the other hand

said the increase was due to ordinary ups and downs.

A report in the Aviation Daily in September 2009 said that Air France was stepping up

efforts to generate 1,500 job reductions. The airline’s officials had previously said they were

looking to reduce the number of employees as a result of decline in passenger and cargo activity

(Sparaco, 2009).

Families

Since the crash, Air France has taken various measures to maintain contact with relatives

of passengers on board AF 447. To do this, Air France’s Web site states that it set up a

permanent AF 447 crisis center, which handles general coordination and specific cases. There is

a Web site exclusively dedicated to the families where regular information and updates are

available. Families living in the Paris region are looked after by a team working with the AF 447

crisis center and Air France states on its Web site that they intent to “fully assume its duty and

responsibility to the relatives of victims” ("Air France to give," 2009).

32  

 
 Despite these measures, Air France faced criticism from families after the crash. CBS

News states, “some families of French victims have accused Air France of a lack of sympathy

and of failing to provide them with timely information on the investigation into the cause of the

crash” (2009).

To date, Air France insurers have provided relatives with an advance of 17,600 euros per

victim (26,502 USD). Letters were sent to approximately 500 beneficiaries, and so far two-thirds

of the families have been paid (“Contact with relatives,” 2009).

33  

 
 IX. Current and Future State

Recent Explanations for the Cause of Crash AF 447

Over the months following the crash, experts in the aviation field have had time to think

about the crash and the implications on the aviation industry. In an article in Popular Mechanics,

Jeff Wise explores how AF 447 disappeared. According to the article, French investigators were

able to determine from the deformation of the wreckage “that the fuselage hit the water more or

less intact, belly first, at a high rate of vertical speed. Added to the ACARS messages and the

satellite weather data, the evidence began to conform to a possible scenario” (Wise, 2009).

According to Wise, 10 minutes after the last radio transmission the plane hit the first

small storm cell in the Intertropical Convergence Zone. Fifteen minutes later, the plane hit a

larger and faster growing system. Just minutes before its last ACARS transmission, the plane hit

a multicell storm, which was “buffeted by turbulence, near the heart of a strong thunderstorm,

the pitot tubes froze over” (2009). Due to a lack of reliable speed indicators, the airplane’s

computerized Flight Management System automatically disengaged the autopilot, which forced

the co-pilots to fly the plane manually (2009).

This was a problem because without autopilot, the co-pilots were left without envelope

protection restrictions. These restrictions are in place to keep pilots from making control inputs

that could overstress the aircraft (2009). Incorrect control inputs are very dangerous at high

altitudes, as the thin air demands that the plane fly faster to achieve the appropriate lift.

However, flying too fast “can create a phenomenon known as mach tuck, when supersonic shock

34  

 
waves along the wings shift the aircraft’s center of pressure and can make it pitch into an

uncontrollable nose-dive. Flying too slow can cause the plane to stall” (2009).

The article states the crew, disoriented by the storm and unsure of their speed and

encountering turbulence, could have easily taken the plane outside of the flight envelope (2009).

However, The pitot tubes were not said to be the only cause of the crash. Even if these

failed, they alone could not have brought down the plane. “'There is always a series of events,’

the FAA’s Pardee says. ‘That means there are multiple opportunities to intervene and break that

accident chain’” (2009).

The error chain for AF 447 included the co-pilots’ choice to fly too close to the

thunderstorm. Other pilots flying similar routes that evening had chosen to give the storms a

wider berth (2009). Though there are other aspects that may have led to the crash, without the

black boxes, those causes may never be found.

Though the cause of the crash will never be verified, the global aviation community has

taken steps to prevent a crash similar to AF 447. Within days, Air France replaced all the pitot

tubes on its Airbus planes with ones made by another company (2009). In July, Airbus advised

all other airlines to do the same and three months later, the FAA turned the recommendation into

a regulation (2009).

Another aspect that officials are working on are alternatives to using the black boxes as a

record of the cause of a crash. “It is feasible to create a system that could broadcast not only text

messages like ACARS but comprehensive data about the status of every aircraft, in real time”

(2009).

35  

 
Financial

According to the Air France-KLM press releases posted on its Web site, a document that

overviews the company’s financials as of July 31, 2009 stated that 2009-2010 revenues have so

far dropped 20.5% from 6.51 billion euros (9.80 billion USD) in 2008-2009 to 5.17 billion euros

(7.78 billion USD) from April to June 2009. Financials since June 2009 have not been released

yet. Out of the 5.17 billion euros of revenue so far, passengers accounted for 4.01 billion euros

(6.04 billion USD), a drop of 18.7% from 2008-2009 (“Air France-KLM publications,” 2009). It

is unknown what caused this drop, though the economic environment is stated as one of the

factors of this decrease in revenue.

As of November 19, Air France did report a net loss of 147 million euros (approximately

$221 million USD) due to cargo operations and fuel hedges (Hall, 2009). Compared to other

airlines such as British Airways and Lufthansa, Air France suffered worse losses than most

airlines of its kind. A Financial Times article quotes CEO Gourgeon, who said “the company’s

performance was improving after deep losses in the first quarter” and that it was “adapting more

rapidly than expected to the environment” (2009). He expects Air France-KLM to increase

profits by 500 million by March 2012, when the fiscal year ends (2009).

According to Finchannel.com, Air France-KLM issued 700 million euro (approximately

1 billion USD) worth of bonds as of October 14, 2009 (“Air France-KLM successfully

launches,” 2009). Investors reacted positively to this announcement, which shows their

confidence with the organization.

36  

 
Employees

According to the Hoovers, Inc. Air France-KLM company profile, employees numbered

107,000 during 2008-2009 (“Air France-KLM S.A.,” 2009). An announcement was made in

September which introduced a plan which would create an additional 1,500 jobs (“Air France to

offer,” 2009).

On the contrary, due to the recent revenue losses as of November 18, CEO Gourgeon said

Air France is “planning to cut 4,500 jobs in the year to March 2010, reducing its global

headcount to 105,000. It is planning to trim the workforce by a further 3 to 5 per cent by March

2011. The job losses would all be voluntary, it added” (Hall, 2009).

Passengers On Board Air France Today

As far as passenger activity on board Air France, passenger activity has decreased, and

therefore so has revenue. As of October 2009, in the most recent traffic press release posted on

the company’s Web site, passenger traffic amounted to 6.1 billion, which is a 5.3% drop from the

previous year. In the months prior, passenger traffic had fluctuated. Beginning in March 2009,

traffic declined by 9.4%; in April by 2.8%; in May by 8.1%; in June by 6.4%; in July by 3.3%; in

August by 2.9% and in September by 3.7%. It is unknown whether the crash was directly

connected these drops in passenger traffic. Other factors include travel, holidays and the

economic crisis as reasons of increase and decrease in passenger traffic over the past eight

months. Overall, compared to 2008-2009, passenger traffic volumes have diminished (“Air

France-KLM publications,” 2009).

37  

 
 Since the announcement of Air France-KLM’s revenue losses, another consequence is a

“reduction in cargo capacity…the airline will reduce its passenger capacity by a further 2% for

the coming winter season” (Pearson, 2009). This means that fewer passengers will be able to

board Air France flights so that the airline can become more financially stable in other areas.

The Airline Industry

Aside from the economic crisis and further airline revenue losses, increasing passenger

activity on airlines across the country and around the world has forced airlines to increase the

number of seats available on flights. According the USA Today, “the world’s airlines have 299.9

million seats available this month [October], or about 3 million more than October 2008”

(Mutzabaugh, 2009). While passengers are flying, several airlines are increasing costs in other

ways such as baggage and other fees. Some airlines are also merging in an effort to combine

aircrafts, destinations and employees.

38  

 
 X. Conclusion

The French announced the end of the search for AF 447 on August 20, 2009. In

particular, the search teams stopped the search for the black boxes that disappeared somewhere

in the Atlantic with the rest of the plane. These black boxes could have indicated the cause,

though they were unable to be found. For the most part, the media has discontinued coverage of

the search and possible causes of the crash. Since the search was completed, most families have

been paid reparations, and employees have continued to board passengers on Air France flights

around the world (“French end flight,” 2009).

39  

 
 Appendices

Appendix I Air France’s First Press Release

Appendix II Air France’s Second Press Release

Appendix III Air France’s Third Press Release

Appendix IV Air France’s Fourth Press Release

Appendix V Air France’s Fifth Press Release

Appendix VI Air France’s Sixth Press Release

Appendix VII Air France’s Seventh Press Release

Appendix VIII Memo To Press

Appendix IX Air France’s Eighth Press Release

40  

 
 Appendix I

First Press Release

Air France regrets to announce that it has lost contact with flight AF 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris-
Charles de Gaulle, expected to arrive this morning at 11:15 local time.
The flight left Rio on 31 May at 7pm local time.
216 passengers are on board.
There are 12 crew members on board: 3 pilots and 9 cabin crew.
The following toll-free number is available in France: 0800 800 812,
and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 outside France.
Air France fully shares the anxiety and distress of the families of the passengers concerned. The families
are been taken care of in a specially reserved area at Paris-Charles de Gaulle 2 airport.

41  

 
 Appendix II

Second Press Release – Paris, June 1, 2009 – 13:39 local time

Air France regrets to confirm the disappearance of flight AF 447 flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris-
Charles de Gaulle, scheduled to arrive at 11:10am local time today, as announced to the press by Air
France CEO, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon.

The Airbus A330-200, registration F-GZCP, left Rio on 31 May at 7:03pm local time (12:03am in Paris).

The aircraft hit a zone of stormy weather with strong turbulence at 2am this morning (universal time), i.e.
4am in Paris. An automatic message was received from the aircraft at 2:14am (4 :14am in Paris)
indicating a failure in the electric circuit a long way from the coast.

The Brazilian, African, Spanish and French air traffic control centres all tried to make contact with flight AF
447 but to no avail. The French military air traffic control centre tried to detect the aircraft but did not
succeed.

216 passengers were on board: 126 men, 82 women, 7 children and one infant.

There were 12 flight crew members: 3 pilots and 9 flight attendants.

The flight captain had a record of 11,000 flight hours and had already flown 1,700 hours on Airbus
A330/A340s.

Of the two first officers, one had flown 3,000 flight hours (800 of which on the Airbus A330/A340) and the
other 6,600 (2,600 on the Airbus A330/A340).

The aircraft was powered by General Electric CF6-80E engines.

The aircraft had totalled 18,870 flight hours and went into service on 18 April 2005.
Its last maintenance check in the hangar took place on 16 April 2009.

Air France fully shares the anxiety and distress of the families concerned. The families are being taken
care of in a specially reserved area of Paris-Charles de Gaulle Terminal 2.

A toll-free number has been opened at 0800 800 812 for calls from France,
and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from outside France.
NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for families and close relatives.

42  

 
 Appendix III

Third Press Release – Paris, June 1, 2009 – 13:59 local time

Air France has sent all the information in its possession on the disappearance of flight AF 447 operating
the Rio de Janeiro – Paris-Charles de Gaulle route to the French Accident Investigation Bureau for civil
aviation (BEA), the French organization in charge of technical investigations into civil aviation incidents
and accidents, and to the aircraft manufacturer Airbus. Air France is in permanent contact with the BEA
and Airbus.

The Airbus A330-200 aircraft, registration F-GZCP, left Rio on 31 May at 7:03pm local time (12:03am in
Paris). The aircraft hit a zone of stormy weather with strong turbulence at 2am this morning (universal
time), i.e. 4am in Paris. An automatic message was received from the aircraft at 2:14am (4:14am in Paris)
indicating a failure in the electric circuit in an area a long way off the coast.

The aircraft was powered with General Electric CF6-80E engines.

The aircraft had totalled 18,870 flight hours and went into service on 18 April 2005.
Its last maintenance check in the hangar took place on 16 April 2009.

Air France shares the anxiety and distress of the families concerned. The families are being taken care
of in a specially reserved area of Paris-Charles de Gaulle Terminal 2.

A toll-free number has been opened at 0800 800 812 in France,

at 0800 881 20 20 in Brazil
and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from outside France.
NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for families and close relatives.

43  

 
 Appendix IV

Fourth Press Release – Paris, June 1, 2009 – 14:44 local time

Air France expresses its deepest sympathy to the relatives and friends of the passengers and crew who
were on board AF flight 447 on 31 May 2009, which disappeared somewhere between Rio de Janeiro
and Paris-Charles de Gaulle.

Air France is doing its utmost to provide support to relatives and friends: counselling with physicians and
psychologists as well as specially trained Air France volunteers has been set up at the airports of Paris-
Charles de Gaulle 2 and Rio de Janeiro.

Air France has also established a special toll-free number for the attention of relatives and friends of
passengers who may have been on board. They can use this number to obtain information on whether or
not a member of their family or friends was on board.

Phone number reserved for relatives and friends

0800 800 812 in France,

0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

44  

 
 Appendix V

Fifth Press Release – Paris, June 1, 2009 – 18:13 local time

Air France is now able to confirm the nationalities of the passengers who were on board flight AF 447 on
31 May 2009, which disappeared between Rio de Janeiro and Paris-Charles de Gaulle. This list of
nationalities is based on the information provided by the Brazilian Authorities.

2 American
1 Argentinian
1 Austrian
1 Belgian
58 Brazilian
5 British
1 Canadian
9 Chinese
1 Croatian
1 Danish
1 Dutch
1 Estonian
1 Filipino
61 French
1 Gabonese
26 German
4 Hungarian
3 Irish
1 Icelandic
9 Italian
1 South Korean
3 Lebanese
3 Moroccan
3 Norwegian
2 Polish
1 Romanian
1 Russian
3 Slovakian
1 South African
2 Spanish
1 Swedish
6 Swiss
1 Turkish
Air France expresses its deepest sympathy to the relatives and friends of the passengers and crew who

45  

 
were on board this flight.

Air France is doing its utmost to provide support to relatives and friends: counselling with physicians and
psychologists as well as specially trained Air France volunteers has been set up at the airports of Paris-
Charles de Gaulle 2 and Rio de Janeiro.

Air France has also established a special toll-free number for the attention of relatives and friends of
passengers who may have been on board. They can use this number to obtain information on whether or
not a member of their family or friends was on board.

Phone number reserved for relatives and friends

0800 800 812 in France,

0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,

and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

46  

 
 Appendix VI

Sixth Press Release – Paris, June 1, 2009 – 20:30 local time

Air France is doing its utmost to provide support for relatives and friends.

Medical and psychological assistance involving 15 specialist physicians has been set up at Paris-Charles
de Gaulle 2 and Rio de Janeiro airports.

Some one hundred voluntary members of Air France staff are backing up the teams in Paris-Charles de
Gaulle and Rio de Janeiro.

Air France has also established a special toll-free number for the relatives and friends of passengers.

Phone numbers reserved for relatives and friends

0800 800 812 in France,

0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

47  

 
 Appendix VII

Seventh Press Release – Paris, June 2, 2009 – 5:38 local time

Flight deck crew

Flight Captain:

· French

· 58 years old

· Entered Air France in 1988

· Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in February 2007

· 11,000 flight hours, including 1,700 on Airbus A330/A340

2 co-pilots:

· French

· 37 and 32 years old

· Entered Air France in 1999 and 2004

· Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in April 2002 and June 2008

· 6,600 flight hours, including 2,600 on Airbus A330/A340

· 3,000 flight hours, including 800 on Airbus A330/A340

Cabin crew

Chief purser:

· French

· 49 years old

· Entered Air France in 1985

2 pursers:

· French

· 54 and 46 years old

· Entered Air France in 1981 and 1989

6 stewards and stewardesses:

· 5 French and 1 Brazilian

· Between 24 and 44 years old

48  

 
· Entered Air France in 1996 and 2007

Phone numbers reserved for families and friends

0800 800 812 in France,
0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.
NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

49  

 
 Appendix VIII

Memo To Press – Paris, June 2, 2009 – 7:25 local time

Air France asks all journalists, and in particular those from the audio visual media, to respect the privacy
of the relatives currently staying in hotels at Paris-Charles de Gaulle. Thank you for your cooperation.

50  

 
 Appendix IX

Eighth Press Release – Paris, June 2, 2009 – 8:12 local time

Overall, 4,000 Air France staff members are part of the voluntary program [sic] to help in case of a crisis.

These volunteers have four main tasks: contact with relatives and friends, logistical assistance, back-up
at airports and telephone assistance.

This programme was launched in November 1998 by the Chairman of Air France.

Air France offers these volunteers three one-day training modules:

- Theory (explaining what it means to be a volunteer and the commitments involved etc.) and
practical training with a psychiatrist,

- Theoretical and practical courses to train leaders whose role is to lead a group of volunteers
and liaise with the Air France crisis centre,

- Training on how to handle telephone calls when the Air France toll-free number is available.

Yesterday, as soon as the news of flight AF 447 was announced, around one hundred volunteers were
contacted to provide back-up to Air France teams in Paris and Rio. Others will be taking over later.

51  

 
 References

(2009). A bold vision. Airbus. Retrieved from

http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/company-evolution/early-days/

(31 July 2009). Airbus will fund third search for crash debris. CNN. Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/07/31/airbus.speed.search/index.html?iref=all
search

(2009). Air France flight 447: timeline. CBS News. Retrieved from
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/01/in_depth_world/main5055175.shtml

(Fiscal Year 2009-2010). Air France-KLM Publications. Air France. Retrieved from
http://www.airfranceklm-finance.com/financial-publications.html

(2009). Air France-KLM S.A. Hoovers Inc. Retrieved from

http://www.hoovers.com/company/Air_France-KLM_SA/rytkcxi-1.html

(15 October 2009). Air France-KLM successfully launches €700 million seven-year bonds.
Air France. Retrieved from
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