Internal UAW Appeals

A Practice Manual For Members

Ellis Boal
9330 Boyne City Road
Charlevoix, MI, 49720
ellisboal@voyager.net

Release 23

June 12, 2010

Dates of earlier releases.

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This manual has received no collaboration, endorsement,

or assistance from the UAW, from any of its administrative
arms or subordinate bodies, or from the IEB, CAC, or PRB.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction
 The UAW
Disclosure
Et cetera

II. Definitions and abbreviations

III. Sources
Constitution, bylaws
Contracts
Constitutional changes and retroactivity
Presidential intepretations
PRB decisions
Convention debates
CAC and IEB decisions
Union past practices
Pamphlets, administrative letters, Solidarity
Websites
Clarity
Procedural advice
Courts and NLRB
Academic writing

IV. Internal law / external law

Internal/external
In the UAW
 V. What Can Be Appealed
Administratorships
Agency
Appealability, mootness, parties, standing
Appointed reps, jointness
Bargaining, strikes, contract ratifications
Bargaining
Interest arbitration
Strike authorization
Strikes, lockouts
Ratification
Ratification procedures
Conventions
Discrimination
Discrimination policy and apparatus
Discrimination by management
Discrimination by a member of the
local
Discrimination by the local
PRB non-grievance discrimination
precedents
Ethical practices codes, free speech in the
union
EPC coverage
 EPC procedure
EPC substantively different?
EPC generally
Exhaustion of remedies
Grievances generally
Stick with the union
Do your homework
The grievance procedure
A few arbitration rules
What union reps do
External-law grievances
Individual/group/policy grievances
The appellee and the time limit in a
grievance appeal
Union role reversal in a grievance
appeal
What if you win a grievance appeal?
Grievances rationally
Pre-1980
Today
Grievances specifically
Absenteeism
After-acquired evidence
Allocation of settlement
 Area hire
Backpay
"Capital offense" Casino
employers Circumstantial
evidence Compromising a
grievance Contracting out
Credibility
Criminal conduct
Denial of union representation
Disability, medical restrictions,
fitness for duty
Disagreement within management
Discrimination, nepotism, disparate
treatment
Drugs or alcohol
Drug-testing
Email
Entrapment
Failure to perform job, efficiency,
safety, work rules
Fighting, threats, shoving, horseplay
Free speech at work
Grievance remedies
 High-seniority members
Incarceration
Job assignment and duties
Jointness, grievability
Last-chance agreements
Layoff
Lying to management
Management Rights
Medical excuse
"Obey now, grieve later,"
insubordination
Overtime
Past practices
Penalty, progressive discipline
Plant closings, work transfer, sale of
company
Pornography at work
Probationary and at-will employees
Profit sharing
Promotions
Public Employers
Quit versus discharge
Retirees
Seniority, "dividing scarcity"
 Sexual/racial harassment
Slander by company
Skilled trades
Sleeping on the job
Subcontracting
Subpoena
Technology, assignment of work
Theft
Timeliness of grievance-processing
Unauthorized strike or slowdown
Unemployment benefits
Voluntary retirement
Wages
Wasting time, leaving work area
Working while on leave
Local elections
General
Eligibility and nominations
Election standards
Interim elections
Election committee
Campaigning
Election day
Protests
 Local expenses
Local meetings
Local newspapers
Local officers, stewards, committeepersons
Locals unions, subordinate and other bodies
Local unions, subordinate bodies
Non-subordinate bodies,
administrative arms
Membership, dues
Active members
Retirees
Organizing
Recall of stewards, committeepersons
Redistricting
Remedies, damages
Damages generally
Damages in grievance appeals
Damages in non-grievance appeals
Timeliness of damage demand
Remedies, generally
Removal
Grievance appeals
Charges and trials
Elections
 Miscellaneous
Removal from office
Saturn
Trials
General
Constitutional provisions
Trial practice
Time limits and specificity
Sufficiency of charges
Trial
Appeals
Unbecoming conduct
Vagueness
Unbecoming
Not unbecoming

VI. Starting an appeal, timeliness

General
Form and delivery of appeal
Timeliness

VII. Processing an appeal at the local level

Burden of proof
Optional local non-membership disposition
 The membership vote
Locally-reinstated grievances

VIII. Processing an appeal at the IEB

IEB functioning
Appealability chart
Procedure before the IEB
Fact-finding and decisions of the president
and IEB
IEB constitutional interpretations

IX. The PRB or CAC?

CAC
PRB
Rationality of grievance dispositions
Official collective bargaining policy
Referral of appeal from PRB to CAC
Which should you choose?

X. Processing an appeal at the PRB

Establishment, composition, consistency
PRB jurisdiction
PRB procedure
New evidence, oral argument
Affirming IEB on different grounds
 Decisions and remedies
Constitutional interpretations
Statistics
The former executive director

XI. Processing an appeal at the CAC

XII. Addresses

XIII. Downloadable PRB Materials

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I. INTRODUCTION

Contents of This Section

The UAW || Disclosure || Et

cetera

The UAW
 CAC, or
Three facts distinguish the UAW, as far as this
PRB. However in handling
manual is concerned. charges or appeals their
members and staff are
First, it holds its officers to high ethical standards, free to use it or quote
higher standards than other unions, or from it with or without
attribution.
corporations, require of their own.
People considering joining
In 1992 in San Diego, the long-serving chairman the UAW are also
welcome to read it.
of the Public Review Board ("PRB") addressed the
convention, the UAW's highest body, reporting I do not advertise the
recent PRB activities. He observed: manual and it carries no
advertising.
[T]he UAW is the only major labor union in America to entrust
I do not police the
the ultimate guardianship of the democratic rights of its
following. But I
members and subordinate bodies to a group of independent
discourage visits, use,
outsiders. That is an enormous grant of powepowe r which no
and quotations from the
other organization outside the UAW, to any significant degree,
manual by anyone else,
whether in labor or out of labor, has ever tried to do.
particularly (1)
... employers, their agents,
and counsel, (2)
The ultimate guarantor of democracy in any institution is not employees represented
the people who run it, but the legal structures which form the by the UAW who have
foundations upon which the institution is constructed. I think
you can be extremely proud of the fact that your institutions
are the best in the United States, or perhaps in the world.

Proceedings, 30th constitutional convention (1992), pp

234-37 (report of PRB chairman).

As to corporations, the PRB compared them in one

Notice

This manual is for the use of members of the UAW

in matters internal to it. It is not authorized by the UAW, IEB,
of its early decisions. In 1957 Russell White judges, and NLRB or DOL
or other government
resigned as president of UAW Local 652 in order to officials.
accept an appointment as Michigan's labor
If you are not with the
commissioner. But then the Michigan Senate
UAW, IEB, CAC, or PRB
rejected the appointment. Brother White said he and insist on reading it,
had the right to go back to his office in the local; using it, or quoting it,
the local had never formally accepted his please inform your
collaborators and readers
resignation. The International Executive Board of the source, recite this
("IEB") said that in fairness and justice resuming notice prominently, and
the presidency should be allowed. Disagreeing, the explain that I have
refused permission.
PRB pointed to White's public statements to the
effect that he had broken ties to the union: I ask that you not print
out the whole manual or
[T]o permit White to take a public posture of severance of sections of it, except that
Union connections while at the same time privately purporting printing one or two pages
to continue to hold the office of Local president is inconsistent for use in a specific
with the high ethical standards of the Union. We are, ofre, of appeal is ok.
course, cognizant of the pattern that has come to exist in our
society of business executives resigning to go into If you attribute a quote,
governmental service, and, in so doing, theoretically severing note the date as I update
their connections with their former employer, only to return
after such service to their old positions.... But we cannot
condone a practice simply because it has become
conventional through repetition.

Egres, 1 PRB 50, 55, 62 (1959);

see also EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 26 (1980)
(PRB imposes no higher standard than the UAW would
impose on itself),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (PRB imposes no
higher standard than the UAW would impose on itself),

resigned or elected not to join, and (3) neutrals including

arbitrators, umpires, mediators, academics, teachers including
labor studies teachers, students, reporters, charities, courts,
 Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 227-28, 232 (1984) (in charging A work of this scope by
expenses to the union members should be guided by one person with no editor
"informed judgment applying [the constitutional contains errors large and
requirements] with an eye to what the UAW is all small. The CAC, IEB, or
about"), PRB may prove me wrong
Page v Local 961, 6 PRB 288, 294 (1991) (PRB not so in some future decision.
naive as to expect that a union election campaign will be If you are researching a
conducted on a higher level than a US presidential one), particular issue, please
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case obtain copies of cited
1476 II (4/12/05), pp 19-23 (employee-members must documents from the UAW
be given notice of adverse personnel actions, and a and read them, to verify
chance to try to convince the decisionmaker to change assertions I have made.
the decision and to appeal if necessary), Most PRB decisions since
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1634 (1/26/10), p 17 ("Most of the beginning of 2004
us have experienced the difficulty and frustration of are downloadable below.
making complex decisions with the various organizations
If willing, please call
to which we belong. As citizens, we might even
errors, omissions, unclear
occasionally indulge in a belief that we could solve our
phrasing, or updated
nation's problems if only we could exercise unfettered
information to my
control over the decision making process. History
attention, and I will try to
informs us, however, that dictatorships seldom operate
correct them.
in the best interest of the governed, whatever the
intentions of the dictators."). If you contact me about
this manual, I will ask
Second, the UAW is united in militancy and you to identify yourself,
solidarity. The constitution points out the your location, and your
authoritarian structure of work and its
contradiction to the democratic heritage members
have as citizens. The UAW is an industrial union. It
bands employees together so their collective
strength can get a modicum of bargaining parity
and counter the company's might. On a larger

the manual periodically, and a later visitor might find the

passage changed.
scale, the collective strength of all members by after the above I reserve.

whomever employed enhances the power even Searching

more.
Being online, this manual
is self-indexing.
Preamble (structure of work and authoritarian workplace);
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 379 (1966) ("The laws which a If you have a particular
union adopts are, like any other laws, binding upon those keyword or case name in
who comprise its society.... [E]ffective collective efforts mind -- say the word
depend for their success upon the degree of adherence by all "amalgamated" or a PRB
who are involved.... Labor then must have a means of case called the "Badura"
enforcing its laws upon those who wowho wo uld disobey them case or PRB decision
for, if it cannot, then the sources of its strength are "1550" or your own last
undermined."), name -- you can find all
Kizelowicz, 1 PRB 705, 707 (1971) (historically UAW as mentions of it through
industrial union has presented one contract for production the "search" or "edit"
and skilled together), menu at the top of your
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 102, 113 (1974) (UAW evolved as an browser.
industrial union in auto, pursuant to egalitarian principles that
all employees would be part of a single bargaining unit in a I have also cross-
single organization), referenced it. The table of
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 135, 146 (1974) (UAW evolved as contents is linked to the
an industrial union in auto, pursuant to egalitarian principles main text, throughout
that all employees would be part of a single bargaining unit in which there are also links
a single organization), to off- and on-site
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251, 259 (1975) (quoting the IEB information.
asserting the local union is "the unit of structure which is the
foundation of mutual assistance in collective bargaining -EB
matters and in other activities in which the union engages"),
Schriber v Local 699, 5 PRB 115, 118 (1987) ("Given the
historic adversarial nature of that labor-management
relationship [the independence of trade unions in North
America], support by management for a candidate for Union
office is usually equated to the sting of a viper."),
Hammersmith v GM Department, 6 PRB 439, 443 (1992)

local union.

Any rights remaining

 (collective strength of all UAW members by whomever employed enhances bargaining
power),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 220 (1996), quoting from Alspach v Local 977, 1 PRB
300 305 (1963) ("trust relationship ... is created when an employee surrenders to a
labor union his individual right in dealing with his employer concerning the terms and
conditions of his employment.... [T]he very purpose[] for which a labor union exists [is]
the protection of the workers who comprise it."),
Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391 (2002) (maximization of voter participation, so
as to more accurately reflect the prefpref erences of the electorate, is a union
responsibility);
compare Franks v UAW, PRB Case 1520 (12/20/05) p 13 ("[A]ssumptions that might be
valid about an employee's knowledge of her dues obligation in the context of the
automobile industry are not necessarily appropriate in the context of a Casino."),
Pearson v Local 140 PRB Case 1534 (2/15/06), pp 7-8 ("[Barring retir("[Barring retir ees
from representing active members in collective bargaining] is a good rule. Retired
members are not as accountable to the current Union membership as active ones.
They may be
less accessible. They may also be more prone to represent the interests of other retired
members instaead of current members. All of these factors may diminish the ability of
the Union to react to the changing nature of the work place. They may also expose the
Union to legal liability...."),
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), pp 6-8 (historic UAW promises,
proclamations, and success in preventing cutbacks on retiree health care benefits
cannot be twisted into a requirement that the union disregard economic reality and the
long-term best interests of its retired membership, when modification of retiree benefits
may be the best hope for restoring economic viability to the company that provides the
benefits),
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07) (in decision discussed more fully
elsewhere, PRB declines to address argument premised on union's obligation to
maximize membership participation).

When a strike is necessary, it is the equivalent of war. Members do not

cross each others' picket lines. In cases of great emergency the UAW can
even call a general strike.
 Article 50 sections 8-9 (in cases of great emergency IEB has power to call a general
strike within the industry);
Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 313 (1965) ("A strike in the labor-management field is
analogous to a war in international affairs.... A strike is not only an economic weapon;
it is also a human situation. People are out of work. Anxiety and apprehension increase
as the days pass. Workers' families are daily asking their provider when will they
resume work, since some of the children need new clothing or the house requires
repairs."),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 343 (1994) (according to PRB, appellants argue compellingly
that crossing picket lines, whipsawing, undermining contracts, and interfering in
elections violate principles of solidarity regardless of local union jurisdictions).

Third, the union is highly political. The constitution embraces this, uniting
employees regardless of affiliation, and encouraging them to participate
in civil political life. Inside the union it is the same. A 1993 PRB decision
said there was nothing wrong about a local solidarity committee whose
genesis lay in discussions with a member of the New Directions
Movement, a particular UAW caucus. In other decisions it said political
debate is the lifeblood of a democratic institution, even in a one-party
union like the UAW, dominated as it is by the Administration Caucus.
Article 2 section 2 (one object of UAW is to "unite in one organization, regardless of ...
political affiliation ... all employees under" UAW jurisdiction),
article 41 sections 1-3 (members' duty to "participate in all ... [public] elections through
registration and balloting");
Appeal of Piper, 2 PRB 541, 542-43 (1977) (UAW's removal of UAW-appointed local
insurance rep, whom the local leadership was out to "hatchet" because of local politics,
upheld on theory that UAW investigated carefully and found that even though the
problems may have been beyond the rep's control he could no longer function
effectively in his job),
Appeal of Kelsey, 4 PRB 46, 47 (1983) ("The UAW is, after all, a highly political
 institution...."),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 130, 138 (1994) ("genesis" of local
Solidarity Committee in discussions with member of New Directions political caucus
"does not establish that the Solidarity Committee was an adjunct of New Directions"),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 236, 241-42 (1992) ("The term 'politics' does not reference
traditional partisan political activity, but rather is intended to embrace the spectrum of
issues which may be the subject of legitimate debate among union members. [footnote
omitted] Such debate is the lifeblood of any democratic institution. Stifle it and that
institution will inevitably be crippled or even die."),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 342 (1988) (for
over 20 years the UAW has been a one-party institution in that the Administration
Caucus controls the government),
Downs v UAW, 8 PRB 548, 553 (1995) ("For political issues, there are political
processes," being the CAP Councils),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1479 (10/25/04), pp 11-13 (fact that local president as
convener of local press committee is more likely to find fault with articles submitted by
critics is simply a fact of political life),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 17 ("In a context so politically volatile as Local
148, the International Union had some obligation to investigate one faction's
argument...."),
Austin v Local 594, PRB Case 1514 (1/24/06), pp 17-19 (drive to recall shop chair is a
political process not a punitive one).

On the other hand a decision whether to arbitrate a grievance is not a

political question. A shop chair who processes a grievance untimely due
to political differences can be brought up on charges before a trial
committee. A proved conspiracy to oust a member as chief steward for
political reasons would entitle the member to financial damages. Trying to
use the PRB itself as a weapon to achieve political goals can get you a
summary suspension of membership.
Ruzicka v Local 166, 1 PRB 654, 657 (1971) ("[Appellant] ascribes the motivating
 influence for this action [processing his grievance untimely] to political differences.
Faced with similar allegations, we have heretofore held them subject to trial
procedures."),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 776-77 (1972) ("[Appellant] indicates a belief that a
conspiracy existed to oust him from his [chief steward] position for political reasons.
Were we satisfied that this was the case, we should be willing to entertain the question
whether [he should be financially compensated for his improper removal as
steward]."),
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7, 14 (1992) ("But to attempt to involve and force the PRB
to act on the very eve of the UAW's Convention, when our proceedings could only have
seriously disrupted scheduled work of the Convention, smacks of an effort by Mr.
Tucker to use the PRB as a weapon to achieve his political goals rather than as a forum
to consider and dispassionately resolve his claims."),
Soncrant v Local 1889, 9 PRB 538, 541 (1997) (PRB asserts decision whether to
arbitrate a grievance is not a political question or a matter of rallying troops to a
cause).

Political activity is the lifeblood, but it can also be ugly. In a 1984 appeal
the IEB said there was nothing wrong with politics playing a role in a local
redistricting procedure. The PRB itself said it was a legitimate political
strategem for the UAW to eliminate a region at the 2002 convention
because of a surprise result in the election for its director. In a 1994
decision it said forgery of an election protest would be yet another example
of a political dirty trick which the Administration Caucus and
New Directions Movement are each quite capable of of perpetrating on the
other.
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 117 (1984) (IEB "understands very well
that politics may have played a part in deciding the procedure [for reallocation of
districts after redistricting; but that] it is neither unusual nor wrong for political
considerations to enter into decisions of this nature."),
 Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 344-45 (1994), reconsideration denied (1/10/95) ("This
whole dispute is simply yet another manifestation of the ongoing political battle
between the proponents of New Directions and the supporters of the Administration
Caucus. To be sure, if Neldrett is guilty of the act with which she is charged, her
conduct was indeed reprehensible, and she reasonably could be compelled to answer
for it. But, viewed from another perspective, even if the allegations against her were
proved, it would simply be yet another example of a dirty political trick which each side
is quite capable of perpetrating upon the other."),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), PP 1-4 ("The Convention's action was a political
strategem designed to counter Davis' own political effort to circumvent the
Administration Caucus' rule that no one older than 65 may seek election to an
International Executive Board office. Nothing in the Ethical Practices Codes prohibits
such political maneuvers.").

Ethics, solidarity, politics. A volatile combination. One discerning member

summed it up this way:
The union is supposed to protect its members from unfairness, not practice it on each
other.

Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04),

record pp 100, 107.

To manage it the union has developed elaborate appeals procedures. It

may be they trivialize the union's purpose, especially as they have
become more bureaucratic over the years. Maybe they just provide a
rubber stamp. One of the PRB's key staff members had an ethical
problem himself in 1994.

Again, to the contrary, perhaps the procedures enliven the democratic

traditions of the organization. One retiree member, whose record at the
PRB is 0-3, commented to her caucus in 2009:
The Convention elects the personnel of the PRB. The CAC are elected delegates. IF we
didn't have a one party system [and] IF we had an active membership that elected
delegates who supported a strong, militant, democratic union, then the CAC and PRB
would function the way they are supposed to. I like the idea of an independent
oversight body (the PRB) and the CAC for checks and balances.

Email, Wendy Thompson to Soldiers of Solidarity, 11/24/09.

I leave that discussion to the members. For the time being, my purpose is
to explain and demystify the procedures, which the UAW pledges to apply
uniformly, and make them accessible to members generally.

The UAW itself knows well enough how to navigate through the process,
as an insightful PRB concurrence noted in 1976. But:
members seldom appear twice before us, although the Union is always a party; and
when members appear they and their occasional spokesmen almost always know far
less about the PRB and the UAW Constitution than does the union. ... But the Union, at
least when it appears before us in an adversary role, has no interest in aiding an
appellant to frame his case in such a way as to take maximum advantage of our
jurisdiction. And if the burden of sophisticated analysis then falls, as it must, upon
individual appellants, it is unlikely to be discharged. I stress, though it should not be
necessary to do so, that the Union is in no way to be blamed for this state of affairs.

Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 187-88 (1976) (concurring opinion).

The UAW education department has pamphlets on grievance-handling,

local elections, local trials, political action, and other issues. But there is
no practice manual on appeals procedures. A resolution recommending a
pamphlet and education on UAW appeals went to the 1995 convention
and died.
Constitution committee resolution # 696, 31st constitutional convention (1995);
see also proceedings, 21st constitutional convention (1968), p 87 (report of PRB
chairman) (recommending that UAW and PRB jointly engage in educational campaign
to make average members more aware of constitutional remedies).

Even so, in 2002 the PRB said:

A claim of ignorance of the requirements of the Constitution is not a satisfactory
excuse for a failure to abide by its requirements.

Phillips v Ford Department, PRB Case 1420 (12/19/02), p 4,

see also Wartley v Local 849, 11 PRB 421, 425 (2001) (ignorance of rights
does not excuse untimely charge).

So with this manual I hope to fill the gap. The method is to have the UAW
speak in its own voice (or that of the PRB); cited sources are practically
all UAW documents. Occasionally I add my own opinions. The purpose is
to move UAW appellate practice to a higher plane, that disputes be
resolved cleanly according to union principles, and that the organization
be freed for its primary goals of organizing, bargaining, and political
action.

Disclosure
I participated, at one level or another, in some of the cases cited or
discussed in this manual. Certainly this affects my opinions.
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856 (1981),
Bier v Local 2500, 5 PRB 805 (1990),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 236 (1992),
Grant v Local 163, 6 PRB 472 (1992),
Yettaw v Local 599 I, 8 PRB 28 (1993),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31 (1995),
Eastman v Local 1292 I, 8 PRB 49 (1995),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331 (1994) reconsideration denied (1/10/95),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35 (1995),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64 (1996),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614 (1998),
Vogen v Local 900 II, 9 PRB 624 (2000) reconsideration denied (7/19/00),
Noall v Local 599, 10 PRB 371 (1999),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457 (2000),
Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568 (2002),
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135 (2001),
Karras v Local 653, 11 PRB 183 (2001), reconsideration denied (5/11/01),
Engle in the matter of Ellis v Local 600, 11 PRB 209 (2001),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235 (2001),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511 (2002),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03),
Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 (1/24/06),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/20/07),
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07),
 Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09),
Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10);
Ware, CAC, session 10/92,
Funti, CAC, session 11/93,
Johnson, CAC, session 5/96,
Hoskins, CAC, session 5/96,
Perez, CAC, session 6/96,
Gardner, CAC, session 10/97,
McTaggart, CAC, session 10/97,
Shillings, CAC, session 10/98,
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06),
Del Morone v UAW, CAC, session 6/09,
Lett v IEB, CAC, session 6/09, Leonard v
UAW, CAC, session 6/09; Sorice v Region
1, IEB Decision (8/6/07).

I have also sued the UAW and various of its locals, represented the UAW
and various locals, and been joined as amicus by the UAW in non-UAW
labor suits.
Workers Unity Slate v Harvey, Eastern District of Michigan Case No 570689 (Feikens,
1975) (represented plaintiffs, UAW Local 140 one defendant),
Chrysler Corporation and Smith, 232 NLRB 466, 96 LRRM 1382 (1977), aff'd 1979 WL
6182, 125 LRRM 3063 (CADC, 1979) (represented Smith, complaint against UAW
withdrawn),
Conaway v FAA, Appeal UCF-81-89419, UCF-81-8703 (MESC Board of Review, 1/2/90)
(represented claimants, UAW amicus for claimants),
UAW v Michigan Department of Mental Health, AAA Case No 54-39-1371-85 (Lyons,
5/27/86) (represented UAW),
DeDuijtsche v UAW Local 2500, Wayne County Circuit Court Case No 87-721665-NO
(Olzark, 1987) (represented Local 2500)
Ryan v General Motors Corp and UAW, 929 F2d 1105, 136 LRRM 2995 (CA6, 1989)
(represented Ryan),
 Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 115 LRRM 1025 (1984), remanded sub nom Prill v
NLRB, 755 F2d 941, 118 LRRM 2649 (CADC, 1985), cert denied sub nom Meyers
Industries v NLRB 474 US 971, 120 LRRM 3392 (1985), decision on remand 281 NLRB
882, 123 LRRM 1137 (1986), affirmed 835 F2d 1481, 127 LRRM 2415 (CADC, 1987),
cert denied sub nom Meyers Industries v NLRB, 487 US 1205, 128 LRRM 2664 (1988)
(represented Prill, UAW amicus for Prill),
UAW Local 594 v UAW, 956 F2d 1330, 139 LRRM 2549 (CA6, 1992) (represented Local
594),
Hoskins v UAW Local 1853, 188 F3d 507, 1999 WL 618074 (CA6, 1999) (represented
Hoskins),
Davis v UAW, 390 F3d 908 (CA6, 2004), cert denied 125 SCt 1984 (2005) (represented
Davis),
Fowler v UAW, 2006 WL 456012, 2006 Fed.App. 0143N (CA6, 2006) (represented
Fowler),
UAW v GM, 2006 WL 891151 (ED Mich, 2006) (represented objector Lopez),
UAW v Ford, 2006 WL 1984363, 39 Employee Benefits Cases 1896 (ED Mich, 2006)
(represented objector Lapso).

I am the web steward of Labor Notes, which carries occasional articles

about the UAW.

Et Cetera

The tone of this manual is sometimes tentative. In several instances I

note uncertainty whether I have the most recent version of a particular
UAW document or contract. I ask interested members to contact me and
provide updated materials. Being located in remote northern Michigan
without an editor, I will depend on help for future updates.
If I state a fact not found in the decision, there should be a citation either
to a page of the record or to a UAW document. But a project of this size
certainly contains errors, omissions, unclear phrasing, and unfair
opinions. You are invited to make suggestions and critiques.

Before the first public release in January 2004, I delivered copies of a

draft to the IEB, CAC, and PRB. The cover letter solicited comments or
corrections but none came.
Letter, Ellis Boal to CAC, IEB, and PRB, dated 12/10/03, delivered 12/12/03 (enclosing
20 copies of release 0 on floppy disks),
email, Jay Whitman to Ellis Boal, 12/15/03 (acknowledging receipt),
email, Ellis Boal to Jay Whitman, 12/15/03 (offering to provide more floppies, and
offering to take any corrections and comments into account before upload).

Corrections should be accompanied by supporting materials in the record

of the appeal or some official UAW document. Otherwise, if the IEB, PRB,
or CAC as decisionmaker made an incorrect fact-finding, for purposes of
this manual we will live with it.

I write for UAW members. The manual does not treat of the relations
between the UAW and non-member employees that it represents.

Thanks to Bill Parker, Mike Parker, Ron Reosti, Gregg Shotwell, Jane
Slaughter, Wendy Thompson, and Dave Yettaw for encouraging me to
write this.
II. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Table of Contents

Definitions:

An "appeal" is a proceeding brought under articles 32 or 33.

An "agreement" and a "contract" are the same thing.

"Appellant" and "appellee" are the parties in an appeal.

"Arbitrator" and "umpire" mean the same thing.

"Article section " refers to an article number and section

number of the UAW constitution.

A "charge" is a proceeding brought under article 31 or rarely, articles

10, 30, 48, or 49.

The "constitution" is the document which is the supreme law of the

UAW and its subordinate bodies. It is regularly amended at UAW
conventions.

"Handbook" means the UAW's Local Union Bargaining & Grievance

 Representative's Handbook.

"The international" is a term I don't use in this manual. But

customarily it means the UAW.
Article 1.

A "local" means a local union chartered by the UAW.

"Pocket guide" means the UAW's Grievance Handlers Pocket Guide.

The "president" means the international UAW president, currently Ron

Gettelfinger.

The "secretary-treasurer" means the international UAW secretary-

treasurer, currently Elizabeth Bunn.

Abbreviations:

"AC" means Administration Caucus.

"Ag Imp" means Agricultuarl Implement.

"CAC" means the Convention Appeals Committee.

"CAP council" means a community action program council.

"EP" means "ethical practices," usually as an adjective.

"EPC" in the singular means the "Democratic Practices" ethical
practices code unless one of the three other codes is specified. There
are four EPCs. In the plural "EPCs" means the four codes collectively.

"DOL" means the US department of labor.

"EEOC" means the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

"FEP" means Fair Employment Practices.

"withdrawal card" means honorable withdrawal transfer card.

"IEB" means the International Executive Board.

"LEB" means a local executive board.

"NDM" means New Directions Movement.

"LMRA" means the Labor Management Relations Act, also often called
the "Taft-Hartley act", 29 USC 141 et seq.

"LMRDA" means the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,

also often called the "Landrum-Griffin act," 29 USC 401 et seq.

"MOU" means a memorandum of understanding, typically between a

company and a union.

"NLRA" means the National Labor Relations Act, also often called the
 "Wagner act," 29 USC 151 et seq.

"NLRB" means the National Labor Relations Board.

"PRB" means the Public Review Board.

"UAW" unless qualified means the international union, as defined in

the constitution, and as distinguished from the locals, and other
subordinate bodies and administrative arms.
Article 1.

III. SOURCES
Table of Contents

Contents of This Section

Constitution, bylaws || Contracts ||

Constitutional changes and retroactivity ||
Presidential intepretations || PRB decisions
|| Convention debates || CAC and IEB
decisions || Union past practices ||
Pamphlets, administrative letters, Solidarity
|| Websites || Clarity || Procedural advice
|| Courts and NLRB || Academic writing
Constitution, bylaws

Thought of as a contract among all members, the UAW constitution is the

"supreme law" of the union. It governs the convention itself, even while
amending the constitution. Local bylaws may not contradict it. If you are
considering an appeal of anything, get a current copy. Last amended at
the 2006 convention, it has a blue cover. Printed constitutions are freely
available from your local union. There is also one on the UAW website.
Article 3 (constitution is supreme law of UAW and can be amended only by majority vote
of delegates at conventions),
article 8 sections 15-16 (amendment procedure);
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 376 (1983) (language of constitution, not historical practices
of convention, are dispositive),
Shinn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 250, 254 (1991) (constitution supreme law of UAW, though
president and IEB may interpret it),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), pp 7-8 (local bylaws may not contradict the
constitution).

Unlike a contract, the constitution takes equitable claims and defenses

into account.
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 6-8, 14-15 (because of nearly-four-year
delay occasioned partially by unreasonable behavior of appellants' counsel, "equity
favors a dismissal" of charge of unbecoming conduct which otherwise would have been
referred to a trial committee);
see also Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), p 16 ("Essentially, appellants maintain
that fairness requires the International to consider their appeal regardless of the
 technical application of Article 17. There is a persuasive logic to this argument
particularly in light of the fact that the International Union delayed its processing of
these apppeals for such a long time. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the equitable
considerations cited by appellants require further proceedings in this particular case.").

When you get one in hand, start by reading article 33. Then read it again.
It is sometimes confusing. But given that appeals stand or fall on it, it is
well to get to know it.

If the appeal involves anything that happened within the local union you
should also get the local bylaws.

Within a local, initial responsibility for enforcing the constitution lies with
the local president. Within the UAW generally, it is the president and IEB.
Article 12 section 6,
article 13 section 8,
article 40 section 1.

Contracts

If the appeal involves the handling of a grievance against the company

then you should get a copy of the national and local agreements, or at
least those parts that have bearing on your appeal. These would include
any shop committee settlements resulting in changes to or modifications
of a contract; such settlements must be reported to and made available
to the members. So must verbal changes or modifications agreed to by
the shop committee; they must be reduced to writing and given to
requesting members.
Article 19 section 1 (agreements must be reduced to writing and signed);
pocket guide, pp 49, 173 (member has right to copy of contract);
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 474-75 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969) (oral
agreement of shop committee must be ratified),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), p 21 (memo
which was not signed and has been disavowed by union and company officials is of no
force and effect),
Aston v Local 1714, PRB Case 1551 (1/24/07), pp 8-9 (though settlement of
equalization-of-overtime grievance under 1999 contract was never put into writing,
2003 contract introduced team concept which favored flexibility and included a
transition period, so it was reasonable for union to conclude 2003 contract did not
require union to abandon settlement agreement).

My experience is that UAW locals freely give copies of contracts to

requesting members covered by them.

I have the 2003 GM agreement. But my copies of the Ford and Chrysler
agreements are dated 1996. I would appreciate receiving 2003 copies
from interested members. The UAW has posted the 2003 highlights, but
not the 2005 amendments at GM and Ford.
Constitutional changes and retroactivity

If you cite a decision be careful that the constitutional or contractual

provision on which it is based has not been amended since the decision.
See for instance Turner, 1 PRB 12 (1958) (trial, notice of hearing, proxy quorum),
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35 (1958) (exhaustion of UAW remedies before a member
can sue a fellow member),
Smith, 1 PRB 44 (1958) (composition of appeals committee),
Smith, 1 PRB 66 (1958) (composition of appeals committee),
Gaikowski, 1 PRB 84 (1959) (appeals committee hearing),
Local 685, 1 PRB 122 (1960) (subordinate body),
Kulinski v Rostek, 1 PRB 142 (1960) (trial procedure),
Ellis v Lindy, 1 PRB 154 (1960) (trial and penalty in amalgamated local),
Davis, 1 PRB 214 (1961) (appeal under predecessor of article 31 section 19, of IEB
requirement in 1961 that appellants execute non-Communist affidavit as condition of
restoration of membership rights suspended in 1953, is to convention because
convention rejected appeal of suspension in 1953, despite that election to appeal to
PRB was unavailable in 1953 because PRB didn't exist then),
Weissman v Local 122, 1 PRB 336 (1964) (effect of discharge on membership
relationship),
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 178 (1976) (scope of PRB jurisdiction).

If there has been a constitutional change, sometimes there is a question

on its retroactivity.
Proceedings, 24th constitutional convention (1974), pp 224-29 (article 48 section 6,
debate on retroactivity of procedure for collecting non-dues money);
Appeal of Atwan, 1 PRB 95, 96 (1960) (suggesting AFL-CIO EPC was not retroactive),
McCreesh v Local 1152, 3 PRB 122, 128 (1981) (PRB jurisdiction of grievance appeals),
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 225-27 (1981) (PRB jurisdiction of grievance appeals).
Presidential interpretations

Article 13 section 8 provides that the president shall decide disputes,

controversies, and questions of constitutional interpretation, except for
appeals under articles 32 and 33. Appeals from presidential
interpretations under article 13 section 8, and all other presidential
decisions, go first to the IEB, whose review power is unlimited.
Article 12 section 18;
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 (1/24/06), p 5 (by its inherent power IEB may overrule,
rescind, reverse, or repeal any decision of the president),
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 18 ("Article 13, §8, states that the President
shall resolve disputes and controversies which are not addressed by procedures and
conditions already outlined in the Constitution. [footnote omitted]")

Where an interpretation under article 13 section 8 goes from there is

confusing. What the section says is "to the Convention." But the CAC is a
standing committee of the convention empowered to decide appeals for it.
There is no appeal from a CAC decision to a convention.

The PRB is not helpful on this point. In its 1989 Taylor decision, it said on
the same page:

"[a]ppeals from Article 13 §8 interpretations may be had only to the

Convention Appeals Committee," and

"the route [is] prescribed by Article 13 §8, that is, to the International
 Executive Board and then to the Constitutional Convention."

My own view is that a presidential interpretation can be appealed to the

IEB and then the CAC.

At any rate a presidential interpretation is of lesser weight than the

constitution itself. Article 13 section 8 procedures only apply if the section
is specifically invoked and both parties agree to its submission. In a 1996
appeal the PRB said that a presidential ruling under this section arguably
should be circulated to the IEB under article 33 section 3(d) review by the
full international executive board, the effect being that if no IEB member
objects to it within ten days it automatically becomes the decision of the
IEB.
Special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173 (matters appealed to CAC are
considered to have been decided by the convention),
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170, 172-73 (1961) (no deferral to president under article 13
section 8 when issue comes to him as IEB's agent to receive appeals directed to it),
Ryan v UAW, 1 PRB 186, 189-90 (1961) (presidential interpretation based on disputed
facts will not bar review of the facts, appellant not having joined in submission of
question to president under article 13 section 8 he has not elected that procedure or
waived right of appeal to PRB),
Weissman v Local 122, 1 PRB 336 (1964) (presidential interpretation ratified by IEB in
1951 does not rise to level of constitutional provision, and cannot substantively change
or add to the constitution),
Payne v Local 453, 1 PRB 580, 582 n 1, 583 n 3 (1970) (decision of nine-member
committee became decision of IEB after ten days unless IEB member objected),
Lain v UAW, 1 PRB 482, 483-84 (1968) (article 13 section 8 procedures are not actually
invoked unless a specific request is made for a determination thereunder and unless
both parties to the dispute agree to the submission),
Balicki v Local 47, 2 PRB 931, 935-36 (1981) (in order for article 13 section 8 procedures
 to be invoked there must be a specific request by a member for a constitutional
interpretation),
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 377 n 11 (1983) (though article 13 section 8 might control
appeal, no party having raised the issue the PRB will not consider it),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 112 (1984) (primary but not exclusive
authority for interpreting the constitution is the president, the IEB, and convention;
PRB will overturn interpretations of the president and IEB only in the event of "clear
error"),
King v Local 600, 5 PRB 265, 268 (1986) (appellant proceeded under article 13 section 8
so there is no PRB jurisdiction),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 688-91 (1989) (limitation of article 33
section 2(a) replicates that of article 13 section 8 and defeats jurisdiction of PRB even
though appeal was not decided under article 13 section 8, since to decide appeal PRB
must affirm or overrule an official 1959 constitutional interpretation),
Sabin v Local 599, 5 PRB 566, 570 (1988) (unless a member requests it president may
not defeat PRB jurisdiction by declaring interpretation to arise under article 13 section
8),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 343-45 (1994) (exception in article 8 section 13 allows PRB
to review constitutional interpretations of president made during an appeal, but PRB
will accord a presidential interpretation great weight),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73-74, 78 n 17 (1996) (part of appeal which was
decided under article 13 section 8 arguably should have been circulated to IEB
members, and PRB recommends to president to grant extension of time now to appeal
president's ruling to IEB),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 7 n 18 (article 13 section 8 inapplicable
because there was no request for a constitutional interpretation and no need for one
because the requirements are so clear),
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), pp 18-19 (president may not invoke his
powers under article 13 section 8 without the consent of the appellant as a means of
defeating PRB jurisdiction);
letter, Jay Whitman to Ellis Boal, 10/14/97 (where an appeal is underway article 8
section 13 leaves constitutional interpretation to the tribunal).

In one remarkable appeal, the PRB upheld a presidential interpretation

that relied on specific language in the constitution and in the convention
debates, even though it agreed that on close reading neither the
constitutional language nor the debates actually supported the president.
The PRB majority explained the ruling, saying the point was it was being
sensitive to the "spirit" as well as the language of article 13 section 8.
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 341, 343-44 (1994).

IEB interpretations get even more deference than presidential

interpretations.

PRB decisions

Throughout this manual are citations to PRB decisions, always listed in

order of PRB case number.

I use two formats for citing PRB decisions. First, decisions through #1200
in mid-1998 have been bound into eight volumes. There are also two
index volumes. Actually, the eight are numbered 1-6 and 8-9 in roman
numerals; I think they just forgot about 7.

I cite decisions in bound volumes by volume number, page number, year,

and sometimes page number of a particular passage within the decision.
For example Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303
(1992) is a decision at page 303 in volume 6, and Brandt v International
Union, 5 PRB 337, 348 n 15 (1988) is a case in volume 5 beginning on
page 337, with a cited passage on page 348 footnote 15.

Starting with # 1401, I cite PRB decisions by number, date, date of

reconsideration if any, and page number, such as Bradley v Local 3520,
PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), or Lapso v
Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), p 12.

For reasons I don't understand, the union lists some case names in a
non-adversarial manner, that is, with only one party in the caption rather
than two.

My citations use a personal shorthand. If there are two or more parties one
one side of a case caption I list only the first. Sometimes I abbreviate the
names of union entities. But the numbered parts of citations should
be correct.
Compare Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03), p 6 n 11 (correcting
caption as styled by IEB).

Copies of decisions issued through the end of 2003 (# 1455) are available
to members at no cost from the president's office and from the PRB's
office. Until then, the PRB published all decisions to various public libraries,
so members could do research there. I contacted the PRB and
the president's office in 2002 about getting a list of the libraries for listing
in this manual. The PRB referred me to the UAW, which did not respond.
Anyway, in 2004 the PRB started a website and began publishing
decisions online. You can also download them here. The first is # 1456.
PRB rules of procedure series 17, rule 8 (10/1/03) (PRB decisions are sent to various
libraries, media, and subscribers),
PRB rules of procedure series 18, rule 8 (7/1/04) (PRB decisions are posted on its
website sixty days after issuance, unless prior written objection is received from any
party),
email, Ellis Boal to prb@htdconnect.coo prb@htdconnect.co m, 12/10/01 (requesting list
of public libraries to which PRB decisions are sent),
letter, David Klein to Ellis Boal, 2/22/02 (referring request to the UAW),
letter, Ellis Boal to Dottie Jones, 3/1/02 (repeating request to UAW).

Convention debates

Table of Contents

Sometimes PRB decisions cite convention debates or IEB debates. Or you

might wish to refer to them yourself in making an argument in an appeal.
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170, 172 (1961), second decision 1 PRB 174 (1962), third decision
1 PRB 178 (1962) (predecessor to article 33 section 3(d)),
Davis, 1 PRB 214, 217-18 (1961) (predecessor to article 31 section 19),
Dimeo v Local 72, 1 PRB 459, 462-63 (1968) (LEB members-at-large not executive
officers),
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 537 (1969) (predecessor to article 10 section 7),
Appeal of Collins, 1 PRB 694, 698 (1971) (strike benefit rules),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 102, 104, 106 (1974) (skilled trades separate ratification
rights),
 Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 135, 137, 139 (1974) (skilled trades separate ratification
rights),
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251, 261-62 (1975) (predecessor to article 33 section 3(f)),
Stevens v Local 595, 2 PRB 493, 498 (1976) ("out-of-work" credits),
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 373-78 (1983) (reaffiliation with AFL-CIO),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 684, 689-90 (1989) (voting rights of
members of defunct units in amalgamated locals),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 38-40, 42-43 (1995) (vote margin necessary to
suspend local bylaws, delegates' travel expenses to convention),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 341 (1994) (standing of member of one local to charge
member of another local),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 69-71 (1996) (article 33 section 2(b)),
Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 609 (2000) (article 6 section 4 dating membership
retroactively to first day of month in which member joined);
but see McKenzie v UAW, 4 PRB 73, 76 (1984) (though time limitations of article 33
section 4(b) date from time of appellant's knowledge of action appealed, date of
knowledge of non-appellants control in this appeal, based on apparent intent of
convention, which PRB determines without reference to convention debates),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), pp 13-14 ("Similarly, legislative history offered
to explain provisions of the UAW Constitution is always acceptable and welcome. What
we mainly learn from the history regarding Article 17 of the UAW Constitution is that its
application has been a topic of concern for a long time. These bits of conversations are
interesting, but the last word on the subject must always be the text of the
Constitution itself.... We believe, however, that the text in Article 17 is sufficiently clear
to resolve the issue of appellants' standing to protest the rerun of the election at Local
Union 174, without the need for any further explanations.").

UAW debates are sometimes difficult to come by, but in the past I have
found the Wayne State University's Walter Reuther Library helpful for
doing research.
CAC and IEB decisions

I cite few CAC or IEB decisions. IEB decisions are not published or
summarized anywhere, that I know of. CAC decisions are summarized in
the CAC report at each convention. I have the reports only at the
conventions of 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2006. I have no actual decisions
except the few in which I participated. Without success, I have asked the
CAC to mail me copies of its decisions and reports.
Letter, Ellis Boal to Stan Geis, 9/26/97 (requesting and offering payment to be on CAC
mailing list for decisions and convention reports),
letter, Jay Whitman to Ellis Boal, 10/14/97 (responding to other parts of 9/26/97 letter).

The summaries are not always clear as to which party is the appellee.
Also the summaries do not show the date of each decision. They show the
dates of the CAC session -- they last 2-3 days -- at which the CAC heard
the appeal. Accordingly, my format for CAC decisions lists only the
appellant's name, and the first date of the session. Appeal descriptions
are taken from the summaries, not actual decisions.

Union past practices

Past practices are of two types, those of the company and those of the
union. This section is about union past practices. Company past practices
relied on in the grievance procedure are discussed elsewhere, but the PRB
analyzes the two types the same way. With a couple of exceptions, the rule
is that practices may help to understand or interpret language, but
the PRB will adhere to specific rules set out in in the constitution or
bylaws, even in the face of longstanding contrary practices.
Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 80-81 (1959) ("The specific provisions of [the local]
bylaws may not be simply disregarded by an organization which functions
democratically on the ground that changed circumstances have made the provisions
unsuitable. The democratic process is to be used in keeping pace with new conditions.
(Footnote: We note the bylaws were revised in 1956.) The usurpation by the few of the
right possessed by the many on the ground that it was inconvenient or difficult to
refrain from doing so cannot be condoned by this panel."),
Beach v Local 653, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (if local decides to change its practice and
insist on literal adherence to a contractual provision it must first announce the change
and then enforce the policy rather than the reverse),
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 376 (1983) (PRB looks to the language of the constitution in
rejecting appeal which challenged decision to reaffiliate UAW with AFL-CIO, made by
IEB after advisory votes in regional conventions, rather than made by convention vote,
despite historical UAW practice of deciding affiliations by convention votes),
Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257 261 n 2 (1994) (if local practice is to notify members of
the date of consideration of their appeals, then the notices should be sent sufficiently in
advance to the member actually receives it before the meeting),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 405 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (in light of
past practice in this and other locals, ex post facto interpretation of local bylaw
regarding compensation of president offends EPC),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), p 11 (in
ordering re-investigation by IEB, PRB notes appellant's removal as local health and
safety rep was contrary to settled practice, contrary to assurances of union official on
which she relied, and contrary to union policy that frowned on using local politics as a
basis for changing reps),
 Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), pp 17, 22
(had local president requested appellant's removal as appointee of DaimlerChrysler
department, the established past practice, the promise made to her at the time of her
appointment, and the EPC guarantee of uniform treatment might well have constrained
the department director's discretion to remove her),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), Pp 6, 7-8 (despite 30-year history that delegate
allocation worked well in amalgamated local, unambiguous language in the constitution
requires that every autonomous unit have at least two delegates to the joint council),
but see Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170 (1961), second decision 1 PRB 174, 176-77 (1962),
third decision 1 PRB 178 (1962) (IEB's literal interpretation of timeliness provision not
in keeping with fair play),
Valdez v Local 31, 9 PRB 298, 301-02 (1996) (PRB decisions over the years saying
officers and agents are not answerable to charges arising out of discharge of official
responsibilities may be wrong in light of article 31 section 9; on the other hand article
31 section 9 may be a relic overlooked by constitutional drafters in 1962),
Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 608-09 (2000) (despite constitutional provisions
indicating membership status begins on the date of local approval of a worker's
application to join union, "we are convinced by the Union's long history of making
membership retroactive to the first day of the month in which an individual applies,
pays dues or signs a check-off authorization" that membership begins on the first day
of the month of the application),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), pp 12 (20-year UAW past practice argues
strongly for local's interpretation and justifies UAW's refund of local's arrearage
payment, but against this is the fact that had the local's view been intended by the
parties the agreement would have so stated explicitly).

Union past practices specifically involving the IEB are discussed

elsewhere.

Pamphlets, administrative letters, Solidarity

The UAW Education Department has a variety of publications for local
unions. These are official expressions of UAW policy and members may
rely on them. Below I list the most recent editions of the publications I
have and their dates. I would appreciate hearing from a member with
other or later editions of the same publications.
Grievance Handling: A Handler's Guidebook for Success, December 2005,
Local Union Bargaining & Grievance Representative's Handbook, August 1996 (the
"handbook"),
Local Union Bargaining & Grievance Representative's Workbook, August 1990,
Local Union Bargaining & Grievance Representative's Answer Book, January 1991,
UAW Grievance Handler's Handbook, undated,
Grievance Handlers Pocket Guide (undated with purple-and-white cover), $1.50,
UAW Local Union Civil Rights Committee Policy and Procedures Guidebook (undated; the
most recent dated document in the edition I have is the 1992 version of article 2
section 2.),
Guide for Local Union Bylaws, July 2002,
Local Union Trials, April 1994,
Guide for Local Union Elections, April 1998, $1 (the "election guide"),
10 Points for Meetings, February 1998 (basic parliamentary procedure),
The Meeting Will come to Order, Simplified Guidelines to Parliamentary Procedure, April
1994.
The President's Job, January 1989,
The Local Union Financial Officers, January 1989,
The Local Union Recording Secretary, January 1989,
Local Union Standing Committees and How They Work, September 1998,
Accepting the Challenge, Leadership Skills, January 1989.

Since 1948 the UAW has also published periodic dated and numbered
administrative letters to the local unions. I have some but do not receive
them regularly. I assume the president's office collects and keeps them in
researchable form for interested members. Occasionally the PRB relies on
them as authoritative.
Weissman v Local 122, 1 PRB 336, 338 (1964) (presidential interpretation lacks
authority of constitutional provision),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 117-18 (1974) (explanation of precedent regarding contract
ratification),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 140-41 (1974) (explanation of precedent regarding contract
ratification),
Stevens v Local 595, 2 PRB 493, 499 (1976) (presidential interpretation published in
administrative letter lacks authority of constitutional provision),
Ramey v Local 652, 3 PRB 393, 396 (1983) (slate voting),
Brandt v UAW, on reconsideration 5 PRB 337, 343 (1988) (administrative letters are
used to announce important policy determinations),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 688-91 (1989) (eligibility of laid-off and
retired members in closed unit of amalgamated local to vote for officers),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 114 (1993) (IEB can change its mind but administrative
letters must be uniformly applied),
Austin v Local 594, 10 PRB 439, 444 (1999) (administrative letters are the device by
which matters of union policy are normally communicated to subordinate bodies),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), pp 4 (dues obligations for employees in public
and health care sector and other non-traditional areas).

The UAW also publishes a magazine for members, Solidarity, to educate

them and acquaint them with UAW activities. The magazine is under the
supervision of a committee of three IEB members, which is itself
responsible to the IEB. It is mailed to all members, and is also online. I
recommend that members read it regularly, though not being a member
myself, I do not.
Article 29 sections 1-6;
but see Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 105 (1974) (dissent) (Solidarity responsible for
 impression of skilled-trades members that they had a right of separate ratification),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 148 (1974) (dissent) (Solidarity responsible for impression of
skilled-trades members that they had a right of separate ratification).

Websites

The UAW and PRB each have a website. The UAW's is

http://uaw.orghttp://uaw.org . It has several important features, including
Solidarity magazine, news about unions and strikes, highlights of the
major auto contracts, summaries of UAW procedures and protocols, a list
of the locals with their own
websites, a list of UAW-made products, and the text of the LMRDA.
Recently the constitution was added.

Unfortunately there are no databases of contracts, umpire decisions,

administrative letters, or CAC decisions. The grievance-handlers' guide,
and the guide for local union election committees are not posted. That is
unfortunate. They are useful documents. When I emailed the web steward
in 1996 to ask why the constitution was not there she answered
C'mon Ellis, lighten up. This is a site to promote some basic unionism and get news out
fast. I'm sure that you and other lawyers (and anyone who goes to a convention) can
get your hand on the constitution and PRB decisions.

Email, Nancy Brigham to Ellis Boal, 5/7/96.

Nine years later a constitution was posted.

The PRB now has its own site,

http://www.uawpublicreviewboard.orghttp://www.uawpublicreviewboard.org , on
which decisions beginning in 2004 are posted in numerical order. They
start with # 1456. The site is an improvement from the old system of
mailing copies of new decisions only to the parties and to inquiring
observers like myself. Now everyone has automatic and immediate
access. Soon presumably the site will add decision summaries so
members can research topics without having to read every case.
Announcement, PRB director Barbara Klein, 5/10/04.

The Walter Reuther Library in Detroit has a site at

http://www.reuther.wayne.edu/http://www.reuther.wayne.edu/ with official and
semi-official UAW archival material, such as the transcripts of old
convention debates and caucus literature.

Other websites of interest to UAW members are mentioned occasionally in

this manual, but these three are the only official UAW sites.

Clarity

Table of Contents

There are sometimes problems reading UAW documents. For example:

Since 1992, article 33 section 4(h) of the constitution has begun with
this sentence:
Hearings, when held, shall be such as, in the discretion of the tribunal, and shall
bring to light all the facts and issues involved.

The 1989 constitution had so many printing errors it was reprinted in

1990.
Letter, David Klein to Ellis Boal, 9/8/95 (highlighting article 33 section 3(d), article
10 section 20).

Article 37 section 3 says local bylaw changes don't become effective

until submitted to the IEB for ratification, except for those enacted
pursuant to section 5. But section 5 reverses the exception; it
requires specific bylaws concerning non-attendance at meetings by
elected officials, and it says bylaws on that subject do not become
effective until submitted to and approved by the IEB.

Since 1983, article 32 section 7 has allowed the PRB to assess a

non-monetary penalty against a frivolous EPC claimant
limited to suspension from membership for a period of not less than three (3)
months.

In 1964 the PRB said interpretation 4 of article 17 section 2, issued

originally in 1951, was not a mere guideline but improperly added to
the constitution. Yet it continued to appear, substantially unchanged,
in printed constitutions for 42 years.

In a 1996 decision the PRB noticed a contradiction between article 31

section 9 and a long line of its own decisions saying local officers are
not answerable under article 31 for charges of dereliction of duty. It
recommended that delegates at a future convention resolve the
problem, but they haven't.

In a 1992 appeal, the Local 51 bylaws were so obscure that the PRB
recommended the local retain an instructor in English composition. By
the time of another appeal in 2001 the local had not.
Campbell appealing Cox v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 343 (1992),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 67 (2001);
compare Lefebvre v Local 1163, 4 PRB 361, 363 (1985) (PRB conducts its affairs in
English).

In 1996 the PRB could not agree within itself whether the second-
to-last paragraph of article 33 section 2(b) was comprehensible.

The 1996 handbook recommends that at the beginning of contract

negotiations local bargainers demand data from the company
concerning "[n]ew order backlogs -- current and year end for
1982-84."

Referring to the provisions regarding dues obligations of discharged

members the PRB said in 2005:
We question whether a set of consistent rules regarding the obligations of
discharged members can actually be gleaned from these provisions, but in any
event, it is clear that an understanding of these provisions cannot be imputed to
individual members.
 Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 12.

A dissent in a 2006 appeal noted that article 35 section 3(a) is

"inherently in conflict" in guaranteeing proportional representation
among delegates to joint councils in amalgamated locals, and also
guaranteeing that small autonomous units including single-member
units will have two delegates.
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), pp 8-9 (dissent).

In a 2009 appeal the PRB observed that honorable withdrawal cards

are issued routinely to laid-off or fired members. But the president's
office argued: "Appellants have argued that they never received any
honorable withdrawal card. There is no physical card; that is old
language."
Article 16 section 19 ("Unless any such member shall [properly certify entitlement to
"out-of-work" credits] the member shall automatically be noted on the Local
Union's records as having been issued an honorable withdrawal transfer card....");
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09),
pp 13, 22, 28.

As noted more fully elsewhere, articles 16 and 40 are contradictory on

whether a local's duty to notify members of dues arrearages is
mandatory or discretionary.
Article 16 section 10,
article 40 section 9.

What if a situation arises which convention delegates did not consider

when drafting the constitution? May provisions be applied which the
delegates would have adopted had the situation occurred to them?

In a 1978 decision the PRB said no: "[I]t may be ... that the issue [appeal
of the procedures leading to an acquittal of a member on charges] was
never considered by the framers ... [but] we are bound by what the
Constitution actually provides and not by what we might think it ought to
provide."

But in a 1984 ratification appeal it said time limits barred the appeal even
of an appellant who hadn't been hired yet and had no way of promptly
knowing of the action he was now appealing. Compare article 33 section
4(b) which sets the time limits. It speaks of the time that the "appellant"
first becomes aware or reasonably should have become aware of the
appealed matter. But the PRB reasoned that starting the limitations period
running at the time of knowledge of a non-appellant local rep was
the "apparent" intent of the convention. It cited no convention debates, or
IEB or presidential interpretation, to show how this intent was apparent
from the word "appellant." I believe in 1984 it did what it said it would
not do in 1978.
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 717, 721-23 (1978), reconsidered 2 PRB 724 (1980) (PRB is
bound by what constitution actually provides not by what PRB thinks it ought to
provide; it may be that article 31 section 11 bars an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal under any conceivable circumstances, but charging member can appeal
procedure by which verdict of acquittal was reached);
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 376 (1983) (historical convention events are not dispositive,
PRB must look to the language of the constitution to decide appeal),
McKenzie v UAW, 4 PRB 73, 76 (1984) (apparent intent of convention was to bar appeals
 by members who were not yet members at time of challenged action);
see also Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 489 (1968) (PRB rejects interpretation of word
"appellant" to refer to status of party when he or she was before the IEB, though th at
may have been intent of drafters of article 33, because holding would be strained in
light of other language),
Tencza, 1 PRB 497, 501 (1968) (PRB orders local to enact bylaw mandated by
predecessor of article 37 section 5),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 341, 343-45 (1994) (PRB must be sensitive to the spirit as
well as the language of consatitution).

Most of the time common words have their customary meanings.

Smith, 1 PRB 44, 47-48 (1958) ("shall"),
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170, 173 (1961), later decision 1 PRB 174 (1962), still later decision
1 PRB 178 (1962) ("shall"),
Balicki v Local 47, 2 PRB 931, 935 (1981) ("Unless the terms employed in the
Constitution are to be stripped of their common meaning, there can be no question but
that the expenditure itself is an action."),
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 378 n 14 (1983) ("such"),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 789 (1990) ("and/or"),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994) ("must");
but see Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 378-79 (1966) (the term "any" employer excludes
certain employers),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 151, 164 n 11 (1996) (in context, word "may"
is mandatory),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), letter, Ron Gettelfinger to PRB, 1/16/03, pp
21-22 ("must" is not mandatory),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 21 ("ratification" may precede
negotiation);
but see Berryman v Skilled Trades Department, 10 PRB 222, 230 (1998) ("similar"
trades are not necessarily "related" trades).

Under ordinary contract principles, ambiguities in a contract are

construed against the drafter. In interpreting collective bargaining
agreements for instance, if an arbitrator has no other way of determining
the intent of a document, he or she resolves doubts against the party that
proposed the language during bargaining.
Elkouri and Elkouri: How Arbitration Works, Fourth Edition (BNA, 1985), pp 362-63.

Should ambiguous provisions in the UAW constitution therefore be

construed against the UAW or its locals in appeals by members,
particularly members who were not delegates to the conventions which
adopted the language?

The PRB and CAC have not addressed this particularly, but the answer
would seem to be no, on the theory that the constitution was drafted by
all the members:
Appellants are members of a voluntary, unincorporated association, the UAW, which is
governed by a Constitution that is the product of the membership's own choices and
determinations. The Constitution is, in effect, a mutually agreed upon charter decreeing
the nature of the relationship of member to member, and member to organization.

Ponce v Local 492, 8 PRB 449, 453 (1994);

see also Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 379 (1966) ("The laws which a union
adopts are, like any other laws, binding upon those who comprise its
society.... [E]ffective collective efforts depend for their success upon the
degree of adherence by all who are involved.");
Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 311 (1965) (a "contractual" relationship),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 9, 2 PRB 9 2, 111 (1974) (dissent)
("contract"), Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 144 (1974) (dissent)
("contract"), Shinn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 250, 253 (1991)
("contract"),
Hammersmith v GM Department, 6 PRB 439, 442 (1992) ("charter");
 but see Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), p 12 ("Finally, we assume
that the International Union is primarily responsible for drafting affiliation
agreements with new UAW Locals, and it is clear that such agreements
require the approval of the IEB. Under the circumstances, any ambiguities in
the agreements would be construed against the International Union.").

Finally, sometimes to discern the meaning of a document you must

consider what it does not say as well as what it does say.

So even if it is difficult, try to make the best sense you can out of UAW
documents you have to deal with. As these decisions say, governing
documents are thought of as contract among the union and its members.

Procedural advice

At any rate a source for procedural advice about appeals is the

president's office and the PRB. I have always found both to be helpful.
Letter, Jay Whitman to Ellis Boal, 10/14/97 (excepting when appeal is underway, advice
about procedural and substantive constitutional issues is available to members from
the president's office, but whether and how to advise is in president's discretion),
PRB 48th annual report (2005), p 5 (online version) (procedural advice available from
PRB via phone, fax, letter, or email);
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 13 (request for advice to president
from local president, and response from president's administrative assistant, were not
unbecoming conduct).
Finally, it should be noted that UAW sources are not always terrific.
Ronald Woods was a member of Local 862 working in production at a Ford
assembly plant in Louisville. In 1992 he asked the skilled trades committee
chair about getting into industrial truck repair, a skilled trade. He already
had the skills for an automotive mechanic card. The local agreement had
the automotive mechanic classification and paid it a
skilled wage, the chairman told him. The UAW then issued him an
automotive mechanic journeyperson card. So he dropped his pursuit of an
industrial truck repair position, and awaited a vacancy in his new trade.

One came up in 1999. The company awarded the job to a senior member
who had no card (though the union quickly got him one). Brother Woods
grieved, but the union dropped it. Officials explained that automotive
mechanic was not a recognized skilled trades position, and the skilled pay
rate was "in the nature of a gift."

Woods then applied for and got the industrial truck repair position based
on the same skills he had seven years earlier in 1992. Given the contract
language he did not protest dropping the grievance. But he appealed the
advice to get the worthless automotive mechanic card, which caused him
to forego $3.35/hour for several years. He argued:
Union representatives should be educated and informed well enough to provide
guidance to their members. The Union should be held accountable for the policies it
administers. These policies affect people's lives.

The UAW defended the appeal in two sentences:

 In his appeal to the Public Review Board, appellant has not asserted that hostility,
discrimination, or bad faith on the part of the International Representative affected the
handling of his grievance. Therefore the appeal should be denied.

That convinced the PRB. It added:

We must say it appears that Woods has been the recipient of some very bad advice. It
is hard for us to understand why, when he expressed an interest in acquiring the skills
of a journeymen, his Union officials would have recommended that he enter a
dead-end classification that is not even recognized as a skilled trade in the UAW/Ford
National Agreement. That said, there is no provision in the UAW Constitution requiring
competence on the part of those seeking or holding positions that involve the
dispensation of advice. The Union does, however, regularly conduct educational
seminars at its Black Lake, Michigan, [family education center] and it actively
encourages its Local Unions to take advantage of these education programs for their
elected and appointed officials. This is probably the most the Union can reasonably do
to prevent the unfortunate circumstance that resulted in Woods receiving the
erroneous advice that had a substantial negative effect on his career.

Woods v Local 862, 11 PRB 332, 335 (201);

see also Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), pp 12-13 (erroneous
advice regarding dues obligations of discharged member given by local
president and financial secretary),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 17 (local president
erroneously advised membership that appellant did not need approval of
membership for EPC claim against UAW),
compare Franks v UAW, PRB Case 1520 (12/20/05) pp 13-14 (in context of
confusion in 2001 on all sides about dues in newly organized unit, when
member asked in 2003 whether she owed dues for 2001 and was told no,
this disposes of issue whether she was ineligible to run in 2004 election due
to dues delinquncy in 2001).
Courts and NLRB

The occasional court decisions and NLRB decisions I cite are available
from a number of on-line sources.
See
http://guide.biz.findlaw.com/casecode/supreme.htmlhttp://guide.biz.findlaw.com/casecode/su
preme.html (supreme court decisions),
http://guide.lp.findlaw.com/10fedgov/judicial/appeals_courts.htmlhttp://guide.lp.findlaw.com/10
fedgov/judicial/appeals_courts.html (courts of appeals
decisions),
http://www.nlrb.gov/ (NLRB decisions).

Academic writing

There is abundant academic writing about the Public Review Board.

Walter Reuther, The Public Review Board -- Why, What, How in A More Perfect Union,
UAW Publication # 100P (1947),
Jack Steiber, Walter Oberer, Michael Harrington, An Analysis of the UAW Public Review
Board, in Democracy and Public Review, Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara, CA (1960),
Jerome Brooks, Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in
Democratic Self Discipline, in Ohio State Law Journal, volume 22 # 1 (winter, 1961),
David Klein, UAW Public Review Board Report, in Rutgers Law Review, volume 18 # 2
(winter 1964),
David Klein, AFT's New Public Review Board: Lessons from Another Union, in Changing
Education, Journal of the AFT, 716 N Rush Street, Chicago, IL, 60611,
David Klein, Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: Alternative Forums, in The
Duty of Fair Representation, Jean McKelvey editor, ILR Publications Division, NY State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853 (1977),
David Klein, Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies after Clayton and Bowen, in The
 Changing Law of Fair Representation, Jean McKelvey editor, ILR Publications Division,
NY State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,
14853,
Leonard Page and Dan Sherrick, The NLRB's Deferral Policy and Union Reform: A Union
Perspective, 24 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 647 (1991),
Paul Alan Levy, Deferral To The Intra-Union Appellate Process: A Response, Public Citizen
(undated),
Mike Parker, Appealing for Democracy, New Labor Forum (Fall 1998).

Of the foregoing I have read only the sixth one and the last one, and I am
unclear on some citations. I would appreciate receiving copies from a
member that has the other articles. Additionally, certain libraries contain
files of closed PRB appeals. I have not reviewed them.
McCulloch papers, 1971-87, University of Virginia Law Library,
McKelvey files, 1957-1980, Kheel Center, Cornell University Library,
PRB files, 1957-1988, Reuther Archives, Wayne State University.

IV. Internal law / external law

Table of Contents

Contents of This Section

Internal/external || In
the UAW
Internal / external

There are two types of "law" to consider regarding the UAW: internal and
external.

Internal law comprises the constitution, interpretations by the IEB and

president, appellate decisions of the IEB, PRB, and CAC, administrative
letters, past practices, and all the utterances and traditions which govern
UAW organization, authority, administration, and conduct. As noted
elsewhere, these are thought of as a contract among the union and all its
members, enforceable through the appeal procedures under the UAW
constitution described in this manual.
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), letter, Ron Gettelfinger to PRB, 1/16/03, pp 1-2
("The structure and governance of the UAW itself ... are questions of private law.").

The font of all this is the constitution, the "supreme law" of the UAW. In
most cases UAW locals, officers, and reps agree with internal laws, and
even if they don't they try to follow them.
Article 3 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme law of [the UAW]."),
article 6 section 14 ("All members of the Local Union are also members of this
International Union and subject to the orders, rulings and decisions of this
International Union and the properly constituted authorities of the same.")

External law is the law of society, determined by acts of Congress and

state legislatures, by decisions of courts, and by social practices.
Regarding the UAW, the most important external laws are the NLRA,
LMRA, LMRDA, and the various state and federal employment laws
regarding discrimination, injuries, health, safety, unemployment,
insurance, and the like.

Another important category of external law is the law of contracts between

the UAW and employers. In disputes over the application or interpretation
of these contracts, the decisionmaker can be a court. But more typically it
is an arbitrator or umpire. Regardless, the decisionmaker is external to the
UAW.

In one decision the PRB referred to this type of external law in a

confusing way:
[T]he failure of GDLS to provide information about a pension benefit that it alone
administers cannot be said to constitute a violation of the UAW/GDLS Agreement.
Appellant Fried may have a remedy against GDLS for deliberately withholding
information from hfrom h im, as he alleges, but it would be a legal as opposed to
contractual remedy.

Fried v General Dynamics Department, 10 PRB 184, 189 (1998).

I think what the PRB meant to say was that, if appellant Fried was
entitled to a remedy, he could seek it from a judge or jury in court, but
not from an arbitrator or umpire in the union-controlled grievance
procedure.

This manual does not discuss external law much.

Talk of "law" and "legality" in internal UAW matters is appropriate when
the reference is to internal law.
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 510 (1969) ("legality" of ratification procedures),
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 29 (1973) ("legal conclusions to be drawn" by PRB),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 117 (1974) (dissent) ("litigated"),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 150 (1974) (dissent) ("litigated"),
Witt v Local 1111, 6 PRB 18, 23 (1990) (grievance procedures as "legalities"),
Ahmad v Region 3, 11 PRB 35, 38 (2000) ("no legal basis for pursuing his grievance"),
Novicenskie v Local 1069, 11 PRB 144, 149 (2001) ("That is all that Union law
requires."),
Baxter v Local 659, 11 PRB 312, 316 (2001) ("legal status" of challenger),
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 11 ("the law established by the
UAW constitution").

But internal and external law sometimes conflict, as well they should.
Thus the preamble of the UAW constitution asserts without qualification:
The structure of work established by management is designed to make of the workers
an adjunct to the tool rather than its master. This, coupled with the authoritarian
climate of the workplace, robs the worker of her/his dignity as an adult human being.
This belies the democratic heritage we cherish as citizens in a society rooted in
democratic values.

Preamble, paragraph 4.

Or as the PRB explained to a GM member:

The charter [among UAW trade unionists] bands together GM's hourly employees so
that their collective strength can establish a modicum of bargaining parity to counter
GM's might. On a larger scale, the collective strength of all UAW members by
 whomever employed, further enhances that bargaining power.

Hammersmith v GM Department, 6 PRB 439, 443 (1992),

see also Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 335, 343 (1994).

Again, as described elsewhere, PRB decisions have given different

treatment to members accused of ratting, according to whether they
ratted to management or the police.

To counter management, the UAW represents its members and

institutionalizes militant collective action. The constitution goes so far
that, when the union and its members are threatened in cases of great
emergency, the UAW can call "a general strike within the industry."
Article 6 sections 15-16 (members delegate UAW and locals to act as exclusive
bargaining representative and to appear for them in court in matters related to
employee or membership status),
article 50 section 8 (general strike);
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 491 (1968) (when union ceases to fulfill representation
function its reason for existence also ceases),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 460-61 (2000) (local bylaws give the
shop committee no grieving, bargaining, or redistricting duties, and make no mention
of bargaining, grievances, labor disputes, or strikes);
but see Davidson v Local 1282, CAC, session 1/81 (CAC declines an opinion on propriety
of a possible future sympathy strike by a local unit).

External law provides for nothing of the sort. Employers and anti-union
people help to enact and administer it. If the UAW called a general strike
it would be enjoined on the spot.
But see Memos, Ellis Boal to Labor/Community/Religious Coalition in Support of the
 Striking Detroit Newspaper Workers:

Legal Notions Concerning Proposed General Strike (9/21/95),

Picket Line Conduct and its Effect on Reinstatement rights (11/21/95),
Government By Injunction (12/3/95),
Update On Sympathy Strikes (12/13/95).

True, some external laws provide for protection for employees. But
uninterrupted production is the overriding national policy. Thus in the
courts, rights "are protected not for their own sake but as an instrument
of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife" by encouraging
collective bargaining.
Emporium Capwell Co v WACO, 420 US 50, 62, 88 LRRM 2660, 2665 (1975).

In appeals, external law is only relevant if re-enacted by the union as

internal law, or recognized by the union as applicable to internal law. For
instance the PRB said in a 2000 decision that the election guide
incorporates certain provisions of external law.
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 579 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00) (election
guide incorporates federal election law that union funds must not be used to promote
the candidacy of any individual);
see also article 37 section 9 (local shall not make its membership list available to anyone
except for the performance of official union business or to satisfy the requirements of
law);
compare King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), p 8 (president's office opposes
appeal partially on basis that appellants' argument is contrary to public policy which
encourages citizens to report wrongdoings to police).

Seeming to contradict all the foregoing, one section of the constitution's

defining "Objects" article does appear to re-enact all laws including
antiunion laws. I have not seen any appeal or any PRB, CAC, or IEB
decision which refers or alludes to this section.
Article 2 section 4 ("[A UAW object is to] enforce existing laws [and] work for the repeal
of those which are unjust to Labor....").

There are lots of laws and regulations and court decisions governing the
subjects in this manual. Lawyers and manuals are around that can explain
them. Members sometimes bypass articles 32 and 33 in favor of court
litigation. Appeals where that occurred are noted elsewhere. If you want
professional counsel I suggest it be someone or something that
specializes in labor law, by which I mean the subset of employment law
which deals with union-management relations.

In the UAW

Table of Contents

If you are before the PRB and you cite a rule of external law, it usually
answers that its job is only to enforce union rules.
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 379-80 (1966) (right-to-work laws not considered),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 475 n 7 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969) ("We
recognize that this determination [that an agreement is of no force and effect] may
have no effect on the legal obligations of the Union to the employer which are
governed by a different set of legal principles."),
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 535 (1969) (US constitution not considered),
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 183, 189 (1976) (PRB rejects "law" sense of dictionary
definition of "fraud"),
Gonzales v Local 163, 2 PRB 386, 389 (1976) (first amendment is irrelevant),
Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 69 (1973) (DOL settlement irrelevant to article 33 claim),
Lynch v Local 302, 2 PRB 787, 789 (1972) (PRB declines to endorse DOL election
regulation),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 22 (1980) (PRB distinguishes between EPC and NLRA
rights),
Adams v Local 148, 4 PRB 332, 337-38 (1985) (questioning whether PRB has authority
to apply principles of NLRA when they contravene specifically a provision of the
constitution),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 5 PRB 228, 234, 366, 372 (1987) (PRB doesn't resolve
tensions between constitution and law, decisions of IEB or PRB do not bind courts or
department of labor, and conversely),
Kyles v UAW Ford Dept, 5 PRB 561, 565 (1988) (workers compensation claim not
considered),
Spencer v Local 140, 8 PRB 210, 214 (1993) (damages for libel other than lost wages or
benefits should be sought in the civil courts),
Loomis v Local 362, 8 PRB 322, 328 (1994) (affirmative action),
Gray v Local 6000, 9 PRB 31, 34 (1995) (state law mandating advance notice of closing
of state mental health facility),
Salyers v Local 1681, 9 PRB 187, 191 (1996) (NLRA),
Rider v Local 1853, 9 PRB 429, 434 (1997) (disability law),
Sanders v UAW, 10 PRB 355, 358 n 4 (1999) (unemployment ruling does not assist
appellant),
see also Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 404-06 (1999), reconsideration denied
(10/28/99), pp 10-13, related case Pearson v Auto Workers, 1999 WL 547882, 161
 LRRM 2893, 2896 (ED Mich, 1999) (court and PRB disagree about bylaw
interpretation),
Holycross v Local 662, 10 PRB 523 (2000), (it may be that under state law the company
could not terminate appellant for having filed a workers compensation petition, but she
had signed an agreement she could be terminated at any time so the union had no
basis on which to grieve),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), p 21 (EEO rights),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), p 4 (age discrimination law),
Kidd v Local 1264, PRB Case 1467 (3/19/04), p 9 (UAW appellate procedures do not
provide for discovery as in courts),
Avery v GM Department, PRB Case 1522 (2/16/06), pp 19-20 (despite UAW's
acknowledgement that appellants were wronged, "[t]he damages appellants seek are
actually in the nature of a tort claim against Delphi."),
Bays v GM Department, PRB Case 1538 (9/28/06), p 9 (substance tested positive for
amphetamine even if it could not have been admi tted itted i n a criminal trial),
Esposito v UAW, PRB Case 1563 (4/17/07), p 7 ("Esposito's claims arising from sources
other than the UAW Constitution and the Ethical Practices Codes are not before us."),
Henderson v GM Department, PRB Case 1568 (7/20/07), pp 15-16 (PRB declines to pass
on the question whether the UAW's reduction of retiree benefits without their consent
violated federal law),
Hanscom v Region 8, PRB Case 1590 (8/29/08), p 13 (PRB declines to pass on whether
company's interference with appellant's website violates NLRA);
but see Pappas v Region 1A, PRB Case 1602 (10/28/08), pp 5, 6 n 15 (PRB construes
Family Medical Leave Act in opposition to interpretation of appellant),
Collins v Region 1A, PRB Case 1607, pp 6-8 (11/25/08) (PRB cites principle in several
court decisions as a factor in decision to deny appeal),
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), pp
11-12, 26 n 69 ("Counsel for appellants has argued that [discharged member] Crisco
should not have been required to pay dues on the money he earned outside the
jurisdiction of the UAW because the Union could not represent him at his new place of
employment. Such an argument might be used to defend a civil action to collect the
dues, but it is clearly not the rule under the UAW Constitution.").

If you have a problem with the UAW, writing one of its lawyers is
pointless. As a UAW attorney wrote to a local president who had sent him
materials:
While I am flattered at being favored with this material, you must understand that the
Legal Dept. is not responsible for interpretation of the UAW Constitution, does not
handle appeals under Article 33, and is not responsible for advising Locals on proper
administrative procedure.

In the UAW, we elect people to interpret, handle appeals, and advise on procedure.

Letter, Jay Whitman to Richard Debs, 11/14/88 (emphasis in original).

Accordingly in appeals I do not cite analogous external legal precedents,

even those under the LMRDA. The EPC closely tracks the LMRDA, the PRB
says; but the PRB is not bound to follow the LMRDA.
Davis, 1 PRB 214, 220 (1961) (LMRDA does not expand PRB's jurisdiction),
Foreman v Local 699, 4 PRB 123, 125-26 (1984) (PRB adopts court's LMRDA reasoning),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 5 PRB 228, 234, 366, 372 (1987) (PRB and court
decisions not binding on each other, member may pursue both court and article 33
remedies simultaneously),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 337, 348 n 15 (1988) (PRB constitutional decision expresses no
view on parallel LMRDA proceeding in court);
see also Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 475 n 8 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969)
(factual setting of court precedent cited for comparison),
Hughey v Local 425 2 PRB 401, 404 (1976) (language of election guide and LMRDA
compared),
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 16 n 6, 17 n 8 (1992) (arguments under the constitution
and LMRDA compared).

Similarly, though the PRB says its standard for grievance appeals mirrors
the court-imposed duty of fair representation, I do not cite analogous
NLRA precedents. Most of the time it doesn't either.

So in any appeal if one side is rooted in union principle and the other
opposes it, in theory and other things being equal the principled side
prevails. The theory doesn't always work. But it has a better chance of
working within the union than without, and this is why you are better off
in a union appeal than in a court.

Be careful if you refer to "law" in an appeal to make sure it is understood

which type of law you have in mind. A side-benefit is this: UAW members
are not expected to have training in legal draftsmanship. The arguments
made and the decision rendered are usually (not always) free of
intimidating jargon.
Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 309-10, 313 (1965) ("[A] lay tribunal cannot be held to
the formal procedure which is followed in a court."),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 530 (1969) (dissent) ("stewards and officers are ...
laymen rather than professional lawyers"),
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 535 (1969) ("justiciable"),
Garrett, 1 PRB 596, 601 (1970) ("judicial notice"),
Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606, 612 (1970) ("judicial notice"),
Balicki v Local 47, 2 PRB 931, 932-33 (1981) ("justiciable"),
Grigsby v Local 110, 5 PRB 412, 415 (1987) ("[F]ew UAW members have had special
training in the subtleties of legal draftsmanship."),
Braman v UAW, 5 PRB 469, 471 (1988) ("In his effort to elevate what he perceives as
technical requirements of the Constitution over aover a common sense application of
its requirements, Braman has totally lost sight of the purpose of the Constitution
which is
simply to require that members pay their dues each month."),
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 199 (1991) ("We recognize that the UAW's internal
appeals procedure is less structured than a civil legal proceeding and that rigid
procedural or evidentiary rules would be futile and self-defeating if applied to the
 Union's system of internal remedies.");
Downs v IEB, 8 PRB 548, 552, 554 (1995) ("justiciable"),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), letter, Ron Gettelfinger to PRB, 1/16/03, pp
21-22 ("precatory").

(I confess to using jargon once myself.)

Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 67 (1996) ("ipse dixit").

Accordingly article 33 concludes asserting your obligation to fully exhaust

constitutional remedies and appeals before seeking redress in a civil court
or government agency. As noted elsewhere the UAW has required this
since its founding.

There is a wrinkle in the above analysis: My pocket guide specifies

violations of laws, regulations, and NLRB rulings as one type of valid
grievance. But that concerns the grievance procedure, not internal law. It
is discussed more fully elsewhere.

A more important problem, discussed more fully elsewhere, is the PRB's

2001 Colley decision. It denied a damages claim for untimeliness. Colley
differentiated similar appeals in which timeliness was waived. The
distinction was based on exhaustion principles; the exhaustion principles
were those of external law not the internal ones noted just above.

Before Colley PRB decisions did occasionally cite external law. But they
seemed to reason only by analogy.
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 240 (2001);
 Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35, 40, 43 (1958) (invoking court precedent on exhaustion
of remedies prior to legal action to determine result in appeal before PRB),
Egres, 1 PRB 50, 60-62 (1959) (applying external legal principles as one basis for
decision that local president's resignation was effective),
Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 82-83 (1959) (NLRA precedent relied on to explain the
character of superseniority),
Telakowicz v Local 425, 1 PRB 148, 151 (1960) (analogy of union elections to NLRA
elections),
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 378-79 (1966) (LMRA relied on to construe predecessor to
article 50 section 4),
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 491 (1968) (citing external law that UAW is obligated to
represent all employees, not just all members),
Tencza, 1 PRB 497, 500 (1968) ("[a]ccepted principles of statutory construction"),
Sneath v Local 1309, 5 PRB 299, 302-03 (1988) (citing NLRA principles on preferred
seniority to decide grievance appeal),
Robinson v UAW, 5 PRB 439, 444 (1988) (4 (1988) ( external legal decision cited in
grievance appeal),
McClure v Local 652, 6 PRB 354, 359 (1992) (adopting courts' approach to proving race
discrimination circumstantially),
Konarske v Local 600, 6 PRB 452, 462 (1992) (external legal precedent relied on in
grievance appeal).

Though appellate union bodies are not bound to apply civil law, they do
sometimes defer to fact-findings of civil tribunals, as noted elsewhere.

V. What can be appealed

Table of Contents
 Contents of This Section

Administratorships || Agency ||
Appealability, mootness, parties, standing ||
Appointed reps, jointness || Bargaining,
strikes, contract ratifications || Conventions
|| Discrimination || Ethical practices codes,
free speech in the union || Exhaustion of
remedies || Grievances generally ||
Grievances rationally || Grievances
specifically || Local elections || Local
expenses || Local meetings || Local
newspapers || Local officers, stewards, and
committeepersons || Local unions,
subordinate and other bodies || Membership,
dues || Organizing || Redistricting ||
Remedies, damages || Remedies, generally
|| Removal from office || Saturn || Trials ||
Trial practice || Unbecoming conduct

An appeal is an attempt to change some course of action or inaction being

undertaken by a union body, including any UAW subordinate body or
administrative arm. The most common appeals are those to undo the
disposition of a grievance. Close behind are protests of elections and
appeals about charges.

Note that an "appeal" concerns a member's protest of an action or

inaction on the part of the union. An appeal is not directed against action
or inaction of a company. This is so, even though the underlying issue
may be a discharge or some other unfair management action. To protest
action by the company, file a grievance.
Davis v UAW, 11 PRB 348, 350 (2001) ("The Public Review Board has no jurisdiction
over Ford Motor Company, and we cannot direct it to do anything.").

Various sections of the constitution provide for different appeals. All

except credential challenges at meetings and certain interpretations by
the president and by the IEB come under article 33. The decisions noted
here touch tangentially on these exceptions:
Article 8 section 17 (convention credentials),
article 13 section 8 (presidential interpretations);
Conroy v UAW, 1 PRB 493, 494-96 (1968) (convention credentials, delegate election),
Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606 (1970) (convention credentials, director election),
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 29-30 1973) (convention credentials, convention
expenses),
Kerik v UAW Ford Sub-Council 3, 2 PRB 772, 775-76 (1980) (sub-council credentials),
Gibbs v Local 551, 3 PRB 210, 215 (1982) (convention credentials, delegate election),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 688-91 (1989) (presidential
interpretation, voting rights of members of defunct unit of amalgamated local),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73-74, 78 n 17 (1996) (presidential
interpretation, right to ratify agreement with purchaser of portion of GM operation).

As discussed elsewhere, you must have "standing" to start an appeal,

though the constitution does not define it.

Your issue must also be "justiciable." This is an ill-defined concept, best

explained by giving examples.
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 535 (1969) ("The application of this constitutional
 provision [former article 10 section 8 which barred members or followers of political
organizations which owe allegiance to governments other than the US or Canada from
holding UAW office] is, however, a justiciable matter and, under the provisions of the
Constitution, subject to the reviewing authority of this Board."),
Balicki v Local 47, 2 PRB 931, 932-36 (1981) (PRB considers the justiciability of
appellant's claim that a local fund was used for improper purposes, before proceeding
to the merits),
Downs v UAW, 8 PRB 548, 553 (1995) ("For political issues, there are political processes
[, CAP Councils, which] advise and counsel the International Executive Board on
programs and policies.... CAP Councils provide the mechanism for the formation of UAW
political policy. Those who disagree with the political decisions of the IEB have this
political process, as opposed to Article 33 appeals, to seek to modify or change these
decisions.... The appeal is dismissed by reason of its failure to state a justiciable
issue.").

Take care not to confuse an appeal from a charge under article 31, which
has different procedures and time limits. The difference is this: An appeal
asks the union to remedy some action or inaction it did badly. A charge
seeks to punish a member or officer by a reprimand, removal from office,
or suspension or expulsion from membership.

However after trial or other action of a local union concerning a charge, it

can be appealed to the IEB, PRB, or CAC through article 33. In other
words a charge against a member can become an appeal when somebody
doesn't like what the union did with the charge, and wants to take it to a
higher level.

Following are some of the areas in which appeals can be brought. The
discussions here are of varying thoroughness. I hope soon to fill them all
out.
Administratorships
An administratorship may be imposed where necessary to:

prevent or correct corruption or financial malpractice;

assure the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other

duties as a bargaining representative,

restore democratic procedures within a chartered subordinate body,

or

otherwise assure carrying out the legitimate objectives of the UAW by

the subordinate body

In a 2008 decision the PRB set out standards of review of

administratorship appeals. An administratorship is only to be employed
for very serious deviations from the operation of a local, which cannot
otherwise be addressed. It must be for one of the four purposes above.
The UAW cannot impose one simply to save money or achieve some other
kind of efficiency. Once legitimate grounds are established, the only
restrictions on the IEB are principles of fairness and due process under the
constitution and EPC.
In the appeal before it, there was no evidence of corruption or financial
malpractice. There was no outright defiance of a specific directive from
the UAW. There was no situation that could not be corrected without an
administratorship. But the authority of the LEB in a local is not absolute.
Members can file appeals and protest elections. In a decision from the
same local three months earlier, the IEB and PRB were troubled by the
election committee's dismissive tretment of legitimate concerns. Now the
LEB appears to be continung an undemocratic pattern. Recommendations
regarding the schedule and rules for a rerun election were ignored at a
meeting. Accordingly, the administratorship was approved.

Turing to another issue, the question whether the administrator properly

removed the local president, the PEB chose not pass on it because the
same issue was pending in another appeal soon to be decided.
Grima v Region 1A, PRB Case 1606 (11/24/08), p 33;
compare Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1589 (8/25/08), pp 8, 25-26, 28 (election overturned
partially because election committee allowed challenged voters to vote unchallenged
ballots, and refused to place appellants' timely and ultimately successful protests on
joint council meeting agenda).

After a hearing and by a 2/3 vote the IEB can suspend officers or take over
supervision of a subordinate body or unit until its affairs have been
properly adjusted. In such event one IEB member becomes an
administrator with full authority of all functions in the local. He or she can
suspend any or all officers and take over their functions either as directed
by the IEB or in his or her own discretion. Where officers are suspended a
new election is to take place within 60 to 180 days of the order returning
the body to autonomy.

Constitutional provisions and PRB administratorship decisions follow.

Article 12 section 3 (administratorship procedures),
article 40 section 10 (suspension of local union if local officers fail to report membership
and per capita taxes to UAW);
Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 18-20 (1958) (one day's notice of IEB hearing adequate in
light of lack of prejudice and need for speedy action, administratorship justified
because of LEB conduct rebellious toward convention),
Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 31 (1958) (threat to impose administratorship because of local's
failure to comply with IEB decision pending appeal to PRB),
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 204 (1961) (in administratorship authority of administrator is
temporarily substituted for that of the general membership to assure carrying out UAW
object of uniting members regardless of race),
Sexton v UAW, 1 PRB 729, 730-31 (1972) (complaints of financial abuses),
Local 1200 v UAW, 3 PRB 419 (1982) (no standards for review of administratorship
established by PRB in previous decisions, nonperformance of collective bargaining
agreement supported administratorship),
Thompson v UAW, 4 PRB 23 (1983) (notice to local of administratorship is notice to
individual members),
Jenkins v UAW, 4 PRB 302 (1984) (refusal of local president to comply with specific
directives of membership authorized IEB to impose administratorship),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399 (1987) (imminence of expensive local election and then plant
closing not sufficient to justify administratorship in light of plant's decision after IEB
decision to postpone closing),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 45 (1995)("friendly" administrator's power to remove
officers includes power to reduce their wages),
Libby v Local 6000, 9 PRB 549, 554 n 4 (1998) (article 40 section 10 probably invoked
by IEB through article 12 section 3),
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 61, 67, 68 (1998) (local joint membership council is highest
authority in administered statewide local, 60 days dates from date of order returning
 body to autonomy),
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 76, 79 (1998) ("[The administrator] could work with the Local
Executive Board when he chose to do so, or could act in its stead."),
Local 2036, v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 143 (2001) (administratorship permissible as last-ditch
effort to bargain contract during lockout),
Baker v IEB, 11 PRB 439, 443-45 (2002) (appellants abandoned challenge to
administratorship, and failure to conduct election in newly formed local not timely
raised; but PRB comments anyway on improper administratorship procedures),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), pp 16-17 (though proposed local bylaw revision
which would have paid full-time newspaper editor as union employee did not conflict
with constitution IEB properly disapproved it because of financial problems revealed in
recent audit).

To accomplish the purpose of the administratorship an administrator may

ignore local bylaws.
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 37, 45 (1995) (because administrator could have removed
officers, he had authority to reduce their salaries below that set by bylaw).

Agency
From time to time the PRB has held that a person or entity was the agent
for another.
Article 6 section 15 (UAW),
article 6 section 16 (UAW);
Local 262 Shop Committee v Local 262, 1 PRB 247, 249 (1961) (local shop committee),
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 394 (1966) (election committee's CPA),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 512 (1969) (intra-corporation council),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 112 (1974) (dissent) (UAW),
 Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 145 (1974) (dissent) (UAW)
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385, 389 (1982) (leadman),
Warren v UAW, 5 PRB 430, 434, 435-36 (1988) (narc),
Jodlowsky v UAW, 5 PRB 463, 467 (1988) (insurance company),
Houghtlen appealing Noble v Local 549, 6 PRB 107, 112-14 (1991) (local civil rights
chair),
Hammersmith v GM Department, 6 PRB 439, 443 (1992) (GM department),
Ponce v Local 492, 8 PRB 449, 453 (1994) (convention),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 42 (1995) (administrator),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 343 n 19 (1997) (officer of local),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 622 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000)
reconsideration denied (7/19/00) (UAW rank-and-filer placed by employer in labor
relations office with duty to respond to employee inquiries),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 462 (2000) (presidential
administrative assistant),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03), pp 2, 9 (management acting
superintendent),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), p 3 n 10 (member who at suggestion of
local president presented evidence to police to see if they could stop other member
from sending letters to local officials thought to be harassing or threatening; PRB did
not decide agency issue),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), pp 11, 14 (presidential administrative assistant).

Appealability, mootness, parties, standing

Table of Contents

This section discusses what types of decision are appealable. Elsewhere is

a chart summarizing limitations on certain kinds of appeal. The
procedures for starting an appeal are discussed elsewhere.

You may appeal any action, decision, or penalty of the UAW or any of its
subordinate bodies or administrative arms, or of a local union or any of its
units, committees, officers, committeepersons, or stewards. A failure or
refusal to act can also be appealed where it results in an injury.
Article 33 section 1;
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 163 (1960) (IEB recommendation to Canadian locals that
appellant be barred from holding office, even if recommendation is mere opinion),
Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 67-69 (1973) (PRB decides appellants have right to have CAC
review validity of selection of CAP council delegates, and hence validity of CAP council
proceedings),
Yettaw v Local 599 I, 8 PRB 28 (1993) (letter of UAW officers to locals allowing locals to
dispense with their bylaws and pay delegates' travel allowances higher than actual
travel fare may be appealed),
Eastman v Local 1292 I, 8 PRB 49 (1993), second decision 8 PRB 31 (1995) (letter of
UAW officers to locals allowing locals to dispense with their bylaws and pay delegates'
travel allowances higher than actual travel fare may be appealed, as also may be the
local's dispensation though it passed by less than a 2/3 vote),
Baxter v Local 659, 10 PRB 337, 341 n 2 (1999) (ratification vote is an appealable action
or decision),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), pp 4, 15 (letter of president saying full-time local
union editor would not be a necessary expense was merely a personal correspondence
without constitutional significance).

If an officer or rep at any level tells you a particular issue is

unappealable, you can appeal that.
Article 33 section 1;
 Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) pp 12-13 (claimed member whose appeal
was barred by local president on ground that he was not a member was entitled to
appeal the issue whether he was a member).

An appeal can be rejected if it is "moot." It is moot if the relief sought has

already been attained, has become unattainable due to the passage of
time, or is otherwise unattainable. Mootness is discussed elsewhere.

The parties to an appeal are the members or UAW entities who are either
appealing or whose actions are being appealed. Their names are shown in
the case caption, though if there is more than one on one side or the
other often only the first is listed.

Usually it is only the parties that can win or lose an appeal. But in one
remarkable decision the PRB held a local may owe compensation to the
appellant even though it was not a party. The appellant had asserted the
local was responsible in her appeals to the membership, the IEB, and the
PRB. But the IEB and PRB did not list it as a party, and it declined to offer
evidence or make argument at some of the hearings including the last
one before the PRB which resulted in the holding against it.
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), record pp 95,
102, 139, 148,
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), pp 14-18,
23, record p 121.

One thing you cannot appeal is an unjust union action where you as a
party lack "standing." In other words, an appeal may be lost not because
of its merits but because of who filed it. "Standing" is a notion that in
some situations may have an intuitive ring to it. The problem is that
except for the several references to "good standing" that every paid-up
member has (unless suspended by a trial committee), the constitution
does not define it or even mention it.

The reason -- I believe -- that there is no mention or definition is that

traditionally in the labor movement an injury to one is an injury to all.
Unbecoming conduct or unjust union action offends the whole union, not
just the members immediately affected. To extend the PRB's analogy
between the union trial procedure and the criminal law, a rape or a
murder is prosecuted by the state not the victim or his or her family.

The most bizarre "standing" ruling was a presidential decision that a

member who is in good standing of one local lacks standing to charge a
member of a second local under article 31. The charge claimed that
appellee forged a protest and interfered with the first local's delegate
election.

"Good" standing is all that article 31 speaks of. The PRB agreed there is
no support for the president's ruling either in the text of the constitution
or in the convention debates leading to its adoption.
But see article 31 section 20 (providing the IEB may prefer charges against members in
cases of extreme emergency or conspiracy).

It also understood that the ruling meant that members of one UAW local
can whipsaw, cross the picket line, or interfere in the election of another
UAW local without fear of union penalty.
But it denied the appeal saying it wanted to be sensitive to the spirit of
article 13 section 8. That section implies that convention delegates prefer
in the main that questions of constitutional interpretation be resolved by
it. One PRB member dissented.
Article 13 section 8,
article 31 section 1;
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 341-48 (1994).

The appeal arose out of Local 594. At the next convention the local
submitted a resolution to amend the constitution to allow members in one
local to charge members in another local. The resolution went nowhere.
Constitution committee resolution # 697, 31st constitutional convention (1995).

In another decision the PRB said the appellant lacked standing, and then
it dismissed the appeal for lack of PRB jurisdiction. The dismissal was
without prejudice to the convention taking up the appeal again. At the
time the predecessor to article 33 section 3(f) Determining jurisdiction --
similar to the 2006 version -- said "[an] appellant may not again raise
any issue which the [PRB] negated in its decision dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction." Yet the decision included a footnote saying the PRB did not
understand its "standing" holding to bind the convention.
Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 590 n 3, 591 n 4 (1970).

Sometimes standing is based on notions of local autonomy.

In some decisions it says there is standing,
Article 32 section 5(d) (IEB may submit any EPC appeal to the PRB);
Egres, 1 PRB 50, 57 (1959) (referral to PRB by IEB),
Local 453 v Hawkins, 1 PRB 234, 236 (1961) (new president has standing to withdraw
appeal brought by predecessor in official capacity),
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 232, 236 (1975) (under pre-1980 constitution any member
could appeal disposition of any grievance whereby he or she "feels" aggrieved, even if
the disposition had no effect on appellant's contractual rights),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 724 n 1 (1980), reconsidered 2 PRB 724 (1980)
(non-party in local trial permitted to appeal procedure leading to verdict of acquittal);
Carstensen v Local 780, 4 PRB 238, 240 (1984) (non-candidate may protest election);
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03) (member's standing to charge LEB for
improperly removing other member from LEB not questioned).

and in others it says there isn't. I don't always see the difference.
Articles 6, 16, 31, and 38;
Local 262 Shop Committee v Local 262, 1 PRB 247, 249 (1961) (local shop committee is
neither a UAW subordinate body nor a "member" with right of appeal, though members
of it have that right),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 511 (1969) (no standing to appeal issue on which there is
no actual controversy because appellant seeks no relief),
Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 591 (local shop committee may not
appeal),
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 317, 319 (1976) (in rejecting charge on ground that no
improper motivation was claimed, PRB notes candidate's challenger had no standing to
contest election),
Kerik v UAW Ford Sub-Council 3, 2 PRB 772, 775-76 (1980) (member of one local has no
standing before the PRB to challenge credentials of another local's delegates to a
sub-council for otherwise, incongruously, he could challenge the election of its
president or any of its other officers or its delegates to national conventions; but he
 would have had standing to challenge the credentials before the credentials committee
of the sub-council),
Local 72 v UAW, 3 PRB 440, 442 (1983) (local has no standing to challenge ratification
procedures in another local),
Scarlett v UAW, 5 PRB 409, 411 (1987) (no standing to appeal non-charge to other
member of overtime hours where appellant was not injured by non-charge),
McGinnis v Local 2123, 8 PRB 26, 27 (1993) (member had no standing to charge another
member claiming an assault on a third member),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 134 (1994) (motion to withdraw
appeal denied partly because appellant filed appeal in capacity as local president, a
position he did not hold at the time he attempted his withdrawal),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 6 (under article 13 section 16 only
secretary-treasurer has authority to challenge the use of the UAW's name or logo),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), pp 14-17 (candidates, one of whom transferred
from his home local to a different plant and local and the other of whom accepted a
voluntary severance package from his employer, lack standing to protest an assertedly
unfair election held when they were employed in the home local).

An interesting 2007 decision rejected an appeal because of who filed it,

without mentioning the "standing" rule. The appeal challenged the
ratification of a 2005 amendment to the Ford national agreement which
contained substantial cutbacks in retiree health care, as well as cutbacks in
active members' benefits. Nationally, the amendment passed the active
membership by a margin of just 50.2%. The UAW had ordered the vote to
proceed at the Local 1250 hall even though the local's plants were on a
temporary layoff that week.

Active members can vote in ratifications; the CAC has held that retirees
cannot. The appellants were retiree Dennis Lapso in Local 1250, and 21
retirees and active members from other Ford locals. Brother Lapso
appeared at a local meeting and argued that 2000 active local members
were disenfranchised because they were on layoff. The members rejected
the appeal. Appellants went to the IEB and the PRB.

The local had printed over 3500 copies of the benefit highlights before the
vote. The exact numbers of eligible local voters and votes are not in the
record. The union did not dispute Lapso's estimates that 1100 voted and
if a rerun were ordered the ballot count could increase by over 1000.
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), record pp 88, 164.

The UAW did not contest appellants' assertions that the procedure
violated technical requirements of article 19 section 3 in that voting
began three hours before information meetings which explain the
contents of the amendment, that 2000 active voting local members were
away from the plant and the local hall the week of the ratification, that
the amendment passed by only 95 votes nationally, that at least 95 of the
laid-off members who did not vote would have voted under reasonable
conditions, that these 95 votes might have affected the outcome
nationally, that article 19 section 3 as well as the traditions of the UAW and
other unions emphasize the importance of maximization of membership
participation, that maximization of participation could have been achieved
by delaying the vote in this local a short period until it was back to full
strength, that the issue of maximization should have been referred to the
director of Local 1250's region because article 19 section 3 gives directors
authority on the issue, and there was no bargaining- related reason and no
reason grounded in UAW past practice why a delay
wouldn't have been appropriate in this instance.
Compare Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391 (2002) (under election guide the union
has a responsibility to maximize voter participation in officer elections; by scheduling
an interim election at the local hall for only four hours on a Sunday the election
committee had to know the turnout would be very light; though the low turnout might
be explained by the fact it was an interim election involving only a single LEB at-large
position, by waiting a day it is virtually certain there would have been a
substantially larger turnout, ensuring that the candidate elected would more accurately
reflect the preferences of the electorate).

The union answered simply that no active member of Local 1250 joined
the appeal, and for this reason appellants had not identified a violation of
the constitution. The PRB agreed. The opinion concluded:
The contents of the tentative agreement and its ratification by a very narrow margin
were well publicized. The fact that local 1250's approval of the amendment by a margin
of 63 percent [in the local] tipped the balance in favor of its approval nationally would
have been apparent to the members of Local 1250. Yet, the active membership did not
challenge the results of the vote or raise questions about the procedures for ratificiton
followed at Local 1250. Appellant Lapso raised his issues before the membership and
the membership rejected his appeal. We do find it significant that no active member of
UAW Local 1250 joined in this appeal. If a substantial number of active members
opposed to ratification of the amendment believed that their voices had been silenced
by the circumstances at Local Union 1250, some of them would have objected. The fact
that no active member of Local 1250 joined in this appeal supports the conclusion that
the membership accepted the precess and the result. There has been no showing in
this record that Article 19, §3, of the International Constitution has been violated.

The decision of the IEB is affirmed.

Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), pp 11-12.

The opinion noted but did not attempt to rebut appellants' argument that
they did have standing, in that the decision to proceed with the vote in
Local 1250 was made at the UAW level not the local level, and it affected
the interests of active and retiree members in every Ford local.
Compare Local 72 v UAW, 3 PRB 440, 442 (1983) (local has no standing to challenge
ratification procedures established by another local).

By upholding the ratification even though voting began three hours before
the information meeting, the holding also means that by voting down the
appeal, the membership could waive the constitutional requirement,
discussed elsewhere, that the voting be "at" the meeting. The constitution
does not permit membership waiver of its requirements.
Compare Smith, 1 PRB 44, 49 (1958) ("As to the question of waiver, we do not think the
appellants had the power, by waiver or otherwise, to give to the two-man committee
authority and jurisdiction not so granted by the Constitution.").

Even apart from ratification of an improper waiver, the opinion in effect

restated and rationalized the already-obscure "standing" rule, and
thereby dodged a serious and material issue affecting tens of thousands
of UAW-represented Ford employees. In this sense, the reasoning didn't
rise to the level of being wrong.
Appointed reps, jointness
Table of Contents

Article 33 section 2(b) allows appeals by unjustly-removed

UAW-appointed reps only up to the IEB. The same section allows appeals
by unjustly-removed locally-appointed reps only as far as the local
membership. Still, the PRB has entertained many appeals over the years
addressing appointed reps' political rights under the EPC at the UAW and
local level.

The following discussion treats UAW-appointed and locally-appointed reps

together, but for convenience I list here the decisions concerning local
appointments.
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 865 (1981) (since LEB with membership approval has
power to appoint, local president may not unappoint),
Mejia v Local 365, 5 PRB 454, 459 (1988) (preponderance burden to show speech
activities motivated removal of locally appointed rep),
Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 596 (1988) (distinguishing between policy-making and
policy-executing; removal of local appointee because she supported opponent in
election would violate EPC),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 272 (1994) (recording secretary should have placed
appellant's EPC claim on agenda of membership meeting),
Riley v Local 1853, 11 PRB 93, 100 (2000) (Saturn AMA appointed by previous union
administration),
Collis v IEB, PRB Case 1517 (10/26/05), pp 5-6 ("Nothing in the Constitution requires
 that [selections of members to attend conferences] be made democratically or
impartially.").

The 1994 Ward decision summarized the previous cases and specified
rules:

A special purpose rep serves at the will of the appointing authority,

and may be terminated at any time for any reason, except a
prohibited reason.

The authority appointing a special purpose rep may condition the

appointment on the appointee's acceptance of limitations on his or her
political activities, so long as these limitations are stated fully and
unambiguously. A dismissal occasioned by a violation of such
limitations does not violate the EPC.

The appointed rep must be willing at all times to implement the

policies of the appointing authority, or be subject to dismissal.

The appointing authority may not, however, retaliate against an

appointed rep, by removing him or her from the job, by reason of the
rep's exercise of non-restricted political rights protected by the EPC.

In Ward, there was evidence the real reason for appellants' removal was
their support for a regional candidate at the convention. The GM
department director had issued a letter limiting local political activities,
but appellants' regional political work did not violate it. The PRB
reinstated the appellants. They did not request backpay.
 Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228 (1994).

A wrinkle in Ward was the noted letter of the GM department. Other UAW
national departments have circulated similar letters over the years.
GM Department director Steve Yokich, memorandum (10/4/89);
see also Chrysler Department director Jack Laskowski, letter (8/20/96),
Chrysler Department director Nate Gooden, letter (11/8/99),
Ford Department director Ron Gettelfinger, memorandum (8/19/98),
Ford Department director Gerald Bantom, memorandum (6/02).

The letters and practices vary from department to department. For

instance until 2003, the Chrysler Department had a settled practice that,
when it appointed a member to serve in its national training center ("NTC")
and the member had previously been serving as a UAW appointee in a
local, the member would return to his or her appointment in the local
should the appointment to the NTC not become permanent. Additionally,
unlike the other departments, the Chrysler Department letters provide:
It is intended that Internationally-appointed Local Union Representatives will become
"experts" in their respective field(s) and a valued asset to the local union. Therefore, it
is not intended that changes in local union administration will also result in changes of
Internationally-Appointed Local Union representatives.

Chrysler Department director Jack Laskowski, letter (8/20/96), p 3,

Chrysler Department director Nate Gooden, letter (11/8/99), p 3;
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp 2,
5, 9, 11 (past practice in DaimlerChrysler Department),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), pp
17, 22 (past practice in DaimlerChrysler Department).
Ward's second requirement (clear enunciation of limitations on political
activities in the letters) was tested in a subsequent appeal from the Ford
Department. The rep, Al Badalamento, had distributed leaflets which
attacked the local president for receiving both a salary and a pension. An
election was imminent but at the time the president had decided not to
run. Also at the time the membership was considering a bylaw
amendment to abolish the president's practice. In modified form the
amendment later passed.

The Ford Department's letter prohibited reps from seeking or holding

elected local positions except as delegates to conventions or conferences.
Reps were prohibited from engaging in local union politics or elections.
They had to support all official policies of the UAW and the local, to
attend local meetings, and to participate in other union functions.

Clarity of the letter was something else. The IEB and the president's
office at various times in the appeal interpreted it to mean:

"Any member can, or course, stand up in a meeting and debate an

issue. For an appointed special purpose representative, this right
stops when the Local Union leadership takes a position and it
becomes the policy of the Local Union administration. That is the
principle. Even in response to a question put to him at a membership
meeting, he should not speak against the policies and programs of the
local leadership. [In this appeal], although there was no public
position on the [proposed bylaw amendment], the President had
 taken a position implicitly by his electing to receive both his pension
and his salary."

"As an appointed representative appellant retained the right to

support candidates for local union offices and even to make that
support known."

"The decision of the IEB does not distinguish written from oral
communications..."

"Later, in responding to [appellant Al] Badalamento's appeal, [the

IEB] drew a distinction between comments expressed orally at a
union meeting and written materials distributed among the
membership."

The IEB held no hearing, so at a PRB hearing Brother Badalamento

produced testimony that the appointed reps had a political meeting where
candidates for local office were discussed. He also produced a copy of the
local newspaper naming UAW-appointed reps who were serving in local
elected positions.

A PRB majority first noted that the Ford Department's policy letter
limiting appointed reps' speech was unclear, and the UAW defense of it
inconsistent.

It nevertheless upheld removal because the Ford Department had

discretion to find the leaflet political. The local president later became a
candidate for re-election, the majority found, and the leaflet contributed
to his defeat. The majority recommended that the Ford department clarify
its policy on political activities of appointed reps. It rejected a dissenting
PRB member's argument that appointed reps should remain free to
disseminate their views on policy matters, as distinguished from political
matters, and the PRB should remand the appeal so the IEB could formulate
a truly ethical code of conduct and do fact-finding.
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 511, 515-16, 517, 518 (2002), record p
18,
The Beacon, Official Publication of UAW Local 228, vol 34 issue 3 (fall, 2002), pp 6, 20
(Bill Tondreau listed as nationally-appointed employee resource coordinator and as LEB
member; Mike Wagner listed as nationally-appointed employee resource coordinator
and as local trustee),
Kidd v Local 1264, PRB Case 1467 (3/19/04), p 8 (PRB holds it will intervene in the
removal of an appointee only when it concludes that a UAW department has used its
discretion unreasonably or for an impermissible purpose).

Several other PRB decisions also discuss the second rule of Ward.
Robertson v UAW, 1 PRB 632 (1971) (under EPC UAW employee-members may appeal
decisions made by UAW as employer; union may condition appointment on curtailment
of political activities),
EP complaint of Wilson, 2 PRB 869 (1980), 3 PRB 1 (1980) (UAW-appointed contractual
rep may be required to surrender political rights as condition of appointment),
Kelley v Local 400, 5 PRB 503, 505 (1988) (UAW rep must resign to seek local office),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 343, 347 (1988)
(rule upheld requiring UAW staff rep to take leave on running for international office
and reassignment if unsuccessful; running against own boss may be dereliction of
duty),
Adams v Ford Department, 6 PRB 444 (1992) (subject to EPC UAW appointee serves at
will of appointer),
 McDonaugh v Local 1183, 10 PRB 359, 362-65 (1999) (removal of UAW rep for
campaigning in local election),
compare Austin v GM Department, 11 PRB 82, 91 (2001) (appellant's attendance at
political caucus meeting may have violated condition of employment of UAW-appointed
rep),
Carver v Local 163, PRB Case 1435 (9/25/03), pp 8-10 (local election overturned
because UAW-appointed reps campaigned),
Crable v Local 148, PRB Case 1452 (12/23/03), p 11 (it is up to UAW department, not
local union, to decide whether UAW rep violated policy against participation in local
politics),
Local 276 v IEB, PRB Case 1631 (9/15/09), p 18 (local could not adopt a rule requiring
internationally-appointed reps to resign their positions before accepting nomnination to
run for local office because the appointment and removal of such reps is solely within
the discretion of the vice president of the national GM department; locally-appointed
reps on the other hand could be forced to resign in order to run for office but only if the
requirement were stated unambiguously in the local bylaws and posted nomination
notices).

The Ward principles were applied to uphold removal of locally-appointed

reps at a Saturn plant though there was no letter conditioning
appointment on staying out of politics. They were removed after a new
administration won local office and said they wanted new people who
would support their ideas and policies. There was no claim that they had
not performed their jobs. The PRB pointed to Ward's requirement that the
appointee be willing to implement the policies of the appointer.
Appellants had supported the other side in the election. But (so far as the
decision reads) during the appeal they did not state their willingness to
implement the new policies. The PRB held there was no evidence one way
or the other on appellants' willingness. Accordingly appellants had not
carried their burden and the appeal failed.
 Riley v Local 1853, 11 PRB 93, 99-101 (2000).

In one appeal the GM department appointed an insurance representative

and then removed him because in the director's view "political
differences" with the local administration impeded his ability to do the
job. An investigator for the director had concluded that the local
leadership would be hard pressed to sustain any claims of dereliction of
duty. The PRB upheld the director nevertheless, saying the situation
constitutes a valid basis for Bluestone's replacement of Piper.... This is so even though
the impediments to Piper's effectively discharging his responsibilities might have arisen
due to circumstances quite beyond his control.... Of course, the exercise of such
discretionary authority may not be abused. Were Piper to have been removed for an
improper reason, such as because he was a member of a minority group, then his
removal could not be countenanced.

Appeal of Piper, 2 PRB 541, 543 (1977);

compare Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476
(9/15/04), pp 10-14 (PRB treats claim of political animus by UAW differently
than claim of political animus by local officers).

I don't follow the reasoning which distinguishes between the right to be a

member of a minority group and the right to express yourself politically.
Compare LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 268 (1994) (appellant argues that "the
values protected by ... the free speech and democratic practices section of the UAW
Constitution are just as fundamental to our society and to the UAW as is race and
sexual equality.").

Several decisions, treated elsewhere, discuss the due process rights an

appointee can expect if he or she makes an EPC claim concerning his or
her status.

Other decisions have discussed the political rights of appointed reps.

Davis, 1 PRB 214, 218 (1961) (PRB will not extend its authority into employment
grievances of UAW staff members),
Northrup v UAW, 2 PRB 467, 469-70 (1977) (contractual UAW appointee "serves at the
pleasure of the appointing official," and may be removed by Ford department because
of political differences with local administration),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 865 (1981) (since LEB with membership approval has
power to appoint, local president may not unappoint),
Ford v UAW, 4 PRB 222 (1984), 4 PRB 268 (1985), 5 PRB 363, 365 (1987), 5 PRB 587
(1989) (removal of much-coveted UAW rep position and membership privileges from
member for misappropriating union funds)
Mejia v Local 365, 5 PRB 454, 459 (1988) (preponderance burden to show speech
activities motivated removal of locally appointed rep),
Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 596 (1988) (distinguishing between policy-making and
policy-executing; removal of local appointee because she supported opponent in
election would violate EPC),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 272 (1994) (claim of removal of local appointed rep
for political reasons presents unique issues),
Kidd v Local 1264, PRB Case 1467 (3/19/04), p 8 (UAW department need not establish
just cause to remove appointee or demonstrate that removal was fair).

One decision discussed the method of computing overtime hours of an

elected time study rep.
Dolin v Local 420, 9 PRB 201 (1996).

Elsewhere are decisions on the grievability of jointness issues.

One decision tangentially discusses whether it could be an EPC violation
to appoint a member with a criminal record.
Appeal of Atwan, 1 PRB 95, 96 (1960) (suggesting that, but for the criminal convictions
being 14 years old and having occurred before adoption of AFL-CIO EPC code III,
appointing or suffering to remain in local office of members convicted of double-dipping
might have violated AFL-CIO EPC code III).

One decision discusses a committeeman, who was also a team leader,

who told members he was a supervisor with authority to dock their pay
and assign overtime. Whether he was right or wrong about this was a
matter of interpretation of the local agreement which should have been
determined by the membership, the PRB held in agreement with the IEB,
even though the charge otherwise properly alleged unbecoming conduct.
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 II (4/23/08), pp 1-2, 4, 7-8.

Finally, in a CAC appeal appellants asked it to disapprove negotiations

because they had been authorized by local presidents and chairpersons
during a joint-funded leadership meeting, not a meeting of the GM
Council. Action relating to negotiation was improper at such meetings,
appellants urged. The CAC disagreed:
Appellants intimate there is something improper about these discussions at the
Leadership Meeting, because it occurred during a caucus of the UAW leadership, during
a session which was otherwise funded by joint funds. This Committee sees nothing in
the least questionable. Both Management and the UAW regularly caucus among
themselves on such occasions. For the last 70-odd years, UAW and its representatives
have been bargaining with Management on GM property and time, and caucusing as
 needed to get the job done for the membership. Appellants, if right, would "taint" the
most routine handling of a grievance, on the floor of the plant, by a Committeeperson
on the clock.

Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), p 13 n 11;

compare article 19 section 3 (international officers and representatives lack
authority to negotiate contracts without first obtaining the approval of the
local union),
article 20 section 5 (the purpose of an intra-corporation council is to coordinate
demands of separate member locals, formulate policies dealing with the
common employer, and to meet to forumulate bargaining demands at least
30 days before the opening of negotiations for a new agreement).

Bargaining, strikes, contract ratifications

Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Bargaining || Interest
arbitration || Strike
authorization || Strikes,
lockouts || Ratification ||
Ratification procedures
Bargaining

The PRB summarized the collective bargaining process in 1998.

When an employer either agrees or is required to recognize a union as bargaining agent
for its employees, this initiates the process of collective bargaining. The ultimate end of
the process is to reach agreement on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment for employees in the bargaining unit. When agreement is finally achieved,
the proposed contract is submitted to the full affected membership for ratification. Once
that contract is ratified and becomes effective, both the employer and the union are
bound by its terms for the duration of the agreement. At the end of the period, either
party may propose changes in the language of the agreement and the process is
repeated for so long as the collective bargaining relationship endures.

Laurin v Local 6000, 10 PRB 169, 173 (1998),

Bargaining is what the UAW is all about, and is what this manual is least
about.
[Members] may not use the grievance procedure to achieve that which they have been
unable to accomplish at the bargaining table.

Rice v Local 719, 10 PRB 564, 567 (2000).

The Local Union Bargaining & Grievance Representative's Handbook (the

"the handbook") offers pointers for local bargainers. I summarize here
only briefly what look to be the main points.
Handbook, pp 71-84.

Before negotiations begin start to collect data on your company from

stockholder reports and libraries.

At the start of negotiations ask the company for more specific data. It
should give you: historic hours worked, historic and current numbers of
workers, labor cost and classification/wage breakdown, and life, medical,
and dental insurance data. Though you might not get it, ask additionally
for income statements, current and expected contracts, extraordinary
costs/writeoffs/income, balance sheets, operating plans and assumptions,
and new order backlogs.

Then sum up the per-employee-hour cost of the company's present

package, and of the demands you intend to make. Start to build three
different files.

First is the history of each contract clause, including bargaining history,

grievances and dispositions, arbitration decisions, specimens of contracts
at other companies or other unions, and cost-of-living indexes.

Second are your own recent experiences, including penalties imposed,

grievances and their associated contract clauses and points of origin,
clauses which caused discontent among the membership without
generating grievances, arbitration awards and required language changes
for the ones which were unfavorable, circumstances of any confrontations
between union and company reps or of work stoppages, and systems and
substance of communication between the two parties.

Third is a "bargaining book" with separate pages on: a grouped seniority

list; data on each operation in the unit; each contract and fringe plan
clause, its history, and desired changes; average earnings, overtime, and
fringe benefits in the unit; projected costs of increases; labor cost per
unit manufactured, selling price per unit, percentage of labor cost to unit
cost; and data on recent settlements in comparable industries.

Finally, begin meeting. The handbook suggests stylistic techniques

related to timing, order of subjects, stalking horses, tit-for-tat, flexibility,
notetaking, precision, orderliness, demeanor, visual aids, statistics, good
faith, and respect of the other side.

Sometimes contracts are settled only after only after strikes or lockouts.
More rarely, sometimes they are settled by interest arbitration.

The constitution suggests that the local membership has the absolute
right to instruct negotiators in bargaining strategy. The PRB hasn't always
seen it that way.
Article 19 section 3 ("No Local Union Officer, International Officer or International
Representative shall have the authority to negotiate the terms of a contract or any
supplement thereof with any employer without first obtaining the approval of the Local
Union."),
see also article 19 sections 3-5 (ratifications),
article 50 sections 1, 5-7 (strikes);
Benchich appealing Abernathy v Local 909, 5 PRB 576, 578 (1988) (local may not
discipline shop committee for refusal to abide by membership resolutions to poll the
membership about contract goals, return to the bargaining table, have the local
president at all meetings with management, and reinstate the 1984 agreement until a
new one could be negotiated),
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 142-43 (2001) (UAW may impose administratorship if
 membership's democratically-decided, stubborn bargaining strategy means eventual
destruction of the local).

The basis for the UAW's traditional opposition to "two-tier" agreements is

article 19 section 6:
The International Executive Board shall protect all Local Unions who have succeeded in
establishing higher wages and favorable conditions and have superior agreements, so
that no infringement by Local Unions with inferior agreements in workplaces doing
similar work may be committed against the Local Union with advanced agreements.

Article 19 section 6.

A 2005 decision considered a negotiation by an intra-corporation council.

In 1999 Delphi was about to spin off from General Motors but the parties
negotiated one national agreement for both and combined the votes of
the two units in the ratification.

By 2003 the companies were separate, though there remained flowback

rights and common fringe benefits between the companies. GM members
outnumbered Delphi members by 4-1. Except for a supplement to provide
"competitive" wages and benefits for new hires at Delphi, negotiation of
which was to be attempted later, the same national agreement was
bargained at each company.

The two national agreements were ratified jointly because, the UAW
asserted, this assisted its goal of maintaining GM-level wages for
incumbent Delphi members and lower wages for future Delphi members.
Delphi members passed it by 72% and GM members by 80%. Bargainers
then began work on the supplement and reached tentative agreement.
New Delphi hires were to receive $11/hour less and no defined benefit
pension plan; the supplement would outlast the national agreement by
four years. The UAW then declared the supplement effective without
further ratification.

There was no evidence the GM council or the bargaining convention had

considered or endorsed any proposal for "competitive" wages. Nor does
the decision mention reliance by either company on the union's joint
strategy. Characterizing the supplement as "two-tier," appellant Gregg
Shotwell argued it "severs the traditional solidarity between generations."
He said joint ratification by members at two different companies was
improper, and secondly the Delphi members should have been allowed to
vote on the supplement.

The IEB noted the integrated fashion in which the two companies
operated, and ruled the joint bargaining structure, strategies, and policies
made sense. It rejected a separate vote by Delphi members, saying that
the GM and Delphi members' ratification had given Delphi bargainers
discretion.

At the PRB, the president's office repeated these points, and added a
rationale the IEB had not adopted, that separate ratification could create
serious practical problems. The president said the two companies
negotiated for an entire integrated collective bargaining agreement
including the competitive wages for new hires at Delphi. If the
supplement were voted down, he argued, Delphi might say the vote was
of no effect, or alternatively that it voided the entire national agreement.
In reply, Brother Shotwell acknowledged possible serious practical
problems, but said they could not stand in the way of principled
constitutional interpretation.

The president also argued the PRB had no jurisdiction over the
combined-vote issue, being that the ratification process was part of the
union's bargaining strategy.

The PRB began by acknowledging

[i]t may well be that one of the reasons for combining the ratification votes on the
2003-2007 UAW-GM-Delphi National Agreement was to assure ratification of the
Agreement by the widest possible margin; however such a motivation does not run
afoul of the guarantee that members shall be entitled to a full share in Union
self-government.

Besides, it said, Delphi members did ratify their agreement even if their
votes were counted separately. A two-tier goal which maintains senior
members at a high pay rate is a legitimate goal, it added.

As to the supplement, first the PRB rejected the UAW's argument that it
was a mere implementation of the jointly-ratified national agreement. Still,
it upheld the supplement. The PRB reasoned that had Delphi members
rejected it, that would have dismantled the ratification framework and the
bargaining strategy. In effect the Delphi members would have assumed
unacceptable veto power over the "national agreement." The GM
agreement was apparently included in this term. The
PRB concluded:
The International Union has the authority and the flexibility to establish ratification
procedures, even one which provides for ratification of a Supplement prior to its
negotiation.

Compare Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 111, 117 (1974) (dissent) (ratification must
precede implemention),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 144, 150 (1974) (dissent) (ratification must
precede implemention),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09), p 9 (president argues that even if
appellants proved serious constitutional breaches in procedure of contract
ratification whose result has been announced, it is doubtful that the remedy
of a re-vote would be appropriate).

The PRB noted that its holding that the ratification strategy prevented
Delphi members from exercising a "veto" dodged the novel issue whether
it could ever review a ratification procedure established by a bargaining
policy.

A curiosity of the decision is that it repeatedly refers to the "2003-2007

UAW-GM-Delphi National Agreement" in the singular, though there was no
such single document. There were two mirrored agreements signed by
two companies, as the parties acknowledged, the UAW-Delphi national
agreement and the UAW-GM national agreement. The one exception to
the mirror was the Delphi supplement.

As noted elsewhere, the ratification procedures of article 19 are unclear.

Still, the PRB's announcement that ratification can precede negotiation
even in the absence of enabling language is startling.
Equally startling is the assertion that the EPC permits bargainers to adjust
the voting unit to achieve a desired voting result. Even if the union did
pursue legitimate goals in this case, this rule will invite manipulation in
future ratifications, possibly resulting in a contract being ratified that
should have lost or vice-versa.

Finally, suppose instead of appealing Shotwell had organized politically

among union officials and been able to convince or force bargainers to
insist, say, that new hires' wages be $5/hour less rather than $11/hour
less, resulting in a breakdown of negotiations and the supplement. The
ratified national Delphi and GM agreements would have remained binding
without it. The decision acknowledges Delphi members could have validly
"vetoed" the supplement in this way without disturbing the ratification
framework or the bargaining strategy of mirrored contracts. Yet the PRB
says that organizing politically among the members rather than officials,
and "vetoing" the supplement in a ratification vote would have been
improper. Allowing for political activity among officials while precluding the
same activity among members is particularly wrong-headed.
Compare Stephens v Champion Department, 4 PRB 349, 352, 354 (1985) (UAW did not
unfairly champion rights of Toledo workers over Hellertown workers),
McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555, p 13 (5/7/07) ("[McMillan points out that under
the two-tier wage structure in place at Android Industries, the Company could replace
him with a cheaper employee [after his discharge]."),
Collins v Region 1A, PRB Case 1607, pp 4-8 (11/25/08) (in face of appellants' argument
that allowing truck drivers to transfer into general utility classification at different rates
in 2004 and 2006 constituted a two-tier agreement, PRB answers this was within the
terms of the Rouge site competitive operating agreement, which was within the wide
 range of reasonableness allowed to unions by court decisions; so there was no contract
violation).

A 2006 appeal challenged the UAW's authority to agree to mid-contract

health-care concessions sought by General Motors. The company was
concerned about its viability and had threatened to modify or elminate
health plans for retirees. It opened the books for the union. An
independent analysis concluded the financial hardship was real and the
need for relief was immediate. At a joint-funded meeting of local
presidents and chairpersons -- not of the GM Council -- they voted to
allow negotiations. Later, a tentative agreement was reached including
newly-created co-insurance and defined-contribution structures, wage
deferrals for active members, and a deferred expiration date.

The appellants argued that this was a "new" contract and that the
constitution's procedural requirements for new contracts -- coordinating
local demands, formulating bargaining policies, and a council meeting 30
days before negotiations -- were not followed. Moreover, the only
pre-negotiation union-side meeting was joint-funded, and therefore
inappropriate for action relating to negotiations. The democratically-
elected GM council should have been calling the shots, not the appointed
GM department, appellants added.
Article 19 section 3 ("No Local Union Officer, International Officer or International
Representative shall have the authority to negotiate the terms of a contract or any
supplement thereof with any employer without first obtaining the appproval of the
Local Union."),
article 20 section 5 ("The purpose of the Intra-Corporation council shall be to coordinate
the demands of the separate members [i.e. member locals] and to formulate policies in
 dealing with their common employer. The Intra-Corporation council shall be convened
not later than thirty (30) days prior to the opening of negotiations for a new national
agreement to formulate bargaining demands....");
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 138, 140 n 12 (1994) (once voted
on, council policies bind the local unions).

The CAC disagreed, saying the requirements of rank-and-file input applied

only "where the union is the party making the demands, not
management." It added that no "particular setting or ceremony" is
necessary for the locals to pre-approve negotiations by the GM
department. Styling the meeting which voted to approve negotiations as a
"caucus of the UAW leadership, during a session [of a Leadership
Meeting] which was otherwise funded by joint funds," it found nothing
inappropriate in the vote; company and union negotiators regularly
caucus during negotiations, it said.
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), pp 10-13.

A 2009 decision concerned the EPC as it applied to "coalition bargaining,"

a practice wherein the UAW and its Local 7777 bargained jointly with three
non-UAW unions against three Detroit casinos. Voting of all the unions
was pooled in the 2007 contract with one of them, MGM Grand.
Contrary to UAW policy, the ballot "stated that a no vote would result in a
strike rather than continued negotiations". The contract passed narrowly
overall, 976 to 878. But among UAW members, according to the
appellants, it failed 475-75.

Typically of coalition bargaining, the four unions had conflicts among each
other. Even if not resolved satisfactorily to UAW members, the PRB said,
there can still be benefits, including the fact that the UAW represented
casino employees at all. The president's staff gave the history:
The three casinos commenced operations in Detroit in July 1999. At that time, the
[UAW president] set himself the task of ensuring that all of the casinos' employees had
Union representation. Traditionally, in the casino industry, the Teamsters, the
Operating Engineers and HERE represent the trucking, operating engineers, and hotel
and restaurant employees. Dealers and associated jobs are usually unrepresented.
[He] reached an understanding with the Teamsters, the Operating Engineers
International Union and HERE that the UAW would organize and represent
classifications not typically represented. This understanding, which was memorialized in
writing on September 9, 2003, is the DCC ["Detroit Casino Council"].

The name "Detroit Casino Council" is just a convenient way of referring to the four
International Unions that represent employees of the casinos. The International Unions
participating in the DCC conduct negotiations with the employer through a Bargaining
Committee pooled from the four Unions. Each Union picks its own Bargaining
Committee members and there are no DCC elections. The association is entirely
permissive, operating by mutual sufferance.

...

It is an interesting theoretical question whether or not the UAW's ability to enter into
this sort of consortium is foreclosed when the other Unions fall short of meeting the
standards embraced by the UAW Constitution.... Certainly, Article 2, §6(b) and (c), of
the UAW Constitution teach the need for flexibility.

Article 2 section 6(b) (IEB is authorized to take action to enable the UAW to
mobilize, assist, and work with other organizations),
article 2 section 6(c) (UAW "shall seek to affiliate groups of employees,
whether by agreement or merger. To do so, and better accomplish this
objective, the [IEB] is authorized to allow necessary deviations from specific
provisions of this Constitution, provided however, that any such affiliations
 must be ratified not later than the next regular convention.").

So the DCC is not a separate entity with actual existence. Yet the model
including pooled ratification was followed for ten years without problems,
the president said, until the 2007 ratification. That year problems
prompted the unanimous local membership to move that the UAW
separate from the DCC in future negotations.

The important constitutional issues were:

The ballot language saying a "no" vote would result in a strike was
prepared by one of the other unions, but it was against UAW policy.
According to an IEB finding, in an informational meeting before the
balloting, a UAW rep explained the "actual consequence" of a contract
rejection in detail. This suggests the rep may have explained a "no"
vote didn't really mean there would be a strike. On the other hand the
IEB cited article 49, which is about "strike balloting" not ratification
votes. The PRB decision does not spell out exactly what the rep said.
Article 19 sections 3-4 (ratification votes),
article 50 section 1 (strike votes).

An hour after the all-day balloting began, according to the appellants

polls closed so the DCC negotiating team could be summoned to
discuss circulating flyers which urged rejection.

The polls closed again around 11:00 am when it was announced that
a substantial number of printed ballots "were lifted from one of the
 voting stations." Of the 3000 ballot printed, between 1600 and 2200
ballots -- over half -- were missing. The decision does not identify the
names or titles of whoever ordered the poll closure; it seems to have
been the DCC bargaining committee. The closure continued for
approximately an hour, during which there was a shift change for
dealers, a large UAW block. During closure the DCC unions placed the
already-cast ballots and sign-in sheets under seal, numbered the
remaining uncast ballots, and then printed and numbered new ballots
on different-colored paper, which were used for the remainder of the
day when polling reopened. The IEB determined the closure
disenfranchised about 86 members -- not a sufficient number to affect
the outcome -- but it noted some of them may have returned and
voted later. Appellants questioned the accuracy of the number 86.

When appellants first protested to the UAW, its response was to refer
them to the DCC, which has no officers or method of deciding
protests, and whose address the UAW did not know.

Appellants wanted a re-vote under UAW rules. Eventually the president's

staff acknowledged the appeals, and referred them to Local 7777 for
initial review, which it is to do whenever a complaint cites the EPC. The
local membership backed the protests unanimously. They came back to
the IEB.

The request for future separation from the DCC was referred to a UAW
vice-president. Appellants were told "a letter will be sent to the Detroit
Casino council" at the unknown address.
IN rejecting the appeals, the IEB said if UAW members were discovered
to be involved in strike ballot fraud they would be subject to severe
punitive sanctions.
Article 49 (fraud in strike balloting is punishable under article 31, with a mandatory
penalty of debarment from elective or appointed office anywhere in the UAW for 2-5
years.).

The IEB added:

there is no separate ratification procedure for UAW members in place at the casinos, so
that even if another ratification vote were ordered for UAW members, it would serve no
useful purpose.

Appellants appealed to the PRB. The president defended, saying there

was no impropriety that would justify rejecting the results of the
ratification. The president acknowledged:
There were aspects of the ratification process that were not done in accordance with
UAW practices. A UAW ratification process would not be conducted by the same
Bargaining Committee that negotiated the contract. The UAW would not have prepared
a ballot suggesting that a no vote would necessarily result in a strike.

The PRB added:

[I]t appears that some of those favoring ratification of the MGM Grand contract
engaged in aggressive tactics during the ratification process that would not be tolerated
in a process under the sole control of the UAW.

As for the lifted ballots, the president argued that prompt action was
taken to protect the integrity of the process and only 86 members "may
have been inconvenienced." He concluded:
We acknowledge the possibility that some particularly egregious violation of the
ratification process, such as direct manipulation by the employer, could put the UAW in
a position where it would be required to reject the result of this process.

...

Even if appellants had established the existence of serious Constitutional violations,

however, it is doubtful that the remedy they now seek would be appropriate. Notice of
ratification of the collective bargaining agreement between the DCC and MGM Grand
Casino has been given. It is difficult to imagine a situation that would justify reversing
the ratification of a negotiated contract retroactively, and potentially sending the
casino's employees out on strike.

This quote of the president gives one example of a "particularly

egregious" violation -- employer meddling -- but it does not give other
examples or flesh out a full definition. Why a particularly egregious
violation would justify a rerun but a serious constitutional one would not
-- particularly where the PRB's job is to decide constitutional violations --
is not explained. The assertion that serious constitutional violations may
not be remediable echoed a passage in a dissent of two PRB members in
1974. As noted elsewhere, I don't agree with it.

As to the ballot wording, the president said the UAW was powerless to
dictate the language to other DCC unions.

On the merits, the PRB rejected the appeal. It held that members urging
rejection of a narrowly winning contract have a "very high burden," which
it said wasn't carried here. There was no conclusive evidence that anyone
actually was intimidated. Voters who were turned away from the polls
could have come back later and voted "even if it was unlikely that they
would." The poll closure was a measure to protect the integrity of the
election process. It resulted in a "disenfranchisement of a large group of
voters" but not a deliberately intentional one.

The problem of the case, the PRB said, was inherent in the decision to
agree to coalition bargaining. A major complaint of appellants, which I did
not list in the bullets above, was that UAW issues got lost amid those
from the other unions. Assuming that were so, the PRB responded that
this was an inevitable consequence of coalition bargaining, which
implicates bargaining policy. I don't disagree.

But there are other issues. As to ballot wording, the PRB said it
understood the UAW could not dictate terms to the other unions. Certainly
this is true, but that doesn't speak to the question. First, there is no
suggestion in the facts that the three other unions were not equally
shocked and would not readily have approved a rerun. Second, even if
not, the DCC operated merely by mutual sufferance. Nothing prohibited
the UAW from ending the coalition on the spot and setting up a new
separate ratification procedure. This is what the unanimous membership
wanted anyway.

The PRB did not adopt the UAW's view that even if serious constitutional
violations were proved no rerun could be ordered. It did say "it would not
be appropriate now to reject the MGM Grand contract retroactively," but
this followed naturally from the holding two paragraphs earlier that
appellants failed to meet their burden.

In my opinion the lifting of over half the ballots and closure of the polls --
particularly the first closure which was due to the free-speech circulation of
the leaflets urging rejection -- should have brought an end to balloting on
the spot. Balloting should have ended whether the closure affected the
outcome or not, and whether it was done in good faith or not. The
persons who actually took the ballots were never identified. The
bargaining committee members supervising the ratification at the
balloting station in question were the ones who had the opportunity. But
it is not necessary to place blame to conclude that these events made a
"mockery" of the process, as the PRB said of a committeeperson election
in a 2005 decision.
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 16.

To dissipate the taint balloting should have begun all over on another day.
As noted elsewhere, in the officer election context some violations are so
rank that they justify a rerun regardless whether the outcome was
affected or not. Certainly a contract affecting members' terms and
conditions of employment for years to come is as important or more
important than the election of officeholders who will implement it.

Also in my opinion, if in fact the UAW rep did say before the balloting that
the ballot did not mean it that a "no" vote would result in a strike, this
would implicate the UAW principle that members are entitled to accurate
and complete information before they vote on a contract.

Finally, nothing in the constitution justifies the PRB's suggestion that

appellants' burden in a ratification appeal is higher than in any other
appeal.

The PRB added that the DCC arrangement does not diminish their
ratification rights under the UAW constitution. It thus seemed to reject
the UAW's position, quoted above, that in coalition bargaining certain
articles of the UAW constitution "teach the need for flexibility."
Article 19 section 3 ("After negotiations have been concluded with the employer, the
proposed contract or supplement shall be submitted to the vote of the Local Union
membership....");
see also article 50 section 1 ("When a dispute exists between an employer and a Local
Union concerning ... any other strikeable issue [the union] may issue a call for a strike
vote.").

It concluded with a lecture it has given many times before, about

the need for a process going forward to address similar concerns. The appellants who
spoke during oral argument were clearly proud of their association with the UAW with
its high democratic standards. These members should have a process to ensure their
enjoyment of those standards.

In this particular instance, the PRB said

[T]he disenfranchisement of a large group of voters that resulted from the closing of
the polls should have been addressed immediately on the day of ratification after it was
brought to the attention of the International Union. As soon as the staff in Detroit were
notified of this problem, some attempt should havhav e been made to ensure that all
UAW
 members were given the opportunity to vote in the ratification process, even if it
meant continuing the ratification process over until the next day.

This last advice was unnecesary to the decision. Appellants didn't carry
their burden, the PRB had just said, and there was nothing to remedy.
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09).

There are few other PRB decisions about bargaining. In 2005 the PRB said
a company might take an action not required by the contract to maintain
a good bargaining relation with the union. A 2000 decision noted that the
union got a discharged member an unconditional job offer at a different
plant despite that it had lost his arbitration in the plant where he worked.
In 2004 the PRB said a local can ask the company to hire individuals
related to local officials.
Nickell v Local 590, 2 PRB 47, 52 (1973) (under contract in which there was no right to
arbitrate and members declined to strike, local union and UAW advise PRB of
continuing efforts to secure appellant's reinstatement in bargaining),
Morgan v Local 6000, 6 PRB 1, 4 (bargaining involves giving, taking, and compromising
by all parties),
Rice v Local 719, 10 PRB 564, 567 (2000) ("[Members] may not use the grievance
procedure to achieve that which they have been unable to accomplish at the
bargaining table."),
Gaul v Local 488, 11 PRB 202, 207 (2001) (there being no contractual support for
appellants' grievance, and the union not having the option of striking locally as it did
successfully in 1998, the union had no leverage and had to withdraw the grievance
protesting implementation of a special attrition plan),
Garrish v GM Department, PRB Case 1480, p 13 (10/25/04) ("The appellants have not
identified any provision of ... the International Constitution that would have been
violated by the Local Union's request that GM hire two individuals who happened to be
 related to Local Union officials."),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11 (to maintain good bargaining
relationship with union company might reopen a closed grievance),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241, 244 (1999) (job offer obtained at different plant for
discharged member despite that union had lost arbitration),
Gillert v Local 594, PRB Case 1591 (6/10/08), pp 9, 12 (choice in negotiations for a local
agreeement was either to take the company's offer or consider a possible strike
action).

In several decisions, discussed elsewhere, the PRB has noted that

sometimes parties settle a matter on terms inconsistent with the contract.

Other decisions concern the PRB's power to remedy discriminatory

negotiation practices. Assuming there is ultimate ratification of the
resulting contract there would seem to be none, in light of article 33
section 3(f) limitation. That is the provision that says the PRB has no
jurisdiction to review official UAW bargaining policy. If the members have
ratified a discriminatory contract, I would think that makes it an official
UAW policy.

But what seems is not always. The PRB does review such claims. In one,
tool machine operators complained of a contract whereby laid-off tool &
die and machine repair members could bump into their classification.
They appealed first to a local committee which said it couldn't modify an
agreement. The IEB later explained the tool & die and machine repair
members had the skill to do the tool machine work but not vice-versa.
The PRB cited a 1967 precedent, and explained why it had jurisdiction:
However, we have recognized an exception to the principle of non-involvement in
 bargaining policy claims when it is charged that bargaining policies have been
deliberately structured so as to discriminate invidiously against an individual or group
of individuals. [footnote omitted] That is the type of claim with which we are confronted
here. Appellants contend that a numerically superior group of employees at Local 600,
namely tool and die makers and machine repair employees, have caused provisions to
be negotiated in the Local agreement which discriminate against the numerically
inferior TMO classification. The sole purpose of these provisions, it is claimed, is to
advantage tool and die makers and machine repairmen at the expense of tool maker
operators who have less political influence.

On the merits the PRB dismissed. It acknowledged that the bumping

scheme could be an aberration within Ford; but bumping into lower
classifications at the time of layoff is common in the industry, and not
discriminatory, it said. The dismissal was without prejudice to appellants
reasserting the claim to the CAC.
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 56-57 (1983),
citing Local 736 v UAW, 1 PRB 440, 442 (1967) (PRB not foreclosed from "examining
claims of discriminatory applications of collective bargaining contract provisions");
see also Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 135 (1960) (for many years males outnumbered
females, and membership voted for two separate non-interchangeable seniority
categories, held effects were not discriminatory),
Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 382, 386 (1997), modified 9 PRB 391 (1998) (when an effect
of bargaining policy determinations is claimed to have impacted upon a member in a
discriminatory way or was otherwise devoid of any rational basis PRB may consider the
claim).

Interest arbitration

To my knowledge, the UAW has no handbooks or manuals, and no

appeals have ever been filed, on the subject of "interest arbitration."

Generally, interest arbitration is a process whereby terms of a new contract

are settled not by the usual give-and-take of negotiations, but by an
arbitrator who considers proposals from both sides and then writes the
contract. The parties must then accept the decision, without strike or
lockout, and without membership ratification of the result.

Sometimes interest arbitration is required by external law and sometimes

it arises by agreement of the parties after traditional negotiations fail.

Rules and standards for interest arbitration can vary, and a complete
definition is beyond the scope of this manual. Sometimes the arbitrator
has great liberty in the process and sometimes he or she is restricted by
narrow requirements. Sometimes the rule is that the arbitrator must
accept one party's complete proposal and reject the other's, with no
compromise between them.

Because members don't ratify interest arbitration results, the IEB

interprets article 19 section 3 as giving them the right before the
arbitration starts to full information about the parties' final offers. The
ratification consists of a vote on whether to defend the union's position in
front of the arbitrator or accept management's offer.

The standards of such a vote are the normal ones under article 19 section
3. It must be at a meeting called especially for that purpose or through
such other procedure approved by the regional director to encourage
great participation.
Article 19 section 3 interpretation 2 ("Where, pursuant to a prior contractual agreement,
bargaining occurs in a context where interest arbitration is the exclusive mens to
resolve impasse, the membership will be presented with full information about the final
offers by management and the union, and will be given an opportunity to vote on
whether to accept management's offer or proceed to interest arbitration in defense of
the union's final offer. The meeting at which such vote is taken shall be conducted in
accordance with the normal procedures for ratification votes. This procedure shall
constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 19, Section 3.") (11/10/05).

Strike authorization

Affected units have the right to authorize a strike and ratify any
agreement. A local on strike must have authorization from the IEB or
president.
Article 19 sections 3-4; article 50 sections 1, 4, 5;
compare Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 793 n 18 (1990) (dissent) (PRB majority's
rationale could be used to justify certain wildcat strikes),
Garrish v GM Department, PRB Case 1480, pp 13-14 (10/25/04) (appellants did not
perfect an appeal of IEB's decision to authorize local strike),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), pp 3-6, 10 (members disciplined for
unauthorized refusal to work mandatory overtime).

Authorization is also required to "encourage" employees of any employer

to strike or concertedly refuse to work or handle goods. One appeal dealt
with trial convictions affirmed by the IEB of members who violated a local
membership resolution not to work overtime during contract negotiations.
For unexplained reasons the UAW had not authorized the resolution.

An assumption of the PRB decision was that the "encouragement" clause

covers concerted refusals to work overtime but the "strike" clause does
not. The decision affirmed the IEB, holding that the "encouragement"
clause applied only to refusals by employees of a "secondary" employer;
the employer here was "primary" so the section didn't apply.

It defined "primary" and "secondary" by analogy to the LMRA, not by

resort to constitutional language, convention debates, IEB or presidential
interpretations, or other UAW sources. Accordingly the decision is
questionable. In ordinary English usage "any" employer includes all
employers including primary employers.
Article 50 section 4;
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 378-79 (1966);
compare Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 376 (1983) (PRB must look to the language of the
constitution to decide appeal),
McKenzie v UAW, 4 PRB 73, 76 (1984) (discerning apparent intent of convention without
reference to debates),
Slawienski v Local 774, 8 PRB 21, 24 (1993) (ratification may occur after
implementation).

A vote requesting strike authorization requires a 2/3 majority to pass.

Ordinarily the election committee need not conduct it. Ballots should not
contain editorial verbiage. The EPC promise of the right to vote in free
and fair "elections" applies to these votes. Only members in good
standing can vote.
 Article 50 section 1(a);
proceedings, 24th constitutional convention (1974), pp 230-31 (debate on procedure for
strike votes);
Sabin v Local 599, 5 PRB 566, 569-70 (1988) (ballot verbiage should not restrict voters
to biased choices),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 119, 122 (2001) (local bylaw may provide that shop
committee conduct strike vote).

Strikes, Lockouts

Commonly, UAW contracts prohibit strikes and suits over grievable

matters, requiring the union to settle them through the grievance
procedure exclusively. Exceptions are sometimes spelled out for certain
issues -- work standards, health and safety, outsourcing -- where
mid-contract strikes are allowed after special procedures are followed.
Interestingly, no appeal has ever resolved such an issue.
But see Gaul v Local 488, 11 PRB 202, 207 (2001) (there being no contractual support
for appellants' grievance, and the union not having the option of striking locally as it
did successfully in 1998, the union had no leverage and had to withdraw the grievance
protesting implementation of a special attrition plan);
Davidson v Local 1282, CAC, session 1/81 (CAC declines an opinion on propriety of a
possible future sympathy strike by a local unit).

But in one unusual appeal, the PRB said the union could strike or sue over
a grievance which had been withdrawn by a unit of an amalgamated local
and reinstated by the LEB. The opinion doesn't say so, but this could be
explained if the contract were about to expire, in which case the
no-strike-no-litigation promise would expire with it.
The Unit complied with the Local Executive Board's directive and presented the
grievance to the Company once again, but Management stood firm. At this point, the
Local Union had to decide whether to pursue the limited options available to it such as
a strike or a lawsuit in an attempt to compel the Company to reinstate McMillan.

McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555 (5/7/07), pp 4 n 13, 10, 13.

As the PRB says just below, a strike is the equivalent of war. It requires
the utmost in discipline, solidarity, and democratic input.
Article 19 sections 2-4 (local committee participates in all conferences and negotiations,
contract requires local vote, approval, and ratification, IEB can reject local approval).

The PRB explained, in an appeal of convictions for violating a mandate

against working overtime during contract negotiations:
[W]e are keenly aware of the philosophical and pragmatic bases for sentiments which
have found expression in such national policies as the guaranteed right to an individual
to refrain from engaging in concerted activity or the right of self determination by the
various states on the question of so-called "right-to-work" laws. We fine fin d these
same sentiments embodied in such challenges as the one presently under
consideration.

Yet we cannot hold with appellants that there is some higher law or established tradition
which makes it inherently improper for the UAW to insist on compliance by its members
with the policies adopted by a majority of those directly involved. A union in a sense is
a microcosm of our society -- a society which has dedicated itself to rule by majority
voice.

The laws which a union adopts are, like any other laws, binding upon those who
comprise its society. Through collective action labor has found a means to realize a
more equitable distribution of the total economic product. But effective collective efforts
 depend for their success upon the degree of adherence by all who are involved. To the
extent that those who for personal or other motivations withhold their support of the
collective action, the interest of the collective majority is damaged. Labor then must
have a means of enforcing its laws upon those who would disobey them for, if it
cannot, then the sources of its strength are undermined.

Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 379-80 (1966);

compare Adams v Local 148, 4 PRB 332, 338 (1985) (strike settlement
prohibiting union from charging line crossers with unbecoming conduct does
not bar members from charging them),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 6-8, 14-15 (because of
nearly-four-year delay occasioned partially by unreasonable behavior of
appellants' counsel, "equity favors a dismissal" of charge of unbecoming
conduct which otherwise would have been referred to a trial committee).

The PRB explained again, in an appeal concerning a 1962 strike against

Doehler-Jarvis. Hourly-rated supervisors crossed the line and went in the
plant. Later they were ordered to do production work. At the time the
supervisors were on honorable withdrawal, with the right to hold and
accumulate seniority while out of the unit. After the strike the company
had cut-backs, and they returned to the unit. They were brought up on
charges for doing the production work, not just for crossing the line.
Pursuant to article 17 section 10 they had remained subject to union rules
while on withdrawal. At trial no specific evidence was presented against
them. They moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, which was denied.
Then they testified and admitted the material facts. They defended saying
as supervisors they had no union protection from unjust discharge. They
were convicted and unspecified penalties were assessed.

The PRB majority upheld the penalties, correctly in my view. Doing

production work during a strike is detrimental to the collective interest of
the members, it said. The constitution is a contract among all the
members. As supervisors defendants' relation with the union was not
severed, for they continued to accumulate seniority. The union made no
attempt to control their activities while supervisors, and took no action
until their return to the unit. They knew when they took supervisory jobs
a strike could happen. The majority concluded:
A strike in the labor-management field is analogous to a war in international affairs.
Comfort and aid to one side is disloyalty to the other. The appellants by crossing the
picket line entered what was, from the Union's point of view, a beleaguered city, an
enemy post. While within the "enemy's" lines, were they doing aught that made the
strike a less effectual instrument for bringing management to terms, than it otherwise
might have been? A strike is not only an economic weapon; it is also a human
situation. People are out of work. Anxiety and apprehension increase as the days pass.
Workers' families are daily asking their provider when will they resume work, since
some of the children need new clothing or the house requires repairs. Beyond the
picket lines and within the plant were these supervisors, formerly their colleagues in
the Union and at the plant. Is it not fair to expect in the light of such a tense situation,
and since their present position was theirs by choice, that appellants on returning to
full membership in the Union would present some evidence purporting to show that
they did not render the kind of help to management which would prolong the strike and
work to the detriment of their striking brethren?

Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 313 (1965);

compare proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 378-79
(debate on return of forepersons who have crossed picket lines to bargaining
unit with large severance pay).

Sometimes a strike will change into a lockout.

Local 2036, v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 136 (2001) (a month after strike for new contract
 members voted to reject management's offer and return to work under the old contract
while continuing to negotiate for a new one, but company locked them out).

The prohibition of belonging only to one UAW local is relaxed for members
on strike.
Article 6 section 10.

Some decisions have concerned strike benefits and expenses.

Article 12 section 14,
article 16 section 14;
Administrative letter, volume 49 # 1 (8/1/00) (strike benefit rules);
Appeal of Collins, 1 PRB 694, 695-98 (1971) (good standing necessary for receipt of
strike benefits),
Local 248 v UAW, 2 PRB 799, 804-05 (1980) (strike benefit rules must be uniformly
applied),
Local 1520, 3 PRB 170, 172-73 (1981) (no expense reimbursement in unauthorized local
strike);
compare proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 384-87 (debate on
adding article 48 section 6 which covers collection of owed non-dues money such as
overpaid strike benefits).

"Arbitration has been an equitable substitute for relying on the

membership's willingness to strike over each and every unresolved
grievance."
Handbook, p 68.
Ratification

Table of Contents

Several decisions consider whether there is a right to ratify in particular

situations.
Daly, 1 PRB 816, 819-20 (1973) (local had right to ratify transfer agreement, but UAW
had right to impose jurisdictional settlement),
Gaw v UAW, 4 PRB 280, 284 (1985) (no ratification of agreement which restates existing
agreement),
Hairston appealing Tackett v Local 1623, 10 PRB 191, 197 (1998) (no ratification of
grievance settlements),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 19 (interim agreements which
alter wages or conditions are supplements and must be submitted for ratification),
Donovan v Ford Department, PRB Cases 1526, 1542 (10/25/06), pp 18-19 (when the
VX-54 program left the plant, the local's separate unit operating under a modern
operating agreement disappeared, and the local's sister unit operating under traditional
work rules absorbed the former VX-54 members, all by operation of the overall local
agreement, so there thee was no right of the former VX-54 members to ratify the
traditional work rules),
Thomas v Local 155, PRB Case 1543 (1/24/07), pp 8-10 (no right to ratify plant closing
agreement which is in the nature of a grievance settlement).

According to two PRB dissenters in 1974, ratification must precede

implemention, and nothing can remedy a contract erroneously
implemented without proper ratification. In effect, the dissenters seemed
to say, such appeals become "moot" at the point of implementation.
According to the president's office arguing an appeal in 2009, with
incompletely-explained exceptions it is doubtful that serious constitutional
violations during ratification would justify a re-vote after notice is given
that contract was ratified.
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 111, 117 (1974) (dissent),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 144, 150 (1974) (dissent);
see also Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) p 9.

I don't agree. First, a member cannot appeal until the result is

announced. The president's view would make the whole appeal process
vacuous.

Second, the UAW constitution is on the UAW's website. When ratification

results are announced, UAW members know article 33 is there to accept
protests and that decisions of the CAC and PRB are final and binding (even
though PRB decisions under the EPC are not). Employers probably know
the same. In any event good faith bargaining would require the UAW to
tell an employer right away if an appeal were started, so it would know
not to consider anything was final till the appeal was done.

If the UAW wants to expedite the appeal it is free to do so. Prudent

appellants should ask it to. Indeed the union could amend the constitution
to expedite time limits of all ratification appeals. For years the PRB has
asked it to set guidelines in this area.

One decision in 2005 held that ratification may precede negotiation if

proceeding in that order is part of the union's negotiating strategy. The
union had combined votes of GM and Delphi members as part of a
strategy of preserving GM-level benefits for Delphi members.
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 20-21.

Without proper ratification an agreement is of no force and effect as far

as the membership is concerned.
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 472 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969).

Shop committee settlements resulting in changes to or modifications of a

contract must be constitutionally ratified. This includes verbal changes or
modifications agreed to by the shop committee. Verbal changes and
modifications must first be reduced to writing and given to requesting
members.
Article 19 section 1 (all agreements must be reduced to writing and properly signed by all
parties);
Espinosa v Local 719, PRB Case 1418 (12/18/02), p 6 n 10 ("handshake" agreement
valid).

An area of great interest has been the ratification rights of skilled

members. The identically-worded 1974 Liddell and Poszich decisions
concerned article 19 section 3 in light of historical UAW leadership
statements to the effect that skilled members had a separate right to
approve/disapprove a contract.

In the 1973 Ford ratification, production agreement production workers

had approved it and skilled members had rejected it; the overall majority
approved. The UAW declared the contract ratified, but asked the company
for further meetings on the issue of voluntary overtime, asserting that
issue was the only "valid" reason for the skilled rejection.

At the PRB the UAW argued successfully that article 19 section 3 provided
only a separate ratification procedure if a local requested it, not a right of
separate approval. Two PRB members dissented. The controversial
decisions produced an extended resolution and discussion at the
convention two months later. During debate the leadership agreed that if
both skilled and production members rejected an agreement, the IEB had
no authority to overrule that and it never had.
Article 19 section 3 (IEB may approve ratification procedure whereby apprenticable
skilled and related, production, and office workers, technicians, and engineers vote
separately on common matters and in the same vote on separate matters;
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92 (1974) (right of IEB to reject agreement approved by majority
implies skilled trades' approved request for separate ratification means that on
approval by production workers and rejection by skilled trades IEB will determine the
meaning of the skilled rejection and attempt to renegotiate with employer),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125 (1974) (right of IEB to reject agreement approved by majority
implies skilled trades' approved request for separate ratification means that on
approval by production workers and rejection by skilled trades IEB will determine the
meaning of the skilled rejection and attempt to renegotiate with employer),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 111, 115 (1974) (dissent) (right to ratify means right to
approve),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 144, 148 (1974) (dissent) (right to ratify means right to
approve);
resolution, proceedings, 24th constitutional convention (1974), pp 264-80 (interpreting
PRB decisions in Liddell and Poszich not to alter the membership's right to ratify under
article 19 section 3; resolved that the IEB will continue to apply ratification procedures
in a flexible, coordinated, and beneficial manner);
 see also Kizelowicz, 1 PRB 705 (1971) (application for separate skilled trades ratification;
historically UAW as industrial union has presented one contract for production and
skilled together).

If a contract is not properly ratified in one unit, it will still be

implemented if it was properly ratified by a majority of all the affected
units. This is the same rule as in elections.
Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 416 (1967);
see also Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 17-18 (union
demonstrated that the agreement would have been ratified by the majority of the
members of Delphi locals even if their votes had been counted separately from
members of GM locals).

Grievance settlements and implementations of existing contracts need not

be ratified.
Iverson v UAW, 1 PRB 221, 224 (1961) (application of principles of master agreement),
Boldt v UAW, 4 PRB 255 (1984) (implementation of agreement),
Smeltzer v Local 652, 5 PRB 669, 671 (1989) (agreement in the course of administering
contract),
Thayer v Region 3, 5 PRB 759, 763 (1990) (deviation from waivable guidelines under
national jobs program),
Mutchler v TOP Department, 6 PRB 488, 494-96 (1992) (implementation of employer's
need to reduce costs without resorting to a general layoff),
Ellis v Local 326, 8 PRB 244, 247-48 (1994) (memorialization of agreement of how
provision was to be implemented in light of changing circumstances),
Beaves v Local 1268, 10 PRB 415, 422-23 (1999) (alternative means of manning work
when electricians refuse work opportunity),
Rosa v Local 1645, PRB Case 1463 (11/22/04), pp 8, 10 (agreements regarding the
application of contracts to existing conditions do not require membership approval or
ratification),
 Hodges v Local 600, PRB Case 1618 (6/2/09), p 10 (administrative decisions made in the
course of a contract need no ratification).

There is no right to ratify actions of a committee authorized by an

agreement to implement it or to negotiate subsidiary provisions. The
authorization must be in clear enabling language. In one appeal the PRB
allowed a skilled trades and apprentice committee to negotiate layoff
priorities for apprentices and employees-in-training in different ways in
various plants around the country without requiring ratification. It added
a caution that some future action of the committee might require
ratification.
Ferrell v UAW, 2 PRB 835, 842-43 (1979) (delegation to skilled trades and apprentice
committee);
see also Wooley v Local 553, 1 PRB 571, 575 (1970) (no right to ratify actions of
trustees under insurance agreement, it is common for agreements to delegate
prerogatives to special committees),
Calloway v Local 887, 2 PRB 428, 440 (1977) (delegation to classifications committee),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 14 (president acknowledges
PRB might have jurisdiction to review an unratified agreement which changed a
pre-existing agreement which lacked proper enabling language).

In a 1996 appeal an MOU was created by virtue of American Axle assuming

a contract of General Motors and then agreeing to additional provisions.
Reps of the UAW GM department came to a local meeting to explain the
deal and tell the members they had no ratification rights. Several members
appealed, but the president said the interpretation was obviously correct
and denied it under article 13 section 8 and article 33 section 2(b). The
former section routes certain types of appeal only to the
IEB and then the convention. The latter section limits and shortens
certain types of appeal; toward the end, it says:
For an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement by a National Department or
Regional Director, where the interpretation is so obviously correct that no purpose will
be served by an appeal, and where it is consistent with other provisions of this
Constitution and International Union policy, the appeal shall be directly to the
International President. There shall be no further appeal from that decision.

Article 33 section 2(b), second-to-last sentence.

Appellants went to the PRB on the issue of whether they could appeal,
arguing that this sentence was circular. A PRB majority disagreed,
explaining:
In our view, however, the language in question is comprehensible and specific. It
requires that in order for the President to exercise his § 2(b) authority there must first
have been an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement by a National
Department or Regional Director and a declaration that the interpretation is obviously
correct, and is consistent with other terms of the Constitution and with International
Policy. The procedural prerequisite is important: If a Regional Director or National
Department declares an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement that has
been challenged by a member or members of the Union, obviously correct and
consistent with other provisions of the Constitution and International Union policy,
some explanation for the ruling would have to be provided, an explanation which the
challengers could then attempt to refute. The challenging members can then state their
reasons as to why the interpretation of the Department was not obviously correct,
contradicted other provisions of the Constitution, or was inconsistent with International
policy. Thus, when the matter is appealed to the President he will have an actual case
or controversy to decide.

In terms of the case before us, the President, himself a former Director of the Union's
GM Department, was intimately familiar with the GM Department's consistently applied
 position that a memorandum agreement negotiated pursuant to the provisions of
Document 91 was not a contract or supplement that was subject to ratification.

We are satisfied that the Department's consistent interpretation of Document 91 since

its first inclusion in the collective bargaining agreement that the implementation of its
provisions is not subject to ratification is tantamount to a declaration that its position in
this respect is obviously correct.

...

Given the Department's consistent position over the years in its interpretation of
Document 91 there was no need for it to make a formal declaration to Thompson and
her colleagues that its interpretation was "obviously correct." The President explained
to Thompson why the Department's interpretation was obviously correct and she has
had the opportunity to advance to the President the very same arguments she has
advanced to the PRB as to why it was not.

That is, for the limitation on appeal to kick in, the department or director
must have declared the interpretation obviously correct -- or must have
engaged in a course of conduct tantamount to such a declaration --
before the appeal started.

The majority also suggested that the president waive the time limits
whereby appellants could appeal the part of his ruling that was under
article 13 section 8 to the IEB.
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 67, 71-73, 78 nn 12, 16 (1996).

Dissenting PRB members objected:

First of all, the point at issue has to be "an interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement by a National Department or a Regional Director." Next that interpretation
 has to be "so obviously correct that no purpose will be served by appeal." In addition,
the interpretation has to be "consistent with other provisions of the Constitution and
International Union Policy." If those three (apparently objective) conditions are
satisfied, then the Appeal shall be directly the President and there shall be no further
appeal from his decision. This provision does not state that if "in the opinion of the
President" his contract interpretation is obviously correct and consistent with union
policy, then any review of his decision by the International Executive Board is
excluded. This critical factor of whose opinion counts is left ambiguous by the wording
of Article 33(2)(b). The PRB's majority answer is that the President's opinion about
those three conditions is absolutely final and binding.

What the majority ignores, though, is that this is not an Article 33(2)(b) case at all.
Thompson did not write to the Union asking for an interpretation by the GM National
Department of a collective bargaining agreement. Instead, Thompson and her follow
Local 235 members requested a ratification vote about a memorandum recently
negotiated by the International with GM and American Axle. The validity of Thompson's
claim turns on a complex interplay among three different documents -- Article 19 of the
UAW Constitution, Document 91 of the GM-UAW Agreement, and the specifics of the
American Axle-UAW Memorandum. Rather than simply an interpretation of the
GM-UAW Agreement (as asserted by President Bieber), the true focus of this dispute is
about whether the detailed American Axle-UAW "Impact" Memorandum was the type of
negotiated agreement that requires a ratification vote under Article 19 of the UAW
Constitution.

Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 76-77 (1996) (dissent).

In a later appeal the PRB extended the Thompson ruling to include

interpretations of contracts by local unions. A dispute arose in the local
about a company summer vacation shutdown. The shop committee
resolved it by agreeing to an MOU. Members appealed claiming the right
to ratify. The president at one point referred the dispute to the regional
director, but the decision shows no investigation or interpretation by the
director. The president eventually upheld the shop committee's action as
obviously correct under article 33 section 2(b) and not further appealable.
The PRB agreed.
Hairston appealing Tackett v Local 1623, 10 PRB 191 (1998);
see also Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), p 20
(where article 33 section 2(b) is invoked by UAW, PRB has jurisdiction to consider
whether appealed decision was in fact based on an obviously correct interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement),
Lee v UAW, 11 PRB 546, 549 (2002) (PRB describes article 33 section 2(b) as "an effort
to eliminate ... essentially frivolous grievance appeals");
Chappell, CAC, session 11/93 (Ford department's interpretation of apprenticeship
standards is obviously correct).

Ratification issues may implicate relations with the employer. But that is
irrelevant to the merits of a ratification appeal.
We recognize that this determination [that an agreement is of no force and effect] may
have no effect on the legal obligations of the Union to the employer which are
governed by a different set of legal principles.

Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 475 n 7 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969);
but see Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 117 (1974) (dissent) (once erroneously
ratified contract is implemented there is no purpose in nullifying it),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 150 (1974) (dissent) (once erroneously ratified
contract is implemented there is no purpose in nullifying it).

The legal principles mentioned are those of external law, mentioned

elsewhere. As noted there, such law is mostly beyond the scope of this
manual. But on the face of it, I expect employers are aware of the
constitution's ratification and appeal provisions on the UAW website, and
know an appealed ratification may be overturned by the PRB or CAC. I
expect the UAW would tell an employer immediately if an appeal were
filed. Appealing members might also tell the employer. So even if the
employer were not at fault in the ratification process, it would know to
wait for finality. I don't see why a court would disagree.

Ratification procedures

Several decisions discuss the procedures for ratification.

Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508 (1969) (per capita ratification procedure questioned),
Darling v Local 499, 3 PRB 55, 60-61 (1980) (information meeting and balloting held
separately),
Local 72 v UAW, 3 PRB 440 (1983) (standing of members of one local to challenge
ratification procedures in another local),
Honey v Local 94, 5 PRB 756 (1989) (dual ballots for local and national agreements),
Slawienski v Local 774, 8 PRB 21, 24 (1993) (ratification may occur after
implementation),
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 138, 140, 142 (2001) (administratorship justified by IEB
partially on ground that ratification vote not conducted by election committee, rationale
rejected by PRB),
Delling v Local 659, 11 PRB 273, 276 (2001) ("substantial evidence" burden of election
appeals apparently applied to ratification appeals),
Delling v Local 659, 11 PRB 273, 277 (2001) (testimony of voters as to how they voted
on a contract ratification is inherently unreliable),
Baxter v Local 659, 11 PRB 312, 316 (2001) (no right to have challengers in ratification
vote),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 17 (combining ratification
votes of GM and Delphi members to assure ratification by the widest possible margin
does not run afoul of EPC),
 Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 20-21 (ratification may
precede negotiation if that order is part of the union's negotiating strategy),
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), p 12 ("We do find it significant that no
active member of UAW Local 1250 joined in this appeal. ... The fact that no active
member of Local 1250 joined in this appeal supports the conclusion that the
membership accepted the process and the result."),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) p 7 (UAW asserts: "There were aspects of the
ratification process that were not done in accordance with UAW practices. A UAW
ratification process would not be conducted by the same Bargaining Committee that
negotiated the contract. The UAW would not have prepared a ballot sugesting that a no
vote would necessarily result in a strike.").

The UAW's practice is not to notify sick or laid-off members, or members

with preferential recall rights, of a ratification vote.
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 25 (1980).

Good standing status is not necessary to participate in a ratification vote.

The reasoning is obscure. Article 19 governing ratifications does not use
the phrase "member in good standing," it is true. It only uses the term
"member." But so does article 33 which governs appeals, and appeals are
limited to "members in good standing."

A member not in good standing is not a member at all. Nevertheless, in a

1997 officer election appeal appellant Rick Doty pointed out that in a
1995 contract ratification vote, members whose dues were not up to date
were allowed to get in after showing only a picket card. The company had
stopped checking off dues due to a labor dispute. Brother Doty therefore
argued such members should have been allowed to vote in an officer
election six months later. Instead, the local had voided the ballots of the
delinquent members in the officer election. Therefore, Doty said, "only
about 25% of the people represented are eligible to vote" in the officer
election. The PRB answered:
The Union is quite correct in its legal analysis of this appeal. As it correctly points out,
both the Constitution of the Union and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA) provide that if a member is in good standing he or she must be permitted
to vote in elections for local union officers. There is nothing in either the Constitution or
the LMRDA that extends this requirement to ratification votes. [footnote omitted]

Doty v Local 974, 9 PRB 443, 446-48 (1997);

see also EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 25 (1980) (fired members with
preferential recall rights would have been allowed to vote had they appeared
at ratification meeting);
compare Kelly v UAW, 5 PRB 484, 488 (1988) (fired member, who failed to
certify his continuing eligibility every six months with the local under article
16 section 19, lost good standing and therefore "[h]aving ceased to be a
member of the Union, he "no longer has any rights under [the]
Constitution]," and cannot appeal).

As noted elsewhere, retirees may not vote on contracts.

If a ratification vote occurs at a meeting, the notice of the meeting must

state that the meeting is for the purpose of ratification. Ratification can
occur by such other procedure approved by the regional director as will
encourage greater participation in voting. The issue of what constitutes
great participation was argued to the PRB in one appeal without a
decision, as noted elsewhere and in the note just below.
Article 19 section 3;
proceedings, 26th constitutional convention (1980), pp 279-83 (in debate of amendment
 to article 19 section 3 to allow ratification votes to be other than at meetings, president
says "The constitutional provision now demands that you have the ratification at a
meeting especially called for that purpose. This change would allow you to go to the
plant gates or any other way you wanted to do it, as long as you maximize the
participation");
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 377 (1966) (notice implicitly advising that
recommendations of leadership of possible courses of action related to union strategy
in collective bargaining was sufficient),
Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 414, 416 (1967) (vote without advance notice was a
nullity),
Patterson v Local 719, 5 PRB 672, 675 (1989) (proof of adequacy of notice is that large
number of members voted);
compare Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391 (2002) (under election guide the union
has a responsibility to maximize voter participation in officer elections; by scheduling
an interim election at the local hall for only four hours on a Sunday the election
committee had to know the turnout would be very light; though the low turnout might
be explained by the fact it was an interim election involving only a single LEB at-large
position, by waiting a day it is virtually certain there would have been a substantially
larger turnout, ensuring that the candidate elected would more accurately reflect th e
preferences of the electorate);
Lapso v Local 1250, IEB Decision (8/15/06), affirmed on other grounds, PRB Case 1550
(2/20/07), record pp 157-58, (in nationwide ratification that was expected to be a close
vote, vote at one local went forward at the hall without referral of encouragement-
of-greater-participation issue to regional director, despite that 2000 members
constituting more than half the plant were home that week on a temporary layoff;
because national press was reporting heavily on the auto industry it was necessary to
get the vote done, despite that some locals might be disadvantaged by the timing; all
active members in the local had or had access to summary highlights and meeting
notices well before the vote; appeal arguing that to encourage greater participation the
vote in that local should have either been conducted by mail or delayed till the end of
temporary layoff rejected, despite that 95-vote change of count in that local could have
changed the national ratification outcome).

Historically the UAW has distributed highlights of tentative agreements to

members before ratification meetings. It has also provided copies of the
full text to the locals for membership review at the halls, though it has
not always given the full text to members individually. In a 2001 decision
however the PRB held that providing information prior to a ratification
meeting is not required. If "accurate and complete" highlights -- which
contain all substantial modifications to the old agreement -- are
distributed at the meeting and negotiators are present to answer
questions about ambiguous points, this gives members sufficient
information on which to vote.
Karras v Local 653, 11 PRB 183, 186, 188, 189 (2001), reconsideration denied
(5/11/01);
see also Callaway v Local 887, 2 PRB 428, 435 (1977) (union's duty is to accurately
summarize changes in substantive portions of the agreement affecting membership
rights),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 17 (1980) (ratification permitted on same day
tentative agreement was reached),
Brown v Local 1832, 3 PRB 201, 208-09 (1982) (though UAW rep may have
unintentionally misled membership and as a result of oversight some negotiating
committee members may have signed a document in error, agreement was not
imposed on membership without its consent),
Hofsess v Local 163, 6 PRB 66, 70-71 (1990) (while all available information should be
disclosed before ratification vote, in this appeal the essential information was
disclosed),
Grant v Local 163, 6 PRB 472, 476 (1992) (normally only highlights not text of
agreement are available at time of ratification);
compare Pearsall v Local 12, PRB Case 1475, p 7 (5/26/04), pp 3 n 5, 4, 7 (charge of
unbecoming conduct for holding ratification vote without special meeting to inform
members of the issues dismissed),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 18 (highlights adequately
informed members that no second ratification vote on supplement to be negotiated was
 intended).

Unlike election procedures, contract ratification procedures are not

spelled out in the constitution. The PRB has recommended numerous
times that the constitution spell them out.
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 510, 513 (1969) (PRB recommendation to clarify per capita
procedures),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 103 (1974) (constitution provides no procedures for conduct of
ratification votes),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 136 (1974) (constitution provides no procedures for conduct
of ratification votes),
Ferrell v UAW, 2 PRB 835, 841 (1979) (PRB may review claims of improper ratificaton
under article 19 sections 3-4),
Baxter v Local 659, 10 PRB 337, 340 (1999) (PRB suggests that the constitution address
procedures for the conduct of ratification votes and challenges),
Baxter v Local 659, 11 PRB 312, 316 (2001) ("Some clarification to address the role of
challengers might help respond to the procedural misgivings raised in this type of case,
but that is a judgment for the members of the union to make, and to this point they
have not done so."),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 21 ("The International Union
has the authority and the flexibility to establish ratification procedures, even one which
provides for ratification of a Supplement prior to its negotiation."),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) pp 10-12 ("There was enough evidence of
irregular practices and/or misconduct during the ratification vote on the MGM Grand
contract to establish the need for a process going forward to address similar concerns.
... The UAW needs to develop strategies to respond to serious deviations from its
practices when they occur. ... We encourage the International Union to establish a
process for members of UAW Local 7777 through which they can raise concerns about
bargaining and ratification procedures at a time and in a context where those concerns
can be effectively addressed.").
Conventions
Table of Contents

The highest tribunal of the UAW is the convention. Between conventions

authority lies in the IEB. Between IEB meetings the president has
administrative authority.
Article 3,
article 7 section 1;
Davis, 1 PRB 214, 218 (1961),
Shinn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 250, 254 (1991).

Sometimes the "convention" is referred to as the "constitutional

convention."
2002 constitutional convention call.

The constitution itself does not use that phrase, nor does it refer to the
"bargaining conventions" which the UAW customarily calls in same years
as "constitutional conventions." In 2002 they were held consecutively in
one city, but every other year that I know of the two were separated by a
period of months, and held in separate cities.

Retirees are not barred from serving, even at bargaining conventions.

Valid credentials of delegates determine the validity of the proceedings of
a state CAP convention. I assume the same principle would apply to any
other convention.
Article 8 section 17 (credentials committee determines validity of delegates' credentials,
has power to order reruns of delegate elections);
Conroy v UAW, 1 PRB 493, 494-96 (1968) (PRB has no jurisdiction over elections of
convention delegates),
compare Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 69 (1973) (validity of selection of CAP council delegates
determines validity of CAP council proceedings).

Only delegates may speak before a convention.

Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 386-87 (non-delegate not
recognized).

Convention delegate elections are discussed elsewhere.

The convention is highly political. At one, after the surprise election of a

regional director, the Administration Caucus met. A constitutional
amendment was drafted to eliminate the region. At the time,
amendments not originating in the constitution committee had to be
submitted three weeks before the convention. The convention adopted the
amendment anyway. The president later argued the three-week rule was
only "precatory." Without noticing the three-week rule, the PRB said the
EPC does not prohibit political maneuvers at conventions.
Article 8 section 15 (three-week rule of 1998 constitution);
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), PP 1-4 (EPC does not prohibit political
 maneuvers at conventions);
compare Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 857, 864 (1981) (amendment to local bylaw which
was noticed only four days before membership meeting violated existing bylaw
regarding bylaw amendment procedure; notice period was too short; therefore action
amending bylaw at meeting was of no force and effect).

The convention speaks through its resolutions and constitutional

amendments. To discern convention intent the PRB sometimes also
reviews convention debates.

Convention delegates do not automatically pass every motion brought

forward by the leadership.
Proceedings, 22nd constitutional convention, pp 192-95 (1970) (amendment would have
extended time limit to file appeals from 60 days to six months, defeated),
proceedings, 26th constitutional convention, pp 188-89 (1980) (amendment would have
rationalized local determinations as to number of alternate delegates at conventions,
defeated),
proceedings, 26th constitutional convention, pp 206-08 (1980) (amendment would have
required three-year terms for stewards and committee, defeated),
proceedings, 27th constitutional convention, pp 234-35, 237-38 (1983) (amendment
would have made penalty for frivolous charges more severe than the penalty for
malicious charges, changed at suggestion of delegate on the floor and then passed).

Minority reports of committee members are allowed.

Proceedings, 29th constitutional convention, pp 252-53 (1989) (organizing).

Each convention votes on its own rules, typically after a recommendation

by an IEB-appointed rules committee. Again typically, the rules provide
that resolutions and constitutional amendments come to the convention
floor only on recommendation of the convention's IEB-appointed
resolution committee or constitution committee, respectively.
Notwithstanding, delegates in a floor vote can call out a resolution or
amendment not endorsed by one of the committees. I don't know of it
ever being done.
Proceedings, 22nd constitutional convention, pp 201-03 (1970) (predecessor of article 10
section 7, ability of member to hold UAW or local office if the member is also a member
of or subservient to a political organization which owes allegiance to a government
other than the US or Canada, call defeated),
proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 378-79 (article 17 section 3,
forepersons returning to the bargaining unit, call defeated),
proceedings, 24th constitutional convention (1974), pp 224-29 (article 48 section 6,
retroactivity of procedure for collecting non-dues money, defeated);
compare rules, 2002 convention, rule # 9 (resolutions or constitutional changes
submitted by locals shall be reported out of committee when requested by 256
delegates in a show of hands).

The CAC is a standing committee of the convention. Its decisions are final
and binding decisions of the convention itself.
Special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173 (CAC decisions are considered
convention decisions and are final and binding);
see also article 33 section 3(e) Jurisdiction and Procedure ("All decisions of the [CAC}
shall be final and binding.").

The PRB usually follows precedents set by the convention.

The PRB rejected one appeal that challenged the IEB's authority to
reaffiliate the UAW with the AFL-CIO. The appeal pointed out the
convention had made all past affiliation decisions. But in this instance,
the IEB scheduled regional conventions having only advisory power. They
voted 63-37% for reaffiliation, and the IEB then did reaffiliate.

The president argued that the smaller regional meetings had freer more
robust debate and were hence more democratic than ordinary conventions
where only a minute fraction of delegates get to speak; in any event article
2 section 6 authorized the IEB to proceed without a convention.
The PRB agreed that despite the past practice, under the constitution the
IEB could act.
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370 (1983);
see also Downs v IEB, 8 PRB 548, 552-54 (1995) (issue of IEB's deviation from a political
convention resolution supporting single-payer national health care is not justiciable).

One curious appeal concerned the election of the director of region 1-A at
the 1970 convention. Appellant Robert Battle lost 417.585 to 405.931 to
Marcellius Ivory, and challenged some of Brother Ivory's votes from Local
1313. The local had been allotted 7 delegates who could cast 46 votes, or
6.571 votes per delegate. Brother Battle noted that two delegates in Local
1313 said to have cast their votes had not been properly credentialed.
Separately, Battle noted only one of the local's seven delegates,
credentialed or not, was visible on the floor during the vote, and under
convention rules that one could cast only 8 votes. A poll was requested of
the Local 1313 delegates but was refused by the chair, wrongly, the PRB
held.

The PRB first disposed of the credentials challenge saying it was merely
an administrative matter. As to the missing delegates it said:
 We take judicial notice of the propensity of members of delegations at Conventions to
be at places other then where official business is being transacted.

Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606, 612 (1970);

compare article 8 section 17(c).

Had the local's delegates been polled they would have been summoned to
appear, the PRB held, and non-attending delegates normally keep
themselves on call for this purpose. None of the local's delegates say
after the fact that the delegation did not intend to cast all 46 votes for
Ivory, and that defeats the appeal, the PRB said.

There are several remarkable points here. First, articles 8, 32, and 33
entrust jurisdiction over credentials challenges solely to the convention
and to no other body, particularly not to the PRB. And even if the PRB
could decide this kind of an appeal, under article 33 the IEB should have
decided it first. The appeal bypassed the IEB and came directly to the
PRB on extra-constitutional stipulated jurisdiction.

Second, on the merits, as noted elsewhere the PRB has always rejected
post-election statements of members in secret-ballot elections as to
whom they voted for.
Slawienski v Local 774, 5 PRB 519, 521-22 (1988),
Faison v Local 900, 6 PRB 208, 210 (1991).

The voting at the convention was public not secret. But just as no
delegates said they intended to vote for Battle, equally none said they
intended to vote for Ivory. Moreover, there is no reason to think that
post-election statements by delegates at a convention as to who they
intended to vote for would be any more reliable than similar statements
in secret-ballot elections.

Third, even assuming post-election statements would be reliable, the

facts lead only to the conclusion that the Local 1313 delegates abstained:
Yes, they could have been summoned; but they weren't. Absent evidence
that the delegates were in fact available immediately for a roll-call,
appellant should have been installed; and if it had turned out they were
available a re-run should have been ordered. Certainly that would have
been a big task, but democracy is sometimes expensive.

Finally, the PRB was troubled by the appeal and recommended changes in
convention rules to avoid repeats of similar problems in the future. For
my part, I am troubled by the propensity of delegates to leave the floor
during the conduct of business at the UAW's most important meeting, and
the casual way the UAW and PRB condone the practice.
Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), p 193 (vice-president says
historically "we would always have trouble before the end of the Convention in getting
a quorum"),
proceedings, 25th constitutional convention (1977), p 210 (convention session adjourned
for lack of quorum);
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 43-44 (1995) (PRB rejects challenge to UAW allowance
for delegate spousal travel to conventions, discussed elsewhere).

In another appeal, the incumbent president was running for reelection. An

appeal of his non-delegate opponent sought to obtain access to the
convention floor for campaigning, and access to various UAW facilities in
the convention hall, on a "level playing field" theory. The PRB rejected it.
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7 (1992).

In another appeal a charge was dismissed because it turned on a factual

finding previously disposed of by the convention in an election appeal.
Gabauer v Local 25, 1 PRB 691, 693 (1971).

Discrimination
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Discrimination policy and apparatus

|| Discrimination by management
|| Discrimination by a member of
the local || Discrimination by the
local || PRB non-grievance
discrimination precedents
Discrimination policy and apparatus

Article 2 section 2 states the UAW no-discrimination policy. A UAW object

is to:
unite in one organization regardless of religion, race, creed, color, sex, political
affiliation or nationality, age disability, marital status or sexual orientation, all
employees under the jurisdiction of this International Union.

The 1936 constitution listed only religion, race, creed, color, political
affiliation, and nationality. In 1972 sex was added. In 1992 age,
handicap, marital status, and sexual orientation were added. In 1998
handicap was changed to disability.

Not included among any of these categories are contractual status and
historic industrial practice.
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 57 (1983) (bargaining discrimination in favor of members in
one classification who are numerically superior and have great political influence,
against members in another clasification who are numerically inferior and have less
political influence, would be invidious and remediable by the PRB; but the facts here do
not show such discrimination because the disputed agreement is over 20 years old and
members in the disfavored classification has less skill and less seniority),
Tiegs v Local 1866, 8 PRB 426, 430 (1994) (employees with post-1985 seniority hardly
constitute a protected class),
Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 382 (1997), modified 9 PRB 391, 395 (1998) (discrimination on
the basis of historic industrial antecedent is not improper),
Patterson v Local 848, PRB Case 1509 (5/12/05), p 9 (discrimination by union on the
basis of shift or other negotiated contractual arrangement is not invidious and not the
type of claim over which the PRB has jurisdiction).
But in addition to article 26 the PRB has said, in decisions noted
elsewhere, it would review bargaining policies claimed to discriminate in
favor of a numerically and therefore politically superior group (such as
tool & die makers and machine repairmen) over an inferior group (such as
the TMO classification).

The apparatus for implementing article 26 is the civil and human rights
department. The 1964 constitution -- the second earliest I have -- called
it the fair practices and anti-discrimination department. A 1958 PRB
decision also mentions the department.
Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 29-30 (1958).

Its purpose is to implement UAW policies dealing with discrimination and

give assistance and guidance to locals in furtherance of their own civil
rights committees, which are mandatory. Local committees are to
promote fair employment practices and eliminate discrimination
affecting individual members of the Local Union, the International Union, the labor
movement, and the nation.

Article 26 section 5.

The civil and human rights department staff is qualified by previous

experience and training in inter-racial, inter-faith, and inter-cultural
relations. Since 1980 one of its functions has been to assist the UAW in
dealing with discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin,
age, and disability.
I don't know why the staff dealt with age and handicap before 1992, the
year those categories were added to article 2 section 2, or why it does
not deal with marital status and sexual orientation today. I don't have
copies of the convention debates about article 26 in 1980, 1992, and
1998, and would appreciate receiving them from an interested member.

Separately, in article 52 the UAW also recognizes local family auxiliaries,

formerly known as women's auxiliaries.

The civil rights guidebook concretizes article 2 section 2. The following are
not quotes. They are just my summary of the no-discrimination policy.

The same benefits are offered to everyone in the UAW. No worker is

excluded for any of the prohibited reasons. No segregation is allowed
regardless of membership approval.

All members are made to feel desired, appreciated, and important, in

mutual solidarity.

No restrictions are permitted on the right to run for office for any of
the prohibited reasons.

No local member may be excluded or restricted from local affairs.

All seniority is applied with equal force.

There is a single uniform procedure for grievance handling. No

 favoritism is allowed in grievances or other matters. Every grievance
is legitimate until decided otherwise by grievance processors.

Charges may be filed against any officer, grievance handler, or

member guilty of violating the no-discrimination policy.

The local has initial responsibility for policy enforcement, and is

accountable to the UAW.
Civil rights guidebook, pp 6-7.

Additionally the guidebook recommends non-discrimination language for

locals to propose to employers.
Civil rights guidebook, p 8.

It recommends procedures for choosing members of a local civil rights

committee and relating it to the UAW civil and human rights department,
to other local committees and education and CAP programs, and to the
larger community.
Civil rights guidebook, pp 8-13.

The pocket guide includes the UAW's 1998 administrative letter on the
elimination of workplace sexual harassment. The letter covers harassment
both by management and by co-workers.
Pocket guide, pp 174-84.
In October 2000 the GM department issued an educational outline on
implementation of non-discrimination policies in several paragraphs and
documents of the GM agreement.

Discrimination by management

The guidebook has procedures for grievance-handling. To me they look

the same as the procedures for all other grievances. There are also
recommendations for coordinating discrimination grievances with the
EEOC and state FEP agencies.
Civil rights guidebook, pp 13-16.

Discrimination grievance appeals are collected elsewhere.

Discrimination by a member of the local

To complain against a fellow member, the guidebook says to use the "civil
rights internal complaint form." But I expect an ordinary letter would
suffice if it identifies you, states the complaint, requests relief, and is
signed. Write the complaint carefully, the way you would begin an appeal
under article 33.

The committee should meet on the complaint within a month of its regular
meeting. There should be notice, an opportunity for testimony, and a
record. A report and recommendation is to be made within a month of the
hearing. The report may recommend that the complaint constitutes
grounds for charges and trial proceedings. The membership considers it
at the next meeting, and will either approve or reject the report.

There has been no PRB ruling on this, but I would think a charge filed
within 60 days of the membership action would be considered timely
under article 31 even though more than 60 days may have passed from
the date of the offense.

Dissatisfied parties may appeal from the membership's action by

following the procedure immediately below.

The procedure does not deprive you of the right to bypass the civil rights
committee altogether and just file a charge.
Civil rights guidebook, pp 17-24.

Discrimination by the local

To complain about discrimination by the local, the guidebook says to use
the civil and human rights department's "internal appeal form," but again
I would think a letter with all the specifics would do.

Unlike appeals under article 33 the complaint is not filed with the
president's office. File it with the chair of the UAW civil rights committee.
This is a committee of IEB members noted in article 26 section 2; I don't
know the name of the current chair.

If you are appealing membership action, the time limit is 30 days from
the meeting where it acted.

The director of the civil and human rights department and the regional
director will investigate and report to the IEB committee chair within 90
days. The chair, the civil rights director, or the regional director will then
either issue a decision or order a hearing within 90 days.

Unlike under article 33, at a hearing the conveners can summon parties,
local officers, and witnesses. The committee has 90 days to act on a
director's decision, and submit the action to the IEB.

The IEB's decision is appealable by dissatisfied parties as usual under

article 33. I don't know of any appeal ever brought to the PRB through
this procedure. But in a 1999 appeal, a member said handling of her
termination grievance was infected by racial discrimination.
Civil rights guidebook, pp 24-26;
 Ramsey v Region 8, 10 PRB 287, 291 (1999) (race claim not addressed because
appellant did not raise it first at the IEB, and the evidence she presented showed if
anything discrimination by management not the union),
Sholes v Local 659, 11 PRB 459, 464 (2002) (charge of discrimination by company does
not amount to charge of discrimination by union).

PRB non-grievance discrimination precedents

Grievance appeals are collected elsewhere.

A concurring PRB member recently noted the racial implications of a white

member's claim -- which was weak internally -- that his actions toward a
younger black supervisor in the company parking lot were justified because
he suspected the supervisor of driving through appellant's neighborhood
looking to take parts from his car. The decision is discussed elsewhere.

A 1960 PRB decision discussed elsewhere approved non-interchangeable

sex-segregated seniority categories because they were approved by the
male-dominated local membership.

In one appeal local members had expelled a member after a trial

committee convicted him of a physical altercation at the heated
ratification meeting of an extremely controversial strike settlement. The
PRB said evidence supported the verdict and upheld the conviction over
appellant Jimmy Mingo's argument that the proceeding was racist. But
noting Brother Mingo's militancy for racial equality in the community and
workplace, his undenied claim that fights among white union members
had not resulted in charges or expulsions, and his argument
that in a right-to-work state such as Alabama, solidarity among trade unionists may be
seriously undermined by the expulsion of one whole-heartedly devoted to furthering
the antidiscrimination aims of the labor movement,

Mingo v Local 1639, 2 PRB 753 757 (1979).

under the circumstances the PRB reduced the expulsion to a 20-month

suspension ending on the date of the decision.

Non-grievance discrimination appeals other than those just summarized

are collected here:
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 204 (1961) (suspension of local officers for enforcing
membership vote to segregate rest rooms and drinking fountains),
Sanders v Ternstadt Unit, 1 PRB 294, 297-98 (1963) (election appeal, asserting six of 35
eligible black members were challenged by election committee asking in what
department they worked, was insufficient),
Mingo v Local 1639, 2 PRB 753 757 (1979) (see summary immediately above)
Page v Local 961, 6 PRB 288, 292-95 (1991) (appellant injected outrageous racial issues
into election campaign),
McClure v Local 652, 6 PRB 354, 359-60 (1992) (circumstantial evidence did not show
redistricting was influenced by racial considerations),
Tiegs v Local 1866, 8 PRB 426, 430 (1994) (employees with post-1985 seniority hardly
constitute a protected class),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997), president's answer to appeal, record p 166
(citing appeals to racial prejudice as possible exception to rule that elections should not
be set aside on the basis of campaign propaganda),
Moye v Local 110, 10 PRB 37, 39, 39 n 1 (1997) (authoring or distributing racially
divisive election campaign literature is not chargeable),
 Harris v Local 2123, 10 PRB 490, 501 (2000) (after rejecting grievance appeal PRB notes
appellant could have charged and obtained a conviction of fellow member for
unbecoming conduct consisting of creating a hostile work environment),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), pp 1, 4 (PRB lacks jurisdiction of appeal
protesting sudden abolition of region after appellant won election for its directorship in
violation of internal rule of Administration Caucus that no caucus member will run for
UAW executive office after turning 65),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1479 (10/25/04), p 12 n 34 (PRB finds political differences
rather than gender differences account for fact that appellant was not called on to
review other officers' article submissions to local newspaper),
Patterson v Local 848, PRB Case 1509 (5/12/05), p 9 (discrimination by union on the
basis of shift or other negotiated contractual arrangement is not invidious and not the
type of claim over which the PRB has jurisdiction).

Ethical practices codes, free speech in the union

Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

EPC coverage || EPC

procedure || EPC
substantively different? || EPC
generally

In 1957 the AFL-CIO adopted ethical practices codes. The PRB was
established the same year. The UAW operated under the AFL-CIO codes
from then until 1968 when it left the AFL-CIO. Without substantial debate
the UAW adopted its own codes at the 1970 convention, where it was
described by then-Vice President Leonard Woodcock as being "a more
binding code than the one we had been operating under as an affiliate of
the AFL-CIO."
Proceedings, 22nd constitutional convention, pp 185-88 (1970) (clarification of officials'
duties to "avoid ... the appearance of a conflict of interest" and to guard union mailing
lists from outsiders),
PRB 48th annual report (2005), p 2 (online version) (PRB created in 1957),
Appeal of Atwan, 1 PRB 95, 96 (1960) (suggesting 1957 AFL-CIO EPC was not
retroactive),
Telakowicz v Local 425, 1 PRB 148, 153 (1960) (appeal protesting the exclusive use by
one slate of a local's equipment and supplies to publish campaign propaganda was
based on code VI paragraph 1 of the AFL-CIO EPC which guaranteed an honest
election),
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 164-65 (1960) (read in conjunction with article II section 10 of
AFL-CIO constitution, article III of AFL-CIO EPC made it mandatory that UAW take
necessary action to protect the labor movement from the undermining efforts of
Communist agencies),
Davis, 1 PRB 214, 217-18 (1961) (reviewing establishment of PRB),
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251, 261-62 (1975) (PRB examines contours of 1959 expansion
of its jurisdiction in relation to article 36),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 23 (1980) (quoting Woodcock, and asserting the
UAW meant to be bound by its new EPC, particularly those relating to democratic
rights).

I do not have a copy of the 1968 constitution, and am not clear on what
codes were applicable in the period 1968-70. Two PRB decisions do make
reference to the existence of codes during this time. I guess the UAW
continued to abide by the AFL-CIO codes even though it was not
affiliated. I would appreciate information from any knowledgeable
member.
Local 306 v UAW, 1 PRB 519, 521 (1969),
Zimmer v Local 927, 1 PrB 551, 553-54 (1969).

There are four codes, titled

Democratic Practices
Financial Practices
Health, Welfare and Retirement Funds
Business and Financial Activities of Union Officials

Generally, as more fully discussed elsewhere, the EPCs ensure various

ethical practices such as free speech, honest elections, fair union trials,
and a union with sound financial practices for itself and its funds free of
corruption and kickbacks. The EPCs do not concern grievances.
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1528 (4/12/06), p 10 ("It is generally understood that [EPC]
complaints should address substantial violations of the fundamental democratic and
financial principles set forth in the Ethical Code....").

There are important exceptions to the right of free speech in the union.
Here is the exact language of the EPC provision on point:
Each member shall be entitled to a full share in Union self-government. Each member
shall have full freedom of speech and the right to participate in the democratic
decisions of the Union. Subject to reasonable rules and regulations, each member shall
have the right to run for office, to nominate and to vote in free, fair and honest
elections. In a democratic union, as in a democratic society, every member has certain
 rights but s/he also must accept certain corresponding obligations. Each member shall
have the right freely to criticize the policies and personalities of Union officials;
however, this does not include the right to undermine the Union as an institution; to
vilify other members of the Union and its elected officials or to carry on activities with
complete disregard of the rights of other members and the interests of the Union; to
subvert the Union in collective bargaining or to advocate or engage in dual unionism.

EPC, democratic practice code 1;

Note the exemptions: Free speech does not include rights to "undermine"
the union as an institution, to "vilify" other members, to do anything with
"complete disregard" for other members' rights or the union's interests, to
"subvert" the union in bargaining, or "advocate" dual unionism.

The only decisions on the exemptions relate to "vilifying" other members.

The PRB defines it:
The term "to vilify" may reasonably be understood to include knowing false statements
about an individual, which impugn his character or reputation or a culpable intent to
injure recognized interests of a fellow union member.

Wright v Local 594, 11 PRB 124, 128 (2001);

see also Foreman v Local 699, 4 PRB 123, 126 (1984) (term "vilification" in
EPC should be narrowly construed),
Scott v Local 239, 5 PRB 37, 41 (1985) (not vilification to report true
statement that member was convicted of embezzling union funds),
Toth v Local 723, 5 PRB 269, 272 (1987) (charges of publishing letter and
vilifying charging member and colluding with company to have personal
union meeting on company time did not identify or quote from letter or
identify vilification or identify meeting),
Dombeck v Local 1645, 5 PRB 493, 496-97 (1988) (vilification in campaign
literature),
 Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 337-38 (1997) (PRB declines to extend the
"vilification" exemption to situations where an employer attempts to exert its
influence in a local union election through threats, coercion, asssistance or
promise of benefit),
Byas v Local 249, 10 PRB 262, 265 (1998) (EPC protects nasty and insulting
words at union meetings),
Noall v Local 599, 10 PRB 371, 377 (1999) (editor may edit as vilification
reference to unnamed "company sympathizers" in officer's signed column),
Hanscom v Region 8, PRB Case 1590 (8/29/08), pp 8, 15 (IEB finds that
appellant's website postings may on occasion cross the line into an attempt
to undermine the union or vilify members, and that such efforts could be a
violation of the EPC because the postings are rarely grounded in fact, but the
UAW did not pursue action against appellant because the readership appears
minimal and no negative impact towards the organization has materialized;
PRB approves UAW response).

Decisions on free speech in the union are collected here. A more extended
discussion of free speech in union election campaigning is elsewhere. Free
speech in the workplace is discussed elsewhere.
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 205-06 (1961) (absent personal animus or abuse of discretion,
mere showing by individuals in opposition to UAW policies that others similarly opposed
were treated differently does not establish a case of unfair treatment under EPC),
Robertson v UAW, 1 PRB 632 (1971) (under EPC UAW employee-members may appeal
decisions made by UAW as employer; union may condition appointment on curtailment
of political activities),
Appeal of Piper, 2 PRB 541, 542-43 (1977) (UAW's removal of UAW-appointed local
insurance rep, whom the local leadership was out to "hatchet" because of local politics,
upheld on theory that UAW investigated carefully and found that even though the
problems may have been beyond the rep's control he could no longer function
effectively in his job),
EP complaint of Wilson, 2 PRB 869 (1980), 3 PRB 1 (1980) (UAW-appointed contractual
rep may be required to surrender political rights as condition of appointment),
Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 217, 219 (1981) (campaign propaganda cannot form the basis
of charges),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 280 (1981) (offsite free-speech violation by union mob),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 337, 345 (1988)(rule which requires an international rep
challenging an incumbent regional director's reelection to take a 90-day leave of
absence before the election, and accept reassignment to another region if he or she
loses, may create unlevel playing field and give incumbent an advantage but is not per
se unfair),
Mejia v Local 365, 5 PRB 454, 459 (1988) (preponderance burden to show speech
activities motivated removal of locally appointed rep),
Kelley v Local 400, 5 PRB 503, 505 (1988) (UAW rep must resign to seek local office),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 343, 347 (1988)
(rule upheld requiring UAW staff rep to take leave on running for international office
and reassignment if unsuccessful; running against own boss may be dereliction of
duty),
EP complaint of Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 596 (1988) (local appointee not
removable for exercise of democratic rights, but otherwise has no just-cause
protection),
Bier v Local 2500, 5 PRB 805 (1990) (censorship of local president's article announcing
her candidacy for third party in civil election),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 236 (1992) (distinguishing politics and policy in censorship of
local president's articles),
Adams v Ford Department, 6 PRB 444 (1992) (subject to EPC UAW appointee serves at
will of appointer),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228 (1994) (though GM department could have barred
appointed reps from running for political office altogether, it could not allow them to
run for convention delegate and limit them from supporting the candidate of their
choice),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 268 (1994) (removal of local appointee for political
activity compared to removal because of race or sex),
Montague v Local 651, 9 PRB 401, 405 (1997) (if one candidate is allowed space to
campaign in local newspaper, all must be allowed),
Mieli v UAW, 9 PRB 449, 457 (1997) (member's right to issue leaflet is fully protected, as
distinguished from officer's),
 McDonaugh v Local 1183, 10 PRB 359, 362-65 (1999) (removal of UAW rep for
campaigning in local election),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 580 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00) (officer's
signed column may not promote a candidate for local union office),
compare Austin v GM Department, 11 PRB 82, 91 (2001) (appellant's attendance at
political caucus meeting may have violated condition of employment of UAW-appointed
rep),
Riley v Local 1853, 11 PRB 93, 100 (2000) (reps appointed by previous administration
were properly removed by new administration because of its desire for support of new
ideas and policies; there being no evidence one way or the other on whether the reps
were willing to support the new ideas and policies the reps failed to carry their burden
of proof),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 518-19, 521 (2002) (EP complaint of
removed appointed rep will be considered because Ford department policy limiting local
political activity of appointed reps is unclear, no violation because rep engaged in local
politics),
Carver v Local 163, PRB Case 1435 (9/25/03), pp 8-10 (local election overturned
because UAW-appointed reps campaigned),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), P 4 (EPC does not prohibit political maneuvers
at conventions),
Crable v Local 148, PRB Case 1452 (12/23/03), p 11 (it is up to UAW department, not
local union, to decide whether UAW rep violated policy against participation in local
politics),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp 10-14 (PRB
treats claim of political animus by UAW differently than claim of political animus by local
officers),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1479 (10/25/04), p 12 n 34 (PRB finds political differences
rather than gender differences account for fact that appellant was not called on to
review other officers' article submissions to local newspaper),
Esposito v UAW, PRB Case 1563 (4/17/07), Pp 7-8 (right of member to distribute leaflet
imputing foreknowledge by local officers of management's intention to lay off third shift
is fully protected by EPC).

Of particular note for this manual, the EPCs require that union rules and
laws are to be uniformly applied. If the UAW changes its mind on a rule --
say, by amending the constitution or issuing a new administrative letter
-- members should be notified. The PRB too is to conform its rulings to
precedent, and with one exception always has. It has never changed its
mind on a point of principle, and the UAW has never asked it to. Otherwise
stated, it has never been wrong. I am not familiar enough with CAC
holdings to say whether or not the same is true of it.
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35, 40 (1958) (PRB declines to follow convention exhaustion
precedent),
Local 248 v UAW, 2 PRB 799, 804-05 (1980) (strike benefit rules),
EP complaint of McCue, 3 PRB 91, 94-95 (1981) (chair's mere error does not amount to
disparate unfair treatment),
Ford v UAW, 5 PRB 587, 589 (1989) (IEB discretion may be limited by rule of
uniformity),
Lawless v Local 854, 6 PRB 39, 44 (1990) (nomination acceptance cutoff rule),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 114 (1993) (IEB can change its mind but locals should first
be notified, administrative letters must be uniformly applied),
Patterson v Local 599, 9 PRB 421, 427 (1997) (dissent) (local practice of allowing LEB
members to remain in office after losing eligibility due to job shift),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 405 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99), pp 13-14
(ex post facto ruling),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 15 (membership approval of
expenditure need not precede incurring the expenditure),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 22 (had
local president requested appellant's removal as appointee of DaimlerChrysler
department, the established past practice, the promise made to her at the time of her
appointment, and the EPC guarantee of uniform treatment might well have constrained
the department director's discretion to remove her);
but see Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 20-21 (PRB decision
relies on previous PRB Liddell precedent unanimously, including a member who
dissented in Liddell.);
 see also Pearson v Local 140, PRB Case 1534 (2/15/06), p 7 ("We do not accept
Pearson's view that the Union is bound to follow past interpretations of the Constitution
in the absence of a formal amendment to the Constitution adopted pursuant to Article
3. The application and interpretation of Constitutional provisions must change with
changing times and circumstances.").

Other than in union trials, the EPC does not specifically provide for "due
process." Pointedly, in a 1992 decision, the PRB questioned whether any
process was due at all when a Ford Department director was deciding
whether to remove at-will appointee John Adams. After an investigative
hearing ordered by the director, Brother Adams was taken out because
when he found out his office was being used by others as a campaign
outpost for the "A Team" slate in a local election and he put a stop to it,
he did not inform the director the improper activities had occurred and
ended. To the IEB and PRB he offered no evidence that impermissible
motivation occasioned his removal, and the PRB upheld it.
Adams v Ford Department, 6 PRB 444, 446, 450-51 (1992).

Similarly, in two 1977 decisions the PRB upheld removals requested

because of political differences with local leadership. In both cases the
UAW conducted pre-termination investigations. In one the investigator
found that the local leadership was "out to hatchet" the appellant with
claims that would have been unsustainable before a trial committee. The
PRB found no "abuse of discretion" in either case, in the sense that it
found the UAW (as distinguished from the local) did not remove the reps
because of political animus. (The PRB also applies an "abuse of
discretion" standard in other contexts.)
 Northrup v UAW, 2 PRB 467, 468-70 (1977) (political differences with local
administration),
Piper v UAW, 2 PRB 541, 542-43 (1977) (local leadership out to hatchet appellant).

But there may be other contexts where EPC-derived "due process" rights
attach. The PRB once referred to them in the appeals context.
Cordilino v Local 887, 10 PRB 40, 45-46 (1998) (appellants' concerns about early
adjournment of IEB appeals committee hearing, evidence not being shown them until
the hearing, and the appellee's refusal at the hearing to explain certain evidence could
have been made the subject of an EPC complaint);
compare Moore, CAC, session 4/99 (with CAC approval IEB reruns election decided by
one vote though all the challenger's protests were rejected, because of unidentified
"due process" concerns).

And a 2004 decision concerned a good appointed rep who was removed
without explanation and contrary to past practice, in a way suggesting
the removal may have been for impermissible reasons on the part of the
UAW. The IEB held a hearing, but did not require the attendance of the
director that removed her. This got the PRB's attention. Its decision spoke
at length of the need for factual investigations of EPC claims:
However, nothing in the IEB's opinion or in the International Union's response to
Gaston-Kelley's appeal suggests any investigation by the IEB into the motivations
behind the decision to remove her from her appointed position.

... Although Gaston-Kelley has not established that an impermissible reason led to her
replacement, she has identified a sufficient number of irregularities in the actions taken
by the Local Union and the DaimlerChrysler Department to require further inquiry on
the part of the International Union.... The failure to conduct a hearing and compel
testimony of the principal actors left the hearing officer with no basis for her
 conclusions [that no impermissible influences were present].... Instead of an
investigation, the International Union conducted a hearing in which the appellant,
although lacking any power to compel the attendance of witnessees or to require their
testimony, carried the entire burden of establishing her claim of improper motivations.

We find that the procedures followed in this case were entirely inadequate and denied
appellant Gaston-Kelley the due process guaranteed to her by the UAW's Ethical
Practices Codes.

The PRB remanded the appeal to the IEB for a meaningful investigatory
hearing. It directed the IEB to keep the PRB and the appellant advised of
the progress and disposition of the case.
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp 13-14.

The 1977 and 1992 decisions were distinguished because in those cases
factual investigations preceded the removal.

Six PRB members participated in Gaston-Kelley. Three concurring PRB

members, focussing on the serious allegations and the last of the EP
codes, took the due-process issue a step further, saying the PRB should
identify the necessary standards of due process in EP cases. They said:
The PRB should not be insensitive to the fact that members of the staff in the
International Union office are appointed. While it is likely they must have political
support from somewhere, they are not likely to have a sense of independence to go
after vice presidents of the International Union, or presidents of local unions which are
part of the vice president's or the president's political support group.

...

With the lack of evidence of due process, with the absence of any explanation for the
 bizarre, one could say arbitrary and capricious, removal of the appellant from a position
she has held over a long period of time with impeccable credentials and reputation, this
case cannot withstand any ethical practices review -- procedural or substantive.

Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp

15-16.

At bottom, the concurring members suggested a special procedure be

instituted for when top UAW players are accused, akin to a special
prosecutor, similar to what was adopted when Region 4 was investigated
for corruption in the 1980s.
See also McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), pp 4, 9
(IEB appeal-handling denied appellant "due process" in that he was not notified of
appeal or appeal hearing).

The EPCs are bound in the 2006 constitution booklet just before the
index.

In keeping with UAW practice, in this manual "EPC" when used in the
singular without qualification means only the the first code, the
"Democratic Practices" code.

EPC coverage

Like the constitution, the EPC does not cover actions of members who are
not officers or reps, or the actions of officers or reps when acting only as
individuals, the PRB held in the Douglas decision. There, members
charged the UAW's human resources director for directing her secretary,
a notary at Solidarity House, to type and forge a signature to a made-up
protest of a dissident local's delegate election, which resulted in a rerun
of the election at a cost of $65,000.

There was no claim she had done this in collaboration with other officers or
reps, or as part of UAW policy. By the time of the charge the director had
retired but remained a UAW member. The only remedy sought was her
expulsion. The president's office notified her of the EPC charge, and asked
for responsive information. But a PRB majority held the EPC did not apply.
Unlike article 31 the EPC does not provide for the rights to notice
of the charges, counsel, a trial, a trial committee, notice of the time and
place of a hearing, the opportunity to produce witnesses and confront
accusers, or a review of the verdict by members of her local, it reasoned.
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 339-40, 346 n 15 (1994), record pp 47-48;
see also Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 31-32 (1958) (enumerating due process rights under the
predecessor of article 31),
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35 (1958) (former version of article 33 section 5 requiring
exhaustion of UAW appeal rights before appealing to court applied only to appeals of
union action),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1528 (4/12/06), p 10 ("The Constitution does not create
procedural barriers to complaints related to violations of the Ethical Practices Codes
similar to those applicable to charges presented pursuant to Article 31 of the
Constitution.").

But in Region 4, after the EPC issue was referred to the PRB by the IEB, a
corrupt manager of a union center agreed to repay $2500 and resign UAW
membership and offices. The appeal involved a number of officers and
reps in the region. The PRB majority in Douglas distinguished Region 4
because there the member was charged for having acted in his capacity
as an officer.
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142, 149-50, 166-67, 170-71 (1983-85).

What about application of the EPC to the union's response to employer

speech-denials? Does the EPC compel the union to grieve such action? In
a 2008 decision discussed more fully elsewhere, the PRB said it did not
apply:
What Hanscom is apparently seeking from this Board is a declaration that
Representative Washington's handling of his grievance violated the Ethical Practices
Codes so that he can be assured that the Union will pursue more vigorously in the
furure grievances defending his right to publish his Internet blog. ... The Democratic
Practices section of the UAW Ethical Practices Codes protects a member's right to
criticize the policies and personalities of Union officials, but that protection does not
create an obligation on the part of Union Representatives to pursue to arbitration any
grievance protesting an employer's interference with this right. ... The fact that the
Ethical Practices Codes might prohibit the Union from interfering with Hanscom's
Internet postings has no bearing on the merits of his grievance against GM.

Hanscom v Region 8, PRB Case 1590 (8/29/08), p 14.

But the PRB has held the EPC requires a second officer election after a
finding that employer threats interfered with first election. However it
does not require the union to grieve the threats.
These are peculiar results. Under the EPC in the election case, the union
was not at fault. The guilty party was the employer. Yet the union bore the
brunt by having to hold a distracting and expensive new election. The
employer got off scot-free. It should should have been answerable in the
grievance procedure, and the union should have had a duty to grieve.

The same is true of the Hanscom case where the employer sent him home
in retaliation for his free speech. Penalizing him was an offense against
the entire union, not just Hanscom individually. The union has a duty to
protect its members. That's what unions are for.

EPC procedure

The procedure under the EPC is set out in article 32. It is the same as
under article 33, and particularly section 4(c), with some additions. That
is, generally members must first appeal to the local union, then to the
IEB, and then to the PRB.
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994) (article 33 section 4(c) applies to EPC claim),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1528 (4/12/06), p 10 ("It is a fairly simple matter for a
member to assert an Ethical Practices Complaint.... The Constitution does not create
procedural barriers ... similar to those [under] Article 31 of the Constitution. It is
generally understood that such complaints should address substantial violations of the
fundamental democratic and financial principles set forth in the Ethical Code;
nevertheless a member can frame a simple disagreement over procedure or expenses
as a violation of the Codes and initiate a complaint....").
Here are the differences:

A claim against the UAW must be approved by a local.

Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 3-4, 7-8, 17 (local
properly approved EPC claim against UAW where majority of members in three
different shift meetings combined approved it and local president certified it, and it
was not necessary for appellant to clarify the members' intent by amending the
minutes at subsequent meetings),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) p 3 (EPC complaint filed with the IEB
about ratification process referred initially to local, where membership
unanimously backed motion to set aside current ratification and hold new
election).

For a claim against the UAW the time limit is 60 days not 30 (filing
and local approval are both necessary within 60 days).

For an election protest the time limit might seem to be 60 days, not
the 7-days-or-next-meeting periods in article 38 section 11 and
article 45 section 5. But prudent appellants should observe the
7-days-or-next-meeting rule.
Compare Appeal of Sparks, 2 PRB 406, 410-12 (1992) (fraud which there was no
reason to discover earlier justifies use of EPC's 60-day limitation period rather
than short appeal period for election protest).

The local union may be bypassed if the IEB or PRB finds there are
substantial reasons.

Sometimes the PRB requires that an initial EPC claim specifically cite
 the EPC.

The PRB can punish a frivolous EPC accuser (though not a frivolous
accused).

The PRB is to be notified of the pendency and disposition of all EPC

claims at the IEB.

The PRB can act on a complaint against the UAW or a local after an
IEB decision even in the absence of an appeal, though it has never
done so.

The IEB may submit an EPC complaint directly to the PRB without
itself issuing a decision.
Article 32 section 5(d),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 20 (1980).

Local bypass has been allowed only four times.

EP complaint of King v UAW, 5 PRB 226 (1986) (bypass not allowed),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 5 PRB 228, 229-32, 366, 367-70 (1987) (bypass not
allowed),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228, 234 (1994) (bypass allowed because local likely
would have approved EPC complaint, EPC rights are important, appellants established a
prima facie case),
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7, 16 n 2 (1992) (bypass allowed without explanation),
Austin v GM Department, 11 PRB 82, 91 (2001) (bypass not allowed),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 521 (2002) (bypass allowed without
explanation),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp 4-6 (after
 holding local president wrongly ruled appellant's EPC claim out of order IEB addressed
merits of claim).

In only one decision has the PRB directed the IEB to advise the PRB
chairperson regarding the progress of the investigation and disposition of
the case.
Article 32 section 5(a), (b),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), p 14.

The PRB once said that an EP claim had to specifically state when it is filed
that it is an EP claim. Dennis Sanders was notified of his local's withdrawal
of his grievance on April 16 of the year. He appealed within 60 days, on
May 26. He argued that withdrawal was improper because he
still had appeals pending for denial of SUB benefits and unemployment
compensation which were vital to the grievance. The appeal also charged
the local union with race discrimination, a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, and a violation of his privacy, asserting various
constitutional rights.

Brother Sanders' initial appeal did not cite the EPC. But when he appealed
to the IEB he added an EPC uniformity claim. After disposing of the
constitutional issues the PRB rejected the uniformity claim:
Sanders argues that ... [he] filed a timely claim of a violation of the Ethical Practices
Codes. He is wrong in this respect. His four page [May 26] letter of appeal ... makes no
mention of any claim of a violation of the Ethical Practices Codes, although other
references to alleged violations of various constitutional rights are numerous....

To file a claim of a violation of rights protected by the Ethical Practices Codes, under
 Article 32 Section 5 of the Constitution, Sanders would have had to file his claim with
his Local Union within 60 days of the time he first became aware of the act, i.e. the
withdrawal of his grievance, that he contends violated his rights.

Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257, 258, 260 (1994).

Sanders seems like an aberration. In other appeals the PRB has

considered and granted an EPC claim, though the EPC was not cited at the
local level or IEB level.
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 114 (1993) (PRB holds under EPC administrative letters
must be uniformly applied though uniformity issue was not discussed by the parties),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 336, 338 (1997), record pp 49-50, 53-55, 61 (PRB
decides election appeal on basis of EPC though at lower levels of procedure appellant
relied only on constitution),
Mieli v UAW, 9 PRB 449, 452, 455, 457 (1997), pp 5, 8, 10 (PRB decides free-speech
appeal on basis of constitution and EPC though parties relied only on constitution);
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), p 10 (EPC relied on by PRB though not
cited by parties),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 6 (PRB says president's handling of
appeal violated specific appellate procedure of constitution as well as principles of
fairness and ethical conduct espoused throughout the constitution, though appellant
based appeal only on constitution).

If you lose an EPC claim at the local and/or IEB level, the PRB's annual
reports and its website say "[the PRB] is the exclusive appellate authority
for claims of violations of the Ethical Practices Codes." In a 1995 CAC
decision it said the same thing. Member Ronald Braman filed an article 31
charge and a financial-practices EPC claim against the president of his
local. He appealed the adverse ruling on the charge, but not the EPC claim,
to the IEB which affirmed. He then appealed both issues to the
CAC. After rejecting the charge and noting the EPC claim had not been
appealed to the IEB, the CAC added:
In addition, Article 32, Section 5(a) of the UAW Constitution places sole jurisdiction to
resolve alleged violations of the UAW Ethical Practices Codes with the local union
membership, the IEB and then the Public Review Board. The Ethical Practices Codes
issue [is] dismissed due to the fact that the CAC lacks jurisdiction.

Braman v Local 699, CAC 1995 report to 31st convention, November 1993
hearings, pp 23-24,
see also PRB 48th annual report (2005), p 8 (online version) (PRB exclusive
authority for EPC claims).

But in 2003 the CAC changed its mind, and relied on the EPC to protect a
shop chair from a charge under article 31. Member Sandra Jacobson had
charged that her shop chair mailed her a note calling her a "bitch." The
LEB held the charge proper for trial, and the shop chair appealed to the
IEB. The IEB reversed, saying the note was not unbecoming conduct. The
CAC explained:
The IEB noted that the International Constitution's Ethical Practices Code contains
strong free speech provisions that protect the single utterance of the written speech at
issue in the appeal.

...

[Jacobson] appealed. The Convention Appeals Committee ... determined that the
isolated comment in a short, private note did not rise to the level of a violation of the
International Union, UAW's Ethical Practices Code which protects the free speech rights
of all Union members.

Jacobson v Local 95, CAC, session 10/03.

 The quotes from Braman and Jacobson are from summaries of the CAC
decisions, not the decisions themselves, which I would appreciate receiving
copies of from interested members.

If the EPC can be used as a shield, it can also be used as a sword. For
example in 1992 the PRB's Yettaw decision held under the EPC that a
local union could not censor articles the local president had submitted to
the local newspaper. Had appellant Yettaw chosen to go to the CAC
instead of the PRB, the CAC could have ruled for Yettaw based on the
same reasoning, including the EPC.
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 236 (1992).

Between the CAC and the PRB, of course the CAC is the superior body. Its
decisions are decisions of the convention itself.
Special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173.

In vesting the PRB with jurisdiction over EPC claims, article 32 section 5
doesn't use the word "exclusive." For many years the CAC has reviewed
trials and elections, both encompassed by the EPC. Accordingly I believe
Jacobson is the right approach, and Braman and the PRB reports are
wrong.

Suppose the CAC changes its mind again; suppose next year it reverts to
the Braman rationale and suppose further it stops reviewing election
appeals and article 31 appeals. Still, the question whether it has EPC
jurisdiction is of practical importance only if the EPC provides substantive
protection not found elsewhere in the constitution, a subject discussed in
the next subsection. If it does not -- and I believe it does not -- then
parties will still be able to get CAC consideration of any EPC issues they
want, simply by not labelling them as EPC issues.

EPC procedure has one very surprising feature. Article 32 establishes

appeal procedures under the EPC; article 33 establishes appeal
procedures under the constitution. Article 32 section 3 lists a number of
areas in which PRB decisions are "final and binding," but EPC appeals are
not among them. The PRB can only "deal with" EPC claims. Article 33
section 5 obligates members to exhaust all appeals before going to civil
court or a governmental agency. If a PRB decision under the EPC doesn't
bind the UAW and the parties, what does?
Article 32 section 3 (PRB can make final and binding decisions under article 33 and article
16 section 7, but can only "deal with" EPC matters),
article 33 section 3(e) Jurisdiction and procedure (subject to article 33 section 2(b) CAC
can decide all appeals from any IEB decision or action, and all its decisions are final and
binding),
article 33 section 3(f) Determining jurisdiction (if PRB dismisses grievance appeal for lack
of jurisdiction CAC may then review appeal on timely application but appellant may not
re-raise to CAC any issue resolved by PRB),
article 33 section 3(f) Procedures (PRB decisions are final and binding),
special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173 (decisions of CAC are final and
binding convention decisions),
proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 192-93 (no appeal to convention
from a CAC decision);
PRB 48th annual report (2005), p 3 (online version) ("In addition [the PRB] is the
exclusive appellate authority for claims of violations of the Ethical Practices Codes.");
Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 590 n 3, 591 n 4 (if appellants appeal
 to convention after PRB dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, PRB's decision on standing
would not bind it);
compare EPC, preface, paragraph 1 (noting that PRB decisions under the constitution are
final and binding.

The constitution is not specific. I don't believe there is an administrative

letter or presidential or IEB interpretation on the subject. But there would
be no point in establishing an elaborate procedure which is nonbinding.

The convention is the union's highest tribunal. For a decision that would
bind the parties and the union an appeal to the next convention would
seem to be indicated. I write this somewhat tentatively because I don't
know that it has ever been done. Article 32 doesn't specify a procedure or
time limit for such an appeal. Try using the same format as an initial
appeal and assuming the 30-day time limit used for appeals to the CAC,
IEB, and PRB. As with other appeals to the convention, the CAC would
probably decide it.
Compare article 33 section 3(e) Jurisdiction and Procedure (all CAC decisions are final
and binding),
article 33 section 4(c) (most UAW appeal periods are 30 days),
special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173 (all matters appealed to the CAC will
be considered to have been decided by the convention and are final and binding).

Other PRB decisions discussing EPC procedures follow.

Article 32 sections 3-5;
Voytek v Local 1010, 1 PRB 97, 102 (1960) (PRB disapproves failure of IEB to notify it of
pending EPC appeal),
Stephen v Local 92, 1 PRB 105, 107 (1960) (PRB disapproves failure of IEB to notify it of
 pending EPC appeal),
Appeal of Sparks, 2 PRB 406, 410-12 (1992) (fraud which there was no reason to
discover earlier justifies use of EPC's 60-day limitation period rather than short appeal
period for election protest),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 26 (1980) (EPC rights are for those who would assert
them),
Thompson v UAW, 4 PRB 23, 25 (1983) (EPC claim of improper administratorship
imposed by UAW not properly approved by membership though membership passed
resolution in support of ending administratorship),
Iyun v Local 2166, 4 PRB 209, 211 (1984) (failure of IEB to hold hearing on EPC claim
against local violated EP procedure),
Toth v Local 723, 5 PRB 269, 272 (1987) (EPC claimant required to proceed under article
32 section 5),
Janowski v Local 9, 6 PRB 407, 411-13 (1992) (requirement to bring EP issues to the
local first),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 272 (1994) (recording secretary should have placed
appellant's EPC claim on agenda of membership meeting),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994) (though claim against UAW was timely submitted
within 60 days, local approval of it occurred after the 60th day and therefore it was
untimely),
Foley v Local 1097, 8 PRB 454, 456 (1994) (argument that violation was ongoing and
could therefore be challenged at any time rejected),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 102, 106 (2001) (in claim against local appellant did not
follow EPC procedure at local level),
EP complaint of King v Local 600, 11 PRB 250, 253 (2001) (EP complaint does not
substitute for appeal of chair's ruling),
Lee v UAW, 11 PRB 546, 549 (2002) (failure to follow local approval process of EPC),
Kidd v Local 1264, PRB Case 1467 (3/19/04), pp 4, 8 (though IEB and PRB questioned
whether local union actually approved EPC claim, both bodies reviewed and rejected
merits of claim),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 19
("[B]eyond allegations of race and sex discrimination or political reprisal, a claim that
an appointed representative was removed [in violation of the EPC] must be specific and
describe conduct contrary to generally accepted moral or ethical principles. A claim that
 the action was simply unfair or unjustified would not be sufficient to confer juridiction
on this Board to interfere with a Department Vice President's Constitutional discretion
in the matter of appointments."),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 3-4, 7-8, 17 (local properly
approved EPC claim against UAW where majority of members in three different shift
meetings combined approved it and local president certified it, and it was not necessary
for appellant to clarify the members' intent by amending the minutes at subsequent
meetings),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 11, 13 (EPC complaint not presented to
local membership).

EPC substantively different?

Table of Contents

The following are my summaries, not exact quotes, of the four ethical
practices codes.

The "Democratic Practices" Code provides for:

full membership shares in union self-government, including full

freedom of speech and the right to participate in the democratic union
decisions,

the rights to run for office, subject to reasonable rules and

regulations, and to nominate and vote in free, fair, and honest
 elections,

the right freely to criticize the policies and personalities of union

officials, except there is no right to undermine the union as an
institution, to vilify other members, to carry on activities with
complete disregard of the rights of other members and the union's
interests, to subvert the union in collective bargaining, or to advocate
or engage in dual unionism,

fair, regular, and noticed membership meetings,

fairly and uniformly applied rules and laws,

due process in disciplinary procedures,

democratic and fair operations, and

a union free of corruption, discrimination, and anti-democratic

procedure.

The PRB has also suggested there may also be a democratic right to be
free of retaliation for exercising appeal rights.
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 15 ("[C]ircumstances suggest that [the
member who accused appellant of having instigated a walkout in violation of the
contract] may have been acting on behalf of Green Slate supporters or on behalf of the
Local Union in retaliation for Lescoe's previous challenge to the election.");
see also Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p
23, record pp 168-72 (after decision ordering an appointed rep to be allowed to resume
 duties the department director did reinstate her but removed her again a week later as
an "exercise [of] my discretion," appellant wrote the PRB asserting the action was
retaliation for her having appealed, on consideration of her letter PRB members were
"deeply concerned," PRB chairman contacted the union, shortly later the new removal
was revoked),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 6 ("The right to appeal also forms an
important element of the ethical principles embodied in the UAW Constitution.... The
International President's refusal to refer Reighard's appeal to the IEB violates not only
the appellate procedures clearly enunciated in the UAW Constitution, but also the
principles of fairness and ethical conduct espoused thoughtout the Constitution.").

The "Financial Practices" Code provides for:

holding of union funds in sacred trust for the members' benefit,

assurance that union funds are not dissipated and are spent for
proper purposes, and reasonable information as to how union funds
are used,

conduct of proprietary functions, including contracts for purchase or

sale or for rendering housekeeping services, in accordance with the
practice of well-run institutions,

securing of competitive bids for major contracts,

no investment of funds in a manner which results in the personal

profit or advantage of any union officer or representative,

no contracts of purchase or sale or for rendering of services which will

result in the personal profit or advantage of any union officer or
representative,
 no personal profit or special advantage for a union officer,
representative, or employee from a husiness with which the union
bargains collectively, and

no loans to union officers, representatives, employees, or members,

or members of their families, for the purpose of financing their private
business.

In a 2001 decision enforcing this code the PRB said:

We would be remiss, however, in the discharge of our responsibility of "ensuring a
continuation of high moral and ethical standards in the administrative and operative
practices of the International Union ..." ... were we to fail to remark upon Appellant's
observations concerning the practice of Local 2256 in some instances of submitting
expenditures for the approval of the local union membership that are simply included
as a part of an overall financial report. We agree with the point made by attorney
Raymond that this device is subject to substantial abuse as a means of evading debate
on expenditures that might otherwise prove controversial. Local 2256, to its credit,
brought the issue of the racing car sponsorship to the floor for free and open debate.
The vote was close as there were strong arguments on both sides of the issue. It
correctly did the same with the issue of the WILX arbitration. But it appears there was
no debate on the issue of the so-called extra day for delegates to the TOP and Detroit
collective bargaining conventions. The members, in all instances, are entitled to know
for what purposes their dues dollars are being expended.

Appellant Mertz can provide a valuable service to her Union brothers and sisters by
bringing issues such as these to the floor at the time they are presented for
membership approval.

Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 612, 621 (2001);

see also Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 76, 80 (1998) (local trustees and
administrator properly solicited and evaluated bids of accounting firms).
The "Health, Welfare, and Retirement Funds" Code provides for:

no receipt by union officials, representatives, or employees of any

fees or salaries from a fund established for the provision of health,
welfare, or retirement benefits, except for reasonable reimbursement
provided in a collective bargaining agreement approved by the IEB,

no compromising personal ties, direct or indirect, with outside

agencies such as insurance carriers, brokers, or consultants doing
business with union health, welfare, and retirement plans, for
officials, employees, or others acting as union agents or
representatives, who exercise responsibilities or influence in the
administration of the programs or in the placement of insurance
contracts,

complete records of the financial operations of all UAW health,

welfare, and retirement funds and programs in accordance with the
best accounting practice, and regular audits,

availability of audit reports to members covered by the fund, and

full annual disclosure and reports to the members covered by the

fund.

These provisions would seem to mean that the union must give copies of
audits of welfare funds to any covered member. But in response to an
EPC claim protesting the UAW's refusal to provide the audit of a joint fund
claimed to be a welfare fund, the PRB director wrote in 2006 that "Article
32 makes no provision for requesting information or compelling the
production of documents." Appellant did not take the matter up with the
PRB itself.
EP claim of Hanline, undocketed, letter, Bill Hanline to Ron Gettelfinger, 7/21/05 (EPC
claim demanding copy of union's copy of audit of UAW-GM joint fund),
EP claim of Hanline, undocketed, letter, Jay Whitman to Bill Hanline, 4/21/06 (responding
to other matters but failing without explanation to provide audit),
EP claim of Hanline, undocketed, letter, Ellis Boal to PRB, 5/18/06 (appealing UAW's
refusal to provide audit),
EP claim of Hanline, undocketed, letter, Barbara Klein to Ellis Boal, 8/1/06 (declining to
docket EPC claim because article 32 does not provide for compelling the production of
documents).

The "Business and Financial Activities of Union Officials" Code provides

for:

representation by elected and appointed officials in sacred trust for

the best interest of the members and their families,

avoidance of outside transactions by officers and representatives

which even give the appearance of a conflict of interest,

the highest loyalty to the duties of union office in light of its special
fiduciary nature,

protection of mailing lists from being turned over to an outsider for

use in the promotion or sale of goods or services that benefits an
 individual or a private concern,

use of mailing lists only for the promotion of the necessary legitimate
functions of local unions, and particularly not to promote the sale of
furniture, appliances, automobiles, insurance, eyeglasses, or other
items, or to enable professionals to solicit the membership,

no financial interests of officers or representatives which conflict with

union duties,

no substantial financial or other interest -- even in the publicly-traded

widely-held stock of a corporation except for stock-purchases plans,
profit sharing, or nominal amounts of stock -- in any business with
which the UAW bargains,

no acceptance by union officers or representatives of kickbacks,

under-the-table payments, valuable gifts, lavish entertainment, or
any personal payment of any kind, other than regular pay and
benefits for work performed as an employee, from an employer with
which the union bargains or from a business or professional
enterprise with which the union does business, and

application of this code to investments and activities of third parties,

where they amount to a subterfuge to conceal the financial interest of
union officials or representatives.

Some of these rights are specified in other sections of the constitution.

For instance the EPC and the constitution both reference fair elections,
trials, and financial practices. The CAC and PRB both can decide appeals
on these matters.
Article 8 sections 8, 11, 17, 21-24 (elections of UAW delegates and officials),
article 10 sections 2, 4-12, 16, 18 (elections of UAW officers),
article 12 section 8 (UAW finances),
article 30 (UAW discipline and trials),
article 31 (local discipline and trials),
article 38 (elections of local officers),
article 45 (elections of stewards and committeepersons),
article 46 (local finances),
article 47 (local dues),
article 48 (local audits);
EP complaint of Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 243, 247 (1982) (requiring equal timely
payment of witnesses at trial, citing EPC),
Glinski v Local 235, CAC 1992 report to 30th convention January 1990 hearings p 1 (trial
appeal),
Frey v Local 735, CAC 1992 report to the 30th convention March 1992 hearings p 39
(trial appeal),
Mays v Local 211, CAC 1998 report to the 32nd convention October 1997 hearings p 30
(election appeal),
LeBlanc v Local 372, CAC 1995 report to 31st convention April 1994 hearings p 33
(election appeal),
Jacobson v Local 95, CAC, session 10/03 (article 31 charge).

But not all the EPC rights appear elsewhere. For instance the constitution
does not speak of the rights to free speech and to criticize. There is no
specific protection for exercising appeal rights. There is no mention of the
right to uniform treatment, or to ethical treatment. And where rights like
election, trial, and anti-corruption rights do appear, they do not utilize
exactly the EPC's language.

So as a whole the EPC gives the impression that, when enacted in 1957, a
new set of rights came into being. And indeed, as noted elsewhere, when
issuing decisions under the EPC, the PRB sometimes cites it without also
citing the constitution.

On the other hand, the EPC preface states that it merely expresses
democratic principles which "have always governed" the UAW and its
locals. The constitution's preamble does speak throughout of the UAW's
dedication to democratic ideals, as well as principles of a participatory,
humanitarian, and equitable society where workers have a voice.
Preamble, throughout,
EPC, paragraph 2;
compare Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 6 ("[The president's action]
violates not only the appellate procedures clearly enunciated in the UAW Constitution,
but also the principles of fairness and ethical conduct espoused throughout the
Constitution."),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 6-8, 14-15 (because of nearly-four-year
delay occasioned partially by unreasonable behavior of appellants' counsel, "equity
favors a dismissal" of charge of unbecoming conduct which otherwise would have been
referred to a trial committee).

I take the preface to mean that, theoretically, if the EPC were repealed
tomorrow all the rights it enumerates would still be available to UAW
members from other sections of the constitution; and indeed, that all the
rights were already there when the AFL-CIO first adopted its codes in
1957. Thus the election guide doesn't mention the EPC even though "free,
fair, and honest elections" are among the primary EPC guarantees.
Election guide;
see also Egres, 1 PRB 50, 57 (1959) (discussing procedural difference between
constitutional and EPC appeals),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 271 (1994) (distinguishing procedures of article 31
and EPC).

But in a 2004 decision also discussed elsewhere, Gwendolyn Gaston-

Kelley appealed her non-reinstatement to a UAW-appointed local health-
and-safety position on return from a temporary assignment to the joint
company-union National Training Center ("NTC"). She appealed under
both article 33 and the EPC, saying the NTC director had told her she
could return to her local position if the NTC assignment did not become
permanent. The PRB first noted that Gaston-Kelly's removal was "contrary
to the settled practice, contrary to assurances from an International
official on which she relied, and contrary to an International policy
statement that frowned upon using local politics as a basis for changing
appointed representatives." Then it said:
[The IEB decision] reported that the issues presented by Gaston-Kelley's appeal were:
1) whether Gaston-Kelley's rights as a member were violated, or 2) whether Director
Gooden abused his discretion by appointing a permanent replacement for Gaston-
Kelley while she was on temporary assignment to the NTC. [footnote omitted]
President Gettelfinger adopted this same satement of the issues in his response to
Gaston-Kelley's appeal to the PRB. [footnote omitted]

Those would have been the issues had Gaston-Kelly been filing an appeal from her
removal under Article 33 of the Constitution. They were not the issues raised by her
Ethical Practices Complaint. The issue raised by Gaston-Kelley's Ethical Practices
Complaint was whether the decision to remove her was motivated by impermissible
 reasons on the part of either Director Gooden or [local] President Zappa.

Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp

11, 13 (quoted passages), record pp 95, 101, 102, 107 (appellant's appeals
state they are brought under both article 33 and the EPC).

So abuse of discretion as to appointees would violate the constitution but

not the EPC. And violation of Gaston-Kelley's "rights as a member" is not
an EPC issue, but removing her for an impermissible reason is an EPC
issue.

The latter proposition implies that removing an appointee for an

impermissible reason would not violate his or her substantive right as a
member.

I find this all confusing. In early releases of this manual I took the view
that it is just as well not to invoke the EPC substantively in appeals.
Rather, I said, just appeal to basic fairness, and understand that when a
decision or argument is based on the EPC it is equally based on the rest
of the constitution. In the end it doesn't matter, I asserted; the PRB
decides appeals sometimes citing the EPC, sometimes citing "the
constitution," and sometimes citing neither.
Appeal of Atwan, 1 PRB 95, 96 (1960) (suggesting that, but for the criminal convictions
being 14 years old and having occurred before adoption of AFL-CIO EPC code III,
appointing or suffering to remain in office of members convicted of double-dipping
might have violated AFL-CIO EPC code III),
Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 135, 137 (1960) (PRB decides appeal of sex
discrimination and democratic principles, relying only on constitution not EPC),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 20, 24-26 (1980) (PRB examines the wording of
 each of the four democratic practices codes and concludes none were violated),
Bynum v Local 235, 3 PRB 85 (1980) (election appeal decided without reference either to
constitution or EPC),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 280 (1981) (coercive union actions at political picnic violate
EPC and constitution),
Wouster v Local 977, 5 PRB 551, 556 (1989) (election appeal decided without reference
either to constitution or EPC),
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 197-201 (1991) (PRB remands election appeal which
claimed employer interference, without reference to substantive provisions of either
constitution or EPC),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 336, 338 (1997) (PRB decides election appeal on basis
of EPC not constitution),
Byas v Local 249, 10 PRB 262, 265 (1998) (EPC not constitution relied on to protect
nasty and insulting words at union meetings),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), p 7 (constitution not EPC relied on to
dismiss article 31 charge brought by member arguing that local officials' intimidation
violated his EPC free-speech rights).

I am no longer sure this is right. In a follow-up decision in the Gaston-

Kelley matter, the president's agent argued the EPC prohibited political
reprisal, race discrimination, and sex discrimination, that it required the
union to investigate allegations that rights had been abused and to allow
appeals, and that it also covered outrageous conduct and violations of
statutes. The agent added there is no guarantee of fairness or consistent
practice, and EPC claims must be specific and involve clearly
objectionable conduct.
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), pp 15-17.

Parenthetically, I find this a peculiar formulation. The allowance of EPC

claims based on statutory rights would cut against the UAW's long-held
view that union law does not embrace external law.

At any rate, the PRB disagreed. The union owes employee-members a

duty of ethical treatment:
We also accept the position of [the president's office] that beyond allegations of race
and sex dicrimination or political reprisal, a claim that an appointed representative was
removed for reasons that violate the Ethical Practices Codes must be specific and
describe conduct contrary to generally accepted moral or ethical principles. A claim that
the action was simply unfair or unjustified would not be sufficient....

...

... We find that [the union's] investigation into Gaston-Kelley's Ethical Practice
Complaint focused too narrowly on the impermissible reasons that were only incidental
to her Complaint. When Gaston-Kelley was informed by President Zappa that she was
no longer the Health and Safety Representative for Local 1248, she did not know what
had happened to cause that result. She attempted to discover by what agency she had
been removed, but the answers she received were at best ambiguous and inconsistent.
We agree with Gaston-Kelley that the protection afforded by the Ethical Practics Codes
goes beyond freedom from invidious discrimination or polical reprisal. A UAW member
does have the right to expect ethical treatment by the Union.

...

... The International's position seems to be that because Gooden had the authority to
remove Gaston-Kelley, and that her only grounds for challenging such removal would
be a violation of the Ethical Practices Codes, there was no need for Zappa to go
through the motions of requesting her removal or for Gooden to go through the
motions of removing her. We find this position unacceptable under the principes
embodied in the UAW's Ethical Practices Codes.

...
 [Had Zappa requested Gaston-Kelley's removal from her local position while serving at
the NTC, the uniformity clause of the EPC] might well have been found to constitute a
reason that constrained the Director's discretion to remove Gaston-Kelley, in light of
the existence of a substantial past practice at this Local which has not been credibly
challenged.

Similarly, Zappa might now request Gaston-Kelley's removal based on the claim that he
is unable to work with her.... [T]he Constitution and the Ethical Practices Codes give
Gaston-Kelley the right to have her arguments considered in the context of an actual
personnel decision removing her from her appointed representative position.

Zappa may request Gaston-Kelley's removal and Gooden may remove her for reasons
not inconsistent with the Ethical Practices Codes, but they may not accomplish her
removal surreptitiously. She is entitled to notice of any action taken by the Union with
respect to her job as Health and Safety Representative at Local 1248.... We
acknowledge the broad discretion granted to Department Directors and Vice Presidents
by the UAW Constitution, but there is no evidence of an exercise of that discretion by
Vice President Gooden in this case.

Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), pp 19-23.

Later developments in the same case suggest there also may be EPC
protection for a member who experiences retaliation for having appealed.

Whether the EPC creates substantive rights may be important

procedurally, because in the Sanders decision discussed in the previous
subsection, the PRB said an initial EP claim had to specifically state it is
an EP claim; as also noted Sanders has not been consistently followed. I
invite interested members to help clarify these problems.
EPC generally

Other EPC decisions follow.

Appeal of Atwan, 1 PRB 95, 96 (1960) (suggesting AFL-CIO EPCs were not retroactive),
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 205-06 (1961) (absent personal animus or abuse of discretion,
mere showing by individuals in opposition to UAW policies that others similarly opposed
were treated differently does not establish a case of unfair treatment under EPC),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 25 (1980) (direct submission to PRB without prior
IEB decision, notice of ratification vote not required to fired members with preferential
recall rights),
EP complaint of McCue, 3 PRB 91, 94-95 (1981) (chair's mere error does not amount to
disparate unfair treatment which would violate EPC's promise of uniform application of
union rules and laws),
Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 217, 219 (1981) (campaign propaganda cannot form the basis
of charges),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 280 (1981) (offsite free-speech violation by union mob),
Thompson v UAW, 4 PRB 23 (1983) (administratorship),
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142 (1983-85) (IEB referral under article 32
section 5(d) regarding financial practices in Region 4),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 225 (1984) (ex post facto interpretations),
EP complaint of Ford, 5 PRB 23 (1985) (union payments as gifts to UAW officers and
reps, timeliness),
Scott v Local 239, 5 PRB 37, 41 (1985) (not vilification to report true statement that
member was convicted of embezzling union funds),
EP complaint of King v UAW, 5 PRB 226, 227 (1986) (in EPC claim against UAW member
must seek local approval even if local would be unable to remedy claim against UAW),
Sabin v Local 599, 5 PRB 566 (1988) (strike authorization ballot wording),
EP complaint of Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 596 (1988) (local appointee not
removable for exercise of democratic rights, but otherwise has no just-cause
protection),
Bier v Local 2500, 5 PRB 805 (1990) (censorship of local president's article announcing
 her candidacy for third party in civil election),
Lawless v Local 854, 6 PRB 39, 44 (1990) (equal application of nomination acceptance
cutoff rule),
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 200 (1991) (PRB allows possibility that after remand
and re-appeal CAC might consider claim of unfair and undemocratic election),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 236 (1992) (distinguishing politics and policy in censorship of
local president's articles),
Adams v Ford Department, 6 PRB 444 (1992) (appointee),
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7 (1992) (convention procedures),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 114 (1993) (expenses and fraternal delegates at
conventions, uniform application of rules),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 268 (1994) (removal of local appointee for political
activity compared to removal because of race or sex),
Foley v Local 1097, 8 PRB 454, 457 (1994) (no violation to award contract to the
responsible low bidder who is the spouse of the shop chair),
Montague v Local 651, 9 PRB 401, 405 (1997) (if one candidate is allowed space to
campaign in local newspaper, all must be allowed),
Byas v Local 249, 10 PRB 262, 265 (1998) (EPC protects nasty and insulting words at
union meetings),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 405 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99), pp 13-14
(ex post facto ruling, union rules and law must be fairly and uniformly applied),
Noall v Local 599, 10 PRB 371, 377 (1999) (editor may edit as vilification reference to
unnamed "company sympathizers" in officer's signed column),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 71 (2001) (removal from office before any violation had
been determined),
Austin v GM Department, 11 PRB 82 (2001) (removal as benefits rep),
Riley v Local 1853, 11 PRB 93, 100 (2000) (Saturn AMA appointed by previous union
administration),
Wright v Local 594, 11 PRB 124, 128 (2001) (vilification is knowing false damaging
statement about an individual),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 518-19, 521 (2002) (EP complaint of
removed appointed rep will be considered because Ford department policy limiting local
political activity of appointed reps is unclear, no violation because rep engaged in local
politics),
 Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), pp 10, 14 (PRB duty to strengthen
democratic processes, right to notice and hearing before discipline),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), P 4 (EPC does not prohibit political maneuvers
at conventions),
Esposito v UAW, PRB Case 1563 (4/17/07), Pp 7-8 (right of member to distribute leaflet
imputing foreknowledge by local officers of management's intention to lay off third shift
is fully protected by EPC),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), p 13 ("The fact that [the local president]
was friends with the new printer [for the local newspaper] does not violate the
Financial Practices section of the Ethical Practices Codes. It is understandable and
appropriate for the officers of Local 148 to do business with someone they know and
trust.").

Remedies under the EPC can be problematic. In one appeal members of a

Minnesota local scheduled a picnic in a local park where Ronald Delia, the
president of a California local, was to speak about pending plant-closing
legislation. A threatening-appearing group of 100 local members and
officers came to "blow away" the picnickers, and no speeches occurred.
The local's building chairman and newspaper later praised the action.
Appellants asked the PRB to order an acknowledgement of local
responsibility and an apology. The PRB ordered only that its decision be
printed in the local newspaper, saying:
In point of fact, the deprivations which have occurred cannot be remedied. One cannot
undo what has happened. Delia was effectively silenced. Both those who may have
supported his views and those who may have opposed them have been deprived of the
benefits which derive from the free exchange of ideas. The most that can now be
hoped for is that these transgressions will not be repeated.

Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 280-81 (1981).

Exhaustion of remedies
Table of Contents

Article 33 section 5 requires any individual or body aggrieved by an

action, decision, or penalty, to exhaust fully the remedy and all appeals
under the constitution and the "rules of this Union" before going to a civil
court or government agency for redress. The "rules" are not identified; I
suppose they are your local bylaws.

Though the same exhaustion requirement has been in the UAW

constitution since at least 1936, there have been few decisions on it. It
applies to all types of appeal, whether concerning grievances, elections,
or anything else.
Article 15 section 6 (1936 constitution),
article 32 section 13 (1964 constitution),
article 32 section 13 (1970 constitution),
article 32 section 12 (1972 constitution),
article 33 section 5 (2006 constitution);
Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 21-22 (1958) (former version of article 33 section 5 requiring
exhaustion of UAW appeal rights before appealing to court applied to IEB action
postponing election),
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35 (1958) (former version of article 33 section 5 requiring
exhaustion of UAW appeal rights before appealing to court applied to appeals of union
action not of member action),
 Schriber v Local 699, 3 PRB 99, 103-04 (1980) (former version of article 33 section 5
requiring exhaustion of UAW appeal rights before appealing to court applied to appeals
of union action not of member action),
EP complaint of King v UAW, 5 PRB 226 (1986) (member required to process EP
complaint against UAW through local union despite local being unable to grant relief),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), p 10 (article 33 section 5 does not require
members to forgo their rights to pursue civil or criminal actions against other
members).

At least through 1964, failure to comply with this section was punishable
by the IEB (or its predecessor); the IEB could suspend or expel a member
or revoke the charter of a subordinate body.

In 1964 the punishment had to be "not inconsistent with any applicable

laws." The section did not spell out which "laws" were referred to.
Presumably they were internal, probably trial procedure rights, as was
indicated by the constitution committee chair during the 1970 convention
debate when the penal provision was removed. In 1957, by contrast, the
IEB could act summarily without a hearing.
Article 32 section 13 (1964 constitution) (discipline is permitted "insofar as imposition of
any such penalty is not inconsistent with any applicable laws."),
article 3 (1964 constitution) (constitution is supreme law of UAW);
compare article 15 section 6 (1936 constitution) ("Any member who violates this section
shall be liable to summary expulsion by the General Executive Board.");
Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 21 (1958) (under 1957 version of punishment provision, IEB
was permitted without a hearing to summarily suspend members who had appealed to
a civil court before exhausting constitutional appeal rights),
remarks of constitution committee chair Lacayo, proceedings, 22nd constitutional
convention, p 204 (1970) (referring to provision of constitution about to be deleted as
"[e]nforcement of the duty imposed upon each member by the trial procedure...").
In 1970 the penal provisions of the predecessor of article 33 were
eliminated. Though the convention debates that year suggest that the
delegates' intention was to eliminate all discipline -- even with due process
and proper trial procedures under article 31 -- for appealing to a court or
agency before exhausting appeals under the UAW's laws, the change was
made only in article 33. Article 31 was untouched. It allows a local to
punish a member for violating "any provision" of the constitution. The
exhaustion requirement remains a vital part of the constitution.
Compare PRB rules of procedure series 18, rule 11 (7/1/04) (revised PRB rule refers to
exhaustion requirement).

In a 2004 appeal however, the IEB said "it was never the intent of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention for Article 33, §5, to form the
basis for charges pursuant to Article 31." In light of article 31's language, I
disagree. The PRB itself did not reach the issue.
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), pp 4-5.

Some appeals concerning situations where members sued without fully

exhausting UAW remedies follow. A discussion of the courts' view of that
is beyond the scope of this manual.
Beach v Local 653, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (court cannot confer jurisdiction on PRB,
appeal dismissed for untimeliness),
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 223, 229 (1981) (court suspends consideration of suit
to allow member to pursue internal appeal, president waives time limit, member wins
appeal),
 EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 5 PRB 228, 233-35, 366, 371-73 (1987) (failure of
appellant to appear at IEB hearing withdrew his appeal despite claim that it was
mooted due to pending litigation),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 170-71 (2002) (after PRB remand and
successful arbitration appellant sued for damages, judge asked appellant to return to
PRB for damages, held untimely request),
Howell v Local 969, 10 PRB Case 198, 203-04 (1998) (court cannot confer jurisdiction on
PRB, appeal untimely),
Long v Local 22, 10 PRB 206 (1998), supplemental decision, 10 PRB 216 (1999) (after
remand appellants opted out of further article 33 proceedings and sued, PRB
nevertheless determined merits of appeal).

Grievances generally
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Stick with the union || Do your

homework || The grievance procedure
|| A few arbitration rules || What union
reps do || External-law grievances ||
Individual/group/policy grievances ||
The appellee and the time limit in a
grievance appeal || Union role reversal
in a grievance appeal || What if you win
a grievance appeal?
Stick with the union

According to the pocket guide:

A Grievance Is:

A violation of either the contract, supplementary agreements, state and federal labor
laws, health and safety regulations, National labor Relations Board rulings, arbitration
or umpire decisions, past practices and policies, or employer's own regulations.

Pocket guide, p 11;

compare Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1470 (5/25/04), p 13 ("The specific
problems ... have been addressed. Any future problems of the type Torres
encountered with [the supervisor] would have to be addressed in separate
grievances."),
Gillis v Local 1976, PRB Case 1523 (11/23/05), p 7 ("it does not appear that
appellant has suffered any injury that could have been addressed through
the grievance procedure...."),
Gordon v Local 1112, PRB Case 1594 (6/11/08), p 7 ("[Appellant] has not
identified any violation of his rights under the collective bargaining
agreement or the Pre-Retirement Option....").

Thus a grievance invokes rules which are not determined unilaterally by

the UAW, rules which strictly speaking are not the subject of this manual.
Even so, these rules impact members' work lives every day. The union's
primary job is to be your interface with the company about them. How well
the union does that job is treated here at length.
By far the largest percentage of appeals concern settled or withdrawn
grievances. I begin this section with an admonition to grievants who are
at a much earlier stage, the stage where the grievance is about to be
filed, or has been filed and is pending. I usually don't have to say this to
UAW members, but I'll say it anyway.

If the company has wronged you the union is your representative. For
several reasons -- including bargaining power and expertise -- in most
situations your best chance of righting the wrong is by trying to work with
the union. This is so even if the union has or thinks it has little bargaining
power and even if your steward or committeeperson seems or is
uninterested, incompetent, or hostile.

Seldom is this actually the case. Consider the following, from a 2009 PRB
decision. Appellant Ronald Simpson was fired for making a fraudulent claim
for disability benefits while he supposedly worked for a second employer.
The company's claim was actually baseless. Medical records showed he
really was suffering from a severe medical condition and he had ended his
employment with the second employer. Before the discharge he could have
resolved the matter with a simple telephone call to the second employer.
Eventually the disability claim was approved. But in the meantime Brother
Simpson did not give the company or union the evidence that would have
cleared him. At his discharge, he did not claim innocence. The grievance
he signed raised a lame excuse saying he didn't know the company's
attendance policy. During the investigation at the second step, he was
vague and evasive. His acquiescence in the union's
weak presentation raised doubts about his whole story. The union
suspected the company's claim might be true. Having no evidence to the
contrary, it withdrew the grievance. Simpson appealed and the local
membership supported him. But the company refused to accept the
grievance back into the procedure. He appealed up to the PRB, which
eventually uncovered that he was wrongfully discharged. Still, it held
withdrawal of the grievance was rational, based on what the union knew
at the time it acted.

The above facts are so bizarre that one wonders if the PRB decision may
have mis-stated them. Simpson might have done better going to the CAC
instead of the PRB, because of its looser standard for grievance appeals.
Regardless, the story makes an important point, that cooperation with the
union is critical.
Simpson v Region 1, PRB Case 1623 (6/24/09), pp 15-17.

Before leaving this subject, consider a second example, a more cautionary

one. Jeffrey Harris was fired for assisting a co-worker install company
products (new seats, trim, and other items) on another employee's
personal truck, after permission was given to bring it into the plant for a
front-end alignment. Another member assisted Brother Harris in the
installation. The truck had a license plate on it, indicating it was not a new
vehicle. A supervisor was aware of what was going on; the next day he
gave Harris the keys and told him to get the truck off
company premises, which Harris did. Later that day Harris was brought to
Labor Relations. The union rep told him all the company wanted was the
truth and he would probably get only a one-month suspension. He signed
a statement admitting he had helped install the company products and
had driven the truck off company property to a Wal-Mart lot. The
company then fired both Harris and the member who had helped him. The
company charged Harris with assisting a theft of company property and
with hindering the investitation by driving the truck to Wal-Mart. Over a
year later, the supervisor who told Harris to move the truck was still
working at the plant, according to a committeeperson. The union got the
other member back to work at the third step.

The union pulled Harris's grievance, saying his guilt was definitely
established. As to the other member, it said the company hadn't been
able to show the other member knew the truck belonged to another
employee. Harris answered that couldn't be so because the truck had a
license plate. Additionally, the supervisor was still working. He added:
Moreover, I was told by a Local Committeeperson at the time of Ford's investigation
that the Company just wanted the truth about my involvement and that I would
receive only a suspension. This was bad advice. If I had lied, or not told the Company
anything, I would still be working for Ford.

The IEB and PRB upheld withdrawal of the grievance. They said even
apart from Harris' confession, the company had "hard evidence" that he
had participated in the theft, and also that he tried to hide the evidence.
As to the other member, the PRB repeated what the union had said
before, that a question had been established whether the other member
knew he was participating in a theft.
The PRB did not explain how the other member could not have known a
theft was in progress, given that the truck had a license plate. Nor did it
describe the "hard evidence" which the company had against Harris, apart
from the confession. Nor did it answer why the supervisor who told Harris
to hide the evidence still worked there. This is a troubling decision.
Harris v Region 3, 11 PRB 537 (2002).

If the union really isn't doing its job, and if it really is not going out and
collecting available evidence and argument, you might end up having to
do the legwork yourself. You shouldn't have to spoonfeed the union, but
doing it is a better option than having no evidence. In most situations a
bad grievance is better than a good appeal or a good lawsuit. There are
some few situations where the opposite proves true, but I seldom see
them. Anyway there will be time for suits later, if that is your direction.
Pocket guide, p 173 ("Considering the large number of grievances that are processed,
there are few duty of fair representation suits, and almost none of those suits
succeed."),
Handbook, p 128 ("Considering the large number of grievances that are processed, there
are few duty of fair representation suits, and almost none of those suits succeed.").

Do your homework

UAW contracts with employers commonly require management to inform

the union of a reprimand, warning, suspension, layoff, or discharge of a
member. Customarily, every discharge is grieved.
UAW/GM 1999 national agreement, paragraph 76,
UAW/Ford 1996 national agreement, article VII section 5(a),
UAW/Chrysler 1996 P & M national agreement, paragraph 40;
pocket guide, p 170 ("If a worker requests that a discharge or other serious discipline be
grieved, then we advise filing the grievance.");
Sallee v Local 933, PRB Case 1627 (6/25/09), p 7 (appellant apparently did not request a
grievance following his discharge, when a timely grievance could have been filed).

If you are fired or suspended ordinarily you cannot go in the plant without
company permission, even to go just to the union committee room.
Schillinger v Region 4 , PRB Case 1414 (4/17/03), p 7;
compare Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 790 (1990) (fired president denied access to
plant).

But you can call a friend who is still working and ask him or her to track
down information. Try to get the phone numbers of witnesses who might
support you, and then call them or have a friend call them. Have a pencil
and paper with you when you call, and take notes. Then give whatever
information you find out to the rep, organizing it if necessary.

Members who have been fired sometimes come to feel that they don't
want to go back to work, and that they would prefer a solely financial
settlement.
Rogers v Region 9, 11 PRB 400, 404 (2002) ("I do not want my job back; I just want the
Company to pay for my medical expenses that it has caused me.").
If that is your own feeling, be very sure of yourself before conveying it to
a union representative. Unless you instruct the rep otherwise, he or she
would be justified in relaying it to the company in settlement discussions.
A job with benefits is not something to walk away from lightly, and your
statement might be seen as a desire to quit.
Compare Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), pp 7-8 (member's refusal
of settlement offer of possible reinstatement with seniority with no backpay but a
higher pay rate in a different department, and her statements that the only thing she
wanted was punitive damages, were factors in PRB approval of union decision to settle
meritorious discharge grievance of high-seniority member for backpay only).

If you come by information late, even after the grievance is dropped and
while you are appealing, the PRB sometimes lets you get away with
submitting it late. But the prudent course is to gather it quickly.
Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748, 753-54 (1990) (appellant's explanation that
he came forward with information about his heart condition late is plausible in light of
statement by attendance counselor after learning of heart condition that nothing could
be done to help appellant, PRB orders appellant to produce medical evidence and
orders union to evaluate it),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), pp 7-9 (PRB considers evidence offered by
appellant because president refused to comply with previous PRB order).

You should be given prompt written notice and a thorough explanation if

the grievance is settled or withdrawn.
Pocket guide, pp 45, 170-71, 173,
Handbook, p 127,
St Hillaire v Local 1459, 3 PRB 32, 35 (1980),
 Huntley v GM Department, 5 PRB 416, 421 (1987),
Hauben v Local 3000, 8 PRB 1, 5 (1993) ("It has been our experience in nearly all of the
several hundred appeals which have been presented to us from the withdrawal or
settelement of employee grievances that the employee is notified in writing of the
Union's action."),
Dalton v Region 9, 9 PRB 57, 61 (1995);
compare Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 573 (2002) (UAW rationally withdrew grievance
because contract was not violated but gave appellant irrational reasons),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/20/07), pp 16-17
(president's staff failed to communicate adequately with appellant about the status of
his appeal after he won at the IEB level; appellant was entitled to receive prompt and
straightforward responses to his inquiries),
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08) p 13 (disposing of grievance without
explanation to grievant was directly contrary to UAW's policy),
Ilgenfritz v Local 2250, PRB Case 1630 (9/14/09) p 8 ("We cannot determine from this
record why Maguire did not immediately communicate his decision [to settle] to
Ilgenfritz, but as the International Union has observed, the lapse did no harm.").

If you think the disposition was wrong or unfair, ask about appeal
procedures. But first, listen to the explanation and ask questions. There
may be facts you didn't know or appreciate that make it a good
settlement.
A legitimate judgment not to arbitrate some grievances can be made simply because
the exigencies of the situation do not require it when balanced against the
expenditures. But when contract violations result in serious personal harm to an
employee or group of employees, then the lack of merit in the cause should be clear
before the claim is dropped.

Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 491 (1968);

see also Body v UAW, 11 PRB 450, 453 (2001) ("Indeed for [the union] to
have [arbitrated the grievance] might well have risked undermining its
credibility in the eyes of the Impartial Chairman on the occasion of the next
 meritorious case it sought to present."),
Norris v Region 1A, PRB Case 1485 (2/10/05), p 8 ("Indeed by pursuing this
grievance [seeking to overturn a discharge which did not violate the
contract], [the union] might well have risked undermining its ability to
negotiate second chances for employees with such chronic attendance
problems in the future."),
Nash v GM Department, PRB Case 1583 (2/12/08), p 14 ("The sad fact is that
Nash has now thrown away $140,000 in order to pursue claims that have
nothing to do with him or any rights arising out of his former employment at
General Motors.").

If you are not convinced, my pocket guide and handbook unfortunately do

not recommend that the rep give you an explanation of your membership
status, or appeal procedures, deadlines, or remedies. Quoting from a
1997 administrative letter about the duty of fair representation, they say
only that if you ask you should be "referred to the UAW remedies or given
a copy of the UAW Constitution and told to examine it." The 2008 version
of the letter is even worse. Nothing in it tells reps to tell you anything
about the appeal procedures and time limits of the UAW constitution.
Pocket guide, p 172,
Handbook, p 127;
compare Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), p 4 (member told of right
to appeal under article 33).

You have a right to a copy of the grievance on request, as well as copies

of management's answers, the disposition, and the contract, all without
payment. A 2008 administrative letter also adds:
In some cases, additional parts of the file, including witness statements and
investigation notes, should also be made available. When there is a concern regarding
 disclosure of any aspect of the grievance file -- for example because revealing the
identify of witnesses may place them in jeopardy -- the assigned union representative
should inform the grievant that portions of the file are being retained, and the reasons
why. In difficult cases, the International Representative may contact the Legal
Department for more detailed advice.

Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,

administrative letter, volume 54 # 4 (8/12/08), p 4.
Pocket guide, p 173;
see also letter, Stephen Yokich to all local union presidents, vice-presidents,
recording secretaries, financial secretaries, and chairpersons, 12/19/95;
compare pocket guide, p 49 (all new members should be given a copy of the
contract and an explanation of their responsibilities as union members);
Smith v Local 262, IEB Decision (undated, some time in 2002), p 8 (grievance
is union property, and decision whether to settle is exclusively union's).

If you request the grievance and disposition promptly, would that excuse
waiting to file an appeal till after you received it? Possibly, if you needed
to see the paperwork to decide whether an appeal would be worthwhile.
But be careful.
Compare Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969) (filing an unsuccessful charge
regarding grievance-handling extends the time to appeal the grievance disposition if
the IEB improperly raises that issue),
Berard v Local 422, 2 PRB 610, 614 (1977) (filing an unsuccessful charge regarding
grievance-handling may extend the time to file an appeal of the grievance disposition);
compare Sailer v Local 214, 8 PRB 555, 558 (1995) (mere rumor and unconfirmed fact
insufficient basis on which to file charge).

The grievance procedure

Little can be written about the technicalities of your grievance procedure
in a UAW-wide manual like this, because every company with which the
union bargains has its own grievance procedure with its own quirks and
deadlines.

To learn the specifics of yours, get a copy of the contract. UAW locals
ordinarily give them out freely.

The UAW's definition of a grievance is elsewhere.

Individual, group, and policy grievances are discussed elsewhere. Multiple

individual grievances arising from the same situation or member are
discussed elsewhere.

Typically, a grievance procedure provides for a series of bilateral meetings

between company and union officials. Certain issues such as management
prerogatives are not amenable to the grievance procedure. If a grievance
cannot be settled at a step it is referred to the next step where higher-
level officials discuss it. These meetings can be thought of as an
extension of the bargaining process. Usually only the union, not an
individual member, can file a grievance or advance it to the next step.
There are often time limits within which a grievance must be filed and
answered, and further time limits within which to appeal to and receive
an answer at the next step. If bilateral meetings cannot settle it, the
ultimate step is to an arbitrator or umpire, whose decisions are final and
binding.
 Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241, 236 (1999) (arbitration decision is final and
binding),
see also Mattox v UAW, 11 PRB 485, 491 (2002) (when union took grievance all the way
to arbitration and lost, "it had done all it could do for appellants").

Typically, once the company takes action it may not change the rationale
it has given the union.
Vogen v Local 900, 9 PRB 614, 622 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000),
reconsideration denied (7/19/00) ("[I]n the event that the Company attempts to shift
the basis for the discharge of Vogen from a three day quit to some other reason, [th e
union] shall object."),
LeClerc v DaimlerChryster Departmen t, 1t, 1 1 PRB 321, 325 (2001) (union objected to
company's amendment of discharge notice three years afterward, but arbitrator
allowed the amendment because the company had promptly, clearly, and repeatedly
informed the union that it considered the drug sale charge to be an additional ground
for the discharge).

Commonly, the contract says the union may not strike or sue over a
grievable issue.

The union should give you prompt notice if a grievance is settled or

withdrawn.
Nickell v Local 590, 2 PRB 47, 52 (1973) (under contract in which there was no right to
arbitrate and members declined to strike, local union and UAW advise PRB of
continuing efforts to secure appellant's reinstatement in bargaining),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11 (to maintain good bargaining
relationship with union company might reopen a closed grievance).

The following are discussed elsewhere in this manual:

 after-acquired evidence,
allocation of settlements,
circumstantial evidence,
compromising a grievance,
credibility,
denial of union representation,
high-seniority members,
jointness and grievability,
last-chance agreements,
"obey now, grieve later," insubordination,
past practices,
penalities and progressive discipline,
probationary and at-will employees,
subpoenas, and
timeliness of grievance-processing.

The way UAW reps are to handle grievances is discussed elsewhere.

Sometimes mediation is the second-to-last step of the grievance

procedure. The PRB explained it in a 2007 decision.
We think McMillan may be overestimating the role of a grievant at [the mediation] step
of the grievance procedure. This would not be a venue for him to plead his case for
reinstatement. There would not have been any opportunity during the mediation
process for McMillan to argue with the mediator or present any additional evidence to
support his position. By this point, the case for McMillan’s reinstatement had already
been presented to Management at the first four steps of the grievance procedure. The
role of the federal mediator at Step 5 of the grievance procedure is to determine
 whether there has, in fact, been a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. If
the mediator finds convincing evidence that the agreement has been violated, he or
she will assist the parties in settling the grievant’s claims. If there is no violation, then
there is no basis for settlement.

McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555 (5/7/07), pp 12-13.

As is discussed elsewhere, a local should stay in touch with members who

have pending grievances.

As is discussed elsewhere, the union can settle a grievance without the

permission of the grievant.

Delay in grievance-processing is discussed elsewhere.

Compromising a grievance where the company and union have differing

interpretations is discussed elsewhere.

Voting on grievance settlements is discussed elsewhere.

Settling a matter on terms inconsistent with the contract is discussed

elsewhere.

Re-filing previously-withdrawn grievances is discussed elsewhere.

A distinction between contractual and equitable claims is discussed

elsewhere.

Other decisions about grievance procedures follow:

 Combs v Ford Department, PRB Case 1478 (5/26/04), pp 4, 8-9 (contract excluded from
grievance procedure matters related to computers used by jointly funded job security
and standards rep),
Keith v Local 524, PRB Case 1458 (2/23/04), pp 1, 5, 8 (disagreeing with IEB, PRB says
company may add reason for discharge at fourth step of grievance procedure),
Gillis v Local 1976, PRB Case 1523 (11/23/05), p 7 ("it does not appear that appellant
has suffered any injury that could have been addressed through the grievance
procedure....").

A few arbitration rules

In deciding grievance appeals the PRB is frequently called on to decide

what would have been the likely result had the grievance been arbitrated.
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07),
reconsideration p 2 ("The conclusion of the President's staff that the case could not
have been arbitrated successfully is still rational based on the entire record."),
Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), p 17 ("This would have been a difficult
case to make before an arbitrator, however, because there is no system of progressiv e
discipline in the collective bargaining agreement.").

The same is true of the CAC, though it uses a more lenient standard.
Shannon, CAC, session 11/94 (appeal remanded so appellant could take his chances
before an arbitrator),
Vargo, CAC, session 11/95 (grievance reinstated even though it would be hard to ask
arbitrator to substitute judgment for that of the company and the local),
Young, CAC, session 9/02 (company sent grievant a five-day notice; grievant may be
able to establish in arbitration she did in fact respond within the time required).
So both bodies sometimes analyze umpire or arbitration precedents.
Hall v Local 735, 4 PRB 263, 267 (1984),
Humphrey v Ford Department, 5 PRB 285, 289-91 (1987),
Frolichman v Ford Department, 6 PRB 382, 385-86 (1992),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 621-22 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000),
reconsideration denied (7/19/00),
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5, 13-14, 17 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20
(1996),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 622 (1998) (though nurse clinician's excuse was
arguably insufficient to show inability to work company did not point out insufficiency
and give appellant an opportunity to supplement it with further evidence as it should
have according to arbitration precedent),
Hunt v Local 435, 10 PRB 141, 147 (1998) ("Umpire precedent is binding on both the
Employer and the Union."),
Hurd v Aerospace Department, 11 PRB 297, 301-02 (2001),
Davis v UAW, 11 PRB 348, 350 (2001),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 366 (2003),
Shepard v Local 174, PRB Case 1495 (5/13/05), p 8,
Smith v Region 4, PRB Case 1537 (9/27/06), pp 7-8 (prior arbitration precedents hold
that the contract language does not protect members for filing workers comp, OSHA,
and EEOC claims, and that a high standard of proof exists to show such acts motivated
her discharge);
compare Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 477, 480 (1969) (in pre-1980 grievance appeal PRB
declines to analyze arbitration precedents),
Lacey v Local 7777, PRB Case 1577 (1/24/08), p 5 ("The arbitrators who previously
addressed this issue apparently felt that the Casino's application of the variance policy
was reasonable."),
Neely v Region 3, PRB Case 1601, pp 15-17 (4/21/09);
Gustafson v Local 865, CAC, session 11/81,

Discussion of arbitrators' rules for deciding grievances is beyond the

scope of this manual. For extended research I refer you to the handbook
and to the sources it cites. These may be available for review at your local;
if not, ask local officers or committeepersons to help you find them.

The handbook lists some general principles arbitrators go by. Except

where noted, the following are my paraphrases not quotes:

"Significantly arbitrators interpret large formal contracts such as

General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and other large companies more
stringently. That is, an arbitrator does not permit customs and
practices, or 'filling in gaps.' An arbitrator holds the parties to the
language of larger formal contracts."

"Most [UAW contracts] are smaller incomplete contracts. Arbitrators

apply a different 'brand of justice' in the interpretation of smaller,
incomplete contracts. Arbitrators 'round-out' contracts by considering
practiced conditions of employment and working conditions as part of
the parties contract. Arbitrators are prone to provide the same
measure of Union rights and security under smaller incomplete
contracts as larger complete contracts."

An arbitrator may not add to, subtract from, or otherwise amend the
contract.

Unclear ambiguous language -- arbitrators only have the authority to

interpret unclear terms.
 "Estoppel" -- a party that does not enforce a right can waive it.

Customs and practices -- unclear terms are interpreted by the way

they are applied. Practices become part of smaller informal contracts.

Specific terms and general terms -- specific language which modifies,

clarifies, or interprets other general terms is the controlling language.

Due process -- grievants may be disciplined only after they have been
charged and given the chance to respond.

Reasonable and fair rules -- an employer may not set rules for rules'
sake; they must be related to efficient, safe, and orderly operation.

Off-duty conduct -- employer's rules should not reach into the private
lives of workers.

Occasionally the PRB too mentions a general arbitration principle. Some

follow:

To sustain a discharge a company need prove its case only by a

preponderance of the evidence.
Sasaki v GM Department, 10 PRB 548, 553 (1999).

A local agreement may not conflict with a national agreement.

Willbanks v Local 599, 10 PRB 180, 183 (1998),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), p 21
 (individual members of management and union have no authority to waive
provisions of national agreement).

Unless renegotiated, umpire or arbitrator decisions establish binding

precedents; settlements do not.
Handbook, pp 65, 68;
Jackson v Chrysler Department, 8 PRB 479, 482 (1995) (umpire decisions),
Tasker v GM Department, 8 PRB 484, 490 (1995) (umpire decisions),
Broughton v Local 659, 9 PRB 362, 367 (1997) (settlements, umpire decisions),
Barnes v TOP Department, 9 PRB 570, 573 (1997) (renegotiated arbitration
decision),
Miller v Ford Department, PRB Case 1427 (3/19/03), p 6 (given result in relatively
recent arbitration decision union had rational basis);
but see Handbook, p 65 (distinguishing between withdrawing a grievance, which
results in a precedent, and withdrawing it "without prejudice" ("WWP"), which
does not).

It is permissible for a company and union to mutually misread or

mutually correct a mistake in a contract or its administration.
Farrell v Local 1929, 6 PRB 424, 430 (1992),
Hollowell v Local 823, 8 PRB 571, 575 (1995),
Clark v Local 686, 10 PRB 318, 321 (1999),
Dillon v Local 735, 11 PRB 222, 224 (2001) ("Dillon relies on a literal reading of
Paragraph (21) of the UAW/GM National Agreement to support his position."),
Chismar v Local 662, 11 PRB 242, 244-45 (2001),
Harmon v Region 1A, PRB Case 1539 (9/27/06), p 7 (company's mistake in
seniority list would not bind the parties to continue it once they concluded they
had made an error).

Factual determinations made in courts or unemployment proceedings

are not binding on arbitrators.
Stone v Region 1B, 5 PRB 16, 18 (1985),
Woods v Local 863, 5 PRB 422, 425 (1987),
Zepplin v Local 974, 6 PRB 477, 487 (1993) (concurring),
Baker-Williams v Region 3, 10 PRB 511, 517 (2000) (contrary to unemployment
commission, there is no evidence that company was informed timely of appellant's
appointment for re-evaluation by doctor),
Addison v Region 8, PRB Case 1600 (12/16/08), pp 4-5, 15 (despite finding of
unemployment judge that evidence was insufficient to establish wilful misconduct,
PRB holds appellant's failure to keep himself informed about company rules could
be said to have amounted to defiance of those rules);
but see Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5, 14 (1995) (testimony developed in
unemployment hearing can be used to impeach witnesses in arbitration),
supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 221-23 (1996) (no mention of knife threat incident
by company in unemployment proceedings supports supports inference incident
was not a basis for discharge, local did not investigate evidence favoring appellant
that he produced at unemployment hearing),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 17, 20 n 22 (2001) (company had been unable to
sustain claim in unemployment proceedings, though unemployment decisions are
not dispositive of evidentiary issues they may be of substantial probative value).

If discipline is not grieved at the time it occurs, it stays on your

record and can be used to build a case for more severe discipline on a
later occasion.
Harrell v Local 842, 3 PRB 299, 301 (1982),
Sparrow v Local 1250, PRB Case 1457 (2/23/04), pp 2, 9-11.

During the grievance procedure the company may not shift the reason
it gives for an action it took.
 Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 220-24 (1996) (no mention of knife threat incident
on company exit interview summary or in unemployment proceedings, unspecific
and non-contemporaneous witness statements concerning knife incident),
Vogen v Local 900, 9 PRB 614, 622 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000),
reconsideration denied (7/19/00) ("[I]n the event that the Company attempts to
shift the basis for the discharge of Vogen from a three day quit to some other
reason, [the union] shall object."),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 237-40 (40 ( 1999) (union was unaware of PRB
concern whether knife incident was actually a company basis for terminating
appellant and whether management's evidence was authentic, union did not
attempt to exclude
knife incident testimony from the hearing);
but see Keith v Local 524, PRB Case 1458 (2/23/04), pp 1, 5, 8 (disagreeing with
IEB, PRB says company may add reason for discharge at fourth step of grievance
procedure),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07),
original decision pp 1, 13, reconsideration p 2 (UAW rationally declined to arbitrate
grievance of member fired for fighting, where evidence showed argument was
instigated by the foreman, and it involved only angry talk and not violence).

The existence of a technical defect in the documents related to

disciplinary action would not alter the merits of a grievance protesting
the assessment of discipline.
Helton v National Heavy Truck Department, PRB Case 1541 (10/26/06), p 6
(management cited wrong shop rule),
Hulme v Northwest Local 163, PRB Case 1588 (6/10/08), p 11 (management
named wrong person as appellant's supervisor).

A company's failure to produce records which appellant says would

exonerate him should be construed in appellant's favor.
Addison v Region 8, PRB Case 1600 (12/16/08), p 12.
 Unlike in traditional discipline grievances where it is the company
which has the burden of proof, where the company has sent the
member a letter saying either to report for work or provide a
satisfactory reason for absence, the union has the burden to show
either that the member either did report or that it was impossible for
the member to do so.
Baker-Williams v Region 3, 10 PRB 511, 516 (2000).

An employee guility of falsifying an employment application may be

discharged within one year after commission of the offense. He or she
may not be fired thereafter for that offense alone, even though the
company did not learn of the fraud until later.
Frolichman v Ford Department, 6 PRB 382, 385-86 (1992).

What union reps do

Table of Contents

What should you and your local expect of stewards and

committeepersons? PRB decisions commonly cite UAW grievance
materials as authoritative.
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385, 390-92 (1982) (PRB grants grievance appeal partially
 because union rep did not follow admonition of handbook),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 17 (2001) (PRB cites UAW Grievance Handlers
Handbook);
but see Clark v Local 686, 10 PRB 318, 322 (1999) (PRB discounts language in UAW
Contract Administration Manual as being "nothing more than the opinion of the author
of the Manual").

My pocket guide states the duties. A good grievance handler must:

keep a complete record of all workers under their jurisdiction,

including their names, addresses, phone numbers, classifications,
seniority, and wage rates,

know the contract, particularly clauses on seniority, grievance

procedure, wages and classifications, and all sections pertaining to
disciplinary action,

know the workers' rights under federal and state labor laws,

know the local bylaws and the constitution,

attend meetings and encourage all other workers to attend,

attend union education classes and share the knowledge with

workers,

strive to keep the workplace free from all health and safety hazards,

keep bulletin boards and information racks timely,

 check dues standing of all members in the department/jurisdiction,

eliminate phony grievances,

distribute union information and literature to all members under their

jurisdiction,

hold regular meetings with members to keep them informed,

not assume responsibilities of management,

not pass the buck or make false promises to workers,

not discriminate or play politics with the grievance procedure.

Pocket guide, pp 46-47;
compare Franks v UAW, PRB Case 1520 (12/20/05) p 12-13 ("There was an
extraordinary amount of confusion regarding the collection of dues on behalf of Local
Union 7777 immediately following the organization of this unit by the UAW.... [T]he
executive officers of the newly established Local did not know.... The International
Representatives assisting the Local had no easy solutions to offer, however. They were
inexperienced with the type of business involved, and the Casinos were not
cooperating with the newly elected officials.").

Regarding grievances, the pocket guide is more specific. The following are
not quotations, but my summary of what look to be the main points of the
many cited pages. Refer to the actual pocket guide for authoritative advice.
A rep should:

Have an awareness of contractual benefits plans and health-

and-safety provisions, and refer specific problems to designated local
reps.

Strive to resolve problems before they become grievances.

Listen carefully to the worker's version of a situation, and ask

questions.

Investigate all the facts because all are important, not just those that
support the case. The more background information, the better.

Investigate and dig up proof. Double-check the issues of who, what,

when, where, and why. Assemble concrete evidence such as doctor's
certificates and employer records.

Write up the facts, in specific detail, preferably on a form.

Know the precise requirements of the contract and follow them.

Study contract interpretations.

Check past practices and workplace rules.

Be prepared to show workers the contract language, so they may

refer to it in their own copy of the agreement.

Ask for advice and get information on past practices and

interpretations from other grievance-handlers or those with greater
experience.

After careful thought and study decide whether you can solve a
problem. Decide on the merits. Sort out any that lack sufficient
grounds such that you cannot resolve it regardless of what you do. If
it is a grievance get ready to win it, and if not tell the worker why.

Watch the time limits.

Write the grievance, including a protest, charge, demand or request,

and proper signatures of yourself and the worker.

Be specific in the request. Ask for a definite type of action which

would remove the real cause of the grievance and for full redress,
such as backpay for hardship imposed on the worker.

Refer grievances quickly, in a prompt and timely manner.

Calendar the grievance, noting when an answer is due.

Inform the grievant of the status of the grievance, even if there is no

answer yet.

Try to develop answers to the arguments management is most likely

to use.

Know the supervisor you are dealing with.

 Don't guess and don't bluff with management.

Be firm and courteous, and don't lose your temper.

Don't argue with another union rep in front of management.

Avoid making deals by trading one grievance to win another.

Drive for an immediate settlement whenever possible, but avoid

getting a quick "no."

Don't continue to argue if management grants your point.

Prepare a brief.

Keep files on past cases for reference in future cases, and for
recommending changes in the next contract.

Brief your replacement.

Pocket guide, pp 3-9, 13-46.

As noted elsewhere, review of the duty of fair representation imposed by

external law is beyond the scope of this manual. However the pocket
guide and handbook note and comment at some length on the duty,
quoting from a 1997 administrative letter.
Pocket guide, pp 164-74,
Handbook, pp 125-28,
 Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, administrative letter,
volume 46 # 3 (5/6/97).

In 2008 the UAW updated the 1997 letter on the duty of fair
representation.
Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, administrative letter,
volume 54 # 4 (8/12/08).

The 2008 version of the letter is not in the somewhat-dated versions of

the UAW's guides and handbooks, noted elsewhere, that I have. The
following is taken from the 2008 version of the letter.

It deserves attention. It repeats many of the pointers noted above, and

adds some. They are puzzling:

"[The following is an example] of conduct which probably would not

be found violative of the Union's duty of fair representation.... The
Chairperson of the grievance committee honestly, but mistakenly,
believes that the employer has not violated the contract and
persuades the committee to withdraw the grievance."

But in nine decisions the PRB held the opposite. It reinstated

grievances the union honestly but mistakenly believed would be lost.
Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, administrative
letter, volume 54 # 4 (8/12/08), p 2,
pocket guide, p 168;
Resnick, Drake, Humphrey, Grant, Testerman, Vogen, Acton, Parden, Neely,
described elsewhere.
Since 1992 the CAC has reversed many more.

There is a "Guidelines" section, headed by a paragraph saying that the

pointers are not required by (external) law or by the constitution. One
pointer says "if there are factual disputes in a given case the
grievance handler should accept the grievant's version of the facts, if
credible."

In eight decisions the PRB held this it is not just good advice, but a
UAW requirement, to arbitrate discharges if the member has high
seniority and the claim is tenable. In the second-to-last last one it
added the union should have accepted the member's version of the
facts.
Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, administrative
letter, volume 54 # 4 (8/12/08), p 3,
pocket guide, p 170,
James, Drake, George, Humphrey, Peterson, Burdette, Acton, Parden, described
elsewhere.

The same pointer says "In deciding whether to arbitrate a discharge

grievance, two important factors to consider are the grievant's
seniority level and work record...."

In a discharge, the most important question is whether the employer

had cause for the separation, "cause" or "just cause" being the
criterion most contracts use. The member's seniority can also be a
proper consideration, as well as his or her disciplinary record,
particularly if the member is working under a last-chance agreement.
But "work record"? In a promotion grievance, that could be proper,
because "experience" or "merit, ability, and capacity" are often
contractual factors. But not in a discharge grievance. A discharge
implies the member was somehow at fault. Besides, a member's "work
record" is a slippery concept, laden with the potential for management
favoritism.

In the same "Guidelines" section, a pointer says, in sum, that if the

grievant is a personal, political, or ideological opponent of a union rep
it is better for another rep to process the grievance when possible.
The same goes for a supervisor if the grievance involves a personal
dispute between himself or herself and the member. If necessary the
union should process the grievance to a higher step so a different
management person can respond.

There is no PRB decision on point, so the issue may not be important.

My own view is this should be thought of as a requirement, not just
good advice.
Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, administrative
letter, volume 54 # 4 (8/12/08), p 3,
pocket guide, pp 171-72;
compare Nafus v Region 9, PRB Case 1531 (4/12/06), p 4 n 12, 7 (fired
non-member of union was represented properly where union had secured his
reinstatement from earlier discharge for altercation through arbitration, but
non-member would not comply with reinstatement condition requiring anger
management treatment, was charged with repeating conduct for which he was
fired the first time, declared he would not curb his expression, and continued to
 vent anger at union representatives, thus raising reasonable doubts as to his
ability to present a case as a witness to an arbitrator),
Phelps v Local 1292, PRB Case 1614 (4/22/09), p 10 ("The fact that Phelps may
have behaved in a way that would justify hostility does not constitute evidence
that hostility influenced the settlement of his grievance. Committeeperson Bean's
handling of Phelps' disciplinary grievance demonstrates that he did not allow past
differences to influence his responsibilities with respect to the processing of
grievances").

Most importantly for this manual, nothing in the letter tells reps,
when a member asks what can be done after a grievance is
withdrawn, to give an explanation of the appeal procedures and time
limits of the UAW constitution. In contrast, the prior version of this
letter, written in 1997, said the member should be directed to the
appeal processes of article 33, and told they have to be exhausted
before the union can be sued.
Grievance Handling and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, administrative
letter, volume 46 # 3 (5/6/97) ("If a grievant asks about his/her recourse after a
grievance is withdrawn, he/she should be referred to the UAW remedies or given
a copy of the UAW Constitution and told to examine it. In general, UAW remedies
under Article 33 must be exhausted before a grievant can sue the Union.").

A pointer says a union rep "should consider the facts surrounding a

grievance to be confidential information to be shared only on a 'need-
to-know' basis." This is a peculiar formulation. I'm not sure what to
make of it. Traditionally in a union an injury to one is an injury to all.
See my discussion of "standing" for appeal-filing, elsewhere.

On other pages the guide adds that reps are to orient new members and
give them a contract, educate members and stimulate union participation,
attend and remind other members about meetings, classes, and special
union events, engage and encourage others to engage in political and
V-CAP activity, and refer out-of-workplace problems to counselors.
Pocket guide, pp 48-50, 173.

Other sections cover strike education and assistance,

Pocket guide, pp 51-57.

work standards,
Pocket guide, pp 57-63.

substance abuse,
Pocket guide, pp 156-64.

elimination of workplace sexual harassment,

Pocket guide, pp 174-84.

what are called "Weingarten" rights (named for a famous case in labor
law), which are rules governing the whether the employer must summon
a steward during investigations of workers,
Pocket guide, pp 82-95.

UAW departments, and

 Pocket guide, pp 63-67.

federal laws and agencies.

Pocket guide, pp 68-82, 96-155, 185-95.

It is a good idea for a local to stay in touch with members who have
pending grievances.
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 228 (1981) (failure of local to respond at all to
grievant's requests as to the status of his grievance casts serious doubt over its claim
that it presented the grievance properly),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 185 (1991) (dissent) (criticizing total absence of
communication between union and appellants between umpire decision and
implementation).

But ordinarily the union need not consult with a grievant respecting a
decision not to arbitrate. It can settle on terms unacceptable to the
grievant. It can even refuse a grievant's request to drop a grievance.
Finally, the most pertinent statement made by the Committeeman in his ... letter to the
Appellant was that since he had been directed to withdraw the grievance, he did
because he apparently came to the conclusion that "I can't make someone pursue a
grievance." The Duty of Fair Representatation does not endow the grievant with rights
to withdraw [the grievance] or demand its protraction in the grievance procedure. Once
reduced to writing by the Union, the grievance becomes the exclusive property of the
Union unencumbered by the grievant's wishes.

...

We credit the Appellant, not the Committeeman, on the question of whether or not the
Appellant actually asked for his grievance to be withdrawn. We find he did not. Even if
the Appellant had asked, we hold, in the particular circumstances of this case, that the
Committeeman should have taken the discharge grievance to the next step of the
grievance procedure.

Smith v Local 262, IEB Decision (undated, some time in 2002), pp 8-9
(emphasis in original);
See also Strong v Local 805, 1 PRB 620, 623 (1971) (union is not required to
accede to every demand of every employee for a time study or to process to
arbitration every grievance which an employee may file),
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 182 (1976) (no duty to consult re decision not
to arbitrate),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 237 (1999) (fact that union and grievant
disagree on settlement of grievance does not give rise to an appeal),
Vogen v Local 900, 9 PRB 624, 628 (2000), reconsideration denied (7/19/00)
("[O]nce a settlement of the grievance was reached it became final and
binding on all parties [footnote omitted]."),
McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474, 479 (2003) (union can settle on
terms nerms n ot acceptable to aggrieved),
Moscato v Ford Department, PRB Case 1483 (10/26/04), p 8 (union not
obliged to obtain grievant's permission to negotiate settlement of
grievances);
but see George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204, 210 (1987) (remand for additional
IEB investigation ordered, after which UAW ordered to meet with appellant
and her attorney to determine whether grievance should proceed to
arbitration),
McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474, 481 (2003) (not irrational to settle
discharge grievance by allowing member to be reinstated for the sole
purpose of applying for total and permanent disability),
Harris v Local 2320, 9 PRB 276, 285 (1996) (if appellant is right that there was
no meeting of the minds of the employer, the union, and the appellant as to
settlement of the grievance, then at least arguably the grievance is still
pending),
Keevis v Local 235, 11 PRB 12, 14 (2000) ("Such contractual ambiguities offer
 the opportunity for compromise [payment of $250], and this is what has
happened here."),
Helton v National Heavy Truck Department, PRB Case 1541 (10/26/06), p 5
(though management argued that the union had made a settlement
regarding the layoffs before filing the grievance, the union did not treat it as
having been resolved, and processed it to the fourth step),
Polansky v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1552 (1/26/07), p 8 ("It
was unfortunate that Polansky refused to take advantage of the settlement
negotiated on his behalf...."),
Bertone v GM Department, PRB Case 1556 (2/21/07), p 9 ("Under the
circumstances, the Union achieved an excellent settlement for Bertone that
preserved his job and his seniority. It is very unfortuante that Bertone did
not take advantage of this settlement.").

Delay in grievance-processing is often a concern for members. Sometimes

this is because the union has missed a deadline, but not always. The UAW
does not always include members in discussion of grievances. The PRB
has shown some interest in the issue of tardy grievance-processing, but
to date it has not upheld an appeal solely on this basis.
Pocket guide, pp 42, 44-45, 171, 173 (union should move quickly, grievant should be
told status of grievance),
Handbook, p 127;
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522 (1969) (committeeman forgot to appeal grievance
timely to the next step),
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 228 (1981) (delay one factor in upholding appeal),
Merrow v Region 1A, 6 PRB 125, 129-30 (1991) (despite PRB's very fundamental
concern that undue delay can constitute breach of duty union performed duty in this
appeal),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 185 n 16 (1991) (dissent) (noting total absence of
communication between union and grievants),
Rowser v Local 909, 8 PRB 57, 63 (1993) (surface plausibility in appellant's claim that
 six-year delay in resolving grievance is itself irrational, but PRB unwilling to hold for
appellants on this issue alone),
Ayres v Local 1112, 10 PRB 126, 128 (1998) (it can take a year or more to move a
grievance to the umpire's docket to be heard),
Brown v Local 325, 10 PRB 130, 135 (1998) (it is not UAW policy to include grievants in
second- or third-step meetings),
Bladen v GM Department, 11 PRB 226, 228 (2001) (20-month period between discharge
and withdrawal of grievance explained by numerous efforts of union to persuade
company to give appellant, a 29-year employee, a second chance),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) (union did not grieve though
aware of violation),
Brown v Region 8, PRB Case 1425 (3/24/03) (member did not notify union of
termination),
Miller v Ford Department, PRB Case 1427 (3/19/03) (union had responsibility to ascertain
if other members shared problem of other member who settled),
Polansky v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1552 (1/26/07), p 8 (reason
grievance took so long to settle was appellant's admission of wrongdoing and his
refusal to cooperate with company's investigation of fellow member; according delay
was an appropriate union tactic),
Francis v GM Department, PRB Case 1587 (10/29/08), p 22 (though troubling grievance-
processing delay unrelated to merits of grievance resulted in taking 18 months to
resolve grievance for job but no backpay, this was not due to deliberate intent to
impose disproportinate penalty on appellant);
Poole v Local 843, CAC, session 11/81 (appellant did not observe time limit of 15
calendar days from when he had knowledge of basis for grievance to file it);
administrative letter, volume 54 # 4 (8/12/08) ("We advise that all grievances, and
especially important grievances, such as long layoffs, discharges, etc., be investigated
promptly and carefully....").

The UAW may compromise a grievance where the company and union
have differing interpretations of the contract.
Early v Region 5, 4 PRB 315, 318 (1984) ("Not every grievance can or should be
 arbitrated simply because it has some merit.... Ultimately, the issue was settled on the
basis of a compromise by both sides. Certainly such a settlement, when there is a
genuine dispute over the meaning and application of collective bargaining agreement
language, is not devoid of any rationl basis.").

There is no right to vote on grievance settlements.

Hairston appealing Tackett v Local 1623, 10 PRB 191, 197 (1998).

The union can settle on terms inconsistent with the contract, but only if
the terms are superior to the contract. If the terms are inferior (and this
will be a judgment call in many cases), the union has failed to protect the
members' rights. The president explained the difference once. This was in
a reconsideration request of a PRB decision holding the union responsible
for dropping a meritorious grievance of a member fired from Ford. The
president explained how that had happened by comparing the bargaining
process to the arbitration/umpire process. In bargaining, he said:
[w]e are not having a "trial" about anything. More often than not, the Union gets
results in that bargaining which, were the facts and contract rights formally
"adjudicated," we would simply lose. Sometimes, as the [PRB] found in the instant
case, it works the other way, i.e. Ford wins more by bargaining.

Vogen v Local 900 II, 9 PRB 624 (5/15/98), reconsideration denied (7/19/00),
letter Stephen Yokich to PRB, 6/8/98, record pp 129-30;
see also Hulme v Local 174, 9 PRB 608, 613 n 6 (1998) ("It is apparent that,
since it has one Committeeperson-at-Large, the Delphi Unit has one more
District than it is contractually entitled to. It has been our experience that
Local Unions are occasionally able to negotiate locally for more District
representatives than specified by the Agreement."),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241, 244 (1999) (job offer obtained at
 different plant for discharged member despite that union had lost
arbitration),
Tackett v Local 735, 10 PRB 82, 86 (1998) ("The settlement of his grievance
ultimately resulted in his receiving a 1985 seniority date, or considerably
more than that to which he was contractually entitled."),
Holet v Local 467, 10 PRB 538, 540-41 (1999) (appellant had not completed
training which would have entitled him to share equally in overtime; union
was nevertheless able to get certain concessions from management in his
favor and an umpire could not have provided him with more),
Gaul v Local 488, 11 PRB 202, 207 (2001) (there being no contractual support
for appellants' grievance, and the union not having the option of striking
locally as it did successfully in 1998, the union had no leverage and had to
withdraw the grievance protesting implementation of a special attrition plan),
Falconer v Region 3, PRB Case 1410 (7/23/03), p 7 (despite lack of contractual
merit the union nevertheless pressed the fired member's grievances and
achieved conditional reinstatement),
Sparrow v Local 1250, PRB Case 1457 (2/23/04), pp 9-10 (union got member
back to work without backpay though company's discharge decision was not
inconsistent with the contract),
Pappas v Region 1A, PRB Case 1602 (10/28/08), pp 5-7 ("Pappas was
fortunate that the Union managed to negotiate his reinstatement, because
the Company could have insisted that his seniority had been broken when he
failed to report to work while he was in the Oakland County Jail").

Some decisions discuss the possibility or efficacy of re-filing a previously-

withdrawn grievance.
Local 699, 3 PRB 302, 303 (1982) (IEB orders that grievance which shop chair had
refused to write be filed),
Notchick v Local 2209, 11 PRB 255, 259 (2001) (re-filing a withdrawn grievance does not
re-start time limits for appeal),
Campbell v Aerospace Department, PRB Case 1411 (12/3/02), p 6 (appellant may not
re-litigate matter already decided),
 Espinosa v Local 719, PRB Case 1418 (12/18/02), p 6 (appellant may not challenge
agreement by filing grievance 18 months after the fact);
but see Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 487, 492 (1968) (IEB and PRB order local to file
new grievance and make appellant whole).

The UAW seeks only contractual remedies. As a matter of policy it does

does not take equitable claims to an Umpire.
Avery v GM Department, PRB Case 1522 (2/16/06), pp 19-20 (though appellants
justifiably relied to their detriment on job offers made by company representative,
contract did not provide remedy for them and union was justified in withdrawing
grievance; the damages that appellants seek are in the nature of a tort claim that must
be pursued in other venues);
compare Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 6-8, 14-15 (because of nearly-
four-year delay occasioned partially by unreasonable behavior of appellants' counsel,
"equity favors a dismissal" of charge of unbecoming conduct which otherwise would
have been referred to a trial committee).

External-law grievances

Table of Contents

The pocket guide specifies several categories of grievance violation:

contracts and supplementary agreements,

state and federal labor laws, health and safety regulations, and NLRB
 rulings,

arbitration or umpire decisions,

past practice and policies, and

the employer's own regulations.

The handbook repeats the pocket guide's second category about external
laws.
Handbook, p 27 ("Why... is this a grievance? Or, why can it be a grievance? The clause
in the contract ... or the law violated ... or the harm done to the members should be
spelled out ... so you can ask for the remedy!") (ellipses in original),
Handbook, p 101, glossary ("Grievance .... A dispute or a difference between the
company and the worker, usually a violation of the union contract, a violation of a law
affecting labor and/or unjust, unequal treatment of a worker by management.")
(ellipsis in original).

The pocket guide and handbook are filled with references to labor laws,
safety laws, wage laws, discrimination laws, disability laws,
unemployment laws, plant closing laws, workers compensation laws, and
other laws.

PRB decisions commonly cite these UAW grievance manuals as

authoritative.
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385, 390-92 (1982),
but see Clark v Local 686, 10 PRB 318, 322 (1999) (PRB discounts language in UAW
Contract Administration Manual as being "nothing more than the opinion of the author
 of the Manual").

But a PRB decision in the 1995 Gray v Local 6000 decision, undercuts the
external-law category. It upholds withdrawing a grievance which was
based solely on a Michigan statute.

The statute established an employment right to 240 days notice in the

closing of a state-owned mental health facility. The purpose of the
240-day law was to allow employees to consider early-retirement options.
The contract itself did not require notice. After consulting with the UAW
legal department the rep withdrew the grievance from arbitration.

Affirming the IEB, the PRB held: "Without the ability to establish that there
was a violation of the contract, there was no basis for proceeding to
arbitration with appellants' claim." It accused the appellants of
"mudd[ying] the waters somewhat by juxtaposing" their contractual and
statutory claims. Appellants who were damaged by the lack of notice
might have valid rights in court, the PRB concluded, but not in arbitration.
Gray v Local 6000, 9 PRB 31, 34 (1995).

There may be good reason to file law-based grievances as the pocket

guide and handbook suggest. But if those grievances will be weak because
of thinking like this, union reps should be told that. On one page the
handbook does hint to this effect. But the page could be overlooked by a
rep pressed for time, and the subject needs to be cleared of ambiguity.
Gray should be either embraced or overruled.
 Handbook, p 66 ("[S]ome contracts do not allow an arbitrator to decide health and safety
issues.");
compare Soncrant v Local 1889, 9 PRB 538, 541 (1997) (PRB asserts decision whether
to arbitrate a grievancerievance is not a political question or a matter of rallying
troops to a
cause).

Individual/group/policy grievances

The UAW also categorizes grievances on the basis of number or type of

grievant. The categories are (1) individual grievances, (2) group
grievances,
Hein appealing Baudoux v Region 1, 5 PRB 703, 710 (1989) (allocation of settlement in
class grievance),
Siwek v GM Department, PRB Case 1595 (10/30/08), pp 7-8 (decision to withdraw group
grievance protesting company's decision to have vendors do their own quality control
was not irrational; vendor quality inspection was not historic bargaining unit work;
settlement was part of protracted negotiation of all outstanding grievances from this
location).

and (3) policy grievances.

The first two are self-explanatory. According to the pocket guide and
handbook, the third is broad and loosely defined. Policy grievances cover
several departments, the whole plant, or inter-plant situations. They
address new jobs, new classifications, new wage rates, longstanding past
practices, union practices, mutual understandings, working conditions or
practices, or company concessions. They tend to become the
responsibility of higher-level union reps.
Pocket guide, pp 10-11;
Handbook, pp 18-19;
but see Kibler v Local 14, 3 PRB 306, 310 (1981) (defining a policy grievance more
narrowly as one that "seek[s] to challenge representation procedures agreed to by
plant management and representatives [of the union].").

In settlements, trading of one individual grievance for another is

discouraged. But evaluation and settlement of multiple individual
grievances in a group is ok if they arise from the same grievant or the
same situation.
Shay v Local 163, 10 PRB 555, 557-58 (2000) (package settlement of appellants'
multiple grievances was permissible without evaluation of each one individually),
Siwek v GM Department, PRB Case 1595 (10/30/08), pp 7-8 (settlement was part of
protracted negotiation of all outstanding grievances from this location).

The appellee and the time limit in a grievance appeal

The time limits are different in grievance appeals, depending on whether

you are protesting a settlement made at the local level (60 days), or at a
higher level (30 days). Accordingly, before starting a grievance appeal it
is important to identify who settled the grievance, as is discussed
elsewhere.
Union role reversal in a grievance appeal

While your grievance is pending the union rep is your advocate. But
suppose he or she settles or withdraws a discipline grievance, leaving
some or all of the discipline intact, and suppose you appeal. In a 2010
decision the PRB noted the problem a rep can have:
It appears that Farris and Jones were somewhat uncomfortable with their role as
defenders of the union's position when Hendley's appeal first reached the IEB level. It
became apparent during our investigatory hearing that Farris and Jones did not clearly
describe the results of their investigation during the first hearing conducted by [the
IEB]. As a result the actual basis for [the local president's] conclusion that the
grievance could not be successfully arbitrated did not come to light. After explaining
that Hendley was not discharged for leaving the plant, but rather for misrepresenting
his time on his time card, Chairperson Farris stated that he did not understand that he
was supposed to volunteer that kind of information during the hearing conducted on
behalf of the IEB. [footnote omitted] His reticence is understandable. When responding
to an appeal challenging the union's handling of a grievance, representatives
accustomed to acting as advocates for unit members are suddenly asked to justify the
imposition of discipline; it is a difficult role reversal.

Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), p 15.

What if you win a grievance appeal?

There are different remedies available, depending on whether a grievance

appeal is won at the local level, or a higher level.
Grievances rationally
Table of Contents

Contents of This
Subsection

Pre-1980 || Today

Pre-1980

Until 1980, unless the IEB itself had found the local improperly
represented you, the PRB tested grievance appeals on a three-part
standard. It had jurisdiction only if you had previously told the IEB with
citation to specific facts that the union mishandled the grievance due to

fraud,
discrimination, or
collusion with management.
As to "fraud" and "collusion", no decision that I can think of has found
these occurred.
McNeal v Ford Department, 10 PRB 504, 508-09 (2000) (in face of appellant's argument
that (a) union must have known of his seniority rights at the time and (b) union later
recognized he was entitled to seniority at the time, fact that union committeeperson
witnessed appellant's signature on a document, which said contrary to the contract
that he would not gain seniority, does not establish collusion with management to
defraud appellant of his proper seniority).

As to "discrimination":
Discrimination essentially is an act which either confers or denies particular privileges
or rights on an individual or group of individuals arbitrarily selected from a large
number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privileges or rights
granted or denied and between whom and those favored, or specifically not favored, no
reasonable distinction can be found.

Strong v Local 805, 1 PRB 620, 622 (1971).

Note discrimination in this context is not limited to the types of

discrimination listed in article 2 section 2 -- religion, race, creed, color,
sex, political affiliation, nationality, age, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation.
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 489-90 (1968),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 57 (1983) (bargaining discrimination in favor of members in
one classification who are numerically superior and have great political influence,
against members in another clasification who are numerically inferior and have less
political influence, would be invidious and remediable by the PRB; but the facts here do
not show such discrimination because the disputed agreement is over 20 years old and
 members in the disfavored classification has less skill and less seniority),
Golden v UAW, 4 PRB 242, 244 (1984),
Benton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52, 55-56 (1986) (claim of collusion to IEB must have cited
specific evidence in support of claim to qualify for PRB jurisdiction),

The three-part standard was not significant. Only two PRB decisions before
1980 and two since then held that a grievance appeal did or might
succeed under the pre-1980 standard.
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485 (1968) (company denial of request to return early from
leave of absence, local refused to arbitrate, PRB affirms IEB order to file new grievance
and compensate member),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 527-28 (1969) (fitness to work after personal auto
accident, negligently tardy grievance-processing, PRB permits appellant at his option to
begin appeal after IEB gratuitously injected issue of appealability of grievance
disposition into appeal about propriety of charges),
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 183, 189-91 (1976) (PRB rejects broad sense of word
"fraud" advocated by concurring opinion),
Benton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52, 55-56 (1986) (remand to IEB with instructions to allow
appellant to introduce evidence of collusion with management),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) (committeepersons assisted
company in blatant pregnancy discrimination);
see also Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 220 (1996), quoting from Alspach v Local 977,
1 PRB 300 305 (1963) ("Applied particularly to labor relations [the term 'collusion']
carries an especially reprehensible connotation, for it implies a breach of the trust
relationship which is created when an employee surrenders to a labor union his
individual right in dealing with his employer concerning the terms and conditions of his
employment. The allegation of collusion implies the perversion of the very purposes for
which a labor union exists, namely the protection of the workers who comprise it. It is
as serious a charge as can be leveled at a labor union. Within the trade union
movement, it is the equivalent of treason in the national life. Charges of so serious a
nature demand a correspondingly high standard of proof.");
compare Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 135 (1960) (in light of historic negotiated
 sex-segregated seniority categories, temporary out-of-class assignments of men into
women's jobs were justified, unspecified non-discriminatory reasons may have
underlain junior men working while senior women were laid off, appeal denied),
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 301 (1975) (local's own conclusion that its committeeman
injured a member and it therefore owed him backpay was appropriate response to
colorable claim timely advanced),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 57 (1983) (bargaining discrimination in favor of members in
one classification who are numerically superior and have great political influence,
against members in another clasification who are numerically inferior and have less
political influence, would be invidious and remediable by the PRB; but the facts here do
not show such discrimination because the disputed agreement is over 20 years old and
members in the disfavored classification has less skill and less seniority),
Chamberlain v Local 652, 8 PRB 18, 20 (1993) (personal social relationship of protested
member and management does not show collusion, where union took quick action to
remedy situation when error was discovered),
Dickerson v UAW, 11 PRB 530, 535 (2002) ("Whether or not [union rep] Zurawski liked
Dickerson is not germane to this appeal, for the fact remains that Dickerson repeatedly
violated the terms of his last chance agreement...."),
Russell v Region 1A, 11 PRB 550, 554 (2002) (PRB rejects claim of hostility of union
rep).

There is one pre-1980 grievance appeal where the PRB held itself not
restricted by the three-part limitation. This was because the appeal came
to it in an unusual posture. The IEB had upheld the member's appeal,
saying the local's failure to arbitrate was wrongful and it owed the
member backpay. On review, holding that the local was obliged to
represent appellant "fairly and honestly," the PRB said evidence supported
the IEB and left it at that.
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 490-92 (1968) (IEB granted member's appeal and local
appealed to PRB, PRB therefore was not bound by its usual jurisdictional limitation,
evidence supported IEB finding that local should have arbitrated early-return-
 from-voluntary-leave grievance in light of wording of leave request, local's counsel
believed that grievance had 50-50 chance of winning, appeal to IEB was timely, and
appellant's dues delinquency at time of grievance and late notice of voluntary leave to
local were irrelevant);
compare Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 10, 16 (2001) (though IEB found local liable,
traditional PRB jurisdictional "rationality" limitation applied because the member not the
local appealed),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) (IEB denied pregnancy-
discrimination grievance appeal, after receipt of PRB questions president reversed
factual finding, president now said appellant's job was within medical restrictions,
president also said local reps had assisted company in blatant discrimination by
agreeing with management and told appellant nothing could be done and to go home
and take care of her baby, company had lied in describing job's physical requirements
in answer to grievance).

It is curious that so few pre-1980 appeals succeeded, because one of

them, Marshall v Local 1364, said:
[P]roven negligence of this kind which demonstrably prejudices substantial interests of
an employee in the bargaining unit could conceivably provide the basis for a claim for
resultant damages.

...

[N]egligent conduct on the part of a steward in the processing of a grievance which

results in prejudice to substantial interests of another may provide the basis for redress
under the Constitution.

Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 527-28 (1969).

The appeal involved a committeeman who put a discharge grievance in his

briefcase for two months and forgot it until after the time to take it to the
next step. The grievance was later settled without backpay. Appellant
Maewethers Marshall filed a charge against the committeeman. The PRB
eventually upheld dismissal because mere negligence is an insufficient
basis for a charge. But for procedural reasons it allowed Brother Marshall
to start a late appeal of the grievance disposition.

PRB reports do not indicate that a new appeal by Marshall ever came back
to it. Maybe he didn't file one, or maybe he did and it was resolved at the
local, the IEB, or the CAC.

But seven years later in Badura v Local 93 a concurring opinion joined by

three of the seven PRB members argued the union commits "fraud" when
it cannot show a "rational basis" for failing to pursue the member's claim.
This was in a grievance appeal lacking the clear-cut facts of Marshall.
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 190 (1976) (concurring opinion).

Suppose Marshall's appeal had come back to the PRB. The insistent views
expressed about a grievance idling in a briefcase make me wonder: Might
one more PRB member have been convinced under a "rational basis"
theory this was enough fraud that the PRB could have acted?

At any rate, echoing the Badura minority, in 1980 a fourth test was added
which allowed PRB review of grievances if

the disposition or handling was devoid of any rational basis.

Article 33 section 4(i).
The convention constitution committee chair explained to delegates in
1980 article 33 was being "completely" revised. The substantive changes
were (1) to make it "easy to understand," (2) limit certain types of appeal
such as procedural rulings of a meeting chair, and (3) expand PRB
jurisdiction to cover grievance-handling where the handling was devoid of
a rational basis. The chairman stated this would include the disposition of a
grievance where there was no reason at all.
Proceedings, 26th constitutional convention (1980), pp 287-304 (debate on article 33).

Rational disposition and rational handling are two different duties.

Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 87 (1983).

They require the PRB to

examine whether there existed persuasive arguments which could have been advanced
by the Union on the grievant's behalf.

Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 228 (1981).

Note that, as the PRB explained in 2002,

the issue is not the reasonableness of the Union's decision, but whether that decision
was devoid of any rational basis.

Smith v Region 3, 11 PRB 507, 510 (2002) (PRB's emphasis).

The PRB says the four-part standard now mirrors the duty of fair
representation as developed in the courts.
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 178-80 (1976) (IEB notes PRB jurisdiction is not defined
in terms of a duty of fair representation, PRB compares its pre-1980 jurisdiction in
grievance appeals to the duty or fair representation developed in the courts),
Stephens v Champion Department, 4 PRB 349, 354 (1985) (PRB-enforceable "duty of fair
representation"),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 310 (1992) (in appeals which
are similar to fair-representation court claims members should have available
substantially all the remedies they would have in court),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73 (1996) (the Clayton doctrine),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 240 (1999) PRB-enforced "duty of fair representation"),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 17 (2001) (PRB-enforced "duty of fair representation"),
Derian v Region 2B, PRB Case 1424 (4/2/03), p 7 (PRB-enforced "duty of fair
representation").

The PRB-reviewable duty of rationality is no higher a standard than what

the UAW imposes on itself, for instance in its handbook. In the past the
handbook and pocket guide described the "duty of fair representation" not
just as a duty imposed by external law but as a UAW principle:
Those duties are to be honest, to act in good faith, to be non-discriminatory, and to be
informed and to have a rational basis for making a decision. In other words, the Union
owes a duty of "fair representation" to all those in units which it represents.

James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385, 391 (1982) (quoting from then-current

handbook),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (PRB's standard is no higher than the
UAW's, quoting from then-current handbook);
see also pocket guide (1988), p 6 ("You give fair representation -- because it is
our union's policy, because it is the law, and because it is your obligation to
the people with whom you work.").
The handbook and pocket guide quoted here are no longer the current
versions. The current versions do discuss the duty of fair representation
as a principle of external law and they urge reps to assume it. But they
no longer describe it as a union principle.

Omissions are sometimes significant in the UAW.

Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251, 262 (1975) (when amending article 33 in 1959 to extend
PRB jurisdiction over disputes arising under article 36 sections 9 and 10, omission of
section 11 was "significant"),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (omission of language in one paragraph of
contract that is present in other paragraph of contract is one basis of reversal of IEB),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 789 (1990) (omission of language in one paragraph of
contract that is present in other paragraph of contract is one basis of reversal of IEB).

The change may signal a shift in UAW thinking. Perhaps the union means
to emphasize there is an even higher standard than the recommendations
of the handbook and pocket guide; perhaps this refers to the tougher
standards of the IEB and CAC.

At any rate it is not useful or relevant for UAW appellate parties or

decisionmakers to reference the phrase "duty of fair representation."
Even though the PRB says it mirrors the courts' approach, rarely do its
grievance appeal decisions cite or rely on court holdings.
But see Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 185 (1991) (dissent) ("internal appeals process ...
is supposed to be fair to the Union members and serve as an antidote to litigation over
the duty of fair representation."),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 310 (1992) (UAW's use of PRB
 decisions to defend members' duty-of-fair-representation claims in civil litigation implies
an obligation on the PRB to insure that members who assert like claims to it have
available substantially all the remedies which would be available to them in court),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 76-77 (1996) (dissent) (1980 expansion of PRB
jurisdiction over grievance appeals benefitted UAW which thereby received de facto
insulation from fair representation suits filed by members in court),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 240 (2001) (in failure-to-install election case, claim for
damages held untimely despite equally late claims in grievance appeals being held
timely, because before a member can submit a grievance claim to a court he or she
must first exhaust article 33 remedies).

A second curiosity of this discussion is why anyone would care whether the
PRB has jurisdiction of the fourth test, given that the CAC already had
jurisdiction of it and its jurisdiction courses beyond the fourth test anyway.
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 489 (1968) (debate about PRB jurisdiction),
Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606, 606 (1970) (parties stipulate that PRB not newly-formed CAC
has jurisdiction in convention credential challenge),
Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 67-69 (1973) (PRB not CAC decides appellants have right to
have CAC review validity of selection of CAP council delegates, and hence validity of
CAP council proceedings)
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173 (1976) (debate about PRB jurisdiction).

Today

Table of Contents
In any event, PRB reversals of IEB grievance decisions have increased
since 1980. To the date of this release, the PRB has returned 20 appeals
to the IEB under the new standard. There are too many lost appeals to
list them all and summarize their reasoning. I find the most helpful way
to explain the standard to members is to highlight the 20 wins. More
detailed discussions on those that resulted in an award of damages are
found elsewhere. A summary of appeals which the CAC reversed are
found elsewhere.
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 227-29 (1981) (unreasonable delay in grievance-
processing, several arguments might have persuaded arbitrator, union would not
respond to member's requests for information about grievance, union sent notice of
arbitration to wrong address, appellant's request for backpay deferred pending
disposition of grievance by umpire),
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385, 389-92 (1982) (sleeping on the job appears to have been
a non-dischargeable first-time offense, member had high seniority, likely racially
discriminatory motivation on part of person who blew the whistle on the member, PRB
jurisdiction retained),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 86-89 (1983) (notice failed to state date by which member
should report, member reported as soon as possible, notice was not received at home
though people were there, contract language appears to require actual delivery not
attempted delivery, other members fired under the same language were later
reinstated including some who failed to report because of incapacitation due to
alcoholism or jail, member had high seniority, PRB jurisdiction retained),
Hall v Local 735, 4 PRB 263, 266-67 (1984) (failure to contact member's doctor, failure
to take umpire precedents into account),
George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204, 209-10 (1987) (high-seniority employee who has
consistently asserted innocence, no evidence in record directly linking appellant to
receipt of stolen property, union made no attempt to contact and evaluate witnesses
against appellant, PRB jurisdiction retained),
Humphrey v Ford Department, 5 PRB 285, 289-91 (1987) (high-seniority employee,
 company sent notice to address it had on file for appellant which was incorrect address,
company sent most recent previous notice to appellant's correct address, umpire
precedents relied on by union are distinguishable, issue might be one of first
impression, burden of proof in termination is on employer, PRB jurisdiction retained),
Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748, 753-55 (1990) (union should have
considered appellant's argument that his absences should have been excludable by
reason of his heart condition under company's chronic absenteeism program,
appellant's explanation that he came forward with information about his heart condition
late is plausible in light of statement by attendance counselor after learning of heart
condition that nothing could be done to help appellant, appellant ordered to produce
medical evidence and union ordered to evaluate it, PRB jurisdiction retained),
Peterson v TOP Department, 8 PRB 289 (1995) (high-seniority employee accused of
serious acts including physical and sexual abuse of client's family which were also the
basis of criminal charges against appellant, prosecutors likely advised client not to talk
to union, appellant's lawyer did the same, union should have put the grievance in
abeyance till the criminal case was disposed of which employer likely would have
agreed to, instead it went ahead with grievance-processing and withdrew it believing it
could not be won, two years later the court found the client not credible and acquitted
appellant, there were big contradictions in client's account of the non-abuse charges,
PRB jurisdiction retained),
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5, 12-15 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20
(1996) (umpire decisions cited by union are readily distinguishable though this is not
alone sufficient to say the settlement was irrational, two key witnesses gave
contradictory accounts in unemployment hearing, union did not contact appellant
during lengthy delay in grievance-processing and therefore did not learn of
developments in unemployment proceeding, remanded for arbitration absent
settlement, 30-day delay ordered for implementation of decision to give appellant a
chance to change his mind and agree to grievance settlement),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 151, 157-60 (1996) (union interpreted
language of chronic absentee procedure too narrowly, attendance council did not
review the grievance as it should have, the procedure is primarily for rehabilitation not
discipline, there was substantial evidence that appellant had improved his attendance,
should have had some of his absences excused or excluded, and should not have been
enrolled in the procedure at all),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 220-24 (1996) (no mention of knife threat incident on
company exit interview summary or in unemployment proceedings, unspecific and
non-contemporaneous witness statements concerning knife incident, local did not
investigate evidence favoring appellant that he produced at unemployment hearing
about the knife incident, appellant was terminated before completing all six steps of
attendance procedure, grievance ordered to arbitration absent settlement, PRB
jurisdiction retained),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 237-40 (1999) (grievance reinstated under article 33
differs from ordinary grievance in that umpire staff must address PRB concerns in the
remand order, union did not present to arbitrator items requested by appellant and
highlighted by PRB in previous decision, union was unaware of PRB concern whether
knife incident was actually a company basis for terminating appellant and whether
management's evidence was authentic, union did not attempt to exclude knife incident
testimony from the hearing, union did not argue that company should have been
required to complete entire six-step process before firing appellant, union did not
understand prior PRB decision, union lacked legal evidentiary skills and should have
sought counsel of its legal staff),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 621-23 (1998) (regardless whether appellant was a
probationary employee the contract provided him just-cause protection after 30 days,
though sick and having a medical excuse in hand he went to company labor relations
before his starting time to display the excuse to the clerk and obtain a call-in number
at plant security, though the clerk was a bargaining unit member temporarily assigned
to labor relations she was the company's agent and the company was bound by her
advice, termination was for being a three-day quit, though nurse clinician's excuse was
arguably insufficient to show inability to work company did not point out insufficiency
and give appellant an opportunity to supplement it with further evidence as it should
have according to arbitration precedent, remand for arbitration absent settlement,
appellant's counsel to be permitted to participate in pre-arbitration negotiations and to
participate in the arbitration in advisory capacity, at arbitration UAW is to advance each
reason cited by PRB decision, if the company attempts to shift the basis for the
discharge the UAW is to object),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 16-17 (2001) (union rep did not interview appellant
fired for absenteeism, company had been unable to sustain its claim to unemployment
agency that appellant had not called in an illness report, rep did not interview
 appellant's four witnesses, rep relied on false information),
Long v Local 22, 10 PRB 206 (1998), supplemental decision, 10 PRB 216, 218-21 (1999)
(area hire grievance asserted that new employees were hired in 1987-91 while
appellants were laid off and unaware of the right to have their names placed in the
local area hire list, grievance withdrawn at the local level, appeal claims appellants
were left out intentionally, IEB dismissed appeal on basis that seniority was only one
factor in deciding whether to place someone from the list and in any event violations of
the contract could not be the basis of backpay claims or retroactive adjustments, PRB
notes that nevertheless a grievance can achieve review at the corporate and UAW level
and this is what the appeal seeks, forms for electing to be placed on area hire list were
not given to appellants at time of layoff, appellants' statistical evidence inferentially
supports their claims, there is no evidence whether the parties' practice was to
automatically place laid-off members on the list, PRB orders remand to determine
whether appellants's name were on list, PRB jurisdiction retained, after meticulous
investigation IEB determined without rebuttal from appellants there were no new hires
during 1987-91 and that no one had been hired from the local area hire list out of line
of seniority, in supplemental decision PRB holds that though 1987-91 local area hire
lists are now lost it is unlikely appellants were deliberately left off and none of the
employees who appellants claimed were recalled out of line of seniority were in fact
improperly recalled),
Burdette v GM Department, 11 PRB 303, 309-11 (2001) (long-time employee with fairly
clean record, neither rank-and-file witness said appellant had poked or spit at
supervisor so issue was a credibility contest between appellant and supervisor,
company had previously resolved grievance issue in appellant's favor by allowing him
to quit and simultaneously become eligible for recall to another UAW-represented
facility, grievance ordered to arbitration absent settlement agreeable to appellant and
union, 30-day grace period allowed to appellant to consider whether to accept
settlement of retirement offered by company, PRB jurisdiction retained),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 365-66 (2003) (local advocated arbitration of
grievance, high-seniority employee, union is to accept grievant's version of facts if
credible, GM department did not interview undercover agent involved in claimed drug
transaction and so had no basis to credit her over appellant, local committeepersons
who did interview agent found her not credible, arbitration precedents offered by UAW
are distinguishable, grievance remanded for arbitration absent settlement, PRB
 jurisdiction retained, requests for further action by PRB to be made within 30 days of
resolution of grievance),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), pp 8-11 (in grievance protesting
management's refusal to allow appellant to bump into packer/stocker classification,
record and PRB hearing testimony showed appellant had completed training necessary
for the position, arbitration decisions relied on by the local were distinguishable since
the employees in those grievances either lacked training and experience or their
personnel records did not reflect it, management originally approved appellant for
packer/stocker position and then changed its mind after talking with local president,
local president's interpretation of contract was not supported by arbitration decisions
which were produced, and fact that other union members may have been denied
seniority rights based on a misunderstanding of the contract did not give local a
rational basis for refusing to process this grievance);
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08) pp 10-13 (union ordered to try to
re-negotiate grievance even though the company has no reinstatement-of-grievances
letter, because member had high seniority, his low blood alcohol level was considered
negative under the company's strict standard, management was hostile to him, and
international rep had no experience arbitrating similar cases, did not investigaste other
similar cases at this plant, did not meet with appellant or explain his decision, and did
not hold the grievance open while appellant appealed),
Neely v Region 3, PRB Case 1601 (4/21/09), pp 11-19 (while an established adverse
arbitral precedent would satisfy the "rational basis" test even if management's decision
were patently unfair, part of the union rep's responsibility is to investigate particular
circumstances of the grievance and research prior umpire decisions; contrary to the
union the prior decisions show an arbitrator will consider the reasonableness of a
member's failure to reply to a five-day quit letter, appellant showed significant issues
whether her actions were reasonable and the company's action unreasonable in
sending the letter, and there would be nothing to lose by arbitrating; arbitration is
directed unless the company agrees to restore appellant's seniority).

In two other post-1980 grievance appeals the PRB as much as held the
same.
 Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1481 (11/22/04), pp 15-16 (grievance was filed against
management's decision to allow recording secretary to schedule her vacation at her
discretion according to practice for local officers with full-time or part-time
representational duties rather than practice which used seniority within her
department, grievance was granted as company simultaneously changed its practice
regarding officials with part-time representational duties, recording secretary whose
representational duties were part-time appealed, PRB held that grievance settlement
would have been irrational in light of different treatment of officials with part-time
representational duties, but that appeal was mooted by change in company practice),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 15 (though not required to resolve
grievance aspect of appeal because it was settled, PRB notes local's handling of it was
inadequate in that appellant would have been unlikely to have encouraged an
unauthorized walkout while campaigning in committeeperson election, none of the 11
member statements gathered by the company the day after the walkout implicated
appellant, the one statement implicating appellant was given 20 days later by a
member who was fired that day and who circumstances suggest may have been acting
on behalf of supporters of opposing caucus or of local in retaliation for appellant's
successful challenge of previous election, and local never interviewed the accuser).

Two more post-1980 grievance appeals, while not granted on the basis of
irrational handling, may have been influenced by the more-lenient
standard.
Janicki v UAW, 3 PRB 333 (1982) (where local bylaws provided for consideration of
appeal by full shop committee, consideration by shop chair alone is insufficient),
Hauben v Local 3000, 8 PRB 1 (1993) (grievance appeal held timely where appellant
asked local president about appealing it within time period allowed and president
refused to allow her to present it to the membership),

Another, though denied, gives insight into the review process.

Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 568-69, 573 (2002) (though UAW rationally withdrew recall
 grievance because in fact no junior member was recalled ahead of appellant, it gave
appellant inconsistent and incorrect reasons (1) that grievance was barred by the
reinstatement-of-grievances letter of the contract, (2) that it was an area hire
grievance, and (3) that it was untimely).

Note the importance the PRB attaches to the requirement that the
appellant have previously alleged specific evidence to the IEB in support
of at least one of the four tests -- and that the IEB have permitted the
facts to be developed sufficiently for PRB evaluation of them later. In
other words, an appellant may not wait until reaching the PRB to make a
claim under one of the four tests.
Benton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52, 55 (1986) (specific claim of management collusion was
not sufficiently developed in IEB record, remand to IEB);
compare Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), pp 6, 9 (in election appeal,
appellant prevails partly based on argument not presented to IEB).

What if the union settles a strong grievance for less than 100%? A
successful appeal would have two results, the PRB noted in a 1998
decision: (a) reinstatement of the grievance, and (b) return of the
member to terminated status while the grievance worked its way up to
settlement or arbitration. Summarizing the 1998 decision in 2009, the
PRB said the appellant,
an employee with 29 years of seniority, was terminated on a questionable accusation
that he damaged the deck lid on a vehicle. The Local Shop Committee Chairperson
negotiated a settlement that returned Ayres to work without backpay. Despite the
strong merits of Ayres claim to have been unjustly disciplined, we held that the
decision to withdraw his grievance from the Umpire was rational, because the risk of
losing the settlement was too great.
 Ayres v Local 1112, 10 PRB 126 (1998), as summarized in Neely v Region 3,
PRB Case 1601, p 14 (4/21/09);
see also Shay v Local 163, 10 PRB 555, 558 (2000) (appellant did not return
wages received in grievance settlement while he appealed),
Gardner v Local 653, 11 PRB 40, 43 (2000) (where appellant was accused of
deliberately impeding production and seeming to boast of it, though his
machine had malfunctioned and his disciplinary record was unblemished it
was rational for the shop committee to compromise his discharge grievance
by returning him to work without pay after five months),
Lamb v Local 599, PRB Case 1544 (10/26/06), p 6 (had IEB reinstated
grievance to procedure, appellant stood to lose the benefit of the good
settlement achieved by local).

The PRB will sometimes grant such an appeal anyway, and leave it up to
the member whether to take the risk.
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996) (PRB
remanded grievance for arbitration absent settlement and ordered 30-day delay in
implementation of its decision to give appellant a chance to change his mind and agree
to grievance settlement, grievant later did change his mind),
Burdette v GM Department, 11 PRB 303, 310-11 (2001) (30-day delay allowed for
appellant to change mind).

Whether a grievance settlement is rational, and whether it is correct, are

not the same.

For example one member appealed the withdrawal of a grievance against

management's refusal to place the senior member in a skilled trades
position. Throughout the grievance and the appeal, no one produced
anything showing precisely what the member's perceived deficiencies
were. Still, the PRB would not second-guess and the appeal failed.
 Shauver v Local 1112, 6 PRB 370, 372 (1992);
see also Jodlowsky v UAW, 5 PRB 463, 466 (1988),
Bania v Ford Department, 5 PRB 651, 657 (1989),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 180, 185 (1991),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 185 (1991) (dissent),
Farrell v Local 1929, 6 PRB 424, 429 (1992),
Jaworski v Ford Department, 6 PRB 544, 551 (1993).

In a second example the PRB upheld withdrawal of a grievance despite

finding that management's claim of a threat was marginal.
Compton v Region 8, 11 PRB 393, 398-99 (2002).

An unusual concurrence in a third appeal makes the point most clearly.

The author of the following voted to deny a grievance appeal:
My colleagues have convinced me that, in light of the arbitral precedent applicable to
Caterpillar and the UAW, we cannot say that the withdrawal of Walter Zepplin's
grievance was "devoid of any rational basis." I should not like to leave the impression,
however, that it was the unanimous view of the members of the PRB that justice has
been done in this case. A 22-year employee has lost his job because, while on disability
leave, he continued his longstanding practice of helping out his wife in her handicraft
business at a crafts show. He has been denied the opportunity to contest that
termination before the contract umpire. I consider that a most regrettable result.

...

It is unfortunate that grievant may have lied about his activities to the Union and the
Company. I concede that lends some further "rationality" to the decision to withdraw
the grievance. But in my experience there would be far fewer grievants going to
arbitration if only the pure in heart were eligible. Twenty-two years of seniority were
on the line here; someone scared about that large looming loss might well have
 succumbed to a hasty falsehood. The personal pique of a Union grievance chairperson
about grievant's deception should certainly not have been determinative. As to the
adverse decision of the state unemployment compensation referee, it's the rare
arbitrator who deigns to give more than a passing nod to such extraneous
administrative rulings. Regardless of whether grievant Zepplin would ultimately have
won or lost at arbitration, he had an eminently arguable case and he ought to have
had his chance to be heard.

Zepplin v Local 974, 6 PRB 477, 486-87 (1993) (concurring);

see also Lacey v Region 1, PRB Case 1577 (1/24/08) p 5 ("The termination of
an employee with a clean disciplinary record for an understandable error
such as Lacey's disregards commonly shared understandings of justice and
fair play. Nevertheless, the discipline assessed in this case apparently did not
violate the [contract].").

There is a tension between this language -- the PRB can review a

settlement to see if it was "devoid of any rational basis" -- and other
language in the constitution saying the PRB cannot "review in any way an
official collective bargaining policy" of the UAW. The PRB says these are
different concepts and I suppose it is right. Perhaps the distinction is that
the PRB cannot set or modify or even interpret an official UAW policy, but
once the UAW has done this the PRB can apply the policy to a specific
grievance, and test whether the UAW followed it or arguably followed it in
handling that grievance. But in practice the distinction can be confusing.
Article 33 section 3(f) limitation,
article 33 section 4(i);
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 472 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969) (distinguishing
bargaining policy and bargaining procedure),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000), reconsideration
denied (7/19/00), p 2 of reconsideration (review of policy and review of rationality are
 two different things),
Schick v UAW, 11 PRB 415, 419-20 (2002) (review of policy and review of rationality are
two different things),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), p 22
(distinguishing between interpreting a collective bargaining agreement and applying it
in context of disputed facts).

Most UAW grievances are handled rationally or better. Most appealed

grievance-handling is so held by the PRB, which generally defers to the
UAW's judgment.
Jodlowsky v UAW, 5 PRB 463, 466 (1988) ("The Union is entitled to great deference in
the area of exercise of its judgment as respects the disposition of grievances."),
Lawrence v Local 1405, PRB Case 1564 (4/17/07), pp 13-14 ("It would have been
irrational for the Union to have rejected this very excellent settlement in order to
challenge Lawrence's suspension through arbitration.").

Grievances specifically
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Absenteeism || After-acquired evidence ||

Allocation of settlement || Area hire ||
Backpay || "Capital offense" || Casino
Employers || Circumstantial evidence ||
Compromising a grievance || Contracting out
 || Credibility || Criminal conduct || Denial of
union representation || Disability, medical
restrictions, fitness for duty || Disagreement
within management || Discrimination,
nepotism, disparate treatment || Drugs or
Absenteeism
alcohol || Drug-testing || Email ||
The union agrees a cEontmrapmanenyt c||anFaieluxrepetocpteerfmormplojoybe, es
to show up on time.
In a 2005 appeal byeafficmienecmy,bseafretoy,nwaonrk LruCleAs |t|
hFeigPhRtinBg,said:
threats, shoving, horseplay || Free speech at
Furthermore, in additwioonrkto|t|hGe rdieisvcaipnlcinearreymaecdtiioenss|t|hat led to
Clark's termination on August 25, 2003, theHCigohm-
spean niyo'rsitryecmoerdmsbsehrsow||thInact aCrlcaerrkawtioans |fr|equently absent for
medical reasons durinJgobthaesstiwgnomye eanrt paenrdiodduptireesc|e|
di n g h i s d i s charge. While these absences were not grgoruienvdasbfiolirtyd|is|
J o in t n e s s ,
ciLpalisnte-,chthaenycewaogurledehmaevnetsm|a|de it more difficult for the Union to
convince theLaCyoomffp|a|nyLytiongretionsmtaatneaCgleamrkeanftte|r| he was
terminated for the second time. As the UMnaionnagheams eanctknRoigwhltesdg||edM,
eFdoircdalheaxscausreig|h|t to expect its employees to report on time for t"hOebier
yscnhoewd,uglerdiesvheifltast.er," insubordination ||
Overtime || Past practices || Penalty,
Clark v Local 325,pPrRogBreCsassieve1d5i0s1cip(l4in/1e8|/|
05P)la, npt 6c.losings, work transfer, sale of
company || Pornography at
As noted elsewhere, tohrke|u| nPrio
w obnathioansarythaendbaut-rwdilel
nemopflopyereosof in absenteeism
grievances. || Promotions || Public
|| Profit sharing Employers || Quit versus discharge ||
Retiree grievances || Seniority, "dividing
Five appeals succeedsceadrciwty"h|e|reSetxhueal/UraAciWal hfaarailsesdmetnot |in|
vestigate or
interpreted the abseSnlatnedeerpbryoccemdpuarney |t|ooSknillaedrrtorawdelys .||Be
very sure the
company is onf tthheejorbe|a|sSounbscofnotrracatinnyg |a|bsence. In a
notified
S le ep in g
2000
ti m e ly
 Subpoena || Technology, assignment of
decision, the severewlyorikll|a| pThpeeftll|a|nTtimre elliineedss oonf ghrievrandcoec-
tor to notify the
company properly anprdoctehsseindg o|c| tUonrauctlhaoirmiz eddsttroikehoarve
done so; but the
doctor's communicatsilowndowwans||faUunletmyp;loaypmpeentllbaenntefwitsa|s|
terminated and her
Voluntary retirement || Wages || Wasting
grievance and appeatilmwe,eleraevidneg nwioerdk .area || Working while on
leave
Local 699, 3 PRB 302, 303 (1982) (appeal granted in part, by IEB),
Fiolek v Region 1A, 5 PRB 274, 276 (1987) (appeal denied),
Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748, 753-55 (1990) (remand for investigation of
medical information to be submitted by grievant),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 296, 302 (1992) (remand for
investigation),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 309-10 (1992) (remand for
arbitration and for consideration by UAW whether appellant should be allowed to play
active role in arbitration),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 156 (1996) (remanded, union interpreted
chronic absentee procedure too narrowly),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 170 (2002) (damages appeal dismissed as
untimely),
Sills v Local 9212, 10 PRB 108, 112 (1998) (appellant was absent approximately
one-third of the time),
Johnson v Local 1292, 10 PRB 136, 139 (1998) ("The fact that an employee is taking
drugs does not excuse absence from work or tardiness."),
Baker-Williams v Region 3, 10 PRB 511, 516-18 (2000) (evidence is weak that doctor
responded timely and properly to company's five-day letter, the burden of proof in the
grievance procedure was on the union, and despite depression appellant could have
responded to it herself),
Douglas v UAW, 11 PRB 74, 76 (2000) ("[appellant's] good intentions and her pledge
never to miss time from work again do not provide us with a basis for ordering the
reinstatement of her grievance"),
Gracia v Ford Department, 11 PRB 368, 372 (2001) (though appellant may not have
received the five-day letter, she heard about it and responded to the company which
said the clock was running on providing medical proofs),
Dickerson v UAW, 11 PRB 530, 535 (2002) ("Dickerson's domestic problems do not
excuse his repeated failure to report for work on time."),
Woods v Local 31, PRB Case 1416 (12/20/02), pp 4-5 (appeal denied),
Mitchell v Local 533, PRB Case 1456 (2/20/04), pp 7-8 (appeal denied),
Hamilton v Region 9, PRB Case 1460 (2/20/04), pp 6-7 (company gave appellant several
opportunities to provide necessary documents to support request for leave),
Norris v Region 1A, PRB Case 1485 (2/10/05), pp 7-8 (no violation of contract in
company's discharge of chronically absent low-seniority member on an LCA who did not
 call in on day of absence, who did not follow company procedures for absences, and
who refused to sign a medical release form).
Hill v Local 12, PRB Case 1516 (9/20/05), p 9 (company had right to insist that appellant
show up for scheduled shifts),
Lamb v Local 599, PRB Case 1544 (10/26/06), p 6 (member failed to respond to a
five-day letter),
Greene v Local 7777, PRB Case 1560 (3/21/07) pp 10-11 (though company may have
violated the precise terms of the point system in its attendance and progressive
discipline policies, the system was never strictly enforced; appellant's absenteeism was
excessive enough that the union could rationally conclude that an arbitrator would
have refused to reinstate him),
Tolliver v Local 551, PRB Case 1566 (5/7/07) pp 5-6 (appellant knew how to extend
medical leave; he did not respond to five-day letter which the post office attempted to
deliver to the correct addres and left notices twice),
Allard v Region 9, 10 PRB 175 178 (grievant's present improved state does nothing to
strengthen the merits of his grievance).

After-acquired evidence

Seeback v Region 1, 5 PRB 608, 611 (1988) (noting affidavits favorable to appellant
were prepared only after grievance was withdrawn),
Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748, 754 (1990) (PRB remands grievance to UAW
to consider medical evidence to be presented by appellant),
Rios appealing Flowers v Local 148, 6 PRB 414, 422 (1992) (in review of trial proceeding
PRB rejects appellant's objection to use of after-discovered evidence because appellant
had impeded its discovery),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), pp 6-8 (president refused to comply with
PRB order to re-submit appeal to IEB, and PRB would ordinarily re-order president to
do so, but does not in this case because considering the after-acquired evidence
submitted by appellant most favorably to him, it is so clear that he cannot prevail).
Allocation of settlement

Hein appealing Baudoux v Region 1, 5 PRB 703, 710 (1989) (class grievance),
Hofsess v Local 163, 6 PRB 66 (1990) (group grievance),
Gillert v Local 594, PRB Case 1591 (6/10/08), pp 11-13 (though many of appellants'
claims lacked contractual merit, the local shop committee negotiated vigorously over a
period of years; their suggestion that the union could have obtained anything near
$150,000 for each appellant seems like wishful thinking; union obtained substantial
monetary settlement, which was divided apparently equitably).

Area hire

Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168 (1991) (implementation of umpire's seniority decision re
seniority employees and document 21 hires),
Gartin v GM Department, 6 PRB 256, 260 (1991) (relative rights of document 21
employees),
Long v Local 22, 10 PRB 206, 211-12 (1998), supplemental decision, 10 PRB 216,
220-21 (1999) (absence of members' names from local area hire list),
Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03), p 9 (clear and unambiguous written
agreement cannot be varied by oral expression),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1571 (8/9/07) p 8 (a number of considerations
beyond the proximity of the plants determined the shape of each Area Hire Area in
1993; the decision was not unilateral on the GM department's part but the result of
negotiations with the company, so IEB would have no basis to set it aside anyway).

Backpay
A 2001 IEB decision discounted a backpay award against a local union for
a reinstated grievance which later won limited backpay from the
company, because (1) the appellant could have begun his appeal earlier,
(2) it would have taken time anyway for the UAW to take the grievance to
arbitration anyway had it not been withdrawn, and (3) appellant had not
looked for work after being discharged. The PRB later reversed as to (1)
because appellant was not promptly informed the grievance was
withdrawn.

A 2008 decision observed that an argument that you are entitled to

backpay, in addition to reinstatement, if you were singled out and fired
for the same offense which other members were also committing, would
be unlikely to succeed.

Backpay in non-grievance appeals is discussed elsewhere.

Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 490-92 (1968) (IEB ordered the local to pay member 14
months of backpay, less deductions including interim earnings, due to refusal to
arbitrate meritorious grievance),
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 301-03 (1975) (PRB approved local membership vote to pay
member $1100 in backpay for grievance settled without backpay, the grievance was
firmly rooted in seniority principles but the committeeman did not advance it to the
next stage),
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 227-29 (1981) (unreasonable delay in grievance-
processing, several arguments might have persuaded arbitrator, union would not
respond to member's requests for information about grievance, union sent notice of
arbitration to wrong address, appellant's request for backpay deferred pending
disposition of grievance by umpire),
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996)
 (discharge grievance settled for reinstatement plus 30 days on the record and no
backpay, PRB remanded grievance for arbitration absent settlement and ordered
30-day delay in implementation of its decision to give appellant a chance to change his
mind and agree to grievance settlement, grievant later did change his mind),
Vogen v Local 900, 9 PRB 614, 624,628-29 (1998, 2000) (after PRB finding that a local
union irrationally handled appellant's discharge grievance it was reinstated, ultimately
the company agreed to reinstate him with full backpay and benefits and seniority,
appellant negotiated instead for a $30,000 lump sum and released the company in a
formal document and quit, PRB held the release by implication necessarily also released
the local)
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241, 244 (1999) (backpay ordered after grievance loss
at arbitration, attorney fees ordered, and job offer obtained),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10 (2001) (after the IEB reinstated appellant's grievance
and remanded it to the local the company settled for reinstatement and backpay of
$58,000+, which covered only to the date when the local had withdrawn the
grievance, appellant asked the local for the remaining backpay damages, the IEB
awarded them partially, the reasons for the reduction were (1) appellant could have
begun his appeal earlier and (2) it would have taken time anyway for the UAW to take
the grievance to arbitration had it not been withdrawn and (3) appellant had not looked
for work after being discharged, the total was $45,000+, PRB raised it to $84,000,
noting that appellant had not been informed promptly the grievance was withdrawn),
Ayres v Local 1112, 10 PRB 126, 128 (1998) (reinstatement of discharge grievance
settled for reinstatement and no backpay, would return member to terminated status),
Grabowski v Local 157, 10 PRB 592, 597 (2000) (If a member wins a grievance and
partial backpay that under the contract strictly considered he or she should have lost
completely, he or she is not entitled to compensation from the union for the remainder
of the backpay),
Sparrow v Local 1250, PRB Case 1457 (2/23/04), pp 9-10 (union got member back to
work without backpay though company's discharge decision was not inconsistent with
the contract, he appealed for the backpay, citing instances where other members had
been treated less severely, PRB affirmed),
Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), pp 7-8 (member's refusal of
settlement offer of possible reinstatement with seniority with no backpay but a higher
pay rate in a different department, and her statements that the only thing she wanted
 was punitive damages, were factors in PRB approval of union decision to settle
meritorious discharge grievance of high-seniority member for backpay only),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), p 8 n 33
("In the Morris decision, [the PRB] not only awarded the appellant the sum of
$250,000 for back pay and certain attorney's fees and expenses, but it also provided
him with an offer of employment in lieu of front pay. [footnote omitted]"),
Francis v GM Department, PRB Case 1587 (10/29/08), pp 16-22 (appellant and likely
others had access to computer with downloaded pornography, evidence supports that
appellant downloaded it despite his denial and that others did too, evidence supports
that appellant's health and safety grievance had no connection to his discharge, so
settlement for appellant's job without backpay was rational, argument that other
people were also downloading pornography would not be likely to convince an umpire
that appellant was entitled to back pay);
Ratliff, CAC, session 10/92 (management claimed appellant assaulted supervisor, GM
department reached settlement for $35,000 in backpay which appellant rejected, in
court appellant pled guilty to disorderly conduct not assault, supervisor's word without
more should not be taken over appellant's, no proof or finding of unprovoked assault,
CAC remanded),
Shannon, CAC, session 11/94 (appellant bid out of chipper classification and was
subsequently laid off for lack of work though junior chippers were kept on, after recall
he grieved and company agreed to train him as a chipper, as to backpay company
offered pension credit for time off, remanded so appellant could take his chances
before an arbitrator),
Boswell, CAC, session 5/01 (union settled discharge and backpay to be paid during period
of termination, appellant appealed settlement because backpay was incorrect, company
arbitration manager says shortfall is being addressed and the difference will be
remedied, CAC remanded);
Blalock v TRW, 1993 WL 475982, 144 LRRM 2168, 2173-74 (ED Mich, 1993) (in oral
argument it is stated that CAC has never awarded backpay),

"Capital offense"
 Dunn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 508, 511 (1992) (fighting),
Hayden v GM Department, 6 PRB 521, 527 (1993) (selling alcohol in plant),
Dickerson v UAW, 11 PRB 530, 535 (2002) ("[Under an LCA an] offense that might for
another employee warrant no more than a reprimand can ... constitute what is in effect
a capital industrial offense.").

Casino Employers

Recently the UAW has begun organizing casinos.

Franks v UAW, PRB Case 1520 (12/20/05) p 13 ("[A]ssumptions that might be valid
about an employee's knowledge of her dues obligation in the context of the automobile
industry are not necessarily appropriate in the context of a Casino."),
Greene v Local 7777, PRB Case 1560 (3/21/07) pp 10-11 (though company may have
violated the precise terms of the point system in its attendance and progressive
discipline policies, the system was never strictly enforced; appellant's absenteeism was
excessive enough that the union could rationally conclude that an arbitrator would
have refused to reinstate him);
Lacey v Region 1, PRB Case 1577 (1/24/08) pp 4-5 (though discharge due to
misunderstanding in cashing stale check was harsh, contract exempts violations of
variance policy from progressive discipline),
Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1604 (11/25/08), pp 11, 15-16 (though election
committee scheduled election in defiance of vote of membership and appellant lost
Motor City chairperson position by only seven votes, election will not be rerun again
since appellant did not appeal until after IEB-ordered rerun election which reran only
other positions not Motor City chairperson position; other member who did appeal the
election timely was not a candidate for Motor City chairperson),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) pp 10-12 (coalition bargaining, discussed
elsewhere),
Lartigue v Region 1, PRB Case 1622 (6/2/09), pp 6-7 (after company denied local
 president's request for union leave, her only option was to report for work and file a
grievance);
Sorice v Region 1, IEB Decision (8/6/07), pp 5-6, 9 (fact that cash drawers of appellant
and co-employee whom she relieved both balanced at the end of their shifts does not
square with appellant being at fault for variance of $728.05 that appeared during her
shift).

Circumstantial evidence

Helton v National Heavy Truck Department, PRB Case 1541 (10/26/06), p 6 ("The Union
asserted that Management's case was purely circumstantial and that the appellants'
claim to have completed their assignment correctly ought to have been give more
weight. Apparently, the supervisors who investigated the incident were not persuaded
by this argument. The Union had no concrete evidence to refute Management's
conslusion....").

Compromising a grievance

Not every grievance can or should be arbitrated simply because it has

some merit.
Early v Region 5, 4 PRB 315, 318 (1984) ("Not every grievance can or should be
arbitrated simply because it has some merit.... Ultimately, the issue was settled on the
basis of a compromise by both sides. Certainly such a settlement, when there is a
genuine dispute over the meaning and application of collective bargaining agreement
language, is not devoid of any rationl basis."),
Ayres v Local 1112, 10 PRB 126 (1998), as summarized in Neely v Region 3, PRB Case
1601 (4/21/09), p 14 ("[The appellant] an employee with 29 years of seniority, was
 terminated on a questionable accusation that he damaged the deck lid on a vehicle.
The Local Shop Committee Chairperson negotiated a settlement that returned Ayres to
work without backpay. Despite the strong merits of Ayres claim to have been unjustly
disciplined, we held that the decision to withdraw his grievance from the Umpire was
rational, because the risk of losing the settlement was too great."),
Gardner v Local 653, 11 PRB 40, 43 (2000) (where appellant was accused of deliberately
impeding production and seeming to boast of it, though his machine had malfunctioned
and his disciplinary record was unblemished it was rational for the shop committee to
compromise his discharge grievance by returning him to work without pay after five
months),
Ilgenfritz v Local 2250, PRB Case 1630 (9/14/09) pp 7-8 (even though due to union
vigilance appellant had a clean record at the time of the first of three suspensions,
union's fear that management was setting appellant up for discharge justified its
decision to settle the three on the basis of a clean record and no pay, where appellant
admitting forging an excuse in one of the three instances).

Contracting out

Sears v Local 1292, PRB Case 1612 (2/24/09), pp 11-12 (though local could have put
forward a theory to support appellant's position that company should have allowed him
to level in from inverse seniority layoff so he could apply for a special assignment at
another plant, and though the issue has been addressed going forward by giving notice
to employees on inverse seniority layoff when similar job opportunties arise, in the
absence of a clear contract violation the committeeperson persuasively explained that
if these assignments began to generate a lot of grievances, the entire program of using
bargaining unit employees rather than outside contractors to do them could be
jeopardized).

Credibility
If there are factual disputes the grievant's version of the facts is to be
accepted if credible.
Pocket guide, p 170;
Hall v Local 735, 4 PRB 263, 266-67 (1984),
Woods v Local 863, 5 PRB 422, 424-25 (1987),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 365-66 (2003),
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08), p 13;
Ratliff, CAC, session 10/92.

Criminal conduct

If a member is fired for conduct and prosecuted criminally for the same
conduct, given that witnesses would be unlikely to talk to either the union
or management the union's proper course is to seek an agreement with
the employer to suspend grievance proceedings pending trial of the
criminal case, after which witnesses would become available.
Petersen v TOP Department, 8 PRB 289, 298 (1995).

Denial of union representation

Taberski v Region 1A, 11 PRB 541, 544-45 (2002) (improper denial of union
representation at time of discharge, but appeal denied because denial was not
substantively prejudicial).
Disability, medical restrictions, fitness for duty

Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522 (1969) (car accident),

Ponce v GM Department, 10 PRB 293, 299 (1999) (medical arbitrator's opinion is
binding),
Wuebben v Local 314, 10 PRB 379, 382-83 (1999) (refusal to accommodate physical
restrictions),
Padilla v GM Department, 11 PRB 336 (2003) (epilepsy),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) (pregnancy),
Schillinger v Region 4, PRB Case 1414 (4/17/03) (fitness-for-duty exam),
Ballard v Chrysler Department, PRB Case 1615 (2/25/09), p 7 (no evidence that
appellant made any effort to obtain a medical leave),
Barnett v Local 735, PRB Case 1632 (10/28/09), pp 8-9 (restrictions placed on appellant
by his own doctor were quite severe, and he had no right to insist that a particular job
was within them; it is the plant physician who decides the requirements of any job).

Disagreement within management

Sorice v Region 1, IEB Decision (8/6/07), p 9 ("There are unanswered questions in this
case which don't add up to termination.... The evidence shows that there was
disagreement among management personnel that the Appellant should not be
terminated....").

Discrimination, nepotism, disparate treatment

Table of Contents
This section primarily concerns discrimination committed by the company,
though some union discrimination is touched on. Discrimination by
another member of the local is discussed elsewhere. Discrimination by a
local is discussed elsewhere. Workplace sexual and racial harassment is
discussed elsewhere.

Sometimes appeals concern discrimination unrelated to general social

prejudice.
Snyder v Local 2031, 9 PRB 265, 268-69 (1996) (where appellant admitted guilt and
served jail time for drug sale, appeal rejected despite that eleven years earlier seven
employees who had been terminated and jailed for selling drugs in the plant returned
to work after two years),
Harris v Region 3, 11 PRB 537, 539-40 (2002) (described more fully elsewhere, appeal
rejected where member admitted he assisted in installing company parts in
co-employee's truck in the plant, despite that union succeeded in reinstating a third
employee who had also helped to install the parts, even though the truck had a license
plate so third employee had to have known the truck was not new).

But several do implicate these issues.

In the first, seven members filed complaints against member Agatha

Praniewicz claiming her loud abusive talk disturbed the department and
asking that she not be returned from layoff. She was shown the
statements at a meeting. Asked for a response, she demanded a trial.
Concluding without a trial the charges were true, the local requested her
discharge from the company. It complied. After intervention by the UAW
Fair Practices and Anti-Discrimination Department asking the local to seek
reinstatement and backpay from the employer, the local membership
refused to alter its position. Sister Praniewicz appealed. An IEB appeals
committee ordered her exoneration, including negotiation for a letter of
recommendation from the employer and payment of $800, in light of her
desire now to sever her employment and find work elsewhere. On the
local's failure to comply the IEB threatened an administratorship, at which
point the local paid the $800 into escrow. Noting the local's failure to
accord her notice, a trial, and the opportunity to confront her accusers,
the PRB upheld the IEB action and released the $800 to her.
Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 29-32 (1958).

The second concerned sex discrimination in a GM plant. For many years

the membership had voted for contracts with two separate
non-interchangeable male and female seniority categories. Men
outnumbered women in the plant and in production jobs. The appeal
noted many instances of males assigned permanently to jobs women
could do, temporary assignments of males to female jobs, and junior
males working while females were laid off.

The PRB said all this could be explained. It said factors such as the
smaller number of female occupational groups, the female workers being
generally older resulting in less frequent turnover among females, and
the laid-off positions being female jobs were non-discriminatory. It
dismissed the part of the appeal alleging discrimination.
It added that seniority is now a recognized equity in union shops and
should be observed except in emergencies.
Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 135 (1960);
compare Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 56-57 (1983) (PRB will examine bargaining
policies structured by a numerically superior group that discriminate against a
numerically inferior group which has less political influence).

This decision may no longer be good precedent in light of the union's

no-discrimination policy.

Next was an EPC challenge to an administrator's removal of four local

officers for effectuating a membership vote to defy a UAW order to racially
desegregate the rest rooms and drinking fountains of its hall. Ten other
officers taking the same stand were not removed. After the removals the
local desegregated the facilities. The PRB upheld the IEB, citing article 2
section 2. It rejected claims that the administrator
discriminated by singling out the four, and that ownership of the hall by a
separate building corporation insulated the officers.
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 205-06 (1961).

The next, brought by a white male, challenged the 1990 version of

document 60 of the UAW/GM contract. At the time document 60 provided
that a committee would consider pre-apprentice training and apprentice
selection as it related to the goal of bringing more minorities and women
into apprentice training. The PRB quoted article 2 section 2 and observed:
 [In 1983 after a charge against GM and the UAW the EEOC] made a finding "that there
is sufficient reason to believe that past employment discrimination existed to warrant
all remedial and affirmative action," and that remedial action included a promise not to
"discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin in violation of
Title VII." [footnote omitted] Confronted with such a finding, what are the
responsibilities of an organization which seeks to embrace such a broad spectrum of
society, in terms of its "improving their working conditions" and "protecting their
interests"?

Although the terms of the Conciliation Agreement entered into by the EEOC, GM, and
the UAW specifically acknowledge that the Union "was not and is not involved in the
formulation or implementation of any past or present Corporation policy" [footnote
omitted] may the Union, consistent with its stated policies, affirmatively assist in
undoing the effects of past discrimination that adversely affected the interests and
employment opportunities of its female and minority members by entering into an
agreement such as is exemplified by Document 60 [concerning pre-apprentice training
as a method of bringing more minorities and females into the program]? Or must it
remain neutral, as insisted by appellant? ...

We do not decide these questions in the context of these appeals [because a

concession by appellant at oral argument before the PRB moots them].

Loomis v Local 362, 8 PRB 322, 329 (1994).

The PRB was intrigued by one hostile-work-environment appeal. It agreed

the member had unfair amounts of overtime assigned, and that her
protests made one or more co-workers hostile. But it also found the local
took effective measures. The shop committee referred her grievance to
the local's fair employment practices committee. It investigated and
found improper discriminatory acts by a fellow member, as well as
management condonation. It made recommendations, all of which were
accomplished. As for the fellow member, the PRB recommended an article
31 charge should harassment recur.
Harris v Local 2123, 10 PRB 490, 498-501 (2000).

In the next, the appellant discovered a cartoon at her workstation

depicting a hooded figure with a Ku Klux Klan symbol. She was upset and
went home. A psychiatrist said she couldn't work. She was denied
workers compensation, but got sickness and accident benefits. The union
grieved the hostile environment. Management agreed she shouldn't have
to work in a degrading environment. It promised to speak to the
appropriate individuals, and to abide by the non-discrimination pledge
now and in the future. The union considered this satisfied the grievance
completely and closed it. The appellant stayed on leave. A year later her
seniority broke time for time. A year later she appealed, asking for a
return to work and backpay. This relief had not been requested in the
original grievance. Noting her now-broken seniority, the PRB approved
the union's handling of the grievance.
Yelder-Whittaker v Local 1292, 11 PRB 8, 11 (2000).

The next considered racial implications of a facially non-racial grievance.

White member Thomas McAuley had been disciplined six times by his
younger black supervisor. Brother McAuley had once embarrassed the
supervisor, and threatened to add his name to a pending EEO case. Later
McAuley was disciplined and told to leave the plant. At the end of his shift
the supervisor left and saw McAuley still on company property near his
(the supervisor's) car. The supervisor claimed McAuley made threatening
gestures and then followed his car; McAuley denied this. He explained he
had remained on the property to see the supervisor's car; on seeing the
supervisor enter it McAuley remembered a similar car had been seen
passing his house for the last 1-2 months; so he wanted to get its license
number. The next day McAuley gave the license number to a neighbor
involved with the neighborhood watch, and asked him to check for the car.

The UAW settled the grievance short of arbitration. The appeal followed.
The IEB and PRB upheld the union action, noting inconsistencies in
McAuley's account. A concurring PRB member added:
[T]here seems to me to an "elephant in the living room" that is being ignored. There
are only incidental references in the record to the issue, but, in all probability, if the
matter went to arbitration it would be explicitly presented to the Umpire by the
Company even if the Union continued to ignore or understate the signie signi ficance
of the element in the case.

...

How persuasive on the credibility issue to a current GM Umpire would the grievant's
excuse that he suspected the supervisor to be cruising his neighborhood for purposes
considering theft of his automobile or trashing it for parts? ... The relationship between
the grievant and his supervisor would not be lost on the Umpire and the racial
implications of the grievant's excuse for staying on the property and following the
supervisor's car would at least implicitly underline that element. Even successful blacks
that have moved up the ladder to supervision in a southern auto plant are suspected of
theft.

...
 Raising the specter of race is an unpleasant and undesirable element which is the
reason for its avoidance. In this [PRB] member's opinion, however, that is all the more
why these matters should be recognized and ventilated if we are ever to get beyond
their silent corrupting influence.

McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474, 481-83 (2003).

In a 2003 appeal a pregnant member was working satisfactorily within

her restrictions. Lying about work unavailability, the company ordered her
onto medical leave. The local union concurred. Then it grieved untimely.
The grievance was withdrawn and an appeal based on pregnancy
discrimination followed. The IEB upheld the union action. On further
appeal the PRB asked the UAW for factual information. The UAW reversed
course and acknowledged the company's pretext.
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03).

Next, a decision involved a member talking to another member at work

referred to her conditionally using a racial slur. He was suspended for 30
days and did not appeal. A year later he came into the area of another
fellow member, grabbed her soft drink, said and performed vulgar
references, argued with her, and addressed her with a sexual slur. The
decision describes the foregoing explicitly. Ford company fired him, citing
a zero tolerance policy. The union got him reinstated after 21 months. He
appealed for the backpay, citing instances where other members had
been treated less severely:
Sparrow's attorney has presented abundant documentation demonstrating that Ford
does not generally assess 30-day disciplinary layoffs for first instances of verbal abuse,
 and that it does not terminate employees for violations of this kind even where the
incidents involved threats and fighting.

Many of the cases cited by attorney Gordon are distinguishable from appellant's
circumstance because they do not arise under the "Zero Tolerance of Harassment and
Discrimination" policy. The discipline appropriate for sleeping, arguing, fighting or even
being intoxicated on the job cannot be compared to the situation where employees are
being subjected to racial or sexual harassment. The UAW and Ford Motor Company
have mutually agreed that employees are entitled to a work environment free from this
kind of harassment. [footnote omitted]

Even in instances that did arise under the "Zero Tolerance" policy, documents
supporting the discipline show that the alleged verbal abuse and threatening behavior
occurred in the heat of some argument connected to the work environment and that
the sexual or racial content was not intended. Sparrow's behavior, on the other hand,
was unprovoked in both of the instances where the Company imposed discipline under
the Policy.

Sparrow v Local 1250, PRB Case 1457 (2/23/04), p 10.

Another hostile environment appeal produced an ambiguous result. A

supervisor had made a hostile vulgar racist statement to member
Deborah Torres. Later after he was removed Sister Torres received
threatening phone calls. Ten days after the calls started she was given
caller ID on her phone. Meanwhile, for 17 days she was denied a job
assignment (apparently at her same rate of pay) to which seniority
entitled her; during this time the protested member was transferred to an
easy job. The shop committee waited four months to file a harasssment
grievance.

Later Torres grieved mistakes in overtime equalization. But management

corrected them and the grievance was withdrawn.

The local civil rights committee chairman investigated. The specific issues
had been dealt with, his final report said, so he recommended the
harassment grievance be withdrawn on the basis of plant-wide training on
worker environment.

The local settled it without that commitment. Torres appealed to the IEB
and then the PRB. Noting evidence of a pattern of unfair tratment and
disrespect shown to Torres as a woman and a minority, the PRB said:
These are indeed serious and troubling issues, but they are not problems that we can
deal with in an abstract way in response to a grievance appeal. The local parties must
become more sensitive to the presence of hostility in the workplace based on race and
sex. Local representatives need to be willing to challenge any pattern of behavior on
the part of Management which disadvantages employees because of their race or
gender.

...

[Civil Rights chair David Sanchez] wrote that the implementation of ... training would
be necessary in order to resolve [the grievance].

The settlement reached ... does not indicate that the Company made any commitment
to implement a training program for its personnel. It appears that some of the
representatives elected by the members of Local Union 594 would also benefit from
participating in such training. We hope that the Local will take the initiative to
implement training for its representatives in dealing with claims of discrimination and
hostility.

We agree with the IEB's conclusion, however, that nothing would be gained at this
point by reponening [the harassment grievance]. The specific problems Torres faced in
 her department ... have been addressed. Any future problems of the type Torres
encountered with [the supervisor] would have to be addressed in separate grievances.

Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1470 (5/25/04), p 13.

Finally, a 2005 decision involved a member about whom another member

went to management saying he had harassed her by touching her crotch
either with his hand or a tool, showing her a naked picture of himself, and
putting his groin into her butt several times over two years. He was
discharged. The investigation showed he had done similar things with other
women. He argued no one ever told him his behavior was unwelcome, he
had not seen the company's zero-tolerance policy, and
that other persons charged with sexual harassment had been given 3-5
days off.

The PRB denied the appeal saying progressive discipline applies only to
minor shop rule violations, and sexual harassment is not minor. Further,
the case involved constant annoying behavior, not something that
occurred in the heat of an argument connected to work where no sexual
or racial content was intended.
Pairan v Region 3, PRB Case 1508 (6/24/05), pp 9-11.

Practically all other appeals claiming discrimination, nepotism, or

disparate treatment have lost.
Nix v Local 1166, 2 PRB 39 (1973) (race),
DeCluett v Local 420, 3 PRB 11 (1980) (race),
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385 (1982) (racial discrimination by management, grievance
 ordered into arbitration),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 57 (1983) (fact that local agreement which disadvantages
lower-skilled members is aberration in Ford system does not make it discriminatory),
Benton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52, 55 (1986) (management harassment acquiesced in by
union, remanded by PRB with instructions to IEB to consider member's allegations),
Welch v Local 599, 5 PRB 125 (1987) (disability),
Garza v Region 1D, 5 PRB 192 (1986) (disability),
Layton v Local 1112, 5 PRB 222 (1986 (disability),
Clark v Local 31, 5 PRB 246 (1987) (sex),
Steltenpohl v Local 180, 5 PRB 253 (1986) (disability),
Kimberly v Region 1A, 5 PRB 308 (1987) (disability),
Kurtz v Local 599, 5 PRB 359 (1987) (nepotism),
McDaniel v Local 1409, 5 PRB 620 (1989) (sex),
Johnson v Region 1D, 5 PRB 676 (race),
Errett v Region 2A, 6 PRB 14 (nepotism),
Jones v Local 135, 6 PRB 134 (race),
Morris v Local 549, 6 PRB 137 (1991) (nepotism),
McKee v Region 4, 6 PRB 202 (1991) (race),
Sundquist v Local 6000, 6 PRB 215 (1991) (race),
Lewis v Local 167, 6 PRB 403 (1992) (age),
Stokes v Region 1A, 6 PRB 497 (1993) (race, age),
Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257, 258 (1994) (race),
Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 382 (1997), modified 9 PRB 391, 395 (1998) (historic
industrial antecedent),
McClain v Local 602, 9 PRB 496 (1997) (race),
Palmer v Local 913, 10 PRB 279 (1999) (race),
Bryant v Local 14, 10 PRB 629, 632 (2000) (no principle of industrial relations requires
absolute uniformity of treatment),
Jurè v UAW, 11 PRB 150, 153-54 (2001) ("None of claims of discrimination submitted by
Jurè bares directly on the issue of race discrimination on the part of those responsible
for the decision to withdraw his grievance.... Unfortunately, discrimination is not
uncommon in America, and if [supervisor] Bonham did in fact say what Jurè attributed
to him, he would be rightly subject to censure. But there is no evidence that
considerations of race influenced the Union's decision...."),
Hills v UAW, 11 PRB 352, 361 n 10 (2001) (race claim against employer),
Welch v Ford Department, 11 PRB 406 (2002) (race);
Scott v Region 8, PRB Case 1404 (10/31/02), p 6,
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), p 21 (even if GM
believed it was necessary to hire appellants' group to satisfy internal employment
goals, nothing supports the notion that EEO regulations would require GM to violate
seniority acquisition rules of agreement with UAW),
Williams v Ford Department, PRB Case 1437 (8/29/03), p 7,
Carraro v Ford Department, PRB Case 1442 (12/22/03), pp 7-8 (union activity),
Ray-Barnett v Local 652, PRB Case 1496 (2/11/05), pp 8-9 ("[I]t does appear that the
team concept is less adaptable to employees with disabilities than an arrangement
where each employee has only one job to perform."),
Edwards v Ford Department, PRB Case 1527 (1/4/06), pp 4-5 (5 ( in age and race
claim, company made every effort to train appellant on his new assignment and local
made certain he was given the opportunity to demonstrate his competence),
Smith v Region 4, PRB Case 1537 (9/27/06), pp 7-8 (prior arbitration precedents hold
that the contract language does not protect members for filing workers comp, OSHA,
and EEOC claims, and that a high standard of proof exists to show such acts motivated
her discharge),
Mitz v Region 1D, PRB Case 1569 (5/8/07), pp 12-13 ("The [intolerable] problems
identified by the Civil Rights committee do not appear to have had any connection to
the the discipline.... It may be that Wolcott was a poor supervisor. ... The fact that
racial tensions have existed in the past and may recur is not the basis for any specific
relief."),
Jones v Region 2B, PRB Case 1581 (2/12/08), pp 8-9 (there was no contractual basis for
the union to insist that the company give appellant a chance to learn the journeyman
job),
Gordon v Local 1112, PRB Case 1594 (6/11/08), p 7 (appellant identified no violation of
his contract or pre-retirement rights; fact that the company retained three other
employees has no bearing on appellant),
Addison v Region 8, PRB Case 1600 (12/16/08), pp 12-15 (though no arbitrator would
sustain a racially motivated or retaliatory discharge even though an LCA was in place,
it was rational for union to withdraw appellant's grievance protesting appellant's
discharge for violating company prohibition of starting overtime early on weekends,
 because appellant was on an LCA and he had to have known of the policy, even though
another employee signed in early the same day without penalty and other employees
besides appellant frequently signed in early, there being no link between the discharge
action and appellant's recent EEOC complaint on the basis of race).

The UAW has a special procedure for handling discrimination grievances,

discussed elsewhere.

Drugs or alcohol

Table of Contents

One early appeal succeeded, where the member was a purchaser not a
seller. But generally these appeals have failed. A long-term clean
disciplinary record is not a defense. Nor is entrapment, even if the
entrapper is your supervisor as seen in a 1996 decision. Nor is being a
mere "gofer" in a drug transaction.

The PRB's attitude is summed up in a 2001 decision:

Davis pleasds that he is drug and alcohol free now and has been for some time. He
emphasizes the fact that drug addiction is a sickness, a condition like any other illness,
and that it is unfair to penalize him for his being ill. We congratulate Davis on his
triumph over his addiction and we wish him well for his future now that he is alcohol
 and drug free. We are sympathetic to his arguments regarding addiction being a form
of sickness. Nevertheless, unfair or not, the Company has a polcy against working
while using drugs, and arbitrators traditionally uphold the discharges of employees who
violate Company policies in this respect. This is not simply a matter of corporate social
engineering; it is common wisdom that employees who abuse drugs and alcohol
present a significant safety hazard to their coworkers.

Davis v Local 882, 11 PRB 317, 320 (2001).

In a 2003 case the PRB did order arbitration of a PCP-distribution

discharge where the member denied it, because of the union's obligation to
accept the member's version of the facts if credible, the member's high
seniority, and the agent's inconsistent testimony. The CAC also showed
interest in a 1999 drug case and a 2000 alcohol case.
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (UAW witnesses testify that incapacitation by
alcoholism is satisfactory reason for failure to report for work),
Warren v UAW, 5 PRB 430, 434 (1988),
Robinson v UAW, 5 PRB 439, 445 (1988) (purchaser not seller),
Stewart v Chrysler Department, 6 PRB 151 (1991),
Sheedy v GM Department, 6 PRB 282 (1992),
Holloway v Local 594, 9 PRB 293 (1996),
Snyder v Local 2031, 9 PRB 265, 269 n 2 (1996) (supervisor as entrapper),
Taylor v Local 1666, 9 PRB 115 (1996),
Bobbitt v Local 594, 9 PRB 245 (1996),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636 (1998),
Sanders v UAW, 10 PRB 355, 358 (1999) (appellant is out of touch with reality),
Sasaki v GM Department, 10 PRB 548, 554 (1999) ("Once an employee's guilt of such an
action [sale of prohibited substances on company premises] is clearly established, it is
the policy of the Union to withdraw the employee's grievance, just as it did here. We
are obliged to respect the Union's policy in this regard."),
LeClerc v DaimlerChryster Department, 11 PRB 321, 325 (2001) (union objected to
company's amendment of discharge notice three years afterward, but arbitrator
 allowed the amendment because the company had promptly, clearly, and repeatedly
informed the union that it considered the drug sale charge to be an additional ground
for the discharge),
Davis v UAW, 11 PRB 348, 350 (2001) (PRB has no power to see to it that appellant is
given a second chance),
Bryant v Local 14, 10 PRB 629, 632 (2000) ("The fact that Bryant may have been under
stress by reason of personal circumstances or substance abuse is not a defense to a
physical assault."),
Jurè v UAW, 11 PRB 150, 153-54 (2001) (member on LCA, who arrived at work
appearing to be drunk, drove Hi-Lo so that fellow member could have been seriously
injured, and made a threat of physical violence),
Bladen v GM Department, 11 PRB 226, 228-29 (2001) (mere possession of marijuana on
company premises is a dischargeable offense, even for a 29-year employee with a good
record, even if others similarly situated have received lesser discipline),
Glysz v Local 211, 11 PRB 327, 331 (2001) ("Glysz's decision to plead guilty to a criminal
charge involving drug trafficking clearly established his guilt."),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 366 (2003) (distribution of PCP, remanded for
arbitration),
Welch v Ford Department, 11 PRB 406, 409 (2002) (appellant prompted breathalyzer
test by saying he felt unwell, and appearing to medical personnel to be intoxicated),
O'Neill v GM Department, 11 PRB 498, 503 (2002) (union pressed grievance to the
umpire stage at which point company finally permitted union to interview undercover
agent; interview convinced union to withdraw grievance),
Jefferson v GM Department, 11 PRB 504, 506 (2002) (appellant does not explain how it
was that agent identified him as a drug seller or why she would say she purchased
cocaine from him if she did not),
Peters v GM Department, PRB Case 1408 (10/29/02), p 6,
Huber v Local 933, PRB Case 1412 (12/3/02), p 6,
Diem v Ford Department, PRB Case 1413 (12/2/02), pp 5-6;
Bays v GM Department, PRB Case 1538 (9/28/06), pp 8-9 (undercover agents are not
always reliable because they are motivated to produce results from their operations,
but appellant admitted drinking beer in the parking lot and observing other employees
using drugs, he failed to report the undercover agent's badgering of employees for
drugs to the company or union, there was no evidence to contradict the agent's report
 of the sale, and the substance tested positive for amphetamine even if it could not
have been admitted in a criminal trial),
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08) pp 10-13 (union ordered to try to
re-negotiate grievance even though the company has no reinstatement-of-grievances
letter, because member had high seniority, his low blood alcohol level was considered
negative under the company's strict standard, management was hostile to him, and
international rep had no experience arbitrating similar cases, did not investigaste other
similar cases at this plant, did not meet with appellant or explain his decision, and did
not hold the grievance open while appellant appealed);
Davis, CAC, session 4/99 (appellant was discharged after claimed threatening behavior
supported by statements of co-workers and positive cocaine test; appellant claimed
witness statements were inaccurate and he was return to work too early from
work-related medical leave; record showed unspecified problems at other Ford plant;
appeal referred back to IEB for investigation of the unspecified problems),
Williams, CAC, session 4/00 (appellant took unopened beer can from car in plant lot and
placed it outside the fence for another employee, thinking that this was off company
property; plant rule prohibits use or consumption of alcohol on premises, and penalty is
only "up to" and including discharge; appellant should have received mere oral
reprimand if there was a violation at all).

Drug-testing

The UAW distinguishes between testing related to workplace health and

safety and testing related to controlled substances.
McGlamory v Region 8, 5 PRB 449 (1988).

Email
 Combs v Ford Department, PRB Case 1478 (5/26/04) (lewd email).

Entrapment

Snyder v Local 2031, 9 PRB 265, 269 n 2 (1996) (marijuana sale solicited by supervisor,
appeal rejected),
Harris v Region 3, 11 PRB 537, 538-40 (2002) (described more fully elsewhere, appellant
installed stolen company parts in co-employee's truck in the plant after which a
supervisor gave him the keys and told him to drive it off company property; he did so
and was fired immediately; part of the company's reason was that complying with the
supervisor amounted to hiding the evidence; appeal rejected despite a report that over
a year later the supervisor was still working).

Failure to perform job, efficiency, safety, work rules

Ponce v GM Department, 10 PRB 293, 298-99 (1999) (member with severe photophobia
may not ignore company's safety policy prohibiting #3 and #4 rose tinted glasses),
Nash v GM Department, 11 PRB 268, 271 (2001) ("If personal safety motivated his
refusal to obey his supervisor's instruction, it was his responsibility to raise the issue on
the spot so that his objection could be evaluated."),
Taberski v Region 1A, 11 PRB 541, 544-45 (2002) (appellant claimed incident was
merely horseplay, appellant did strike co-worker in the face after co-worker took
appellant's cell phone, and fellow workers filed a contemporary petition stating
appellant was a violent person and worse was yet to come),
Keith v Local 524, PRB Case 1458 (2/23/04) (ongoing problem of failure to keep up with
production coupled with harassment of fellow employee meant decision not to arbitrate
discharge of high-seniority member was not irrational),
Ferrell v Local 856, PRB Case 1492 (1/14/05), pp 5, 6, 8 (company standards,
 time-study),
Helton v National Heavy Truck Department, PRB Case 1541 (10/26/06), pp 5-6
(replacement of three air lines and one water line on a welding robot, circumstantial
evidence, three-day suspension),
Burnes v UAW, PRB Case 1592 (9/3/08), pp 9-10 (appellant knew of work rule and
deliberately violated it),
Thompson v Local 1292, PRB Case 1633 (10/28/09), pp 12-14 (retaliation for raising
safety isues is grievable even if management did not violate the safety provisions of
the contract, but appellant did not properly invoke the procedures under the health and
safety memorandum, and there is no evidence that management retaliated aginast
appellant in this case for raising a safety issue),
Furby v Chrysler Department, PRB Case 1636 (1/25/10), p 10 (possession of a valid hi-lo
driver's license has no bearing on the question whether appellant could operate a hi-lo
safely).

Fighting, threats, shoving, horseplay

With the exception of two decisions for one member noted elsewhere,
these appeals have lost.
Gomez v Local 211, 5 PRB 257 (1987),
Jackson v Chrysler Department, 8 PRB 479 (1995),
McClain v Local 602, 9 PRB 496 (1997),
Greenslit v Local 2488, 10 PRB 101, 106 (1998) (shouting and cursing at group leader,
while waving arms, and holding a long file and a pillar pick),
Johnson v Local 1292, 10 PRB 136, 139 (1998) (death threats),
Wischer v Region 1 10 PRB 411 413-14 (1999) (instigation of a fight),
Bryant v Local 14, 10 PRB 629 (2000),
Jurè v UAW, 11 PRB 150, 153-54 (2001) (member on LCA, who arrived at work
appearing to be drunk, drove Hi-Lo so that fellow member could have been seriously
injured, and made a threat of physical violence),
Vitti v Local 2000, 11 PRB 177, 182 (2001) ("We realize that Vitti's conduct may have
resulted from his anxiety and depression. Even assuming this to be true, compassion
for his condition is outweighed by the very real possiblity that failure to remove him
from the plant might have fatal consequences to his fellow employees or members of
Management."),
Mullins v Local 600, 11 PRB 284, 286 (2001) (company had statements from five
witnesses saying appellant had used abusive language toward supervisor; appellant
had statements of four witnesses saying they were witness to no act of abuse; PRB
holds "stating that one did not witness any abusive conduct falls short of providing
proof that it did not happen"),
Hills v UAW, 11 PRB 352, 360 (2001) ("In the past six years, we have been called upon
six times to review the withdrawal of grievances of employees disciplined for hostile or
threatening conduct towards management or their fellow employees. In each instance
we have upheld the Union's decision."),
Taberski v Region 1A, 11 PRB 541, 544-45 (2002) (appellant claimed incident was
merely horseplay, appellant did strike co-worker in the face after co-worker took
appellant's cell phone, and fellow workers filed a contemporary petition stating
appellant was a violent person and worse was yet to come),
Schillinger v Region 4 , PRB Case 1414 (4/17/03), p 7,
Long v Local 325, PRB Case 1422 (2/3/03), p 3,
Coyne v Regin 2B, PRB Case 1488 (9/2/05), p 8,
Nafus v Region 9, PRB Case 1531 (4/12/06), p 4 n 12, 7 (union had secured grievant's
reinstatement from earlier discharge for altercation through arbitration, but grievant
would not comply with reinstatement condition requiring anger management
treatment, was charged with repeating conduct for which he was fired the first time,
declared he would not curb his expression, and continued to vent anger at union
representatives, thus raising reasonable doubts as to his ability to present a case as a
witness to an arbitrator),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/20/07), pp 15-16
(noted elsewhere, in this appeal appellant was fired for fighting, but the facts showed
the altercation involved no threats or blows, only angry talk instigated by the foreman;
PRB denied the appeal because of "the concern of employers that they can be held
liable if they do not act to prevent violent behavior in the workplace"),
Bryant v Region 5, PRB Case 1561 (3/21/07) (threatening),
 Lawrence v Local 1405, PRB Case 1564 (4/17/07), pp 12-14 (member's statement in
third hand language that anyone that did what fellow member did should be "taken out
back and have the shit kicked out of them" while holding a box cutter worn down to
only having a small part of the blade showing might well have been sufficient to sustain
member's discharge in arbitration, so union's convincing of management that member
was essentially innocent was a very excellent settlement),
Thomas v GM Department, PRB Case 1640 (3/8/10), pp 10-11 (in a worplace fight with a
fellow employee appellant produced a knife resulting in injury).

What if the threat is non-physical, say if you threaten a supervisor with a

lawsuit? In our society, anyone who thinks in good faith that there is a
case has the absolute right to file a lawsuit. It follows that anyone who
thinks in good faith that there is a case has the absolute right to threaten
to file a lawsuit.

But in one appeal member Kenneth Mitz threatened to sue a contract

supervisor during an altercation. Later the local civil rights committee
concluded the supervisor had created a hostile working environment which
was partially racially based. The PRB opinion doesn't specify it, but
presumably the hostile environment would have been the basis of Mitz's
intended litigation. Nothing in the decision indicates any bad faith on his
part. Both men were aggressive, but neither was physically so. So Mitz
should have had the absolute right to threaten the suit. But he was given
the balance of the shift and three days off. The union settled the
grievance by clearing his record and getting him paid, but only for one
day. He had to eat the other days. The PRB held this was rational. The
bottom line is that the right to threaten a good-faith suit is not absolute.
Mitz v Region 1D, PRB Case 1569 (5/8/07), pp 4, 6, 11-12.
Free speech at work

In a 2008 decision, member Doug Hanscom maintained a website, the

"Disgruntled Autoworker," which was critical of the UAW's jointness
programs with the car companies.

In 2004 GM gave him time off for posting an article it claimed contained
non-factual information. The local grieved, the discipline was reduced to a
written reprimand, and Brother Hanscom got backpay.

In 2006 Hanscom published another piece which included:

"hundreds of union reps [are] liars, thieves, thugs and punks,"

one particular union rep was "selfish,"
members are appointed to jointness positions by virtue of being
"relatives" of local union or management officials or they "kiss up,
suck up, stroke, sleep with, do whatever" local union or management
officials do to get those positions,
"seniority is not a factor in Mgt's decision [choosing team
coordinators]," and
UAW and AFL-CIO officials "have their heads so far up corporate
America's asses...."

The company claimed this was false and malicious, and gave Hanscom
time off for violation of its plant rule 29. The rule prohibited publication of
 false, vicious, or malicious statements concerning any employee, supervisor, the
company, or its products.

Hanscom grieved. Management responded, saying his actions:

amount to a wanton, malicious verbal assault against GM and its employees, therefore
possessing the potential of creating an angry, aggravated, anxious and hostile work
environment.... Additionally, the grievant's actions were an attempt to polarize the
Wilmington workforce by creating a division between recent transfers from closed
facilities and long time Wilmington Assembly employees. His repeated us vs them
reference and inferences are evidence of such an attempt.[footnote omitted]

...

As part of the orientation session ... the process for being promoted to Team
Coordinator was throughly explained. As part of that explanation, seniority as a
determining factor was discussed.

Union rep John Washington withdrew the grievance. He explained he

"agreed with the Company's position" and "it was not a proper letter for
Union members to be reading." He thought the website contained "false
or malicious statements" about the members, "false and indefensible"
comments about how team coordinators and UAW officials obtained their
positions, and "profanity which I find very offensive."

Hanscom appealed. The IEB found that the website articles may on
occasion cross from protected free speech to to an attempt to undermine
the union or vilify members; but it also found the site's claims were
harmless and no negative impact toward the union had materialized. It
said the company on the other hand found the articles threatening to the
work environment. It concluded the union would be unlikely to persuade
an umpire the writings were harmless:
... The Umpire has ruled many times that the Union cannot supplant its beliefs for that
of the Company's. Instead, Washington realized that an Umpire could render a ruling
that would [be] detrimental to similar future cases, therefore, establishing bad
precedent. Accordingly, after weighing the pros and cons of processing the grievance to
the Umpire, Washington withdrew the grievance from the procedure.

Meanwhile Hanscom charged the company at the NLRB, which found merit
in the case and scheduled a trial. As a result GM settled, paid Hanscom
his lost time, removed the discipline from his record with a note
"removed per grievance settlement," rescinded and replaced plant rule
29, and posted and distributed a notice saying it wouldn't repeat the
conduct.

Hanscom requested and couldn't get a copy of the supposed grievance

settlement. Union rep Washngton had told him there was no settlement.
Hanscom appealed to the PRB, arguing that without documentation he
might be disciplined again for the same conduct:
My intent is to use shop talk, as crude and colorful as it can sometimes be, to agitate
the GOBs [locally-appointed union reps] and Yum Yums [UAW-appointed reps] while
educating the membership about the devastating effect the UAW's partnership policies
are having on our Union. I suppose my writings are inflammatory to GOBs and Yum
Yums and they are intended to be. I hope to piss off the membership to the point
where they decide to get involved and attend Union meetings, challenge incumbents,
or just voice their opinions. I want to initiate any action that will replace the fear and
apathy instilled in the members over the years by the GM/UAW joint partnership. GM
claims that my newsletters threatened its employee/employer relationship. What the
 Company is really saying is that an uprising by its employees against the policies of the
IEB would threaten its relationship with the IEB. GM hopes to forestall an inevitable
uprising against a Union leadership that has betrayed its members and retirees for way
too long, which is an act of collusion by GM to protect the IEB's dynasty and its joint
relationship.

I believe that I have established that the language in my newsletters is nothing more
than ordinary shop talk, that my descriptions of GOBs and Yum Yums and their actions
are accurate from a shop floor perspective. The statement about the selection of Team
Coordinators is based on my personal observations and those of my coworkers and a
Committeeperson.

The PRB affirmed the IEB. It held it was powerless to tell the union to
demand that GM explain a decision to grant a grievance. As to
Washington's expression of personal irritation, it said he believed
Hanscom's statements were false and he was entitled under the EPC to
say that. The EPC does not obligate the union to arbitrate a grievance
protesting an employer's interference with members' right to criticize the
policies and personalities of union officials. Washington merely made an
honest assessment.

As noted elsewhere, this is a peculiar result.

The PRB concluded with a comment on Hansom's goal that management

cease future interference with his right to express his views:
That kind of protection cannot be obtained thourgh the grievance procedure. In a
practical sense, it cannot be obtained at all. Appellant has to take into consideration
how hurtful and insulting his comments are to some of his coworkers. Publishing
statements such as those found on "The Disgruntled Autoworker" is going to make
people angry. Indeed, Hanscom has acknowledged that his manner of expression is
 intended to make people angry. One expressing dissident views in a manner intended
to be provocative cannot expect to be entirely insulated from the consequences of that
provocation.

Hanscom v Region 8, PRB Case 1590 (8/29/08).

Grievance remedies

Grahek v TOP Department, 10 PRB 268, 274 (1998) ("The remaining remedy that
Grahek seeks, monetary damages for time lost as a the result of emotional distress, is
not available through the grievance procedure.").

High-seniority members

There is a presumption favoring arbitration of any discharge of a

high-seniority member. Unless there are compelling facts ruling out any
reasonable prospect of success the UAW will arbitrate. Compelling facts
existed in one appeal where the member had 29 years. This is a good
rule, but enforcement may be spotty. One member with six years was
held to have "relatively high seniority" but another with almost eight
years was held to have "relatively low seniority." The relative position of
each on seniority lists was not noted.
Pocket guide, p 170;
Handbook, p 127,
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 228 (1981) (20 years, failure to report within 5 days,
remanded),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (14 years, failure to report as directed,
remanded),
Hall v Local 735, 4 PRB 263, 266-67 (1984) (5 years, failure to report as directed,
remanded),
George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204, 209 (1987) (6 years held to be relatively high seniority,
theft, remanded),
Humphrey v Ford Department, 5 PRB 285, 289 (1987) (7 years held to be high seniority,
failure to report after receipt of five-day letter, remanded to grievance procedure),
Harris v Caterpillar Department, 6 PRB 122, 124 (1991) (22 years, absenteeism, appeal
denied),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303 (1992), second decision 6 PRB
303 (1992) (16 years, absenteeism, remanded for arbitration with instructions),
Petersen v TOP Department, 8 PRB 289 (1994) (17 years, abuse of authority and of
clients, remanded to fourth step of procedure),
Jackson v Chrysler Department, 8 PRB 479 (1995) (16 years, possession of weapon on
company property, appeal denied),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 621-23 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000)
reconsideration denied (7/19/00) (probationary, 3-day quit, remanded with
instructions),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636 (1998) (19 years, positive cannabinoid test, appeal
denied),
Bryant v Local 14, 10 PRB 629, 629, 632 (2000) (11 years held to be long-term
employee entitled to presumption for arbitration, assault, appeal denied),
Chase v Local 1231, 11 PRB 53, 59 (2000) (12 years held to be long-term employee
entitled to presumption for arbitration, theft, remanded for arbitration with
instructions),
Bladen v GM Department, 11 PRB 226, 228-29 (2001) (29 years, possession of
marijuana in plant, appeal denied),
Davis v Local 882, 11 PRB 317, 319 (2001),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 365-66 (2003) (20 years, distribution of PCP,
remanded for arbitration),
Gracia v Ford Department, 11 PRB 368, 372 (2001) (25 years, failure to respond to
five-day letter, appeal denied),
Compton v Region 8, 11 PRB 393, 393, 398 (2002) (6 years held to be relatively
 short-term employee, threat, appeal denied),
Rogers v Region 9, 11 PRB 400 (2002) (21 years, assault, appeal denied),
Samuel v UAW, 11 PRB 526 (2002) (28 years, incarceration, appeal denied),
Folino v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1415 (10/30/02) p 7 (29 years, theft,
appeal denied),
Diem v Ford Department, PRB Case 1413 (12/2/02), pp 5-6 (1 year held to be
short-term, no discrimination to reinstate high-seniority employees charged with same
offense but not appellant, marijuana, appeal denied),
Keith v Local 524, PRB Case 1458 (2/23/04), pp 8-9 (16 years, refusing to do job
assignment, appeal denied),
Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), pp 5, 8 (22 years, abuse of
co-workers and general misconduct, appeal denied because union settled for all that
could have been achieved through arbitration, and contract did not provide for
reinstatement of grievances),
Norris v Region 1A, PRB Case 1485 (2/10/05), pp 7-8 (almost 8 years, unjustified
absence, appeal denied because there was no violation of contract in company's
discharge of chronically absent "relatively low seniority" member on an LCA who did
not call in on day of absence, who did not follow company procedures for absences,
and who refused to sign a medical release form),
Clark v Local 325, PRB Case 1501 (4/18/05), pp 5-6 (15½ years, unjustifed tardiness,
though member was entitled to receive careful scrutiny of the circumstances appeal
denied because he was on an LCA, many of his absences were for medical reasons
which while non-disciplinable would have made it difficult to convince the company to
reinstate him, and the PRB has a history of denying appeals for high-seniority
employees with chronic absenteeism and tardiness problems in the auto industry after
corrective discipline),
Pairan v Region 3, PRB Case 1508 (6/24/05), pp 9-11 (17 years, sexual harassment,
local tried to think of defenses, met with the company several times to try to get relief
for grievant, but investigation only produced more evidence of objectionable conduct
and grievant's incredibility, and grievant's conduct was not comparable to sleeping,
arguing, fighting, or being intoxicated, not uttered in the heat of a work-related
argument, and not unintentional)
Bays v GM Department, PRB Case 1538 (9/28/06), pp 8-9 (23 years, selling drugs,
appellant admitted drinking beer in the parking lot and observing other employees
 using drugs, he failed to report the undercover agent's badgering of employees for
drugs to the company or union, there was no evidence to contradict the agent's report
of the sale, and the substance tested positive for amphetamine even if it could not
have been admitted in a criminal trial),
McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555 (5/7/07), p 14 (1 year, last-chance agreement,
failure to comply with outpatient treatment program),
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08), pp 10-13 (23 years, alcohol at work, blood
alcohol level of .016 which is considered a negative result under the company's strict
rule).

Incarceration

These appeals have almost never succeeded. But the PRB and CAC both
have noted that if a member were cleared completely of the criminal
charge leading to the incarceration he or she might win on the theory of
circumstances beyond the member's control.
Green v Region 1D, 5 PRB 167, 170 (1986),
Ulmer v Local 735, 5 PRB 239, 241 (1986),
Duff v Region 8, 6 PRB 533, 535-36 (1992),
Johnson v Chrysler Department, 10 PRB 28, 30 (1998) (PRB acknowledges that acquittal
on all charges could require UAW to argue circumstances beyond control to company),
Hines v Region 1, 10 PRB 424, 427 (2000) (PRB acknowledges possible correctness of
appellant's statement that fellow inmates got jobs back at Chrysler and Ford),
Hunter v Local 218, 10 PRB 480, 482 (1999) (incarceration is not a satisfactory excuse
for absenteeism over five days),
Culp v Region 1, 11 PRB 169, 173-75 (2001),
Samuel v UAW, 11 PRB 526, 529 (2002) ("Incarceration, unless shown that it was
unwarranted, is not a reason beyond an employee's control that will excuse his failure
to report for work."),
 Russell v Region 1A, 11 PRB 550, 555 (2002) (a medical excuse will not suffice if it is not
the real reason for absence),
Clark v Region 8, PRB Case 1513 (9/19/05), pp 5-6 ("We have consistently held that
incarceration, unless shown that it was unwarranted, does not constitute a reasonable
excuse for failing to report to work"; other member's return to work distinguished
because he obtained a leave of absence before being incarcerated);
but see Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (UAW witnesses testify that
incapacitation by jail is satisfactory reason for failure to report for work),
Pappas v Region 1A, PRB Case 1602 (10/28/08), pp 5-7 (incarceration is not generally
considered a satisfactory reason for failure to report to work under Ford agrement);
Wagstaff, CAC, session 11/95 (appellant was terminated for inability to report after state
conviction for possession of marijuana; UAW withdrew grievance; appellant then faced
federal prosecution for the same offense but the federal judge dismissed the case
saying the police search was illegal; appellant has now petitioned the state court for
release on the same theory; CAC puts appeal in abeyance pending outcome of state
proceedings),
Cook, CAC, session 10/98 (appeal which was dismissed by IEB for failure of appellant to
appear remanded by CAC because of evidence he did not receive notice of the IEB
hearing and was incarcerated at the time).

Job assignment and duties

Rogers v Local 1714, 10 PRB 447, 450-51 (1999) (right to return to job after temporary
assignment),
Vineyard v Region 1, 11 PRB 279, 282-83 (2001) (the contract reserves the right to
management to make work assignments to employees),
Wilson v Local 1976, PRB Case 1573 (9/6/07) (management's assignment was within
appellant's job description),
Furby v Chrysler Department, PRB Case 1636 (1/25/10), p 10 (appellant had begun to
struggle with following instructions and performing his job assignments).
Jointness, grievability

In a 2007 appeal by a retiree attacking modifications of health-care

benefits due to retirees under the GM national agreement, the appellant
asserted the union was increasingly dependent on joint programs to
maintain its operations. He noted the company's transfer of $7.8 million
to the UAW for salaries in such programs in 1992, and the full-time
compensation of over 100 UAW employees in them today. The PRB
answered:
Indeed, Henderson's critique of the Union's jointly funded programs seems to justify
the Union's concerns. The Union's concept of "partnering" with GM may be heresy to
Henderson, but the current generation of union members has embraced a less
adversarial approach to bargaining in recognition of the Union's and the Company's
shared interests.

Henderson v GM Department, PRB Case 1568 (7/20/07), pp 8, 14;

see alsoCombs v Ford Department, PRB Case 1478 (5/26/04), pp 4, 8-9
(contract excluded from grievance procedure matters related to computers
used by jointly funded job security and standards rep),
Ray-Barnett v Local 652, PRB Case 1496 (2/11/05), pp 8-9 ("[I]t does appear
that the team concept is less adaptable to employees with disabilities than an
arrangement where each employee has only one job to perform."),
Donovan v Ford Department, PRB Cases 1526, 1542 (10/25/ 0606 ), pp 17-
20 (though appellants presented a strong and sympathetic case in favor
of modern operating agreements, this one was defined by product not by
geographic location; the product is gone; PRB cannot order that a modern
operating ageement be established in the unit to which appellants have been
transferred),
 Aston v Local 1714, PRB Case 1551 (1/24/07), pp 8-9 (new agreement in
2003 introduced team concept which encouraged flexibility and discouraged
natural tendency to cling to the old way of doing things; though parties
stated that agreement terms "should not be diluted with remnants of past
practices, they also recognized that a certain period of transition would be
necessary before the Team Concept it introduced would be entirely
realized").

Last-chance agreements

A company sometimes will impose a last-chance agreement ("LCA") on a

member claimed to have repeatedly violated company rules. Typically
under an LCA, a member agrees that if he or she commits an infraction,
however minor, the member can grieve only his or her guilt or innocence,
and not the severity of the penalty, which can be discharge. LCAs are
term-limited, often to a year. Grievances and appeals under LCAs usually
lose, but not always.
Clark v Local 31, 5 PRB 246 (1987),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636 (1998),
Robinson v Region 1D, 10 PRB 559, 562 (2000) (local had no breach of contract to
assert, and could argue only for reinstatement on a last-chance basis, which the
company refused),
Chase v Local 1231, 11 PRB 53, 60 (2000) (discharge grievance of member on LCA
remanded for umpire hearing with instructions),
Jurè v UAW, 11 PRB 150, 153-54 (2001) (member on LCA, who arrived at work
appearing to be drunk, drove Hi-Lo so that fellow member could have been seriously
injured, and made a threat of physical violence),
Webb v UAW, 11 PRB 214, 217-18 (2001) (medical excuse for appellant, who was
 working under the terms of a conditional reinstatement, and left work station claiming
medical exigency, covered period commencing two days after the incident),
Nash v GM Department, 11 PRB 268, 271 (2001) (given that appellant had been
discharged twice previously and he was working under the terms of a conditional
reinstatement agreement, the union could reasonably conclude it would not prevail
before an umpire, so settlement on the basis of the balance plus 29 days and a new
conditional reinstatment agreement was rational),
LeClerc v DaimlerChryster Department, 11 PRB 321, 325 (2001) (company allowed to
amend rationale of discharge decision that he violated LCA to add rationale that he sold
drugs on company premises),
Welch v Ford Department, 11 PRB 406, 409 (2002) (appellant prompted breathalyzer
test by saying he felt unwell, and appearing to medical personnel to be intoxicated),
Body v UAW, 11 PRB 450, 452-53 (2001) (violation of third LCA),
Sholes v Local 659, 11 PRB 459, 464-65 (2002) (contradictions in appellant's account of
problems with his log),
Samuel v UAW, 11 PRB 526, 528-29 (2002) (company would not grant third LCA),
Dickerson v UAW, 11 PRB 530, 535 (2002) ("[Under an LCA an] offense that might for
another employee warrant no more than a reprimand can ... constitute what is in effect
a capital industrial offense."),
Huber v Local 933, PRB Case 1412 (12/3/02), p 6,
Woods v Local 31, PRB Case 1416 (12/20/02), pp 4-5,
Derian v Region 2B, PRB Case 1424 (4/2/03), pp 3, 6 (letter of conditions which would
have allowed member to sue company),
Anderson v Local 659, PRB Case 1484 (11/22/04), pp 8-9 (record does not support claim
that union failed to investigate grievance adequately and present the case
aggressively),
Norris v Region 1A, PRB Case 1485 (2/10/05), pp 7-8 (no violation of contract in
company's discharge of chronically absent low-seniority member on an LCA who did not
call in on day of absence, who did not follow company procedures for absences, and
who refused to sign a medical release form),
Clark v Local 325, PRB Case 1501 (4/18/05), pp 5-6 (many absences of appellant who
was on an LCA were for medical reasons which while non-disciplinable would have
made it difficult to convince the company to reinstate him),
Frierson v Local 235, PRB Case 1545 (10/27/06), pp 4-5 (company's employee
 assistance program (EAP) confers no specific rights on employees, so appellant
relinquished no rights when he was reinstated on an LCA without being informed of
assistance available under EAP),
McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555 (5/7/07), p 13 ("There is no explicit requirement in
the last chance agreement that McMillan should seek outpatient care and there is a
serious question whether his discharge would be sustained on the basis of an implicit
requirement.").
Nash v GM Department, PRB Case 1583 (2/12/08), pp 14-15 (despite appellant being on
LCA at time he left plant without permission, it appears that management did not
actually intend to terminate him until his bizarre behavior at disciplinary interview),
Addison v Region 8, PRB Case 1600 (12/16/08), p 11 ("If the Company refuses to
reconsider a discharge under [the terms of an LCA], the withdrawal of a grievance
protesting the discipline cannot be said to lack a rational basis."),
Pappas v Region 1A, PRB Case 1602 (10/28/08), p 6 (employee discharged under LCA
cannot challenge the discipline which led to the LCA),
Sallee v Local 933, PRB Case 1627 (6/25/09), p 7 (no basis for a grievance because
appellant violated the terms of his LCA),
Furby v Chrysler Department, PRB Case 1636 (1/25/10), pp 2-3, 9-10 (conditional
reinstatement letter);
Warmley v Local 600, CAC, session 6/81,
Johnson v UAW, CAC, session 6/82,
Wilson v Local 450, CAC, session 11/82,
Hester, CAC, session 3/93 (though on an LCA, appellant had nurse call plant within
specified time, and doctor's slips covered entire period he was off).

Layoff

Konarske v Local 600, 6 PRB 452 (1992) (limitation on company liability),

Mattox v UAW, 11 PRB 485, 491 (2002) (according to arbitrator's ruling laid-off members
hired at another plant lost their seniority at first plant, and this result held even though
the parties later negotiated a one-time exception for another member),
Geniac v Local 12, PRB Case 1491 (1/14/05), p 5 ("It has always been the position of the
 UAW International Union that new technology may be inevitable. However, whoever
performed the work manually in the past should continue to perform the work required
by the new technology."),
Perez v Region 2B, PRB Case 1493 (2/10/05), pp 2 n 2, 6 n 19, 8-9 (where contract
liberally allows layoff and performance of bargaining-unit work by non-bargaining-unit
employees it was not irrational to drop nurse's layoff grievance due to elimination of
position).

Lying to management

Frolichman v Ford Department, 6 PRB 382, 385-86 (1992) (lying on employment

application, umpire ruling that company has one year within which to detect and
discipline),
Baker v Local 892, 11 PRB 45, 51 (2000) (grievance of appellant accused of falsifying his
attendance record, thus allowing him to apply for incentive pay, was settled rationally
by persuading the company to cut his suspension by half),
Ilgenfritz v Local 2250, PRB Case 1630 (9/14/09) pp 7-8 (even though due to union
vigilance appellant had a clean record at the time of the first of three suspensions,
union's fear that management was setting appellant up for discharge justified its
decision to settle the three on the basis of a clean record and no pay, where appellant
admitting forging an excuse in one of the three instances).

Management rights

Laurin v Local 6000, 10 PRB 484, 488-89 (1999) (high-seniority member had layoff
preference even if she lacks the interpretive skills posessed by appellant; management
had the prerogative to determine appellant's job wasn't needed and abolish it),
Philip in the matter of Alexander v Region 4, 10 PRB 529, 531-32 (1999) (because
company had sole right to determine number of hours to be worked and appellant had
 medically-restricted assignment, union could rationally compromise overtime grievance
for fewer hours than appellant demanded),
Smith v Local 2190, 11 PRB 455, 457-58 (2002) (management may choose overtime
oppotunities on the basis of "continuity on a a job").

Medical excuse

Novack v Region 1, 5 PRB 582, 585-86 (1988) (appellant may not selectively provide
medical evidence to state agency but not to union),
Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748, 753-54 (1990) (untimely offering of medical
documentation explained by attendance counselor's telling appellant nothing could be
done for him),
Sills v Local 9212, 10 PRB 108, 112-13 (1998) (alteration of medical excuses),
Baker-Williams v Region 3, 10 PRB 511, 516-18 (2000) (evidence is weak that doctor
responded timely and properly to company's five-day letter, and despite depression
appellant could have responded to it herself),
Webb v UAW, 11 PRB 214, 217-18 (2001) (medical excuse for appellant, who was
working under the terms of a conditional reinstatement, and left work station claiming
medical exigency, covered period commencing two days after the incident),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 9 ("The fact that an appellant has been
suffering from depression cannot by itself be held to warrant a waiver of the time limits
on appeals involving the withdrawal of grievances.").
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 622 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000)
reconsideration denied (7/19/00) (employee must be given chance to supplement
insufficient excuse with further evidence),
Rhodes v Local 699, 10 PRB 153, 157 (1998) ("[I]f depression [from five deaths in
appellant's family] was his problem then it was also the solution, for certainly he could
have applied for medical leave in order to treat the condition."),
Putnam v Local 1853, 10 PRB 275, 278 (1998) (appellant's original medical excuse was
altered),
Vasi v Local 2000, 11 PRB 378, 383-84 (2002) (excuse must be timely and must explain
why illness prevented member from working),
 Dickerson v UAW, 11 PRB 530, 536 (2002) (excuse must be timely),
Russell v Region 1A, 11 PRB 550, 555 (2002) (a medical excuse will not suffice if it is not
the real reason for absence),
Mitchell v Local 533, PRB Case 1456 (2/20/04), pp 7-8 (medical leave must be justified
timely),
King v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1574 (9/4/07), pp 11-12 ("[Appellant]
truly seems not to understand the concept of honesty."),
Deliso v UAW, PRB Case 1578 (1/24/08), pp 8-9 (if appellant had objections to five-day
quit letter she should have raised them at the time).

"Obey now, grieve later," insubordination

Kerr v Local 465, 9 PRB 344 (1997),

Kerr v Local 465, 9 PRB 651 (1998),
Nash v GM Department, 11 PRB 268, 271 (2001) ("The evidence that Nash intentionally
refused to comply with a direct order from his supervisor is substantial."),
Schillinger v Region 4 , PRB Case 1414 (4/17/03),
Bertone v GM Department, PRB Case 1556 (2/21/07), p 8 ("It is the general rule of the
workplace that an employee must comply with a supervisor's instructions and grieve
those which he or she feels are improper."),
Mitz v Region 1D, PRB Case 1569 (5/8/07), p 12 ("It is a well-established rule of the
workplace that an employee must comply with a supervisor's instructions and grieve
those which he or she feels are improper."),
Addison v Region 8, PRB Case 1600 (12/16/08), pp 12-15 (it is difficult to understand
how appellant could have been ignorant of a policy with which all the other employees
were complying especially where another employee had been fired for violating it; so if
appellant didn't know about the policy it was because he didn't want to know and his
violation amounted to defiance),
Lartigue v Region 1, PRB Case 1622 (6/2/09), pp 6-7 (after company denied local
president's request for union leave, her only option was to report for work and file a
grievance).
Overtime

Eckerle appealing Harrison v Local 151, 5 PRB 311, 313-14 (1987),

Scarlett v UAW, 5 PRB 409, 411 (1987),
Warner v Local 599, 6 PRB 165 (1991),
Grant v Local 163, 6 PRB 472 (1992),
Cammarata v Local 400, 10 PRB 435 (2001) (appellant and comparator member work on
different shifts and appear on two different overtime lists),
Philip in the matter of Alexander v Region 4, 10 PRB 529, 531-32 (1999) (because
company had sole right to determine number of hours to be worked and appellant had
medically-restricted assignment, union could rationally compromise overtime grievance
for fewer hours than appellant demanded),
Holet v Local 467, 10 PRB 538, 540-41 (1999) (appellant had not completed training
which would have entitled him to share equally in overtime; union was nevertheless
able to get certain concessions from management in his favor and an umpire could not
have provided him with more),
Keevis v Local 235, 11 PRB 12, 14 (2000) ("Such contractual ambiguities offer the
opportunity for compromise, and this is what has happened here."),
Williams v Local 7, 11 PRB 429, 433 (2002) (grievance had no basis in fact and no
contractual merit),
Smith v Local 2190, 11 PRB 455, 457-58 (2002) (management may choose overtime
oppotunities on the basis of "continuity on a a job"),
Patterson v Local 848, PRB Case 1509 (5/12/05), pp 8-9 (in the face of appellant's
persuasive argument for his interpretation of the contract the local relied on the
experience of long-serving past officials and the plant's firmly established past practice
regarding distribution of overtime, a practice which the company argued was not
changed by the current contract),
Palmer v Local 668, PRB Case 1559 (4/16/07), pp 8-9 (union properly surveyed members
as to whether they prefered use of flextime in lieu of overtime; appellant did not show
management had used flextime to undermine standards of 40-hour week and
8-hour day; flextime policy mutually served management and members),
 Aston v Local 1714, PRB Case 1551 (1/24/07), pp 8-9 (though settlement of
equalization-of-overtime grievance under 1999 contract was never put into writing,
2003 contract introduced team concept which favored flexibility and included a
transition period, so it was reasonable for union to conclude 2003 contract did not
require union to abandon settlement agreement),
Gillert v Local 594, PRB Case 1591 (6/10/08), pp 11-13 (GM was permitted to
subcontract work on premium days rather than assign it to appellants because the
work was not normally and historically done at appellants' location),
Breckenridge v Region 1A, PRB Case 1596 (9/4/08), pp 7-8 (fact that third shift
employees punch out at 7:00 am on Sundays and so have no chance to earn double
time for that Sunday is due to longstanding consistent practice at this location and is
therefore not irrational).

Past practices

Table of Contents

While they can help to clarify or explain contract language, past practices
and oral expressions may not be used to supplant or supplement clear and
unambiguous language of an agreement, particularly where management
has given notice that practices deviating from contract language will no
longer be permitted. Grievance-handling involving company past practices
is discussed elsewhere.
Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 391, 394-95 (1998) (history of collective bargaining
relationship with GM relating to skilled trades controls decision of appeal, even though
the language of the contract can be read in such a way as to refute the union's
 position),
Tate v DaimlerChrysler Department, 11 PRB 16, 18 (2000) (collective bargaining
agreement dynamic not static),
Krueger v Ford Department, PRB Case 1417 (12/18/02), p 6 (past principles and
practices may not supplant or supplement clear and unambiguous contract language),
Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03), p 9 (clear and unambiguous written
agreement cannot be varied by oral expression),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), pp 4, 8-11 (PRB inquires as to past
practice but ultimately decides appeal based on arbitration decisions),
Patterson v Local 848, PRB Case 1509 (5/12/05), pp 8-9 (in the face of appellant's
persuasive argument for his interpretation of the contract the local relied on the
experience of long-serving past officials and the plant's firmly established past practice
regarding distribution of overtime, a practice which the company argued was not
changed by the current contract),
Espinosa v Local 719, PRB Case 1511 (9/6/05), pp 6-7 (nine-year temporary employee
not treated as permanent for purposes of eligibility to run for shop committeeperson),
Appeal of Bellew, PRB Case 1558 (3/20/07), pp 8-9 (responsibility of placing members
whose plant closed is jointly company's and union's; company manpower is an
important element; accommodation of the preference of 85 members by seniority is
hardly possible; appellant has not demonstrated existence of past practice that
high-seniority members can select the plant where they will go and it would difficult to
even speak of such a practice),
Gillis v Local 1976, PRB Case 1611 (2/24/09), p 8 (established past practice that full-time
employees cannot bump part-time employees).

Penalty, progressive discipline

Robinson v Region 1D, 10 PRB 559, 562 (2000) (local had no breach of contract to
assert, and could argue only for reinstatement on a last-chance basis, which the
company refused),
Gardner v Local 653, 11 PRB 40, 43 (2000) (it was rational for the shop committee to
compromise appellant's discharge grievance by returning him to work without pay after
 five months, given that much later umpire might have reduced the discharge to a
disciplinary leave equivalent to time served),
McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474, 481 (2003) (not irrational to settle discharge
grievance by allowing member to be reinstated for the sole purpose of applying for total
and permanent disability),
Sparrow v Local 1250, PRB Case 1457 (2/23/04), pp 9-10 (difference in penalties
assessed varying employees justified by differences in nature of offenses),
Wilson v Region 1C, PRB Case 1502 (9/6/05), p 3 (union properly withdrew grievance of
appellant fired after final warning for failing to sweep the floor),
Cullens v Local 7777, PRB Case 1506 (6/23/05), p 6 (uncontradicted employer assertion
that warning letter was not a step in progressive discipline provided rational basis for
union to withdraw grievance short of arbitration),
Pairan v Region 3, PRB Case 1508 (6/24/05), pp 10-11 ("The progressive discipline
appropriate to address minor shop rule violations, however, may not be appropriate in
cases where a pattern of sexual harassment has been established, because of the
employer's responsibility to its employees to provide an environment free of this kind of
harassment."),
Greene v Local 7777, PRB Case 1560 (3/21/07) pp 10-11 (though company may have
violated the precise terms of the point system in its attendance and progressive
discipline policies, the system was never strictly enforced; appellant's absenteeism was
excessive enough that the union could rationally conclude that an arbitrator would
have refused to reinstate him),
Lacey v Region 1, PRB Case 1577 (1/24/08) pp 4-5 (though discharge due to
misunderstanding in cashing stale check was harsh, contract exempts violations of
variance policy from progressive discipline);
Patton, CAC, session 3/02 (CAC remands in part because shop rules mandated a lesser
penalty than discharge for a first offense),
Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), pp 3-4, 7, 10-12, 16-18 (where appellant
had left the plant for 12 minutes without punching out, the company rule requiring
punching out had been announced during a production meeting and posted in the plant
though appellant didn't attend the meeting and didn't see the posting, the contract had
no system of progressive discipline, the arbitrator can only enforce the contract as it is
written, and the union obtained a $5000 settlement offer from company which
appellant rejected, the union acted rationally in withdrawing the discharge grievance,
 despite IEB testimony of two fellow members who said they too continually left the
plant for short periods without punching out and they continued to do so for three
years after appellant was fired).

Plant closings, work transfer, sale of company

In one plant closing appeal member Russell Thomas challenged the

union's failure to obtain members' accrued vacation pay. Defending, the
president's office set out a thoughtful discussion of the problems the
union faces generally in these situations. The PRB endorsed it:
When confronted with the closure of a business by a small employer such as Hydraulic
Accessories Company, where there remain unpaid obligations which the employer is
unable or unwilling to pay, the UAW’s experience has been that it is not to the
employees’ advantage to force an involuntary bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In the first place, Chapter 7 liquidations involve administrative costs
which deplete the assets available to pay the employees’ claims. Furthermore, unpaid
obligations to employees fall behind claims of secured creditors, administrative claims
and professional fees in accordance with the priorities established by the Bankruptcy
Code. Sadly, in liquidations under the Bankruptcy Code, it is not at all uncommon for
valid pre-petition wage and benefit claims to go unpaid.

Many times a small employer will simply allow the secured creditors to foreclose on the
remaining assets of the business, rather than declaring bankruptcy. In such a situation,
the employer and its creditors generally understand that the distribution of the
employer’s remaining assets must be consistent with the priorities outlined in the
Bankruptcy Code. If these priorities are not observed, the secured creditors could get
together and force the business into bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7. The priorities
outlined in Chapter 7 give a modest priority to certain claims of employees over the
claims of general unsecured creditors. In the case of vacation pay, this priority is
limited to claims earned within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition. Claims related to
 unpaid contributions to employee benefit plans arising within 180 days prior to the
petition also receive priority over general unsecured claims. Even claims for vacation
pay or contributions to employee benefit plans falling within the stated periods still
come after the claims of secured creditors and administrative expenses.

Deductions from employee paychecks for contributions to benefit plans, withholding

taxes, and union dues are a special category. Employers on the brink of liquidation
often deduct these amounts but fail to transmit the money to the proper recipient.
Instead, the employer uses the money to pay immediate demands of creditors to avoid
termination of a utility, eviction by a landlord, or foreclosure by the banks. In situations
where the employer has deducted money from employee paychecks and used those
funds to pay other creditors, the UAW has with some success argued that the employer
has actually committed a crime by converting the employees’ money to its own use.
The employer and its secured creditors will sometimes accede to the Union’s demand
that deductions for benefit plans or Union dues be paid to the proper recipient even
where the secured creditors’ claims have not been paid in full.

The Union can sometimes find a secured creditor or former owner of the liquidated
business who is willing to discuss making payments toward employees’ claims. When
there are assets available to make any payment at all, the liquidating employer will
generally insist that any payment on employees’ claims be acknowledged in an
agreement in which the Union consents to the payment and agrees not to pursue
additional claims. Such an agreement may be termed a “closing agreement” in that it
brings a formal end to the relationship between the employer and the employees, but it
is more in the nature of a grievance settlement than a collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, no formal ratification of such an agreement would be required.

Thomas v Local 155, PRB Case 1543 (1/24/07), pp 8-11.

Other decisions follow.

Stephens v Champion Department, 4 PRB 349 (1985) (plant closing agreement),
Local 677 v Mack Truck Department, 5 PRB 107, 112-13 (1986) (right of local A to ratify
local B's grievance settlement which affected seniority rights of members of local A),
 Taylor v Local 600, 5 PRB 135, 138, 139, 141 (1987) (compelling union witnesses to
attend arbitration),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399 (1987) (administratorship, elections),
Morris v Local 549, 6 PRB 137 (1991) (seniority),
Kruckeberg v Local 2250, 6 PRB 528 (1993) (seniority),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64 (1996) (sale of operations, no right to ratify
MOU, discussed elsewhere),
Madden v UAW, 11 PRB 28 (2000) (major transfer of operations, appealability of national
department's obviously correct interpretation of a contract),
Gaul v Local 488, 11 PRB 202, 207 (2001) (there being no contractual support for
appellants' grievance, and the union not having the option of striking locally as it did
successfully in 1998, the union had no leverage and had to withdraw the grievance
protesting implementation of a special attrition plan),
Anderson v Local 488, 11 PRB 293, 296 (2001) (limitation on number of highly-
desireable "Document 117" retirement options offered in plant closing),
Schick v UAW, 11 PRB 415, 420 (2002) (though appellants have 30 years of seniority
and were treated less favorably than so-called new hires after an optional transfer,
they elected a buyout of some $30,000 while new hires had no buyout and their
transfer was required),
Ratkos v Local 651, PRB Case 1530 (2/14/06), pp 13-15 (in face of claim local Delphi
East JOBS committee was motivated by desire to protect the native workforce, it had
discretion to place transferrees from Delphi Livonia and Delphi West into JOBS bank
instead of allowing them to bump active incumbent Delphi East members, because the
GM national agreement does not provide company-wide seniority rights and local JOBS
committee had discretion to ensure orderly transition),
Donovan v Ford Department, PRB Cases 1526, 1542 (10/25/06), p 19 (when the VX-54
program left the plant it was not a plant closure, but a transfer of operation anticipated
under the national contract, and was unchallengeable),
Appeal of Bellew, PRB Case 1558 (3/20/07), pp 8-9 (responsibility of placing members
whose plant closed is jointly company's and union's; company manpower is an
important element; accommodation of the preference of 85 members by seniority is
hardly possible; appellant has not demonstrated existence of past practice that
high-seniority members can select the plant where they will go and it would difficult to
even speak of such a practice),
 Evans v Ford Department, PRB Case 1579 (1/25/08), pp 13-15 (there is no local right to
vote on Ford department's decision to interpret "date of hiring" language in national
agreement to mean date of hiring by Ford not date of hiring at particular physical
location).

Pornography at work

Francis v GM Department, PRB Case 1587 (10/29/08), pp 16-22 (appellant and likely
others had access to computer with downloaded pornography, evidence supports that
appellant did so despite his denial and that others did too, evidence supports that
appellant's health and safety grievance had no connection to his discharge, so
settlement for appellant's job without backpay was rational).

Probationary and at-will employees

These appeals have failed, except where the probationary was entitled to
just-cause protection. In particular, employees who sign
acknowledgements that they can be fired at any time have no protection.
Smith v Local 155, 5 PRB 97 (1986) (89 days),
Bailey v Region 1A, 5 PRB 305 (1987),
Ali v Local 1776, 6 PRB 32 (1990) (63 days),
McClain v Local 602, 9 PRB 496 (1997) (85 days),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000), reconsideration
denied (7/19/00) (87 days, just-cause protection, member followed exactly the
instructions given him by the personnel office),
Holycross v Local 662, 10 PRB 523 (2000), (company could fire temporary employee who
signed union-approved acknowledgement that she could be terminated at any time,
 despite that she was on disability leave at the time),
Werts v Local 6000, 10 PRB 542, 546 (1999) (85 days),
Smith v Region 3, 11 PRB 507, 509-10 (2002) (company conceded it would not have
discharged member had she had seniority, but she had only 81 days and probationary
employees are subject to stricter rules, including that they can be fired for missing
days even when they have a debilitating physical condition).

Profit sharing

Hodges v Local 600, PRB Case 1618 (6/2/09), p 11 (where profit sharing plan excluded
extraordinary or infrequently occurring items from calculation of profits, one-time
payment by supplier was not profit, even though company described it as profit to
investors).

Promotions

Cooper v Local 163, 4 PRB 200, 205 (1984) (management pre-qualifying junior members
for promotion, based on contractually-allowed "merit, ability, and capacity"),
Cronenwett v UAW, 10 PRB 232 (1998) ("{The contract provides] that in determining
who should receive a promotion, seniority comes into play only when two or more
applicants are qualified for the position."),
Allen v Region 3, 10 PRB 238, 241 (1998) (whether an individaul is qualified for a
journeyperson card is a matter of bargaining policy),
Wright v Local 659, 10 PRB 248, 254-55 (1999) (protested member had more seniority
and was more qualified),
Collar v Local 413, 10 PRB 384, 388-89 (1999) (management did not regard the
appellant and the protested employee to be relatively equal in skills and abilities),
Tate v DaimlerChrysler Department, 11 PRB 16, 18 (2000) ("[Appellant's] employer has
the contractual right to determine what qualifications are required for promotion to a
 given position."),
Barrett v Local 599, 11 PRB 23, 26 (2000) ("[S]eniority becomes the determinative
factor only where 'ability, merit and capacity are equal.'"),
Powell in the matter of Stewart v IEB Region 3, PRB Case 1466, p 9 (3/18/04) (pursuit of
grievances by committeeman was not unbecomingbecoming despite that grievances
challenged
appellants' promotion to the carpenter trade),
Jones v Region 2B, PRB Case 1581 (2/12/08), pp 8-9 (appellant lacked posted
qualifications, and there was no contractual basis for the union to insist that the
company give him a chance to learn the journeyman job);
Luna v Local 600, CAC, session 6/82 (appellant's failure to meet precisely the procedures
for bidding for job was not sufficient grounds to deny him promotion, in light of
admission that if he had been given the opportunity to bid he could have been the one
selected).

Public employers

Sarkissian v Local 6000, 5 PRB 624, 629-30 (1989) (PRB accepts credibility finding of
civil service judge),
Morgan v Local 6000, 6 PRB 1, 4 (bargaining with public employer),
Sundquist v Local 6000, 6 PRB 215 (1991) (secretary),
Gray v Local 6000, 9 PRB 31 (1995) (layoff of state mental health employees at
children's center),
Werts v Local 6000, 10 PRB 542, 546 (1999) (state probationary employee),
Pilgrim v Local 6000, PRB Case 1521 (10/26/05) (discharge of corrections officer),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), p 4 (referencing administrative letter re dues of
public employees);
administrative letter, volume 43 # 3 (9/28/92) (amalgamated public/private local's per
capita tax obligation in light of prohibition of strikes by public employees).
Quit versus discharge

Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 87 (1983),

Eutsey v Region 2A, 5 PRB 211 (1987),
Humphrey v Ford Department, 5 PRB 285 (1987),
Jodlowsky v UAW, 5 PRB 463 (1988),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 621-23 (1998) (though sick and having a medical
excuse in hand appellant went to company labor relations before his starting time to
display medical excuse and obtain a call-in number, termination was for being a
three-day quit; even though nurse clinician's excuse was arguably insufficient to show
inability to work company did not point out insufficiency and give appellant an
opportunity to supplement it with further evidence),
Carroll v Region 1A, PRB Case 1472 (5/26/04),
Deliso v UAW, PRB Case 1578 (1/24/08), p 9 (five-day quit letter),
Neely v Region 3, PRB Case 1601 (4/21/09) (appellant raised significant issues regarding
the reasonableness of her reliance on nurse's promise to fax certificate of disability to
company in response to five-day quit letter, and the reasonableness of company's
decision to send letter).

Retirees

Bee v Local 719, 10 PRB Case 1, 4-5 (1998) (appellant's retirement and court-enforced
agreement to release company from all claims barred union from further prosectuion of
pending grievances),
McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474, 481 (2003) (not irrational to settle discharge
grievance by allowing member to be reinstated for the sole purpose of applying for total
and permanent disability),
Samuel v UAW, 11 PRB 526, 528-29 (2002) (on company's refusal to grant 28-year
appellant a third LCA, union rep tried unsuccessfully to convince the company to grant
two years further service so he could retire with full benefits),
 Gordon v Local 1112, PRB Case 1594 (6/11/08), p 7 (PRB rejects appeal of a member
claiming the pre-retirement program was applied unfairly to him),
Brogdon v Local 719, PRB Case 1625 (6/25/09), p 7 (appellant is bound by the paper he
signed; he did not postpone his retirement under duress; he postponed it to protect his
workers' compensation benefits),
Furby v Chrysler Department, PRB Case 1636 (1/25/10), p 9 (appellant's election to
retire was irrevocable),
Thomas v GM Department, PRB Case 1640 (3/8/10), pp 10-11 (at umpire stage union
got appellants a good settlement allowing him backpay and a full retirement, after a
workplace fight with a fellow employee where appellant produced a knife resulting in
injury).

Seniority, "dividing scarcity"

There are two different types of seniority:

[Appellant's] UAW/GM seniority commenced with the date he qualified to be a seniority
employee at Coit Road, October 8, 1962, and that date has never changed. His GM
benefits, pension and vacation entitlements all stem from that date. On the other hand,
what the Union terms "competitive seniority", the seniority that governs such matters
as layoff and recall, shift preference and, in certain circumstances, promotion
opportunities is not fixed, but may change many times depending upon employment
circumstances.

Veneziano v Local 549, 11 PRB 197, 200 (2001).

The time limit for filing a seniority appeal begins to run when the the
seniority decision affects the appellant, not when the appealed seniority
provision was negotiated.
 [Appellants] apparently have not actually been personally impacted in their plant by
the decision.... At this point any effect upon them is only potential. [footnote omitted]
For this reason alone, their appeal should have been dismissed as premature.

Martin v Local 699, 9 PRB 374, 380 (1997);

see also EP complaint of Placido, 2 PRB 165, 170 (1974) (appeal of seniority
agreement not untimely because claims are continuing),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 56 (1983) (seniority issue became appealable
when appellant was displaced, not when the seniority provision was
negotiated),
Santos v UAW, 8 PRB 249, 252 (1994) (time period to appeal action on a
seniority issue begins to run when appellant learns of the action, not the
reasons for it).

Other seniority appeals:

EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 25-26 (1980) (quick ratification of new contract by
junior members without notice to 120 fired senior members holding preferential recall
rights which were vacated by new contract, approved),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 57 (1983) (bargaining discrimination in favor of members in
one classification who are numerically superior and have great political influence,
against members in another clasification who are numerically inferior and have less
political influence, would be invidious and remediable by the PRB; but the facts here do
not show such discrimination because the disputed agreement is over 20 years old and
members in the disfavored classification has less skill and less seniority),
Sneath v Local 1309, 5 PRB 299 (1988) (revocation of union officer's preferred seniority
status upheld),
Shelton v Local 1112, 5 PRB 571, 575 (1988) (seniority claims generally not pursued
beyond term of agreement under which they arose),
Quintana v Local 719, 6 PRB 155 (1991) (adjusted seniority dates),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 181 (1991) (effect of umpire seniority decision on
non-grievants, "dividing scarcity"),
Gumhold v Local 677, 6 PRB 189, 191 (1991) ("Issues of health and safety of the
 workforce as well as its productivity are too important to be left to the caprice of
seniority"),
Gartin v GM Department, 6 PRB 256 (1991) (area hire list),
Long v Local 22, 10 PRB 206, 211-12 (1998), supplemental decision, 10 PRB 216,
220-21 (1999) (area hire),
Laurin v Local 6000, 10 PRB 484, 488-89 (1999) (high-seniority member had layoff
preference even if she lacks the interpretive skills posessed by appellant; management
had the prerogative to determine appellant's job wasn't needed and abolish it),
McNeal v Ford Department, 10 PRB 504, 508-09 (2000) (grievance settled for 20-month
improvement in appellant's seniority date, appeal for backpay denied because of
contractual limit on backpay in non-disciplinary non-pay-shortage grievances),
Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 573 (2002) (junior members working while senior member
laid off),
Veneziano v Local 549, 11 PRB 197, 200-01 (2001) (appeal rejected because (1)
appellant's seniority rights under a contract between GM and the Patternmakers
League of North America have nothing to do with his seniority rights under a GM-UAW
contract, and (2) appellant had relinquished recall/rehire rights in exchange for
$5000),
Hornbuckle v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1401, p 7 (10/18/02) ("[S]eniority
is [not] a fundamental law that governs the employer/union relationship"; retirement
option not offered to senior member because he was productive),
Miller v Ford Department, PRB Case 1427 (3/19/03) (junior members working whileg
while senior member laid off),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), pp 5-6, 20-23 (in
one appeal contract interpretation was obviously correct because individual negotiators
have no authority to deviate from terms of nation agreement; in other appeal IEB
ruling avoided disparate treatment and GM department reamains willing to correct
errors where it can be shown adjusted seniority date is incorrect),
Powell in the matter of Stewart v IEB Region 3, PRB Case 1466 (3/18/04), p 9
(committeeperson is not subject to charges for pursuing seniority grievances even
though pursuit will be detrimental to interests of other members),
Long v Local 2089, PRB Case 1469 (4/27/04), pp 5-6 (when PPM job position was posted
in maintenance classification no one challenged successful bidder's right to accrue
seniority, so when PPM job was changed later to no longer accrue seniority, shop
 committee's determination that successful bidder did not forfeit seniority earned to date
was rational),
Sasaki v Local 1853, PRB Case 1524 (12/21/05), pp 12-13 (local had no authority to
negotiate corporate seniority dates, and it would have been unfair to other GM
employees to restore GM corporate seniority to Saturn employees),
Ratkos v Local 651, PRB Case 1530 (2/14/06), pp 13-15 (in face of claim local Delphi
East JOBS committee was motivated by desire to protect the native workforce, it had
discretion to place transferrees from Delphi Livonia and Delphi West into JOBS bank
instead of allowing them to bump active incumbent Delphi East members, because the
GM national agreement does not provide company-wide seniority rights and local JOBS
committee had discretion to ensure orderly transition),
Eardley v Local 1112, PRB Case 1535 (6/28/06), pp 6-7 (WEMR and electrician trades
are "related" and in fact the same at appellant's plant, so seniority established in one
trade is the same as seniority established in the other),
Harmon v Region 1A, PRB Case 1539 (9/27/06), p 7 (Visteon national agreement
precludes a member hired into a classification not covered by the agreement from
asserting seniority rights for time spent in that excluded classification, and union's view
that this controls the tie-breaker language at the Monroe plant is consistent with the
contracts and past practice),
Appeal of Bellew, PRB Case 1558 (3/20/07), pp 8-9 (responsibility of placing members
whose plant closed is jointly company's and union's; company manpower is an
important element; accommodation of the preference of 85 members by seniority is
hardly possible; appellant has not demonstrated existence of past practice that
high-seniority members can select the plant where they will go and it would difficult to
even speak of such a practice),
Sears v Local 1292, PRB Case 1612 (2/24/09), pp 11-12 (though local could have put
forward a theory to support appellant's position that company should have allowed him
to level in from inverse seniority layoff so he could apply for a special assignment at
another plant, and though the issue has been addressed going forward by giving notice
to employees on inverse seniority layoff when similar job opportunties arise, in the
absence of a clear contract violation the committeeperson persuasively explained that
if these assignments began to generate a lot of grievances, the entire program of using
bargaining unit employees rather than outside contractors to do them could be
jeopardized).
Sexual/racial harassment

General discrimination, nepotism, and disparate treatment is discussed

elsewhere.
Administrative letter on the elimination of workplace sexual harassment, volume 47 # 5
(11/2/98);
Grahek v TOP Department, 10 PRB 268, 269, 273 (1998) (taken from its context, the
meaning of a supervisor's comment that she had no problem with choosing appellant
for position "as long as he wears a short skirt" is ambiguous),
Harris v Local 2123, 10 PRB 490, 498-501 (2000) (member had unfair amounts of
overtime assigned, her protests made one or more co-workers hostile, of which she
grieved, but local took effective measures, making recommendations, all of which were
accomplished; as for harassing fellow member, the PRB recommended article 31 charge
should harassment recur),
McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474 (2003) (white member, disciplined frequently by
younger black supervisor, later went to supervisor's car in the parking lot, saying he
was looking at it because he had seen a similar car passing by his house recently and
he wanted to get its license number to give to his local neighborhood watch; his story
had inconsistencies and the supervisor said the member threatened him in the parking
lot and followed him; held it was not irrational to settle the grievance to allow member
to apply for total and permanent disability),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) (pregnancy discrimination),
Sparrow v Local 1250, PRB Case 1457 (2/23/04), (member with a disciplinary record of a
racial slur, who insulted a member sexually, and was fired and came back without
backpay, argued others had been treated less severely under the company's
zero-tolerance harassment policy; PRB distinguishes other instances on basis that they
occurred in the context of work-related argument or that sexual or racial content was
not intended),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1470 (5/25/04) (supervisor made a hostile vulgar racist
statement to appellant and was removed, appellant received threatening phone calls,
 company gave her caller ID, for 17 days she was denied an entitled job assignment to
which seniority entitled her, shop committee waited four months to file a harasssment
grievance, later appellants grieved mistakes in overtime equalization and management
corrected them, after local civil rights committee investigation local settled harassment
grievance on basis of plant-wide training on worker environment, PRB approved
settlement given that no specific problem remained pending),
Pairan v Region 3, PRB Case 1508 (6/24/05), pp 9-11 (because of employer's
responsibility to provide a harassment-free environment, credible claim that male
member touched female member on inside of her leg with a broom handle up to her
crotch, that he said he would put money in her underwear with his mouth, that he
showed her pictures of himself naked, that he put his groin into her butt several times,
and that he had told women graphic details about his sexual experiences, all while at
work, meant the union rationally withdrew his discharge grievance, even though he
had not been previously warned about sexual harassment, and even though complaints
against other members about sexual harassment in the past had resulted only in 3-5
day discipline).

Skilled trades

The UAW is proud of its skilled trades progam. The president's office
explained while defending a 1998 appeal:
The UAW skilled trades card is a symbol of the successful attainment, either as an
apprentice or by experience, of journeyman status. It states that this member is
qualified completely to work as a journeyman in his or her field. The UAW is proud of
its program which is a testament to the quality of a certified employee's work and to
the hard work put forth to obtain this status.

A journeyman card remains the property of the UAW....

Estes v UAW, 9 PRB 555, 560 (1998).

Later that year the union lost its enthusiasm:
But then of what use is such a card, for as the Union has pointed out, an employer h as
90 days in which to reject the possessor of the card as incompetent.

Berryman v Skilled Trades Department, 10 PRB 222, 227 (1998).

The difficulties of sorting out skilled-trades demarcation and seniority

issues were illustrated by a series of PRB decisions in GM cases in
1997-99. Traditionally the UAW opposed consolidation of trades, but that
was in the 20th century. Times have changed. Consolidation was
implemented and demarcation lines blurred. "Relatedness" of certain
trades was deprecated. "Appendix A" was negotiated, providing 1985
seniority for large numbers of skilled members. The main purpose was to
achieve "efficiency," and certain adjustments were also made in the name
of fairness. Sometimes the results were contradictory, generating anger
and frustration. "But life is sometimes unfair," the PRB answered. It
approved the changes.

To start, three decisions arose from Local 699. Oral argument was heard,
and all were decided the same day. The first involved Ronald Rivett. He
started as a machine repairman at Delphi and transferred into the tool
inspector classification in 1991. Under various agreements in the following
years other members also transferred from various
classifications and became tool and die makers. They were awarded 1985
seniority dates, to which Brother Rivett objected. A grievance was refused
and he appealed. He said:
 he is being treated unfairly vis-a-vis late comers to the IF6J Inspection classification
who were allowed to bring with them their January 7, 1985, seniority dates while he
was not.

The Inspection Trade designated as IF6J is a non-apprenticeable classification. Indeed,

we are able to find no reference to inspection of any type in the parties' apprentice
training schedules. Neither is there any reference to inspection in the Skilled Trades
Department's [non-contractual] list of basic trades.

Initially the PRB granted the appeal, saying the union's logic was "totally
irrational [and] ... discriminatory." But it invited the UAW to seek
reconsideration, saying:
This is the first time in our history that we have ventured so far in the labyrinthine
passages of the world of skilled trades. Caution is advised lest we have missed some
obvious point, or misunderstood some argument that to the initiated would be obvious
and dispositive.

Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 382, 389 (1997), modified 9 PRB 391, 393 (1998).

The second decision was Martin. Appellants there conceded their trades
and those of the protested employees were "related." But:
The decision to grant January 7, 1985, seniority to the former single-purpose people
was devoid of rational basis, appellants say, because it makes absolutely no sense that
former single-purpose jourmeyman/woman should receive exactly the same seniority
tratment as their fully qualified fellows. These single-purpose people were not even
tranferred into the tool and die trade until 1993, at which point they began to learn the
full range of skills it would be necessary for them to master in order to be fully qualified
Tool and Die Makers. Logically, in appellants' view, these single-purpose people should
have seniority commencing with their date of entry into the Tool and Die classification.
 We disagree. What GM and the UAW did here was almost monumental in its scope.
They revised an entire seniority system that had endured since World war II. The plan
they agreed to rebuilt the system from its very foundations. It provides the means to
create a more efficient and more fair tool room at the Saginaw facilities. Efficient,
because its work force is now more highly trained. Efficient, also because that same
work force is now more flexible, no longer hidebound by a myriad of jurisdictional
fiefdoms. Fair, because opportunities available only to a relatively few elite are now
made available to all. And fair, because all of the former single-purpose people are not
made to stand at the end of the line when it comes to such matters as promotions,
shift preferences, vacations and the other perks that come with seniority. These people
have paid their dues, otherwise they would not qualify for January 7, 1985, seniority
pursuant to the requirements of Appendix A, Section VI.A.4. We find the application of
Appendix A, Section VI, to the Restructure Agreement to be entire rational, and wholly
consistent with the ends it seeks to achieve.

Martin v Local 699, 9 PRB 374, 378-79 (1997).

Third, Wlodarczak quoted Martin and held:

[The above] sentiments are equally applicable to this appeal. When all is said and done,
this appeal consists of nothing more than a claim that incumbent Inspectors are being
somehow treated unfairly because Tool and Die Makers from the TD6J classification are
being allowed to transfer to the Inspector classification, and to bring with them their
January 7, 1985, seniority date.

The Wlodarczak appellants argued that appendix A applied only to

persons laid off from closed or idled facilities, that tool inspection is a
separate non-interchangeable trade, and that the former tool and die
makers lacked the necessary skills. The PRB rejected all this, particularly
noting that tool inspection is "related" to tool and die making because
both are included as part of the metal working trades.
 Wlodarczak v Local 699, 9 PRB 435, 440-41 (1997).

A year later the PRB reconsidered and reversed Rivett, with one member
dissenting.

The majority opinion:

In the context of the history of UAW/GM skilled trades employees, the tool room may
be likened to a generic family. Originally, it was populated by persons who were trained
in the totality of the skills required to operate all of the tools and machines found in the
GM tool room of the 1930's and early 1940's. However, this practice ceased and the
tool room was broken up into specialized segments as a result of special circumstances
deriving from World War II. No longer was there time to train fully the men and women
who were hired during the War to build and operate the machinery required for the
War effort. Most of these employees were trained to perform a single operation or
related series of tasks. These specialized trades were classified overall as "Metal
Working Trades." They included Diecast Diemaker, Die Moldmaker, Diemaker, Die
Sinker, Metal Modelmaker, Metal Patternmaker, Tool and Diemaker, Toolmaker,
Guagemaker, Tool Layout Inspector A.A., Metal Spinner, Templatemaker - Tool and
Die, and Tool Machinist A.A. [footnote omitted]

Once in place, these specialized trades survived long after the end of World War II.
Some employees worked their entire careers in but one of these specialized positions.
The lines of demarcation between these various single purpose skilled trades
eventually became virtually set in stone, and were jealously guarded. A Diemaker,
however skilled, might not do the work of a Die Sinker. Inefficiencies resulted. As long
as the industry was insular, these inefficiencies could be tolerated. However, with the
advent of the globalization of the automobile industry the pressure for change began to
mount.

Now, by reason of these considerations of competitiveness and the need for an ever
better-trained and skilled workforce the original tool room is being reshaped and
reconstituted as provided for in Document 112 of the parties' Agreement. The single
 purpose classifications are slowly being eliminated, their employees are being retrained
and the lines of demarcation are becoming increasingly blurred and eliminated. Still,
the original constituent metal working trades are considered by the Union and GM to be
"related" in the sense that they were all originally part of the tool room.

Machine Repair, on the other hand, is considered by the Union and GM as a separate
family, and was never a part of the tool room. Machine Repair skilled trades people
may be closely related in terms of their training, but the trade was never a part of the
original tool room generic family.

Ultimately, the decision of the Union and GM to treat these former tool room trades,
and only the tool room trades as "related" is a matter of bargaining policy and is
therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Review Board unless it can be
shown that the policy derives from impermissible motivation such as fraud, collusion or
discrimination or is otherwise devoid of rational basis. It is not devoid of rational basis
because it has its roots in the historic tool room recognized by the parties from the
inception of their bargaining relationship. While appellant Rivett does contend that
because he acquired his journeyman status in the Machine Repair trade he is a victim
of discrimination, that discrimination, which is not based upon impermissible factors
such as race, gender, religion or disability, but rather on historic industrial antecedent,
is not improper.

Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 391, 395 (1998).

The dissent:
To accommodate the Union's position we have invented a so-called generic family
comprised of former tool room trades considered by the Union to be "related." This
generic family is better described as a virtual family, constructed without regard to
modern day realities such as the type of training received by the employees who make
up the family, the language of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and the
contradictory statements in non-contractual documents supplied by the parties to the
appeal.
Take first the issue of training. Following is the apprentice training schedule for the Die
Making and Machine Repair classifications:

...

From the schedule, it is apparent that the training that these two groups of employees
receive, while not identical, is quite similar. Contrast the training schedule of a
"related" metal working trade:

...

As is readily apparent, although Metal Model Making is considered a related metal

working trade, the apprentice training for this trade is far more unrelated to Tool and
Die Making than is Machine Repair.

This brings us to the language of the Agreement itself. In our original decision in this
matter, we noted Rivett's argument, repeated many times, that Paragraph (178a) of
the National Agreement expressly states that Machine Repair is "related" for purposes
of training to the Tool and Die trade. The International's response to this argument is
that Paragraph (178) merely defines a journeyman/woman; that Rivett is relying on an
irrelevant provision. A careful reading of Paragraph (178) in its entirety demonstrates
the fallacy of this contention.

...

It is readily apparent from the quoted language that Rivett having completed an
apprenticeship in Machine Repair is a journeyman within the meaning of Paragraph
178. It is also apparent that the trade Machine Repair is regarded by the parties as
"related" to several other metal working trades including Tool and Die Making. What
this means, according to the language of Paragraph (178a), is that the machine
operations of the listed are considered by the parties as related to their respective
classification. The reference to Paragraph (174), which address layoff procedures,
means that in the event of a reduction in force Rivett may exercise his seniority in any
other related classification for which by reason of his training he is qualified. Note,
however, that Model Making - Metal is not listed as one of the "related" trades. This
 makes perfect sense, for the training of a Model Maker is very different from that of the
trades listed in Paragraph (178a). [footnote omitted]

The Union places further reliance on a document it has supplied entitled

"Companion/Related Trades".... This shows the crafts listed ... as Metal Working Trades
all to be "related basic trades," this despite the very different training required for
these various trades, the fact that most of them are no longer, if they ever were,
apprenticeable trades and they are no longer mentioned anywhere in the parties
National Agreement.

Also contained in the record are the job descriptions of various skilled trades some of
which are apprenticeable and some of which are not. They are divided into three
groups, maintenance trades, metal tades, and technicians. [footnote omitted] Although
the Union has taken the position that Machine Repair is a maintenance trade, in this
document it is listed as a metal trade.[footnote omitted]

... [T]he union has produced absolutely no convincing evidence to demonstrate that,
despite the language of the Collective Bargaining Agreement to the contary, Machine
Repair is not related to the Tool and Die Making trade. As a member of a related trade,
Rivett, nvett, n o less than all the former single-purpose tradespeople, is entitled to the
same treatment that they received upon the occasion of their transfer into the Tool
Inspection IF6J classification.

Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 391, 396-99 (1998).

The next decision was Wemyss v Local 594, which followed the Rivett
reversal by two months. Wemyss noted that GM's market share had
declined by nearly one half since Douglas Wemyss hired into the tool and
die classification. It continued:
We agree on the surface it is "unfair" that Douglas Wemyss, who was first hired by
General Motors in 1971 and has continued to work there ever since, should have only
a 1991 seniority date in the wood model shop to show for it.... But life is sometimes
unfair....
 While we can readily understand the anger and frustration felt by Wemyss over his
seniority situation, we hope we can demonstrate to him that although his
circumstances may be "unfair," the fault for this lies not with his Employer or his
Union, but rather with circumstances over which neither Wemyss nor they have
complete control....

...

To cope with changing times, GM and the UAW have had repeatedly to amend
provisions of their collective bargaining agreements to provide job security for
employees in a Company that, in order to remain competitive, has been and continues
to be rapidly downsizing. New technologies have also had considerable impact on both
the kind and number of skilled trades personnel employed since the time of Wemyss's
hire.

Among the solutions adopted by the parties for providing job opportunities for
employees who become permanently laid off from their home plant are various
appendices to the UAW/GM National Agreement including Appendix A [footnote
omitted], which provides preferential hiring rights for such employees, and Appendix
D-1. [footnote omitted] This latter provision provides for the seniority treament of
permanently laid off seniority employees who acquire a position at another GM plant. It
is this Appendix which establishes a January 7, 1985, date of entry for employees
whose corporate seniority dates are January 7, 1985, or earlier. These appendices
have been applied by the parties in related situations such as those involving transfers
of operations, abolition or consolidation of classifications and the like. Their principles
are embodied in the memorandum agreement between Local 594 and Local
Management providing for the transfer of employees from the Tool Maker and Jig and
Fixture classification to the Wood Model Maker classification.

Wemyss v Local 594, 10 PRB 119, 121-22 (1998).

Finally, two months after Wemyss, Daniel Maloney sought to distinguish

the previous holdings on the ground that the Machine Builder/Machine
Repair classification and Mold Maker trades were not "related." He
argued:
the [union's] position on the relatedness of the tooling trades was a first step towards
consolidation of all trades, and he submitted documents to show that the UAW has
traditionally been opposed to skilled trades consolidation.

The PRB quoted from Wemyss at length, and then answered:

The determining factor is not the relatedness or non-relatedness of the trades in
question, but rather that the decision to treat them or not to treat them, as related is
essentially a matter of bargaining policy over which this Board has no jurisdiction.
[footnote omitted] It is not the question of the relatedness of the various specialized
trades that counts. Rather, it is the policy of the parties to eliminate and consolidate
the former single-purpose trades in order to increase the efficiency of the work force
while at the same time attempting to treat as fairly as possible all employees whose
seniority rights are affected by the process.

Maloney v Local 1097, 10 PRB 301, 302, 305-09 (1999),

see also Reiter v Local 1097, 10 PRB 310, 313-14 (1999) (citing Maloney).

The constitution was amended in 2002 to give the IEB final authority in
appeals concerning skilled trades lines of demarcation, and give the
president final authority in appeals concerning a journeyperson card.

Other appeals regarding skilled trades follow.

Article 19 section 3 (separate contract ratification for skilled and other work groups),
article 19 section 3 (skilled trades department reviews contract demands affecting skilled
members before they are submitted to the employer),
article 33 section 2(b) (appeals of local decisions as to skilled trades lines of demarcation
go to the IEB and there is no further appeal),
article 33 section 2(b) (appeals of decisions of the skilled trades department pertaining to
 a journeyperson card go to the president and there is no further appeal);
Garrett, 1 PRB 596, 600-02 (1970) ("We are cognizant of the Union's very legitimate
concern that the standards for the issuance of a journeyman's card be jealously
maintained and we wholeheartedly endorse its view in this respect[,]" but appellant
has satisfactorily explained discrepancies in his application),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 57 (1983) (numerically superior tool and die makers and
machine repair members did not cause provisions to be negotiated into local agreement
which discriminate against the numerically inferior tool machine operators, despite that
the system may be an aberration in the Ford system),
Krueger v Local 1999, 6 PRB 320, 323 (1991) (decision whether to grant journeyperson
status under a contract is a matter of union bargaining policy),
Salyers v Local 1681, 9 PRB 187, 188, 191 (1996) (agreement with management to
violate contract by exceeding contractual journeyman/apprentice ratio does not state a
charge under article 31),
Estes v UAW, 9 PRB 555, 564 (1998) ("[T]he journeyman certification process is not an
adversarial procedure...."),
Berryman v Skilled Trades Department, 10 PRB 222, 227-31 (1998) (application for
electrician journeyperson card properly derly d enied because experience in WEMR
classification is not "related" to experience as electrician),
Allen v Region 3, 10 PRB 238, 241 (1998) (whether an individaul is qualified for a
journeyperson card is a matter of bargaining policy),
Wright v Local 659, 10 PRB 248, 254-55 (1999) (protested member had more seniority
and was more qualified),
Rice v Local 719, 10 PRB 564, 567 (2000) ("[Members] may not use the grievance
procedure to achieve that which they have been unable to accomplish at the
bargaining table."),
Badour v Local 668, 11 PRB 219, 221 (2001) ("Badour is attempting to bootstrap his way
into a skilled trades classification without first completing the training required to
become a journeyman."),
Woods v Local 862, 11 PRB 332, 335 (201) (contract did not recognize automotive
mechanic trade, so UAW's journeyperson card in the trade was worthless),
Garrish v GM Department, PRB Case 1480, p 12 (10/25/04) (appellants have burden to
establish grounds to disturb local's decision to withdraw grievances challenging
qualifications of new hiree journeymen, and there is no requirement that the local
 provide evidence supporting decision to other members),
Eardley v Local 1112, PRB Case 1535 (6/28/06), p 7 (relatedness of trades is matter of
bargaining policy and therefore exempt from PRB review except on a showing of
impermissible motivations or no rational basis);
McTaggart, CAC, session 11/93 (appellant cutter grinder EIT sought to transfer plants to
get more overtime, remanded to determine whether opening appellant sought to fill
involved a requisition for a journeyman).

Separate contract ratification by skilled trades members is discussed

elsewhere.

Slander by company

Acker v Local 735, 4 PRB 249, 251 (1984),

Spencer v Local 140, 8 PRB 210, 214 (1993).

Sleeping on the job

James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385 (1982) (sleeping on the job appears to have been a
non-dischargeable first-time offense, member had high seniority, likely racially
discriminatory motivation on part of person who blew the whistle on the member,
arbitration ordered, PRB jurisdiction retained),
Sarnella v Region 5, 11 PRB 288, 291-92 (2001) (union secured offer of $1000 and a
voluntary quit but appellant declined).

Subcontracting
 Hein appealing Baudoux v Region 1, 5 PRB 703, 710 (1989),
Siwek v GM Department, PRB Case 1595 (10/30/08), pp 7-8 (decision to withdraw group
grievance protesting company's decision to have vendors do their own quality control
was not irrational; vendor quality inspection was not historic bargaining unit work).

Subpoena

Pledger v UAW, 11 PRB 493, 496 (2002) (subpoena as sufficient excuse for missing
work).

Technology, assignment of work

Hurd v Aerospace Department, 11 PRB 297, 301-02 (2001) (union became convinced
that work was experimental until testing and evaluation would be complete, and
therefore work was properly assigned to R & D employees, but it also got company to
pay $10,000 each to certain tool builders),
Geniac v Local 12, PRB Case 1491 (1/14/05), p 5 ("It has always been the position of the
UAW International Union that new technology may be inevitable. However, whoever
performed the work manually in the past should continue to perform the work required
by the new technology.").

Theft

George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204, 209 (1987) (remanded),

Harris v Region 3, 11 PRB 537, 539-40 (2002),
Trimceski v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1409 (10/30/02),
 Folino v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1415 (10/30/02),
Polansky v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1552 (1/26/07), p 8 (time card
fraud).

Timeliness of grievance-processing

Discussed elsewhere, this is a recurring issue, whether or not the union

has missed a deadline.

Unauthorized strike or slowdown

Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 793 n 18 (1990) (dissent) (PRB majority's rationale
could be used to justify certain wildcat strikes),
Gardner v Local 653, 11 PRB 40, 43 (2000) (where appellant was accused of deliberately
impeding production and seeming to boast of it, though his machine had malfunctioned
and his disciplinary record was unblemished it was rational for the shop committee to
compromise his discharge grievance by returning him to work without pay after five
months),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 15 (appellant would have been unlikely
to have encouraged an unauthorized walkout while campaigning in committeeperson
election, none of the 11 member statements gathered by the company the day after
the walkout implicated appellant, the one statement implicating appellant was given 20
days later by a member who was fired that day and who circumstances suggest may
have been acting on behalf of supporters of opposing caucus or of local in retaliation for
appellant's successful challenge of previous election, and local never interviewed the
accuser).
Unemployment benefits

Weir v Region 1D, PRB Case 1580 (6/9/08), pp 21-24 (though company manipulated the
union and arbitrator in articulating the standard it had used in deciding which of the
198 accused members and officers to discipline for widespread misconduct regarding
unemployment benefits, union did save many of their jobs; as to the others, union's
strategy had been explained to and approved by the membership, discovery is not
available in the grievance procedure, a too-suspicious attitude toward the company
could have undermined the collective bargaining relationship, and once the arbitrator
rejected the grievance of one of the least guilty the union had to recognize the
likelihbood that none of the others would be reinstated through the arbitration
process).

Voluntary retirement

Carson v Region 2A, 6 PRB 186, 188 (1991).

Wages

Bania v Region 1A, 10 PRB 243, 246-47 (1998) (diminution of pay rate following
re-placement after discontinuance of appellant's classification),
Carraro v Ford Department, PRB Case 1442 (12/22/03), pp 7-8 (management had
discretion to pay employees at rate within a specified range).

Wasting time, leaving work area

 Erd v Region 2B, 10 PRB 257, 260 (1998) (appellant does not deny violating company
rule),
Ramsey v Region 8, 10 PRB 287, 291 (1999) (appellant does not deny she left the plant
without management's permission),
Webb v UAW, 11 PRB 214, 217-18 (2001) (medical excuse for appellant, who was
working under the terms of a conditional reinstatement, and left work station claiming
medical exigency, covered period commencing two days after the incident),
Nash v GM Department, PRB Case 1583 (2/12/08), pp 14-15 (despite appellant being on
LCA at time he left plant without permission, it appears that management did not
actually intend to terminate him until his bizarre behavior at disciplinary interview),
Hulme v Northwest Local 163, PRB Case 1588 (6/10/08), pp 10-11 (though supervisor
appeared to unfairly single out nearly-30-year appellant for discipline, he claimed to
have twice seen appellant out of the plant for an hour each time and appellants'
witnesses could not verify the time of day they saw him in the plant; committeeman
succeeded in reducing the discipline, and to grant some of appellant's other
grievances),
Pappas v Region 1A, PRB Case 1602 (10/28/08), p 6 (company rules state unequivocally
that leaving the plant without permission and overstaying lunch are prohibited),
Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), pp 3-4, 7, 10-12, 16-18 (where appellant
had left the plant for 12 minutes without punching out, the company rule requiring
punching out had been announced during a production meeting and posted in the plant
though appellant didn't attend the meeting and didn't see the posting, the contract had
no system of progressive discipline, the arbitrator can only enforce the contract as it is
written, and the union obtained a $5000 settlement offer from company which
appellant rejected, the union acted rationally in withdrawing the discharge grievance,
despite IEB testimony of two fellow members who said they too continually left the
plant for short periods without punching out and they continued to do so for three
years after appellant was fired).

Working while on leave

 Zepplin v Local 974, 6 PRB 477 (1993),
Simpson v Region 1, PRB Case 1623 (6/24/09), pp 15-17.

Local elections
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

General || Eligibility and

nominations || Election standards
|| Interim elections || Election
committee || Campaigning ||
Election day || Protests

General

The PRB's job is to enforce the union's election rules, not to assure that
an election was conducted in the optimal way.
Englund v Local 699, 5 PRB 142, 144 (1986),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 16.

Elections are covered by articles 38 (LEB members), 45 (stewards and

committeepersons) and 8 (convention delegates).

There are lots of IEB interpretations of these articles. I will not try to
review them all because (1) they are so many and complex, (2) they are
bound in the constitution and you can read them yourself, and (3) there
don't seem to be many appeals about them.

Officers' duties once they are elected are discussed elsewhere.

The procedure for recalling stewards and committeepersons after being

elected is treated elsewhere.

The UAW has published a Guide for Local Union Election Committees,"
also called the election guide.

It is based on the LMRDA and the constitution. For every suggestion in it,
the guide takes care to note which of the two is a source. For instance a
candidate's use of employer or union funds is prohibited by the LMRDA but
not the constitution. On the other hand the procedures for appealing an
unfair election under the constitution are spelled out, but not the
procedures under the LMRDA. For many rights, both are listed as a
source. A copy of the election provisions of the LMRDA is printed at the
end, but not the election rules of the constitution. A third source, the
EPC's guarantee of "free, fair, and honest elections," is not mentioned at
all.
Election guide, chapter 8 "Union and employer funds" pp 27-30,
election guide, chapter 15 "Appeals and new elections", pp 74-75.
The introduction says:
The Guide is designed to an easy-to-use reference based on the law and regulations as
well as our International Constitution.

This is misleading. The PRB has upheld elections which violated the guide
because the PRB could find no violations of the constitution or bylaws.
Silva v Local 2244, 10 PRB 148, 151-52 (1998) ("[T]here will sometimes be situations
which arise that are not addressed in the Guide or which require a process different
from the one recommended in the Guide."),
Baxter v Local 659, 11 PRB 263, 266 (2001) (guide recommendations are not fiats),
Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391-92 (2002) (election upheld though election
committee violated provision of election guide which provides it is to "[s]elect a polling
site(s) and schedule polling hours which will provide all members a reasonable
opportunity to vote"),
Jones v Local 140, PRB Case 1620 (6/24/09) pp 13-14 (deviations from procom proc
edures in the election guide do not provide grounds for overturning local elections).

Few UAW elections are conducted under antiseptic conditions. Invariably

some rules are broken, usually out of ignorance or overzealousness.
Regardless of the motivation, if the violation could have affected the
result the election will be rerun.
Leflore v Local 600, 3 PRB 381, 383-84 (1982) (few are conducted under antiseptic
conditions),
Horton v Local 422, 5 PRB 480, 482 (1988) (laboratory conditions not required but
democratic conditions are).

In one bizarre appeal the local had scheduled an interim election for a
four-hour period on a Sunday at the hall, knowing this would result in light
turnout. The PRB upheld it anyway. What was strange was the UAW and
the local then asked the PRB to help figure out how to interest members in
voting. The PRB answer: Talk to them about the issues; also, get the
company to pay them while they vote:
Alas we have no magic formula. Low turnouts are not confined to union elections; they
are the norm in civil elections as well. The phenomenon tends to change, however,
when there is an issue or issues of intense interest to the electorate.

It has been demonstrated that voter interest can be stimulated by bringing the issues
to the doorsteps of the electorate. Debates among the candidates are one device that
has been shown to stimulate interest, and local unions might try to schedule special
meetings devoted exclusively to this purpose. Another such device could be to afford
the opportunity to nominees for office to have their views printed in local union
newspapers in the weeks leading up to the election. Pictures of the candidates in the
newspaper may also stimulate interest, for persons whose names are unknown to the
electorate may well have a familiar face as someone seen working in the plant.

Finally, when all else fails, why not consider providing an economic inducement? For
example, this could take the form of giving employees an hour or so off on election day
in order to vote in their Union elections. While this would have to be negotiated with
the employer, it is not inconceivable that the employer might accede. After all, it is in
the Company's interest as well that the leaders of the local union with whom it must
bargain truly speak for the majority of the employees who elected them.

Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391-92 (2002).

Eligibility and nominations

Sometimes there are questions of candidate eligibility.

Retiree eligibility for bargaining positions is discussed elsewhere. Voter

eligibility is discussed elsewhere.
Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 384-87 (debate on adding article
48 section 6 covering owed non-dues money and effect on good standing);
article 38 section 1 interpretations 1-3 (3/5/45, 8/5/46, 3/17/47),
article 45 section 4,
article 45 section 4 interpretation 1 (6/10/71);
Espinosa v Local 719, 5 PRB 327, 329 (1987) (candidate for member-at-large working
outside affected plant),
Grose v Local 279, 5 PRB 530, 535 (1988) ("[a]s the title of the position would indicate,
the time study steward must perform all of his responsibiliites in the plant[,]" and the
contractual super seniority provisions do not apply to the position for recall purposes,
so laid-off member was ineligible to run),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775 (1990) (discharged member as president),
Shaffer v Local 1112, 6 PRB 517, 519 n 2 (1992) (national agreement "requires that the
committeeperson must be working in the district in order to represent the employees in
that district"),
Hawkins v Local 7, 10 PRB 533, 536-37 (2000) (retiree as candidate for president of
Chrysler local),
Bryant v Local 2116, 10 PRB 588 (2001) (laid-off member as candidate for president),
Espinosa v Local 719, PRB Case 1511 (9/6/05), pp 6-7 (nine-year temporary employee
as candidate for shop committeeperson),
Adams v Local 174, PRB Case 1536 (6/28/06), p 6 (even though election committee
declared him elected by acclamation, member could not challenge layoff on the basis of
steward's superseniority, since because he lacked a year of continuous good standing
under the local's rule he was neither nominated nor elected).

In 2006 the president's staff explained the UAW discourages part-timers

from running for shop chair, and most contracts in large bargaining units
prohibit part-timers from holding that position. But the contract at issue
did not state that, and appellant part-timer was held eligible.
Frederick-Brown v UAW, PRB Case 1519 (12/21/05, 4/20/06), pp 13-14.

In 2002 the IEB interpreted articles 38 and 45 to mean that retirees are
ineligible to run for local position which carries responsibility for grieving
or bargaining required by contract or the local bylaws. This is so even
though retirees may serve as delegates at bargaining conventions. In
2006 it explained:
This is a good rule. Retired members are not as accountable to the current Union
membership as active ones. They may be less accessible. They may also be more
prone to represent the interests of other retired members instead of current members.
All of these factors may diminish the ability of the Union to react to the changing
nature of the work place. They may also expose the Union to legal liability....

Pearson v Local 140 PRB Case 1534 (2/15/06), pp 7-8 (quoted by PRB from
IEB position in previous appeal);
see also article 6 section 19 interpretation 3 (6/1/02),
article 45 section 1 interpretation 2 (6/1/02),
article 6 section 19 interpretation 1 (1/21/60),
article 6 section 19 interpretation 2 (undated),
article 55 section 1(b) interpretation 1 (4/6/67);
Hawkins v Local 7, 10 PRB 533, 536-37 (2000) (retiree may not run for
president of Chrysler local even if it is established that retirees have served
as presidents of Chrysler locals in the past),
Bennett v Local 1853, PRB Case 1429 (4/22/03), pp 6-7 (retiree as president),
Yettaw v UAW, PRB Case 1482 (10/26/04), p 6 (challenge to 2002 IEB
interpretation held untimely),
King v Local 600 PRB Case 1499 (9/19/05), pp 9-10 (retiree as financial
 secretary);
see also Burkus, CAC, session 11/94 (retirees may not serve as delegates to
meeting of Allied-Signal (Bendix) council).

A rule disallowing a substantial number of members to vote or stand for

office may render the election undemocratic.
Stephen v Local 92, 1 PRB 105 (1960);
compare Scott v Local 664, 2 PRB 679, 684-85 (1978).

Local bylaws may specify the time by which nominations must be

accepted, but the rule must be applied uniformly.
Article 38 section 2;
Lawless v Local 854, 6 PRB 39, 44 (1990) (equal application of nomination acceptance
cutoff rule).

To be eligible for election to executive office or as a delegate you must

have been in continuous good standing for a year prior to the
nominations. There are multiple sections of articles on the point of
"continuous" good standing, as well as IEB interpretations, and I try to
capture them here:

Continuous good standing means having dues paid during every calendar
month in which they were due, even if the last day of the month is a
Sunday. While you are in the military service of the United Nations dues
are waived, and good standing continues. Members entitled to
"out-of-work" credits or on check-off or on strike are exempted from dues
payment, and their good standing continues. If your company transfers
you with an operation to another local, good standing continues. If you
are a UAW officer or rep and your local disbands you may transfer to
another local in the same region, and your good standing continues. If
you are laid off, transfer to another local, and return to the first local
within a year, your good standing continues.
Article 6 section 3,
article 8 section 11,
article 16 sections 8-9, 13, 18-20, 26,
article 16 section 8 interpretation 1 (last day of month falling on Sunday does not extend
time for dues payment to Monday) (5/1/44),
article 16 section 8 interpretation 3 (authorized strike will not make member delinquent)
(1/12/46),
article 16 section 18 interpretation 3 (laid-off member not on check-off must report)
(1/21/60),
article 17 sections 2-5, 7
article 17 section 2 interpretations 3-4 (possession of withdrawal card normally interrupts
good standing) (1/21/60, 10/11/51),
article 17 section 4 interpretation 1 (good standing continues in transfer of operations if
entire seniority transfers) (6/1/02),
article 17 section 7 (if delinquent member is transferred or works at another local
member must pay back dues and reinstatement fee to establish continuous good
standing) (6/1/02),
article 38 section 3,
article 38 section 3 interpretation 1 (continuous good standing requirement cannot be
waived) (3/5/45),
article 38 section 3 interpretation 3 (lack of qualified members who accept nomination
will not vary requirement of one year continuous good standing) (3/4/45),
article 38 section 3 interpretation 4 (trial verdict of guilty upheld by membership breaks
continuous good standing) (2/2/51),
article 38 section 3 (arrearage in any part of one-year period more than the time allowed
by the local member may seek only non-executive office such as steward) (3/5/45),
article 48 section 6 (collection of owed non-dues money such as overpaid strike
 benefits);
proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 384-87 (debate on adding article
48 section 6);
proceedings, 26th constitutional convention, p 279 (1980) (debate on withdrawal cards
and transfer to other workplace);
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 12 (member's failure to pay dues for
two months did not break his continuous good standing because he was acting on the
advice of local president),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), pp 8, 13-14 (when discharged GM
member, who was working elsewhere making less money and overpaying dues due to
incorrect advice having been given him by local financial secretary to pay at the rate of
his GM job, realized he was ahead, election committee had discretion to find that
member could not cease paying dues until the overage was corrected and remain in
continuous good standing without notifying the local he was paid ahead),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), pp 14-17 (candidates, one of whom transferred
from his home local to a different plant and local and the other of whom accepted a
voluntary severance package from his employer, lack standing to protest an assertedly
unfair election held when they were employed in the home local).

Late payment of dues will not render a member ineligible to run for office
if the member reasonably thought he or she was current and made a
timely good faith effort to ascertain his or her dues status and maintain
good standing but was frustrated by the negligence of the local financial
secretary.
Local 952, 1 PRB 647, 649-50 (1971).

Election standards

Table of Contents
There are different standards for elections:

Executive officers: article 38.

LEB members-at-large: article 38 section 5.

Stewards and committeepersons: article 45.

Convention delegates: article 8.

Article 45 is less involved than article 38, but the two standards are just
as exacting.
Waldo v Local 780, 1 PRB 592, 394-95 (1970) (PRB rejects president's argument that
the democratic standards under article 45 are not as high as those under article 38, so
are not as easily set aside);
but see Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1604 (11/25/08), pp 11, 15-16 (PRB declines to
rerun election for non-executive position that occurred in different hours than were
ordered by the membership, partially because the constitutional requirement that
election dates be established by membership applies only to executive offices).

One difference between articles 38 and 45 is that if the members vote to

rerun an officers' election, whether there is an appeal or not the rerun
cannot happen until the UAW president reviews the matter and approves
it. In a steward or committee election by contrast, if there is no appeal
the rerun can proceed immediately. Another difference is that there is no
requirement that the election committee conduct steward or committee
elections. Another difference is that committeepersons can be elected by
a plurality; plurality elections are only allowed under article 38 for LEB
members-at-large. Another is that in steward and committee elections,
complete ballot integrity is not required, and afterward ballots need not
be preserved.
Article 38 section 12,
article 45 section 5;
Harry v Local 774, 1 PRB 576, 579 (1970) (local was not clearly wrong to order rerun of
non-officer election),
Waldo v Local 780, 1 PRB 592, 595 (1970) (local's decision to rerun non-officer election
should not be upset if there is evidence to support it),
Reid v Local 222, 2 PRB 459, 462 (1976) (committeeperson could serve on election
committee for officer election),
Tanzella v Local 738, 3 PRB 67, 71, 72 n 3 (1981) (steward and committee elections
commonly present eligibility issues substantially more complex than in election for
executive office, PRB reserves judgment whether rule in officer elections about who
serves in contested spot pending appeals should be applied to steward and committee
elections),
Bynum v Local 235, 3 PRB 85, 88 (1980) (dissent) (election guide has separate section
for steward and committee elections and it does not provide for complete ballot
integrity),
Burns v Local 719, 4 PRB 33, 35 (1983) (more rigid controls apply to elections under
article 38),
Langworthy v Local 652, 4 PRB 68, 69 (1983) (only requirement of article 45 is that
elections be democratic),
Carriveau v Local 651, 4 PRB 289, 291 n 1 (1984) (more elaborate procedures for officer
elections do not apply to steward and committee elections),
Parker appealing Smithey v Local 276, 5 PRB 601, 604 (1988) (committeeperson
elections need only be basically democratic),
Baker v Local 1618, 6 PRB 271, 273 (1991) (stewards and committee need not be
 elected by majority vote),
Pochik appealing Kapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52, 58 (1998) (when local membership
directs a rerun the local must do it unless there is a timely appeal),
Rickert v Local 1695, 10 PRB 464, 473 (1999) (automatic stay of election rerun pending
presidential review),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 119, 122 (2001) (local bylaw may provide that shop
committee conduct district committeeperson election).

Article 45 provides that stewards and committee are elected for

three-year terms, except by affirmative membership action a local can
ask the IEB to permit terms as short as two years.
Article 45 section 2;
compare proceedings, 26th constitutional convention, pp 206-08 (1980) (convention
rejects amendment which would have required three-year terms for stewards and
committee).

The members-at-large on the LEB are not executive officers, and may be
elected by plurality or majority vote at the local's option.
Article 38 section 5;
Dimeo v Local 72, 1 PRB 459, 462-63 (1968),
Craig v Local 997, 2 PRB 152 (1974).

The procedures for delegate elections are in article 8. To be eligible to run

the usual rule about continuous good standing applies, plus you must
have been a member of the local for three months before the convention
month. Locals may elect a limited number of alternate delegates, but
unless a new election is held an alternate may only replace a regular
delegate who is "unable to serve." Elected members of the International
Retired Workers Advisory Council are automatic delegates.
Article 8 sections 8, 11, 13, 17, 21-24,
article 55 section 4(f);
proceedings, 26th constitutional convention, pp 188-89 (1980) (convention rejects
amendment which would have limited the number of alternate delegates a local could
send).

There is no restriction on retirees running for and serving as delegates,

even though part of a delegate's function is to attend and vote at
bargaining conventions, and even though retirees may not serve in local
positions which carry responsibility for grieving or bargaining.

There are no PRB decisions about elections of convention delegates and

alternates. These are judged by the convention credentials committee.
Conroy v UAW, 1 PRB 493, 494-96 (1968) (PRB has no jurisdiction over delegate
elections);
compare Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 69 (1973) (validity of selection of CAP council delegates
determines validity of CAP council proceedings).

The Credentials Committee is appointed from the elected delegates by the

IEB. It is to assemble at least 10 days before the convention, and examine
all credentials and investigate the standing of the delegates and their
locals. Protests of a delegate election must be filed with the credentials
committee within seven days after the local delegate election and not less
than 21 days before the convening of the convention, whichever is first,
absent a waiver of the time limits by the credentials committee. Protests
may be filed by a member of the involved local, or by
anyone on the credentials committee. The credentials committee may also
consider protests of elections of international officers and regional
directors. The president may intervene in the appeal if the violation
occurred in the pre-election procedures. If the credentials committee
decides an election was improperly conducted and the elected delegates
should not be seated, jointly with the president it may order a rerun. Any
appeal of the credentials committee decision is to the convention iteself.
Article 8 section 17.

Delegate elections must be run by an elected local election committee.

Elections must be by secret ballot. They must be at least 30 days before
the convening of the convention. At least seven days must pass between
nominations and the election. Members must be notified of the election at
least 15 days beforehand. Polls must be open a sufficient number of hours
to allow all members to vote. Voting must be at the polls.
Article 8 sections 21-24.

Interim elections

These have occasionally been the subject of appeals.

Zajaczkowski v Local 296, 5 PRB 282, 284 (1987) (officers),
Parker v Local 420, 10 PRB 328, 331-32 (1999) (election committee),
Gonzalez v Local 1097, 11 PRB 373, 376-77 (2002) (election committee),
Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386 (2002) (executive board member),
 Powell v Local 670, PRB Case 1474 (4/28/04), p 5 (steward elected to fill vacancy
created by termination of previous steward serves only for the remainder of the
unexpired term),
Lyons v Local 2280, PRB Case 1576 (12/17/07), pp 7-8 (though crucial piece of evidence
possibly supporting IEB decision surfaced only after the decision, and investigation by
president's staff was at best perfunctory, appeal of local's failure to hold election to fill
interim vacancy within 45 days is moot due to passage of time and holding of untimely
election).

Election committee

Officer and delegate elections are held under the supervision of a

democratically elected election committee. A committee member must
resign to seek office. Election committees may not add qualifications fixed
by the constitution for exeuctive local office.
Article 8 section 21,
article 38 sections 3, 10-12;
article 38 section 3 interpretation 10 (local may not add to the qualifications for LEB
offices fixed by the constitution, and contrary local bylaws are invalid) (3/5/45),
article 38 section 10(e) interpretation 1 (committee members must resign to seek office)
(8/11/60);
Reid v Local 222, 2 PRB 459, 461-62 (1976) (candidate for alternate committeeperson
may serve on election committee in officer election),
Burns v Local 719, 4 PRB 33, 35 (1983) ("It was not error for the election committee to
impress volunteers when, by reason of bad weather, some of its members were unable
to make it to the meeting."),
Appeal of Conway, 4 PRB 36 (1983) (regardless of election committee's good faith, use of
absentee ballots was not in accord with local's bylaws and IEB resolution),
Horton v Local 422, 5 PRB 480 (1988) (chaos at election committee election),
Parker v Local 420, 10 PRB 328, 331-32 (1999) (membership may fill vacancy in election
committee on temporary basis at the next meeting after vacancy occurs),
Rogers v Local 235, 10 PRB 520, 522 (1999) (election committee member should have
quit when she ran for LEB member-at-large),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 119, 122 (2001) (local bylaw may provide that shop
committee conduct strike vote),
Engle in the matter of Ellis v Local 600, 11 PRB 209, 212-13 (2001) (opening of ballot
box by CPA firm outside the presence of the election committee and candidates'
challengers, in election won by a single vote, was fundamental error, making it
impossible to know who won the election),
Gonzales v Local 1097, 11 PRB 260, 262 (2001) (appeal to have local hold election to fill
vacancy in election committee mooted by holding of a new election),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 (6/22/04), p 13 (election committee may be elected by
acclamation),
DeGray v MDA Local 571, PRB Case 1477 (6/23/04), p 7 (election committee applied
absentee ballot procedure rigidly but in good faith, and election result will not be upset
though otherwise eligible voters were disenfranchised to an extent possibly to have
affected the outcome),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), pp 13-14 (election committee's ruling
holding appellant ineligible was not compelled by the constitution and neither was it
prohibited, and it's decision was a good-faith exercise of discretion),
Frederick-Brown v UAW, PRB Case 1519 (12/21/05, 4/20/06), p 13 (election committee's
determination of eligibility will not be disturbed in absence of constitutional violation),
Baxter v Local 659, PRB Case 1617 (4/22/09), p 14 ("[Election committee chair] did not
have authority to overturn a motion [setting the election date] duly adopted by the
Joint Council."),
Jones v Local 140, PRB Case 1620 (6/24/09) pp 13-14 (election committee's failure to
preserve envelopes containing challenged ballots, removal of ballots from sealed
container without the knowledge or presence of the election committee, and temporary
disappearance of over 300 ballots do not warrant setting aside the election; even
though these lapses were improper they occurred after the balloting was over and
there was no direct evidence that any challenged ballot was improperly counted or that
any eligible voters were disqualified),
Kibby v Local 148, PRB Case 1624 (6/1/09), pp 8-9 ("It is the role of the Election
 Committee to supervise the election; it is not the role of the challengers to supervise
the Election Committee."),
Local 276 v IEB, PRB Case 1631 (9/15/09), pp 17-19 ("Local Election Committees are
without power to add to the qualifications fixed by the UAW Constitution for executive
Local Union offices.").

Sometimes election committee members defer to local officers rather than

exercising their own judgment. This should not be. The committee must
consult and cooperate with the incumbent officers, but the actual conduct
of the election is entirely its responsibility. The local president is not an
ex officio member, and has nothing to say about committee decisions.
Article 38 section 10(c) interpretation 1 (committee must cooperate and consult with
officers, but actual conduct of election is committee's responsibility) (1/31/74);
election guide, p 25 ("In most Local Unions the Financial Secretary is the officer who
maintains the membership list, and so will be responsible for making the list available
to candidates."),
election guide, p 81 (president not ex officio member);
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), record pp 41-43, 47 (candidate's request
for reconsideration of election committee's eligibility ruling rejected by local president),
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 17 ("President Kimmons' appointment of the
additional Election Committee members to assist in the recount was also improper.
Nothing in the Constitution or its official interpretations authorizes a Local Union
President to place unelected members on an Election Committee."),
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 14 (once election is underway only
the election committee should be involved in determining voter eligibility; incumbent
officers' and candidates' search in employer records looking for additional information
about membership standing was improper);
but see Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 102, 105-06 (2001) (under local bylaws president,
even though he is a candidate, has discretion to determine whether to approve lost
time for election committee).
Campaigning

Table of Contents

Candidates are entitled to view the local's list of active members before
an election.
Rickert v Local 1695, 10 PRB 464, 475 (1999).

Only rarely does campaign activity result in an election rerun.

Crook appealing Spain v Local 1112, 10 PRB 88, 92 (1998) ("Indeed, on only two prior
occasions have we determined that conduct occurring during an election campaign was
so egregious as to require overturning an election.").

In one of its earliest decisions the PRB formulated the oft-quoted rule that
circulation of defamatory campaign propaganda is not grounds to set
aside an election:
In a free society a candidate in an election not only exposes himself to the possibility of
defeat but also to sharp attacks and allegations by his opponents and their
sympathizers. Since the purpose of campaign material is to propagandize, exaggerated
statements are frequently included. Voters recognize this practice and consequently
expect campaign literature to contain accusations and innuendoes leveled with less
accuracy than that employed in usual forms of communication....

Since the question of the truth or falsity of the campaign leaflet and the existence or
 absence of malice in its publication need not be resolved in disposing of this case, we
do not do so. In this context, however, the panel should observe that if appellant
believes that he has been defamed by the leaflet, he is afforded remedies within the
union and in the civil courts for vindication.

Appeal of Petrove, 1 PRB 126, 127-28 (1960);

see also Hite v Local 663, 4 PRB 356, 359 (1985).

Similarly, distributing defamatory campaign literature is not unbecoming

conduct under article 31. Members are skeptical because they expect
exaggeration and even false claims in election propaganda.
Foreman v Local 699, 4 PRB 123, 125 (1984) (term "vilification" in EPC should be
narrowly construed),
Dombeck v Local 1645, 5 PRB 493, 496-97 (1988) (vilification in campaign literature),
Armstrong v Local 952, 5 PRB 537, 540 (1988) (asssumedly inaccurate election leaflet
linking Blue Slate candidates with misappropriation of union funds),
Moye v Local 110, 10 PRB 37, 39 (1997) (authoring or distributing false, defamatory, and
racially divisive election campaign literature),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), p 11 (union political activity is not for the
faint of heart),
Karniewicz v Local 1999, PRB Case 1505 (6/23/05), p 7 (sharp attacks on opponent in
political campaign are not unbecoming).

Racial issues have sometimes been raised in campaigns.

Sanders v Ternstadt Unit, 1 PRB 294, 298 (1963) (ill-founded charges of racial
discrimination),
Page v Local 961, 6 PRB 288 (1991) (ill-founded charges of racial discrimination),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997), president's answer to appeal, record p 166
(citing appeals to racial prejudice as possible exception to rule that elections should not
be set aside on the basis of campaign propaganda).
Union resources -- including official information and the newspaper --
may not be used to promote one candidate over another. In particular,
the local newspaper may not print partisan articles unless it offers the
same chance to all candidates.
Roberson v Local 974, 2 PRB 395, 399-400 (1976) (articles in union newspaper),
Spain v Local 1112, 2 PRB 649, 653-54 (1977) (information received by local president
in an official capacity from UAW),
Hite v Local 663, 4 PRB 356, 359 (1985) (local union telephones),
Montague v Local 651, 9 PRB 401, 405 (1997) (local newspaper's policy was to accept
submissions of any member; appellant submitted no article to newspaper which it
refused to run so local cannot be faulted for running partisan articles for incumbents),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 579 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00) (election
guide prohibits use of articles in local newspaper to promote a candidacy),
Montague v Local 651, 9 PRB 401, 405 (1997) ("Of course, if the newspaper's editors
accepted articles of this [frankly partisan] nature only from incumbents, this would
constitute an improper expenditure of Union funds.").

One PRB decision contrasts such articles to articles which are merely
political:
Appellant Kelsey complains that Keresi's article was "political" in nature. We agree that
these remarks could be considered political. We suspect, however, that many of the
other articles which appear monthly in the "Beacon" also could be characterized as
political. The point we wish to make is that there is nothing inherently wrong in a local
union newspaper publishing political articles. The UAW is, after all, a highly political
institution; it should come as no surprise, therefore, that most articles appearing in
local union newspapers which deal with issues of concern to local union members will
be "political" in at least some respects.

Appeal of Kelsey, 4 PRB 46, 47 (1983).

One decision overturned an election because a forged letter was
circulated at a retiree meeting, purportedly written by an incumbent
candidate and other incumbents to a UAW official, requesting that the
local be allowed to impose a special $15/month assessment on its
members. The real authors of the letter were never identified.
In the Matter of Shoemaker, 4 PRB 367, 370-71 (1985).

Campaigning using company or union resources or time is a frequent

UAW issue. Candidates are often committeepersons or maintenance
employees who naturally have daily access to members that other
candidates don't have. The IEB and PRB only rarely overturn an election
on this basis.
Telakowicz v Local 425, 1 PRB 148, 150, 153 (1960) (in a runoff election decided by a
29-vote margin out of over 1800 ballots cast, one slate's exclusive, deplorable, and
reprehensible use of local's equipment and supplies to publish campaign propaganda
election did not deprive opponent of fair election because practice did not hamper
opponent in publication of his own literature, number of leaflets produced by each side
was approximately equal, and there is no evidence the practice materially affected the
result),
Donovan v Local 2000, 2 PRB 813, 816-17 (1979) (campaigning on company time is
virtually universal throughout the union, rules which are unenforceable should not be
made),
Schriber v Local 699, 5 PRB 115, 117 (1987) (PRB has never overturned election
because of campaigning on company time),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 337, 345 (1988)(rule which requires an international rep
challenging an incumbent regional director's reelection to take a 90-day leave of
absence before the election, and accept reassignment to another region if he or she
loses, may create unlevel playing field and give incumbent an advantage but is not per
 se unfair),
Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472, 477 (1988) (campaigning on company time cannot be
policed),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997) (company threats to influence election require
new election),
Crook appealing Spain v Local 1112, 10 PRB 88, 92-93 (1998) (solicitation at
new-employee orientation meeting with management present require new election),
Donovan v Local 2000, PRB Case 1448, 1449 (11/20/03), p 9 (claim of campaigning on
company time, even if true, will not provide basis for overturning an election),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 (6/22/04), p 14 (enjoyment of campaign advantage
intrinsic to office of incumbent is not unfair),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1553 (2/20/07), p 13 ("We frequently encounter
claims of violations which do not warrant the cost and disruption of rerunning an
election, even where the violation has been firmly established. Claims based on the use
of company equipment by candidates fall into this category.")
Baxter v Local 659, PRB Case 1617 (4/22/09), p 13 ("Incumbent officers naturally have
more opportunities to get their message to the membership than opposition candidates,
but we have consistently ruled that such advantages are not cause for overturning an
election [footnote omitted].");
compare Karniewicz v Local 1999, PRB Case 1505 (6/23/05), p 7 (fact that charged
members may have acted on company or union time when distributing leaflet charged
to be unbecoming is irrelevant to issue whether distribution was chargeable).

It is considered legitimate for an incumbent candidate or supporter to

give out campaign literature or wear insignia while handling grievances or
working at the hall.
Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472 (1988),
Moye v Local 110, 10 PRB 32, 35 (1997).

Theoretically the international UAW may not interfere in an election of a

local.
 Spain v Local 1112, 2 PRB 649, 653-54 (1977) (release of confidential information from
UAW that 49 local members including appellant were to be accused of financial
misconduct requires rerun),
Rickert v Local 1695, 10 PRB 464, 476-78 (1999) (no evidence of material improper
interference of UAW into local election);
compare Kelley v Local 400, 5 PRB 503, 505 (1988) (constitution does not prohibit UAW
rep from campaigning in a local election).

The IEB and PRB at one time disagreed on whether the constitution or
EPC prohibit employer interference in an election. During a campaign in
Local 900 one of the shop chairs used a bulletin to publicize a threat by
management to lay off members if appellant were elected; he
recommended members should therefore vote against appellant Richard
Feldman. Members also testified of other threats by company officials.
Brother Feldman lost narrowly. First he went to the NLRB. Then at the
local, he protested the election and demanded a grievance be filed
against the company. The local refused.

On appeal the IEB said in 1996 that the local violated no rules. As to the
employer, it said interference was irrelevant:
The Appellant also filed charges with the NLRB against Ford Motor company alleging the
Company interfered with the Local Union election and a hearing has been scheduled.
This notwithstanding, our decision cannot be based on whether Ford Motor Company is
guilty, but whether the bulletins put out during the election violated our International
Constitution and/or served to intimidate the members of the Michigan Truck Plant and
affected the outcome of the election.

Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997), IEB decision (9/13/96), record pp
118, 127, 138.
The EPC guarantees elections which are free, fair, and honest, but it says
nothing specifically about employer interference.

The latest edition I have of the election guide, published in 1998, includes
a chapter on "union and employer funds." It incorporates as UAW policy a
rule from external law which prohibits use of such funds to promote an
individual candidacy. But the edition current during the election in Local
900 did not prohibit use of such funds for a candidacy, and the IEB's
holding was internally defensible.
Election guide, chapter 8, pp 27-30 (president's office publication # 349-98, 4/98);
compare Guide for UAW Local Union Election Committees, (publication # 349, 1/88),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997), record p 178 (asserting the current election
guide did not specify employer interference as a basis to overturn an election).

Before Feldman,
[incumbent officials' advantage] has been the subject of scores of appeals to this
Board. But we have never set aside an election for this reason. There simply is no
effective way that such campaigning can be policed or regulated.

Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472, 477 (1988).

PRB decisions in 1989 and 1991 did turn on employer interference. The
first held that the possibility of employer interference sufficed to overturn
an election though no effect on the outcome was shown. The second
remanded an appeal for development of evidence on company
involvement, but it noted a factual issue whether local policy prohibited
it. Neither decision cited the EPC, the constitution, or the then-current
election guide for the existence of a UAW policy prohibiting company
interference.
Wouster v Local 977, 5 PRB 551, 556 (1989),
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 197-201 (1991).

The PRB downplays the possibility that management would even want to
take sides.
[T]he type of influence complained of here [management favoring a candidate] is
scarcely the sort that constitutes a serious threat to the independence of trade unions
in North America. Given the historic adversarial nature of that labor-management
relationship,ship, support by management for a candidate for Union office is usually
equated to the sting of a viper.

Schriber v Local 699, 5 PRB 115, 118 (1987).

Given these mixed rulings, Feldman conceded there was no clear error in
the IEB's EPC interpretation. He just argued that the company threat was
unfair, and the IEB was out of step with the labor movement. He added
that the shop chair had used the threat, knowledge of which came to him
in the course of his official duties, to partisan effect.
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997), record pp 49-50, 53-55, 61, 178-86, 193-210;
compare Teamster Election Office Case, P-651-IBT (8/14/91), p 3, affirmed under the
caption Durham Unity Team and Committee to Elect Ron Carey, 91 Elec App 183 (SA)
(9/17/91), pp 3-5, reprinted in Feldman, record pp 200, 205-07 (Teamster election
rules prohibit employer contributions to candidate's campaign),
Election Officer's Rules for 1995-96 IBT International Union and Delegate and Officer
Election, definition 5(f), (g), reprinted in Feldman, record p 194 (campaign
 contributions defined to include endorsements and solicitations).

The PRB granted the appeal. But the reason was not the generalized
unfairness Feldman had argued; rather it was the EPC:
Nevertheless, we have declined to extend this exemption [to the EPC whereby
vilification is permitted in election campaign material] to situations where an employer
attempts to exert its influence in a local union election through threats, coercion,
asssistance or promise of benefit. We have held that such conduct could interfere with
the right of Union members to a free, fair and honest election as guaranteed by the
UAW's Ethical Practices Code.

Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 338 (1997) (emphasis in original).

The PRB remanded for further investigation, ordering a rerun if employer

interference and effect on the outcome were eventually shown by a
preponderance.

It added that on learning of the employer action the local had no duty to
file a grievance.
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 343 nn 10, 13 (1997);
see also Hanscom v Region 8, (discussed elsewhere).

In a 1998 decision, the IEB and PRB agreed that employer involvement
required a rerun of a close election. New hires had received a campaign
pitch for a slate of candidates at their orientation on the first day of work.
Management reps were there. They said nothing, but the PRB reasoned
the new hires could reasonably have interpreted their presence as an
endorsement.
 Crook appealing Spain v Local 1112, 10 PRB 88, 92-93 (1998).

Election day

Table of Contents

Local executive officers are to be elected in May and June of the year, and
installed at the following meeting, except as otherwise authorized by the
IEB. The membership determines the specific election date(s).
Article 38 section 2,
article 38 section 10(d);
Blevins v Region 1A, 8 PRB 240, 243 (1993) (on request of local per membership vote,
IEB advanced election because of impending contract negotiations),
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 61, 68 (1998) (consolidating three elections into one resulted in
saving of up to $200,000),
Mont v UAW, 10 PRB 428, 433-34 (1999) (IEB may authorize both election and
installation out of the months or May and June),
Baxter v Local 659, PRB Case 1617 (4/22/09), p 14 ("[Election committee chair] did not
have authority to overturn a motion [setting the election date] duly adopted by the
Joint Council.").

Unopposed candidates stand elected by acclamation.

Article 38 section 17;
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 (6/22/04), p 13,
Local 276 v IEB, PRB Case 1631 (9/15/09), p 19 (an unopposed nominee may be elected
 by acclamation but only where there was a reasonable opportunity to nominate
opposing candidates; that was not provided here because the membership had no way
of knowing during the nomination meeting that the candidates who were nominated
would not appear on the ballot).

Each candidate may have a challenger, but a candidate may not be a

challenger. Challengers have the right to insist that the ballots of
challenged voters be segregated. Protests as to ineligible voters will be
entertained only if they were challenged at the poll.
Article 38 section 10(g) interpretation 1 (3/5/45) (candidate cannot be a challenger);
election guide, p 52 ("The term 'challenged ballot' refers to a ballot cast by a person
whose eligibility to vote has been questioned by Election Committee Members,
candidate challengers, or members.... If a member's name appears on the Local
Union's voter eligibility list, he or she should be presumed to be eligible to vote in the
election. Therefore, if such a member's eligibility is questioned, the person making the
challnge must give a specific reason why the member is not eligible to vote. However, if
a person's name is not on the official voter eligibility list, Election Committee Members
must insist that he or she vote a challenged ballot.");
Langworthy v Local 652, 4 PRB 68, 69 (1983) (ineligible voters not challenged on
election day),
Parker appealing Smithey v Local 276, 5 PRB 601, 604 (1988) (ineligible voters must be
challenged when their ballots are case),
Leventis v Local 909, 8 PRB 541, 547 (1995) (because appellant had no challenger he
forfeited his right to claim there was massive participation by ineligible voters),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1589 (8/25/08), pp 8, 28 (election overturned partially because
challenged ineligible voters were allowed to vote unchallenged ballots),
Kibby v Local 148, PRB Case 1624 (6/1/09), pp 8-9 ("It is the role of the Election
Committee to supervise the election; it is not the role of the challengers to supervise
the Election Committee.").

Some decisions concern polling sites and hours.

 Horton v Local 422, 5 PRB 480, 483 (1988) (chaos and confusion surrounded balloting
process),
Fields v Local 961, 9 PRB 369, 370, 373 (1997) (claim that non-English-speaking voters
were not instructed in their native languages was neither supported by evidence nor
shown to be a violation if true),
Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391 (2002) (election committee has responsibility
under the election guide to select a time and place intended to maximize voter
participation),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1553 (2/20/07), p 13 ("Similarly, we have consistently
rejected protests based on allegations that campaigning occurred in the vicinity of the
polls in the absence of evidence that the activity undermined the intergrity of the
balloting process [footnote omitted].");
Olson, CAC, session 4/99 (CAC would have granted appeal about lack of voting booths on
election day, but appellant and challengers made no protest at the time).

Sometimes there are questions of voter eligibility.

Tanzella v Local 738, 3 PRB 67 (1981) (voters working outside the district),
Morgan v Local 2083, 5 PRB 377, 380-81 (1987) (resigned member who rejoins),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 687-91 (1989) (laid-off and retired
members in closed unit of amalgamated local),
Hite v Local 807, 9 PRB 477 (1997) (retirees voting for bargaining chair),
Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) p 13 (member who had been suspended
by a trial committee years earlier, and who though never formally reinstated had been
restored to good standing status according to various local officals and was allowed to
vote unchallenged for a period of years, may vote),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1589 (8/25/08), pp 25-26 (retirees retired from old Local 174
could not vote in 2007 local election due to 2002 IEB decision which transferred units
from old to new Local 174 and also said then-retirees could not vote; 2006
constitutional credentials committee held the same);
election guide, p 52 ("If a member's name appears on the Local Union's voter eligibility
list, he or she should be presumed to be eligible to vote in the election. Therefore, if
such a member's eligibility is questioned, the person making the challnge must give a
 specific reason why the member is not eligible to vote. However, if a person's name is
not on the official voter eligibility list, Election Committee Members must insist that he
or she vote a challenged ballot.").

In one voter-eligibility case the PRB held that it had to follow the
constitution and deny the appeal, even though it said the provision in the
constitution was itself undemocratic. At UAW urging, it read the history of
the provision to mean members become eligible to vote not from the first
of the month when their applications are acted on at a meeting, but from
the first of the month in which they pay dues and sign a check-off form.
Article 16 sections 2(a), 4;
Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 608-09 (2000).

A local can provide limited procedures for absentee balloting.

Article 38 section 10(b) interpretation 1 (4/4/67);
Appeal of Conway, 4 PRB 36 (1983) (regardless of election committee's good faith, use of
absentee ballots was not in accord with local's bylaws and IEB resolution),
DeGray v MDA Local 571, PRB Case 1477 (6/23/04), p 7 (election committee applied
absentee ballot procedure rigidly but in good faith, and election result will not be upset
though otherwise eligible voters were disenfranchised to an extent possibly to have
affected the outcome).

Rules regarding the validity of ballots should be liberally construed to

afford as many members as possible with the opportunity to vote in local
elections.
DeGray v MDA Local 571, PRB Case 1477 (6/23/04), p 7.
Election materials should be preserved for at least a year, and longer if
an appeal is pending.
Article 38 section 12;
election guide, pp 70, 72, 94-95;
Jones v Local 140, PRB Case 1620 (6/24/09) p 13.

Recounts may be done to determine whether errors occurred in the

original tally. Election guides have long recommended that locals enact
bylaws requiring an automatic recount if the difference between a
challenger and the highest vote-getter is less that 1% of the total votes
cast.
Michener, 1 PRB 270, 274 (1962) (appeal of recount untimely),
Archer v Local 218, 5 PRB 426, 428 (1987) (though appellant was within 1% of winner,
local had not enacted 1% rule in its bylaws, appellant could point to no error in election
process, and persons doing the tablulating were professionals, so no recount required),
Hite v Local 807, 9 PRB 477, 483 (1997) (instead of recounting with ballots of ineligible
retiree voters discarded, IEB improperly ordered a new election, but PRB upheld IEB
action because protested candidate won again rather handily, a greater proportion of
the electorate voted, and losing candidate did not participate in appeal),
Engle in the matter of Ellis v Local 600, 11 PRB 209, 212-13 (2001) (the single purpose
of a recount is to determine whether errors occurred in the original tally; opening of
ballot box by CPA firm outside the presence of the election committee and candidates'
challengers, in election won by a single vote, was fundamental error, making it
impossible to know who won the election).

A 1980 appeal addressed the issue of ballot secrecy. Appellant Charlie

Bynum would have won a committee election by one vote, but for a ballot
in his favor which had an obscenity handwritten across the name of his
opponent. No rule in the constitution, local bylaws, or the EPC spoke to
the situation. The election committee voided the ballot and the IEB
affirmed.

Relying on a rule in the then-current election guide the PRB majority

agreed, saying the principle of ballot secrecy was of even greater
importance than majority rule. It reasoned that permitting a ballot with
extraneous handwriting would permit the voter to prove to the election
committee and fellow members that he or she had voted for a particular
candidate. This would undermine total assurance of ballot secrecy.

The problem with that reasoning, two PRB dissenters responded, is there
was not a rule of complete ballot integrity for steward and committee
elections under article 45. Neither the constitution nor the election guide
provided that level of secrecy in those elections. For stewards and
committee, the guide allowed hand-written votes on blank pieces of
paper. Even for officers the guide permitted extraneous ballot markings --
such as crossing out all names but one -- but only if they did not identify
the voter. That distinction was irrational, the dissenters said. The
principle of majority rule should have controlled and Bynum should have
been installed, they concluded.

As the majority acknowledged this was not an easy case. My own view is
the dissent had the better argument. Regardless, what is remarkable is
that neither side cited or relied for its bottom line on any provision of the
constitution, the local bylaws, the EPC, or an existing formal IEB
interpretation. Each side just looked to its gut to decide what was fair.
They came up with opposite answers. Fortuitously, one side had more
PRB votes. The guarantees of the EPC and constitution are vague, so an
arbitrary outcome like this is not surprising.
Bynum v Local 235, 3 PRB 85 (1980);
see also Engle in the matter of Ellis v Local 600, 11 PRB 209, 212-13 (2001) (in close
election, opening ballot box by CPA outside presence of election committee and
challengers was fundamental error and requires rerun).

Protests

Table of Contents

Elections are presumed to be valid.

Trick v Local 212, 6 PRB 103, 105 (1990),
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 16,
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 II (6/22/04), p 13,
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 13.

Although a 2007 decision discussed elsewhere, and a 2008 decision noted

below, suggest the PRB is re-thinking, traditionally any member of a local
has been thought to have standing to appeal an unfair election, even a
non-candidate.
Carstensen v Local 780, 4 PRB 238, 240 (1984) (non-candidate may protest election),
 Horton v Local 422, 5 PRB 480, 482 (1988) (election committee election overturned
though no candidate protested),
Silva v Local 2244, 10 PRB 148, 151-52 (1998) (successful candidate's protest of
election entertained),
DeOerio v Local 1112, 10 PRB 158, 162 (1998) (non-candidate's election protest
entertained),
Novicenskie v Local 1069, 11 PRB 144, 148 (2001) (non-candidate's election protest
entertained),
Yettaw v Local 599, 11 PRB 191, 196 (2001) (non-candidate's frivolous appeal of
postponement of elections for standing committees entertained);
but see Lynch v Local 302, 1 PRB 787 (1972) (non-candidate not prejudiced by local's
failure to post nominations notice timely),
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 317, 319 (1976) (in rejecting charge on ground that no
improper motivation was claimed, PRB notes candidate's challenger had no standing to
contest election);
see also Hite v Local 807, 9 PRB 477, 482-83 (1997) (fact that candidate, who lost
election due to ineligible retirees voting and later lost IEB-ordered rerun election, did
not participate in appeal which sought his installation based on first election, was a
factor in PRB decision to honor results of rerun rather than order him installed);
but see Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1604 (11/25/08), pp 11, 15-16 (though election
committee scheduled election in defiance of vote of membership and appellant lost
Motor City chairperson position by only seven votes, election will not be rerun again
since appellant did not appeal until after IEB-ordered rerun election which reran only
other positions not Motor City chairperson position; other member who did appeal the
election timely was not a candidate for Motor City chairperson).

The PRB has imposed varying burdens of proof on appellants in election

appeals.
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 342 (1997) (preponderance of the evidence that
threats or rumors might have intimidated sufficient members of the electorate to have
affected the outcome),
Valin v Local 400, 9 PRB 459, 463 n 2 (1997) (appellant has burden to produce
 evidence),
Cordilino v Local 887, 10 PRB 40, 45 (1998) (appellant has burden to produce evidence),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 (6/22/04), p 13 (substantial evidence that improper
practice occurred to such an extent that it could have affected the outcome),
Simmons v Local 7, PRB Case 1533 (2/15/06), p 3 (clear and convincing evidence that
improper practice occurred to such a degree that it could have affected the outcome),
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 13 (clear and convincing evidence
that improper practice ocurred to such a degree that it could have affected the
outcome).

Election protests must be made either in writing to the recording

secretary within seven days after the polls close, or verbally at the next
membership meeting (or if membership meetings are suspended for the
summer, within 30 days to the next LEB meeting), whichever is later. If
protest is made to the LEB it "shall" rule within 30 days. The seven-day
limit means "actual" receipt by the local recording secretary. Though no
decision says this, I would think actual receipt means either receipt by
the recording secretary personally, or receipt in or at the recording
secretary's office during normal business hours. Receipt in the office
within seven days but after the close of business might be acceptable; I
don't know. Alternatively, the 60-day time limit for bringing EPC claims
might seem also to apply to an election challenge. The PRB has never
held to this effect, and prudence counsels to observe the seven-day-or-
next-meeting time limit.
Article 32 section 4,
article 37 section 4(c),
article 38 section 11,
article 45 section 5;
compare Appeal of Sparks, 2 PRB 406, 410-12 (1992) (fraud which there was no reason
 to discover earlier justifies use of EPC's 60-day limitation period rather than short
appeal period for election protest),
Donovan v Local 2000, 2 PRB 813, 816 (1979) (under former version of article 38
section 11 protest could be made to election committee verbally),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 (6/22/04), p 13 (ground for election protest raised
untimely)
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1589 (8/25/08), pp 25-26 (when appellants sent timely detailed
protest which raised substantial issue to recording secretary before meeting, protest
should have been placed on meeting's agenda without need for appellants to re-raise it
at the meeting).

The PRB has established an important exception to the 7-day-or-next-

meeting rule. If you notice a violation during an election, it has held, you
have to call it to the election committee's attention immediately or forfeit
an appeal of that violation. Even a meritorious post-election challenge will
be rejected if it should have been made during the election.

This rule does make good sense. But with the exception of election-day
protests by challengers it has no basis in the constitution or the election
guide. Only students of the PRB, or readers of this manual, would know
about it. Because of it one incorrigible local was able to avoid a
meaningful remedy for a committeeperson election violation. After the
PRB ordered that the election in Local 900 be rerun, and after appellant
James Lescoe's intervening and contractually dubious discharge, Lescoe
-- a 28-year member -- sought relief from the PRB again. But it had not
retained jurisdiction. The local's investigation of his discharge was
"inadequate" and it did not interview his sole accuser, a fellow member.
It got Lescoe reinstated probationarily but to a different department.
Meanwhile the rerun had proceeded while he was on the street. Unable to
campaign, he lost. Lescoe did not protest the process until after the
rerun. The IEB held the local was not accountable for the discharge, so
that could not be a basis for rerunning the rerun. After the IEB decision
and before the PRB ruled, a redistricting and new election occurred.
Though holding the rerun was a "mockery" of the rerun process, the PRB
denied relief:
There is no point in rerunning that election now; the Districts have been changed and
new elections have been conducted. The remedy requested by appellant cannot be
granted. There is nothing in the Constitution that authorizes this Board to supervise
Local Union elections or accelerate appeals in separate cases as requested by Lescoe.

... In considering appeals regarding arrangements made by local unions for elections,
our responsibility is not to ensure that the best procedures have been adopted by the
Local officals involved, but only that the procedures adopted were consistent with the
requirements of the Constitution. [footnote omitted] ...

... It was up to Lescoe to bring this issue to the membership's atention, so that the
membership could act prior to the election taking place....

... A candidate seeking to represent members of a district or group must have some
faith in his constituency. Had Lescoe gathered his supporters and presented the details
of his situation to the members, and requested that the election in Group 12 be
postponed until after his reinstatement had been obtained, it is by no means certain
that his appeal would necessarily have been unsuccessful. The influence of the local
leadership may be strong, but members will nevertheless respond to situations they
regard as patently unfair.

Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), pp 9-10,

Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), pp 15-17;
compare Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 341 (1997) (company threats to
influence election require new election);
see also article 38 section 10 (right of LEB candidates to have election-day
 challengers),
article 38 section 12 (appeal process for LEB elections makes provision only for
protests by election-day challengers and for post-election appeals),
article 45 section 5 (appeal process for steward and committeeperson elections
makes provision only for post-election appeals);
Telakowicz v Local 425, 1 PRB 148, 150-51 (challenge of good standing status
of voters should have been made on election day),
Gabauer v Local 25, 1 PRB 827, 829 (1972) (change of election date should
have been challenged before the election),
Forte v Local 422, 2 PRB 655, 658 (1977) (appellant did timely protest the
running of election for chief steward and was advised to seek his remedy
through a post-election challenge),
Tanzella v Local 738, 3 PRB 67, 70-72 (1981) (voter eligibility not challenged
on election day),
Salisbury v Local 892, 3 PRB 73, 77 (1980) (denial of access to retiree
meetings, local newspaper, and membership list, altered ballot positions not
challenged during campaign),
Langworthy v Local 652, 4 PRB 68, 69 (1983) (ineligible voters not challenged
on election day),
Hite v Local 663, 4 PRB 356, 359 (1985) (inability of poll watchers to view
adequately the counting process not challenged at time of occurrence),
McGuffin v Local 44, 5 PRB 42, 44 (1985) (eligibility of retirees to vote not
challenged prior to the election),
Balester v Local 424, 5 PRB 489, 492 (1988) (claim that lottery for selection of
ballot positions was tainted by fraud must be asserted at the time of
observation),
Parker appealing Smithey v Local 276, 5 PRB 601, 604 (1988) (ineligible
voters must be challenged when their ballots are cast),
Kelley v Local 400, 6 PRB 28, 30-31 (1990) (candidate must protest at the
time his right to see voter eligibility list was denied),
Haddad v Local 157, 9 PRB 307, 311 (1997) (election dates and ballot security
challenged neither before election nor within 60 days of when appellants
became aware of the facts),
Baxter v Local 659, 11 PRB 263, 267 (2001) (limitation on number of
 challengers should have been challenged when the election committee was
elected),
Baxter v Local 659, PRB Case 1617 (4/22/09), p 13 (UAW-approved decision
of local joint council to advance election date could not be challenged after
the election since appellant accepted the decision's legitimacy at the time);
Olson, CAC, session 4/99 (CAC would have granted appeal about lack of voting
booths on election day, but appellant and challengers made no protest at the
time).

But in a 2003 decision the PRB declined to apply the pre-election protest
rule. Four reps appointed by the GM department had campaigned for the
winning candidate. Had a protest been made at the time, there was
nothing to show the election committee could have intervened effectively
or that appellant could have gone to the GM department with a complaint.
The PRB ordered a rerun.
Carver v Local 163, PRB Case 1435 (9/25/03), p 8 n 8;
compare Valin v Local 400, 9 PRB 459, 462-63 (1997) ("Valin upon his observing [that
opposing caucus candidates campaigned on union time] had a responsibility to bring
the violations to the attention of the Election Committee. He may not wait in the
weeds....").

Post-election statements by members as to how they voted are thought of

as inherently unreliable.
Slawienski v Local 774, 5 PRB 519, 521-22 (1988),
Faison v Local 900, 6 PRB 208, 210-11 (1991);
compare Delling v Local 659, 11 PRB 273, 277 (2001) (testimony of voters as to how
they voted on a contract ratification is inherently unreliable).

After each election the election committee is to report the results in

writing to the next membership meeting, after which the membershi is to
vote on them.
Article 38 section 11;
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), pp 11-12.

Confusion as to election notices can result in a rerun.

Griffiths v Local 148, 3 PRB 425 (1983) (rerun ordered because of diminished election
turnout due to erroneous election notices),
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 13 (no rerun because appellant did
not establish that eligible voters did not receive election notices).

The local president's mishandling of election protests and the local's

failure to maintain adequate records do not necessarily require a new
election of officers.
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 13;
see also Jones v Local 140, PRB Case 1620 (6/24/09) pp 13-14 (election committee's
failure to preserve envelopes containing challenged ballots, removal of ballots from
sealed container without the knowledge or presence of the election committee, and
temporary disappearance of over 300 ballots do not warrant setting aside the election;
even though these lapses were improper they occurred after the balloting was over
and there was no direct evidence that any challenged ballot was improperly counted or
that any eligible voters were disqualified).

If the local orders a rerun of any election and there is an appeal, the
rerun must await a ruling from the president to proceed. In the case of an
officer election, the rerun must await a ruling from the president even if
there is no appeal. The election guide explains why:
 In some cases a minority of the membership of a Local Union may be in a position to
overrule the will of the majority in passing judgment upon the report of the Election
Committee. A situation may arise when a group of officers is elected by the votes of a
thousand or more yet when the Election Committee reports to the membership, a
group of 50 or 75 might constitute the majority of that membership meeting and reject
the Election Committee's report on some very minor, technical, or insubstantial
grounds, thus frustrating the will of the majority. Accordingly, certain safeguards must
be taken to protect the democratic decision of the majority against minority action.

Article 38 section 12;

Election guide, p 74;
Rickert v Local 1695, 10 PRB 464, 473 (1999).

The president is required to act "expeditiously" in such a situation, and

any new election is to be held as soon as possible. This unique review
procedure is discussed elsewhere.
Article 38 section 12,
article 45 section 5.

If an election violation is found a rerun normally will be ordered only if

the violation could have affected the outcome.
Telakowicz v Local 425, 1 PRB 148, 153 (1960) (reprehensible irregularity did not affect
result),
Roberson v Local 974, 2 PRB 395 (1976),
Miller v Local 677, 4 PRB 234, 236 (1984),
Trnka v Local 688, 4 PRB 329, 331 (1985) (in election decided by one vote, manipulating
the grievance procedure to affect the outcome was remote in time and did not affect
outcome),
Jackson v Local 634, 5 PRB 514, 517 (1984) (signed statement of a voter that he voted
twice insufficient proof of fraud),
 Rogers v Local 235, 10 PRB 520, 521-22 (1999) (though election committee member
should have quit when she ran for LEB member-at-large and won, she did not
participate in this election as an election committee member, so her position on the
committee could not have affected the outcome),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 580 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00),
Blevins v Local 735, 10 PRB 599, 602 (2000),
Snyder v Local 2488, 11 PRB 344, 347 (2001),
Powell v Local 670, PRB Case 1474 (4/28/04) p 5 (no showing that lack of voter checkoff
list and ballot security affected result of steward election),
Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) p 14 (affect of error on outcome "was at
best a remote mathematical possibility"),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1528 (4/12/06), p 8,
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 17 (election committee chair's initial private
recount of ballots, and local president's later improper appointment of election
commitee members in second recount did not affect accuracy of second recount),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 II (6/22/04), p 13 (even if election committee
members were ineligible to serve, that would not warrant overturning an election since
there is no evidence they failed to perform their responsibilities),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1553 (2/20/07), p 14 ("Furthermore, it is not
necessary for the challenger to demonstrate that any specific number of votes was
changed by the improper activity, if the violations were widespread enough to have
had a significant influence over the outcome of the race[footnote omitted]."),
Baxter v Local 659, PRB Case 1617 (4/22/09), p 14 (local responded to misleading
posting of election committee chair within hours of when it was posted);
but see Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1604 (11/25/08), pp 15-16 (though the local's
failure to follow the membership's instruction "affected all of the races, not just the
races for executive officers," a second rerun of all the races after the IEB had ordered
a rerun only of the executive offices is not justified because "appllants would have to
show that the IEB's decision deprived the membership of a fair election, and they have
not done that.");
compare Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 416 (1967) (rule applied to contract
ratifications).

The requirement to overturn an election that an irregularity have affected

the result applies even if only one vote separated the winner from the
loser.
Trnka v Local 688, 4 PRB 329, 331 (1985),
Jackson v Local 634, 5 PRB 514, 517 (1988).

Some violations are special and warrant a rerun with no showing that the
result was affected.
Rangel, 2 PRB 215, 219 (1974) (evidence regarding whether election violation affected
outcome disappeared),
Ramey v Local 652, 3 PRB 393, 397 (1983) (slates on ballots),
Griffiths v Local 148, 3 PRB 425, 431 (1983) (confusion whether election would proceed,
small turnout),
Snider v Local 477, 5 PRB 7 (1985) (ballot fraud),
Horton v Local 422, 5 PRB 480, 483 (1988) (unprecedented turnout for election of
election committee, during brief voting hours in small-sized hall where all candidates
were write-ins, the result being chaos and confusion such that not everyone could
nominate or vote),
Wouster v Local 977, 5 PRB 551 (1989) (company involvement),
Rickert v Local 1695, 10 PRB 464, 475 (1999) (refusal to allow view of membership list),
Engle in the matter of Ellis v Local 600, 11 PRB 209, 212-13 (2001) (in close election,
opening ballot box by CPA outside presence of election committee and challengers was
fundamental error and requires rerun because there is no way to determine who
actually won),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1589 (8/25/08), pp 13, 18, 27-28 (number of ineligible voters
could not have affected the outcome but they did more than merely vote; some were
appointed to the election committee which is supposed to be democratically elected,
actively took part in the election process, and were involved not just as assistants but
in making executive decisions about the process; the effect of this kind of participation
on the outcome cannot be measured mathematically; plus the election committee did
not follow the union's specific and detailed rules for the tabluation of ballots and
preservation of election materials);
 Moore, CAC, session 4/99 (with CAC approval IEB reruns election decided by one vote
though all the challenger's protests were rejected, because of unidentified "due
process" concerns).

Occasionally an installation may be ordered or rescinded.

Ryan v UAW, 1 PRB 186, 193 (1961) (installation),
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 395 (1966) (installation and payment for any financial
losses),
Tanzella v Local 738, 3 PRB 67, 70-72 (1981) (installation),
Appeal of Conway, 4 PRB 36 (1983) (installation),
Colley Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 236 (2001) (IEB orders local to fill committeeperson
position by election, appellant who had won election installed immediately but damages
refused because initial appeal did not request damages);
but see Williams v Local 719, 8 PRB 157, 160 (1993) (on discovery of ineligibility of
elected candidate proper remedy was to rerun election with new nominations, not
install the second-highest vote-getter),
Frederick-Brown v UAW, PRB Case 1519 (12/21/05, 4/20/06), p 14 (installation of losing
candidate rescinded after determination that winning candidate was eligible;
compensation ordered for winner),
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 17-19 (appellants not entitled to be installed
at membership meeting because at the time, even though they had been declared
winners, error in vote count had been discovered and election outcome was still
undecided; it matters not that error came to light through improper action of election
committee chair taking ballots home and counting them alone because there is no
evidence that she interfered with or altered election materials).

The PRB has no authority to supervise local elections.

Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 16.

If a new election is conducted for the same post that is under appeal
while the appeal is pending, the appeal becomes moot and the PRB will
dismiss the appeal, even if it otherwise has merit.
Brown v Local 600, PRB Case 1419 (1/31/03), p 3,
Knox in the matter of Schriner v Local 969, PRB Case 1428 (5/29/03), p 5.

A new election can become mooted if the challenging member becomes

ineligible during the appeal process.
Hamilton v Local 595, PRB Case 1432 (7/23/03), p 5.

In one election appeal, 58 ineligible retiree members voted for bargaining

chair. Members challenged them and asked that their different-colored
ballots be segregated. The 58 votes tipped the balance against the
rightful winner and the other candidate was installed. The IEB on appeal
recognized the impropriety. But it ordered a new election instead of
recounting without the colored ballots. Members appealed to the PRB. The
PRB agreed the IEB's remedy was not the most appropriate. But in the
meantime the rerun election had resulted in the installed candidate
winning again, this time legitimately. The PRB allowed the IEB's remedy
to stand.
Hite v Local 807, 9 PRB 477, 483 (1997).

As with appeals generally, the PRB is concerned about the slow pace in
getting officers installed.
Nettles, 1 PRB 814, 815 (1973) (23 months),
Beck v Local 5, 2 PRB 12, 16 (1973) (23 months),
McCue v Local 1459, 2 PRB 780, 783 (1980) (25 months),
 Ramey v Local 652, 3 PRB 393, 397 (1983) (22 months),
Clark v Local 1248, 6 PRB 278, 282 (1991) (18 months),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 342 (1997) (in order that rights "not be prejudiced by
the undue passage of time," IEB ordered to complete re-investigation of facts of appeal
within 30 days),
Brown v Local 600, PRB Case 1419 (1/31/03) (20 months);
see also Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997), record p 160 (letter, David Klein to Ellis
Boal, 11/8/96) ("It is also the policy of the PRB to expedite processing of appeals that
involve elections so that, in the event the appellant prevails, there will be time to order
an effective remedy."),
compare proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention, pp 186-89 (1972) (vice-president
notes that in election appeals time is of the essence).

In a 2004 appeal the IEB said that under its longstanding policy it was
holding the matter pending a DOL ruling on a parallel appeal which was
before it. Without waiting for an IEB decision on the merits, the
appellants appealed the delay policy to the PRB. The IEB promptly asked
for a remand and began its investigation of the merits. It denied the
appeal and the PRB ultimately upheld the IEB in that respect. But in the
process it termed the IEB policy an "obstacle."
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1459 (6/22/04), pp 8, 13.

But the PRB is part of the problem. The average time between an election
and a PRB decision in the nine appeals listed under "local union election
remedies" in the index of volumes 5-6 of the PRB decisions was 17
months; the average time for PRB consideration was 10 months. For the
five in which a rerun was ordered the respective averages were 17 and 11
months.
 Snider v Local 477, 5 PRB 7 (1985) (15 months from election, 8 months from appeal to
PRB, rerun),
McGuffin v Local 44, 5 PRB 42 (1985) (17 months from election, 8 months from appeal to
PRB, denied),
Zajaczkowski v Local 296, 5 PRB 282 (1987) (17 months from election, 7 months from
appeal to PRB, denied),
Bugos v Local 974, 5 PRB 396 (1987) (12 months from election, 6 months from appeal to
PRB, denied),
Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472 (1988) (24 months from election, 11 months from
appeal to PRB denied),
Horton v Local 422, 5 PRB 480 (1988) (16 months from election, 11 months from appeal
to PRB, rerun),
Reyes appealing Nelson v Local 2250, 5 PRB 498 (1988) (17 months from election, 12
months from appeal to PRB rerun ordered by IEB, appeal to PRB denied),
Wouster v Local 977, 5 PRB 551 (1989) (21 months from election, 13 months from
appeal to PRB, rerun),
Lawless v Local 854, 6 PRB 39 (1990) (14 months from scheduled election, 9 months
from appeal to PRB, rerun).

Democracy is sometimes expensive.

Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 332 (1994) (rerun of delegate election cost $65,000)
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 61, 68 (1998) (consolidating three elections into one resulted in
saving of up to $200,000),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 580 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00) (after
holding appellants were entitled to a rerun because local newspaper campaigned
against them PRB reminded them of the costs and disruption in light of an impending
plant shutdown and asked if they really wanted it),
Quesada v Local 2244, 11 PRB 386, 391 (2002) ("[D]emocracy is not the cheapest way
to select a governing body, but no one has come up with a better system."),
Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) p 14 ("It is expensive and disruptive for
local unions to rerun elections....").
Local expenses
Table of Contents

This section discusses local expenses. Removal procedures arising from

audits are discussed elsewhere.

Under article 46 section 1, local funds shall be used to defray all necessary
expenses, and expenses must be approved by the membership at a
meeting.

How is it determined that an expense is "necessary"? Article 46 offers

little guidance. In the 1984 Alli appeal the UAW explained to the PRB:
[N]o institution can abandon standards in favor of detailed lists or "recipes" [of] what is
not permitted. For, if this is done, the intent of the standards can easily be avoided by
the next dishonest person, if only s/he is devious enough to do (or claim to do)
something not on the list. The better protection is informed judgment, applying Art. 46
§1 requirements with an eye to what the UAW is all about.

As examples of unnecessary expenses the UAW noted duplicate

payments, examples, gifts, first-class air fare, and excessive
entertainment of fraternal delegates.

The PRB found little fault with this as far as it went, noting that taking
union funds for personal use, and expenses violating the local bylaws
would never be "necessary."

But most expenses in the appeal involved grey areas, such as travel,
lodging, food, and drink. Initially in PRB hearings the UAW took the
bright-line position that dues money could never be spent for food or
drink; then it backed away from that.

The PRB thought it unfair to penalize local officers and reps after-the-fact
for failure to follow standards which have not been enumerated. It noted
the excellent guidelines the union provides to locals on other subjects such
as elections and grievances. It added that many members elected to office
have little or no training in handling institutional funds. It recommended
guidelines in three areas:

protocols for proper authorization and reporting,

basic principles to determine whether an expense is "necessary," and

prohibited financial practices.

Particularly with regard to the second point the PRB suggested there be
guidelines, adding entertainment to the grey-area list. Remarkably it
went further, touching areas the UAW is "all about": contributions to
other unions' strike assistance funds or organizational efforts, fund raising
activities, testimonial dinners or retirement parties, local charities,
scholarships, and state and local political candidates. The UAW pamphlet
The Local Union Financial Officers current at the time of Alli did not
address these issues.
Compare proceedings, 24th constitutional convention, p 228 (1974) (article 48 section 5
not intended to prohibit collections for locals on strike).

There were several appellants in the appeal. Because of the UAW's

unclarity, one of them -- Al Alli who was accused of excessive
expenditures of $3700+ for travel and entertainment including food and
liquor -- was completely cleared and reinstated to office. The PRB was
reluctant in ordering this; some of his charges appeared on their face to
be excessive. At such future time as standards are enunciated, it
concluded, it would not hesitate to affirm convictions.

Twenty-two years later the UAW had not issued guidelines in the three
areas recommended in Alli.
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 225-28 (1984),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 15 n 28 (PRB reminds the UAW of its
recommendation in Alli to adopt clear guidelines, in this case regarding whether
membership may approve an expense after it was incurred)
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 13 n 36 (IEB has still issued no guidelines);
compare article 46 section 1,
article 46 section 1, interpretation 1 (1/10/56);
EPC, Financial Practices,
EPC, Business and Financial Activities of Union Officials,
UAW Education Department Handbook, The Local Union Financial Officers, (January
1989);
but see administrative letter, volume 28 # 7 (8/28/74) (only coach fare allowed for air
transportation),
administrative letter, volume 27 # 4 (8/20/75) (with limited exceptions, air
 transportation to a conference must be used in preference to auto transportation if it is
cheaper; alternatively, auto may be used but expenses can only be reimbursed to the
extent of the price of an air ticket);

Who determines whether an expense is "necessary"? This is a little

confusing. It is the UAW president and the IEB, and the local membership
may not overrule them.
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 301 (1975) (local's judgment while not absolute is primary),
Shinn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 250, 255 (1991) ("Applying these constitutional priciples to the
issue in this case it is readily apparnent that it is the International president and the
International Executive Board, and not the local union memberhship, who are
authorized by the Constitution to decide what is or is not a necessary expenditure of
Union funds.[footnote omitted]"),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 138, 140 n 12 (1994) (when intra-
corporation council determines bargaining policy, local is bound, and it might no longer
be considered a necessary expense for a local to spend funds to advocate policies
contrary to those adopted by the intra-corporation council),
Pruett appealing McBride v Local 598, 8 PRB 183, 186 n 2 (1993) (IEB has final say on
whether a local expenditure is "necessary"),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 43 (1995) (IEB and president determine what is a necessary
expense, not membership),
Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 612, 619 (2001) (PRB reluctant to interfere with the
determination of a local that an expenditure is necessary);
but see Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07), p 13 ("In fact, in the absence of any
statement of policy on the part of the IEB, the membership is fhe final arbiter of what
is necessary within the meaning of Article 46, §1, of the International Constitution.
[footnote omitted]").

But membership consideration is a necessary prerequisite. It must be

informed consideration, and if the members turn it down that ends the
matter.
 Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 612, 621 (2001) (members perform a valuable service by
bringing expense issues to the floor);
see also Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 302-03 (1975) (local may reimburse damages to
wronged member),
EP complaint of Toth, 3 PRB 195, 198-99 (1982) (membership approval need not
precede expenditure),
Tanzella v Local 738, 3 PRB 287, 290-91 (1982) (if the membership turns down a
claimed necessary expense its action is determinative),
Jenkins v UAW, 4 PRB 302, 305 (1984) (local union not local president is employer of
office personnel),
McCabe appealing Flowers v Local 1077, 5 PRB 318, 320-21 (1987) (local officer and rep
should justify lost time to membership, and then be subject to charges if they lie to the
membership),
Pruett appealing McBride v Local 598, 8 PRB 183, 186 (membership authorization
required before payment),
Austin v Local 594, 10 PRB 439, 444-46 (1999) (in the absence of an administrative
letter on the subject, a local may vote that payment of lost time to witnesses in a trial
is a necessary expense),
Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 624, 627 (2000) (membership had responsibility to
determine whether member's claim for expenses for attending LEB meetings was or
was not a necessary expense),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 102, 106 (2001) (it is for the local membership to determine
what is a necessary expense),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 15 (membership approval need not
precede expenditure),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 16 ("We have ruled on several occasions that
the membership has the right to decide whether an expense is necessary, and that the
term 'necessary' should be liberally construed. [footnote omitted]");
but see Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 28 (1973) (PRB passes on necessity of local
delegate's convention expenses without prior membership action).

If the membership approves an expense, ultimately on appeal the IEB

and PRB or CAC can make the final call. Sometimes they are reluctant to
intervene.

The PRB illustrated this dramatically in 1995. The appeal challenged the
IEB's decision to allow locals to vote to suspend their bylaws and provide
a spousal travel expense allowance for delegates at the 1992 convention.
Locals sent 2449 delegates and alternates to the convention that year.
Had all locals voted to send spouses, appellants' spreadsheet estimated
the total allowance for all of them would have been $1,052,597. But a
PRB majority said:
We were not created to be a superior legislature empowered to overrule policy
decisions of the International Executive Board. Is it for us to tell the Union how it is to
spend its money? ... [S]urely it is not for us to say that the IEB acts improperly when it
encourages officers, staff and local unions delegates to bring their spouses to its
Constitutional Conventions by providing an expense allowance for this purpose.

...

If we are to substitute our judgment for that of the International Executive Board and
the local union memberships as respects Convention travel expenses, then why not for
the locus of the Convention itself? Is it also for us to decide where it should take place
if someone objects to its location because of the expense occasioned to the Union in
getting there? Why should the PRB permit the union to hold its Convention in far away
California, when the majority of its local unions and its membership are located in the
mid-eastern part of the country? Was it truly 'necessary' for the Union to go to San
Diego in 1992, with all the attendant airline expense that is thereby incurred, when
there are adequate convention and hotel facilities in Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland or St.
Louis, to name but a few possible sites? Most delegates could drive to a Convention
held in one of these locations, saving the Union many more millions in expenses than
appellants have demonstrated were occasioned by the IEB's travel expense policy.
Should we also set limits on the amounts that may be expended for a hotel room or for
food and drink?
Two dissenters responded:
The IEB has never explicitly adopted and communicated to its locals a policy that each
local delegate should be entitled to take a spouse to the national Convention and have
some or all of that expense defrayed. In fact, the double air fare payment is made to
every local delegate irrespective of whether they took a spouse to San Diego -- and
many, if not most, of the delegates were not accompanied by their spouse.

The basic response of our Board colleagues, as in similar cases in the past, is simply to
have the PRB defer to the judgment calls made by the IEB. ... [But this allowance] was
offering an additional monetary benefit to Local delegates to be spent as they wished.

Replying to the dissent the majority said:

We would strongly urge the IEB that, when communicating to UAW local unions its
recommendations for Convention expense allowances, it articulate the bases for its
recommendations, including the spousal allowance as well as any other expense it
regards as legitimate. Regardless of the omission of this information in the 1992
communication, we have considerable confidence in the knowledge, acuity and
common sense of the average rank and file members. We do not know where our
dissenting colleagues obtained their information on the number of delegates who
brought spouses to the 1993 convention, but we do know that many, if not most, of
those who did could not have done so but for the expense allowance for this purpose
deliberately built into the travel allowance policy formulated by the IEB and adopted by
many of the local unions.

... The Union's leadership, the International Executive Board, obviously regards the
triennial Constitutional Convention as a very special occasion. That is why it has
exempted Conventions from the constraints of [an administrative letter saying that
sending non-elected guests to meetings was not a necessary expense under article
46].

Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 42-45, 47 (1995) (emphasis in original),
 letter, Ellis Boal to David Klein, 8/17/94 (attaching spreadsheet prepared from
roll call in 1992 convention minutes, summing spousal travel expenses
authorized by the IEB at approximately $1,052,597 for all delegates and
alternates, had every local authorized such expenses);
see also administrative letter, volume 30 # 5 (10/19/78) (prohibiting sending
fraternals to meetings other than conventions without president's
permission);
King v Local 600, 5 PRB 265, 268 (1986) (whether a local can send
non-elected delegates to a constitutional convention as opposed to other
meetings is a question of policy best decided not by outsider PRB members
but by the union under the constitution and EPCs).

Sometimes though the PRB does intervene in an appeal concerning

expenses. For instance it overturned one IEB ruling that a local
expenditure was a gift to one of its members. The local argued the
expense was not gift but a legitimate expense. The PRB agreed, despite a
published IEB interpretation prohibiting mere gifts.
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 302-03 (1975);
compare article 46 section 1 interpretation 1 (1/10/56) (no gifts allowed),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 14 (unnecessary use of a hotel room
at a convention was a gift and not reimbursable).

The requirement that local funds shall be used to defray necessary

expenses trumps any local bylaw limiting expenditures below amounts
necessary for the local to function. Where a bylaw-mandated expense
limit for local delegates to a convention was too low to cover the
delegates' expenses, the members were entitled to vote higher expenses
without amending the bylaw, the PRB said in 1978. This is a curious
decision. The president had been contacted before the appeal, and the
IEB could have solved the problem cleanly by just repealing the bylaw
because it contradicted article 46 section 1.
Article 12 section 5 (IEB shall repeal a bylaw of a subordinate body not conforming to the
constitution);
Leslie v Local 206, 2 PRB 747, 751-52 (1978).

In two cases the PRB reinstated presidents of Chrysler locals removed by

the IEB for drawing a full company salary equal to that of an international
rep, plus lost time. The PRB also ordered backpay and other substantial
relief. Both appeals arose under article 48 not article 46. In each, there
was confusion between the locals' historic practices regarding
compensation and what the local bylaws required. There was also
confusion whether the president was full-time or part-time.
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 399 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (lost time),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 67, 71 (2001) (wage payments to local president from
Chrysler that should have been offset from his local salary);
see also Gaines v UAW, 11 PRB 410, 413-14 (2003) (though local bylaws did not provide
for financial secretary to receive profit-sharing payments, she received them anyway in
1996-98, with LEB approval in all three years; because of the LEB approval the IEB
approved the payment in 1998; therefore it should also have approved the payments
in 1996-97; appellant need not reimburse the local).

An administrative letter later tried to address these problems. It

emphasizes that a local can only pay members what is specifically
detailed in the bylaws for salary, lost time, expenses, and benefits.
Full-time officers or reps are those who receive their entire compensation
from the local; part-timers are those who receive some from the local and
some from the company. Any monies paid by the employer must offset
monies to be paid by the local. A note adds that if the compensation
package is not articulated in the bylaws then payments may not exceed
basic lost time. An attachment defines lost time as money owing because
the member has performed "necessary" duties for and on behalf of the
local during a time when he or she would otherwise be compensated by
the employer. The amount should never exceed the amount the member
would otherwise have received from the employer for the same period of
time.
Administrative letter, volume 50 # 3 (5/30/02).

The PRB and IEB have made various other rulings over the years
concerning the necessity of certain expenses.
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24 (1973) (delegate's convention expenses),
Balicki v Local 47, 2 PRB 931, 936 (1981) (new member orientation fund),
EP complaint of Toth, 3 PRB 195 199-200 (1982) (officers' litigation expenses, officers'
interest compared to local's),
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142 (1983-85) (accounting procedures for
special union funds),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222 (1984) (ex post facto accounting rules),
EP complaint of Ford, 5 PRB 23 (1985) (union payments as gifts, timeliness),
EP complaint of King v UAW, 5 PRB 226 (1986) (convention expenses),
King v Local 600, 5 PRB 265, 268 (1986) (convention expenses),
Kronenberg v Local 961, 6 PRB 377, 380 (1992) (member's expenses in challenging
election not necessary),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 114 (1993) (convention expenses and fraternal delegates),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 130, 138 (1994) (permitted:
Solidarity Committee set up in consultation with a political caucus to resist company
demands for concessions),
 Pruett appealing McBride v Local 598, 8 PRB 183, 186 (payments to retired president),
Yettaw v Local 599, 8 PRB 363, 367 (1994) (expenses of two extra delegates who
attended skilled trades conference),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 43 (1995) (restoration of wages and expenses reduced
during administratorship),
Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 612, 614, 615, 621 (2001) (race car sponsorship, delegates'
debriefing each other over dinner, flat versus itemized expense allowance),
O'Connor v Local 974, PRB Case 1570 (12/14/07) pp 8-10 (local bylaw required that
convention delegates be paid lost time and per diems for attending convention; local
union is financially sound);
administrative letter, volume 30 # 5 (10/19/78) (sending fraternals to meetings other
than conventions without the president's permission is an unwarranted drain on local
resources, and not a necessary expense);
administrative letter, volume 35 # 4 (8/22/84) (defining private use of union hall for
which settled schedule of rental fees must be charged),
administrative letter, volume 36 # 2 (3/19/86) (only a modest gift may be given at a
retirement party or testimonial, even if the event is private),
administrative letter, volume 36 # 5 (3/19/86) (fund raisers for union election campaigns
or for other personal reasons are private events).

Local meetings
Table of Contents

Meetings are where local unions resolve political questions, despite the
difficulties that may be presented by strong disagreements among the
members.
 Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 7 (political disagreements among
competing caucuses),
Schultz v Region 5, PRB Case 1498 (3/17/05), p 6 (policy disagreements among
competing caucuses).

Membership meetings are the highest authority in the local.

Non-amalgamated locals, and units of amalgamated locals, must have

membership meetings at least once a month, unless their bylaws specify
at least once every three months in which case a workplace council must
meet the other two months. In some cases the UAW can grant permission
to a local to meet with the general membership only once a year,
provided the workplace council meets certain specifications. By
appropriate action a local or a unit can postpone meetings during the
summer months.
Article 37 section 4(c);
Abronowitz v Local 2256 PRB Case 1599 (9/25/08), p 10 (suspension of local meetings
during the summer months is very common),
Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 12 (if local does not suspend
meetings during the summer months, election committee report must be taken up by
membership not LEB).

Any member in good standing, whether employed or laid-off, enjoys full

rights and privileges in a meeting. Unless the bylaws otherwise indicate,
this applies to zone meetings. Laid-off members may attend, speak, and
vote, particularly where the topic is of interest to both laid-off and
working members.
 Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 137 (1960).

Meetings are governed by a local's bylaws. The constitution recommends

that all questions of parliamentary procedure be decided by "Robert's
Rules of Order." This is not terrifically clear, because there are different
versions of Robert's:

Pocket Manual of Rules of Order for Deliberative Assemblies (Cover

short title: Robert's Rules of Order) (1876),

Robert's Rules of Order Revised (1915), and

Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised (1970)

I find it least confusing to refer to each version by its year.

One editor of the 1970 version asserts on the copyright page that that
version supersedes all unspecific bylaw references by all organizations
(which would include the UAW) to previous editions of Robert's. The
author of the 1970 version doesn't say that, and neither does the UAW
constitution. But the PRB and the president agree with the editor.
Article 42 point 13;
Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised 9th Edition, Scott-Foresman/Addison-Wesley,
1990, table headed "The Editions Of This Manual," p vi immediately before the table of
contents;
Convention rule 1, report of rules committee, 2002 convention (specifying 1915
version);
Davis v UAW, Letter, Ronald Gettelfinger to PRB, 1/16/03, p 4 n 7 (though 2002
 convention rules specify the 1915 version, president defends appeal on basis of 1970
version),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 105 nn 1, 2 (1984) (PRB equates Robert's Rules of
Order to 1970 version);
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 387, 389 n 1, 392 n 3 (1992), other part of decision
withdrawn, 6 PRB 393 (1992) (PRB equates Robert's Rules of Order to 1970 version);
see also Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 24 (1958) (dissent) (reference to Robert's Rules of
Order -- Revised 1943, proxy voting).

The Education Department has a short pamphlet on parliamentary

procedure.
10 Points for Meetings (Jan 1987).

Article 42 suggests the following order of business at local meetings:

1. Roll call of officers

2. Reading of the minutes of the previous meeting
3. Applications for membership
4. Voting on applications
5. Initiation of candidates
6. Report of financial secretary and/or treasurer
7. Reports of officers, committees, and delegates
8. Communications and bills
9. Unfinished business
10. Good and welfare
11. Does anyone know of a member out of work or in distress
12. New business
13. Closing
 Article 42.

The minutes are the official record of what happened at a local meeting,
regardless of what witnesses may say later. The non-existence of minutes
for a crucial meeting is a very serious irregularity:
The membership of a Local Union acts and makes decisions through motions adopted at
membership meetings. Such meetings, therefore, form an essential part of the
democratic structure of the UAW. Minutes need not be detailed or follow any particular
format, but some record of motions presented to the membership and the action taken
on such motions must be kept. Accurate minutes ensure that the Local Union's
business is conducted in accordance with its own bylaws and the law established by the
UAW Constitution rather than according to the whim of any particular elected official.

Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 11;

see also Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1634 (1/26/10), pp 17-18 (the local makes
decisions at memberhip meetings; this assures that business is conducted
according to the constitution and bylaws not the whim of an official).

If there is any question whether the minutes accurately reflect what

happened at a meeting, it is best to clear that up by motion when they
are read at the next following meeting. In the absence of minutes, the
PRB will rely on statements of witnesses.
Article 42, suggested order of business # 2 (reading of the minutes of the previous
meeting);
article 40 section 3 interpretation 1 (1/31/74) (only the minutes are the official record of
LEB and membership meetings; tapes may not be considered as official records);
Dunlap v UAW, 1 PRB 547, 549-50 (1969) (local officers can be charged with fraudulent
alteration of meeting minutes; however in this appeal no attempt was made to correct
the minutes at the next meeting),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 857, 864 (1981) (PRB relies on minutes as corrected at
next following meeting),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 106 (1984) (without mention of what the minutes might
have shown PRB receives and relies on tape of membership meeting to prove events at
meeting),
Englund v Local 699, 5 PRB 142, 145 (1986) (official minutes definitively dispose of issue
as to the wording of the election rules, especially because the membership was given
an opportunity to correct them at the next meeting),
Grigsby v Local 110, 5 PRB 412, 414 (1987) (LEB minutes are not correct where several
LEB members have verified an attempt was made to correct them but were ruled out of
order),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994), reconsideration denied (8/5/94) (local
membership can interpret its own minutes, but in so doing it may not rewrite history),
Pochik appealing Kapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52, 58 (1998) (minutes are the official
record of what happened at membership meeting),
EP complaint of King v Local 600, 11 PRB 250, 253 (2001) (corrections to minutes should
be made when they are submitted for approval at following meeting),
see also Gaines v UAW, 11 PRB 410, 411, 413 (2003) (though minutes do not reflect
that LEB authorized profit-sharing payments to financial secretary in 1996-97, IEB and
PRB accept affidavits of witnesses that LEB did approve the payments),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 12 (recording secretary who prepared
minutes is corroborating witness in article 31 charge),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), p 9 (LEB meeting minutes rarely contain
any detailed report of the members' deliberations on the issues),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 3-4, 7-8, 17 (local properly
approved EPC claim against UAW where majority of members in three different shift
meetings combined approved it and local president certified it, and it was not necessary
for appellant to clarify the members' intent by amending the minutes at subsequent
meetings),
Austin v Local 594, PRB Case 1514 (1/24/06), p 18 ("The Local Union's members were in
the best positon to resolve disputes concerning the conduct of the recall meeting....
The Local membership obviously agreed with the conclusion reached by the hearing
officers that there was an organized effort by those who opposed the recall of Gene
Austin to prevent a quorum from assembling at the meeting of April 25."),
 Carthon v Local 2297, PRB Case 1603 (12/16/08), p 11 ("In the absence of minutes, we
have had to rely on statements from the people involved in this election....").

One local denied a request of members for a copy of meeting minutes,

but agreed they could examine the minutes at the local office at the
members' convenience. Under these circumstances the CAC found the
local acted properly and consistent with UAW policy.
Mertz, CAC, session 11/99;
compare King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), pp 7, 9 (despite claim of
president's office that IEB ruled that minutes of local membership and LEB meetings
were not to be distributed, president's office should have required local to forward LEB
minutes to the PRB in connection with appeal).

Since 1980, article 33 section 2(b) has limited appeals of rulings of the
chair to the membership or delegate body (if there is one) in the local
union. There is no further appeal. But the PRB has reversed procedural
rulings of chairs in the course of deciding appeals on other issues.
Article 33 section 2(b);
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 377 (1966) (even if chair committed error, motion adopted
at a meeting is not thereby nullified unless error prejudiced position of opponents, for
example by not permitting full and free debate of the issue),
Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606, 610-11 (1970) (candidate challenger at convention should
have been permitted to challenge votes in roll call vote by polling local's delegation,
appeal decided on other grounds),
EP complaint of McCue, 3 PRB 91, 94 (1981) (though chair's refusal to allow member to
appeal procedural ruling to members at meeting was clear error this does not amount
to a violation of the EPC because appellant has shown no bad faith or conscious
malice),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 104-06 (1984) (as a technical matter under 1970
 version of Robert's Rules PRB overturns ruling of chair declaring motion to rescind
resignation out of order),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 393, 393-94 (1992) (PRB withdraws portion of previous
decision holding that membership's action overturning ruling of chair could be
appealed),
EP complaint of King v Local 600, 11 PRB 250, 253 (2001) (if dissatisfied, proper course
on being ruled out of order is to challenge ruling of chair at the time)
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 19 (president's mistaken reliance on article
13 section 8 caused international rep to say mistakenly at local meeting that discussion
of election protest was out of order),
Levin v Local 2250, PRB Case 1582 (1/28/08), pp 8-9 (PRB has no jurisdiction to rule on
the propriety of a procedural ruling by the chair at a membership meeting),
Baxter v Local 659, PRB Case 1617 (4/22/09), pp 13-14 (motion to reopen issue of
election date).

Local bylaws ordinarily provide that a bylaw amendment can only occur
by a 2/3 vote at a properly noticed meeting after having been read out at
previous meetings. A bylaw amendment voted at a meeting that does not
follow the rules is ineffective.
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 859, 864 (1981) (deficiency of four-day notice that
meeting would consider enlarging terms of office meant that action on that subject at
meeting was of no force and effect);
compare article 45 section 3 interpretation 3 (notice required for meeting to recall
steward or committeeperson) (9/8/47).

Ordinarily the constitution does not require a 2/3 vote on issues; if a 2/3
vote is required, the constitution spells that out.
Moye v UAW, 5 PRB 612, 619 n 4 (1989);
compare Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 32, 38-41, 46 (1995) (IEB may suspend local
bylaw requirement that suspension of a bylaw requires a 2/3 membership vote).
A meeting does not stand adjourned simply because the local president so
declares it or because he or she vacates the podium. This is so even if the
meeting is disorderly. Members may test the chair's ruling.
Lloyd v Local 550, 1 PRB 417, 420 (1967).
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 784-85 (1990).

Local newspapers
Table of Contents

Local publications are to conform themselves with the policies of the

UAW, and editors are responsible to local officers and the LEB, who have
authority to effectuate conformity.
Article 29 section 7.

Even though articles appearing in local newspapers may be political,

rank-and-file members have no automatic right of access to respond.
Plyer v Local 599, 1 PRB 238, 241-42 (rank-and-file member has no right to have article
published in local newspaper) (1981),
Kelsey v Local 245, 4 PRB 46 (1983) (though political, article in local newspaper that
criticized members who opposed contract is protected by the EPC),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1479 (10/25/04), pp 11-13 (fact that local president as
 convener of local press committee is more likely to find fault with articles submitted by
critics is simply a fact of political life),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1528 (4/12/06), p 9 ("We have previously observed that
nothing in the Constitution prohibits the use of local union newspapers for the
publication of political articles. [footnote omitted]").

In a 1992 appeal the PRB considered whether a local president could run
a signed column in his allotted space criticizing the local's policy of
censoring his previous articles. The PRB established guidelines for the
application of editorial conformity: (1) equality of treatment among
officers with signed columns wishing to write on the same subject, and
(2) a distinction between policy and politics, the latter being "the lifeblood
of any democratic institution." The PRB explained:
Union policy is normally formulated only after an issue has been thoroughly examined,
aired and debated by the Union's officials and members. During this phase of policy
development, the editorial policy of Local 599 commands, as ought all such policy
statements, that viewpoints on the subject are entitled to expression. Whether the
issue be collective bargaining policy, world trade, political endorsements, or any other
like matter of controversy within the Union, until a policy decision is actually reached
requirements of freedom of expression protect from censorship the view of persons
who have been given, by virtue of office or position, the right to express them in a
union publication.

Once a union policy has been so formulated, the Union's Constitution provides for the
requirement of editorial conformance.

Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 236, 243 (1992);

Bier v Local 2500, 5 PRB 805, 811-12 (1990) (even if LEB was wrong in
assessing IEB policy under article 29 section 7, it had right to enforce what it
thought was IEB policy in pulling local president's signed column from local
newspaper),
 Noall v Local 599, 10 PRB 371, 376-77 (1999) (adding third guideline to those
formulated in Yettaw, PRB affirms right of editor to edit on grounds of
vilification reference to unnamed "company sympathizers" in officer's signed
column),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 580 (2000), reconsideration denied
(6/14/00) (officer's signed column may not promote a candidate for local
union office),
Yettaw v Local 599, 11 PRB 434, 438 (2002) (local may provide procedures for
resolution of disputes regarding access to local newspaper),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1479 (10/25/04), p 11 (president's 11/21/03
administrative letter prohibits local union endorsements of outside
businesses, but one instance of unequal application of the letter does not
amount to a pattern of discrimination).

Sometimes the PRB will order a local newspaper to publish a particular

article.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 2 (7/1/04) (notice of pending appeal),
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 350 (1965) (publication of article of reversal of trial
judgment of equal size as previous article reporting original judgment),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 281 (1981) (publication of PRB decision condemning union
mob's disruption of political picnic).

Local officers, stewards, and committeepersons

Table of Contents

The political structure of local unions is discussed elsewhere.

The procedures for electing LEB members are discussed elsewhere.

The procedures for challenging elections of stewards and

committeepersons are discussed elsewhere.

The procedures for recalling stewards and committeepersons are treated

elsewhere.

The local's executive officers are: president, vice president(s), recording

secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, trustees, sergeant-at-arms, and
guide.
Article 38 section 1.

The LEB consists of the executive officers, and such members-at-large as

the local deems necessary.
Article 38 section 5,
article 55 section 1(b) (retiree member-at large).

The executive officers' duties are set out in the constitution. Curiously,
except for the obligation to turn over local property at the completion of
their duties, the duties of the LEB members-at-large, the stewards, and
the committeepersons are not.
Articles 38 section 5, 39-40, 45;
compare Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 460-61 (2000) (bylaws give
the shop committee no grieving, bargaining, or redistricting duties, and make no
 mention of bargaining, grievances, labor disputes, or strikes).

If one or more executive officers are absent, the absent officer is to be

temporarily replaced by the next officer present in the order listed above.
Article 38 section 1.

Local presidents and financial officers must be bonded.

Article 12 section 15, article 40 section 12,
article 38 section 3 interpretation 2 (5/25/59);
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 407-08 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99), pp 6-8,
11, 24-26,
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 62, 70-71 (2001),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 4.

At the completion of their duties all officers, committees, stewards, and

other members handling funds or other local property are to turn over all
local papers, documents, funds, and other property to the proper officers.
Article 40 section 15.

Rights of officers under the EPC are different from those of members.
Members have greater latitude.
Gonzales v Local 163, 2 PRB 386, 389-90 (1976) (committeeman who supports rival
union may not serve),
Betts v Local 376, 4 PRB 307, 311-12 (1984) (bargaining committee member may not
seek to supplant UAW as bargaining agent),
Mieli v UAW, 9 PRB 449, 457 (1997) (member's right to issue leaflet is fully protected, as
distinguished from officer's).
Sometimes distinctions are made between officers acting in an official
capacity and in an individual capacity.
Local 453 v Hawkins, 1 PRB 234 (1961) (local president in official capacity),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 134 (1994) (local president in official
capacity),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 339-40 (1994) (EPC remedies not available to charge
member in capacity as a member and not as a representative).

The PRB is inclined to regard union officers as comparable more to

corporate officers than to government officers.
Egres, 1 PRB 50, 61-62 (1959).

My summary of each of the executive officers' duties follows, taken from

the constitution. The UAW also has booklets elaborating most of the
duties. These documents should be consulted to be sure my summaries
are accurate. I would appreciate any member advising me if there are
updated versions of these booklets.
The President's Job, January 1989,
The Local Union Financial Officers, January 1989,
The Local Union Recording Secretary, January 1989.

The local president is to enforce the constitution. He or she is also to

preside at local meetings, sign orders on the treasury (vouchers),
countersign checks issued by the financial secretary, appoint committees
not otherwise provided for, be a member ex officio of all committees
except the election committee, and supervise local clerical help. In an
amalgamated local, the president is not an officer of his or her unit.
Penalties may be imposed if the president fails to account fully on per
capita taxes to the UAW.
Article 40 sections 1, 10;
article 40 section 1 interpretations 1-3.

The vice-president assists the president and attends all local sessions. If
the president is absent or incapacitated, the vice-president performs the
president's duties. If there are more than one vice-president, the local is
to determine who does what.
Article 40 section 2.

The recording secretary keeps a correct record of the local proceedings.

Tapes made in membership and LEB meetings are not official records. The
recording secretary signs orders on the treasury (vouchers), reads all
documents and conducts the general local correspondence not pertaining
directly to the duties of other officers, and keeps them on file for future
reference. The recording secretary brings any correspondence to the
membership's attention on which it must take action. When the local is
facing possible strike action the recording secretary is to prepare a full
statement of the matters in controversy and forward it to the regional
director and president. The recording secretary is to keep updated copies
of contracts, classifications, rates, and information that may be useful to
other locals in their collective bargaining on file with the regional director
and the UAW Research Department.
 Article 40 section 3,
article 50 section 2;
article 40 section 3 interpretation 1 (1/31/74).

The financial secretary receives all local income including check-off income
and provides receipts, writes checks, prepares written financial reports for
each regular local meeting, deposits collections with the treasurer or a
bank, sends money owed to the UAW by the 20th of each month for the
preceding month, receives applications for membership and notifies
applicants of action taken, assists the UAW in making sure all members
receive Solidarity regularly, makes the constitution and local bylaws
available to each member, holds the membership list in
confidence, keeps an inventory of all local records and property including
date and cost of purchase, notifies members in arrears, and turns over
books to the trustees and UAW auditors for audit. Locals can opt to
combine the financial secretary and treasurer offices. Penalties may be
imposed if the financial secretary fails to account fully on per capita taxes
to the UAW.
Article 29,
article 37 section 9,
article 38 section 9,
article 40 sections 4-10;
but see article 16 section 10 ("Local Unions may notify members of their delinquency.
However, failure of the Local Union to notify the member of delinquency shall not
exonerate such a member from automatic suspension....";
Libby v Local 6000, 9 PRB 549, 552-53 (1998) (charge against financial secretary for
failing to perform duties and responsisbilites specified in article 40, dismissed for failure
to show the financial secretary acted with specific intent to injure the interests of the
 charging member),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), pp 12-15 (though IEB characterized removal
of financial secretary by LEB without due process as mere mistake which was quickly
remedied, PRB has a "less charitable view" even though action was taken in the
course of official responsibilities, because it was a flagrant flouting of the EPC),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 12 ("Discharged members have an
absolute right to rely on the instructions given to them by their Local Financial
Secretary in regard to their dues obligations, and they cannot be held to have broken
membership in good standing if they follow such instructions, even where such
instructions are inconsistent with some portion of Article 16 and the related provisions
of the Constitution."),
Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1518 (12/20/05), p 11 (charge which amounts to no
more than an accusation that the financial secretary was negligent in the performance
of her duties was properly disqualified),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), p 27 n 63 ("The rule that [financial
secretaries] should not be subject to charges for errors or even incompetence in the
job has particular application to Financial Secretaries ... in order to ensure that
members will be willing to perform this function [of keeping track of the local union's
money].),
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), pp 25-26, reconsideration denied
(4/22/09) (though financial secretary's involvement in the events that led to the lapse
in appellants' membership is not entirely above reproach, appellants knew they were
not paying dues and had to take some action to maintain their good standing, they
never created a memorandum of their communications with her as they would have
been expected to had she given them instructions about certification requirements of
article 16 section 19, and there was no ambiguity about the section's requirements
that all they had to do was tell her either they were getting no income or if they were
getting income tell her the amount.).

The treasurer receipts all money from the financial secretary and deposits
them in an approved bank. The treasurer signs checks which must be
countersigned by the local president. He or she issues written financial
reports at regular membership meetings, hands over all local books and
property to his or her successor, and produces books for examination or
audit on demand by the UAW. Locals can opt to combine the financial
secretary and treasurer offices. Penalties may be imposed if the treasurer
fails to account fully on per capita taxes to the UAW.
Article 40 sections 10-11.

The trustees have general supervision of the funds and property of the
local. They are in charge of semi-annual local audits. They are to see that
the financial officers are bonded and that funds are properly deposited,
co-sign on safety deposit boxes, and report to the membership if books
are not timely received after the end of each six-month period.
Article 40 section 12.

The sergeant-at-arms introduces new members and visitors, assists the

local president in preserving order, and has charge of local property not
otherwise provided for.
Article 40 section 13.

The guide maintains order, inspects membership receipts, and checks to

see if all present are entitled to remain in the meeting.
Article 40 section 14.

Two appeals have considered the consequences of tendering a resignation

and then withdrawing it before the local accepted it.
 Egres, 1 PRB 50 (1959),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 104-07 (1984).

Several appeals have considered the subject of superseniority, or

preferred seniority, of stewards and committeepersons.
Preferred seniority allows individuals accorded such status the right to be retained by
their employer in circumstances when their natural seniority would dictate thay they be
laid off. Not every local union officer is entitled to be vested with preferred seniority
status. Only those officers or agents whose duties and responsibilities involve him or
her in the administration of the collective bargaining agreement or related activities
such as health and safety or sickness and accident administration may lawfully be
accorded seniority status. It is the content of the individual's job, rather than his title,
which is determinative of his right to receive preferred seniority status under a
collective bargaining agreement.

Sneath v Local 1309, 5 PRB 299, 302 (1988);

see also Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 82-83 (1959) (superseniority is not a
personal right but a device for the benefit of the union's collective interest),
Clocker v Local 1010, 1 PRB 138, 141 (1960) (if superseniority in good faith is
improperly removed, the loss is that of the membership as a whole not of the
member removed),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 776 (1972) (steward was improperly
removed and lost his superseniority in a redistricting),
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 232, 234 (1975) (PRB remands appeal which
challenged superseniority provisions of local agreement for determination by
IEB on the merits),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1481 (11/22/04) (superseniority in scheduling
vacations for local officials with part-time representational duties),
Adams v Local 174, PRB Case 1536 (6/28/06), p 6 (member who was ineligible
to serve as steward could not accept nomination, be elected, and then be
allowed to exercise superseniority),
Gillis v Local 1976, PRB Case 1611 (2/24/09), p 8 ("These [superseniority]
 provisions are designed to ensure that active employees have Union
representatives available to enforce the contract. ... Gillis' claim that Kubrak
did not work in his district or classification has no merit. The Local Union's
officers are in a position to state which district and classification the steward
represents. The same is true of Kubrak's status as a full-time employee.").

Locals, subordinate and other bodies

Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Local unions, subordinate bodies ||

Non-subordinate bodies,
administrative arms

Local unions, subordinate bodies

Chartered subordinate bodies are defined as local unions, district

councils, family auxiliaries, and CAP councils. The most important of
these are the local unions. Only two PRB decisions deal with subordinate
bodies other than locals.
Article 23 section 6 (CAP councils),
 article 34 section 2 (district councils),
article 36 sections 1-14 (locals),
article 36 section 15 (locals, district councils, family auxiliaries, CAP councils),
article 52 section 1 (family auxiliaries);
proceedings, 26th constitutional convention (1980), p 283 (article 23 sections 13-14
added);
Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 67-69 (1973) (PRB not CAC decides appellants have right to
have CAC review validity of selection of CAP council delegates, and hence validity of
CAP council proceedings),
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251, 259 (1975) (quoting the IEB asserting the local union is
"the unit of structure which is the foundation of mutual assistance in collective
bargaining matters and in other activities in which the union engages"),
Downs v UAW, 8 PRB 548, 553 (1995) ("For political issues, there are political processes
[, CAP Councils, which] advise and counsel the International Executive Board on
programs and policies.... CAP Councils provide the mechanism for the formation of UAW
political policy. Those who disagree with the political decisions of the IEB have this
political process, as opposed to Article 33 appeals, to seek to modify or change these
decisions.").

The constitution also allows for non-chartered subordinate bodies. They

are supervised by the IEB and "have no autonomy."
Article 36 section 15.

The constitution gives no examples of non-chartered subordinate bodies.

As noted elsewhere, intra-corporate councils are not examples.
Departments might be, but they also might be administrative arms.
Article 12 section 13 (IEB may set up constitutional departments and by a 2/3 vote may
also create additional departments),
articles 24-28 (competitive shop department, research department, civil and human
rights department, education department, family education center department, all
 created by the constitution).

The constitution contains the wording of the charter only for locals.
Generally, the charter of a local union names the charter members and
the local. It requires that the local subordinate itself to and comply with
the constitution and laws of the UAW. It requires that the local be guided
by all UAW acts and decisions. It allows the UAW to modify a local's
powers, privileges, or rights if the local takes advantage of them. It
obliges the UAW to continue the charter in full force as long as the local
adheres to it, but the UAW may revoke it if there is an infraction.
Article 36 section 6.

The constitution provides for involuntary dissolution of a local only if its

workplace ceases production.
Article 36 section 9 ("If a Local Union disbands or if a Local Union goes out of existence
by reason of cessation of production at the workplace over which it has jurisdiction, all
of the funds, property and assets of the Local Union shall forthwith revert to and
become the property and assets of the International Union.").

An act, or a failure or refusal to act, of any subordinate body or

administrative arm can be appealed.
Article 33 sections 1(b), (d).

A subordinate body must do all in its power to strengthen and promote

the labor movement.
 Article 37 section 6.

UAW organization is essentially federalist; primary authority resides in

the UAW, which charters the locals and other subordinate bodies.

Nevertheless certain autonomous powers are reserved to the locals, the

fundamental units of UAW government, including with certain exceptions
the power to defray necessary expenses. Reversing the IEB, the PRB held
Local 3 had the right after a membership vote to pay one of its members
$1100 as compensation for a wrong it did to him, regardless that the
international union asserted no wrong had been done. The local's finding
to the contrary was not clearly wrong. And as also noted elsewhere, the
constitution suggests that locals have the absolute right to instruct
bargainers on bargaining strategy.
Article 12 section 3 (IEB may suspend local's autonomy and place it under
administratorship);
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 303 (1975);
see also Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 204 (1961) (in administratorship authority of
administrator is temporarily substituted for that of the general membership),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 112 (1974) (dissent) (UAW is members' agent, but members
have reserved to themselves certain fundamental powers),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 145 (1974) (dissent) (UAW is members' agent, but members
have reserved to themselves certain fundamental powers),
Kerik v UAW Ford Sub-Council 3, 2 PRB 772, 775-76 (1980) (member of one local has no
standing to challenge credentials of another local's delegates to a sub-council for
otherwise, incongruously, he could challenge the election of its president or any of its
other officers or its delegates to national conventions),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 113 (1984) (local membership is
fundamental unit of government in UAW),
 Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 343 (1994) (constitution recognizes certain aspects of local
sovereignty),
Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07), pp 13-14 ("Staff should have acted
immediately to resolve this matter once they took the extraordinary step of interfering
with the operation of a Local Union in this way.");
compare Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 163 (1960) (it is unrealistic to believe a local, being a
subordinate body, would not be restrained from permitting appellant to hold office after
IEB finding that appellant was ineligible under the predecessor of article 10 section 7
because of his relationship to the Canadian Communist Party).

The UAW has extensive control over locals.

Article 12 section 3 (administratorships),
Article 12 section 7 (appeals of locals),
Article 12 section 16 (IEB can adjust jurisdictional disputes between locals);
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 163 (1960) (it is unrealistic to believe that any Canadian local
would not be restrained by letter from UAW from permitting appellant to run for office
or hold appointive position),
Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 589-90 (work assignment dispute),
Daly, 1 PRB 816, 819-20 (1973) (local had right to ratify transfer agreement, but UAW
had right to impose jurisdictional settlement),
Local 677 v Mack Truck Department, 5 PRB 107, 112 (1986) (constitution allows UAW to
be partisan and take sides in disputes between locals).

Local unions must have bylaws. These may be informed by the local's
past practices. They may not contradict the constitution.
Article 37 section 3;
administrative letter, volume 50 # 3 (5/30/02) (local can only pay members that which is
specifically listed in the bylaws; bylaws must address lost time, salary,
full-time/part-time, daily/weekly/monthly expenses);
Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 80-81 (1959) (local's interpretation of its bylaws was not
justified by its past practice),
Tencza, 1 PRB 497, 501 (1968) (PRB orders local to amend bylaws to provide penalties
for elected officials' non-attendance at meetings),
Beach v Local 653, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (if local decides to change its practice and
insist on literal adherence to a contractual provision it must first announce the change
and then enforce the policy rather than the reverse),
Leslie v Local 206, 2 PRB 747, 751 (1978) (bylaws require special procedures to be
amended, but unlike constitutions commonly have provision for their suspension,
usually by a 2/3 vote),
McCue v Local 1459, 2 PRB 780, 783 (1980) (action taken by a local which is contrary to
its bylaws is null and void),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 864 (1981) (misleading notice posted four days before
meeting to consider bylaw change held to be violation of existing bylaw amendment
procedure, so amendment was of no force and effect),
Garrone v Local 595, 3 PRB 349, 350-51 (1982) (local bylaws may not contradict the
constitution),
Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257 261 n 2 (1994) (if local practice is to notify members of
the date of consideration of their appeals, then the notices should be sent sufficiently in
advance to the member actually receives it before the meeting),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 460-61 (2000) (bylaws give the shop
committee no grieving, bargaining, or redistricting duties, and make no mention of
bargaining, grievances, labor disputes, or strikes),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), p 8 ("Local union bylaws, no matter how
reasonable, cannot supersede the UAW Constitution."),
O'Connor v Local 974, PRB Case 1570 (12/14/07) pp 9-10 ("A motion at a membership
meeting that is silent with respect to a mandatory provision of the Local bylaws cannot
override the clear language of those bylaws.... [A] private agreement among a group of
political insiders cannot be imposed on members outside the group without their
consent in contravention of the rules established for governance of the Union, which
are its bylaws."),
Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07), p 12 ("[A]s this record demonstrates,
amending Local Union bylaws can be a lengthy process."),
Local 276 v IEB, PRB Case 1631 (9/15/09), p 18 ("Members have a right to rely on
published rules and regulations. [footnote omitteitte d]").
If your bylaws are unclear on any point, sometimes guidance can be had
from the Guide for Local Union Bylaws. Among others, the guide
recommends bylaws which in sum:

provide for restriction or expulsion of members who are intoxicated or

disruptive at meetings,

provide that subject to the constitution and bylaws the membership is

the highest authority, between membership meetings the LEB is the
highest authority except it can't act affecting the vital interests of the
local, and between LEB meetings the local president can act for the
LEB,

identify the executive officers including the number of

vice-presidents,

provide for rules about vacancies in LEB office,

provide for clear definition of LEB members who are members-

at-large but not executive officers,

set notice requirements for special LEB meetings,

set procedural and agenda rules for LEB meetings,

set election and recall rules for stewards and committeepersons,

set up optional advisory stewards councils,

establish rules for standing committees,

set up standing or special election committees, and rules for

nominations,

set up initiation and reinstatement fees, salaries, allowances,

expenses, and per diems,

establish eligibility requirements for elected officials,

establish attendance rules for elected officials, including rules for

excuses with cause,

establish a regular order of business at meetings,

establish an optional preliminary layer for appeals at the local level,

provide that long term agreements be reviewed by an outside expert

or attorney,

provide that at the completion of their duties local officials turn over
local property to the proper local officers,

provide that pronouns refer to men and women, and

provide a method of amending the bylaws.

Locals must have reasonable attendance rules in their bylaws requiring
elected officials to attend a stipulated number of local meetings, with
non-monetary penalties such as automatic removal for non-compliance.
Interestingly, in a 1980 interpretation, the UAW interprets the
constitution to mean that such bylaws apply with equal force to
UAW-appointed reps such as benefits, health and safety, and alcohol and
drug abuse reps, and apprentice committee members "on submission of
the facts to [the appointing authority] for necessary action by his or her
office." Where a bylaw provides for automatic removal, I do not take this
to mean that the UAW appointer has discretion to retain a rep who has
not satisfied attendance requirements and not presented legitimate
excuses as judged within the local.

Another interpretation explains that such bylaws should only apply to

elected officials, not candidates.

A 1953 administrative letter is also applicable, according to the Guide for

Local Union Bylaws, though it is not contained in the interpretations
bound with the constitution. It suggests in sum that the attendance
bylaws:

set a standard of attending at least two of every three meetings,

refer to membership meetings as well as meetings involving the

officials' office or position,
 establish a mechanism -- such as a standing "excuse" committee or
the membership itself -- to judge the legitimacy of excuses for
officials who fail to meet the requirement, and

provide for publicity of the bylaws via acceptance forms and meeting
attendance receipts.
Article 37 section 5;
article 37 section 5 interpretation 1 (non-application to candidates) (5/27/53);
article 37 section 5 interpretation 3 (application to appointees) (12/16/80);
administrative letter, volume 5 # 13 (7/6/53) (standards for bylaws).

The IEB is to ratify initial bylaws, and repeal bylaws and amendments
which do not conform to the constitution. Normally the review task is
delegated to presidential assistants, who require that requesting locals
submit an entire set of bylaws for approval when any one is amended.
Bylaws may be disapproved for reasons other than nonconformity to the
constitution, such as unclarity or likelihood to lead to conflict among
members, litigation, undue financial liability for the local, or audit
problems. Opinions of the president about bylaws expressed prior to
receipt of the entire set are unofficial and of no constitutional
significance.
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), pp 14-16;
see also article 12 section 5 (IEB will repeal bylaws of any subordinate body not
conforming to the constitution),
article 37 section 3 (locals must establish bylaws and submit them to IEB for ratification;
bylaw changes enacted by locals, excepting bylaws concerning non-attendance by
elected officials at meetings, are not effective until approved by IEB; all bylaws remain
 effective until repealed by IEB),
article 37 section 5 (bylaw changes enacted by locals concerning non-attendance by
elected officials at meetings are not effective until approved by IEB);
Tencza, 1 PRB 497, 501 (1968) (PRB orders local to amend bylaws to provide penalties
for elected officials' non-attendance at meetings),
Local 145 v IEB, 3 PRB 363, 364 (1982) (absent bad faith, PRB may not review IEB's
policy-based collective bargaining judgment reviewing proposed bylaw revisions).

A local is to guard its membership and mailing lists.

Article 37 section 9,
EPC, Business and Financial Activities of Union Officials ("The mailing lists of the Union
are valuable assets.");
Schultz v Region 5, PRB Case 1498 (3/17/05), pp 2, 6 (lost time vouchers and
correspondence containing names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of other
members are not mailing lists within the meaning of the constitution or the EPC).

Action taken by a local contrary to its bylaws -- including an action

amending the bylaws -- is null and void.
McCue v Local 1459, 2 PRB 780, 783 (1980) ("... the membership's action was contrary
to the requirement of Local bylaws and hence null and void."),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 859, 864 (1981) (deficiency of four-day notice that
meeting would consider enlarging terms of office meant that action on that subject was
of no force and effect, because bylaws provided for seven-day notice).

The PRB once remarkably said a change of a local's organizational

structure due to having changed from a single-unit to a multi-unit local
was only a ministerial matter.
Moye v UAW, 5 PRB 612, 619 (1989).
Within a local the membership acting either in the voting booth or in a
meeting is the highest authority. Local officers must carry out local
directives:
As we understand the Constitution of the Union, a Local Officer is obliged to carry out
the directions of a Local membership or, if he believes the directives to be improper or
illegal, to appeal such directives to the International Executive Board. The failure of
Local officials to so act might, given the presence of improper motivations, subject
them to liability under [the predecessor of article 31].

Dunlap v UAW, 1 PRB 547, 549 (1969).

Whether the membership is the highest authority in a local under

administratorship is not clear. See also:
Guide for Local Union Bylaws, article 6(a);
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 204 (1961) (under administratorship authority of administrator
is temporarily substituted for that of the general membership),
Local 262 Shop Committee v Local 262, 1 PRB 247, 249 (1961) (membership vests shop
committee with its powers),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 475 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969) (purpose of
article 19 section 3 was to protect right of a bargaining unit to self-determination in the
matter of wages, hours, and conditions),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969) (sovereign membership of the local
union),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 113 (1984) (membership fundamental
unit of government),
Jenkins v UAW, 4 PRB 302, 305 (1984) (president is servant of local membership not its
master),
EP complaint of Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 595 (1988) (membership is sovereign
authority),
 Campbell appealing Cox v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 343 (1992) (membership should tell local
officers what it means by contradictory bylaws),
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 61, 67, 68 (1998) (local joint membership council is highest
authority in administered statewide local),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 107, 109 (2001) (ultimate sovereignty of a local lies in its
membership);
but see Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 298 (1975) (quoting disapproving IEB reference to
decision at a local meeting as "an action in which the membership, by a vote of a small
handful attending the membership meeting"),
McCue v Local 1459, 2 PRB 780, 783 (1980) (action taken by a local which is contrary to
its bylaws is null and void),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 2-3, 13, 18-19, 22, 27 (financial
secretary-treasurer chargeable for defying will of membership, as expressed by LEB
which instructed her not to post office employee payroll information on her office
window),
Grima v Region 1A, PRB Case 1606 (11/24/08), p 20 ("While Local Executive officers
necessarily exercise a great deal of control over the operation of the Local, their
authority is not absolute.");
election guide, p 74 ("A situation may arise when a group of officers is elected by the
votes of a thousand or more yet when the Election Committee reports to the
membership a group of 50 or 75 might constitute the majority of that membership
meeting and reject the Election committee's report on some very minor, technical, or
insubstantial grounds, thus frustrating the will of the majority.");
but see Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1604 (11/25/08), pp 11, 15-16 (though election
committee scheduled election in defiance of vote of membership and appellant lost
Motor City chairperson position by only seven votes, election will not be rerun again
since appellant did not appeal until after IEB-ordered rerun election which reran only
other positions not Motor City chairperson position).

Amalgamated locals are a little different.

Article 35;
article 35 section 3(a) interpretation 3 (a unit of one employee in an amalgamated local
will be considered as having satisfactory proportional representation in joint council by
 having a single delegate) (6/16/06);
Local 453 v Hawkins, 1 PRB 234, 236 n 2 (1961) (in amalgamated local membership's
function is performed by a joint council),
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251 (1975), 2 PRB 264 (1976) (joint council ordered to adopt a
formula for recording of proportionate votes allocated to respective constituent units),
Moye v UAW, 5 PRB 612 (1989) (procedure for changing single-unit local to
amalgamated local),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680 (1989) (voting rights of members of
defunct units),
Baker v IEB, 11 PRB 439, 444-45 (2002) (request of unit to withdraw),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), pp 7-8 (though this situation may not have been
anticipated when it was drafted, unambiguous language of article 35 section 3(a)
requires that every autonomous unit of an amalgamated local must have at least two
delegates to the joint council),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), pp 11-13 (PRB remands appeal as to meaning
of affiliation agreement because there was no on-point language in the agreement to
be interpreted),
Hodges v Local 600, PRB Case 1618 (6/2/09), pp 10-11 (where profit-sharing contract
for unit of amalgamaged local is signed by local president on behalf of the local and
anticipates that the president will be the union's rep for administration purposes, it was
proper for local president to enter negotiations and settle a dispute as to how to treat
an unusual payment from a supplier).

The duties of local officers, stewards, and committeepersons are

discussed elsewhere.

Several appeals have addressed the powers of locals and their relation to
the convention.
Article 8 section 25 (locals may not instruct or bind its delegates' votes on any issue at a
convention);
Dunlap v UAW, 1 PRB 547, 549 (1969) (convention delegates cannot be charged for
failure to follow local instructions at convention),
 Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 41-45 (1995) (IEB can approve spousal travel
convention expenses),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 113-14 (1993) (IEB not local decides which convention
expenses are necessary),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228, 234, 237 (1994) (locals may not instruct or bind its
delegates' votes on any issue at a convention).

The UAW and a local may have adverse positions in an appeal.

Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241 (1999) (UAW suggests that local should be
responsible for all or some of appellant's damages in which both processed grievance
irrationally).

In article 37 the constitution notes "workplace councils," which can be

established in locals or units of an amalgamated locals to serve as
membership bodies. A workplace council consists of the elected officers
plus additional elected proportional representation as approved by the
IEB and the bylaws. On petition of a local with substantial membership
and as provided in the bylaws, the IEB can establish a "representative
workplace council" consisting of the local officers with additional elected
proportional representation, which serves as the local's membership
body. It meets once a month, with a general membership meeting once a
year. I don't know if there are any locals with either type of council.
Article 37 section 4.

A local union can organize a membership corporation under state law to

own real property for the benefit of the local. The membership and
officers of the corporation must be the same as the local's. Parts of the
constitution affecting the relation between the UAW and the locals apply
equally to the relation between the UAW and such corporations, particularly
including parts relating to reorganizations, administratorships, bylaws,
reductions due to plant closings or layoffs, and audits. A local
may not insulate itself from UAW scrutiny by acting through a building
corporation.
Article 37 section 8;
Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 203-05 (1961) (interests of local respecting corporate property
are identical to interests of corporation).

Non-subordinate bodies, administrative arms

Table of Contents

Certain UAW bodies are administrative arms, without autonomy. They are
neither chartered nor non-chartered subordinate bodies.
Article 20 section 1,
see also article 36 section 15 (distinguishing chartered and non-chartered subordinate
bodies).

Most prominent among them are the intra-corporation councils. I don't

see any difference between an administrative arm and a non-chartered
subordinate body. But the constitution asserts they are different so I list
them separately. Their decisions are appealable. The "members" of
councils are the affected locals, which participate through elected
delegates. Councils can set up sub-councils. Councils and sub-councils
both have bylaws. A council's purpose is to coordinate the demands of
member locals, and convene at least 30 days before negotiations to
formulate demands and policies in dealing with the employer. It may not
legislate for the union at large.
Article 20 section 1 ("[A]n Intra-corporation Council shall be an administrative arm of the
International Union and not a subordinate body."),
article 20 section 5 ("The purpose of the Intra-Corporation Council shall be to coordinate
the demands of the separate members and to formulate pote po licies in dealing with
their common employer. The Intra-Corporation Council shall be convened not later
that thirty (30) days prior to the opening of negotiations for a new national corporation
agreement to formulate new contract demands. The Council shall deal only with
matters pertaining to problems arising in their immediate corporation. It shall be
understood that such Intra-Corporation Council is not a legislative body of the
International Union and shall not deal with policies of the International Union other
than those concerning their own immediate corporation problems."),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 511-12 (1969) (at a time when PRB had no jurisdiction over
appeals from administrative arms, PRB asserts jurisdiction anyway because IEB had
considered the matter pursuant to article 12 section 7 which concerned appeals from
subordinate bodies, despite language of article 20 section 1),
Kerik v UAW Ford Sub-Council 3, 2 PRB 772, 774 (1980) (Ford sub-council No. 3 has
bylaws),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 5 (GM council has bylaws).

Again, whether the UAW regions or the IEB itself are administrative arms
or are non-chartered subordinate bodies is unclear. Regardless, their
decisions are appealable.
Additionally, articles 24-28 provide for certain departments, and article
12 section 13 authorizes the IEB to set up additional departments.
Whether the departments are administrative arms or non-chartered
subordinate bodies is not clear.
Article 24 (competitive shop department),
article 25 (research department),
article 26 (civil and human rights department),
article 27 (education department),
article 28 (family education center department);
see also article 12 section 13 (additional departments).

At any rate, the departments grouped under the title "national collective
bargaining departments" on the UAW's website are the important
corporate/industry departments:

General Motors
Ford
DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace
Agricultural implement
Competitive shop/independents, parts and suppliers
Heavy trucks
Transnational and joint ventures
Technical, office & professional
Skilled trades

On the same page are the departments under the president:

 Arbitration
Community Action Program
National CAP Civil
Rights Community
Services Education
Governmental & International Affairs
Health and Safety
Information Systems
Legal
Legislative
Public Relations and Publications
Research
Research Library
Retired Workers
Social Security

On the same page are the departments under the secretary-treasurer:

Accounting
Auditing
Circulation
Purchasing and Supply
Strike Insurance
Technical, Office & Professional
Women's
Other UAW departments on the page are:

Conservation & Resource Development

Consumer Affairs
Organizing
Recreation & Leisure-Time Activities
Time Study and Engineering
Veterans

The union also maintains a family education center on a thousand acres of

woods at Black Lake in northwest lower Michigan. Again, I don't know
which category it is in. Funded by interest on the strike assistance fund, it
is equipped with classrooms, an auditorium, a gym, a pool, a weight
room, a sauna, a campground, a boat launch, rooms, and a golf course.
Scholarships are available.
The education center conducts conferences geared to the responsibilities of union
officeholders. Classes are offered on leadership development, union involvement,
health and safety, political action, civil rights and many other topics. It is also used by
UAW regions for leadership training in their summer and fall schools.

Article 28.

A local shop committee is not a subordinate body.

Local 262 Shop Committee v Local 262, 1 PRB 247, 249 (1961) (local shop committee
not a subordinate body and has no rights of appeal),
Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 591 (local shop committee may not
appeal).
The UAW has collaborative ventures with each of the big 3 auto
companies. Other than what is on their websites I don't know much about
them. They are not subordinate bodies.
UAW-GM Center for Human Resources,
UAW-Ford National Programs Center,
UAW-DaimlerChrysler National Training Center.

A skilled trades conference is not a subordinate body. It has its own rules
for credentials.
Sosnowski v Local 719, 2 PRB 923, 925 (1980).

The UAW's call to a 1993 skilled trades conference authorized Local 599
to send six official delegates and two fraternal delegates to a skilled
trades conference. The local voted to send extra delegates beyond the
two allotted fraternals. A 1978 administrative letter prohibits this; it
prohibits locals from sending fraternals to council, sub-council, or
conference meetings except with the president's permission. But no
appeal was taken. The extra delegates' credentials were not challenged at
the conference. The local president then attempted to block payment of
their expenses. The membership overruled him and he appealed. Because
there was no appeal of the original decision the PRB upheld payment of the
expenses notwithstanding the 1978 letter.
Yettaw v Local 599, 8 PRB 363, 367 (1994);
see also administrative letter, volume 30 # 5 (10/19/78) (prohibiting sending fraternals
to meetings other than conventions without president's permission);
 Shinn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 250, 252, 255 (1991) (administrative letter prohibits fraternals
at meetings other than conventions without president's permission),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 112-13 (1993) (IEB not local decides what expenses are
necessary).

The Staff Council is the bargaining agent of the international reps

employed by the UAW. Occasionally it has grievances or litigation with
the UAW. It is not a subordinate body.
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330, 334 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 340-41,
343-44 (1988) (memoranda between UAW and Staff Council sufficient to provide notice
of UAW rule to international reps).

Rival unions seeking to supplant the UAW as bargaining agent are not
subordinate bodies.
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 101-02, 112 (1974) (autonomy of ratification, separate
committee representation, and right to vote separately conceded to skilled trades by
UAW in response to challenge by ISST),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 134-35, 145 (1974) (autonomy of ratification, separate
committee representation, and right to vote separately conceded to skilled trades by
UAW in response to challenge by ISST),
Gonzales v Local 163, 2 PRB 386, 389-90 (1976) (UAW may remove ISST supporter
from office).

The Administration Caucus ("AC") is a political party in the UAW, not a

subordinate body. It doesn't have a website. In 1988 the PRB noted the
AC's dominance in the IEB:
We cannot ignore the fact that the UAW is now, and has been for over 20 years, a
one-party institution not in all respects unlike that found in many national governments
 in which a single political party controls the government, and the officials who formally
make and administer the laws pursuant to which the country is governed are selected
wholly by that party. As a consequence, in the UAW the lines of demarcation between
party, the Administration Caucus, and the formal governing body, the International
Executive Board, have become blurred, for 100% of its personnel are, and traditionally
have been members of the Administration Caucus.

Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 342
(1988).

In the late 1980s the New Directions Movement ("NDM") challenged the
AC and in 1988 briefly gained one seat on the IEB. The PRB later
observed:
Clearly, the advent of the New Directions movement in the UAW, and its challenge in
1992 for the top two offices of the International Union plus various Regional
directorships, renders the analogy [to one-party control] archaic.

EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7, 14-15, 17 n 12 (1992);

see also Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 138 (1994) ("New
Directions is a political caucus within the UAW."),
proceedings, 30th constitutional convention, p 236 (1992) (Higgins remarks)
(putting to rest PRB analogy of governmental structure of UAW to a
one-party institution).

NDM lost its IEB seat in 1989, and over the next several years it
diminished. It was not otherwise visible at the 2006 convention.
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), pp 1-4.

A local union can set up a Solidarity Committee using union resources in

consultation with a political caucus to resist company demands for
concessions.
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 130, 138 (1994).

Membership, dues
Table of Contents

Contents of This
Subsection

Active members ||
Retirees

Active members

Members owe a duty to try to understand and exemplify the intent and
purpose of her or his obligation as a member of the UAW, to render aid
and assistance for sister or brother members in cases of illness, death, or
distress, to acquit her or himself as a loyal and devoted member of the
UAW, and to participate in all political elections by registration and
balloting.
 Article 41 sections 1-3.

Article 6 outlines various rules about joining the UAW.

An applicant must be an "actual worker in and around the workplace"

and not affiliated with an organization with principles and philosophy
contrary to those in the preamble to the constitution.
Applicants sign a promise to abide by all laws, rules, and regulations
and the constitution.
Locals must act on applications within 60 days.
Applicants working for unorganized employers may join the UAW
directly until a local is chartered in their workplace, at which point
they become members of that local.
On acceptance of the application membership dates from first day of
the month for which dues are paid or check-off is authorized.
Rejected applications are not reconsidered for 30 days.
Unless waived by the local a candidate failing to present him or herself
for initiation within four weeks after notification of being accepted
without good and sufficient reason forfeits any money paid. No one
who is a department head, directs company policy, or who has
authority to hire and discharge workers can be accepted as a
member, and members promoted to such positions are issued
withdrawal cards.
Names of applicants about whom there is the least doubt may be
published in Solidarity, and no one can be received into membership
for 30 days after the publication; except that applications from an
 unorganized or newly organized workplace shall be held in
confidence.
Article 6 sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 17,
Article 16 section 5;
Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 607-10 (2000) (for new members, membership in good
standing and entitlement to vote is retroactive to first day of month in which they join),
Stoner v Local 292, 11 PRB 156, 161 (2001) (for new members, membership in good
standing and entitlement to vote is retroactive to first day of month in which they join).

All newly elected UAW members subscribe to the following at the time of
initiation:
I ___________ pledge my honor to faithfully observe the Constitution and laws of this
Union and the Constitution of the United States (or Canada, as the case may be); to
comply with all the rules and regulations for the government thereof; not to divulge or
make known any private proceedings of this Union; to faithfully perform all the duties
assigned to me to the best of my ability and skill; to so conduct myself at all times as
not to bring reproach upon my Union, and at all times to bear true and faithful
allegiance to the International Union, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW).

Article 43.

All members designate the UAW and his or her local as bargaining agent:
The International Union and the Local Union to which the member belongs shall be
her/his exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment; and for
the negotiation and execution of contracts with employers covering all such matters,
including contracts requiring membership or the continuance of membership in the
Union as a condition of employment or continued employment; and contracts requiring
 the employer to deduct, collect, or assist in collecting from her/his wages any dues,
initiation fees, reinstatement fees, payable to the International Union or her/his Local
Union.

Article 6 section 15;

Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 491 (1968) (UAW represents everyone in a
unit not just its members),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 791 (1990) (dissent) (most fundamental
obligation of office is to maintain and protect the interests of the members),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 220 (1996), quoting from Alspach v Local
977, 1 PRB 300 305 (1963) ("trust relationship ... is created when an
employee surrenders to a labor union his individual right in dealing with his
employer concerning the terms and conditions of his employment");
but see Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration
denied (4/22/09), p 26 n 69 ("Counsel for appellants has argued that
[discharged member] Crisco should not have been required to pay dues on
the money he earned outside the jurisdiction of the UAW because the Union
could not represent him at his new place of employment. Such an argument
might be used to defend a civil action to collect the dues, but it is clearly not
the rule under the UAW Constitution.");
see also article 6 section 16 (members designate UAW and local exclusively to
act for them in board and court proceedings in matters affecting their status
as employees or members, and to act as the members' agent and bind them
in the settlement of disputes of any kind arising out of the employer-
employee relationship).

Of the major auto contracts, only Chrysler's formally recognizes the locals
as joint representatives with the UAW. Ford and GM recognize only the
UAW. Perhaps there are side-letters in which these companies formally
recognize the locals as joint agents. I have not seen them, and moreover
my copies of the contracts are dated. I would appreciate current
documents from an interested member. Where there is no joint
recognition the UAW can unilaterally delegate bargaining responsibility to
the members' local.
UAW/Chrysler 1996 P & M national agreement, title page (including listed local unions
within the term "union"),
UAW/GM 1999 national agreement, paragraph 1 (recognizing only UAW)
UAW/Ford 1996 national agreement, preface (identifying UAW as "the union");
Jones v Local 1853, 10 PRB 95, 99 (1998) (bargaining agent is local and UAW),
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 135, 143 n 1 (2001) (though UAW was the certified
bargaining representative and the local union was not chartered until after the
certification, the UAW and the local represented the unit jointly).

Dues are equivalent to at least two hours' straight time pay per month
regardless whether you are paid on an hourly basis. If your pay varies, an
average is used. If you are fired or laid off and want to remain a member
even though you got a job somewhere else where the UAW does not
represent you, you still have to pay full dues.
Article 16 sections 2, 18, 19;
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), p 26
n 69 ("Counsel for appellants has argued that Crisco whould not have been required to
pay dues on the money he earned outside the jurisdiction of the UAW because the
Union could not represent him at his new place of employment. Such an argument
might be used to defend a civil action to collect the dues, but it is clearly not the rule
under the UAW Constitution. Under Article 16, § 18, of the UAW Constitution, a
discharged member is required to report to the Financial Secretary any other
employment he or she may obtain while discharged. Crisco became delinquent in the
payment of dues, therefore, as soon as he failed to report his other employment to the
Financial Secretary.").
Every member is a member of some local. Cards
There is no such thing as a member at under articles 16 and 17
large, except temporarily when a new
employer is being organized. Without As noted elsewhere, the language
special permission (for instance if you are of these sections is daunting. As
also noted elsewhere, please
on strike), you can be a member of only contact me if you think anything
one UAW local. here is wrong.

Article 6 section 2(b),

article 6 section 10;
Smith v UAW, 2 PRB 483, 485-86 (1976),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 343 (1994),
Mays v Local 598, 8 PRB 382, 385 (1994),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), pp 14-15
("There was no need for Grima to apply for dual
membership pursuant to Article 6, § 10, because
[under article 17 section 3] he remained a member
of Local Union 174 as long as he continued to be
elected as its President.").
A supervisor may not become or remain a
UAW member.
Dues are generally two hours'
straight time pay a month.
If you don't work by reason of not
being scheduled for work at least
40 hours in a calendar month you
are "entitled to exemption of
payment of regular monthly dues."
An exception to the 40-hour
not-working requirement is if you
received 40 hours worth of benefits
in lieu of work, such as SUB or

Article 6 section 11,

article 17 sections 10, 12-13;
compare Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 309-10,
311-12 (1965) (supervisors holding withdrawal
cards but also holding seniority in the bargaining
unit remain subject to union rules on returning to
unit).

Attempt to summarize

Dues, Good Standing, and

Honorable Withdrawal Transfer
 dues are reduced to one hour's
The UAW draws a distinction between straight
"membership" and "membership in good time pay a month if you make 50%
standing." Good standing status is said to or more of your gross pay for a
40-hour week, less deductions, in
be necessary for strike authorizations, and the month.
almost everything else. Without it a
member ceases to be a member, and has If you are on check-off and are
no rights under the constitution. But there separated by layoff, leave, or
discharge, you are automatically
are strange exceptions. Good standing is entitled to something called
not necessary to participate in contract "out-of-work" credits, and you are
ratification. And the decisions are not exempted from dues payment,
unless you got benefits in lieu of
consistent as to whether a non-member work equivalent to 40 hours.
has a right to appeal.
The constitution has the term
Article 8 section 11 (one-year continuous good "out-of-work" in the phrase "'out-
standing to run for convention delegate), of-work' credits" always in quotes.
article 31 section 1 (good standing necessary to file It does not define an "out-of-work"
charge), credit, or explain the significance of
article 38 section 3 (one-year continuous good having more than one. The PRB
standing to run for office), defined a member's certification of
article 38 section 10(a) (good standing necessary to entitlement to them in 2009 by
vote for officers),
article 47 section 2 (locals may provide for forfeiture
of membership or a delinquent member for
non-payment of dues without necessity of trial),
article 50 section 1(a) (good standing necessary to
vote to authorize strike);
Local 262 Shop Committee v Local 262, 1 PRB 247,
249 (1961) (local shop committee is not a UAW
"member" with right of appeal, though individual
equivalent benefits, or vacation pay, holiday pay,
jury duty pay, bereavement pay, or paid absence
allowance. Exceptions to the exception are pension
benefits, S&A benefits, and workers compensation.
Another exception to the exception is that your
 members of it have that right),
Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 591
(local shop committee may not appeal),
Appeal of Collins, 1 PRB 694, 695-98 (1971) (good
standing necessary to receive strike benefits),
Appeal of Vincent, 1 PRB 783, 784-85 (1973) (good
standing necessary to vote for district
committeeperson),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 15-16, 20 (1980)
(without examining their good standing status,
former employees out of plant for six years
permitted to appeal rescission of preferential recall
rights),
Morgan v Local 2083, 5 PRB 377, 381 (1987) (good
standing necessary to vote for committeeperson),
Kelly v UAW, 5 PRB 484, 488 (1988) (fired member
who failed to comply with article 16 section 19 lost
good standing, and thereby ceased to be a union
member, and therefore "no longer has any rights
under [the] Constitution]," and therefore cannot
appeal),
Robinson appealing Blandford v Local 659, 6 PRB 219,
224 (1991) (good standing needed to participate in
appeal),
Toth v Local 723, 5 PRB 644, 647 (1989) (PRB
decides appeal of resigned member on the merits),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 336, 340-45, 346 (1994)
(good standing not sufficient for member to file a
charge, member must also have standing),
Mays v Local 598, 8 PRB 382, 384 (1994) (member
may appeal issue whether he has good standing
and right to appeal),
Doty v Local 974, 9 PRB 443, 447-48 (1997) (no
requirement of membership in good standing
holding it consists of informing the financial
secretary you are not working either for your
UAW-represented employer or any other
employer.
Whether covered by check-off or
not, to be entitled to "out-of-work"
credits you have to report your
separation to the local financial
secretary within a month. If you
are laid off or go on leave (but not
if you are fired) and don't report it
timely you automatically get an
honorable withdrawal transfer card
("withdrawal card").
Any fired member or member
covered by check-off must report
any other employment to the
financial secretary immediately.
(Laid-off or on-leave members not
covered by checkoff are not
mentioned.)
Any member not covered by
check-off must report the
termination of the separation or
other employment. I assume for
members covered by checkoff the
termination of separation is
 necessary to participate in contract ratification),
Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) pp
12-13 (claimed member whose appeal was barred
by local president on ground that he was not a
member was entitled to appeal the issue whether
he was a member),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 12
(questioning whether in light of article 47 section 2
forfeiture of membership does not automatically
result from a dues delinquency),
Nafus v Region 9, PRB Case 1531 (4/12/06), p 4 n 12
(fired non-member fee-payer permitted to appeal);
Pickett v UAW, CAC, session 11/82 (membership is
required to begin an appeal).
There is only one category of
good-standing membership. Laid-off and
employed members in good standing have
equal rights and privileges.
Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 137 (1960).
How do you lose good standing? Dues
delinquency deprives a member of "good
standing" status, by operation of articles
16 and 17. No trial is necessary. The only
other ways to lose it are by conviction after
a fair trial, or by resigning from the union.
In the box at right I try to explain what
reported to the union by the company.
If you are entitled to "out-of-work" credits under
article 17 section 2, you are exempted from paying
dues. (Article 17 section 2 doesn't
provide for entitlement to
"out-of-work" credits.)
Any member entitled to
"out-of-work" credits and who does
not have a withdrawal card is
presumed to continue to be entitled
and thus remains in continuous
good standing without paying dues
for six months unless the member
had employment which would
necessitate paying dues or taking a
withdrawal card.
"Six months" means the period
from the date of separation to the
end of the sixth calendar month
following the month of separation.
For members getting SUB or similar
money subject to dues, the six
months starts when the benefits
are exhausted, or any subsequent
combination of six months during
the layoff.
articles 16 and 17 say. These articles are
quite complex as the PRB said in 2005:
Making sense of the provisions in the International
constitution that deal with members' dues
obligations is a daunting task to say the least, and
this is particularly so in the case of discharged
members. The extremely dense prose of Article 16
§§18 and 19, is followed by further complications in
regard to the issuance of Honorable Withdrawal
Transfer Cards in Article 17. Article 17 refers back
to Article 16 and also to Article 47. Article 47
indicates that the Local Union may provide for the
forfeiture of membership for non-payment of dues
without the necessity of filing charges and
conducting a trial, but this suggests that forfeiture
of membership does not automatically result from a
delinquency. We question whether a set of
consistent rules regarding the obligations of
discharged members can actually be gleaned from
these provisions, but in any event, it is clear that an
understanding of these provisions cannot be
imputed to individual members. Discharged
members have an absolute right to rely on the
instructions given to them by their Local Financial
Secretary in regard to their dues obligations, and
they cannot be held to have broken membership in
good standing if they follow such instructions, even
where such instructions are inconsistent with some
portion of Article 16 and the related provisions of
the Constitution.
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05),
p 12;
According to the constitution, unless you certify in
writing to the financial secretary during the last ten
days of the six-month period that
you continue to be eligible for
good standing status without
paying dues, local records will
automatically show you were
issued a withdrawal card at the end
of the six months. In 2009, the
UAW stated that just because local
records show you were issued a
withdrawal card doesn't mean it
should have physically issued it.
The certification must be in person
or by registered or certified mail. If
you do certify, your "out-of-work"
credits continue for each calendar
month in which you similarly certify
during the last ten days. If you fail
to certify during a month, you get a
withdrawal card automatically on
the first day of the month.
If you are out of work because of
illness or injury you are
automatically exonerated from
dues payment if you have proof.
Withdrawal cards are issued to
 see also article 16 sections 8-10, 12,
article 47 section 2 (local can provide for
forfeiture of membership without trial of
delinquent member);
see also Smith v UAW, 2 PRB 483 (1976) (fired
member who has obtained work outside UAW
jurisdiction and wishes to continue to pay dues
and remain a UAW member must verify
employment and the rate of pay to IEB, and
may do so in an anonymous way if the
member fears UAW retaliation),
Stevens v Local 595, 2 PRB 493 (1976) (fired
member held as in good standing until his
reinstatement despite IEB interpretation,
anticipating a constitutional change, that he
should be on withdrawal during period),
Seal v Local 216, 3 PRB 338, 341-42 (1982)
(laid-off member's good standing status
continued when she in effect inquired of local
financial secretary as to how it could be
maintained by attempting to pay her dues;
financial secretary rejected her dues but did
not tell her of entitlement to "out-of-work"
credits by certifying during last ten days of
first automatic six-month "out-of-work" credits
period under article 16 section 18 and article
17 section 2),
Mays v Local 598, 8 PRB 382, 385 (1994)
(pendency of grievance longer than six months
after discharge without certifying eligibility for
"out-of-work" credits is insufficient to maintain
good standing status),
Bryant v Local 2116, 10 PRB 588, 591 (2001)
(voluntarily laid-off member on check-off did
members laid off and working outside UAW
jurisdiction, and to members who voluntarily
separate from UAW jurisdiction. An IEB
interpretation says members who
go to elected public office and fired
members are exempt from the
automatic issuance of a withdrawal
card, or not, according to the
local's discretion, subject to appeal
under article 33. As to fired
members I don't understand this
because nothing says a fired
member gets an automatic
withdrawal card in the first place.
Moreover the PRB's Weissman
decision discussed in the main text
rejects the interpretation.
The significance of a withdrawal
card is that it interrupts your good
standing status. The holder of a
withdrawal card can become a
member again without hassles by
resuming employment under UAW
jurisdiction.
If you are laid off you can choose
to remain a member in good
standing simply by continuing to
pay dues.
 not maintain continuous good standing after
six months though company reported his layoff
status monthly to the recording secretary
because additional requirement of notifying
the local he was not fully employed was not
satisfied),
Abronowitz v Local 2256 PRB Case 1599
(9/25/08), p 10 (local president's notice to
appellants regarding dues arrearages was not
malicious, but mere advice on how to maintain
good standing, though it was subsequently
determined they were entitled to "out-of-work"
credits),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), p 14
("We believe, however, that the text in Article
17 is sufficiently clear to resolve the issue of
appellants' standing to protest the rerun of the
election at Local Union 174, without the need
for any further explanations.").
Four years later in 2009 the PRB backed
away from this sweeping language in an
appeal it described as a high profile
dispute involving fundamental questions of
the reciprocal rights and obligations of a local and its members.
To get a withdrawal card your dues
must be current or you must have
out-of-work receipts and you must
not owe money to the local.
"Out-of-work receipts" are not
defined. Withdrawal cards are
involved when you transfer from
one local to another. The local or
UAW can terminate one "for good
and sufficient reasons." On
depositing the card and resuming
membership, you are subject to
article 31 charges for acts you
committed while holding the
withdrawal card. An officer or rep
of the UAW or a local who is
offered to go into management
must get union permission to get a
withdrawal card, and violators are
subject to expulsion.

Local 3520 in North Carolina retroactively lapsed five members of the

bargaining committee as of October 2007, six months after their
discharges for leading a strike at Freightliner. The five had also held other
local offices, some on the LEB.
Appellants were not told of the lapse until four months later in February
2008. During the four months they signed in and participated in
membership and officer meetings without protest from the local or its
financial secretary. Her primary job was to determine and know members'
dues obligations and maintain an accurate list of active members, and she
hadn't seen a problem with appellants' continuing membership.
Appellants also secured a "not guilty" verdict in a union trial in November
seeking to expel them for their strike activities. In January their names
were on a list of eligible members to vote in a local election.

But other local officers consulted the UAW concerning the validity of a
nomination made by one of the appellants in the January election. The
president's office told them the nominator was not in good standing
because he was terminated more than six months ago and had not
notified the financial secretary of his wish to stay a member.

So the local lapsed him and the four other appellants as of October 2007,
even as it allowed the nomination to stand. They appealed. By the time of
the PRB decision, arbitrators had put two of them back to work but not
the others.

Article 16 sections 18-19 say in daunting language that starting the sixth
month after being fired or laid off, unemployed members wishing to
remain active must certify every month in a timely writing with a written
receipt, that he or she "continues to be eligible for good standing
membership without payment of dues." If you do find interim work, you
are to report it promptly to the financial secretary and pay whatever dues
are assessed.

The local's practice had been to allow laid-off members to certify by

phone without stating whether they had interim work. In April 2008 the
LEB reinstated a different fired committeeperson though he had not
certified at the end of his six months, because he had a grievance
pending.
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), pp 9,
19, 29, record pp 100, 214-15, 281.

The IEB held that appellants lapsed in October 2007 because, in the last
10 days of the six-month period, they didn't certify in writing that they
were unemployed or had a job. Appellants answered that the financial
secretary told them they need not certify. She denied it. Without holding
a live hearing, the IEB credited her. Appellants were not issued
withdrawal cards, the IEB continued, because article 16 section 19
requires only that the issuance of withdrawal cards is to be noted on local
records, not that they be physically issued. The IEB cited a notice on the
local's website which said to certify you must give the union a monthly
letter saying you want to stay a member. The IEB added that appellants
had not paid dues on certain income they had from the local during the
first six months after the discharges.
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), pp
11-17, 13 n 47, 26 n 67, record pp 100, 169, 170.
At the PRB, all appellants, including the three still fired, argued that under
the PRB's 1964 Weissman decision, fired members, including even those
whose grievances are lost, can continue to pay dues and maintain good
standing. Bob Weissman, by then a retiree, gave an affidavit saying he
stayed a member for 25 years after he was fired and lost his grievance.
Further, article 45 section 1 interpretation 1 says a fired committeeperson
with a grievance pending "remains a member" and may run for re-
election. Further, UAW Vice-President General Holiefield wrote appellants
in February 2008 stating he considered they were still UAW members.
Further, the PRB held in 2005 that article 16 section is so dense, daunting,
and inconsistent that understanding of it cannot be attributed to individual
members. Further, the website notice does not
say you have to report interim income. Further, the local allowed other
members to maintain good standing via technically non-compliant phone
calls. Further, another fired committeeperson with a pending grievance
was allowed to remain a member without certifying. Further, the fact that
four of the five appellants signed in faithfully at all monthly meetings
after their discharges amounted to an expression that at least the four
wanted to remain union members. Further, appellants were not issued
withdrawal cards at the end of the six months. Further, each of them
consulted the financial secretary about the certification process, and was
told no certification was necessary because of their open grievances and
signing in at meetings. Further, they paid all required dues in the first six
months after the discharges. Finally, active interest and involvement such
as appellants' is to be encouraged in the labor movement rather than
discouraged by nitpicking exclusion.
 Article 45 section 1 interpretation 1 (1/12/46) ("Where a Committeeperson is discharged
by management and her/his grievance is pending, s/he remains a member of her/his
Local and unit and, if otherwise eligible, may run for re-election or other office in such
unit or Local or for Convention Delegate. And where pending the outcome of her/his
grievance s/he finds temporary employment elsewhere her/his membership in her/his
original Local is not affected and s/he need not transfer to the Local having jurisdiction
over her/his new workplace. The new Local should issue to her/him a work permit.").

None of that was relevant, said the PRB, though it agreed the IEB was
wrong to hold appellants did not pay dues during the first six months, and
it was wrong not to have held a fact-finding hearing. Even so, the PRB said,
the record is clear that in October 2007 at the end of the six
months, appellants failed to formally notify the financial secretary the
amount of their interim wages, whether it was zero in the case of four of
them or a positive number in the case of the fifth appellant David Crisco
who had found interim work. (The PRB said Brother Crisco should have
paid dues based on his hourly rate at the interim job even though the
UAW didn't represent him there.) Had appellants simply informed the
financial secretary of their employment or unemployment, the PRB said,
they would not have lapsed and no appeal would have been necessary.
The PRB added that "out-of-work" credits are defined in article 16 section
18.
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), p 24
("... 'out-of-work' credits as defined in Article 16, §18....");
article 16 section 18 ("A member who has been laid off, is on leave of absence, or is
discharged from regular employment who is covered by check-off provisions under
which management notifies the Local Union of members who are on leave of absence,
laid off, rehired, or discharged, shall automatically be considered as entitled to
 "out-of-work" credits, unless s/he has received benefits in lieu of work equivalent to
forty (40) hours' pay as provided in the second paragraph of this Section. Any member
in order to be entitled to "out-of-work" credits shall report her/his layoff, leave of
absence, or discharge, in person or otherwise, to the Financial Secretary of her/his
Local Union within one month of the date such action became effective. ... Any member
who is entitled to "out-of-work" credits pursuant to this Section and Section 2 of Article
17 shall be exempted from dues payment for the period of her/his entitlement.").

The heart of the opinion follows:

In the Karras descision [in 2005] we held that the provisions of the International
Constitution describing the dues obligations of discharged and laid-off members are so
complex that such members have an absolute right to rely on instructions given to
them by the Local Financial Secretary with regard to such obligations, even if such
instructions later turn out to be in conflict with some portion of Article 16. We reaffirm
that holding here. ...

...

We are troubled by the IEB's failure to conduct a hearing on this appeal so that explicit
testimony could have been obtained about what the parties actually said to one
another on this subject. This was a high profile dispute involving the discharge of Local
Union officers and it focused public attention on the UAW's appellate processes. The
failure to provide an opportunity for appellants to make their case and defend their
positions in person is especially unfortunate given the political dimensions of appellants'
relations to other Local Union members after the unsuccessful strike.

...

We find it significant that appellants failed to create any memorandum of the

communications with [financial secretary] Brown. All of the statements in the record
were prepared months after the events giving rise to this appeal and there is no
concrete evidence contemporaneous with the period prior to October 2007 to
corroborate any of them. In a matter of such significance, it would be expected that
appellants would have confirmed Brown's instructions to them in a letter. In addition, it
is evident that Brown was not thinking about the requirements of Article 16, §19, with
respect to appellants during this period.

...

In any event, appellants cannot credibly claim that they did not fully understand the
Constitutional procedure for certifying their continued eligibility for "out of work" credits
after six months. Appellants knew that they were not paying dues. The record
demonstrates that they knew unemployed members had to take some action to
maintain their good standing. Robert Whiteside had described the certification
procedure for laid off employees in his website posting following the layoffs in March
2003....

Accordingly, there was no reason for appellants to have asked Financial Secretary
Brown about the certification procedure, because there was no ambiguity about its
requirements in these circumstances. In the case of four of the appellants, all they had
to do was to inform the Financial Secretary that they were not receiving income from
any other source. David Crisco [the one appellant who had found interim employment],
on the other hand, was required to report the income that he received form his other
employment to the Financial Secretary so that his dues obligation could be determined.
[footnote omitted] Had he done this, he would have been entitled to rely on what the
Financial Secretary told him was required. In short, appellants were not free to ignore
their dues obligations entirely based solely on a casual remark by the Financial
Secretary about what she believed were their intentions, even assuming that Brown
made the statement attributed to her....

...

The source of appellants' misunderstanding regarding their dues obligations was

apparently the Interpretation of Article 45, §1, cited in their argument, which held that
a committeeperson's eligibility for office is not affected by discharge. That
Interpretation has nothing to do with the member's dues obligation. It speaks to the
eligibility of a discharged committeeperson to run for re-election. The section assumes
the committeeperson is fulfilling the basic obligations of a Local Union member with
regard to the payment of dues. If the Interpretation were about a member's dues
obligations it would be associated with Article 16 instead of Article 45. Appellants'
reading of this Interpretation is simply incorrect.

Appellants have argued that even if Financial Secretary Brown did not give explicit
instructions to them regarding the application of Article 16, §19, her behavior
amounted to an assertion that their membership in good standing remained intact
following their discharge by Freightliner. ... Brown did not challenge appellants' right to
attend membership meetings prior to February 2008. [The UAW] attributed Brown's
silence to her belief at the time that appellants' theories about officers being exempt
from the dues obligation may well have been right and her desire not to start an
argument. Not only did Brown acquiesce in appellants' continued participation in the
Local Union's affairs, she specifically affirmed that they were members in good standing
during the trial which took place in November 2007. ...

...

A trial procedure initiated by charges filed pursuant to Article 31 of the Constitution is

designed to determine whether a member has committed some act which would justify
his expulsion from membership. ... The lapse of membership at the end of six months is
not the equivalent of explusion from the Union. ... The issuance of the honorable
withdrawal card, as the very name suggests, does not indicate any failure or
misconduct on the part of the former member. ...

In the atypical situation where [a fired or laid-off] member wishes to retain his
membership in order to run for office, Article 16, §19, puts the onus on the member to
keep the Financial Secretary advised of his intentions. The Financial Secretary is not
required to track down all members who have been separated from their employment
after the expiration of the six month period to remind them of their obligation to
certify. It is the member's obligation to keep his membership active. The member's
obligation in this respect is easy to understand and satisfy; the member simply has to
let the Financial Secretary know at the end of each month that he or she wishes to
continue as a member. Once that obligation is met, the member is entitled to rely on
any instructions the Financial Secretary gives regarding the payment of Union dues.
We understand appellants' position that they should not have had to notify Financial
Secretary Brown that they wanted to remain members because she already knew that.
Further, it was Financial Secretary Brown's business to know what the Constitution
required in regard to a member's dues obligation. Determining members' dues
obligations and maintaining an accurate list of active members is the primary obligation
of a Local Union Financial Secretary. Brown ought to have questioned appellants'
theory that they were allowed to continue their membership without the payment of
dues. Whether through intimidation, indecision, or ignorance, she failed to do her job
when she did not immediately raise the issue of "out-of-work" credits upon the
expiration of the six month period.

The fact is, however, that Financial Secretary Brown did not question appellants'
assertion that they were not required to pay dues and she did not know that they were
required to certify for "out-of-work" credits until January 2008. Her ignorance on this
point is not the kind of instruction upon which a member is entitled to rely, and
especially not members like appellants who were thoroughly familiar with the
certification requirements of employees who are no longer having their Union dues
automatically deducted from their paychecks. ...

... There has been no showing of an unfair application of Union rules or a consistent
practice of allowing members to continue in good standing without meeting the
certification requirements of Article 16, § 19. The case of Otis Tabor [the other fired
committeeman whom the local allowed to remain a member though he did not certify]
arose after October 2007, so appellants cannot claim to have been relying on it. ...

One of the basic obligations of Union membership is the payment of dues. Given their
situation, appellants should have been extra careful and diligent to perform this duty.
Had appellants paid their dues or certified their right to an exemption from dues, it
does appear that they could have continued their membership in the Local Union.
When appellants failed to certify their entitlement to "out-of-work" credits in October
2007, their membership lapsed automatically.

Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied

(4/22/09), pp 24-29;
compare EPC Democratic Practice 4 ("All Union rules and laws must be fairly
 and uniformly applied...."),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), p 12 (ambiguities in UAW-drafted
documents would be construed against the UAW).

Four of the appellants -- the ones who had not found interim work --
sought reconsideration. They pointed out that the factual question
whether appellants had informed the financial secretary in October 2007
that they were out of work had not been addressed in a factual hearing
up to that point in the appeal; none of the parties or witnesses on either
side had discussed, admitted, or denied it; the longstanding website
notice said you only have to tell the financial secretary you want to
maintain good standing not report interim employment or income; the
local accepted monthly telephone certfication from laid-off members
without inquiring whether they had interim employment or income; it was
the PRB which injected the question of interim employment into the
appeal and made it key to the result; questions posed in the PRB's notice
to present oral argument had not identified interim employment as a key
issue; and though there was a 2001 decision which held similarly to this
one, neither the local, the IEB, nor the PRB itself cited it in this appeal.
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), pp
392-93 (notice of hearing);
compare Bryant v Local 2116, 10 PRB 588, 591 (2001) (voluntarily laid-off member on
check-off did not maintain continuous good standing after six months though company
reported his layoff status monthly to the recording secretary because additional
requirement of notifying the local he was not fully employed was not satisfied).

The four wrote statements showing in fact they had told Financial
Secretary Brown in front of lots of witnesses exactly what the PRB said
they should have -- that they remained unemployed -- in October 2007 in
the course of discussing a motion at an LEB meeting. They collected
evidence that the same information was given out in the public media and
at union meetings every month through the fall and into January 2008.
The financial secretary attended all these meetings. Appellants asked that
their evidence be considered at a factual hearing to be conducted by the
PRB, which had never held a factual hearing in the appeal either.
Appellants said they didn't expect the financial secretary would disagree
that she did know they were unemployed through the time period.
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09),
record letters of 3/24/09, 3/25/09, 4/13/09.

The PRB refused to consider the statements or hold a fact-finding

hearing:
We do not agree that this issue was not addressed in our decision. The entire
discussion is directed to the question whether appellants certified their entitlement to
"out-of-work" credits within the meaning of Article 16, § 19, of the International
Constitution. A member certifies entitlement for "out-of-work" credits by informing the
Financial Secretary that he or she is out of work.

Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied

(4/22/09), reconsideration decision, p 1.

Article 16 sections 18-19 do not define certification of entitlement to

"out-of-work" credits. Nor do they define "out-of-work" receipts.
Article 16 section 18 ("A member who has been laid off, is on leave of absence, or is
discharged from regular employment who is covered by check-off provisions under
 which management notifies the Local Union of members who are on leave of absence,
laid off, rehired, or discharged, shall automatically be considered as entitled to
"out-of-work" credits, unless s/he has received benefits in lieu of work equivalent to
forty (40) hours' pay as provided in the second paragraph of this Section. Any member
in order to be entitled to "out-of-work" credits shall report her/his layoff, leave of
absence, or discharge, in person or otherwise, to the Financial Secretary of her/his
Local Union within one month of the date such action became effective. ... Any member
who is entitled to "out-of-work" credits pursuant to this Section and Section 2 of Article
17 shall be exempted from dues payment for the period of her/his entitlement."),
article 16 section 19 ("Any member who is entitled to "out-of-work" credits under Section
18 of this Article and who...."),
article 17 section 6 ("A member shall be entitled to an honorable withdrawal transfer
card provided s/he shall have her/his dues paid up to and including the current month,
or out-of-work receipts, and there are no charges or debts owed to the Local Union");
compare article 8 section 11 ("For the purpose of this Section of the Constitution
[regarding continuous good standing of convention delegate candidates], members
must pay their dues or secure out-of-work receipts in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution.").

So at least now we have a definition of "certification of entitlement to

'out-of-work' credits." But neither PRB opinion took note of the different
and favored treatment received by the phone-in members who certified
without creating a memorandum or saying they were out of work.

The PRB added that its 2005 decision, holding that instructions from the
financial secretary may be followed even if they are wrong, was still
good. I don't agree.

As to the UAW's argument that article 16 section 19 does not require

physical issuance of withdrawal cards, the PRB made no comment.
Finally, without saying so specifically, the opinion suggests the PRB will
not require future appellants to observe strictly the rules about timing
(last 10 days of every month) and delivery (receipted) of written
statements of employment status. But be careful.

What is the bottom line for laid-off or fired members who wish to stay in
the union after six months, particularly in locals with ignorant and
discriminatory financial secretaries? They should submit written statements
of their employment status every month starting in the sixth month after
their separation, regardless of contrary notices in the union hall or on its
website or "casual" remarks by the financial secretary letting them off the
hook.

Article 40 says the local financial secretary absolutely "shall notify all
members in arrears of the amount of their indebtedness...." But article 16
gives him or her slack: "Local Unions may notify members of their
delinquency. However, failure of the Local Union to notify the member of
delinquency shall not exonerate such a member from automatic
suspension...." I don't know which prevails.
Article 16 section 10,
article 40 section 9;
Abronowitz v Local 2256 PRB Case 1599 (9/25/08), p 10 (local president's notice to
appellants regarding dues arrearages was not malicious, but mere advice on how to
maintain good standing, though it was subsequently determined they were entitled to
"out-of-work" credits).

In a 1964 appeal Bob Weissman was a member in good standing. He was

fired for falsifying his employment application. The union grieved, arguing
the real reason was Brother Weissman's union militancy. An umpire
denied the grievance. He continued to pay dues, but later the local
terminated his active status. On appeal the IEB said that was within the
local's discretion. It relied on article 17 section 2 interpretation 4, which
said a local had discretion to issue a withdrawal card to a discharged
member. Rejecting the interpretation the PRB said that in the UAW,
retention requirements differ from admission requirements. "[D]ischarge
has no spontaneous effect on the membership relation." The UAW itself
argued to the umpire that the discharge was a subterfuge; thus the
union's position was that Weissman was not discharged in a manner that
would lead to forfeiture of job rights. Membership rights could only be
deprived him in an article 31 trial, which he was not given. The PRB
restored Weissman to good standing status. In 2006 the offending
language was removed from interpretation 4.
Weissman v Local 122, 1 PRB 336, 338-39 (1964).

The 2006 constitution contains a special note that on order from a court,
the UAW had removed from the constitution restrictions on resignation.
Before the court order until 1989, the restrictions were based on time,
manner, effective date, good standing status, and the lack of any
arrearages or pending charges.
Article 6 section 17 (procedure for resigning),
special note to article 6 section 17 of 2006 constitution, p 173.

Special suspension and expulsion procedures apply when a member is

charged with dual unionism or decertification efforts. The charge must be
proved by convincing evidence. The IEB is involved, an appeals
committee can temporarily suspend pending IEB action, and the IEB can
suspend or expel by a 2/3 vote.
Article 10 section 12,
article 31 section 24;
Gonzales v Local 163, 2 PRB 386 (1976),
Betts v Local 376, 4 PRB 307, 311-12 (1984),
Mieli v UAW, 9 PRB 449, 455-58 (1997).

Retirees

Retirees are different from other members.

The International Union has explained that its bargaining policies are designed
primarily for active employees whose interests may be at odds with those of retirees.

...

We also agree ... that the Union did not necessarily have a conflict of interest with the
retirees as a group simply because the Union's primary duty was to active members of
the bargaining unit. An agreement, even an agreement to reduce benefits for retirees,
could be in the retirees' best interests.

Henderson v GM Department, PRB Case 1568 (7/20/07), pp 13-14.

Good-standing members who are retired are entited to "retired

membership status," which entitles them, without having to pay dues, to
membership privileges, except for two: (1) voting for stewards,
committeepersons, and other bargaining officers (the rationale is
explained elsewhere), and (2)voting on strikes and contracts.
King v Local 600 PRB Case 1499 (9/19/05), p 10;
Article 6 section 19,
article 19 section 3,
article 45 section 2,
article 50 sections 1,5,
article 55 sections 5, 7.

This language is not in terms a prohibition on retiree voting. So a 2006

appeal asked the CAC to allow GM retirees to vote on mid-contract
health-care concessions. Several dozen retirees had been allowed to vote
on an Ag Imp contract that had been negotiated by the Ag Imp
Vice-President and his staff in 1987, according to an uncontradicted
affidavit. Members not in good standing -- equivalent to non-members --
are allowed to vote on contracts. $15 billion in GM retiree health care
liabilities were at stake. And the CAC stands in the shoes of the
convention itself, the appeal noted.
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), CAC record pp 131-32 (affidavit of Tom
Seymour),
Doty v Local 974, 9 PRB 443, 446-48 (1997) ("There is nothing in ... the Constitution ...
that extends this requirement [of good-standing status] to ratification votes."),
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), CAC record p 54 ("$15 billion, over a
seven-year period").

The CAC answered simply that to give retirees the ballot it "would have to
require the IEB to violate the Constitution, a power the CAC does not
have."
 Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), pp 8-9.

Under constitutional language unchanged at least since 1964 (the earliest

constitution I have), the UAW represents retirees exclusively with respect
to bargaining collectively as to conditions and contracts of employment.
Retirees irrevocably and exclusively authorize the UAW to appear for
them before courts and tribunals in matters affecting their status as
employees or members, and to be their exclusive agent in "disputes of
any kind or character arising out of the employer-employe relationship."
Article 6 sections 15-16.

The UAW has always considered that retiree benefits are among those
which arise out of the employment relationship. Accordingly the union
appeared before the NLRB in 1969 and brought it to observe:
Bargaining on benefits for workers already retired is an established aspect of current
labor-management relations. The United Auto Workers, the United Steelworkers, and
the Amalgamated Transit Union, amici curiae, have cited many instances in which
bargained increases in benefits have been obtained for retired workers.

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 177 NLRB 911, 916 (1969), rev'd on other grounds,
404 US 157 (1971),
see also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co v NLRB, 427 F2d 936, 947 (CA6, 1970),
aff'd 404 US 157 (1971) ("We have studied with care the evidence in the
amicus curiae briefs tending to show that the practice in industry is to
bargain on retired employees' benefits. This voluntary practice demonstrates
the increasingly humanitarian quality of the labor-management relationship,
and is to be encouraged.").
Retirees pay voluntary dues of $2 a month. The constitution establishes a
series of retiree chapters and advisory councils in which they may
participate. As noted elsewhere, retirees may not hold collective
bargaining positions. But they may vote for and hold other offices,
including convention delegate.
Article 6 section 19,
article 8 sections 11, 13,
article 38 sections 3-5,
article 55 sections 4(f), 5.

Regular withdrawal-transfer provisions apply if a retired member returns

to active employment.
Article 6 section 19.

Occasionally disputes arise as to terms of an offer of retirement. These

are discussed elsewhere.

Organizing
Table of Contents

The UAW's view of organizing is summed up in the preamble and in

article 2.
Preamble ("Essential to the UAW's purpose is to afford the opportunity for workers to
master their work environment; to achieve not only improvement in their economic
status but, of equal importance, to gain from their labor a greater measure of dignity,
or self-fulfillment and self-worth."),
article 2 section 2 (a union object is to "unite in one organization, regardless of religion,
race, creed, color, sex, political affiliation or nationality, age[,] disability, marital
status or sexual orientation, all employees under the jurisdiction of [the UAW]").

Organization of new members occurs differently from how it happened in

the union's early days.
As the International Union points out, the realities of today's labor-management
relationships differ remarkably from circumstances as they existed in 1940 when the
language of what is now Article 35, §4 was added to the Constitution. At that time, a
unit became "organized" when it became formally recognized pursuant to a countract.
At that point it would generally have adopted a system of governance, have elected
officers, and otherwise have been constituted as a viable organization. Now, however,
a bargaining unit technically becomes "organized" when an election is held and a Union
is legally certified as the bargaining agent for the employees in the unit.

But in reality this is often just a prelude to actually achieving an organized unit.
Frequently, there are legal challenges to the certification process. If these are
overcome, then negotiations commence for the negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement. Finally, if an agreement is negotiated its ratification must be secured. A
substantial period of time may pass before all of these steps can be accomplished.
Normally, during this hiatus it is the International which runs the affairs of the new unit
until the contract is in place, local union officers, elected, and bylaws adopted and
approved [footnote omitted]. Hence, it may realistically be said that a unit remains
"unorganized" until these goals are accomplished.

Moye v UAW, 5 PRB 612, 618 (1989);

 see also Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 609 (2000) (requirement in article 6
section 2(a) and article 42 of local action on an application to join UAW, is a
relic of days when companies would attempt to enroll spies as members).

Recall of stewards, committeepersons

The constitution provides a procedure for recall of stewards and
committee, but not officers.
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 782 (1990) (noting there is no recall procedure for
officers).

To recall a steward or committeeperson, the constitution and IEB

interpretations say a "valid" petition setting out "specific" complaints of
"failure to perform the duties of office" must be deposited with the local
within 45 days of being initiated. Your local bylaws should specify a
minimum number of petitioners. On due notice a special recall meeting is
held with a quorum present, at which a 2/3 vote of the members present
is required to effect a recall. Again, your local bylaws are to specify the
quorum requirement. If the petition is found invalid or if the meeting
decides not to recall then no further petition citing the same specific
complaint may be considered valid for a period of a year, except by waiver
of the president. Multiple or frivolous petitions may be declared invalid
and appealed to the president.
Article 45 section 3,
article 45 section 3 interpretation 3 (9/8/47),
 article 45 section 3 interpretation 4 (12/17/80).

Members might suppose from such technical provisions that the recall
process is similar to the disfavored trial process, and would accordingly
be strictly construed. On first reading, I expected that to be valid a
petition had to allege the steward or committeeperson failed to do a
required task on a certain date -- something listed in the pocket guide for
instance -- and didn't do it. I expected that as in the trial process a
preliminary test of the petition's validity had to be made by the LEB or
membership.

The PRB corrected me in 2006. It held "a recall drive is a political process
rather than a punitive one." Once sufficient signatures have been
obtained and validated a meeting has to be held, with no preliminary
determination of the sufficiency of the specifics. The petition in the case
gave no dates or specific acts. Brushing aside appellant's argument based
on an IEB precedent which said specifics were required for recall
petitions, it said the gravamen was clear enough:
There was a conflict between the Chairperson and the President which the petitioners
perceived as being the fault of the Chairperson, and as a result of this conflict the Local
had been put in disfavor with the International Union and disadvantaged vis-à-vis other
locals for work assignments.

This was, the PRB agreed readily, a political petition, and the only
requirement was that the issues be identified adequately so that a recall
target can respond with his or her own political campaign.
The conclusion of the President's hearing officers that it was sufficient that Austin and
 the membership knew what the complaints set forth in the petition referred to,
although a third party might not, was appropriate in the context of Article 45, because
a recall petition is addressed to the membership and sets in motion a political process.

Next was the issue whether the recall meeting was properly rescheduled
when a quorum failed to appear by the deadline. There was a claim that
Brother Austin's allies had improperly sought to prevent a quorum at the
first recall meeting. The IEB heard no evidence on the issue and upheld the
local's finding in support of the claim. The PRB held that was proper
because the local was in the best position to resolve such a dispute. A
second recall meeting was held at which a quorum appeared and voted by
98% to recall the shop chair. The recall was upheld.
Austin v Local 594, PRB Case 1514 (1/24/06), pp 16-19;
see also Hills v Local 961, 11 PRB 230, 233 (2001) (LEB has no role in deciding the
validity of a recall petition),
see also DeBoer v Local 257, 1 PRB 639, 641-42 (1971) (though the steward was told
verbally the removal petition was for collusion with a company foreman, recall charges
were insufficiently specific because they merely recited provisions of the constitution).

Redistricting
The PRB has decided several appeals regarding redistricting. In one the
IEB said without disagreement from the PRB majority that it
understands very well that politics may have played a part in deciding the procedure
[but that] it is neither unusual nor wrong for political considerations to enter into
decisions of this nature.
 Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 117 (1984) (quoted by
disagreeing dissent).

See also:
Article 19 section 3 (listing ratification groups as apprenticeable skilled trades and related
worker, production workers, office workers, engineers, technicians),
article 45 section 4 (stewards and committeepersons may be elected exclusively by and
from appropriate groups);
Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 80-81 (1959) (redistricting must be done in accordance
with local bylaw despite past practice),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773 (1972) (removal of steward due to redistricting),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108 (1984) (determination of who shall be
committeepersons or shop stewards after merger of zones due to reduction in plant
population),
Styer v 4 PRB 133, 4 PRB 133 (1984) (committeeperson not designated as such in
writing to management, redistricting was decided by entire bargaining committee, not
just chair),
Dennis v Local 909, 5 PRB 89, 96, 151, 158 (1986) (membership ceded redistricting
authority to shop committee),
McClure v Local 652, 6 PRB 354, 359-60 (1992) (redistricting not influenced by racial
considerations),
Patterson v Local 599, 9 PRB 421, 425-26 (1997) (LEB member-at-large properly
removed from LEB after moving to job in different district),
Hulme v Local 174, 9 PRB 608, 613 n 6 (1998) (locals are occasionally able to negotiate
locally for more district reps than specified by the agreement)
Canada v Local 849, 10 PRB 366, 368-70 (1999) (local may provide that certain
constituencies (such as skilled and production members) be represented specially)
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 463 n 5 (2000) (membership
delegated redistricting responsibility to shop committee),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), p 9 (redistricting of one member to
prevent him from becoming a committeeperson candidate),
Levin v Local 2250, PRB Case 1582 (1/28/08), pp 8-9 (PRB has no jurisdiction to rule on
the propriety of a procedural ruling by the chair at a membership meeting).
Remedies, damages
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Damages generally ||
Damages in grievance appeals
|| Damages in non-grievance
appeals || Timeliness of
damage demand

Damages generally

This section discusses damage remedies. Remedies generally are

discussed elsewhere.

The UAW agrees -- indeed it asserts -- that members who have been
wronged are entitled to "damages", by which is meant financial
compensation:
It is not, of course, the position of the International Union that a local union may not
reimburse one its members whom it has wronged for the damages which he has
 sustained. Indeed this authority is central to the system of internal remedies provided
under the UAW Constitution and it is upon this authority that the entire system of
internal remedies is based.

Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 301 (1975) (upholding local's self-assessment of

$1100 in damages);
see also Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 527 (1969) (grievance-handling
could provide basis for member's "damages" claim),
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 297-303 (1975) (describing backpay as
"damages"),
Spencer v Local 140, 8 PRB 210, 214 (1993) (lost wages or benefits seemingly
included in term "damages"),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 18 (2001) (using term "damages" to describe
union's backpay liability),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 67, 72 (2001) (order to resolve claims for
"damages" including backpay, damage to reputation, and denial of due
process rights).

Fourteen decisions have ordered that money be paid to an appellant.

Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 32 (1958) ($800),
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 395 (1966) (unspecified amount),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 476 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477, 479 (1969) (though
vacated the PRB continues to cite this decision, 2 PRB 428, 440 (1977), 4 PRB 280,
284 (1985)) (unspecified amount, later rejected by appellant),
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 485 n 1 (1968) ($4897),
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 29 (1973) (unspecified amount),
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 303 (1975) ($1100),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 791 (1990) (unspecified amount),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241, 244 (1999) ($250,000 plus job offer obtained),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 19 (2001) ($84,689.11),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 408 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99)
(unspecified amount),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 72 (2001) (unspecified amount),
 Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), pp 6, 11 (about $700),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 23, record
pp 174-75, order to show cause 12/21/05 (claimed amount of $79,278.94 plus interest
at NLRB rate),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 14 (unspecified amount).

Another required lost-time payment to witnesses who appeared at a trial.

Austin v Local 594, 10 PRB 439, 444-46 (1999).

Two others resulted in recoupment of money improperly taken from the

union.
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142 (1983-85),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222 (1984).

Allocation of damages between the UAW and a local was discussed in one
appeal. The local irrationally withdrew the grievance originally, and the
PRB reinstated it. It was processed to the GM department, which then
irrationally lost it at arbitration. The UAW suggested the local should be
responsible for all or part of the damages. The appeal was remanded for
the local and UAW to try to settle that.
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 237, 241 (1999) (UAW asserts that local made original
decision to withdraw grievance and was responsible for some delay in grievance-
processing),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 244 (2000) (PRB orders both UAW and Local 1853 to pay
damages).

Should doubts about facts relating to damages be resolved against a local

found to have been a wrongdoer? The only decision to address this
tangentially was Vogen, discussed elsewhere. No, the PRB implied, in
holding that a liable local's interpretation of a settlement agreement was
entitled to deference under the PRB's ordinary rational-basis standard.

Withdrawing a damages claim in an appeal does not of itself bar asserting

it again later. In one case, a trial committee convicted shop chair David
Ryan of unbecoming conduct and suspended him from office in January
1984. After a hearing two months later the IEB overturned the conviction.
During the IEB appeal he made and abandoned a pay claim for lost
overtime; the IEB did not rule on the issue. He re-asserted it to the
membership in May 1984. They turned him down. He waited three more
months to appeal the vote to the IEB and was therefore untimely.
Sympathetic, the PRB recommended the time limits be waived but left that
to the IEB. It added:
At this point [after the membership rejection], Mr. Ryan could have appealed to the
International Executive Board for his appeal, timely presented to the Local
membership, had been denied.

Ryan v Local 6, 4 PRB 379, 383 (1985), 5 PRB 1, 5 (1985);

Backpay and expenses have been awarded in various situations.

Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 30 (1958) (backpay),
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 395 (1966) (financial losses),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 476 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477, 479 (1969) (wages
and benefits lost for implementation of unratified agreement),
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 29 (1973) (expenses and wage allowance for attendance
at convention),
 Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 301 (1975) (backpay),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 791 (1990) (wage loss for wrongful expulsion after
union trial);
but see Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 106-07 (1984) (no lost wages for local's
wrongful refusal to allow shop committeeperson to rescind his resignation from office,
because employer is responsible).

Interest has been awarded.

Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 171 n 9 (listing interest as among the
types of damage the PRB might award in grievance appeals, if the PRB is to be guided
by customary representations of UAW counsel to courts in fair representation cases
that members can obtain the same relief through article 33 appeals as they can obtain
from courts),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 408 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99)
("reasonable interest" ordered),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), record pp
174-75, order to show cause 12/21/05 (in light of passage of six months from
appellant's submission of specification of monetary losses of $79,278.94 in lost
overtime, local monthly expense, local profit sharing payment, and attorney fees, with
no response by UAW, UAW ordered to pay appellant the amount claimed plus interest
at the NLRB rate, or to show cause why it has not done so),
Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07), p 14 ("We also believe that Brant is entitled to
interest [at the NLRB's rate] on the compensation [ordered to be paid by the local]
because of the undue delay in processing his claim by International Union staff.").

A 2007 appeal to the IEB sought to establish that interest should be

compounded daily. Member Nick Karras had been prematurely removed
from office in Local 653 and was owed $5250.89. Noting the NLRB's use
of the quarterly "short-term federal rate + 3%" (derived from the rate
used by the IRS for interest on underpaid taxes), Brother Karras argued
he should receive an additional $984.54 in interest. He added:
 We accept the NLRB rate ... as reasonably commensurate with the market, but there is
a further consideration. The IEB is a union tribunal not an employer-tilting rightwing
government agency. You are not bound to follow NLRB rules in all their particulars. The
NLRB refuses daily compounded interest, but you should order it.

After leaving the UAW Leonard Page was appointed NLRB general counsel. In 2000 he
identified several loopholes in the NLRB remedial scheme. One of them concerned
compounding interest. Presumably his ideas hatched years earlier while he was still
with the UAW. They may even be official UAW policy. The labor movement as a whole
certainly supported Brother Page's initiative, as he advised me in conversation this
week. So we scatter seed on fertile soil in quoting ... from his memorandum [linked in
the note].

Leonard Page, NLRB Remedies: Where Are They Going?, NLRB Press Release
R-2388 (4/10/00), text at nn 38-43;
see also acting NLRB executive secretary Joseph Moore's 1992 Codification of
Standardized Remedial Provisions, 57 FR 7897 (1992) ("Furthermore, we
find that significant purposes are served by [compounding interest]. The
Board properly seeks, through its remedies, to compensate discriminatees
for the delay in their receipt of wages -- in particular, to offset, at least
partially, the reduction in value of delayed payments to discriminatees
resulting from inflation during the backpay period. The Board is also
interested in promoting prompt payment of legal obligations. A formula
incorporating daily compounding of interest will serve these purposes even
more effectively than the current simple interest rule.").

Karras noted that Page was never able to bring the compounding issue to
the NLRB for a decision, and Page's successor later rescinded the whole
idea. "But so what?" Karras argued. "The NLRB serves both unions and
corporations. The UAW by contrast is single-minded, and holds itself to a
higher standard."
The IEB rejected his appeal for untimeliness, and the IEB has not directly
considered the compounding issue.
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 14 (ordering that Karras be
compensated "for any monetary loss he suffered as a result of his removal before the
expiration of his term."),
Karras v Local 653, appeal to IEB (4/12/07) (seeking compounded interest on backpay
award),
Letter, Eunice Stokes-Wilson to Karras (5/4/07) (dismissing appeal as untimely).

No PRB decision has awarded or discussed frontpay. But one decision for
a fired GM member who had lost an arbitration resulted in the appellant
receiving cash plus an unconditional offer of employment at a different
GM plant.

No PRB decision has awarded or discussed incidental damages.

The constitution is specific that any party retaining counsel does so at his
or her own expense. Despite this some decisions suggest that attorney
fees would be considered, particularly if there are unusual or extraordinary
circumstances. A 2000 decision actually awards them. In
2005 the PRB ordered the union to pay appellant the monetary losses she
had calculated for an EPC violation, including attorney fees, or to show
cause why it had not done so.
Article 33 section 4(f) last sentence (party retaining counsel or other representative shall
bear any cost of such representation);
but see Wirth v Local 596, 4 PRB 1, 3 (1983) (PRB would consider awarding attorney
fees),
 Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 244 (2000) (part of cash award was to cover "certain
attorney fees and expenses"),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 13, 16 (2001) (IEB says a wronged member was
entitled to certain attorney fees from the union in grievance appeal where local acted
irrationally, but PRB reverses because of article 33 section 4(f), and also noting there
are no unusual or extraordinary circumstances that might justify such an award here),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), record pp
174-75, order to show cause 12/21/05 (in light of passage of six months from
appellant's submission of specification monetary losses of $79,278.94 in lost overtime,
local monthly expense, local profit sharing payment, and attorney fees, with no
response by UAW, UAW ordered to pay appellant the amount claimed plus interest at
the NLRB rate, or to show cause why it has not done so).

The PRB has indicated it can award damages for emotional distress.
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 171 n 9 (2002) (in grievance cases UAW
commonly represents to courts that under article 33 a member can obtain "the same
relief he could obtain from the court," claims in this case include one for "compensation
for emotional distress," courts have ruled that "compensatory damages" are available
and are measured by what is "required to place him in the economic position he would
have been in had the wrongful discharge not occurred"),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241 (1999) (UAW ordered to consider compensating
appellant for "additional" damages),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 67, 72 (2001) (order to resolve claims for damages for
reputation and due process violations);
but see Wirth v Local 596, 4 PRB 1, 3 (1983) (acquittal at trial restores member's good
name).

Punitive damages are a long way off in the UAW, though neither the UAW
nor PRB has taken a principled stand against them. Apparently the PRB
feels that a showing of bad faith or improper motivation would be
necessary to award them.
 Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 166, 170 (2002) (after PRB remand and
favorable umpire decision on grievance, member sought damages including punitive
damages from court which referred member back to PRB untimely),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 16 (2001) (apart from question whether PRB has
authority to award punitive damages in grievance appeal, nothing would support such
an award here where union had no bad-faith motivation),
Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 573 (2002) (though UAW rationally withdrew grievance, it
gave appellant inconsistent and incorrect reasons, teaching him an expensive lesson),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 237, 240 (2001) (appellant intended to seek punitive
damages if warranted, appeal decided on other grounds without commenting on
awardability of punitive damages),
Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), p 8 (because contract did not
provide for punitive damages against employer, PRB could not award them in grievance
appeal against union).

Damages in grievance appeals

Table of Contents

Monetary damages are not an appropriate remedy for claims involving the
mishandling of grievances where there is a reinstatement of grievance
letter in the contract.
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 229 (1981),
Phelps v Local 1292, PRB Case 1614 (4/22/09), pp 9-10.

A 2006 decision explained the PRB's cautious approach in deciding

whether damages are awardable in grievance appeals which have been
won where there is no such letter.

Terrance Lombard was fired in 2003, the company said, for fighting a
foreman. The foreman had instigated an altercation after a dangerous
mechanical failure in the shop, not caused by Brother Lombard. Later the
company fired the foreman for a different fight not involving Lombard.
After an adverse mediation and review of a prior arbitration decision,
Region 1A rep Frank Woods withdrew Lombard's grievance. Lombard
appealed to the IEB. Under its broad standard, the IEB held that Brother
Woods had improperly investigated the witnesses and Lombard's prior
record, and had made an inadequate presentation to the mediators. So
his decision was not rationally based.

The IEB directed the region to re-investigate which it did. According to

the PRB, it then asked the company to reinstate the grievance but the
company refused.

As noted elsewhere, the union could and should have held Lombard's
grievance open while he appealed, but it didn't. The president's office,
which up till then had not been involved, entered the picture.
Independently, it evaluated the likelihood of success had the grievance
been arbitrated. The president's staff concluded it could not have been
won anyway, for several reasons. The case involved violence against a
supervisor, there was at least one pro-company witness, violence
allegations are generally difficult to challenge, mediators had
recommended settlement instead of arbitration, and the prior arbitration
and Lombard's previous record would hurt.

The most significant item in his history was a claimed threat to a different
supervisor two months earlier. But there was a question as to the
authenticity of that incident, and the involved supervisor admitted hitting
Lombard in the genitals.

Nevertheless with PRB approval, the president concluded that even if

Woods's investigation had been adequate he still would have determined
that Lombard would lose. The PRB denied damages:
Lombard has argued that the IEB's decision of January 3, 2005, conceded the Union's
fault in the handling of his grievance so that no further inquiry ought to have been
conducted into its merits. He maintains that the only question before us in September
2005 was the measure of damages. We cannot accept that position. We reject as a
matter of policy the conclusion that a decison by the IEB in favor of an appellant
necessarily amounts to a finding that the Union has failed in its duty to represent that
appellant and so should he held liable for damages. The IEB must be able to demand a
better investigation from the representatives whose decisons it reviews without
incurring financial liability on the part of the International Union. Such a decision by the
IEB is simply a step in the review process and not a determination on the ultimate
question whether the union has met its duty of fair representation to the member
involved.

See also Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), p 15.

Lombard asked for reconsideration. He noted that new evidence showed

the union had actually never reviewed the prior arbitration and could not
produce a copy, and further the company had fired its last remaining
witness. The PRB refused:
 Lombard now argues that without the arbitration decision, there is no basis for the
International Union's conclusion that his case could not have been arbitrated
successfully. He points out that the testimony of the Company's witness, Roosevelt
Black, was discredited in a subsequent deposition. Black was discharged by Chrome
Craft on March 24, 2006, so his testimony would not be available in any event.
Appellant insists that the incident that led to his discharge involved only angry talk and
no violence.

Our [original] decision ... referred to the prior arbitration decision as one of the factors
supporting the President's conclusion that Lombard's case could not have been
arbitrated successfully. Our decision was not dependent on the existence of the prior
[arbitration] case, however, but involved an evaluation of the the entire situation,
particularly the concern of employers that they can be held liable if they do not act to
prevent violent behavior in the workplace.... The conclusion of the President's staff that
the case could not have been arbitrated successfully is still rational based on the entire
record.

Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), pp 15-17, reconsideration denied

(1/30/07), pp 1-2;
compare Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 12-13 (2001) (in grievance appeal
IEB appeals committee orders local to pay damages to a member without
finding that the local's handling was irrational).

In 2002 the PRB dropped a footnote concerning the measure of damages

in grievance appeals. In embracing the power to award the same
remedies that courts can award, the PRB did not limit itself to those
remedies. I am not aware that the UAW has ever limited itself either.
Testerman claimed the following damages from the UAW: backpay for the gap period;
interest accrued to date at the Delaware legal rate; out-of-pocket amounts expended
by Testerman for health insurance; amounts withdrawn by Testerman from his 401-K
pension plan; net legal expenses; compensation for emotional distress; punitive
 damages. In defending against duty of fair represenation cases in federal court by its
members who have not exhausted their internal union remedies, the Union commonly
represents to the courts that a member can obtain from the Union's internal remedies
procedures the same relief he could obtain from the court. Its motions for summary
judgment or dismissal of such claims are generally accompanied by the affidavit from
our staff which states, among other things, that the PRB has the authority to award
money damages to UAW members, and has so ruled in many instances. Of the types of
damages claimed by Testerman, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled definitely only on
two: Compensatory damages, including damages for losses sustained during the gap
period, may be recovered in a claim for a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation. The appropriate measure of compensatory damages to a wrongfully
discharged employee is that required to place him in the economic position he would
have been in had the wrongful discharge not occurred. Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171
(1976); Bowen v United States Postal Service, 459 US 212 (1983). Exemplary or
punitive damages are not available. Electrical Workers v Foust, 442 US 42 (1979).
Other forms of damage claimed by Testerman may or may not be awarded by a court
of law. We will be guided by legal precedent but will have to consider these claims on a
case-by-case basis.

Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 171 n 9 (2002);

see also Karras v Local 653, appeal to IEB (4/12/07) (invoking higher union
standards, appellant seeks compounding of interest on backpay award even
though NLRB does not compound interest).

The PRB has not discussed allocation of backpay liability between the
UAW and an employer. The courts have considered allocations based
either on a chronological formula, or on a formula determined by the
degree of fault of each party. The UAW's major contracts resolve
allocation with a chronological formula.
Compare Aguinaga v Food Workers, 993 F2d 1463, 1475-79, 143 LRRM 2400, 2408-12
(CA10, 1993) (discussing methods of apportioning liability between company and
union).
Despite the time limits of article 33 section 4(c), the PRB has allowed
members to add damage claims to grievance appeals late in the appeal
process. The reason is unclear. The Moran rule says successful grievance
appellants should have court-like remedies available; but as the president
has pointed out courts require that all relief be requested at the start of
all suits.

The PRB rejected the president's analogy, but it could re-appear in some
future appeal. Unless there is authoritative clarification from the UAW,
prudent appellants might want to include damage claims when starting
grievance appeals. I am sorry to have to give that advice.

There have been eight grievance appeals where damages were awarded.
The background of all but the first three is discussed elsewhere.

Local 469

Arguably this is a trial appeal, not a grievance appeal. It is included here

only for completeness. There is no indication in the decision as to when
the appellant made her backpay claim. The appellant was exonerated and
the local ordered to pay her $800.
Local 469, 1 PRB 27 (1958).
Pfeiffer

In this appeal, the IEB held without explanation that a local's failure to
process a re-hire grievance to arbitration was a deliberate abrogation of
member Jim Pfeiffer's rights. It ordered the local to pay 14 months of
backpay, less deductions including interim earnings. The total came to
$4897. The local appealed. The PRB enforced the IEB decision. The
opinion does not indicate whether or when Brother Pfeiffer claimed
reimbursement for damages.
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485 (1968).

Dawkins

Albert Dawkins grieved for backpay saying his transfer to a lower

classification had violated the contract. He then appealed, saying the
committeeman did not advance the grievance to the next stage. The
members voted to pay him $1100 out of local funds. The IEB reversed on
the ground the company had not violated the contract and the payment
was therefore a gift to Brother Dawkins. The PRB reversed again, saying
the local had determined the payment was not a gift. The PRB remanded
to the local with instructions to comply with the membership's vote.
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296 (1975).
Testerman

In 1996 the PRB reversed and remanded member Randall Testerman's

grievance back to the procedure, as his appeal had requested. It did not
retain jurisdiction. An umpire sustained the grievance in 1997, and in
1998 the company paid Brother Testerman's back wages except for the
period during which the grievance had been withdrawn. A month later he
sued the UAW and the local for wages in the 39-month period not covered
by the award, plus emotional and punitive damages, interest, costs, and
fees. In 2000 the court asked him to seek the remedy from the PRB.

At the PRB, the UAW argued the damage request was untimely because
not filed within 30 days of the 1996 PRB decision. The PRB rejected this
date. Instead, it said Testerman should have come to it within 30 days of
the 1997 arbitration decision. It barred his damages claim.
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165 (2002).

To guard against such remedy collapses in the future, PRB decisions now
specifically advise successful appellants that requests for further PRB
action be made within 30 days of the resolution of the grievance.
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 366 (2003);
compare PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 11 (7/1/04) (30-day time limit for
motions for reconsideration).
Morris

In 1996 after the local irrationally withdrew Karl Morris's discharge

grievance, the PRB remanded it. The order instructed the local to
arbitrate if it couldn't be settled to Brother Morris' satisfaction.

In 1997 the GM department lost the arbitration. Morris re-appealed

making several points, including that the union had not raised the bases
of the PRB ruling to the umpire, and the conflict had been improperly
resolved. Originally Morris asked that an "appeal of the umpire's decision
be granted so that his case might be properly presented and decided."
Later he asked for damages.

The PRB answered it had no power to review the umpire's decision. The
only further remedy for Morris would be monetary damages. A reinstated
grievance, the PRB explained, differs from a grievance referred to the
umpire staff during the grievance process where the union has broad
discretion. Instead, after a remand the umpire staff must attempt to
address the concerns of the remand order.

One of the factors of the Morris discharge involved a knife incident. The
PRB had raised concerns about the authenticity of alleged witness
statements, and whether the incident was really part of the company's
reason for the discharge. One of the union's tasks therefore was to
challenge the admissibility of the evidence, and if the challenge were
rejected to impeach its validity. Instead the union allowed the knife
incident to become the principal issue before the umpire.

A second PRB concern had been whether Morris' absences were sufficient
for discharge, given that the company had a six-step process and he had
not advanced even two steps. The union had submitted no record
documents on this issue to the umpire.

Emphasizing that article 33 remedies must be meaningful, and repeating

Moran's lament that mere reinstatement of a grievance may not be an
effective remedy, and noting that damages in every case would wreck the
union -- not to mention that it would not compensate the appellant
adequately -- the PRB began by saying the union should have allowed
Morris's lawyer to be involved in preparation and presentation to the
umpire. The grievance required knowledge of evidentiary issues, which
the GM department lacked. The PRB concluded that the department
should have sought counsel of the UAW legal staff. Had legal been unable
to illuminate the PRB order the GM department should have sought more
specific direction from the PRB.

The PRB ordered that Morris be paid damages. As to apportionment, the

UAW suggested that the local be responsible for all or part of them, since
the local made the original decision to drop the grievance and was
responsible for some of the processing delay. There was also a question
of when the damage claim should cease to run. Finally, Morris requested
"additional damages ... for the permanent loss of his position."

The PRB ordered Morris to specify his damage claim within 60 days,
including tax returns if requested. Then the UAW and local were to respond
as to the issues of amount and apportionment, at which point the PRB
would give a final ruling.
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 228, 236-41 (1999);
compare Norris, CAC, session 11/00 (after reinstatement of grievance by IEB UAW
withdrew it again at same step where it had been withdrawn before; on re-appeal CAC
ordered it into next higher step).

After further proceedings the PRB issued the following order a year later
without explanation:
In full and final disposition of all claims herein, including claims for back pay and certain
attorney fees and expenses, Local 1853 and the International Union, UAW, or their
insurance companies on their behalf, shall, within 14 days of the date of this order, pay
to Karl Morris the sum of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).

Karl Morris shall have twenty-four (24) hours following receipt of this Order to accept
an unconditional offer of employment from the General Motors corporation at its
Pontiac, Michigan, Truck and Bus plant.

Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 244 (2000).

In a 2006 decision the PRB clarified the rationale of the job offer.
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), p 8 n 33
("In the Morris decision, [the PRB] not only awarded the appellant the sum of
$250,000 for back pay and certain attorney's fees and expenses, but it also provided
him with an offer of employment in lieu of front pay. [footnote omitted]").

Whether the money was actually paid is questionable. Schedule 15

("other disbursements") on the annual "LM-2" financial reports the local
and the UAW file with the department of labor that year shows no payout
to Karl Morris in 2000. A letter attached to Local 1853's report says the
Morris matter is concluded and is no longer pending.
UAW LM-2, File No 000-149, 2000,
UAW Local 1853 LM-2, File No 519-459, 2000,
letter, Lee Anderson to Georgia Lindstrom, 3/14/01.

Taylor

In 1996 the IEB reinstated Samuel Taylor's grievance and remanded it to

the local. It did not find a breach of any duty by the local; it found only
that there were unresolved factual issues. Brother Taylor appealed,
challenging the IEB's finding of no breach of duty. Meanwhile in 1997 the
company settled the grievance on the basis of reinstatement and backpay
of $58,000+, which covered the period up to 1994 when the local had
withdrawn it. Taylor asked for the remaining backpay, and eventually
appealed again to the PRB, adding claims for punitive damages and
attorney fees.

On remand for factual investigation, as is its custom the IEB delegated

the hearing to an appeals committee. The committee issued a report
awarding partial backpay. The report discounted the amount because
Taylor could have begun his appeal earlier, because it would have taken
time anyway for the UAW to take the grievance to arbitration had it not
been withdrawn, and because Taylor had not looked for work after being
discharged due to a belief no one would hire him. The committee relied
on an expert affidavit obtained by the local that Taylor could have earned
$12,000 while the grievance was pending. The committee awarded
$45,000+. Despite the prohibition of article 33 section 4(f) it added $640
in attorney fees.

The local maintained throughout that it violated no duties in the first place.
Taylor maintained the opposite. Importantly, though the IEB made no
finding on that point it still awarded significant compensation. Possibly
neither party might have appealed. Both might have been satisfied, and
the IEB decision would have stood. This is a striking illustration of the
IEB's power -- like that of the CAC and unlike that of the PRB -- to
overturn grievance settlements and enforce decisions without a finding of
irrational or discriminatory handling.

What is even more remarkable is that this power was exercised by a mere
committee of two unelected hearing officers. The IEB never formally
adopted the committee report, yet it was treated by the parties and the
PRB as though it were a decision of the IEB.

Taylor did appeal to the PRB and the local did not. PRB jurisdiction was
not challenged. The PRB conducted its own evidentiary hearing.

It ruled in 2001. First, the PRB dismissed the claims for punitive damages
and attorney fees, finding even if such remedies were theoretically
available, they are not awardable in this appeal because there was no bad
faith or unusual circumstances.

It then found what the IEB did not, that the local handled the grievance
irrationally. The union rep did little investigation. He was unaware that
the employer didn't sustain its burden in parallel unemployment
proceedings. He had not interviewed Taylor or the four witnesses who
corroborated his story. There were several factual discrepancies.

In computing the backpay the PRB discovered at its hearing that Taylor
had not been informed promptly the grievance was withdrawn. It agreed
with the $12,000 reduction because Taylor didn't seek work. And it
agreed with the reduction due to the time of processing the grievance
after it was reinstated, reasoning that there was no guarantee the
grievance would have been won before an umpire. The umpire might have
ruled for, against, or somewhere in the middle. In sum the PRB raised the
award to $84,000.
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10 (2001).

Vogen

In 1998 the PRB found that a local union irrationally handled member
Robert Vogen's discharge grievance against Ford. Brother Vogen had
made no monetary claim when he filed the appeal. The PRB retained
jurisdiction. The grievance was reinstated. It advanced out of the local's
hands to step 4 at which point Ford agreed to reinstate him with full
backpay, benefits and seniority. Having moved out of state by that time,
Vogen negotiated instead for a $30,000 lump sum. He released Ford in a
formal document, and quit.

Under the contract Ford did not owe Vogen for 111 weeks of backpay
during the time the grievance had been withdrawn. At the time of the
release Vogen stated he understood it only to settle disputes between him
and Ford, not between him and the local. Neither the UAW nor the local
agreed or disagreed on that point. Vogen then returned to the PRB for the
111 weeks and other relief from the local.

At that point the local argued that the settlement released it as well. The
PRB agreed, and in a departure from its usual world view cited federal
law in support. Vogen pointed out that under federal law the courts say a
member's settlement with an employer has no effect on a union's liability.
Regardless, the PRB reasoned that it understood that a settlement under
the UAW/Ford contract was final and binding on all parties including the
local. Vogen should have asserted his monetary claim against the local at
the time he settled with Ford. Though not disputing Vogen's statement of
federal law, the PRB explained on reconsideration that it was only holding
the local's interpretation of the contract and the settlement to be
reasonable.
Vogen v Local 900 II, 9 PRB 624, 625, 629 n 5, 630 n 9 (2000), reconsideration denied
(7/19/00), pp 1-2,
UAW/Ford 1996 national agreement, article VII section 1,
UAW/Ford 1996 national agreement, letter of understanding on reinstitution of
 grievances;
compare Czosek v O'Mara, 397 US 25, 28-29, 73 LRRM 2481, 2482 (1970) (if employer
is not a defendant, damages against union will be only for its own conduct),
Foust v Electrical Workers, 572 F2d 710, 718, 97 LRRM 3040, 3046, 3047 (CA10, 1978),
modified on other grounds 442 US 42, 101 LRRM 2365 (1979) (settlement with
employer does not preclude recovery against union),
Tinsley v United Parcel Service, 635 F2d 1288, 1293, 106 LRRM 2049, 2052 (CA7, 1980)
(union's dismissal for failure to exhaust internal remedies does not require employer's
dismissal as defendant),
Bowen v US Postal Service, 459 US 212, 219-30, 112 LRRM 2281, 2284-88 (1983)
(liability is to be apportioned between employer and union according to damages
caused by fault of each, union is primarily liable for part of damages caused by union's
breach),
DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 US 151, 165, 113 LRRM 2737, 2742 (1983) (employee
may choose to sue one defendant and not the other),
Young v US Postal Service, 907 F2d 305, 308-09, 134 LRRM 2639, 2642 (CA2, 1990)
(union's absence from the case should not add to the plaintiff's burden against
employer),
Aguinaga v Food Workers, 993 F2d 1463, 1475-79, 143 LRRM 2400, 2408-12 (CA10,
1993) (damages are based on proportionate fault between employer and union),
White v White Rose Food, 128 F3d 110, 116, 156 LRRM 2680, 2684 (CA2, 1997)
(plaintiff need not sue union at all, fact that limitations period ran against union does
not preclude suit against employer).

Morgan

In 2005 the PRB held the local had no rational basis for withdrawing a
grievance for refusing, at the local president's request, to allow appellant
to bump to a packer/stocker classifcation. Unlike the major auto
companies,
 Steris Corporation has not signed a letter agreeing to the reinstatement of grievances,
but [the president's office] suggested during the hearing that the Corporation might be
persuaded to reopen the grievance in the interest of maintaining a good bargaining
relationship with the Union. Accordingly, we direct the International Union to make
every effort to reopen Morgan's grievance and obtain a settlement which affirms
Morgan's right to claim the Packer/Stocker position pursuant to Article 14, §H, 4, and
further to compensate Morgan for the losses he incurred as a result of the former Local
Union President's interference with his contractual rights.

Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11.

Damages in non-grievance appeals

Table of Contents

Though formulated for grievance appeals, the Moran rule applying

court-like remedies may also apply to other appeals. For, it is not only in
grievance suits that UAW attorneys defend by pointing to articles 32 and
33. It defends the same way in LMRDA election suits.
Tucker v Bieber, 900 F2d 973, 979-80, 134 LRRM 2016, 2021 (CA6, 1990) (UAW argues
court should not substitute its judgment of UAW policy over the PRB's, regarding rule
which required appointed union staff member to announce 90 days in advance
intention to run for elected union office, to forego salary during period of candidacy,
and to accept transfer to another city in the event of losing election),
UAW Local 594 v UAW, 956 F2d 1330, 1335-36, 139 LRRM 2549, 2554 (CA6, 1992)
(UAW argues it is immaterial whether UAW officer or rep maliciously filed a fictitious
protest in local election in which New Directions candidates beat Administration Caucus
candidates resulting in substantial expense to the local, because local's proper route of
appeal was to the convention).
In certain situations wronged members are denied monetary damages on
the theory that the wrongful act injured the entired membership, not just
the appellant. In an appeal by a steward found to have been wrongfully
removed and as a result laid off due to the loss of superseniority status,
the PRB denied damages. It reasoned that superseniority is not a
personal right; superseniority is a device developed through bargaining
for the benefit of the union collectively, to provide continuity of
representation for members. Such losses are not uniquely the steward's.
Had the layoff been part of a conspiracy to oust appellant for political
reasons as he claimed, rather than a simple mistake, the result might be
different, the PRB said.

By the time of the decision, the PRB found the appellant would have been
laid off anyway due to the abolition of his district. The only relief possible
was to order the union to negotiate with the company for an adjustment
of his seniority to reflect the a layoff date which would have resulted but
for his wrongful removal. It retained jurisdiction in the event negotiations
were unsuccessful.
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 776-77 (1972);
see also Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 82-83 (1959) (superseniority is not a personal
right but a device for the benefit of the union's collective interest),
Clocker v Local 1010, 1 PRB 138, 141 (1960) (if superseniority in good faith is
improperly removed, the loss is that of the membership as a whole not of the member
removed),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 107 n 5 (1984) (where a steward has been improperly
removed the loss is not uniquely his but is shared by all the members who were as a
consequence deprived of the benefit of his representation),
 see also Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 241 n 10 (2001) (noticing but not addressing
the issue),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1481 (11/22/04) (superseniority in scheduling vacations for
local officials with part-time representational duties).

I don't see any particular difference between a member losing money due
to incorrect application of contractual superseniority provisions and a
member losing money because of a wrongful denial of installation in office,
wrongful removal from office, or wrongful conviction while in
office. In the latter cases the membership loses the benefit of its choice
of leadership, just as in the former. Yet appellants in the latter category
can collect damages.

Thus, in appeals of members wrongfully denied office the PRB has

ordered damages.
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 408 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (return of
money appellant wrongly repaid union, with interest),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 67, 72 (2001) (restoration to office, order to resolve
claims for backpay and damages for reputation and due process violations).

An appointed rep removed from her local position unethically was ordered
to be allowed to resume her duties and to be paid for any compensation
owing.
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 23;
see also Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228, 232, 238 (1994) (wrongly removed
appointed reps expressly disavowed backpay, but PRB looked through the record
anyway and there being no evidence of pay loss it ordered none).
In an election appeal the PRB ordered installation and damages for an
elected financial secretary.
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 391, 395 (1966);
see also Frederick-Brown v UAW, PRB Case 1519 (12/21/05, 4/20/06), p 14 (wrongfully
removed shop chair who was part-time employee ordered reinstated and compensated
at full stipend).

One appeal seemed to the PRB at first to protest an improper ratification

of an oral shop committee agreement. As a result of the agreement
appellant Calvin Hopkins was demoted and lost income. He filed a
grievance which was withdrawn. He appealed. The appeal sought no
damages. The PRB granted it and ordered the local to pay damages
anyway.

(On reconsideration, Hopkins rejected the damages award, noting he had

not requested it. The oral agreement was void because it violated the
contract, he said. The appeal was solely a grievance appeal, and what he
wanted was an order to arbitrate the grievance. Belatedly, the PRB
recognized Hopkins was right about this. But under its then-current
standard for grievance appeals, an appellant needed to prove improper
motivation; a mere contract violation was not a sufficient basis for PRB
intervention. The PRB dismissed the appeal without prejudice to Hopkins
taking it to the CAC within 30 days.)
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 476 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477, 479-81 (1969).
In Wright v Local 1069, noted elsewhere, lost wages were ordered for a
wrongly convicted member.
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 791 (1990).

Timeliness of damage demand

None of the above non-grievance decisions concerned itself with the

timeliness of a damage demand. But in 2001 the PRB faced a claim for
$2.5 million in an election appeal. It time-barred the claim, saying that
because damages were not requested at the time of the original appeal
when the office was wrongfully denied, they were waived.

Member George Colley had asked the IEB and PRB to apply the Moran
approach to his election appeal. He had won a district committee election
by 117-34 in April 1998. Management refused to recognize him. The
losing candidate was installed. Colley appealed. At the same time he went
to the NLRB where he obtained a management letter saying someone at
the UAW had instructed it to recognize the loser. The UAW did not deny the
management letter, but would not identify the UAW person referred
to. In December the IEB directed the local to notify the company Brother
Colley had won and would begin functioning. He was installed. He
promptly asked the IEB to retain jurisdiction and supplement its remedy.
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235 (2001), record, pp 4-7 (Letter, David Barnes to Blair
 Simmons, 5/11/98) (asserting UAW had instructed company not to install Colley),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235 (2001), record, pp 8-9 (letter George Colley to Stephen
Yokich, 1/5/99 (asking IEB to supplement remedy and retain jurisdiction)),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235 (2001), record, pp 169-70 (George Colley Summary,
12/5/99), (explaining unsuccessful efforts to track down name of UAW person referred
to by company).

He wanted compensation for lost overtime, medical expenses, attorney

fees, and punitive damages if warranted. He was somewhat reluctant to
ask for money, as he explained to members of his local:
I might add that the Moran formulation is a curious one. The idea that a working-class
organization like a union would govern itself according to what courts say is hard to
swallow. Citizens before courts do not share a relationship of solidarity, as members of
the UAW do. And judges are often anti-union.

Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235 (2001), record, p 169 (George Colley
Summary, 12/5/99), (discussing Moran formulation),
see also Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235 (2001), record, p 154 (letter, Ellis
Boal to Dick Long, 9/13/99), ("The ideas of punitive damages and attorney
fees mesh particularly poorly with principles of membership solidarity. Still,
Colley will play the cards he is dealt.").

Colley had waited until after establishing liability to ask for damages,
explaining that he had no way to specify damages in April 1998 when he
should have been installed. At that point he couldn't know how much they
would be.

But relying on article 33 section 4(c) the IEB said the damage claim was
time-barred because not asserted in April 1998. It did not explain why
other appeals had been treated differently.
In defending the IEB decision, the president analogized to rules of courts
which say a plaintiff may not split his claims for relief into different
proceedings. But this would be equally true of the other appeals where
split claims had been allowed. The PRB rejected the president's position
that Colley could not assert a new claim for damages, saying it went
beyond the IEB's rationale.

Distinguishing late remedy claims allowed in two grievance appeals, the

PRB offered rationale which the IEB and the president had not:
Colley's claim for damages was not timely submitted. Neither Vogen nor Morris
represents a contrary precedent. Both of these cases involved claims of a breach of
their duty of fair representation on the part of the local unions involved. Before a
member can assert such a claim in a court of law, he must first exhaust his internal
union remedies if those remedies can provide essentially the same relief that he could
obtain in federal court, including lost wages. Clayton v International Union, UAW, 451
US 679 (1981).

Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 237, 239, 240 (2001);

compare Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 228, 236-41 (1999),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 621-23 (1998).

The PRB's reliance on the Clayton decision is remarkable. Clayton is

external law. Members are not expected to know external law. The PRB
traditionally said it ignores external law and decides appeals only based
on the constitution and EPC. To the extent that Moran's reference to
external court remedies changed anything, it was to supplement union
law not displace it. Union law on exhaustion is found at article 33 section
5, and only there.
Clayton is a 1981 supreme court decision rejecting a UAW claim that
article 33 section 5 (actually, it's predecessor) should bar fair
representation suits if article 33 was not exhausted first.
Clayton v UAW, 451 US 679, 682-83, 690 n 17, 695, 107 LRRM 2385, 2386, 2389 n 17,
2391 (1981).

Clayton had several asides saying that had the case arisen under a
contract that allowed for reinstatement of grievances through article 33
the result would likely have been different; but a cautionary passage
questioned whether the different result would apply to a suit seeking
prospective monetary relief, or incidental damages, or punitive damages.
If Clayton had relevance to Colley's appeal to begin with, this passage
should have commanded particular attention because he was considering
punitive damages.

The exhaustion requirement has been in the UAW constitution since at

least 1936. Like the rest of the constitution, the UAW treats it as a
charter or contract among all the members. It applies to all appeals,
whether grievance appeals, election appeals, or remedy appeals.

Exhaustion was not an issue in Colley so the relevance of citing

exhaustion principles -- whether under internal or external law -- is not
apparent. Even had exhaustion been at issue, the UAW itself did not cite
Clayton. Even had Clayton been cited, it does not say anything about the
timeliness of damage claims or splitting claims for relief. Nor did Clayton
order the UAW to remove article 33 section 5.
Clayton's explanation of article 33 section 5 has not been adopted into the
constitution. Whether the courts enforce the section or not, inside the
UAW it is in full flower. To the extent exhaustion principles had any
bearing on Colley' appeal, they should have been the principles of article
33 section 5 -- which makes no distinction between grievance and
non-grievance appeals -- not Clayton.

Fortunately, in Gaston-Kelley, a decision four years later treated more fully

elsewhere, the PRB ignored Colley. The appellant had been unethically
pulled from her local appointed position. The PRB ordered that she be
allowed to resume her duties and be compensated for any monetary losses
she suffered. Arrived at after two PRB hearings, the decision makes no
mention of any claim she had made for compensation. A reader would be
forgiven for thinking she never made any monetary claim at all until she
came to the PRB the second time in 2005. This was after one PRB remand
and almost two years after her initial appeal to the local. Actually, buried
in the record amid seven pages of single-spaced typing, appellant's initial
appeal did include a sentence fragment asking
to be "made whole." The PRB did not notice or rely on it, or use the two
words to distinguish the result from Colley. One can hope it is re-thinking.
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), record pp 101,
107,
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), pp 15, 23;
see also O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 391, 395 (1966) (PRB ordered installation and
damages for elected financial secretary though according to the decision he requested
only installation),
 Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 476 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477, 479-81 (1969) (PRB
awarded damages to member who protested improper ratification of an oral shop
agreement though member sought none),
Ryan v Local 6, 4 PRB 379, 383 (1985), 5 PRB 1, 5 (1985) (recommending to IEB that it
allow wrongly convicted member who previously waived damages to change his mind),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228, 232, 238 (1994) (wrongly removed appointed reps
expressly disavowed backpay, but PRB looked through record anyway to see if there
was evidence of pay loss),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 14, record pp 88, 102-04, 121-22,
166, 170, 201 (compensation for monetary loss ordered for removal from office,
though appellant's original appeal did not request damages).

Damages are central, and the authority on which all of article 33 is based.
The PRB has occasionally granted relief which was not requested. Colley
appears to be a deviation. In any event, there is no administrative letter,
pocket guide, or IEB or presidential interpretation explaining damages or
distinguishing among different types of appeal or different types of
damages. If there are to be different rules for claiming them in various
situations, members should be told what they are, and not penalized for
missteps.

Remedies, generally
Table of Contents
 Contents of This Subsection

Removal || Grievance appeals ||

Charges and trials || Elections ||
Miscellaneous

Suppose you win an appeal at the IEB, PRB, or CAC. What exactly do you
get? The answer varies with the type of appeal.

A grievance might be reinstated in the grievance procedure or ordered into

arbitration; if the grievance was lost you might get damages and and a job
offer elsewhere. If it is an election appeal, you might get a rerun election
or an order of installation. If the appeal arose out of charges or a trial, the
matter might be ordered into trial or re-trial, or ordered not to
be tried; or a guilty verdict might be modified. If it arose out of an
administratorship the administratorship might be lifted. If it arose from a
removal from office you might be reinstated. In non-grievance appeals
you can also sometimes win damages.
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391, 395 (1966) (installation and restitution of financial losses
after election),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 733 (1980) (retrial of acquitted member),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399, 408 (1987) (administratorship lifted),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228, 238 (1994) (reinstatement of appointed reps),
see also Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 241 (1999) (backpay ordered after grievance
loss at arbitration),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 244 (2000) (backpay and attorney fees ordered, and job offer
 obtained),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), pp 9-10 (appellant reinstated in district
and rerun election ordered),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 23
(reinstatement and possibly compensation for EPC claim).

The UAW is not always good about explaining these remedies to

members.
Ruggirello v Ford Motor Co, 411 F Supp 758, 761-62, 92 LRRM 2230-31, 1977 WL 1826
(ED Mich, 1976) (affidavit unchallenged by UAW says one UAW official and two UAW
attorneys told fired member's attorney that damages are unavailable in grievance
appeal under articles 32 and 33 even if the union is wrong).

In a decision discussed elsewhere the PRB ordered an assessment of

possible compensation against a local even though it was not a party to
the appeal.

This section explores remedy scenarios in more detail. General

observations on PRB decisions are elsewhere.

Removal

In two cases discussed elsewhere presidents of Chrysler locals removed

under article 48 the PRB ordered reinstatement and other substantial
relief, including in one case restoration of the right to seek office, a rerun
election, an order to advise the bonding company that appellant
committed no wrongdoing, and reimbursement of returned settlement
money with interest, and in the other restoration to office, and an order
to resolve claims for backpay and damages for reputation and due
process violations.

After an audit and removal of top local officers from office, the PRB
variously ordered unconditional reinstatement to office, or an order to
repay money and approval of an IEB bar on running for future office.
Article 48 section 5;
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 229 (1984) (reinstatement to office without requirement of
reimbursement),
Ford v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 230 (1984), 4 PRB 268, 270 (1985), 5 PRB 363 (1987), 5 PRB
587 (1989) (on reimbursement by appellant, right to run for office suspended for three
years).

Grievance appeals

Remedies in grievance appeals won at the local level are discussed

elsewhere.

The following discussion applies if you win a grievance appeal at the IEB,
CAC, or PRB level, the contract with the company obligates the company
to accept such cases back into the grievance procedure, and there has
been no ruling by an arbitrator.
Two exceptional decisions have considered the consequences of winning
an appeal at this level and arbitration is not available, either because
there is no agreement and the company refuses to allow the grievance
back into the procedure (Lombard), or the arbitrator has already ruled
(Morris).

If an arbitrator has not yet ruled, winning a grievance appeal simply

means having the grievance reinstated, perhaps with an order to
arbitrate.
Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 30 (1958) (backpay and an order to obtain a letter of
recommendation from the company),
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221, 229 (1981) (reinstatement of grievance for submission
to umpire),
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385, 389 (1982) (remand for arbitration, PRB retains
jurisdiction),
Jodlowsky v UAW, 5 PRB 463, 466 (1988) (in other ruling PRB ordered member's
grievance submitted to umpire, but umpire ultimately rejected grievance),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 309 (1992) (in every previous
remand for arbitration by the PRB the UAW ultimately lost the case, new remedies
considered establishing procedural rights of member in arbitration),
Petersen v TOP Department, 8 PRB 289, 301 (1995) (remand to fourth step of
procedure),
Ayres v Local 1112, 10 PRB 126, 128 (1998) (reinstatement of grievance would return
member to terminated status),
Chase v Local 1231, 11 PRB 53, 60 (2000) (union ordered to submit grievance to
arbitrator with arguments that safety glass rule for which he was fired was not
uniformly enforced and that even though he was on a last-chance agreement his
violation of the rule was not intentional),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03), pp 9-10 (grievance reinstated,
jurisdiction retained in event company does not make grievant whole),
 Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/20/07), pp 15-18
(after IEB order to re-investigate grievance the company refused to reinstate it to the
procedure, but appellant is due no damages because the president has provided a
convincing rationale for the union's conclusion that the grievance could not have been
arbitrated successfully).

Though reinstatement certainly bodes well, you could still lose the
grievance at arbitration. If a discharge grievance was settled for partial
relief (say, reinstatement and no backpay) and your appeal is later
successful, at least theoretically you will again become a terminated
employee with a pending grievance. I hedge a little in saying this,
because your job record between the time of reinstatement and the time
of winning the appeal could be a factor in the company's attitude.

At any rate the PRB occasionally has ordered reinstatement of a

grievance, reminded the successful member of the risk in light of a
history of other grievances having been ordered into arbitration by the
PRB after which the arbitrator ruled for the company anyway, and
provided the member a grace period in which to reconsider taking the
partial settlement.
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5, 15 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996)
(30-day delay allowed for appellant to change mind; as noted in supplemental decision
he did so),
Burdette v GM Department, 11 PRB 303, 310-11 (2001) (30-day delay allowed for
appellant to change mind),
Lamb v Local 599, PRB Case 1544 (10/26/06), p 6 (had IEB reinstated grievance to
procedure, appellant stood to lose the benefit of the good settlement achieved by
local),
compare Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), pp 4, 7 (member rejects
 settlement backpay offer but cashes the check anyway due to financial need, appeal
rejected by PRB on other grounds);
but see Green, CAC, session 4/99 (CAC denies appeal, noting that even if successful
result of appeal would be to rescind settlement and return to company money received
in settlement).

But in a 1996 appeal, despite a PRB dissent highlighting appellant's dismal

attendance record, his failure to contest certain absences, his subsequent
failure to improve during counselling, the union's inability to convince the
company to give him another chance, and the limitation on the umpire's
authority in absentee discharges, the UAW eventually won the member's
grievance anyway. Other grievances occasionally have also won after
remand.
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 151, 161-62 (1996), second decision, 9 PRB
165, 166 (2002),
Vogen v Local 900 II, 9 PRB 624 (2000), reconsideration denied (7/19/00) (discussed
more fully elsewhere, after PRB remand in this appeal company offered appellant
reinstatement and full backpay minus 111 weeks which had accumulated during the
period the grievance was withdrawn);
Fowler, CAC, session 5/01, second decision, session 3/03 (discharge grievance referred
back to region for investigation, grievance pressed to arbitration where grievant won
but recieved no backpay for time during which the grievance had been withdrawn; CAC
later rejected claim for backpay from the union for this period);
compare Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 309 (1992) ("We are
painfully cognizant that in every instance in which we have directed the reinstatement
and arbitration of a grievance, the ultimate result has been that the arbitrator has
ruled against the Union and the grievant....").

If a member wins a grievance and partial backpay that under the contract
strictly considered he or she should have lost completely, he or she is not
entitled to compensation from the union for the remainder of the
backpay.
Grabowski v Local 157, 10 PRB 592, 597 (2000),
compare Ayres v Local 1112, 10 PRB 126, 128 (1998) (if PRB were to reinstate grievance,
arbitrator might eventually award him reinstatement and only partial backpay, so
settlement providing him reinstatement after eight months and no backpay
was rational).

In its 1992 Moran decision the PRB announced a new rule for formulating
remedies in grievance appeals. It ordered a withdrawn grievance into
arbitration. That was not particularly unusual. But it was skeptical of the
union's enthusiasm, given that on a previous remand the grievance was
re-investigated by the same rep who had settled irrationally before and
then settled irrationally again.
Compare Norris, CAC, session 11/00 (on reinstatement of grievance by IEB at step 3, a
different regional rep met on it, and again withdrew it; CAC reinstated grievance at
step 4).

Burned, and being "painfully" aware that the UAW had lost every previous
grievance ordered by the PRB to arbitration though nearly all seemed like
strong cases, the PRB considered whether an order to arbitrate by itself
might be ineffective. It continued:
We are ever mindful that the decisions of this Board are sometimes used by the Union
as a part of its defense in duty of fair representation claims asserted against it in civil
litigation by its members. That fact in turn implies an obligation on our part to insure
that members who assert like claims to us have available to them substantially all of
the remedies that would be available to them in a court of law.
To see that a member receive as efficacious a remedy as possible, it
recommended the UAW consider whether the member should have the
rights to (1) be present and be heard at the arbitration proceeding, (2)
have a voice in the selection of the arbitrator when there is no permanent
umpire, and (3) have independent legal counsel participate in all
arbitration phases.
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 310 (1992);
see also George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204, 210 (1987) (remand for additional IEB
investigation ordered, after which UAW ordered to meet with appellant and her
attorney to determine whether grievance should proceed to arbitration),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225, 239-40 (1999) (if union makes no attempt to correct
deficiencies identified by PRB in disposing of appeal nothing will be gained by
reinstatement of grievance, union had appellant's attorney been allowed to assist UAW
in handling case before umpire union would almost certainly not be facing an award of
damages),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614, 622 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000)
reconsideration denied (7/19/00) (UAW ordered to advance to the umpire all the
reasons noted by the PRB in its decision, object if the company tries to change the
reason it fired the grievant, and at the grievant's request permit his attorney to
participate in negotiations with the company and if necessary participate in the
arbitration in an advisory capacity),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 367 n 6 (2003) (different rep must handle the
grievance on remand).

This is a remarkable decision. I don't know of a court case where a judge

ordered individual participation in an arbitration similar to the remedy in
Moran. The PRB didn't cite any. Usually when a court finds a union liable it
just orders damages. Did the PRB mean to say it was going to start
ordering damages in grievance appeals? Maybe, except that as noted just
below damages have been the whole basis of article 33 since day one.
The PRB traditionally orders them when the UAW is wrong.

Moran is remarkable in other ways. As elsewhere noted, lawyers are not

held in high esteem in the UAW. It is odd that the PRB would base a
decision on guaranteeing their promises. The UAW does not publicize to
members the promises its lawyers make to judges. The PRB's purpose is
to enforce ethical conduct in a working-class organization, not concern
itself with litigation or external law. Fair representation suits usually lose
anyway.

In any case, wronged members have to play by the PRB's rules. So,
members should visit law libraries, or hire lawyers, and cite court
decisions when addressing damages. One appellant researching damages
in a non-grievance appeal even queried a national database of jury
verdicts in similar cases. This is very bizarre, but it is where the Moran
logic leads.
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 238 (2001).

Charges and trials

Table of Contents
Charges and trials can result in punitive action being taken against a
member, in the form of a reprimand or suspension from office or
membership. Remedies in these appeals are described elsewhere,

Elections

Remedies in election appeals are discussed elsewhere.

Miscellaneous

Occasionally the PRB considers whether to allow an appeal to be

withdrawn.
Local 453 v Hawkins, 1 PRB 234, 236-37 (1961) (withdrawal request approved over
objection of appellant charge-filer because appellant filed charge in capacity as local
president which he no longer is, and local now wishes to withdraw),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 134 (1994) (withdrawal request
denied because appellant filed appeal as president which he no longer is, and other
party objects because appeal involves substantial issues),
Rider v Local 1853, 9 PRB 429, 434 n 4 (withdrawal request denied because of
appellant's history of changing mind);
 compare article 33 section 4(h), interpretation 1 (failure of appellant to comply with
constitutional requirement to appear at IEB hearing privileges IEB to consider appeal
was withdrawn) (8/11/60).

Sometimes also the PRB will recommend specific action to the IEB to act
in the appeal at hand.
Ryan v Local 6, 4 PRB 379, 384 (1985), 5 PRB 1, 6 (1985) (waive time limits),
Ford v UAW, 5 PRB 363, 365 (1987) (grant restitution of membership rights),
Benchich appealing Abernathy v Local 909, 5 PRB 576, 578 (1988) (waive time limits),
Ford v UAW, 5 PRB 587 (1989) (grant restitution of membership rights),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73-74 (1996) (waive time limits),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), p 14 (report to
PRB and appellant progress and disposition of proceedings on remand to IEB).

The PRB has recommended that a local change or clarify its bylaws.
Campbell appealing Cox v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 343 (1992) (status of local officers as
full-time or part-time, vacation pay, lost time),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1481 (11/22/04), pp 15-16 (status of local officers as
full-time or part-time, their compensation).

The UAW has been ordered to obtain information from or bargain with the
company.
Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 30 (1958) (local ordered to obtain letters from management
clearing appellant's record and recommending her for future employment),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 777 (1972) (union ordered to bargain with company
for adjustment of appellant's seniority status),
Long v Local 22, 10 PRB 206, 212 (1998), supplemental decision, 10 PRB 216, 217
(1999) (GM department ordered to obtain area hire lists, new hires, and analysis from
company, and then investigate).
Sometimes the PRB will issue an order which does not affect the pending
appeal, but is "prospective." That is, it is intended only to govern future
conduct. It has never ordered or considered frontpay.
Piluso v Local 738, 1 PRB 355, 359 (1966) (in election season local should not publish
materials in local newspaper respecting new appointees to office if the appointees are
candidates, newspaper should give equal space to all candidates),
Tencza, 1 PRB 497 (1968) (amend bylaws to provide penalties for officers'
non-attendance at meetings),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 117 (1974) (dissent) (separate skilled trades ratification),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 150 (1974) (dissent) (separate skilled trades ratification)
Conrad, 8 PRB 439, 444 (1994) (at future retiree banquets if politicking is to be
permitted if must not be from the podium and access must be made equally available
to all candidates),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1479 (10/25/04), p 11 (PRB cannot provide anticipatory
remedy for proclivity of local president as convener of local press committee to
scrutinize articles submitted by recording secretary more closely than articles
submitted by other local officers).

Sometimes the PRB will order a local newspaper to publish something.

Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 350 (1965) (publication of article of reversal of trial
judgment of equal size as previous article reporting original judgment),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 281 (1981) (publication of PRB decision in local union
newspaper condemning union mob's disruption of political picnic).

Occasionally the PRB will order relief the appellant did not request.
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 350 (1965) (publication of article in local newspaper),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 476 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477, 479 (1969) (wage loss
reimbursement),
 Tencza, 1 PRB 497, 501 (1968) (requirement that local amend bylaws),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271, 281 (1981) (publication of PRB decision in local union
newspaper condemning union mob's disruption of political picnic),
Seal v Local 216, 3 PRB 338, 342 (1982) (in election appeal granted by PRB, where
member did not request rerun PRB withholds remedy to give appellant an opportunity
to request rerun),
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5, 15 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996)
(opportunity to withdraw appeal).

Occasionally the PRB will decide not to decide an issue because it has
become "moot". By this is meant that there is no longer or never was an
actual controversy to appeal. Mootness can sometimes be avoided by
expediting an appeal.
Article 33 section 1;
Wright v Local 501, 1 PRB 78, 81 (1959) (new elections moot restoration of appellants to
office),
Local 971 v Lucki, 1 PRB 284, 287-88 (1962) (IEB's reversal of appellants' convictions
for exceeding production quotas on procedural grounds meant there was no longer an
actual controversy and appellants lacked standing to appeal local's policy of restricting
productive output),
Smith v UAW, 2 PRB 483, 485-86 (1976) (request by fired member of one local to be
allowed to get employment under and pay dues to second local moot until he gets
employment in the second local),
Unit 24, Local 412, 3 PRB 46, 49-50 (1980) (local unit can appeal IEB's disposition of
grievance though UAW says local unit prevailed at IEB, because the unit disagrees and
says it is dissatisfied with the disposition),
EP complaint of Thompson, 4 PRB 81, 82 (1983) (removal of administratorship moots
appeal of administrator's order prohibiting shop committee member from publishing
leaflets concerning local negotiations),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 5 PRB 228, 233, 366, 371 (1987) (failure of IEB to
dispose of election complaint within 4-month time period indicated by federal law did
not render appeal moot),
Bugos appealing Hobson v Local 974, 5 PRB 396, 398 (1987) (election appeal mooted by
rerun),
Woodward v Local 325, 6 PRB 95, 98 (1990) (workload assignment grievance appeal
moot because appellant no longer performs job),
Gonzales v Local 1097, 11 PRB 260, 262 (2001) (appeal to have local hold election to fill
vacancy in election committee mooted by holding of a new election),
Yettaw v Local 599, 11 PRB 434, 438 (2002) (IEB has already provided relief, and more,
to which appellant was entitled),
Brown v Local 600, PRB Case 1419 (1/31/03), p 3 (new election and delay in appeal-
processing, much of which was due to appellant, moots election appeal),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1481 (11/22/04), p 15 (grievance dispute over scheduling
vacations for local officrs with part-time representational duties mooted by change in
company practice),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), p 16 (election protest mooted by
redistricting and new elections),
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), record p 108, letter, Barbara Klein to Ellis
Boal, 6/26/06 ("[T]here is no authority in the UAW Constitution for the PRB to direct
the IEB to expedite appeals."),
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), p 3 n 4 (CAC questions whether
concomitant class actioss actio n court proceedings might have mooted appeal had
CAC been
inclined to grant it, since all parties to appeal were also parties or objectors in court),
Donovan v Ford Department, PRB Cases 1526, 1542 (10/25/06), p 20 (new election
cannot be conducted in unit because the unit no longer exists and anyway lawsuit
settlement agreement remedied UAW error in ordering elections to be in combined
units; monetary damages were occasioned by company decision to move work),
Lyons v Local 2280, PRB Case 1576 (12/17/07), pp 7-8 (though crucial piece of evidence
possibly supporting IEB decision surfaced only after the decision, and investigation by
president's staff was at best perfunctory, appeal of local's failure to hold election to fill
interim vacancy within 45 days is moot due to passage of time and holding of untimely
election),
Grima v Region 1A, PRB Case 1606 (11/24/08), p 22 ("Theoretically, the issue of Grima's
removal has been rendered moot by the rerun of the officers' election at [the local].);
Davidson v Local 1282, CAC, session 1/81 (CAC declines an opinion on propriety of a
possible future sympathy strike by a local unit).
Even though an appeal is "moot," sometimes the PRB will go ahead and
decide it anyway.
Article 32 section 5 (PRB may act on EPC matter in absence of appeal if there was
substance to original complaint and IEB action did not satisfactorily meet the problem);
Beach v Local 653, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (were appeal timely it would have been
meritorious),
Sabin v Local 599, 5 PRB 566, 570 (1988) (though moot PRB decides strike authorization
ballot violated EPC),
EP complaint of Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 595-96 (1988) (restoration to position
moots appeal of removed appointee, but PRB expresses views anyway on EPC issues),
Cordell appealing McDonaugh v Local 1183, 9 PRB 591, 595 (1998) (though appeal is
mooted by appellants' reelection victory, PRB advises IEB on decorum of hearings),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 14 (PRB decides trial would be warranted
on charge despite member's abandonment of request for trial).

Sometimes the PRB will issue an order and then retain jurisdiction to be
sure that the order is carried out or is effective.
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 23, record
pp 168-72;
see also Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 777 (1972),
Nickell v Local 590, 2 PRB 47, 52 (1973) (PRB asks UAW to keep it advised of continuing
efforts to secure appellant's reinstatement),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 72 (2001),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03), pp 9-10,
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08) p 13.

Sometimes the PRB will temporarily withhold fashioning of a complete

remedy.
 Seal v Local 216, 3 PRB 338, 342 (1982) (in election appeal granted by PRB, where
member did not request rerun PRB withholds remedy to give appellant an opportunity
to request rerun).

Removal from office

Table of Contents

Several provisions in the constitution, and several PRB decisions, discuss

the occasions and procedures for removing an appointed or elected
member from office.
Article 10 section 7 (relations to a political organization such as the Communist Party),
article 10 section 8 (support of organized workplace rackets),
article 10 section 12 (support of rival union or decertification),
article 12 section 3 (local in administratorship),
article 30 (UAW unbecoming conduct),
article 31 (local unbecoming conduct),
article 33 section 2(b) (locally-appointed officials),
article 33 section 2(b) (UAW-appointed officials),
article 37 section 5 (local officers who do not attend meetings),
article 45 section 3 (recall of stewards and committeepersons),
article 48 section 5 (financial misconduct),
article 48 section 6 (member owing non-dues money to UAW entity);
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 776 (1972) (local redistricting),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 106 (1984) (resignation),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 14 (president had no authority to
 remove appellant shop chair for any reason, and appellant is entitled to compensation).

In some situations, the removal can be summary.

Article 10 section 12 (support of rival union or decertification),
article 30 section 4 (UAW unbecoming conduct),
article 31 section 6 (local unbecoming conduct),
article 37 section 5 (local officers who do not attend meetings),
article 48 section 5(c) (financial misconduct).

Saturn
Table of Contents

Several decisions have concerned members working under the contract

formerly in effect at Saturn. According to the president's office in 1996:
Work practices at Saturn are unique. Saturn has no shop rules; rules are contrary to
the Saturn concept of employees working in teams that are self-motivated and
self-directed. It is not acceptable to use so-called "free" time to play cards; at Saturn
work never ends. Under the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement between Saturn
and the UAW, an employee who finishes his assignment is supposed to work on
problem solving in such areas as quality control, health and safety, ergonomics,
repairs, control of scrap, and training, and is expected to do so. The team centers were
created so that the teams can do the work that supervisors and foremen perform in
other GM plants. These centers were built at considerable cost just for this purpose.
They are not recreation areas.
 Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 217 (1996);
see also Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225 (1999),
Rider v Local 1853, 9 PRB 429 (1997),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10 (2001),
Jones v Local 1853, 10 PRB 95 (1998),
Riley v Local 1853, 11 PRB 93 (2000),
Bennett v Local 1853, PRB Case 1429 (4/22/03),
Sasaki v Local 1853, PRB Case 1524 (12/21/05);
Hoskins, CAC, session 5/96.

Trials

Contents of This
Subsection

General || Constitutional
provisions

General

Union discipline is enforced under article 31. It is triggered when a charge

is made that a member committed misconduct of some kind. There are
two categories of offense, as described elsewhere. The PRB explained in
one case:
 [I]t may be true that appellant Estes has suffered a "penalty" in the sense that his
journeyman credentials have been withdrawn and he is no longer working as a
Millwright at Volvo.... [But it] would have been improper for Farley to have proceeded
against Estes under Article 31, for the issue was not whether Estes had engaged in
some form of misconduct, but whether he was eligible to be certified as a journeyman
Millwright by the Union's Skilled Trades Department.

Estes v UAW, 9 PRB 555, 562 (1998).

Discipline because of union misconduct is different from lapsing due to

non-payment of union dues. Expulsion due to a trial procedure is punitive.
On the other hand lapsing, typically because the member has been laid
off or fired from the job, is a housekeeping provision to assist the local in
keeping an accurate membership list. According to the PRB, an honorable
withdrawal card is issued routinely in most cases. The card's very name
indicates no failure or misconduct by the former member.
Article 16 section 19 ("Unless any such member shall [properly certify entitlement to
"out-of-work" credits] the member shall automatically be noted on the Local Union's
records as having been issued an honorable withdrawal transfer card....");
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), pp 13, 22, 28 (PRB says in most cases
withdrawal cards are issued routinely, but UAW says constitutional language is old and
the local need not actually issue it).

A charge can be brought only against a member.

Tomblin v UAW, PRB Case No 1565 (4/18/07), p 8 ("A charge against a person who is
not a member of the UAW would never be appropriate for submission to a Local Union
Trial Committee. The very idea is illogical.").
A charge can be brought only by a member.
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), p 26 ("At the outset, we need to
address the issue of who initiated this charge.... The [non-member] secretaries were
not filing Article 31 charges; that would clearly be improper.").

Article 31 says members can be brought up on charges and tried before a

trial committee of members randomly chosen at a union meeting. By a
2/3 vote upheld after various levels of appeal, a trial committee can
reprimand a guilty member, suspend or remove the member from office,
or suspend or expel the member from the UAW. By a 2/3 vote of the
membership before trial, a local can also suspend an accused member
from an elected or appointed position pending the trial outcome.

Until 1983 article 31 also permitted a fine of up to $100. Additionally,

article 37 permitted locals to impose $1 fines -- in certain cases without
trial -- for non-attendance at meetings and for other unspecified reasons.
Article 49 also permitted $10 fines for fraud in local elections or strike
balloting. In 1983 the convention eliminated all these fines, in light of an
organizing department recommendation reviewed and endorsed by the
constitution committee. According to the report, though historically the
UAW only rarely imposed monetary fines, anti-union forces were using
the existence of the constitutional language to defeat the union.
Article 31 sections 6, 10 13, 14,
article 37 section 5,
article 49;
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 376 (1966) ($100 fines upheld for violating local mandate
 not to work overtime during negotiations),
remarks of constitution committee chair Bob King, proceedings, 27th constitutional
convention, pp 231-38 (1983) (debate on elimination of fines).

Withdrawal of representation is not listed as a penalty a trial committee

can impose. In one situation, described elsewhere, a member directed
racial and sexual slurs toward fellow members at work. The company
fired him. He wasn't charged for unbecoming conduct under article 31,
but if charged he likely would have been guilty. Still, the union
represented him. He came back, though without backpay, even though
according to the PRB the company had the right to fire him.

Unlike recall petitions, charges tend to be disfavored in the UAW, and are
thought of as a necessary evil. Be careful when you make one. It may be
warranted but it can take the union's eye off the ball:
This appeal which has required so much time and effort on the part of so many people
had its origin in nothing more than a name calling incident. Throughout the course of
these proceedings we have wondered at the stubbornness displayed by persons party
to this case in processing the matter to an ultimate conclusion. Appellant apologized to
his accuser and apparently fulfilled the meeting attendance requirements for he was
reinstated to membership in good standing in September, 1961. While we cannot
overemphasize the importance of adherence to requirements of the Constitution we
cannot help but lament the diversion of so much energy to a matter of comparatively
little consequence. Such preoccupations tend to obscure the purposes the Union was
meant to serve and perhaps weakens the dedication with which it should serve them.
[footnote omitted]

Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 178, 185 (1962);

see also Wirth v Local 596, 4 PRB 1, 3 (1983) (acquittal at trial restores
member's good name),
 McCabe appealing Flowers v Local 1077, 5 PRB 318, 320 (1987) (if officers and
reps must justify actions to a trial committee each time someone challenges
lost-time claim, business of union could quickly grind to halt),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 136-40 (1994) (castigating
all parties and the president's office),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 344-45 (1994), reconsideration denied (1/10/95)
(dispute is simply manifestation of political battle between caucus
supporters),
Valdez v Local 31, 9 PRB 298, 302 (1996) (charges against officers for
dereliction of duty are "largely profitless"),
Cain v Local 862, 9 PRB 407, 411 (1997) ("Charges however also provide the
opportunity for mischief and abuse."),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 7 ("Charges are not an
appropriate means to resolve political or policy disputes.").

The UAW and PRB say these disciplinary provisions are the union's
equivalent to criminal proceedings. They should be narrowly construed.
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35, 39-40 (1958) ("guilt" not "liability"),
Campbell in the matter of Cox v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 341 (1992) ("equivalent to a penal
code"),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 345 (1994) ("Union's equivalent of criminal proceedings").

Penalties not imposed pursuant to trial procedures will be set aside.

Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 31-32 (1958) (notice, trial, confrontation of accusers), Siren
v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 164 (1960) (notice, trial, confrontation of accusers), Sexton v
UAW, 1 PRB 729, 735-37 (1972) (dissent) (burden of proof on charging
member, notice, trial, confrontation of accusers),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 727-33 (1980) (unbiased trial committee, denial of right
to effective counsel).

To convict a member, the PRB says wrongful intent must be shown, either
an intent to injure recognized interests of the union or its members, or a
disregard of such interests so flagrant as to be willful and wanton. That's
pretty vague. A listing of acts found chargeable or unchargeable is
elsewhere and can help in figuring it out.

As discussed elsewhere, regardless of your "good standing" you must

have "standing" to bring a charge. PRB decisions are not consistent on
this point, and I wish you the best of luck.
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 724 n 1 (1980), reconsidered 2 PRB 724 (1980)
(non-party in local trial permitted to appeal procedure leading to verdict of acquittal);
McGinnis v Local 2123, 8 PRB 26, 27 (1993) (member had no standing to charge another
member claiming an assault on a third member),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03) (member's standing to charge LEB for
improperly removing other member from LEB not questioned).

If you win a charge and succeed, say, in removing an officer who settled a
grievance improperly, that does not change the grievance settlement.
Only an appeal can remedy that; or as the PRB phrases it, only an appeal
can provide "remedial" relief. Thus, a 1969 decision extended the time
limits for a member to start an appeal after the PRB rejected the
member's charge against the committeeperson who handled the
grievance.
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969);
see also Lloyd v Local 550, 1 PRB 417, 420 (1967),
West v Local 738, 1 PRB 430, 434 (1967),
Ruzicka v Local 166, 1 PRB 654, 657 (1971),
Berard v Local 422, 2 PRB 610, 614 (1977),
Keliipio appealing Damico v Local 438, 5 PRB 201, 203 (1986),
 Benchich appealing Abernathy v Local 909, 5 PRB 576, 580 (1988),
Adams v Local 425, 6 PRB 464, 470 (1992),
Gardner v Local 653, 10 PRB 584, 586 (2000),
Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 624, 627 (2000) (membership not trial committee should
have decided whether charged member should have returned money she received for
attending meeting),
Powell in the matter of Stewart v IEB Region 3, PRB Case 1466, p 9 (3/18/04),
Pearsall v Local 12, PRB Case 1475, p 7 (5/26/04),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1486, p 5 (11/23/04),
King v Local 600 PRB Case 1499 (9/19/05), p 10,
Abronowitz v Local 2256 PRB Case 1599 (9/25/08), p 10 (complaints ought to have been
addressed in grievances or appeals to the membership, not in charges).

On returning from honorable withdrawal a person is subject to charges for

acts committed while on withdrawal.
Article 17 section 10;
Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 311-12 (1965).

Constitutional provisions

Charges against local members and officials most commonly arise under
article 31. Section 9 of that article particularly covers officials of
amalgamated locals and provides unusual standards for them.

Theoretically a charge can also be brought against an international officer

under article 30; I don't think any have ever been brought.
Northrup v UAW, 2 PRB 467, 468-69 (1977) (under constitution UAW officer or director
 may not be charged by member, and in any event member brought charge under
article 31 not article 30),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 342 (1994) (comparing articles 30 and 31);
see also article 31 sections 22-23 (charges against IEB member).

In a 2005 decision the president argued in support of an IEB decision,

and the PRB agreed, that article 13 section 16 preempts article 31 in
charges alleging misuse of the UAW seal or name, and accordingly only
the secretary-treasurer had authority to police use of the UAW's seal or
name. The PRB added that the secretary-treasurer would have had no
need to proceed in this case because the charged members ceased their
efforts regarding the union seal when requested to do so.
Article 13 section 16;
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), pp 6-7.

Article 48 is somewhat similar to article 31. Section 5 allows the president

to temporarily suspend a local officer without a hearing on discovery of
dues-related financial misconduct revealed by audit, subject to appeal.
The constitution sets no specific time limit for starting proceedings under
article 48, but they must begin reasonably promptly. Section 6 covers
non-payment of owed non-dues money such as overpaid strike benefits.
Under both sections no intent to defraud need be proved.
Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 384-87 (debate on adding article
48 section 6 which covers collection of owed non-dues money),
proceedings, 24th constitutional convention (1974), pp 224-29 (debate on amending
procedures article 48 section 5 which covers collection of owed dues money, no time
limit to start proceedings),
proceedings, 25th constitutional convention (1977), p 209 (no time limit to start
 proceedings),
Thompson v UAW, 1 PRB 322, 326-27 (1964) ("A 'misappropriation of funds' denotes an
appropriation of money for a wrongful or unauthorized purpose. It is not, however, a
technical or legal designation for a criminal act, nor does it include as an element the
presence of any improper intent on the part of the misappropriating party; while
misappropriation may, of couse, result from a wrongful purpose, it may also occur as a
consequence of an honest mistake or negligent hehavior. ... Suspension under these
circumstances is not to be equated with the imposition of a penalty following a formal
finding of a violation of union law. The suspension is, on the contrary, the act of
initiation of a procedure rather then the culmination of one...."),
Sexton v UAW, 1 PRB 729, 733-34 (1972) (former officer may be barred from seeking
office for actions taken while an officer, summarily though no emergency exists),
Kiel v UAW, 1 PRB 738, 741 (1972) (effect of expiration of 120-day period is to terminate
suspension, not deprive IEB of power to act),
Sims v UAW, 2 PRB 578, 583 (1977), reconsideration denied, 2 PRB 584 (1977) (intent
to defraud is not a prerequisite),
Chakonis v Bieber, 5 PRB 277 (1987) (improper lost-time claims),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 229 (1984) (extended discussion of necessary expenses),
Ford v UAW, 5 PRB 363, 364-65 (1987), 5 PRB 587 (1989) (IEB decision to defer
consideration of request for reinstatement of membership rights until three years after
member reimbursed union for misappropriated funds upheld),
Grigsby v Local 110, 5 PRB 412, 415 (1987) (article 48 distinguished from article 31 in
that no wrongful intent need be shown),
Kronenberg v Local 961, 6 PRB 377 (1992) (personal political telegrams charged to local
union),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 399 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (lost time),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 72 (2001) (wage payments to local president from
Chrysler),
Gaines v UAW, 11 PRB 410, 413-14 (2003) (profit sharing),
Mays v UAW, 11 PRB 446, 449 (2002) (non-dues money, membership suspended until
sum owed is repaid),
Pollard v UAW, 11 PRB 467, 471-72 (2002) ("The bylaws allow [appellant] to claim only
the time he lost from work to perform the responsibilities of his office.... He shall
remain suspended from office and the right to seek or hold office in Local 961 until
 such time as he has repaid in full ... and the [IEB] has lifted his suspension."),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), p 8 ("The
record in this case is a good illustration of the importance of requiring that claims made
pursuant to Article 48, §6, of the Constitution be presented within a reasonable time
after the events they describe. [footnote omitted]"),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1634 (1/26/10), pp 15-18 (local president was properly
barred indefinitely from holding or seeking union office due to entering into an
unauthorized lease and improperly using local funds to secure it, despite that no
restitution is due and she did not act for personal gain, because appellant defied an
express direction of the LEB and misrepresented her actions at a membership meeting
in order to conceal her improprieties).

Article 40 provides for penalties for responsible local officers who willfully
and intentionally fail to report monthly the full local membership to the
UAW or refuses to send in the full amount of per capita tax. The local itself
can also be suspended.
Article 40 section 10.

Article 49 can also be used to punish fraud in elections or strike balloting.

The penalty is mandatory debarment from holding elective or appointed
office anywhere in the UAW for 2-5 years. To proceed under this article file
a charge under article 31.
Miller v Local 677, 4 PRB 234, 236 (1984).

Article 10 section 7 provides for removal from office of members who are
subservient to or members of a foreign-controlled political organization.
The PRB has never upheld a removal under this provision.
 Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 538 (1969) (burden is on charging member in
proceeding under predecessor of article 10 sections 7, 9-10).

As discussed elsewhere, until 1970 a charge could be brought under the

predecessor of article 33 section 5 for appealing to a court prior to
exhausting appeals in the union.
Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 21 (1958).

One other source of punishment is the EPC, which allows the PRB to
punish frivolous accusers summarily without a trial.
Article 32 section 7.

Trial practice
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Time limits and specificity ||

Sufficiency of charges || Trial
|| Appeals
Time limits and specificity

Under article 31 the time limit for filing charges is 60 days from when you
knew or should have known the essential facts of the offending conduct.

In one appeal, member George Sailer charged a health-and-safety rep in

December 1993 with overbilling the local in connection with a conference
he had attended in July 1993. After rumors of the matter had circulated
Brother Sailer spoke to the financial secretary in July who confirmed that
the rep's receipts had been apparently altered. On being confronted the
rep paid back the money. The incident was reported to the membership at
the November meeting. Sailer filed the charge within 60 days of then.

The local held the charge untimely because of common knowledge of the
incident in the plant in July. Sailer responded that he had no specific facts
on which to base a charge until the November meeting. The PRB agreed:
The problem that we have with the position taken by the Local Executive Board and
affirmed by the IEB is that it equates "general knowledge" with mere rumor and
unconfirmed fact. The fact that there was a claim that representative Rankin was
rumored, or even accused, or receiving money to which he was not entitled, does not
constitute a matter of general knowledge no matter how widely the rumor or allegation
was disseminated. For also disseminated, was Rankin's denial of the claim and his
contention that he could obtain receipts which would support his entitlement to the
reimbursement he had originally claimed. The matter was the subject of a Local Union
investigation, the results of which were not reported to the Local Union membership
until November 14, 1993. It was at this point that rumor became fact, and that
knowledge of the fact could reasonably be attributed to the membership. That Sailer
had made inquiries of Local officers on the subject as early as August 1993 did not
 make him privy to the facts any earlier than any other member, for he states that he
was told that the matter was then still under investigation and no definitive conclusion
had been reached. ...

A member may not be subjected to Article 31 charges on the basis of mere rumor or
innuendo, even though the rumor and innuendo may be wide-spread and a "political
football" within the plant. Article 31 §1 charges based on mere rumor or speculation
will not satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the charges be "exact" and
"specifically set forth." ...

Once the Local's official investigation had concluded, the situation changed completely
for it was reported that Rankin was unable to obtain the supporting receipts he sought,
and had repaid the money. [footnote omitted]

Sailer v Local 214, 8 PRB 555, 558 (1995).

Here is an example of a charge which was held sufficiently specific. The

event occurred in a room where a membership meeting was about to
begin. The charged member was the local president. She had just been
elected. The charging member was a former local president. The two had
discussion about an email which the charging member had placed on all
the chairs. Both then began collecting them. According to the PRB:
At this point, [Malcolm] Marts claims, Spurlock rushed at him and shoved him in the
chest. She attempted to take a swing at him, missed and then fell over a couple of
chairs.

Marts's charge alleged:

Assault and Battery -- On Wednesday October 28, 1999, Dorothy Spurlock committed
assault and battery against a fellow union member. The details of this assault are
included in the attached statements submitted to EMU police officer Chuck Mosher by
 three witnesses and myself. Subsequently, Dorothy has been charged by the
Washtenaw County Prosecutor's Officer with the crime of Assault and Battery.

The IEB and PRB approved the wording of the charges, and sent them to
a membership trial committee. Other decisions on time limits and
specificity follow.
Local 971 v Lucki, 1 PRB 284, 288-89 (1962) (charge of exceeding production quota
should have specified local law violated, date, and amount by which quota was
exceeded),
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 232, 234 (1975) (charge of discrimination based on national
origin was not specific),
Keown v Local 1587, 2 PRB 308, 312 (1976) (charge of fraternizing with company
officials and accepting documents to undermine negotiations is unspecific),
St Hillaire v Local 1459, 3 PRB 32, 35 (1980) (charge that local president initiated events
leading to charging member's discipline and withdrew grievances in bad faith lacked
specifics),
Toth v Local 723, 5 PRB 269, 272 (1987) (charges of publishing letter and vilifying
charging member and colluding with company to have personal union meeting on
company time did not identify or quote from letter or identify vilification or identify
meeting),
Nyhart v Local 31, 10 PRB 342, 346 (1999) (charges provided no detail as to how and in
what manner the charged parties acted),
Hills v Local 961, 11 PRB 77, 80 (2000), reconsidered in 2001 according to Hills v Local
961, 11 PRB 230, 234 n 7 (2001) (reason for requiring specifics is so charged member
has chance to prepare defense),
Wartley v Local 849, 11 PRB 421, 425 (2001) (ignorance of rights do not excuse
untimely charge),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1486 (11/23/04), p 4 (charge saying that while he was
investigating a grievance a committeeperson obtained a statement from supervisor
asking to confirm his belief that charging member was incapable of doing job does not
specifically describe malice necessary to convict the committeeperson),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 7 (charges that members tried to sell
 t-shirts with the local union's logo without local authorization falls far short of providing
a basis for charges of racketeering and extortion, so charges fail specificity
requirement),
Karniewicz v Local 1999, PRB Case 1505 (6/23/05), pp 6-7 (charges may be amended if
the amendment is within 60 days of the act charged).

If a charge is unspecific but otherwise timely and proper, the PRB has
allowed it to be re-filed at the accuser's option, provided it is
particularized with specifics.
West v Local 738, 1 PRB 430, 435 (1967),
Keown v Local 1587, 2 PRB 308, 312 (1976),
St Hillaire v Local 1459, 3 PRB 32, 35 (1980);
but see Abronowitz v Local 2256 PRB Case 1599 (9/25/08), p 10 (because of separate
defect, no allowance to re-file unspecific charge about representation appellants
received on grievances).

Sufficiency of charges

As described elsewhere, there are are two categories of charge.

When a charge is filed, before a trial can proceed the LEB or unit
workplace organization (and the president, IEB, and CAC or PRB if
appealed) must review its sufficiency under article 31 section 3. Until
1962 a trial was held every time a charge was brought.
Article 31 section 3;
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 348 (1965),
Lloyd v Local 550, 1 PRB 417, 419 (1967).
That year the constitution was amended to provide a procedure for
evaluating the sufficiency of charges. A charge is insufficient if it fails one
or more of four tests. I paraphrase them as follows:

the charge does not state specific facts of the charged member's act;

the charge is untimely;

even if true the act is neither unbecoming conduct nor a violation of

the constitution;

the charge involves a policy question.

These tests are applied to charges solely on the basis of the charges'
specific content, and not on other extraneous material. At this stage, the
LEB is to assume the facts alleged in the charges are true. During review
of the charges no action is taken, and the charged party may not even
learn of them.
Bradley appealing Glinski v Local 235, 5 PRB 174, 180 (1987) ("We have long held that
charges must be reviewed solely on the basis of their specific content, and not on any
other extraneous material."),
Cain v Local 862, 9 PRB 407, 411-12 (1997) (constitution does not provide for reading
charges to membership),
Harmon v Local 1977, 11 PRB 163, 166 (2001) ("Once again we find it necessary to
reiterate our often-repeated admonition that when reviewing Article 31 charges it is
the responsibility of the reviewing agent to assume that allegations contained in the
charges are true!"),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 7 ("Charges must be reviewed under
 Article 31, §3, solely on the basis of their specific content."),
Tomblin v UAW, PRB Case 1565 (4/18/07), p 7 ("We have long held that a Local
Executive Board should not consider any extraneous material when applying the tests
of Article 31, §3, to charges [footnote omitted]."),
Pollard v Local 7777, PRB Case 1619 (6/2/09), p 7 ("There is to be no action on the
charges, and the charged party is not even to be notified that charges have been filed,
until this review has taken place. It was improper for the Recording Secretary to read
Pollard's charges to the membership at the December membership meeting. [footnote
omitted]");
but see Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 (8/10/07), pp 6-7 ("While it is true that a
Local Executive Board must look only to the text of the charges presented in applying
the tests of Article 31, §3(a) through (d), that is not the case when applying subsection
(e).").

A member of the LEB who is involved either as the charging or charged

member should abstain from voting on the sufficiency of the charge.
Gilbert v Local 326, 6 PRB 436, 438 (1992) (improper for charged member to vote on
whether charge was sufficient),
Harmon v Local 1977, 11 PRB 163, 166 (2001) (LEB member, who was charged
member, should have excused and removed himself during consideration of the
sufficiency of the charges);
but see Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 5 (LEB reviewing charge against
itself not questioned).

Some latitude is allowed with specificity, for instance stating a

time-period rather than an exact date when the conduct occurred.
Article 31 section 1;
Grigsby v Local 110, 5 PRB 412, 415 (1987) (charge of double-dipping was sufficient
where total amount of $2000 in vouchers on several occasions over a two-month time
period were specified).
The first two tests are discussed immediately above. The third test is
discussed elsewhere.

The fourth test is sometimes the most difficult to comprehend, partly

because of the circular wording used for it in article 31 section 3, which I
quote word-for-word here:
The charges involve a question which should be decided by the membership at a
membership meeting and not by the trial procedure.

The test is sometimes explained by saying that the "political" branch of

government in a local is the membership acting in a meeting, and the
"judicial" branch is a trial committee. That analogy may not be very
helpful either. I find the best way to understand it is by reviewing
examples:
Dillon v Local 735, 3 PRB 152, 155-56 (1981) (redistricting issues are for the local
membership to decide in a meeting not a trial committee in a trial),
McCabe appealing Flowers v Local 1077, 5 PRB 318, 320 (1987) (propriety of lost-time
payments is for the local membership to decide, not a trial committee),
Bradley appealing Glinski v Local 235, 5 PRB 174, 179-80 (1987) (bargaining policy and
contract administration are for the local membership, not a trial committee),
Harmon v Local 1977, 11 PRB 163, 166-67 (2001) (in local union that had no weapons
policy, local president could not be charged with bringing gun into union office and
stating when it was found that it was for protection of recording secretary, unless the
purpose of bringing the gun had been to threaten or scare officer),
Wartley v Local 849, 11 PRB 421, 424 (2001) (local membership not a trial committee
should interpret bylaws in regard to expenses for attendance at meeting at Black
Lake),
Crable v Local 148, PRB Case 1452 (12/23/03), p 10 (ambiguity in constitution and
 bylaws as to who is entitled to make appointments is for membership not trial
committee),
Parker in the matter of Zappa v Local 1248, PRB Case 1473, p 12 (6/23/04) (fact that
the political situation in local union makes it difficult to have issues presented at
membership meetings does not make the subject of appellant's charges appropriate for
a trial),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 7 (charges arose out of long-standing
dispute between two political caucuses in local union; charges are not an appropriate
means to resolve political or policy disputes),
Schultz v Region 5, PRB Case 1498 (3/17/05), p 6 ("We strongly urge the membership of
Local 148 to try to rise above their caucus affiliations and begin to conduct the
business of the Local through reasoned debates of the issues at membership meetings,
rather than by means of charges and counter-charges presented under Article 31 of
the Constitution."),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 11-12 (claim that expenses should not
have been authorized by local officers is issue to be decided by membership, not trial
committee),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 II (4/23/08), pp 1-2, 4, 7-8 (even though charge
that committeeman told members in his capacity as team leader that he was their
supervisor with authority to send them home early and to assign overtime properly
alleged unbecoming conduct, this raised an issue of contract interpretation which
should have been decided at a membership meeting not in a trial).

The examples suggest that an issue can be tried only if the bylaw,
constitutional provision, or standard of unbecoming conduct is clear; but
if the issue involves interpretation of ambiguous rules it cannot. However,
in two appeals officers were charged with violating unambiguous rules
and the PRB let them go. I cannot explain these results.
Benchich appealing Abernathy v Local 909, 5 PRB 576, 576, 580 (1988) (shop
committee's refusal to abide by membership resolutions to poll the membership about
contract goals, return to the bargaining table, have the local president at all meetings
 with management, and reinstate the 1984 agreement until a new one could be
negotiated),
Pearsall v Local 12, PRB Case 1475, pp 3 n 5, 4, 7 (5/26/04) (holding ratification vote
without special meeting to inform members of the issues).

In 1998 the convention amended article 31 to add a fifth test:

the charge is not supported by substantial direct evidence or at least

one corroborating witness, which if unrebutted would establish the
charge.

Under this test, a valid charge need not have both substantial direct
evidence and a corroborating witness; one will suffice.
Otto v Local 1292, PRB Case 1598 (11/24/08), pp 12-14 ("Article 31, §3(e), should only
be applied in those cases where there is neither supporting evidence nor a
corroborating witness.").

In 2007 the PRB commented on the change:

Section 3(e) was added to Article 31 of the Constitution based on our recommendation
in Cain and Dennis v Local Union 862 Executive Board, UAW, 9 PRB 407 (1997), in
order to provide a tool for eliminating artfully drafted charges which, while technically
satisfying the requirement of Article 31, §3(a) through (d), of the Constitution, were
nevertheless wholly untrue. Unfortunately, some Local Executive Boards seem not to
comprehend the notion of corroboration, and the section has been the source of much
confusion.

Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), p 14.

The IEB and PRB have established a sequence for LEBs to follow in
evaluating the five tests: the last is not to be addressed until the first
four tests have been passed.

In a 2001 case the PRB did find the first four tests were satisfied in an
appeal where intentional misappropriation of union funds (in the form of
lost-time claims) was alleged. But the LEB dismissed under the fifth test
because appellant had not provided supporting documentation with the
charges. This was error, the PRB said. The LEB should have contacted
appellant to determine if he had evidence to satisfy the fifth test. In other
words, while it is true that a LEB must look only to the text of the charges
in applying the the first four tests, that is not the case when applying the
fifth. In this appeal it turned out appellant did have evidence, and just
didn't turn it in with the charge. (By chance, collateral events had shown in
fact the misappropriation was not intentional, but otherwise the PRB would
have remanded for trial.)
Nasello v Local 282, 11 PRB 1, 5-6 (2001);
see also Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 12 (recording secretary who
prepared minutes is corroborating witness in charge relating to conduct at meeting),
Parker in the matter of Zappa v Local 1248, PRB Case 1473, pp 12-13 (6/23/04)
(purpose of fifth test is to assure that charge is based on a real situation),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), p 14 ("Where the act complained of is
something that affects several people and triggers an investigation by management,
those circumstances alone amount to corroboration."),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 (8/10/07), pp 6-7 ("The point of Article 31, §3(e), is
to provide a tool to weed out charges lacking tangible corroboration in the real world....
If the members of the Executive Board believed that the charges lacked any
corroborating evidence, §3(e) required them to contact the charging parties to
determine if they had any substantiating evidence. While it is true that a Local
Executive Board must look only to the text of the charges presented in applying the
 tests of Article 31, §3(a) through (d), that is not the case when applying subsection
(e).").

In considering whether a charge has corroboration, the LEB may not

reject it on the ground that the corroboration is hearsay, is unreliable or
insufficient, or otherwise fails to satisfy stringent evidentiary rules. Such
determinations are for the trial committee.
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 (8/10/07), pp 6-7 ("It was error, therefore, for the
Local Executive Board to disqualify [appellants'] charges ... based on the conclusion
that their evidence was hearsay.... [I]t is up to the trial committee to evaluate the
evidence presented, and determine its significance, relevance, and reliability."),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 28-29 ("As long as there are
clearly corroborating witnesses, the rere is no need for affidavits or other evidence
to substantiate the charges."),
Otto v Local 1292, PRB Case 1598 (11/24/08), pp 12-14 ("We hold that it was error for
the IEB to dismiss the evidence presented in support of Otto's charges as unreliable or
insubstantial.").

Review of the five tests is not limited to the ones specified by the parties in
an appeal. In the review process no testimony is presented. The LEB is first
to assume without deciding that a charge is true and all supporting
documents are authentic. Then it is to decide whether the charge ought to
go to trial.

If the LEB finds the charge is specific, timely, properly alleges unbecoming
conduct or a constitutional violation, and does not amount to a
disagreement over policy that the membership as a whole should decide,
and if it then finds there is substantial direct evidence or corroboration by
at least one witness, a trial should then proceed unless
there is a pre-trial appeal. The local membership has no role in appeals
concerning the sufficiency of charges.
Article 31 sections 2-3;
article 31 section 3 interpretation 2 (6/1/02),
Benchich appealing Abernathy v Local 909, 5 PRB 576, 581 n 4 (1988) (IEB and PRB can
review a charge on all grounds, not just those claimed by parties),
Adams v Local 425, 6 PRB 464, 468-69 (1992) (in LEB review process charging and
charged members have no right to be present, no testimony is taken, appeal is to IEB
not local membership),
Cain v Local 862, 9 PRB 407, 411-12 (1997) (constitution does not provide for reading
charges to membership),
Hills v Local 961, 11 PRB 77, 80 (2000), reconsidered in 2001 according to Hills v Local
961, 11 PRB 230, 234 n 7 (2001) (if charge passes first four tests of article 31 section
3, fifth test is then evaluated),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 12 (minutes can be corroborating
evidence under fifth test),
Karniewicz v Local 1999, PRB Case 1505 (6/23/05), p 6 (membership has no role in
process of evaluating the five tests).

One decision held a trial could not proceed, since the central fact had
already been determined in an election appeal at the convention, which is
a higher body.
Gabauer v Local 25, 1 PRB 691, 693 (1971).

Failure to appeal an LEB decision that charges are sufficient does not bar
an accused from challenging their sufficiency later if convicted.
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 786 (1990).
An appeal by an accused member arguing that the charges are
insufficient delays the trial until the IEB passes on it. In 2008 the
president convinced the PRB that the constitution appeared to mean that
such appeals were limited to the IEB level, and PRB review would not
occur until after a trial, a conviction, and a post-trial appeal to the IEB.
The PRB recommended the constitution be amended to clarify that
pre-trial appeals of the sufficiency of charges to the PRB level are
allowed.
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 7-10, 22-23, 31-32;
compare article 31, section 3(d)("If a trial is ordered by the Local Union Executive Board
and this order is appealed, no such trial shall be held until the matter has been
submitted to, and an order thereon received, from the International President."),
article 33, section 3(f)("[T]he Public Review Board has jurisdiction to consider and decide
appeals from any decision or action of the International Executive Board ...: Where the
case arises under ... Article 31....").

Trial

Table of Contents

Restitution and an apology for unbecoming conduct will not avoid a trial.
Valdiserri v Local 699, 2 PRB 570, 570 (1977),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 733 (1980),
 Null v Local 735, 4 PRB 94, 96 (1984),
Sailer v Local 214, 8 PRB 555, 558 (1995);
but see Tolbert v UAW, PRB Case 1586 (4/23/08), p 8 (charged member's
acknowledgement of wrongdoing one factor in PRB decision holding that charge did not
allege unbecoming conduct).

The trial committee is selected randomly from among the members

present at a meeting. A large group is named first. Then the charging and
charged members get to strike names.
Article 31 section 7;
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 783-86 (1990) (problems with trial committee selection
process were in large part appellant's own fault as chairperson).

There seem to be special procedures applicable to a charge against an

officer, executive board members, or delegate of an amalgamated local.
Article 31 section 9;
Local 453 v Hawkins, 1 PRB 234, 235 n 1 (1961).

There are also special procedures involving extreme emergencies and

conspiracies which provide for IEB intervention in a local trial. I have
never seen them invoked.
Article 31 sections 20-21.

As noted elsewhere, the EPC guarantee of equality of treatment means

witnesses for charging and charged members must be paid or not paid
equally at the time of trial for their time at trial.
In one appeal members were accused of having worked during a strike. At
the trial, the charging parties' spokesperson reiterated the charges,
without producing witnesses or evidence to prove them. He rested. The
charged members asked for an immediate judgment of acquittal. The trial
committee refused. They then defended, in the course of which they
admitted the charged conduct. They were convicted and appealed.

A majority of the PRB affirmed on the basis of the admissions, over a

dissent. A concurring member explained:
Had the appellants rested after making their motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, I
would have agreed with our dissenting colleague that the charges against the
appellants had not been proved and that consequently their convictions should be set
aside. But since they proceeded to present their witnesses "in the interest of getting
the entire facts before this tribunal" ... I conclude that appellants in effect waived their
procedural defense. I do not interpret our decision in this case as constituting any
endorsement of the proposition that local trial committees can base convictions upon
assertions without adducing any proof whatsoever. It is only because I find that
appellants here admitted the commission of the acts with which they were charged that
I concur in the opinion.

Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309, 309-10, 313-17 (1965).

The question whether evidence amounts to hearsay is for the trial

committee. Trial committees seem to have more leeway in admitting
hearsay than does the IEB in its fact-finding.
It is not clear from this record what evidence the local Executive Board regarded as
hearsay. In any event, the fact that some evidence might be rejected in a civil court
based on questions about its reliability would not necessarily disqualify that evidence
 from being presented to a trial commiittee. As we have observed, it is up to the trial
committee to evaluate the evidence presented, and determine its significance,
relevance, and reliability.

Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 (8/10/07), pp 6-7;

see also Wyatt appealing Miller v Local 2190, 10 PRB 163, 167 (1998).

A trial committee can assess penalties against an accuser if the charged

member was obviously innocent and the accuser brought the charge with
obvious malice.
Article 31 sections 13, 14
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 132-33, 136 (1994);
compare article 32 section 7 (PRB power to reprimand or suspend accuser in EPC case
where accused is found to be obviously innocent and accuser acted in bad faith or with
malicious intent or in a willful effort to divide and disrupt the union).

Appeals

A guilty verdict is brought to the next membership meeting, where the

members vote on it by secret ballot.
Article 31 section 11;
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 376 n 2 (1966).

With certain exceptions acquittals by the trial committee are not

appealable, even to the membership. But in the 1980 Laughery decision
the PRB permitted a collateral attack on the procedures -- the trial
committee's biased hostility -- leading to an acquittal.
 Article 31 sections 11, 17;
see also Ruzicka v Local 166, 1 PRB 766, 768 (1972) (no exception allowed),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 717 (1978), reconsidered 2 PRB 724 (1980) (collateral
attack allowed),
Valdiserra v Local 699, 2 PRB 570, 572 (1977) (exception allowed for misappropriation or
embezzlement of union funds).

A UAW appellate body can modify or set aside a guilty verdict.

Article 31 section 15;
Mingo v Local 1639, 2 PRB 753, 757-58 (1979) (expulsion reduced to 20-month
suspension),
EP complaint of Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 243, 247 (1982) (member restored to office),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 786-90 (1990) (two-year expulsion set aside, accused
member restored to membership and to office of president and made whole for lost
wages),
Rios appealing Flowers v Local 148, 6 PRB 414, 417, 422 (1992) (removal from office for
filing frivolous charge overturned).

If a verdict is set aside a wrongly-convicted member may request

damages provided time limits are met.
Ryan v Local 6, 4 PRB 379, 384 (1985), 5 PRB 1, 5-6 (1985) (wrongly-suspended shop
chair's request for damages held untimely),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 791 (1990) (wage loss for wrongful expulsion after
union trial).

A member expelled or suspended may be reinstated under certain

conditions.
Article 31 section 19;
 Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) p 13 (member who had been suspended
by a trial committee years earlier, and who though never formally reinstated had been
restored to good standing status according to various local officals and was allowed to
vote unchallenged for a period of years, may vote).

Unbecoming conduct
Table of Contents

Contents of This Subsection

Vagueness || Unbecoming || Not

unbecoming

This section discusses unbecoming conduct. Trials generally are discussed

elsewhere. Practice and procedure under article 31 is also discussed
elsewhere.

Members can be charged either for "unbecoming conduct" or for violating

the constitution.
Article 31 section 1;
Libby v Local 6000, 9 PRB 549, 552-53 (1998) (distinguishing between claims of
constitutional violations and claims of unbecoming conduct),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), pp 12-15 (though IEB characterized
 removal of financial secretary by LEB without due process as mere mistake which was
quickly remedied, PRB has a "less charitable view" even though action was taken in the
course of official responsibilities, because it was a flagrant flouting of the EPC),
Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1518 (12/20/05), p 11 (distinguishing between claims of
constitutional violations and claims of unbecoming conduct).

For purposes of this section constitutional violations seem to include

bylaw violations.
Tencza, 1 PRB 497, 501 (1968) (members charged for violating bylaw, charge dismissed
because bylaw unspecific).

They also include violations of membership resolutions.

Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 377 (1966).

Vagueness

There is no definition of "unbecoming" conduct. This is a problem.

Members should be able to know beforehand whether conduct they
engage in is guilty or not.
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 349 (1965) ("it is a fundamental hypothesis of any
disciplinary system that one subject to its strictures be able to know beforehand when
his conduct is likely to bring him within the realm of proscribed activity").

So minimally, the PRB said in the 1965 Comley decision, "unbecoming"

must mean conduct "so flagrant as to be willful and wanton," and which
involves an intent to injure recognized union interests or another
member. But that doesn't completely define it either, and it all may be
too vague, the PRB added. In a footnote, it said that it hoped to resolve
the vagueness problem squarely on some future occasion.
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 349 n 4 (1965);
see also Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 233 (1984) (standards of conduct by which members are
to abide must be clear).

Vagueness of the standard would seem to violate the EPC's promise of

fair and uniform rules, and a fair disciplinary procedure with due process.
But as of 2009, 44 years after Comley, neither the PRB nor the UAW have
given a strict definition.

Still, some important points have been made. In one appeal a member
had charged another for threatening to take him outside and beat him up;
a committeeperson had to physically restrain the threatener. Apparently
the incident occurred at work, because the company gave the threatener
time off.

Agreeing the charge was specific enough, the PRB nevertheless said the
threat would not be a violation of the constitution or unbecoming conduct.
Quoting from a previous decision, it held:
"[T]he internal disciplinary procedures of Article 31 were never intended to
accommodate the day to day petty differences between UAW members nor are they a
palliative for the redress of fancied wrongs or slights. Disagreements of the sort which
have occurred here between [the two members] mustmust in the final analysis be
resolved personally between them, if they are to be resolved at all." ... We find this
reasoning apropos for the resolution of this dispute. The pressures of the work place
and the day
 to day interaction among employees inevitably lead to disagreements and disputes
between them. These disputes have nothing to do with their membership in the UAW
or their relationships as Union brothers and sisters; they are simply manifestations of
our human failings. These confrontations and disagreements are inappropriate for
resolution through Article 31 procedures.

Clapp appealing Tomczak v Local 699, 5 PRB 119, 121 (1986).

I take from the above that the argument was not about work and not
about union matters. That is what makes this decision right. Trials are
about union conduct and union principles.

The UAW also tries to overcome the vagueness problem by requiring that
charges state the nature of the offense exactly. Accordingly the best way
to explain unbecoming conduct is just to give examples:

Unbecoming

The following conduct was held unbecoming:

Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 21-22 (1958) (under former version of article 33 section 5,
appealing to a civil court without exhausting appeal rights in the UAW),
Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309 (1965) (working during strike),
Hess v Local 287, 1 PRB 375, 377 (1966) (violation of membership ban on working
overtime during negotiations),
West v Local 738, 1 PRB 430, 434 (1967) (steward's knowing acceptance of upgrade in
violation of seniority),
Dunlap v UAW, 1 PRB 547, 549-50 (1969) (if there are improper motivations, local
officers can be charged with failure to carry out membership directives and with
fraudulent alteration of meeting minutes),
Hedrick v Local 1747, 2 PRB 518, 522 (1976) (shop chair's conscious failure or refusal to
prosecute grievances successfully, appear at arbitrations ready to testify, and observe
the rules under which proceedings are conducted),
Ruzicka v Local 166, 1 PRB 654, 657 (1971) (consciously and purposely allowing
grievance to expire because of political differences),
Valdiserri v Local 699, 2 PRB 570, 573 (1977) (personal use of union charge account,
double-dipping),
Golias v Local 91, 2 PRB 588, 590 (1977) (refusal to follow mandates of membership and
LEB, refusing to turn over files, interfering with a union committee, misappropriating
union funds),
Arcaro v UAW, 2 PRB 618, 620 (1978) (ratting to management),
Adams v Local 148, 4 PRB 332, 338-39 (1985) (repeatedly crossing picket line),
Bradley appealing Glinski v Local 235, 5 PRB 174, 179-81 (1987) (shop chair's lying to
and intentionally misinforming members about grievance and allowing management to
hire friends and relatives to take jobs that belonged to laid-off members),
McCabe appealing Flowers v Local 1077, 5 PRB 318, 320-21 (1987) (fraudulent
submission of lost-time claim),
Wyatt appealing Miller v Local 2190, PRB Case 1228 (10/15/98), p 6 (charging personal
airline tickets to union),
Henderson v Local 659, 10 PRB 348, 352 (1999) (snitching to management),
Harris v Local 2123, 10 PRB 490, 501 (2000) (sexual harassment and hostile work
environment),
Hills v Local 961, 11 PRB 77, 80 (2000), reconsidered in 2001 according to Hills v Local
961, 11 PRB 230, 234 n 7 (2001) (conspiring with management to embarrass a
candidate for local office),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), pp 12-15 (temporary LEB removal of
financial secretary without hearing in violation of constitution is willful and wanton
disregard of officer's interest, regardless whether LEB was motivated to scapegoat
officer because he was not drinking buddy of LEB),
Hill v Local 212, PRB Case 1471 (5/25/04), p 6 (possibly, gambling in the workplace if
employees were unfairly exploited),
 Parker in the matter of Zappa v Local 1248, PRB Case 1473, pp 10-11 (6/23/04)
(officials are chargeable for performance of duties involving an actual violation of the
constitution),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 13-14 (local president's request, based
on seeing them there on his own time, that management investigate members in bar
on company time would be unbecoming conduct),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 2-3, 13, 18-19, 22 26-27
(financial secretary-treasurer's creation of hostile environment by badgering and
discrediting union office staff is unbecoming, as is defiance of formal instructions of the
LEB acting for the membership to stop posting office employee payroll information on
office window, and racially-motivated deliberate payment of delegate per diem and
expense checks in the wrong amounts and with insufficient funds)

Violation of the no-discrimination policy is unbecoming.

Sims v UAW, 1 PRB 200, 205-06 (1961) (segregated rest rooms and drinking fountains),
Harris v Local 2123, 10 PRB 490, 501 (2000) (hostile work environment).

Not unbecoming

Though the PRB questioned the rule in one decision, in general, officers,
committee, and stewards are not liable for an action taken in office unless
it was influenced by a improper motive, or violated a specific provision of
the constitution. A 1969 decision said an official's mere agreement with
management to something that benefits the official personally does not
imply a bad intent. Mere errors in judgment and mere negligence are not
chargeable.
Article 31 section 3 interpretation 5 (1/27/61),
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347, 349 (1965) (committeeperson's impulsive recommendation
made without thorough investigation and without consideration of consequences to
management of discipline is not chargeable),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 477, 479 (1969) ("We will not presume that every time a
bargaining committee reaches an agreement with management which may have the
incidental effect of benefiting some or all of the bargaining committee members
personally that an improper intent was responsible for the undertaking."),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 526 (1969) (issue is not whether charging party was
prejudiced by conduct, but rather charged party's intent),
Dunlap v UAW, 1 PRB 547, 549 (1969) (convention delegates cannot be charged for
failure to follow local instructions at convention, or unless improper motivation is shown
for failure to enforce contract),
Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 243, 243 (1982), 4 PRB 1, 3 (1983) (vice-president not
chargeable for alleged refusal to perform duties of president while president was
absent);
Trimm v Local 596, 4 PRB 130, 131 (1983) (failure of recording secretary to report to
membership IEB reversal of charges is not unbecoming),
Bradley appealing Glinski v Local 235, 5 PRB 174, 179-81 (1987) (shop chair's failure to
properly discharge the duties of office not chargeable),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775, 786-90 (1990) (charges against officers arising out of
actions taken in connection with their official repsonsibilities are not generally favored;
president's refusal to attend grievance meeting because of intent to leverage company
into acceding to his demand to be allowed to investigate grievances though he was
discharged is not chargeable),
Campbell appealing Cox v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 341-42 (1992) (receipt of money to
which member was not entitled is not chargeable in light of disagreement over
interpretation of ambiguous bylaws),
Salyers v Local 1681, 9 PRB 187, 188, 191 (1996) (agreement with management to
violate contract by exceeding contractual journeyman/apprentice ratio does not state a
charge),
Libby v Local 6000, 9 PRB 549, 552-53 (1998) (charge against financial secretary for
failing to perform duties and responsisbilites specified in article 40, dismissed for failure
to show the financial secretary acted with specific intent to injure the interests of the
charging member),
 Nyhart v Local 31, 10 PRB 342, 346 (1999) (charges related to performance of
chairperson's duties),
Nasello v Local 282, 11 PRB 1, 6 (2001) (incorrect but innocently intended receipt of
lost-time expenses not chargeable),
Powell in the matter of Stewart v IEB Region 3, PRB Case 1466, p 9 (3/18/04) (pursuit of
grievances by committeeman was not unbecoming despite that grievances challenged
appellants' promotion to the carpenter trade),
Parker in the matter of Zappa v Local 1248, PRB Case 1473, p 13 (6/23/04) (in case
which is close call, PRB rejects charges because of principle that charges against union
officers arising out their official responsibilities are to be discouraged),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 13 (request for advice to president
from local president was not unbecoming conduct),
Collis v IEB, PRB Case 1517 (10/26/05), p 5 ("The President of a local union does not
engage in conduct unbecoming a member of the union by selecting members to attend
conferences."),
Franks v Local 7777, PRB Case 1518 (12/20/05), pp 11-12 (failure to present accurate
financial reports to the membership, publication of false information in an election flyer,
failure to process charges properly, entering lease agreement and purchasing furniture
without approval from membership),
Esposito v UAW, PRB Case 1563 (4/17/07), Pp 7-8 (right of member to distribute leaflet
imputing foreknowledge by local officers of management's intention to lay off third shift
is fully protected by EPC).

In one remarkable holding also noted elsewhere the PRB held it not
unbecoming for a local president to hunt with management on union
time; no bylaw prohibited it.
Matthes v Local 699, 6 PRB 395, 397-98 (1992).

As noted elsewhere, distributing defamatory election campaign literature

is not unbecoming conduct. The same rule applies even when there is no
election campaign.
 Turner v Local 57, 2 PRB 707, 708 (1978) (extremely satirical and provocative literature
distributed over several years),
Pollard v Local 7777, PRB Case 1619 (6/2/09), pp 7-9 (leaflet which attacked "FMLA
[Family and Medical Leave Act] abusers" in urging ratification of a contract).

In a 2009 decision, the PRB identified one possible exception to the rule
that statements made in the context of propaganda are not chargeable.
An attack on a protected group such as, for instance persons with disabilities, could
give rise to a charge of conduct unbecoming a Union member.

Pollard v Local 7777, PRB Case 1619 (6/2/09), pp 8-9.

A similar point has been made in the context of election appeals. In the
noted Pollard decision, the appellant argued that a leaflet did attack
members with disabilities. The PRB found this particular leaflet was not
such an attack. But in some future appeal such a leaflet might come
before the PRB, in which case it would presumably remand the case for
trial.

In a 2003 appeal, a member charged the shop chair with telling

management that the member and another member were circulating a
petition in the plant and "falsely accusing us of threatening and harassing
members to sign." In going to management the shop chair apparently
relied on contract language in which the union agreed it would not
intimidate or coerce employees in respect to their right to work or in
respect to union activity or membership; the contract added that the
company could take disciplinary action for violations.
The PRB suggested that the shop chair's understanding of the language
was wrong; still, the PRB said, it was plausible to conclude that he lacked
the willful and wanton intent necessary to charge him as a union officer.

The PRB distinguished the facts from those of a 1977 appeal in which a
member kept detailed records of the absences from work of a fellow
worker and then provided the information to a foreman. Providing the
records was unbecoming in light of the pledge every new member makes
to "maintain and protect the interests of workers" under UAW jurisdiction.
The surveilled member did not lose his job, but being put in jeopardy by
itself was sufficient to convict.
Compare Polansky v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1552 (1/26/07), pp 5, 8
(company offered to reinstate member who admitted dischargeable offense, if he would
turn in a fellow member).

A 2004 appeal was very similar to the 1977 appeal, but involved the police
not management. Local officials had taken a large quantity of assertedly
harassing or threatening letters from retired member Bob King to the
police. The letters concerned union affairs. One of the officials stated
willingness to sign a criminal complaint against Brother King. The city
attorney brought a criminal complaint. The local judge dismissed it
because King's letters were not threatening or obscene. King then filed
charges against the officials under article 31 describing their efforts to
get a criminal complaint as trumped-up, baseless, and fabricated. The
PRB ultimately dismissed the charges because there was no claim that
the officials' inquiry contained fabricated evidence and it was the city
attorney who decided to bring the criminal complaint.

In deciding the evidence was not fabricated the PRB may have taken to
itself a decision that should have been a trial committee's. Apart from
that, I agree with the results in both the 1977 and 2004 appeals. By
definition management is on the other side of the class line. In light of
the falsity of the shop chair's accusation alleged by the charge however, I
disagree with the distinction in the 2003 appeal.

Compare a 1986 appeal discussed elsewhere, where a member charged

another for threatening to take him outside and beat him up. Unlike in the
2004 decision the argument was apparently over a personal matter. It did
not involve the union or work, and on that basis the PRB dismissed the
charge.
Boyle v Local 157, 2 PRB 445, 449-50 (1977) (member kept detailed records of fellow
member and provided them to employer, held unbecoming),
Clapp appealing Tomczak v Local 699, 5 PRB 119, 121 (1986) (threatening to take
member outside and beat him up, held not unbecoming),
Amarel in the matter of LeBlanc v Local 465, PRB Case 1438 (7/24/03), pp 3 n 2, 9
(shop chair falsely told management member was circulating a petition in harassing
manner, held not unbecoming),
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), pp 11-12 (officials took member's letters to
the police, held not unbecoming).

In a 2007 appeal one LEB member said to another during a meeting: "I'm
going to kick your mother fucking anorexic ass." The PRB said this was
not unbecoming, because in the circumstances it was an expression of
frustration rather than a serious threat.
 Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1554 (1/25/07), pp 1, 5;
see also Russell v Local 1292, PRB Case 1629 (9/14/09), pp 2, 6 ("The stresses of the
work environment will inevitably lead on occasion to heated language.").

A 2008 appeal concerned a financial secretary-treasurer who was claimed

to have failed to perform her duties in two respects. In the first, she
posted office employee payroll information on her office window after the
LEB acting on behalf of the membership told her not to. In the second,
her monthly financial reports included information about the previous
month which all parties agreed was required, and the current month
which a majority of the LEB thought should not be included. Reporting
finances is part of her job. The PRB held the first act chargeable and the
second one not, the distinction being that the first contained an element
of defiance of a formal membership instruction.
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 2-3, 13, 18-19, 22, 27;
compare Jenkins v UAW, 4 PRB 302 (1984) (refusal of local president to comply with
specific directives of membership authorized IEB to impose administratorship).

Other conduct held not unbecoming:

Appeal of Atwan, 1 PRB 95, 96 (1960) (appointing or suffering to remain in office of
members convicted criminally of double-dipping 14 years earlier, before adoption of
any EPC code),
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 537-38 (1969) (subservience to foreign government
in 1969),
Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 217, 219 (1981) (untrue and malicious campaign literature
intended to injure member),
Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 217, 220 (1981) (electioneering on paid time when the
opportunity arises),
Norman v Local 699, 4 PRB 213, 214 (1984) (hiring relatives),
Harmon v Local 1977, 11 PRB 163, 164, 167, 168 n 3 (2001) (EPC's free-speech
guarantee protects local president from charge for preparing or distributing a cartoon of
a character labeled "Deputy Dog" holding a gun and stating "I gotta get rid of that
Mary Harmon! I shoulda got rid of her 18 months ago!"),
Ponce appealing Schmidling v Local 1492, 10 PRB 47, 49 (1998) (settlement of grievance
on terms unsatisfactory to charging member does not constitute collusion with
management),
Wartley v Local 849, 11 PRB 421, 425 (2001) (rough gesture and bluster do not amount
to unbecoming conduct, where charging member did not apprehend he was about to be
struck by charged member),
Leal v Local 578, PRB Case 1405 (12/2/02), pp 6, 7 (expressing opinion as to what
occurred during negotiations, walking "back and forth as though he wanted to hit me"),
Crable v Local 148, PRB Case 1452 (12/23/03), p 10 (appointing political ally to further
political agenda),
Parker in the matter of Zappa v Local 1248, PRB Case 1473, p 11 (6/23/04) (political
motivations alone do not amount to malice),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04), p 13 (response from president's
administrative assistant to local president's request for advice was not unbecoming),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1486 (11/23/04), p 4 (mere request of committeeperson of
supervisor during grievance investigation that supervisor confirm committeeperson's
belief that charging member was incapable of doing her job was not malicious),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), p 7 (attempt to sell t-shirts bearing UAW
seal at a profit not unbecoming),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), p 12 (political motivations alone do not
amount to malice),
Tolbert v UAW, PRB Case 1586 (4/23/08), p 8 (failure to follow proper procedures in
reporting audit results to LEB; review of member's payroll records believing there was
a discrepancy in the vouchers),
Abronowitz v Locl 2256, PRB Case 1610 (12/17/08), p 5 (customary and usual practices
in the collective bargaining relationship are not chargeable).
VI. Starting an appeal, timeliness
Table of Contents

Contents of This Section

General || Form and delivery of

appeal || Timeliness

General

As noted elsewhere, a claim of ignorance of the requirements of the

constitution is not a satisfactory excuse for a failure to abide by its
requirements.

This section describes the procedures for starting an appeal. Elsewhere is

a discussion of what kinds of issues are appealable. Elsewhere is a chart
summarizing limitations on certain kinds of appeal.

First read article 33. Then re-read it a couple of times. It's hard. Then read
any other articles and sections of the constitution, including the ethical
practices code at the back, that you think might be relevant. There is an
index at the back of the constitution which is helpful. There are also
interpretations by the IEB of each article and section in the back; read
them too.

An improper action becomes finalized and proper if there is no appeal. At

least, this is implicit in one PRB decision. There is one exception to such
finality involving officer elections, and a second possible exception
involving membership votes on grievance appeals. But in general, if you
let time limits go by without taking action there can be important
consequences.

It may not always be clear whether filing a grievance or filing an appeal

is the proper course. Under the facts in a 2003 appeal that was ultimately
barred in part for untimeliness, the PRB said the time for filing both
began the same day. For me this is counterintuitive. Ordinarily a
grievance runs its course first because it holds out the hope that the
matter might be settled satisfactorily. If that doesn't happen, an appeal
follows.
Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03), pp 9-10 (on appellants' arrival at
new plant with claimed wrong seniority appropriate remedy would have been to file
grievance; time for appealing seniority under article 33 also started when they arrived
at new plant).

When a dissatisfied member asks a union official what can be done to

change a union decision, the official must give you a constitution and
explain the UAW appeal procedure.
We have previously ruled, however, that an appeal filed beyond the thirty day limit will
not be considered untimely where an appellant has made a good faith effort to resolve
the issue raised or to obain information about appeal procedures and time limits.
 [footnote omittted]

Willis v UAW, PRB Cases 1507, 1510 (5/18/05) p 12;

see also pocket guide, p 172,
Handbook, p 127,
Local 952, 1 PRB 6952, 1 PRB 6 47, 649-50 (1971),
Stevens v Local 595, 2 PRB 493, 499-500 (1976),
Mosely v UAW, 2 PRB 621, 623 (1977),
Seal v Local 216, 3 PRB 338, 341-42 (1982) (failure of financial secretary
correctly to advise appellant of procedures for maintaining membership in
good standing when she inquired excused her from her resultant failure to
follow the procedures),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 272 (1994) (lack of membership
consideration not fault of appellant),
Owen v Local 652, 8 PRB 531, 537-38 (1995),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 218 (1996),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), pp 12-13 (candidate could rely
on erroneous advice regarding dues obligations of discharged member given
by local president and financial secretary),
Franks v UAW, PRB Case 1520 (12/20/05) p 14 ("The International Union has
an affirmative responsibility to assist Local Unions and to inform employees
about their rights and obligations.").

In one appeal the PRB suggested UAW officials may have an obligation to
inform a dissatisfied member of appeal rights even without the member
requesting it.
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 77 n 4 (1996).

Article 33 contemplates appeals only from action of a lower union level to

a higher. It does not cover actions of members who are not officers or
reps. It does not cover actions of officials who were acting only as
individuals.
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35, 38-39 (1958) ("appeal" does not mean suing an
individual member in court),
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142, 149-50, 166-67, 170-71 (1983-85) (EPC
remedy available against individual acting as officer),
compare Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 349-40 (1994), reconsideration denied (8/5/94)
(EPC remedy not available against individual member).

What if you don't know whether it is the actions of the local union or the
international union you are appealing, say if it is about a grievance and you
don't know who settled it? For each there are different time limits and a
little bit different procedures.

In that case assume the shorter time limit (30 days) applies, and appeal
against both. Later, if you find out one was not involved, drop the appeal
against that one and apologize with an explanation of your mistake.
Wilson v Region 1C, PRB Case 1502 (9/6/05), p 1 n 2 (when appellant appealed to local
against withdrawal of grievance by UAW rep, president's office held appeal should have
been made to the IEB and it was error for the local to have considered it),
Mitz v Region 1D, PRB Case 1569 (5/8/07), p 9 ("[The cases] were settled at the third
step by International Representative Dan Baldwin, so that Mitz ought to have appealed
directly to the IEB rather than presenting his appeal to the Local Union membership.").

But before you even start, have your thoughts and your documents
together. One of the most important decisions you make is choosing the
issues to take up. It is always a temptation to appeal every error, no
matter how small. But consider that by doing so the decisionmaker might
get distracted amid the paperwork from your most effective argument. A
middle-ground approach might be to appeal everything at the start, and
then drop the less important ones at higher levels of the appeal.
Muhammad v Local 435, 9 PRB 357, 360 (1997) (member appealed two issues to the
IEB, and having lost both at that level, chose to appeal only one to PRB).

I recommend documents be chronologically ordered. If the appeal depends

on a certain oral conversation, have witness statements. Preferably they
should be signed and have an address and phone number, but they need
not be notarized. As a courtesy, give each witness a copy
of anything you ask him or her to sign. Also, if you kept notes of a
conversation or event, either at the time or immediately after, your
credibility is enhanced.
Huff v Local 686, 10 PRB 323, 326 (1999) (non-contemporaneous notes have little
weight).

Wisely in my view, the UAW is suspicious of lawyers.

Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 17 (1976) (on inquiry to local union about progress of
grievance, appellant's attorney was told it was none of his business),
Davis v Local 499, 2 PRB 375, 379 (1976) ("The participation of legal counsel [at IEB
hearings] is not encouraged."),
Mosely v UAW, 2 PRB 621, 623 (1977) ("In the instant case, the International is of the
opinion that appellant has been lead by legal counsel to raise unsubstantiated
allegations and secure our review. That may be true.");
Krott v Local 900, CAC, session 11/82 (company offered settlement to grievant three
times but on advice of counsel he turned it down, appeal rejected because grievance
could not be won at arbitration).
However you do have a right to counsel before the IEB, CAC, and PRB
under article 33, and before a local union under article 31. Counsel can be
a non-member non-attorney. The right to counsel is interpreted as the
right to effective counsel.
Article 31 section 5,
article 33 section 4(f);
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969) ("lay counsel"),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 728 (1980) (right to effective counsel),
Wirth v Local 596, 4 PRB 1, 3 (1983) (one appearing before PRB or at any other stage of
trial or appellate procedures of constitution need not be an attorney),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), p 7 n 7, 8 (non-member lay representative
permitted).

Outside of the trial context of article 31, a local union can decline to
recognize an attorney or other non-member as representing a member.
Because of this, if you ask a non-member to communicate with a local
union on your behalf it is good practice for you to co-sign the first letter,
or otherwise personally introduce him or her to the local as your counsel.

Form and delivery of appeal

There is no special form. Just set out all the facts and arguments
specifically and in detail. For clarity, the caption or the first sentence
should state it is an "appeal," but use of that word or reference to article
33 are not strictly required.
 Article 33 section 4(a) ("Any appeal should set forth the action or decision being
appealed and should include all information available in support of the appeal. The
appeal should be as specific and detailed as possible and must be signed by the
member(s).");
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 1 (7/1/04) ("The appeal shall be accompanied by
a Statement of Reasons for Appeal as required by Article 33, Section 4(a) of the [2006]
Constitution....");
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 28 (1973) (appellant's letters to three local officers,
requesting that local reverse its position and give her delegate's pay and expenses,
despite lacking the word "appeal" or reference to article 33 were a demand on the
local, and officers should have referred them to the membership),
Mingo v Local 1639, 2 PRB 753 754 (1979) (timely letter to UAW complaining of local
vote returned to appellant for clarification of its purpose, appellant then allowed to
clarify that letter was an appeal of a trial conviction),
compare Yettaw v UAW, 6 PRB 231, 235 (1991) (series of correspondence between
appellant and UAW did not amount to an "appeal"; appellant was a local president and
knows how to file an appeal).

I usually organize an appeal like this, in separate sections:

State that it is an appeal. State the name or title of the person(s) who
did whatever you are appealing.

State as nearly as you know it the date the official(s) did this thing.
Also state the date you first found out about it. If you are not sure of
dates give your best estimate. If necessary for timeliness, state why
you did not find out about it earlier.

Summarize the gist of the appeal in a couple of sentences.

 State the facts in chronological order and in detail. This is the most
important part. Do it in a straightforward non-argumentative way.
Include both the facts supporting the appeal and the facts detracting
from it. Prune it down as much as you can, leaving out facts which
are not relevant to the appeal. Attach copies of relevant documents,
and put them in order, perhaps with tabs or exhibit numbers. If it
concerns a grievance, state the grievance number and the date it was
written or should have been written. The grievance should be one of
the documents.
Gonzales v Local 1097, 11 PRB 20, 22 (2000) ("[Appellant's] claim that he
personally spoke to 1,500 members of Local 1097 and that all of them told him
they did not receive a notice of election is not worthy of credence.... [W]e note
once again that he has produced no evidence to support his claim."),

State your argument. This is the second most important papa rt.
Toward the end state the argument of your opponent, and then
explain why you think your argument prevails.

State the remedy that you want. Usually this is one or two sentences.

A word more about the all-important factual statement. The IEB and PRB
are sometimes obtuse. The need to spell out the facts and witnesses is
illustrated by the following denial of an appeal of a local president's
election, where dozens of members of the appellant's opposition were
excused from work and paid for union business during the voting.
We are troubled in this case by evidence that a large number of United Alliance
supporters were excused from work in order to campaign. Union funds may not be
 used to support any particular candidate or slate. It would be improper for the Local
Union to pay lost time to Union members in order to allow them to campaign for a
particular slate. Such an allegation, if established, would constitute grounds to overturn
the results of the contest in which Alejandro was a candidate.

It is clear, however, that the President’s office also took these allegations very
seriously. Administrative Assistant Curson conducted a hearing on Alejandro’s election
protest over a two day period. In his report to the IEB, Curson expressed concern that
the decision to excuse nearly forty members for Union business on days coinciding with
the election was poor judgment on the part of the Local Union President. Nevertheless,
Curson reported that Alejandro had not supplied sufficient evidence to support a
conclusion that these individuals had not been excused for legitimate purposes. Curson
noted that there were only two witnesses in addition to Alejandro who claimed to have
observed these members campaigning for the United Alliance. He further remarked
that the witnesses’ statements were vague as to who was involved and exactly what
they were doing.

We agree with the conclusion of the IEB that this was not sufficient evidence to support
a finding that these members were not excused for legitimate purposes or that they
were campaigning while being paid lost time by the Local Union. Indeed, the charge
might be difficult to establish, but something more than what has been presented here
would be necessary to justify overturning the Presidential race. If such a large group of
people had actually been excused from work in order to campaign, many Local Union
members would have been aware of it. Witnesses ought to have been able to identify
those who were campaigning and describe their activities in detail. As Administrative
Assistant Curson has observed, the witness would also need to identify the time of the
occurrence, because the members would be entitled to campaign if they were not
receiving lost time from the Local Union. Although Alejandro’s complaint, if established,
would justify an order to rerun the Presidential race, she has not produced sufficient
evidence to support the charge.

Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1553 (2/20/07), pp 14-15.

It is not required, but I recommend that appeals be typed rather than

handwritten. It will be easier for the receiving union officer to read. You will
have enough other problems getting attention for what you are doing; you
will have enough problems actually winning. Don't give yourself an extra
one by making your first document hard to read.

You might want to show a draft to a friend or another member for

suggestions about style and clarity.

When it is done, keep a copy of the appeal and all attachments for
yourself.

Different sections of the constitution have different writing, signing, and

submitting requirements for different types of appeal. Regardless, I
recommend that initial documents be written and signed.
Article 8 section 17(b) (protests to elections of convention delegates must be filed with
credentials committee)
article 8 section 17(c) (protests of elections of officers at conventions must be filed in
writing with credentials committee)
article 31 sections 1-2 (charges must be signed and submitted to recording secretary),
article 32 sections 4-5 (EP complaint must be filed with local membership),
article 33 section 4(a)-(b) (appeals must be signed and filed with local membership),
article 38 section 11 (election protests must be raised either at next membership
meeting, or LEB meeting if membership meetings are suspended for the summer, or in
writing which is actually received by the recording secretary)
article 45 section 5 (election protests must be raised either at next membership meeting,
or LEB meeting if membership meetings are suspended for the summer, or in writing
which is actually received by the recording secretary);
compare Donovan v Local 2000, 2 PRB 813, 816 (1979) (under former version of article
38 section 11 election protest could be raised verbally to single member of election
committee),
 letter, Maurice Treadwell to Larry Reichle, 5/18/89 (asserting that appeals must be
signed, and asking appellant to advise whether he desired to pursue convention
delegate election challenge containing his typed name but not his signature).

Several sections of the constitution are listed in the note above. In each
case it may not always be clear exactly what officer to send the appeal
to. For an appeal to a local, I always address it to the recording secretary.
For an appeal to the IEB, CAC, or PRB, send it care of the president's
office.
Article 40 section 3 (duty of local recording secretary is to conduct general
correspondence not pertaining directly to duties of other officers which is received by
the local, and keep it on file for future reference).

Although the constitution doesn't provide for it, as noted elsewhere,

appeals to the PRB can be accomplished by writing directly to the PRB.

But if you are not sure which of two places to send it to, send it to both.

It is not required, but I usually also send a courtesy copy to the officer or
rep or body whose actions you are appealing. I also send copies to any
other parties. Beyond that, you can send copies to anyone; these are
public documents within the union. But as a matter of practice I don't like
to burden people who are not in the chain of appeal with extra copies of
things.

If it is a group appeal, and if it requires signing, to be absolutely safe all

appellants should sign. But normally in my experience one is permitted to
appeal on behalf of a group, so long as the appeal specifies all appellants
by name or as a specifically identifiable group. Make sure though that the
one signer has no individual procedural problems that might end up
disqualifying the whole thing.
Robinson appealing Blandford v Local 659, 6 PRB 219, 225-26 (1991) (current member
who is also a lapsed former member lacked standing to join group appeal because at
the time appeal was filed she was not a member).

If an appellant signs an appeal without understanding it, it will still be

considered on its merits.
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 40, 49 n 29 (1995) (in face of claim that appellant admits he
signed an appeal without understanding it, fact that it was drafted for him by other
members does not invalidate it);
see also Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35 (1995), record pp 247, 310-14, deposition transcript
pp 7-8, 11-16, 24-25 (appellant signed appeal which protested membership vote that
officers be paid $27,000, though he voted with the majority at the protested meeting,
he didn't realize the appeal protested officers getting paid, the reason he signed appeal
was to get controversy off dead center, he assumed that by signing appeal somebody
down the road would pay them their money, and he doesn't know what article 33 is),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 26, 30 (any member would have
standing to bring a charge, so there was nothing wrong with local president soliciting
other members who had no knowledge of or interest in the case to sign the charges;
even so, charged member has the right to confront and question the charging
members in front of the trial committee).

The constitution does not speak to the timeliness or permissibility of

starting an appeal by fax or email. Presumably these are permitted. In
one appeal the PRB acknowledged a fax directly to it as the
commencement of an appeal. If faxed, the printout on your fax machine
should work as proof of receipt. Proof of receipt of an email might be a
problem.
Article 33 section 4(b);
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135 (2001), record pp 37-39, 42 (faxed communication to
PRB acknowledged as commencement of appeal).

Timeliness

Table of Contents

For an appeal against the actions of someone at the local level the time
limit is 60 days from when you first found out, whether orally or in
writing, that some union right of yours was abridged.
Article 33 section 4(c).

For an appeal against the actions of someone at the regional or

international level, the time limit is 30 days if it is based on the
constitution and 60 days if it is based on the EPC. In the latter case local
approval is also necessary within the 60 days.
Article 32 section 4,
article 33 section 4(c);
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994) (though EPC claim against UAW was timely
submitted within 60 days, local approval of it occurred after the 60th day and therefore
it was untimely),
 Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 3-4, 7-8, 17 (local properly
approved EPC claim against UAW where majority of members in three different shift
meetings combined approved it and local president certified it, and it was not necessary
for appellant to clarify the members' intent by amending the minutes at subsequent
meetings).

Election appeals normally have even shorter time periods, with the period
sometimes beginning -- according to the PRB -- even before the polling
starts.

Timeliness of charges filed under article 31 is discussed elsewhere.

In early years the UAW had no time limit for starting an appeal at the
local level, according to the president at the 1970 convention. That year
an amendment was proposed to extend the time from 60 days to six
months. The PRB backed it. It was defeated apparently. To be sure, the
president asked for a second vote. A delegate objected, but the vote
proceeded. It lost again, this time obviously.
Proceedings, 22nd constitutional convention, pp 192-95 (1970).

If the last day of a time period for an appeal falls on a Saturday, Sunday,
or holiday, does it get extended to the next day which is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday? The constitution, PRB rules, and PRB decisions do not
answer that directly. An IEB interpretation of a different part of the
constitution, concerning the timeliness of dues payments, suggests the
answer may be no.
Article 16 section 8 interpretation 1 (last day of month falling on Sunday does not extend
 time for dues payment to Monday) (5/1/44).

But one appeal protested a contract negotiated by the UAW and ratified on
November 11, 2005. The 30th day was December 11, a Sunday. In letters
to the president postmarked the 31st day, nine members appealed in
separate letters. Eventually they lost, but their timeliness was never
questioned.
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), record pp 21-30 (nine appeals and
UAW acknowledgement of appeals including postmark date).

On EPC claims there are discretionary procedures for bypassing the local
level.

The proponent of an appeal has the burden of proof to establish its

timeliness.
Dillon v UAW President, 9 PRB 303, 305 (1997),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), p 8 ("It was up
to [appellant] Carnahan to establish that he had presented a timely, meritorious claim
against [appellee] McComb").

In one appeal appellant Art Pederson claimed to have sent a timely IEB
appeal to the president's office. There was evidence that at the same time
he cc'd a copy to an international rep. Two years went by with no action,
so he sent an inquiry. The UAW responded saying it had no record he had
appealed at all and the fact he waited two years to follow up was not
credible. He was dismissed as untimely.
On further appeal he said he waited because he just assumed proceedings
took that long in the UAW. The PRB decided to give him the benefit of the
doubt. It noted the UAW had acknowledged in the past that other
correspondence in this time period had been mis-filed. It said Brother
Pederson's explanation for waiting two years to follow up was credible:
"Unfortunately, it ofen does take many months for an appeal to work its
way through the system."
Pederson v UAW, PRB Case 1593 (9/3/08), p 6;
see also Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 487, 491, 492 (1968) (appeal not untimely,
though technically late, where appellant made good-faith effort to satisfy constitution,
local ordered to re-file withdrawn grievance and make appellant whole),
Mosely v UAW, 2 PRB 621, 623-25 (1977) (PRB decides untimely grievance appeal on
the merits because procedural errors should not foreclose examination of narrow
question of improper conduct or motivation),
Duff v Region 8, 6 PRB 533, 535 (1992) (whenever possible member entitled to benefit
of doubt on timeliness though appeal to IEB was two months late),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213, 218 (1996) (appeal though technically late is not
time-barred where appellant can show a good faith effort to comply with
requirements).

Timeliness of an appeal, like timeliness in the grievance procedure is

usually pretty simple. The problem is it can kill you if you are one day
over. The rule's harshness is modified somewhat by the PRB's
requirement that if you ask responsible union officials about appeal
procedures, they have to tell you.
Pochik appealing Kapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52, 58 (1998) ("We have concluded that a
filing was untimely where it was only one day late.");
 see also Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 775 (1972) (PRB announces that henceforth
it will default the UAW for untimely compliance with PRB filing rules);
compare Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07),
p 17 ("We do not regard the Union having missed its deadline by a single day as the
kind of unexcused failure to comply with our Rules of Procedure addressed in
Dietrich.").

According to a 1998 decision involving a runoff shop committee election,

the time limits of article 33 are "jurisdictional." That is to say, if they are
not satisfied and not waived by the UAW president, an appellate tribunal
cannot entertain the appeal. The members had ordered a rerun, but the
IEB ordered the election to stand. The PRB then nullified the IEB decision
because the appeal to the IEB had been untimely.
Article 31 section 2, Article
32 sections 4, 5, article 33
section 4(b), (c);
Campbell v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 342 (1992) ("These charges appear to be untimely,
since the information on which they were based came to light August 8, 1990, and
they were not filed until October 8, 1990, or 61 days later. Nevertheless, no objection
to their timeliness has been made by any party and, for that reason, we shall not
disqualify them on grounds of untimeliness."),
Pochik appealing Kapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52, 58 (1998) ("The time limits of Article
33 are jurisdictional.... We have concluded that a filing was untimely where it was only
one day late."),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), p 8 (failure of
member who was appellee at IEB level to object to untimeliness of original claim would
not preclude PRB from observing that claim was untimely on its face);
see also article 33 section 4(d) (president can waive time limits for filing an appeal),
Beach v Local 653, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (were appeal timely it would have been
meritorious),
Howell v Local 969, 10 PRB Case 198, 203-04 (1998) (PRB ordinarily will not waive time
 limits).

This holding is somewhat problematic, since as noted elsewhere, in the

UAW the word "jurisdictional" lacks uniform meaning.

At any rate it is prudent to to be careful about UAW time limits. If you are
up against a deadline, get a receipt on delivery of the appeal. Certified mail
is cheaper than registered and provides equal proof of delivery. Delivery
confirmation is as good and even cheaper. Be careful though about using
delivery confirmation if the rules expressly require registered or certified. If
mailed, filing of an appeal is considered complete as of the postmark date.
Article 33 section 4(b) (if mailed, an appeal will be considered filed on the date it is
postmarked);
DeGray v MDA Local 571, PRB Case 1477 (6/23/04), pp 4-5, 7 (though absentee voting
procedure specifically provided for use of registered or certified mail, PRB approved
election committee and IEB interpretation that permitted use of express mail because it
had a similar type of tracking number and was not significantly different).

If hand-delivered, dated initials by a receptionist or security guard on

your own copy are a sufficient receipt.

Timeliness rulings are frequent and sometimes contradictory. The

president has discretion to waive time limits for filing. His exercise of the
discretion is reviewable by the IEB and PRB. One thread that seems to
run through the decisions is that an appellate tribunal can in its discretion
deny an untimely appeal on the merits, but it cannot grant one; but
deciding on the merits implicitly waives the time limits, and opens the
way for the PRB later to review the merits. Another thread is that a time
limitation cannot bar an appeal of an ongoing practice. Another is that
ignorance of the time limits does not excuse a late appeal.
Article 12 section 8;
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170 (1961), second decision 1 PRB 174, 176-77 (1962), third
decision 1 PRB 178 (1962) (IEB's literal interpretation of timeliness provision not in
keeping with fair play),
Beach v Local 653, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (were appeal timely it would have been
meritorious, but court cannot confer jurisdiction on PRB),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969) (filing an unsuccessful charge regarding
grievance-handling extends the time to appeal the grievance disposition if the IEB
improperly raises that issue),
Beach v UAW, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969) (court cannot confer jurisdiction on PRB),
Battle v Local 122, 2 PRB 5, 8 (1973) (had appellant initiated action within 60 days of
notification, PRB might have considered he had substantially complied),
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 28 (1973) (word "appeal" need not be in appeal letter,
local's and IEB's failure to act on valid appeal not the fault of appellant),
EP complaint of Placido, 2 PRB 165, 170 (1974) (appeal of seniority agreement not
untimely because claims are continuing),
Callaway v Local 887, 2 PRB 428, 435 (1977) (IEB waived untimeliness by determining
appeal on its merits),
Sparks v Local 149, 2 PRB 605, 606 (1977) (tacit presidential waiver of timeliness in
appeal about ending monthly allotments to retiree chapter),
Berard v Local 422, 2 PRB 610, 614 (1977) (filing an unsuccessful charge regarding
grievance-handling may extend the time to file an appeal of the grievance disposition),
McGill v Local 387, 2 PRB 759, 761, 765 (1979) (IEB held appeal untimely but also
denied it on the merits, PRB affirms on the merits without discussing timeliness),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 20 (1980) (EP complaint against local filed directly
with PRB without IEB decision, processed because of UAW waiver of timeliness
objections),
Darling v Local 499, 3 PRB 55, 59-60 (1980) (party who makes procedural error during
appeal may not later object to the error; only other parties may object but they can
 choose to waive),
Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 56 (1983) (seniority issue became appealable when
appellant was displaced, not when the seniority provision was negotiated),
Styer v UAW, 4 PRB 133, 136 (1984) (untimeliness of appeal held waived where
president investigated and decided appeal on its merits),
EP complaint of Ford, 5 PRB 23 (1985) (untimeliness of appeal held not waived though
IEB investigated and decided appeal on its merits),
Goold, 5 PRB 33, 36 (1985) (appeal limitations periods are short, similar to time
limitations on grievances in collective bargaining agreements,
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB Case 231 (1991) (correspondence with UAW does not relieve
appellant of obligation to appeal),
Hauben v UAW President, 8 PRB 1 (1993) (untimeliness excused because local president
had said he would refuse to allow member to present an appeal),
Santos v UAW, 8 PRB 249, 252 (1994) (time period to appeal action on a seniority issue
begins to run when appellant learns of the action, not the reasons for it),
Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257, 260 (1994) (PRB overrules IEB's determination of when
appeal period started running),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 272 (1994) (lack of membership consideration not
fault of appellant),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994) reconsideration denied (8/5/94) (article 32
section 4, article 32 section 5(b), and article 33 section 4(c), saying EP complaints
"must" be filed and locally approved within 60 days, enforced),
Ponce v Local 492, 8 PRB 449, 452 n 1 (1994) (president should waive time limits
"where an issue of obvious substance was involved"),
Foley v Local 1097, 8 PRB 454, 456 (1994) (argument that violation was ongoing and
could therefore be challenged at any time rejected),
Sailer v Local 214 8 PRB 555 (1995) (hearing a rumor of an impropriety and a denial
does not start time limit running to file a charge),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 38, 43 (1995) (president properly excused untimeliness
because local president had announced she would not pay appellees amounts
improperly voted for them by the membership until authorized by UAW, and it was not
until appellees sued that appellant had justifiable concern that payment might be
made),
Martin v Local 699, 9 PRB 374, 380 (1997) ("[Appellants] apparently have not actually
 been personally impacted in their plant by the decision.... At this point any effect upon
them is only potential. [footnote omitted] For this reason alone, their appeal should
have been dismissed as premature."),
Williams v UAW I, 9 PRB 255, 258 (1997), second decision 9 PRB 260 (1997)
(presumption of timeliness, time period begins on written notice of appealed local
decision absent compelling evidence to the contrary),
Braid v Local 599, 10 PRB 21, 25-26 (1998) (appellant may not re-start limitations period
by seeking late reconsideration of decision below),
Pochik in the matter of Kapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52, 58 (1998) (time limits are
jurisdictional and PRB once barred an appeal which was only a day late),
Howell v Local 969, 10 PRB Case 198, 203-04 (1998) (court cannot confer jurisdiction on
PRB, timeliness can be waived where delay was due at least partly to some act of the
union, where UAW in effect waived time limits by addressing merits of otherwise
untimely appeal, or where appellant made a good faith effort to satisfy constitutional
requirements),
DelMorone v Local 1292, 10 PRB 333, 336 (1999) (time limits for appeal begin when
appellant first becomes aware of the alleged action or decision appealed),
Goodyear v Local 599, 10 PRB 432, 455-56 (1999) (failure-to-recall appeal barred since
appellant appeared at LEB meeting where she was told there was a question whether
her grievance was still pending and told to return to the following LEB meeting, she did
not return to the following LEB meeting, and she started the appeal years later),
see also Hills v Local 961, 11 PRB 230, 233 (2001) (assuming appellant did not learn of
LEB's November disqualification of July recall petition until February, it is inconceivable
that appellant would have ignored non-action on his petition for seven months without
making inquiry, and he reasonably should have become aware of the November
action),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 240, 241 n 9 (2001) (president's agent did not waive
time limits on appellant's damage claim when he told local union appellant was entitled
to backpay information),
Jackson-Thomas v Region 2B, 11 PRB 246, 249 (2001) ("Appellant is attempting, by
using the device of a challenge of certain Supplemental Retirement benefits, to raise
collaterally the issue of alleged coercion to sign off her production and maintenance
seniority rights. If Jackson-Thomas believed that she had been wrongly coerced into
giving up her plant seniority, she should have raised the issue at the time. Her failure
 to do so bars her collateral effort at this time."),
Notchick v Local 2209, 11 PRB 255, 259 (2001) (re-filing a withdrawn grievance does not
re-start time limits for appeal),
Baker v IEB, 11 PRB 439, 444-45 (2002) (untimely protests of merger and failure to
conduct election during appeal of administratorship),
Espinosa v Local 719, PRB Case 1418 (12/18/02), pp 5-6 (ignorance of terms of new
agreement due to missing local meeting does not excuse missing deadline, nor does
filing grievance later re-start time-bar period),
Phillips v Ford Department, PRB Case 1420 (12/19/02), p 4 ("A claim of ignorance of the
requirements of the Constitution is not a satisfactory excuse for a failure to abide by its
requirements."),
Hill v Local 212, PRB Case 1471 (5/25/04), p 6 (appeal to IEB untimely though
president's office misplaced appeal letter which would have shown date of receipt,
where president's office notified appellant timeliness of appeal was at issue and
appellant did not promptly provide copy of dated appeal letter),
Redfern v Region 1, PRB Case 1489 (1/13/05), p 5 (review barred because appeal from
president's failure to waive time limits was itself untimely),
Addison v UAW, PRB Case 1500 (9/2/05), p 4 (appeal held timely where member relied
on statement of shop chair that he would appeal, and appellant appealed as soon as he
learned shop chair had not),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 (1/24/06), p 5 (by its inherent power IEB may overrule,
rescind, reverse, or repeal any decision of the president),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 8 (PRB has no constitutional authority
to waive time limits on appeals to the IEB; PRB can only decide whether the decision
amounted to an abuse of discretionary authority; a remand to the IEB to review
president's decision would be warranted but for the the ultimate outcome being so
clear; appellant's depression by itself would not warrant waiver, and interpreting the
facts most favorably to appellant there is little likelihood that an arbitrator would have
ordered reinstatement anyway),
Chester v Region 4, PRB Case 1547 (12/18/06), p 9 (appellants knew in 1990 that less
senior employees worked in chip and grind classification while they were laid off, and
that the chief steward did not intend to grieve the issue; this knowledge started the
60-day time period; union's subsequent efforts to negotiate pension credits for
appellants did not revive the lcaims they failed to make in 1990),
 Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 1-8 (PRB may not waive time limits
applicable to appeals before the IEB, but in this case president's staff twice lost papers
timely filed by appellants; appellants provided replacements and so are entitled to a
ruling on the merits, even though they deliberately calculated to keep the matter open
to embarrass the president's staff),
Flores v UAW, PRB Case 1557 (3/20/07), pp 7-8 (ignorance of 30-day time limit for
appealing to IEB does not excuse failure to comply with it; time limit is not a mere
technicality),
Carter v Region 1, PRB Case 1567 (6/1/07), p 7 (inquiry by president's staff about the
circumstances giving rise to appeal did not amount to a waiver of time limits; the
president's staff frequently conducts such preliminary investigations),
Barbour v UAW, PRB Case 1608 (11/25/08), p 11 (appeal submitted 11 months after act
complained of was untimely);
Jones, CAC, session 5/96 (grievance was withdrawn, local sent certified letter to last
known address, but it was returned; appellant had moved and notified post office and
secretary of state but not local; during a meeting with the local vice-president he
attempted to change his address but the vice-president said he couldn't personally take
it because he might lose it; he was told to contact the region, he did, was told
grievance was withdrawn, and appealed; president said appeal was untimely; CAC
asked president's office to reverse earlier decision and president's office agreed),
Raein, CAC, session 10/98 (CAC upholds president's refusal to waive time limits because
appellant did not go to a local meeting which would have been the logical place to air a
complaint about local action, and his claim was not credible that information about
appeal rights was not available and Ford department rep told him nothing else could be
done),
Bouchard, CAC session 10/21/03-10/22/03 (CAC agrees with president's decision not to
waive time limits).

The starting date of a time period is sometimes an issue. They

begin to run from the time the appellant first becomes aware, or reasonably should
have become aware, of the alleged action or decision appealed.
This "allows for a certain flexibility in determining the point at which the
limitations clock starts ticking," the PRB said in 1999. Time may be
needed to learn all the facts which make up an appealable issue. But in a
member's 1983 appeal of an administratorship imposed on her local the
PRB held the 30-day time period began the day the UAW informed the
local leadership.
Article 33 section 4(b) (start of period);
Thompson v UAW, 4 PRB 23 (1983) (notice of administratorship to leadership held to be
notice to each member),
Santos v UAW, 8 PRB 249, 252 (1994) (time period to appeal action on a seniority issue
begins to run when appellant learns of the action, not the reasons for it),
Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257, 260 (1994) (PRB overrules IEB's determination of when
appeal period started running),
Williams v UAW, 9 PRB 255, 258 (1997), second decision 9 PRB 260 (1997)
(presumption of timeliness, time period begins on written notice of appealed local
decision absent compelling evidence to the contrary),
Baxter v Local 659, 10 PRB 337, 341 n 4 (1999) (flexibility in determining start),
Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03), pp 5, 9, 10 (for appellants claiming
they were placed in area hire pool with wrong seniority dates after being laid off after
voluntary transfer to new plant, the time period for grieving or appealing dates began
when they arrived at new plant, despite that before arrival they had been told by
authorized officials they would have desired seniority dates and that between times of
arrival at and layoff from new plant posted seniority lists showed both desired and
undesired seniority dates for each, because written agreement was clear and
unambiguous),
Yettaw v UAW, PRB Case 1482 (10/26/04), p 6 (amendments to IEB's June 2002
revisions of constitutional interpretations became appealable when UAW distributed
printed copies of constitution in December 2002),
O'Connor v Local 974, PRB Case 1570 (12/14/07) p 9 ("Greg Larson's motion did not
start the time limits running because it did not change appellants' right to lost time and
 per diem, whatever may have been Larson's intent."),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1571 (8/9/07) p 7 ("The IEB's argument that the
time limits on Shotwell's appeal began to run when the decision was made to alter the
Area Hire Area for Lansing implies that Shotwell might have had standing in 1993 to
challenge that decision based on speculation about its application sometime in the
future. That is clearly not the case.").

In one curious appeal the IEB and PRB treated an individual appellant as a
collective appellant and held a 1982 appeal time-barred where the
appealed 1977 agreement with management was or should have been
known to at least one other member in 1977, even though the individual
appellant had not been a UAW member and had no way of knowing of the
agreement in 1977. The PRB acknowledged there was no support for the
holding in article 33 section 4(b) (which refers in the singular to the
"appellant's" awareness of the appealed action). With no citation to
convention debates or constitution committee reports, the PRB divined
the "apparent intent" of the framers to time-bar such a claim from the
extremely short limitations periods of the constitution.
McKenzie v UAW, 4 PRB 73, 76 (1984).

On the other hand, the president said in a 2003 appeal that the
then-three-week constitutional time limit before the 2002 convention by
which a proposed amendment to the constitution "must" be submitted
was not mandatory.

The convention call and a "Talking Points" document circulated to the IEB
at the time referred to the three-week rule as a "deadline," a "cutoff
date," and as "necessary." The president submitted no examples of
untimely amendments having been considered on the merits in past
conventions. But the "must" language in the constitutional three-week
rule was only "precatory," he said, because its purpose is to sort and
distribute proposed amendments among various proper committee
chairpersons.

The PRB did not rule on the point. But there is no evident reason why the
word "must" in article 8 would mean anything different than what it
means in articles 32 and 33. This suggests a loosening of UAW attitudes
about timeliness in future appeals.
Article 8 section 15;
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), letter, Ron Gettelfinger to PRB, 1/16/03, pp
21-22 (explaining that "must" is precatory not mandatory);
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), appendix to UAW opposition to jurisdiction,
exhibit A (2002 convention call quoting article 8 section 15 and referring to three-week
rule as a deadline);
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), letter, Ellis Boal to PRB, 2/10/03, attached
"Talking Points," p 2 (referring to three-week rule as necessary and a cutoff date),
compare Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 340 (1994), reconsideration denied (8/5/94)
(article 32 section 4, article 32 section 5(b), and article 33 section 4(c), saying EP
complaints "must" be both filed and locally approved within 60 days, enforced),
PRB 48th annual report (2004), p 5 (online version) (EP complaints "must" be both filed
and locally approved within 60 days).

VII. Processing an appeal at the local level

Table of Contents
 Contents of This Section

Burden of proof || Optional local non-

membership disposition || The
membership vote || Locally-reinstated
grievances

Burden of proof

There are varying burdens of proof in different types of appeal.

Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 538 (1969) (burden is on charging member in
proceeding under predecessor of article 10 sections 7, 9-10),
Betts v Local 376, 4 PRB 307, 311 (1984) (convincing evidence burden to remove from
office for dual unionism),
Mejia v Local 365, 5 PRB 454, 459 (1988) (preponderance burden to show speech
activities motivated removal of locally appointed rep),
Martin v Local 624, 8 PRB 411, 414 (clear and convincing evidence burden that fraud or
impropriety occurred in such a degree as to have affected election outcome),
Dillon v UAW President, 9 PRB 303, 305 (1997) (proponent of appeal has burden of proof
to establish timeliness),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 342 (1997) (preponderance burden that threats or
rumors might have intimidated sufficient members of the electorate to have affected
election outcome),
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 142 (2001) (preponderance burden in administratorship
appeals),
Delling v Local 659, 11 PRB 273, 276 (2001) (substantial-evidence burden of election
 appeals apparently applied to ratification appeals),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), p 13 (appellant
identified sufficient irregularities in challenge to her removal from appointed position
that to require further inquiry by UAW, including compelling attendance at hearing of
parties responsible for decision under scrutiny so they could be questioned regarding
their motivations),
Garrish v GM Department, PRB Case 1480, p 12 (10/25/04) (appellants have burden to
establish grounds to disturb local's decision to withdraw grievances challenging
qualifications of new hiree journeymen, and there is no requirement that the local
provide evidence supporting decision to other members).

As shown by example elsewhere, if unappealed a membership vote on

any matter will in general stick.

Optional local non-membership disposition

The Guide for Local Union Bylaws encourages locals to establish a

preliminary layer at the local level. Under this suggestion, a member's
appeal would be processed and decided by the bargaining committee or
stewards council and possibly also the LEB if it involved a grievance or
collective bargaining, and by the LEB alone if it didn't. If unsatisfied with
the decision, a second appeal to the membership within 30 days would be
required to obtain its consideration.
Guide for Local Union Bylaws, section 18.
In an appeal arising under the pre-1980 version of article 33 the PRB
insisted that such a bylaw be strictly followed. The appeal concerned a
member wanting to become an electrician. The PRB said that
consideration by the shop chair -- as opposed to the whole shop
committee -- was insufficient:
The membership of Local 1364 clearly wished to ensure that decisions as to whether a
grievance was to be continued in the procedure or withdrawn be made with the fullest
possible participation of those in whose hands responsibility for making these decisions
has been vested. Perhaps Janicki could have convinced the entire bargaining
committee of Local 1364 of the efficacy of his position, even though he was unable to
convince its chairman.

The appeal was remanded for a hearing before the entire committee.
Janicki v UAW, 3 PRB 333, 337 (1982);
compare 1977 constitution, article 33 section 5 (allowing appeal to IEB without action by
membership or delegate body if membership or delegate body does not meet and act
on it within 45 days),
see also Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170, 172 (1961) (appellant entitled to consideration of
appeal by quorum of IEB, not just by president);
see also Yettaw v Local 599, 11 PRB 434, 438 (2002) (to resolve conflicting viewpoints
about articles submitted for publication local bylaw provides for meeting of author,
editor, and officers).

Except during summer months when some memberships don't meet, the
constitution today does not seem to allow the possibility of locals having
such procedures. I don't know of any locals which do, and would be
interested in hearing of them.
 Article 33 section 2(a) ("The normal route of appeal is: FIRST to the membership or
delegate body immediately responsible for the official, officer, action or decision under
challenge"),
article 33 section 3(a) (if no local membership meeting is scheduled within 45 days of
receipt of appeal LEB may rule on it),
article 33 section 3(b) (if no unit membership meeting is scheduled within 45 days of
receipt of appeal LEB may rule on it),
article 37 section 4(c) (locals or units may postpone meetings during the summer
months).

The membership vote

Potential appellants frequently believe there is no point in appealing to

local members. They reason that meetings are stacked with officers and
appointees who automatically support the leadership.

It is true that meetings are often like that, and the bylaws of most locals
do say the membership is the highest governing authority in the local.
Yettaw v Local 599, 8 PRB 363, 367 (1994) (membership is sovereign in a local union),
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 61, 67, 68 (1998) (joint membership council highest governing
body in local under administratorship,
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 107, 109 (2001) (ultimate sovereignty of local is in its
membership, but membership may delegate authorities to others).

Further, if you lose the local can then defend at the next stage of appeal
saying that democratic membership vote should weigh in its favor.
 Compare Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), p 12 ("We do find it significant
that no active member of UAW Local 1250 joined in this appeal. ... The fact that no
active member of Local 1250 joined in this appeal supports the conclusion that the
membership accepted the precess and the result.").

Often though, local votes are unavailing on appeal.

Krueger v Local 1999, 6 PRB 320, 321 (1991) (appeal denied though local membership
voted 122-4 in favor of appeal),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 37, 43 (1995) (PRB overrules payment of money to officers
voted by membership),
Montague v Local 651, 9 PRB 401, 406 n 6 (1997) (had membership supported protest,
on appeal PRB would have overturned it anyway),
Hunt v Local 435, 10 PRB 141, 143, 145 (1998) (though membership voted 57-2 to
reinstate grievance, per the contract the vote had no binding effect on the company,
and neither the IEB nor PRB took appellant's overwhelming support among
membership into account in deciding appeal),
Butina in the matter of Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 458, 459, 462-63 (2000) (shop
committee not membership had authority over redistricting, and fact that ¾ of
redistricted members signed petition opposing redistricting plan was not factored into
decision either of IEB or PRB in upholding plan),
Smith v Local 2190, 11 PRB 455, 456, 457 (2002) (membership votes to reinstate
grievance, IEB and PRB disagree);
Riley v Local 1853, 11 PRB 93, 95, 100 (2000) (in violation of constitution local union
refused to consider appeal, but appellant not prejudiced by this because appeal lacked
merit),
Clark v Local 325, PRB Case 1501 (4/18/05), p 3 (membership votes to support right to
appeal, IEB and PRB take no account of vote);
but see Englund v Local 699, 5 PRB 142, 145 (1986) ("The membership ... could have
ordered that the election be rerun. Had they done so, we probably would have
concurred in their choice. But, instead, they have seen fit to reject Englund's claim....
We sustain their judgment."),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61, 64, 70 (2001) (local vote to conform bylaw to practice by
 which president was paid a factor in PRB decision reinstating him after an audit),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362, 365-66 (2003) (local's support of member's
grievance withdrawn by UAW a factor in PRB's remand of grievance for arbitration),
Austin v Local 594, PRB Case 1514 (1/24/06), p 19 (on recall petition which was a
political process, PRB is impressed that 98% of members voted against appellant),
Long v Local 2089, PRB Case 1469 (4/27/04), pp 2 (though local membership supported
appeal, IEB and PRB take no account of that),
McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555 (5/7/07), p 13 ("The fact that the Local Executive
Board thought McMillan's case was worth pursuing further does not require us to
conclude, however, that the unit's decision to withdraw his grievance lacked a rational
basis."),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) p 3 (EPC complaint protesting ratification
rejected, though complaint was backed unanimously by local membership).

And occasionally, as explained just below, appellants do prevail over the

officers. Even more occasionally, if it is a grievance appeal the company
will take the grievance back into the procedure. The chance should not be
bypassed.

If the appeal is filed against the action of someone at the local level, ask
to be told when the membership meeting will occur at which your appeal
would be considered, and what the procedures will be at that meeting.

If you don't ask the local need not tell you anything unless that is its
practice. If you do ask, the information must be provided before the
meeting. But if you don't ask and there is no such practice, the UAW
president takes the position you must assume the appeal will be heard at
the first regular meeting after the appeal.
Sanders v Local 685, 8 PRB 257, 261 n 2 (1994) (president argues appellant must
 assume appeal will be heard at first regular meeting after appeal; though constitution
does not require that members filing appeals be notified by certified mail of the date of
consideration of their appeals, if the local's practice is to do so notices should be sent
sufficiently in advance so member actually receives it before the meeting),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266, 271-72 (1994) (appeal was timely and it properly
presented issues both under the constitution and the EPC, and appellant requested
guidance of recording secretary as to how to proceed, so recording secretary should
have placed appeal on agenda of next membership meeting).

If you start the appeal during the summer when local membership
meetings are suspended, the appeal might be considered by the LEB.
Article 33 section 3(a) (if no membership meeting is scheduled within 45 days of receipt
of appeal LEB may rule on it),
article 33 section 3(b) (if no membership meeting is scheduled in unit of amalgamated
local within 45 days of receipt of appeal unit committee or executive board may rule on
it).

Whatever body decides it, come to the meeting and bring as many
supporters as you can. You might want to bring copies of your appeal,
plus the documents on which they are based, to hand out to members for
their review at the meeting.

The members will vote by a majority on whether your appeal should be

granted or denied. They have the power to overrule the officers or the
shop committee or the shop chairperson. For instance, they can direct
that an election be rerun or that a member injured by the union be paid
for that injury.
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 301-03 (1975) (local has authority to pay member $1100 in
backpay for grievance earlier settled without backpay).
Locally-reinstated grievances

Table of Contents

The membership can also direct that a withdrawn grievance be reinstated.

For grievants employed by the major auto companies and a few other
companies, UAW contracts require employers to accept a grievance back
into the procedure if it has been reactivated through the article 33 appeal
process; the company is not liable for backpay between the date the
grievance was settled and the date it was reinstated.
UAW/GM 1999 national agreement, document 52,
UAW/Ford 1996 national agreement, letter of understanding on reinstitution of
grievances,
UAW/Chrysler 1996 P & M national agreement, letter 7,
UAW/BlueCrossBlueShieldMichigan 1987 master agreement, section 7.92,
letter of understanding between Globe Union Inc and UAW quoted in James v Region 5, 3
PRB 385, 392 (1982);
if any member has current contract citations I would appreciate hearing of them.

Not all companies have made such agreements with the UAW. For those
that don't, the PRB says the better practice for a union which has decided
to withdraw a grievance is to inform the member and then hold it open if
possible to give the member the chance to overturn the decision in the
appeal process. If it is not possible, the PRB said in a 2010 decision, the
unfortunate effect is to transfer liability for a wrongful discharge from the
company to the union.
Dailey v Local 848, 8 PRB 509, 521 (1995) (employer agreed to no side-letter),
Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), p 5 (contract did not provide for
reinstatement of grievances),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11 (contract did not provide for
reinstatement of grievances, UAW ordered to try to reopen grievance anyway and to
compensate appellant for losses),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), pp 7, 15
(contract did not have a reinstatement-of-grievances agreement, and company, which
has a very poor human resources climate, was unmoved by a desire to foster good
relations with the union; with no reinstatement-of-grievances agreement, better
practice for the union would have been to keep the grievance open until internal
appeals could be completed),
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08) p 12 n 29 (when there is no
reinstatement-of-grievances agreement, the preferred practice is for the union to hold
the grievance open while the member tries to change the decision in an appeal; in this
case the local is ordered to try again to reinstate the grievance, with the UAW's
assistance; meanwhile PRB will retain jurisdiction),
Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), pp 14, 15 n 61 (option of holding
appellant's grievance open beyond the local union step was not available under this
grievance procedure; the procedure provided that the decision whether to arbitrate is
made by the local president); PRB notes the unfortunate effect of such a set-up.

But even if the company has such an agreement, there's a catch.

Reinstatement is only enforced under the contracts if the decision to
reinstate is made by the IEB, PRB, or CAC; local membership decisions do
not suffice. The IEB, PRB, and CAC could get around the problem by
adopting a policy of automatically reinstating grievances successfully
appealed at the local level, thus vindicating local autonomy in this niche
of collective bargaining. But they haven't.

Occasionally though, a company sometimes will take a grievance back

into the procedure just because the union asks it to. Usually the union will
make the effort. The PRB explained why in 2006:
In order to commence this process, the Union requested that the grievance be
reinstated. Although the collective bargaining agreement between Local Union 174 and
Chrome Craft Corporation did not include any provision requiring the employer to
reinstate a grievance, a local union can often convince an employer to take a second
look at a situation in order to maintain its good bargaining relationship with the union.
In this case, however, Chrome Craft's management was apparently unmoved by any
desire to foster good relations with the Union. Furthermore, the description of this
incident and prior altercations involving Foreman Owens, as well as other verbally and
physically abusive interactions between employees and supervisors at Chrome craft
revealed a very poor human resources climate. The absence of a reinstatement
agreement and the poor bargaining relationship between the Union and this employer
forced the International Union to pursue further investigation of Lombard's case.

Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied

(1/30/07), p 15;
see also Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 174-75, 182 (1976) (local membership
could not have set aside settlement reached after submission to umpire
being that it was binding),
Eckerle appealing Harrison v Local 151, 5 PRB 311, 311, 312 (1987) (company
reinstated grievance after vote on appeal by unit members, after second
withdrawal, second appeal, and vote by joint council to grant second appeal,
company refused to reinstate it again),
Scarlett v UAW, 5 PRB 409, 409 (1987) (company rebuffed shop committee's
effort to reinstate grievance after vote by local membership),
Snyder v Local 2031, 9 PRB 265, 269 n 4 (local voted to reopen grievance and
local shop chair attempted to comply, but company refused),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636, 642 (1998) (local voted to reinstate
 grievance and president sought to do so but management refused),
McNeal v Ford Department, 10 PRB 504, 505, 509-10 n 16 (2000) (company,
which was not liable for substantial backpay on seniority grievances,
accepted withdrawn seniority grievance back into the procedure without an
order from the CAC, PRB, or IEB, and without a vote of the membership),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11 (company has not signed
a letter agreeing to the reinstatement of grievances, but president has
suggested it might reopen the grievance in the interest of maintaining a good
relationship with the Union; PRB orders union to attempt to do so, to settle
the grievance, and to compensate appellant for his losses),
Ferrell v Local 856, PRB Case 1492 (1/14/05), p 3 (company argued: "For the
Company and Union to continue to have a positive working relationship, we
must have the trust that once a commitment is made, it will be honored."),
Clark v Local 325, PRB Case 1501 (4/18/05), p 3 (membership voted to
support right to appeal grievance, local officers make no effort to ask
company to reinstate grievance),
McMillan v Local 659, PRB Case 1555 (5/7/07), p 13 ("The role of a Local
Union Executive Board in reviewing decisions made with respect to the
handling of grievances is broad and flexible. The Local Executive Board's
direction to the Unit in this case [to try again to convince the company it
would lose in arbitration] was consistent with its function as guardian of the
members' right to vigorous representation in the processing of their
grievances.").
compare Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11 (even in
absence of company agreement to reinstate withdrawn grievance
successfully appealed to PRB, company might reinstate grievance anyway to
maintain good bargaining relationship with union);
Berstler, CAC, session 4/00 (appellant charged for overtime for taking paid
bereavement; local voted to uphold appeal but company refused to reinstate
grievance; at CAC hearing local asked for remand; IEB did not oppose this
and the CAC remanded the grievance to the local).

But a curious dynamic sometimes kicks in here, if the company refuses to

accept your grievance back or the union refuses to try to get the company
to take it back.

In either case the union official or committee which pulled the grievance
was unable to justify it later. So -- in my opinion -- that official or
committee should be designated the "appellant" going up to the next level.
The appellant should be the one at risk of the appeal being held untimely
or in improper form. The appellant is the one that must comply with the
members' wishes while the appeal goes up. The local union should be
designated the "appellee" and a local agent on union time should carry the
ball, assemble the witnesses, arrange for their lost time, and defend the
membership vote in your favor, with you as an interested member. You
should have no burden whatever to act.
Compare Burnes v UAW, PRB Case 1592 (9/3/08), pp 6-10 (LEB sent grievance back to
the shop committee to be presented again to management; when management refused
LEB then upheld the appeal and referred it to the IEB).

In one appeal GM member Milton Lowhorn's grievance was withdrawn,

and the membership voted to reinstate it. Instead of going to the
company and at least asking to reinstate the grievance, the local
recording secretary told Brother Lowhorn to appeal to the IEB. Lowhorn
did, and eventually lost on the basis that the settlement was rational.

Lowhorn separately appealed the fact that the local had been given him
this advice in the first place. The PRB cited the GM contract and said the
advice was correct.
 Lowhorn v Local 933, 4 PRB 127, 127-28 (1983);
compare article 33 section 4(e) (appealing party must comply with decision pending
appeal);
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), p 12
("This case did not come before us in the usual way as an appeal from a decision of the
IEB. Indeed, Lombard had no reason to appeal the decision of the IEB that his
grievance was not properly investigated.").

I disagree. Still, what should you do? The members in all the above
examples did what Lowhorn did. They appealed to the IEB anyway. The
IEB accepted and decided their appeals. They all lost. But had the locals
advocated for them the results might have been different.

In one amazing grievance appeal from Local 1853, the local membership
voted against it and simultaneously wrote the IEB saying the appellant
should be rehired. The appellant explained this procedure was
recommended by the local president just so the IEB could reinstate the
grievance.
Rider v Local 1853, 9 PRB 429, 431, 432 (1997);
see alsoBenton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52, 55-56 (1986) (membership directed appeal be
transmitted to UAW),
Hunt v Local 435, 10 PRB 141, 143, 145 (1998) (after members voted to reinstate
grievance and management refused, recording secretary advised member to appeal to
IEB).

There are a couple of appeals from 1983 and 2005 where the membership
voted to reinstate a grievance and local officials didn't go to the company
and try to comply. In such a case the responsible officials can be brought
up on charges before a trial committee. If found guilty they can be
removed from office. However removal from office would not in and of
itself result in reinstatement of the grievance.
Lowhorn v Local 933, 4 PRB 127, 127-28 (1983) (membership voted to reinstate
withdrawn grievance; instead of going to the company and at least asking to reinstate
the grievance, the local recording secretary told appellant to appeal to the IEB),
Clark v Local 325, PRB Case 1501 (4/18/05), p 3 (membership voted to support right to
appeal grievance, local officers make no effort to ask company to reinstate grievance),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08), pp 2-3, 13, 18-19, 22, 27 (financial
secretary-treasurer chargeable for defying will of membership);
compare article 33 section 4(e) (appealing party must comply with decision pending
appeal).

VIII. Processing an appeal at the IEB

Table of Contents

Contents of This Section

IEB functioning || Appealability

chart || Procedure before the IEB
|| Fact-finding and decisions of the
president and IEB || IEB
constitutional interpretations
IEB functioning

In non-EPC cases, when an appeal reaches the IEB, it divides them into
what it calls "original matters" and "appellate cases," and treats them
differently:
The [IEB] has original jurisdiction to consider and decide all appeals submitted to it
from any decision or action of an International Officer, Regional Director, International
Representative, or any administrative arm of the National Department of the
International Union, except in the relevant types of cases set forth in [article 33
section 2(b)].

Article 33(d) Original Matters.

The [IEB] has appellate jurisdiction to consider and decide all appeals submitted to it
from any decision or action of a Local Union, Amalgamated Local Union or other
subordinate body; except in the relevant types of cases set forth in [article 33 section
2(b)], the [IEB] shall entertain an appellate case only when it has been ruled upon by
the appropriate membership or delegate body.

Article 33(d) Appellate Cases.

In particular, there are different time limits for each type of appeal.

For EPC cases, the time limits are also different.

The IEB consists of the president, the secretary-treasurer, five

vice-presidents, and 11 regional directors. The IEB is to execute the
instructions of the convention and be the highest UAW authority between
conventions, subject to the constitution. It has power to authorize strikes,
issue charters, and punish subordinate bodies for violation of the
constitution. Between quarterly IEB sessions to which the president
reports, the president executes IEB instructions, and has full authority to
direct the working of the UAW subject to the constitution.
Article 10 sections 1, 21,
article 12 sections 1, 8,
article 13 section 2;
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 (1/24/06), p 5 (by its inherent power IEB may overrule,
rescind, reverse, or repeal any decision of the president).

Article 33 notes only one situation in which an IEB member should recuse
himself or herself from an appeal -- that is, abstain from participating in
the decision. In an appeal routed through the first track, the regional
director of the region from which the appeal originated may not sit on the
appeals committee.
Article 33 section 3(d) Disposition By An Appeals Committee;
compare Gilbert v Local 326, 6 PRB 436, 438 (1992) (improper for charged member of
LEB to vote on whether charge was sufficient under article 31 section 3),
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), p 12, reconsideration denied (4/22/09)
(appellants request recusal of president from IEB decision because his agent directed
the appealed action, IEB decided appeal without recusing president).

Within the IEB, the president supervises certain departments, and the
secretary-treasurer supervises others. The regional directors direct the
geographic regions. The IEB itself has charge of the intra-corporation
councils.
The PRB has said repeatedly that IEB jurisdiction may not be conferred by
stipulation or waiver. Further, unless waived by the president article 33
time limits are "jurisdictional."
Smith, 1 PRB 44, 47, 49 (1958) (improper composition of IEB appeals committee may
not be waived by appellants),
Smith, 1 PRB 66, 67 (1958) (improperly composed IEB appeals committee may not
decide appeal),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969) (IEB had no power to decide propriety of
committeeman's grievance-processing where appellant only appealed holding that his
charges against committeeman were improper),
Robinson appealing Blandford v Local 659, 6 PRB 219, 225-26 (1991) (IEB may not
confer jurisdiction to appeal on non-member),
Pochik appealing Kapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52, 58 (1998) (time limits of article 33 are
"jurisdictional"; if they are not satisfied and not waived appellate tribunal has no
jurisdiction to entertain appeal).

The word "jurisdictional" is not useful, because it has a different meaning

depending whether it is applied to the IEB or PRB.

Like the CAC and unlike the PRB, in grievance appeals the IEB's
jurisdiction is unlimited. It may set aside a grievance disposition and
order damages without a finding that the local's handling was irrational.
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 488-89 (1968) (UAW argues to PRB in pre-1980
grievance appeal that though PRB had no jurisdiction because there is no evidence of
fraud, discrimination, or collusion, IEB did have jurisdiction (PRB assumed jurisdiction
on other grounds)),
Local 699, 3 PRB 302, 303 (1982) (IEB orders that grievance be filed because shop chair
improperly refused to write it claiming member had not complied with previous
 settlement, without a reason being given as to why shop chair's act was improper),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 12-13 (2001) (in grievance appeal IEB appeals
committee orders local to pay damages to a member without finding that the local's
handling was irrational);
but see Grubba v Chrysler Department, 4 PRB 5, 7 (1983) (under the constitution CAC is
"only appellate body" with authority to deal with questions of bargaining policy);
but see Garab v TOP Department, PRB Case 1461 (3/18/04), pp 5, 9 (IEB upholds
grievance settlement because not devoid of a rational basis, PRB affirms);
see also Hahn v 163, CAC, session 1/81 (CAC holds itself without jurisdiction to interpret
a local collective bargaining agreement),
Spradlin, CAC, session 11/93 (appeal denied by CAC because decision to withdraw
grievance was not devoid of a rational basis and appellant's discrimination claim was
without merit).

In most situations the IEB keeps verbatim minutes of its meetings. The
minutes are transcribed and available for inspection by members at IEB
members' offices. The IEB can also function as a body outside its
meetings, establishing rules by past practices.
Article 12 section 19;
Smith, 1 PRB 44, 47-49 (1958) (IEB past practice of allowing 2-man committee to sit as
quorum of 3-man committee to hear appeals does not justify hearing of present appeal
by 2-man committee even though one man was sick and even in absence of objection
by appellants, in light of constitutional requirement of 3-man committee),
Smith, 1 PRB 66, 67 (1958) (IEB past practice of allowing 2-man committee to sit as
quorum of 3-man committee to hear appeals does not justify hearing of present appeal
by 2-man committee even though one man was sick, in light of constitutional
requirement of 3-man committee),
Appeal of Collins, 1 PRB 694, 697 (1971) (convention implicitly ratified IEB strike benefit
rule),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 106-08 (1974) (IEB past practice ratified by convention,
regarding separate skilled trades ratification, relied on),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 139-41 (1974) (IEB past practice ratified by convention,
 regarding separate skilled trades ratification, relied on),
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 343-44 (1988)
(historic practice of dealing, in administrative letters and communications with Staff
Council, with staff challenges to directors' reelections relied on, despite constitutional
requirement of verbatim minutes of IEB meetings),
Moye v UAW, 5 PRB 612, 617 (1989) (historic IEB practice of amalgamating locals relied
on),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 689-90 (1989) (longstanding IEB
constitutional interpretation supported by IEB minutes relied on),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 33-34, 37, 39-40, 42-44 (1995) (IEB minutes recount
history of UAW practice to allow locals to reimburse travel expenses for spouses of
delegates to conventions and though IEB never announced spousal allowance policy,
PRB majority believes "average rank and file members ... are certainly aware, by and
large, that officers, staff, and delegates have been bringing spouses to the Union's
Conventions since the time that it was founded."),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575, 579 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00) (chapter
8 of election guide incorporates external legal prohibition of use of union and employer
funds to promote an individual candidacy as UAW policy);
compare Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 608-09 (2000) (despite constitutional
provisions indicating membership status begins on the date of local approval of a
worker's application to join union, "we are convinced by the Union's long history of
making membership retroactive to the first day of the month in which an individual
applies, pays dues or signs a check-off authorization" that membership begins on the
first day of the month of the application),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 47 (1995) (dissent) ("The IEB has never explicitly
adopted and communicated to its locals a policy that each local delegate should be
entitled to take a spouse to the national Convention and have some or all of that
expense defrayed."),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 14 (no requirement that president document
his delegation of responsibility for reviewing bylaws to administrative assistants).

The IEB can vote by proxy.

Article 10 section 20(e);
 Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 16 (1958);
compare Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 22-24 (1958) (dissent) ("It is fundamental that one
who decides a case must hear it, and, conversely, that one who does not hear the case
should not be permitted to decide it."),
Janicki v UAW, 3 PRB 333, 337 (1982) (rationale of providing a hearing before entire
shop committee is to allow for the fullest exchange of views and provide widest
opportunity for aggrieved party to convince committee).

The PRB reviews presidential or IEB permissions on an abuse-

of-discretion standard.
Tool and Die Unit, Local 600 v IEB, 2 PRB 273, 276 (1976) (short terms for stewards or
committeepersons under article 45 section 2),
Ford v UAW, 5 PRB 363, 364 (1987), 5 PRB 587 (1989) (reinstatement of membership
rights after suspension under article 48 section 5),
Halstead v IEB, 10 PRB 61, 67 (1998) (permission to advance a local officers' election
under article 38 section 2);
compare Noall v Local 599, 10 PRB 371, 376-77 (1999) (PRB affirms right of editor to
edit),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), pp 13-14 (election committee's ruling
holding appellant ineligible was a good-faith exercise of discretion);
compare Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 (1/24/06), p 5 (IEB has power to review
president's decision not to waive time limits for appealing to IEB).

Appealability chart

Table of Contents
Under article 33 section 2(b) there are certain types of appeal that are
either not appealable or have special appeal procedures. It is pretty
complex. Below I have tried to make a chart covering everything. Good
luck following it, be careful whether you are appealing against the UAW
itself or a local or other subordinate body, and watch the time limits.
 Where To Appeal What
Under Article 32 Section 5 and
Article 33 Section 2

Subject Of Appeal To Whom To Appeal

A ll appeals unless otherwise specified To the membership or delegate body

below. immediately responsible for the official, officer,
action, or decision under challenge, then to the
IEB unless the appeal begins there, then to the
CAC or PRB as may be appropriate.

EP complaint against a subordinate To the membership unless bypass is allowed

body or any officer or representative by the IEB and/or PRB, then to the IEB, then to
thereof. the PRB; PRB may act in the absence of an
appeal.

EP complaint against the UAW or any Unless bypass is allowed by the IEB and/or
officer or representative thereof. PRB, approval of complaint by local union, then
to the IEB, then to the PRB.

In non-amalgamated local, handling or To the local, then to the IEB, then to the
disposition of a grievance by a local C AC or where appropriate the PRB.
union committeeperson, steward,
bargaining committee, officer, or other
local union official.

In amalgamated local, handling or To the unit, then to the local, then to the IEB,
disposition of a grievance by a local then to the CAC or where appropriate the PRB.
union committeeperson, steward,
bargaining committee, officer, or
 by an international representative, a ppropriate the PRB.
regional director, international officer,
or national department.

H andling or disposition of any non- To the IEB, then to the CAC or PRB.
grievance matter by an international
representative, regional director,
international officer, or national
department.

A decision of a local union or unit of an To the president, then the IEB, and then the
amalgamated local union on an election CAC or the PRB.
appeal.

A decision of an LEB or amalgamated To the president, then the IEB, then the
local's unit workplace organization on the C AC or the PRB.
propriety of charges.

A decision of a local union or unit of an To the IEB and then to the CAC or the PRB.
amalgamated local union on a trial
committee's recommendation.

D isputes or questions in controversy, To the IEB, then to the convention.

including all questions involving
interpretation of the constitution by the
president under article 13 section
8, except as otherwise outlined in the
constitution.

D ecisions of the president under To the IEB and then to the CAC or PRB.
article 48 section 5 (financial
 misconduct in local union discovered by
international audit) or section 6 (non-
dues debt owed to union).

A ny action or decision by a national or To the IEB. There is no further appeal.

corporate bargaining council or sub-
council, or by a national or regional
wage-hour council or
sub-council.

A ny action or decision pertaining to To the local membership, or in the case of an

sports and other recreational
activities
rulings of the chair on
procedural questions arising
during local union membership
and other meetings
the appointment and/or
removal of appointed officials on
local union committees
the sending of authorized
members from a local union to
any convention, conference, or
other meeting, whether
sponsored by the UAW or some
o ther organization, except for
the UAW's constitutional
convention
amalgamated local first to the membership of
the appellant's unit if necessary, and then to
the delegate body
or general membership of the amalgamated
local. Then if the EPC, article 46 section 1
(necessary local expenses approved by the local
in a regular meeting), or some other substantive
provision of the constitution is implicated, to the
IEB, and then to the CAC or PRB; otherwise
there is no further
a ppeal.

A ny action or decision pertaining to If there is a credentials committee for the

the seating of members at any
conference or other meeting
sponsored by the UAW.
conference or meeting, first to the credentials
committee and then to the general delegate
body of the conference or meeting. If there is
no credentials committee for the conference or
meeting, directly to the director of the national
department or region responsible for the
conference or meeting. In either case there is
no further appeal.

A ny action or decision pertaining to To the IEB. Unless the EPC is implicated

the appointment or removal of special- there is no further appeal.
purpose representatives, such as
benefit representatives or
h ealth and safety committeepersons,
by a national department under the
provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement.

A local union decision pertaining to To the IEB. There is no further appeal.

skilled trades lines of demarcation.

An interpretation of a collective To the president. There is no further

bargaining agreement by a national appeal.
department or regional director, where
the interpretation is so obviously correct
that no purpose will be served by an
appeal, and where it is consistent with
other provisions of the constitution and
international union policy.
 Any action or decision of the UAW To the president. There is no further
national skilled trades department appeal.
pertaining to a journeyperson card.

Procedure before the IEB

Table of Contents

The IEB occasionally rebukes local union grievance-handling, and sends a

grievance back for further investigation. In one 2006 action involving a
member of Local 659, it did so without opinion.
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 11, 13, 15 (2001) (IEB orders damages against local in
grievance appeal without finding local had acted irrationally),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), pp 3-4
(IEB "concluded that the Local Union had not adequately investigated Lombard's
grievance in order to make a rational decision about its proper disposition");
Smith v Local 262, IEB Decision (undated, some time in 2002), pp 6-9 (both the
appellant and committeeman are not credible, but two members have given statements
supporting appellant regarding the gun incident for which he was fired; the dismissal of
appellant's criminal charges could have been used possibly to secure his reinstatement;
appellant did not ask that his grievance be withdrawn, but even if he had his wishes
would not have bound the union for the grievance is union property),
Sorice v Region 1, IEB Decision (8/6/07), p 9 ("There are unanswered questions in this
case which don't add up to termination.... The evidence shows that there was
disagreement among management personnel that the Appellant should not be
 terminated....");
letter, Ron Gettelfinger to Local 659 member James Mattis, 7/17/06 ("This letter is to
advise you of the action taken on your Article 33 appeal. Arrangements are being
made to reinstate your grievance into the UAW-GM grievance procedure. You will be
notified in the very near future. We are closing your Article 33 appeal."; no IEB opinion
attached).

The IEB does not publish its decisions or summaries of its decisions, at
least that I know of. My knowledge of them is from the few appeals in
which I participated or which otherwise have come to my attention, and
from reading summaries in CAC and PRB decisions of IEB decisions that
are appealed.

The IEB has no jurisdiction of an appeal against a local until the local
itself has considered it.
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 528 (1969).

Unless excused by the president because of unusual circumstances, the

loser at any lower level of appeal is required to comply with the decision
pending the next level of appeal.
Article 33 section 4(e) (compliance pending appeal);
Local 469, 1 PRB 27, 31 (1958) (IEB threat to impose administratorship because of
local's failure to comply with IEB decision pending appeal to PRB),
Dunlap v UAW, 1 PRB 547, 549 (1969) (if there are improper motivations, local officers
can be charged with failure to carry out membership directives),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 462 (2000) (presidential
administrative assistant empowered to waive compliance),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), pp 9-10 (UAW
arguably waived compliance requirement by referring to PRB appeal of its order that
 appellant must reimburse local $20,000, but in any event enforcement of the rule
would be inappropriate because of PRB ruling overturning IEB).

You have 30 days to appeal from the local to the IEB, the UAW's highest
authority between conventions. File it care of the president's office. Send
a copy to the recording secretary of the body you are appealing from. If
mailed, the filing date of an appeal is the postmark date. Timeliness
issues are discussed elsewhere.
Article 33 section 3(d),
article 33 section 4(b).

As when you the began the appeal, state that it is an appeal, choose your
issues, and organize all the relevant details.

After receipt of the appeal the president's office is to obtain from the local
a complete statement of the matters at issue, including copies of all
charges and records, minutes, transcripts of testimony and other material
relating to the appeal. Ask to be sent a copy as soon as the president
gets it. Make sure you have everything in hand that the president has.
Article 33 section 3(d) appellate cases, last sentence;
compare Cordell appealing McDonaugh v Local 1183, 9 PRB 591, 595 (1998) (material
provided to IEB should be provided to all parties),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636, 644 n 9 (1998) (IEB commonly accepts or solicits
post-hearing evidence, and this is proper so long as all parties are informed),
Shay v Local 163, 10 PRB 555, 558 n 3 (2000) (IEB should not meet privately with one
side before a hearing).

With tongue in cheek the constitution requires the IEB to use its "best
efforts" to get a decision out within 60 days of the president's receipt of
the appeal.
Article 33 section 3(d) last sentence;
compare Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 775 (1972),
Krajewski v Chrysler Department, 3 PRB 415, 417 (1982),
EP complaint of King v Local 600, 11 PRB 250, 254 n 7 (2001) (5/11/01),
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), record p 108, letter, Barbara Klein to Ellis
Boal, 6/26/06 ("[T]here is no authority in the UAW Constitution for the PRB to direct
the IEB to expedite appeals.").

Initially, appeals to thes to the IEB are routed through one of three tracks. In
the first, they are referred to a two-member appeals committee of the IEB
not including the director of the region originating the appeal. The
constitution is explicit that the appeals committee consists of IEB
members, not designees, yet there seems to be a practice of delegating
hearings anyway. Other than one administratorship hearing in 1995, I
have been to no IEB hearing which IEB members actually conducted.
Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67, 68 (1973) (in election appeal IEB appeals committee consists of
two IEB members),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 46 n 1 (1995) (IEB administratorship hearing conducted by
IEB),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 11 (2001) (in grievance appeal IEB appeals committee
consists of two non-IEB members),
Rogers v Region 9, 11 PRB 400, 404 (2002) ("Rogers has also been given a further
opportunity to establish the credibility of his account before his Union peers serving as
an IEB appeals Committee [neither member of which was an IEB member].").

After review of the appeal and the record, the appeals committee will
hold a hearing before at least one of them, unless it concludes a hearing
would not be useful. The committee will make a recommendation which
together with the record is submitted to a nine-member committee of the
IEB with a quorum of five. Members of the nine-member committee can
designate substitutes.
Article 33 section 3(d), disposition by an appeals committee.

In the second track, instead of the IEB the president decides the appeal.
He or she may designate non-IEB-member representatives to conduct an
investigation or hearing. I am not clear on how these people are chosen,
or who qualifies to be asked. I would appreciate input on that from
interested members.
Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention, pp 186-89 (1972) (appeals procedure
amended to allow president to intervene and decide appeal at IEB level in the first
instance).

Under article 33 section 3(d), whether an appeal proceeds under the first
or second track is at the president's dsicretion. The president stated in the
course of a 1996 appeal that he chooses the second track only in cases
about elections and charges. In any event, the president is to base the
decision on the files and records of the case and any briefs that may have
been submitted. The constitution says that in grievance appeals the
president's decision is then submitted to the above nine-member
committee. According to the PRB director in 1995 the UAW's practice is
for the nine-member committee to review all the president's decisions.
Article 31 section 3 (president reviews appeal from decision of LEB to proceed with trial),
article 33 section 3(d), disposition by the international president (president at discretion
 may intervene in appeal to IEB),
article 33 section 4(h) interpretation 2 (jurisdiction of nine-member committee) (3/7/63),
article 38 section 12 (president reviews decision of local to rerun officers' election
regardless whether there is appeal),
article 45 section 5 (president reviews appeal from decision of membership to rerun
election of committee or stewards);
Unit 24, Local 412, 3 PRB 46, 50 (1980) (on remand PRB recommends appeal be
considered by IEB committee and not president's office because president's office was
involved in original determination),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 68 (1996) (president's agent argues that
president decides appeals only under articles 31, 38, and 45 and these are the only
decisions that the president circulates to the IEB; all other appeals are handled by the
IEB directly);
letter, David Klein to Ellis Boal, with copies to PRB members and to president's office,
9/8/95 ("As respects Article 33, §3(d), it is my understanding that notwithstanding the
wording of the provision, it is the Union's practice to submit all Presidential decisions to
the Nine Member Committee of the International Executive Board.").

The third track is an amalgam of the first two. Discussed elsewhere, it is

only used for submissions to the president after a local union membership
has ordered a new officer election in reponse to a protest. Such
submissions are required regardless whether a local member appeals.
There are no PRB decisions explaining this track, the constitutional wording
is ambiguous, and I am not familiar with the IEB's practice. I am not sure
the three tracks matter to anyone anyway.
Article 38 section 12 ("Any appeal from the International President's order [on review of
a local membership order for a new election] shall be taken in the usual way pursuan t
to Article 33 of this Constitution provided, however, that if the President's order is
based upon an Appeals Committee recommendation, the appeal shall omit the step
provided for in Article 33, Section 3(d), and the appeal shall commence with review of
and action on the Appeals Committee recommendations pursuant to Section 3(d) of
 Article 33.");
compare article 45 section 5 ("If a new election for Committeeperson or Steward is
ordered as the result of a protest and this order is appealed, no such election shall be
held until the matter has been submitted and an order thereon received from the
International President.");
Williams v UAW, PRB Case 1540 (8/2/06), p 19 (president's review of a local's decision to
rerun an election is under article 38 section 12, not article 13 section 8).

In this track, after reviewing the local's report of the circumstances which
influenced the membership's vote, including the meeting minutes and any
other statements of members, the president decides whether there are
sufficiently contradictory facts to warrant a hearing. If not he or she
issues an order. But if there are, it goes to an appeals committee of IEB
members constituted under track one -- not a presidential designee under
track two -- after which the president "shall" make an order pursuant to
the committee's recommendations.

Whether the nine-member committee reviews a track-three appeal that

went through an appeals committee before the full IEB reviews it is not
clear to me. On the one hand article 38 section 12 commands the
president to act "as expeditiously as possible," it adds that "the step"
provided in article 33 section 3(d) shall be omitted, and it requires that
any ordered new election shall be held "as soon as possible." On the
other hand the omitted "step" is not specified, and the UAW has the
practice noted just above of sending every appeal to the nine-member
committee.

At any rate, regardless which track the appeal came up through, after
consideration either by the president or the nine-member committee, the
decision is circulated to the full IEB and automatically becomes the decision
of the IEB if within ten days none of the IEB members objects. In only one
appeal has it been reported that an IEB member objected and thereby
obtained full IEB review.
Article 33 section 3(d) Review by the Full International Executive Board;
Payne v Local 453, 1 PRB 580, 583 n 3 (1970) (in case of nine-member committee, the
ten days runs from the decision of the committee, during which one regional director
requested review);
compare Perez v Region 2B, PRB Case 1493 (2/10/05), pp 7-8 (first draft of IEB decision
prepared by hearing officers, which may have favored appellant and then been altered,
is irrelevant).

If a president's decision is transmitted to the parties without being

circulated to the IEB, the party who is appealing at the PRB has the
option either to demand remand to the IEB for circulation or to waive
circulation and insist on immediate PRB consideration. But in a 1995
appeal the PRB permitted the IEB to re-review the president's decision
over appellants' objection.
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170, 172-73 (1961), second decision 1 PRB 174 (1962), third
decision 1 PRB 178 (1962) (appellant entitled to the benefit of the judgment of a
quorum of the 24-member IEB),
Lain v UAW, 1 PRB 482, 484 (1968), (president, not full IEB, ruled on appeal so PRB
remands it to allow appellants to appeal to IEB),
Darling v Local 499, 3 PRB 55, 59-60 (1980) (failure of president to circulate decision to
IEB so it could give decision was president's fault so despite constitutional violation PRB
jurisdiction is not defeated, no remand to IEB unless appellant requests it),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 39, 41, 44 (1995) (after president's decision which became
IEB decision because of 10-day rule, IEB re-decided the appeal on different grounds
 over then-appellees' objection, held as harmless error because then-appellees' defense
to appeal was meritless to begin with),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73-74, 78 n 17 (1996) (part of appeal which was
decided under article 13 section 8 arguably should have been circulated to IEB
members, and PRB recommends to president to grant extension of time now to appeal
that part of ruling to IEB),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), p 7 (UAW may not rely on its deliberate
refusal to follow the constitution to insulate decisions of the president from review by
PRB).

Fact-finding and decisions of the president and IEB

Table of Contents

The fact-finding stage of the appeal procedure may be the last in which
you are permitted to introduce testimony or documentary evidence.

At least theoretically, every decision of the IEB, PRB, or CAC is divided

into two parts: one part which decides the truth about the facts of the
appeal, and a second which interprets those facts and comes to a
decision. If the facts are not properly developed at the IEB level, there
may be nothing for the PRB or CAC to interpret and decide.
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), pp 11-13 (PRB remands appeal as to meaning
of affiliation agreement because there was no on-point language in the agreement to
be interpreted).
In a 1991 election appeal, the president said in 98% of the cases there is
no hearing.
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 197 (1991).

In an early appeal the PRB summarized the procedure for IEB and
presidential hearings, emphasizing that the appearance, as well as the
fact, of neutrality must be maintained:
As a rule each party is asked to present its "side" of the controversy; cross-
examination is generally not permitted, and all questions of the opposing side usually
must be asked through the hearing officer or panel. The presiding officials normally
take a vigorous part in the proceedings, asking questions and commenting on the
evidence.

...

The participation of legal counsel is not encouraged.

...

[T]he Local Union may have an advantage in some instances by reason of the fact that
it may make arrangements for witnesses whom it wishes to present to be paid for time
away from work, while the rank and file member is not normally in a position to be able
to re to re imburse his own witnesses for lost time. Hence the importance of conducting
these hearings at times when witnesses are not likely to lose time from work in order to
present their testimony.

...

It is [the hearing officers'] responsibility to see that the Record is developed as

completely as possible, including summoning witnesses themselves if their testimony
 would be critical to the resolution of the issues before the committee.

Davis v Local 499, 2 PRB 375, 379 (1976);

see also EP complaint of Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 243, 247 (1982) (lost time
for witnesses),
Austin v Local 594, 10 PRB 439, 444-46 (1999) (lost time for witnesses).

The appearances of impartiality are as important to preserve as the

realities of it.
Branch v Local 848, 1 PRB 448, 450 (1967) (refusal by local union to call out appellants'
witnesses for IEB hearing unless appellant paid their lost time, while at the same time
calling out the local's own witnesses and paying them lost time, falls short of the
appearance of impartiality),
Hite v Local 663, 4 PRB 356, 358, 360 (1985) (improper-seeming conduct of hearing
officer arriving and departing and having lunch with appellee union officers and
witnesses is to be avoided),
Jackson v Local 634, 5 PRB 514, 518 (1988) (personal acquaintance of hearing officer
and one of the parties to appeal is not by itself grounds for officer's disqualification),
Cordell appealing McDonaugh v Local 1183, 9 PRB 591, 595 (1998) (material provided to
IEB should be provided to all parties),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636, 644 n 9 (1998) (IEB commonly accepts or solicits
post-hearing evidence, and this is proper so long as all parties are informed),
Shay v Local 163, 10 PRB 555, 558 n 3 (2000) (IEB should not meet privately with one
side before a hearing),
Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07), p 14 ("The constant shifting of the
International Union's rationale for denying Brant the compensation he claimed, and the
involvement of the president's staff in overturning the membership's decision, created
the impression that the issue was a personal one between members of President
Gettelfinger's staff and the appellant.").

In the 1991 Downs case the PRB set some hearing ground rules. Though
the PRB has no authority over the CAC, the decision purports to apply
even to appeals that end up at the CAC; the CAC, which holds a hearing
in every appeal, has a different view.

At any rate the PRB's underlying assumption is that neither it nor the CAC
are fact-finding bodies with the ability to investigate anything. They are
just reviewing bodies. Both depend on the IEB to do the factual
investigation and develop a "complete record" so new evidence does not
show up at the PRB or CAC.

So, the IEB has to give the appellant a chance, if he or she was not given
it at the local level, to present factual information. If there are credibility
issues, the IEB must hold a live hearing. If not, it has discretion to waive a
hearing. But before deciding the appeal it must tell the parties there
will be no hearing so they can submit their evidence and arguments in
writing.

Finally, when the IEB approves a final decision, the decision must contain
a summary of the parties' positions and arguments, findings of fact
including reasons where the facts are disputed, and ultimate conclusions
with underlying bases.

Downs did not distinguish between IEB and presidential hearings, and I
believe it applies to both.

A year after Downs the PRB noted the quality of fact-finding below had
improved.
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 198-200 (1991) (rules for IEB hearings),
 Clark v Local 1248, 6 PRB 278, 282 (1992) (since Downs the quality of records
developed by IEB has improved substantially),
Kibby v Local 148, PRB Case 1624 (6/1/09), p 8 ("When investigating appeals to the IEB
on behalf of President Gettelfinger, the President's staff should expressly offer to
receive submissions from both sides of the argument.");
compare CAC chairman's statement (undated), p 2 (parties can present new evidence to
CAC).

It is interesting that the PRB requires the IEB to give reasons for its
fact-findings and bases for its conclusions. The requirement makes sense;
appellants must state reasons in their appeals so deciding bodies ought to
state reasons in their rulings. But the constitution does not actually
require local unions or the IEB, PRB, or CAC to give reasons and bases in
their decisions, nor even do the PRB's rules require that of itself. At any
rate, customarily, all do attempt to give reasons and bases.
Articles 32-33;
PRB rules of procedure, series 18 (7/1/04);
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 490 (1968) (without announcing basis for decision IEB
said local's failure to process grievance was deliberate abrogation of member's rights
and ordered him made whole; PRB left to speculate as to reasons),
compare Ford v Local 600, PRB Case 1436 (10/25/04) (according to 2004 annual report,
p 7 of online version, without opinion PRB decided appeal by remand and closure),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v Local 659, PRB Case 1453 (5/10/04) (according to
2004 annual report, p 7 of online version, without opinion PRB decided appeal by
remand and closure),
letter, Ron Gettelfinger to James Mattis of Local 659, 7/17/06 ("This letter is to advise
you of the action taken on your Article 33 appeal. Arrangements are being made to
reinstate your grievance into the UAW-GM grievance procedure. You will be notified in
the very near future. We are closing your Article 33 appeal."; no IEB opinion attach ed),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), pp 8-9
("Conclusions on dispositive issues must be based on evidence and reasoning from that
 evidence.").

There have been many rulings on the significance of and procedures for
fact-finding at this level. Article 33 section 4(h) sets out some basics:

The appellant and appellee (or their representatives) shall be required

to appear, with such witnesses as they may choose, and shall answer
fully and truthfully all questions put to them.

The parties shall be afforded full opportunity to present their

respective positions on all matters bearing on the action, decision, or
penalty under review.

An IEB hearing shall be held as close to the locality from which the
appeal originates as possible in order to minimize the expense and
inconvenience to the parties.

Hearsay statements are notoriously unreliable.

Barrett v Local 599, 11 PRB 23, 26 (2000);
see also Mieli v UAW, 9 PRB 449, 457-58 (1997) (surprise hearsay evidence rejected),
Cordell appealing McDonaugh v Local 1183, 9 PRB 591, 595 (1998) (material provided to
IEB should be provided to all parties, hearsay evidence is dubious, parties should sit
separately from IEB at hearing);
but see Carver v Local 163, PRB Case 1435 (9/25/03), pp 9-10 (IEB improperly rejected
as hearsay previously-written statements detailing election violations from witnesses
present at IEB hearing because all said they were satisfied when asked by hearing
officer at end of hearing if they had anything to add; hearing officer was obliged to
search for the truth of the matter and should have questioned witnesses).
Decisions on various aspects of IEB fact-finding follow:
Article 33 section 4(h);
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 490 (1968) (without announcing basis for decision IEB
said local's failure to process grievance was deliberate abrogation of member's rights
and ordered him made whole; PRB left to speculate as to reasons),
Payne v Local 453, 1 PRB 580, 587 (1970) (opportunity allowed to appellant to cross-
examine neutral expert witness),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 776 (1972) (PRB reviews tape of IEB hearing),
Calloway v Local 887, 2 PRB 428, 435-36 (1977) (waiver of untimeliness and failure-
to-appear-at-hearing defenses),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 724, 727 (1980) (court evidentiary rules do not apply under
article 33),
Brown v Local 1832, 3 PRB 201, 208 (1982) (only if appeals committee's factual findings
have no basis will PRB substitute its own),
Local 699, 3 PRB 302, 304-05 (1982) (IEB may consider events subsequent to discharge
in deciding grievance appeal),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 106 (1984) (tape of membership meeting admitted),
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142, 144-45 (1983-85) (in IEB-requested
investigation into possible region-wide improprieties, special counsel appointed to make
initial findings, with right of hearing before a mutually-agreed impartial third party, and
right of appeal to PRB),
Helsel v Local 598, 4 PRB 197, 199 (1984) (PRB will not normally overturn credibility
findings of IEB),
Iyun v Local 2166, 4 PRB 209, 211 (1984) (merit of EPC claim could not be evaluated
because IEB held no hearing, remanded for hearing, jurisdiction retained),
Hite v Local 663, 4 PRB 356, 359-60 (1985) (court evidentiary rules do not apply under
article 33),
Scarlett v Local 735, 5 PRB 49, 51 (1985) (IEB's practice is to schedule hearings outside
of normal working hours, failure of appellant to appear at IEB hearing results in
dismissal),
Benton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52, 55-56 (1986) (remand to IEB with recommendation that
IEB hearing be transcribed by a certified court reporter),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399, 406 (1987) (despite IEB request for remand to conduct factual
hearing PRB conducts its own in view of imminence of plant closing),
Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472, 477 (1988) (no cross-examination allowed, failure of
appellee to appear at IEB hearing is immaterial),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 140 n 16 (1994) (Downs procedures
not followed, IEB decision shed no light on its reasons),
McClain v Local 651, 8 PRB 222, 224, 227 (1993) (appeals committee member need not
disqualify himself just because he founded caucus which governs the local against
which appeal is made),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228, 234 (1994) (testimony unrebutted before IEB is
credited by PRB),
Hollowell v Local 823, 8 PRB 571, 574 (1995) (tape of IEB hearing made contrary to IEB
ruling rejected by PRB),
Hale v Local 326, 9 PRB 35, 41, 43 (1995) (in face of appellants' claim that IEB should
have allowed them to bring professional stenographer to IEB hearing and that IEB
decision incorrectly reflected testimony at the hearing, president notes it is not IEB
policy to allow stenographic records at IEB hearings; PRB relies on notes of IEB hearing
testimony made by one appellant),
Williams v UAW, 9 PRB 255, 258 (1997), second decision 9 PRB 260 (1997) (IEB held no
hearing, so it could not judge credibility of witnesses),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 341 (1997) (local officer was required to appear before
IEB to answer questions of appeals committee and appellant on material issue;
rank-and-file members possibly may not be required to appear),
Manning v Local 364, 9 PRB 500, 504 (1997) (normally there is no transcript of an IEB
hearing; the IEB's job is to describe only the testimony it thinks significant, and if its
report is deficient appellant should say so and give the particulars),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636, 644 n 9 (1998) (IEB commonly accepts or solicits
post-hearing evidence, and this is proper so long as all parties are informed),
Cardilino v Local 887, 10 PRB 40, 45 (1998) (),
Cordilino v Local 887, 10 PRB 40, 45-46 (1998) (appellants' concerns about early
adjournment of IEB hearing, evidence not being shown them until the hearing, and the
appellee's refusal at the hearing to explain certain evidence could have been made the
subject of an EPC complaint, but nothing was produced to the PRB which would
convince it to overturn IEB's credibility determination),
 Shay v Local 163, 10 PRB 555, 558 n 3 (2000) (IEB should not meet privately with one
side before a hearing),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06), pp 8-9
("Conclusions on dispositive issues must be based on evidence and reasoning from that
evidence."),
Keith v Local 524, PRB Case 1458 (2/23/04), pp 1, 5, 8 (PRB modifies IEB fact-finding as
to company's reason for discharge),
Kidd v Local 1264, PRB Case 1467 (3/19/04), p 9 (appellate procedures do not subject
the UAW to the same rules of discovery that would be applicable in a court of law),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04), pp 13-14 (IEB
should have compelled the attendance of parties responsible for appealed decision at
IEB hearing so they could be questioned as to motivation in EPC appeal),
Bays v GM Department, PRB Case 1538 (9/28/06), p 9 (if accuser's credibility is to be
union's primary basis for a decision not to pursue a discharge grievance of a
high-seniority member, in the future the IEB ought to conduct a hearing and make an
independent evaluation of the appellant's credibility),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), p 6 ("... the IEB is the Constitutional body
charged with the task of investigating and resolving factual disputes."),
Lyons v Local 2280, PRB Case 1576 (12/17/07), pp 7-8 (though crucial piece of evidence
possibly supporting IEB decision surfaced only after the decision, and investigation by
president's staff was at best perfunctory, appeal of local's failure to hold election to fill
interim vacancy within 45 days is moot due to passage of time and holding of untimely
election),
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), p 25, reconsideration denied (4/22/09)
(in high-profile appeal which presented fundamental questions concerning the
reciprocal rights and obligations of members and the local, IEB's failure to give
appellants opportunity to make their case in person is especially unfortunate; given
fact that IEB decision rested on "he said, she said" controversies, failure to hold
hearing is difficult to understand).

Failure of an appellant to appear at an IEB or presidential hearing can

result in the appeal being regarded as withdrawn.
 Article 33 section 4(h);
Article 33 section 4(h) interpretation 1 (8/11/60);
Lenner v Local 122, 1 PRB 676, 678 (1971) (appeal dismissed for failure to appear at or
request adjournment of IEB hearing),
Calloway v Local 887, 2 PRB 428, 433-35 (1977) (improper to schedule IEB hearing
during hours when most appellants had to work, IEB waived appellants' failure to
appear by determining appeal on its merits),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 5 PRB 228, 233-35, 366, 371-73 (1987) (failure to
appear at hearing permitted IEB to consider appeal withdrawn),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399 (1987) (failure to appear before IEB excused because of
imminence of election and plant closing),
Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472, 477 (1988) (failure of appellee to appear at hearing is
immaterial),
Hendricks v Region 6, 8 PRB 187, 189 (1993) (though there may be circumstances which
excuse the failure of an appellant to appear at a scheduled IEB hearing, none appear in
this case),
Lamb v Local 599, PRB Case 1544 (10/26/06), pp 5-6 (appellant's failure to receive
notice of the IEB hearing until the day of the hearing should have excused her
non-appearance),
Staley v UAW, PRB Case 1584 (2/13/08), pp 4-6 (IEB had discretion to consider appeal
withdrawn when appellant failed to appear for hearing due to a conflicted schedule; IEB
then considered whether the circumstances of the appeal merited further review in th e
interests of justice or constitutional correction and decided they did not);
Cook, CAC, session 10/98 (appeal which was dismissed by IEB for failure of appellant to
appear remanded by CAC because of evidence he did not receive notice of the IEB
hearing and was incarcerated at the time).

IEB constitutional interpretations

Table of Contents
The IEB has power to interpret the constitution, either during an appeal
under articles 32 or 33, or in review of an interpretation by the president.
IEB interpretations -- apparently only the "basic" ones -- are bound with
printed versions of the constitution, at the end after the index. The
printed constitutions do not define "basic," but I take it to mean those
interpretations the IEB expects the membership to abide by. The first three
were in 1943 in Philadelphia. The most recent was at the Las Vegas
convention in 2006 about joint council delegates in amalgamated locals,
responding to a PRB decision a month earlier. There was one in 2005 about
interest arbitration. There were six at the 2002 convention. Before that
there were two revisions in 1983. Most are from the 1940s. There are
163 in all.

Though reluctant, the PRB can overrule an IEB interpretation in an

ordinary appeal.
Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 414 (1967) (former IEB interpretation requiring notice of
purpose of ratification meeting should have been followed),
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 174, 176-77 (1962) (PRB overrules IEB's interpretation of
beginning of time period within which to appeal local action,
Local 952, 1 PRB 647, 649-50 (1971) (IEB's strict interpretation of article 16 section 2
does not serve justice, application of any rule must be tempered with compassion),
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296, 298 n 4 (1975) (PRB finds IEB misapplied IEB
interpretation),
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 377-78 (1983) (IEB concurs in president's interpretation),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 112 (1984) (primary but not exclusive
 authority for interpreting the constitution is the president, the IEB, and CAC, and PRB
gives great weight to interpretations of president and IEB),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 115 (1984) (dissent) (IEB has not
expressed a clear and considered interpretation of article 45 section 2),
Carstensen v Local 780, 4 PRB 238, 240 (1984) (IEB holding that only candidate has
standing to protest election overturned),
Shinn v Region 1A, 6 PRB 250, 255 (1991) (IEB interpretations formally bound and
promulgated since 1946),
Williams v UAW, 9 PRB 255, 258 (1997), second decision 9 PRB 260 (1997) (rejecting
IEB view, PRB holds that an appeal from a written notice of an action, filed within the
limitations period, must be considered as presumptively timely unless there is
compelling evidence to the contrary),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 405 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (in light of
past practice in this and other locals, ex post facto interpretation of local bylaw
regarding compensation of president offends EPC),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 341 (1997) ("The IEB is obliged to respect the
concerns expressed by this Board over Employer interference in local union
elections...."),
Donovan v Ford Department, PRB Cases 1526, 1542 (10/25/06), pp 19-20 (article 12
does not give UAW general authority to set aside local bylaws and and decisions
whenever it deems such action to be in the best interests of the members; local
membership had right to reject Ford Department's sensible recommendation that it
combine elections of two units into one).

In the 1989 Taylor election case, the IEB had applied its 1959 basic
interpretation of article 36 in granting the appeal. The 30-year-old
interpretation voided the voting rights of members of a defunct unit of an
amalgamated local, the IEB held. On appeal to the PRB, the local pointed
out the members of the defunct unit were still members of the local, so
under article 38 section 10 they should be able to vote. But on appeal,
the PRB said it lacked jurisdiction
 if, in order for us to decide this case, we must either affirm or overrule an official
Constitutional interpretation. To conclude otherwise would result in a serious
overreaching of our jurisdiction, so that the PRB, instead of the Constitutional
Convention, would become the arbiter of ultimate authority in the resolution of issues
of official Constitutional interpretation. Plainly this would run counter to the results
intended by the framers of the Constitution.

Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 689 (1989).

In the appeal the president argued to the PRB without citation that IEB
interpretations are ratified by each convention. The PRB didn't comment
on that, nor did it rely on the printing in the bound constitution of the
1959 interpretation at issue. Though the holding concerned an IEB
interpretation, the reasoning applies equally to presidential
interpretations.
Article 12 section 6 (IEB's power to interpret),
article 13 section 8 (president's power to interpret),
article 33 section 2(a) (special route of appeal for disputes or questions in controversy
including presidential interpretations);
Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 414 (1967) (former IEB interpretation concerning notice
of purpose of ratification meeting should have been followed),
Appeal of Collins, 1 PRB 694, 697 (1971) (convention implicitly ratified IEB strike benefit
rule),
Ramey v Local 652, 3 PRB 393, 396-97 (1983) (IEB interpretation prohibiting ballot
machines which present names of candidates to be voted on as slates not individually
should have been followed),
Yettaw v UAW, PRB Case 1482 (10/26/04), p 6 (amendments to IEB's June 2002
revisions of constitutional interpretations became appealable when UAW distributed
printed copies of constitution in December 2002).
In 1964 in Weissman, the PRB rejected an interpretation of article 17
section 2 which had been approved by the president and IEB 13 years
earlier. But the PRB held that it substantively changed or added to the
constitution. In effect, the UAW had raised it to the level of a
constitutional provision, which the PRB said was improper.

I cannot distinguish the facts in Weissman from those in Taylor, but the
results are opposite.
Article 17 section 2 (a laid-off member working outside UAW jurisdiction shall either pay
dues or take a withdrawal card; with limited exceptions anyone who voluntarily leaves
UAW jurisdiction is issued a withdrawal card immediately),
Article 17 section 2 former wording of interpretation 4 (discharged members are exempt
from issuance of withdrawal card, the decision being left to the discretion of each local
subject to appeal under article 33) (10/11/51);
Weissman v Local 122, 1 PRB 336, 338 (1964) (disapproving interpretation that
continuance of good standing of fired member was at discretion of local membership);
see also Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35, 40 (1958) (PRB declines to follow convention
precedent),
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 491 n 7 (1968) (under article 17 section 2, while
member was on leave from employer, local could have brought about his discharge for
non-payment of dues but did not).

Apart from the IEB interpretations which the IEB publishes with the
constitution, it sometimes makes ad hoc interpretations in the course of
deciding an appeal. The PRB feels free to overrule these.

IX. The PRB or CAC?

 Table of Contents

Contents of This Section

CAC || PRB || Rationality of grievance

dispositions || Official collective bargaining
policy || Referral of appeal from PRB to CAC
|| Which should you choose?

If you lose at the IEB, your final level of appeal is to either the PRB or
CAC. This section describes the differences in the jurisdiction and
standards of the PRB and CAC. Sections X and XI describe the functioning
of each once the choice is made.

In either case the appeal is done by writing or faxing the PRB or CAC care
of the president's office within 30 days of the IEB decision. An appellant
must comply with the IEB decision before either can accept the appeal.
Article 33 sections 3(e), 3(f), 4(c), 4(e).

The PRB and CAC are the ultimate judicial authorities of the UAW.
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 182 (1976) (PRB's task is to "fill out the meaning of the
Constitution"),
Grubba v Chrysler Department, 4 PRB 5, 7 (1983) (CAC is "only appellate body" with
authority to deal with questions of bargaining policy),
 Miller v UAW, 4 PRB 118, 122 (1983) (both PRB and CAC have "ultimate judicial
authority"),
Lefebvre v Local 1163, 4 PRB 361, 363 (1985) ("While our comprehension of the French
language is imperfect, our understanding of the requirements of the UAW Constitution
under these circumstances is not."),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 8 PRB 7, 15 (1992) (PRB "sit[s] in judgment on the
ethical and constitutional correctness of [UAW] actions"),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 408 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99), p 1 (PRB is
"supreme judicial authority"),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), pp 11-13 ("Unfortunately, there is no language
in the Affilation Agreement that can be interpreted to resolve this dispute. ... We
cannot supply what is missing from the Affiliation Agreement by means of an
interpretation."; appeal remanded for negotiation).

They are parallel appellate bodies and generally handle the same issues,
with certain differences noted just below. The PRB once said:
In an effort to avoid any possible conflict between actions taken by these two bodies
[CAC and PRB] and to assure complete independence of each, the appeals procedures
in the Constitution have been carefully drawn to avoid the occurrence of a situation in
which one body would review an action taken by the other.

Davis, 1 PRB 214, 219 (1961);

see also article 33 section 4(f) determining jurisdiction, last sentence.

CAC

The CAC is thought of as a standing committee of the convention. All its

decisions as final and binding.

Even more so than at the PRB, the majority of appeals at the CAC (and
IEB) allege that a grievance settlement was irrational or worse. Unlike the
PRB, in grievance appeals the jurisdiction of the CAC (and IEB) is
unlimited. Nothing in article 33 prevents it from reinstating a withdrawn
or settled grievance, regardless whether the handling or disposition was
rational or not, and regardless whether the appeal involves questions of
official bargaining policy. A disposition can be set aside and damages
ordered, for instance, because the committeeperson was negligent or
merely because the CAC disagrees with it. Examples are elsewhere.
Frequently the PRB has dismissed a grievance appeal where the
settlement was rational or the matter involved official bargaining policy,
with specific instructions that the appellant could re-raise the matter
before the CAC.
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 177-78, 183 (1976) (president argues negligence and bad
judgment in grievance-handling are remediable by CAC, PRB observes that IEB's
jurisdiction is broader than its own),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 12-13 (2001) (IEB appeals committee orders substantial
damages against local in grievance appeal, making no finding on adequacy of local's
representation).

The CAC has decided appeals concerning both elections and trials, despite
claims noted elsewhere that the PRB is the exclusive appellate authority for
claims of violations of the EPC, which assures fair elections and trials.
Brewster v 1695, CAC, session 1/81 (election),
Lively v Local 1611, CAC, session 6/82 (sufficiency of charges),
 LeBlanc v Local 372, CAC, session 4/94 (election),
Mays v Local 211, CAC, session 10/97 (election),
Moore v Local 898, CAC, session 4/99 (election),
Olson v Local 3000, CAC, session 4/99 (election),
Altman v Local 594, CAC, session 11/99 (sufficiency of charges),
Walls v Local 1435, CAC, session 11/00 (sufficiency of charges),
O'Risky v Local 1633, CAC, session 5/01 (sufficiency of charges),
O'Risky v Local 1633, CAC, session 10/01 (sufficiency of charges),
Williams v Local 969, CAC, session 10/01 (supporting evidence for charges),
Jacobson v Local 95, CAC, session 10/03 (sufficiency of charges).

PRB

In addition to EPC cases, and subject to the limitation on review of official

collective bargaining policy, the PRB's jurisdiction is limited to:

Cases under article 10 section 12 (eligibility for office of members

supporting dual union, decertification efforts, or an employer during
UAW organizing)

Cases under article 12 section 2 (reorganization of subordinate body

because of internal disputes)

Cases under article 12 section 3 (administratorships or subordinate

bodies)
Cases under article 16 section 7 (member's objection to use of part of
dues for political purposes)

Cases under article 30 (charges and trials of international officers)

Cases under article 31 (trials of members)

Cases under article 36 sections 9-10 (local dissolution or reduction in

membership due to plant closure, layoffs, or other reasons)

Cases under article 38 sections 11-12 (local officer elections)

Cases under article 48 sections 5-6 (audits and finances)

Subject to limitations, cases under article 12 section 17 (appeals from

IEB review of decisions by an IEB "satisfactory administrative arm"
for handling members' grievance appeals; I recall no appeal arising
under this section; I don't know what satisfactory arm it
contemplates)

Subject to limitations, cases where the IEB itself has decided a

grievance appeal

Any other case in which the IEB has passed on an appeal from a
subordinate body. This is subject to the limitations of article 33
section 2.
Article 32 section 3,
 article 32 section 5,
article 33 section 3(f) jurisdiction.

In a 1975 decision the PRB held that for appeals under sections of the
constitution not specifically named in article 33 section 3(f) jurisdiction
and listed just above, its review is limited to the procedures by which a
decision was reached. For appeals under sections that are listed the
converse is implicit, that the PRB can properly review the substantive
issues.
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251, 261-62 (1975) (after IEB decided an appeal, PRB assumed
jurisdiction only over the procedures by which a unit's withdrawal from an
amalgamated local under article 36 section 11 occurred);
compare Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 490 (1968) (plenary jurisdiction assumed over
grievance appeal because IEB had passed on it and, atypically, appellant was local
union),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 16 (PRB has no authority to review decisions of
IEB with respect to bylaws based on policy considerations, absent bad faith).

This may appear problematic, as the PRB commonly reviews the

substantive fairness of elections of both officers and committeepersons
under articles 38 and 45 for example even though article 38 is on the list
and article 45 isn't. It is reconcilable because the particular provision at
issue in the 1975 appeal, article 36 section 11, gives the IEB
extraordinary powers.
Rationality of grievance dispositions

Table of Contents

The PRB's jurisdiction over grievance appeals is limited, but the limitation
does not in terms apply to appeals claiming improper contract ratification.

Official collective bargaining policy.

In 1998 the PRB wrote:

From time to time disagreements may arise between the parties as to the meaning or
application of the language of an agreement. When this occurs, a grievance is normally
filed and processed through the steps of the agreement's grievance procedure until
mutual agreement is reached. If parties are unable to agree, then the matter may be
submitted by either party to an independent arbitrator who is empowered to decide
which party's interpretation of the agreement is correct. An arbitrator can decide the
dispute within the context of the language of the agreement, but he or she may not in
any way modify or change its terms.

...

This is not the first time that members of the UAW have attempted to have us review
contract language which they have found objectionable. We have counseled them as
 we now counsel [appellants] that if they object to language in their collective
bargaining agreement, their recourse is to take their objections to their Union's
leadership and lobby for change. [footnote omitted] Failing that, they may resort to the
ballot box to elect either themselves or persons sympathetic to their views. The UAW is
a democratic organization, and that is the democratic way to achieve the ends sought
by appellants.

Laurin v Local 6000, 10 PRB 169, 173 (1998).

The PRB's jurisdiction precludes it from reviewing an official UAW

collective bargaining policy.
[I]t may be supposed that the goal of every labor union is the betterment of the lot of
its members. Arguably, then, everything done by the union to achieve this end is
merely the implementation of its policy. Under this view, Public Review Board control
over the content of UAW contracts would be limitless. Such a result, we believe, would
be neither proper nor desireable.

Considine, 1 PRB 255, 258 (1962).

This is so whether the appeal concerns a grievance or not. Curiously, one

1982 decision even held collective bargaining could be involved in bylaw
approval.
Article 33 section 3(f), limitation;
see also article 33 section 2(b) second-to-last paragraph;
Sanders v Local 157, 1 PRB 115, 116 (1960) (in bargaining with GM, local was carrying
out policy adopted by UAW which involves interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement),
Ferrell v UAW, 2 PRB 835, 841 (1979) (PRB may review claims of improper ratificaton
under article 19 sections 3-4),
Local 699, 3 PRB 302, 305 (1982) (PRB may not review IEB decision that local should
write grievance),
Kibler v Local 14, 3 PRB 306, 310 (1981) (policy grievances which seek to challenge
contractual representation procedures),
Guncsaga v Local 846, 3 PRB 315, 318 (1982) (bargaining policy questions are reserved
for IEB subject to CAC review),
Local 145 v IEB, 3 PRB 363, 364 (1982) ("The Constitution authorizes the International
Executive Board members to exercise their collective bargaining judgments in
approving or disapproving of Local Union bylaws."),
Robinson v Local 92, 4 PRB 364, 366 (1985) (PRB may not review bargaining policy),
West v Local 1590, 5 PRB 10, 14-15 (1985) (negotiation of exclusion from recall rights of
employees laid off before date recall rights were established),
Local 677 v Mack Truck Department, 5 PRB 107, 113 (1986) (local B's grievance
settlement affected seniority rights of members of local A),
Snider v Local 714, 5 PRB 159, 163 (1986) (PRB may not resolve differences over
contract interpretation),
Hein v Local 653, 5 PRB Case 164, 166 (1986) (dispute over interpretation of contract),
Shelton in the matter of Van Keek v Local 1112, 5 PRB 571, 575 (1988) (seniority claims
not pursued after end of contract in which they arose, no seniority adjustment unless
error is obvious and beyond question),
Thayer v Region 3, 5 PRB 759, 762 (1990) (appellant may not invoke PRB jurisdiction
over mere disagreement regarding bargaining policy and administration of jobs bank),
Hayden v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 79, 81-82 (1990) (disagreement
over meaning of contract language),
Morris v Local 549, 6 PRB 137, 144 (1991) (PRB has no jurisdiction of claim of
misinterpretation of contract),
Krueger v Local 1999, 6 PRB 320, 323 (1991) (grant of journeyperson status),
Suchyta v Local 362, 6 PRB 366 (1992) (demarcation of trades, award of work to group
of competing employees),
Tidal v TOP Department, 8 PRB 178, 182 (1993) (highest authority for interpreting
agreements between conventions is the IEB),
Brown v Chrysler Department, 8 PRB 282, 287-88 (1994) (IEB, which between
conventions IEB has final say on bargaining policy, rejected appellants' contract
interpretation and PRB may not overrule it),
Jarmoluk v GM Department, PRB Case 1423 (5/28/03), p 8 (transfer of major operations
between plants);
but see Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 472 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969) (PRB
interprets a contract to the extent of determining that it is a contract)
Miller v UAW, 4 PRB 118, 122 (1983) (though appeal arguably falls within PRB
jurisdiction, PRB elects not to exercise it),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 181 n 15, 183-84 (1991) (dispute among PRB members
as to proper analysis of seniority provisions of GM contract),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 151, 156-59 (1996) (union interpreted
contract's chronic absentee procedure too narrowly),
Kerr v Local 465, 9 PRB 344, 348-49 (1997) (disagreement with team concept is not a
basis for appeal),
Schick v UAW, 11 PRB 415, 420 (2002) (union cannot insulate itself from PRB review
simply by invoking the language of article 33 section 2(b)),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), pp 20-22 (article
33 section 2(b) does not preclude review but GM department's interpretation of
contract was in fact obviously correct),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 17-18 (decision of
representatives of GM and Delphi locals to combine ratification votes on 2003
agreement was a bargaining policy within discretion of negotiating committee, even if a
reason for combining the votes was to affect the vote margin),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 20 (PRB avoids novel question
whether resolution of a claim of improper ratification under article 19 sections 3-4
might be precluded from PRB scrutiny under article 33 section 3(f) Limitation),
Eardley v Local 1112, PRB Case 1535 (6/28/06), p 7 (relatedness of trades is matter of
bargaining policy and therefore exempt from PRB review except on a showing of
impermissible motivations or no rational basis);
but see Gillis v Local 1976, PRB Case 1611 (2/24/09), p 8 ("Gillis is mistaken in his
interpretation of Article XIV, Section B, of the Local Agreement.");
Henderson v GM Department, PRB Case 1568 (7/20/07), pp 13-15 ("The question
whether a particular course of action is consistent with the objectives of an
organization is essentially a political question which must be resolved through political
processes." This is so even if the Union could not legally take the challenged action
without appellant's consent because that issue is being addressed by the federal
courts.).
Only "official" policies are excluded from PRB review. "Official" is not
explained. I suppose the word to refer to a policy which is formally
stated, or perhaps one that is necessarily implicit, in a UAW document
published to the affected members. In 2002 the PRB tried to explain it
using examples:
We have also in recent times refused to review a challenge to the GM Department's
policy that seniority claims would not be pursued beyond the period of the agreement
under which they arose ... ; a disagreement over the interpretation as to how a jobs
bank program should be administered ... ; a claim that a National Agreement was being
misinterpreted ... ; and a protest to the award of work to a group of competing
employees....

Schick v UAW, 11 PRB 415, 420 (2002).

The constitution does not limit PRB review of official collective bargaining
policies of subordinate bodies. Usually the PRB has precluded itself from
reviewing them anyway. The theory seems to be that a subordinate
body's policy becomes the UAW's own policy during the appellate process.
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 232, 234 (1975) (PRB remands appeal which challenged
superseniority provisions of local agreement for determination by IEB on the merits),
Jongeling v Local 391, 2 PRB 471, 473-74 (1976) (on appeal IEB upheld right of local to
ratify agreement establishing qualifications for new job classification, on further appeal
PRB holds it lacks jurisdiction),
McCormick v Local 2055, 4 PRB 70, 72 (1983) (on appeal IEB upheld local's
interpretation of local seniority agreement, on further appeal PRB holds it lacks
jurisdiction),
Eckerle appealing Harrison v Local 151, 5 PRB 311, 313-14 (1987) (on appeal IEB holds
that grievance over application of local overtime agreement could not be won, on
 further appeal PRB holds it lacks jurisdiction),
Marble v Local 1112, 9 PRB 138, 142 (1996) (IEB's approval on appeal of local's
interpretation and application of MOU makes the MOU an official bargaining policy of
the UAW unreviewable by the PRB);
but see Berry v Local 600, 4 PRB 53, 55-56 (1983) (PRB reviews local bargaining policy
despite IEB's holding that it does not violate EPC).

Referral of appeal from PRB to CAC

If you bring a grievance appeal to the PRB and it finds the allegation on
which you based its jurisdiction is not true and dismisses the appeal, the
constitution permits you to re-appeal to the CAC within 30 days of
notification by the PRB. At the CAC you may not again raise an issue
resolved by the PRB.
Article 33 section 3(f), determining jurisdiction;
Smith v Local 653, 3 PRB 238, 242 (1981) (discharge for failure to return timely after
sick leave, PRB dismisses appeal for lack of PRB jurisdiction),
Frank v Skilled Trades Department, 3 PRB 410, 411 (1982) (work assignment),
Burgwald v Local 488, 4 PRB 17, 19 (1983) (PRB rejects grievance appeal because local's
disposition had a rational basis, without prejudice to appellants timely submitting
principal issue of appeal to CAC which has authority to resolve bargaining policy);
Cooper v Local 163, 4 PRB 200, 205 (1984) (management pre-qualifying junior members
for promotion),
Dalton v Region 9, 9 PRB 57, 63 (1995) (outsourcing);
Smith v Local 653, CAC, session 6/82 (discharge for failure to return timely after sick
leave, CAC considers appeal after PRB dismissed for lack of jurisdiction);
but see Fisher Bargaining Committee v UAW, 1 PRB 588, 590 n 3, 591 n 4 (dismissing
appeal for lack of jurisdiction and allowing re-submission of appeal to convention, with
understanding that PRB holding on standing would not be binding on convention).
Unfortunately, the CAC doesn't always agree that it can resolve collective
bargaining issues.

PRB decisions are final and binding as to cases appealed to it through

article 33. As to EPC cases, its only power is to "deal with" them.
Article 32 section 3,
article 33 section 3(f), procedures.

Which should you choose?

Personally I haven't had any luck at the CAC. But a review of its decisions
indicates that at least sometimes it does exercise the larger scope of
jurisdiction that it has. Since 1992, its rate of reversal of IEB decisions
has been slightly higher than the PRB's.

X. Processing an appeal at the PRB

Table of Contents

Contents of This Section

Establishment, composition, consistency ||

 PRB jurisdiction || PRB procedure || New
evidence, oral argument || Affirming IEB on
different grounds || Decisions and remedies
|| Constitutional interpretations || Statistics
|| The former executive director

Establishment, composition, consistency

At the 1957 convention the president recommended setting up the PRB,

saying:
When you give consideration to this recommendation, do so fully mindful of the fact
that this is not window dressing. There are no constitutional loopholes. This is not the
creation of a public board of apology. These people are going to be an essential part of
our Constitution and they will have broad powers and responsibilities.... We mean to
give the Public Review Board real status, and these recommendations do exactly that.

Davis, 1 PRB 214, 218 (1961);

PRB 48th annual report (2005), p 2 (online version) (PRB created April 8,
1957).

Article 32 section 1 states the PRB's purpose.

For the purpose of ensuring a continuation of high moral and ethical standards in the
administrative and operative practices of the International Union and its subordinate
bodies, and to further strengthen the democratic processes and appeal procedures
within the Union as they affect the rights and privileges of individual members or
subordinate bodies, there shall be established a Public Review Board consisting of
 impartial persons of good public repute not working under the jurisdiction of the UAW
or employed by the International Union or any of its subordinate bodies.

Article 32 section 1.

Under this section the PRB may act as necessary to "strengthen the
democratic processes and appeal procedures" in the union.
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 6-8 (PRB has authority under article 32
section 1 to "act as necessary" to strengthen union's appellate procedural procedures;
because appellant's procedural maneuvers appeared deliberately calculated to keep the
matter open as long as possible to embarrass and annoy the president' staff, PRB says
"[i]f, in the future, we find evidence of bad faith on the part of Wilbert Sonnier in the
processing of appeals on hehalf of members of Local Union 148, we will suspend his
right to represent those members in the union's appellate process.").

The seven PRB members are university and law teachers from around the
country, a curious fact given the UAW's usual hostility to lawyers.
Pictured in the printed versions of the annual reports, they are chosen at
each convention, and some have served for decades. They have no
relation to the UAW other than to be on the PRB, though some have been
close observers. George Higgins, the PRB chair for 34 years, attended
every UAW convention from 1940 until his retirement in 2000. The
current members are James Brudney (chair), Harry Katz, Janice Bellace,
Maria Ontiveros, Fred Feinstein, and Calvin William Sharpe. In 2008
collectively they were paid $140,880.
Article 32 section 1;
proceedings, 30th constitutional convention, p 235 (1992),
proceedings, 33rd constitutional convention, pp 247-50 (2002),
 proceedings, 34th constitutional convention, pp 339-40 (2006).

At the 1977 convention President Woodcock lauded PRB members for

their contribution to "strengthening the sinews" of democracy. The UAW
has never defied a PRB decision.
But see Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p 23,
record pp 168-72 (after order to reinstate appellant to union job and UAW
reinstatement and removal of appellant a week later, PRB chairman contacted the
union to discuss compliance, and shortly later the removal was revoked),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), record pp
180-81, order to show cause 7/18/05 (PRB ordered appellant reinstated to first shift,
but when UAW reinstated her to the second shift PRB ordered it to show cause why it
should not be found in violation),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), record pp
174-75, order to show cause 12/21/05 (in light of passage of six months from
appellant's submission of specification of monetary losses of $79,278.94 in lost
overtime, local monthly expense, local profit sharing payment, and attorney fees, with
no response by UAW, UAW ordered to pay appellant the amount claimed plus interest
at the NLRB rate, or to show cause why it has not done so).

Not everyone agrees the UAW finds PRB members in the right places.
Proceedings, 25th constitutional convention, p 62 (1977) (remarks of delegate Mitchell
Sosnoski) ("Brother Chairman, it is necessary to take a look at the Public Review
Board, which is, I think, too much in the ivory-tower category. Some changes should
be made to put on a few members which can be considered our own peers. If you
reviewed the record of the Public Review Board over the years -- and I have done it
over the past 10 -- it becomes apparent that the Public Review Board has become a
rubber stamp too often for the International Executive Board in too many cases. I
humbly ask you, the members of the Public Review Board, in the future to give more
consideration to the appellants who come before you with their complaints than you
have done in the past. Thank you.").
The PRB has its own offices, separate from the UAW's. It publishes annual
reports and sometimes interim reports, which are customarily available
both online and in printed versions. The greater part of both versions is
an explanation of PRB jurisdiction and procedure, and summaries and
statistics of the previous year's decisions. The online version omits a title
page and pictures of the PRB members. It has an executive director,
pictured in the printed versions, and two other staff members. The IEB
pays its necessary compensation and expenses, which in 2008 were a
little over $555,000. An audited financial report is submitted to each
convention. The printed report for 2008 has a typo, in proposing only
$4,500 for executive sessions for 2009. The online version corrects that
figure to $35,000.
Article 32 sections 1, 2, 8, 9;
PRB 51st annual report (2008), appendix D,
email, Pam Klingbeil to Ellis Boal, 9/14/09 (explaining typo in 2008 report).

One of its members addresses each constitutional convention, typically to

say that integrity and honesty in the union are beyond question, no
incident of serious wrongdoing has been uncovered, democracy is alive
and well, federal courts generally defer to the PRB, the UAW is nearly
unique in the US in even having a PRB, PRB members are diversified
labor advocates and highly accomplished ones, and they are thrilled to be
associated with it.
Proceedings, 21st constitutional convention, pp 84-90 (1968) (Higgins) ,
proceedings, 25th constitutional convention, pp 57-63 (1977) (Higgins),
 proceedings, 26th constitutional convention, pp 210-12 (1980) (Higgins),
proceedings, 27th constitutional convention, pp 216-19 (1983) (Higgins),
proceedings, 28th constitutional convention, pp 208-10 (1986) (Higgins),
proceedings, 29th constitutional convention, pp 253-57 (1989) (Higgins),
proceedings, 30th constitutional convention, pp 234-39 (1992) (Higgins),
proceedings, 31st constitutional convention, pp 232-33 (1995) (Aaron),
proceedings, 32nd constitutional convention, pp 106-08 (1998) (Higgins),
proceedings, 33rd constitutional convention, pp 246-50 (2002) (St. Antoine),
proceedings, 34th constitutional convention, pp 337-41 (2006) (St. Antoine).

The PRB has a set of rules which are updated from time to time and are
available to requesting members. They are to be liberally construed and
may be modified. The most recent is "series 18," announced in 2004.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 12 (7/1/04).

It conducts its affairs in English.

Lefebvre v Local 1163, 4 PRB 361, 363 (1985).

Unless there is prior written objection from a party, after 60 days the PRB
publishes decisions on its website. Unpublished decisions occasionally have
precedential effect.
Article 32 section 8;
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 8 (7/1/04);
Davis, 1 PRB 214, 218 n 6 (1961) (relying on unpublished PRB decision),
Waegele v Local 435, 4 PRB 137, 141 (1984) (PRB refuses appellant's request to
disseminate decision only to parties),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 71, 77 n 10 (1996) (non-publication of prior
decision means present case is one of first impression).
Some years ago I wrote the PRB, not on behalf of any member, making a
suggestion. In the middle I said:
Though I do not see it stated in Article 32 or in your annual reports, I have always
understood or assumed that the Public Review Board is accountable to the public. That
is, its hearings are open to UAW members (the UAW "public"), and its decisions and
operations are open and disseminated to the general public.

Letter, Ellis Boal to PRB, 11/30/94.

The PRB chairman corrected me:

You also proceed from a fundamental misconception of the role of the Public Review
Board in the UAW. The word "Public" in our title refers to fact that the members of the
Board are drawn from a community of persons who are not members of the UAW. It
does not mean that we are a public agency. We are accountable to the Union and its
members; not to the public at large.

Letter George Higgins to Ellis Boal, 12/28/94.

PRB members think of themselves as judges in a court, but not just any
judges. They think of themselves as honest, thorough, anti-employer,
pro-union, and generous to the parties before them. At least, I have this
impression.
Acker v Local 735, 5 PRB 100, 104 (1986) ("We are proud of the role which we play in
this unique effort of a Union to ensure that appellants will receive an independent and
unbiased review of their appeals.").

They sometimes have peculiar views.

 [Maybe the local president's] constituents actually like the idea of his promoting labor-
management harmony by rubbing shoulders with his Company counterparts in field or
stream [hunting turkey and deer on union time]. After all, experience teaches that
there are a variety of ways to achieve one's ends, and that not all of them involve
attending meetings or pushing paper.

Matthes v Local 699, 6 PRB 395, 398 (1992).

Once they said:

Moreover, a decision whether to arbitrate a grievance is not, after all, a political
question; it is not a matter of rallying the troops to a cause. To decide the issue,
requires an evaluation of the facts of the case to determine whether there is a realistic
possibility that the Union can prevail.

Soncrant v Local 1889, 9 PRB 538, 541 (1997);

compare Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 11 (PRB orders
UAW to try to reopen improperly-settled grievance despite finality language
of contract, in light of assertion of president's office that company might do
so to maintain good bargaining relationship).

Once they held, in an appeal noted more fully elsewhere, that the UAW
rationally concluded a discharge for fighting could not be successfully
arbitrated, where the evidence showed the altercation involved no threats
or blows, only angry talk instigated by the foreman. They relied on "the
concern of employers that they can be held liable if they do not act to
prevent violent behavior in the workplace"
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/20/07).

PRB members sometimes disagree with one another. One 1994 dissent
was so sharp I thought the writer was about to leave the PRB (he didn't).
He ended his thinking this way:
When one steps back from these esoteric procedural questions that lawyers and
officials love to debate, and concentrate again on the fundamental substantive issues
that the union members are interested in, the entire process does strike one as being
rather bizarre.

Very serious allegations were made of political corruption perpetrated in the

headquarters of the International Union. As noted earlier, I have absolutely no idea
whether these allegations are true: I certainly hope they are not true. However, no
one within the International has investigated whether the allegations were true or n ot
-- whether to censure and expel from the union the person responsible, or to clear the
accused's name from a serious charge. Instead, the International and the [Public
Review] Board have concentrated on finding technical reasons why these charges will
not be investigated and heard: the result is that this matter is left to fester inside the
organization.

There are two reasons why I have taken the time and effort to spell out my concerns in
this solitary dissent. One reason is that this is just the latest in a number of such cases
that have arisen over the last several years, in which serious charges have been hotly-
contested by the protagonists, but the debate within the Union and before the PRB has
been about procedural niceties that block these issues ever being aired in
front of the union membership.

The second reason stems from my role as Chief Counsel for the President's Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations -- a distinguished member of this
Commission being Doug Fraser, former president of the UAW. Doug Fraser and I have
been listening to American workers and union organizers voicing their intensely-felt
concerns about how the National Labor Relations Board's legal doctrines and procedural
routines keep from public view what is really happening in the American workplace --
especially in union organizing drives. The NLRB does not look quite so bad, though,
when one compares it with what the UAW has been doing to complaints such as the
one filed in this case.
 This is my advice to the UAW as well as to my colleagues on the PRB. When they get a
charge such as the one in this case -- Just Hear It!

Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 347 (1994) (dissent) (emphasis in original);

see also Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 184 (1991) ("I have ben involved in
labor relations for twenty-five years, as teacher, scholar, arbitrator, and
labor board chairman. I have never heard such an argument made before,
let alone by a Union.") (dissent),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 524 (2002) ("[T]he right way
for the PRB to address this issue in the interest of all UAW members is to
remand this matter to the IEB with the instruction that it formulate a truly
ethical code of conduct for appointed representatives....") (diss(diss
ent).

Sometimes decisions are amazingly thorough, particularly in the appeals

it grants.

Sometimes they are instinctual.

Occasionally the PRB ranks a decision by its degree of difficulty.

Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 717, 721 (1978) (novel),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 24 (1980) (not free from doubt),
Bynum v Local 235, 3 PRB 85, 87 (1980) (not easy),
Local 1520, 3 PRB 170, 172 (1981) (not easy),
Brown v Local 1832, 3 PRB 201, 206 (1982) (not easy),
Schrade v UAW, 3 PRB 370, 376 (1983) (not easy),
McCabe appealing Flowers v Local 1077, 5 PRB 318, 320 (1987) (not easy),
George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204, 208 (1987) (not easy),
Jodlowsky v UAW, 5 PRB 463, 466 (1988) (difficult),
Page v Local 961, 6 PRB 288, 291 (1991) (not difficult),
EP complaint of Tucker v UAW, 8 PRB 7, 14 (1992) (issues of appeal not difficult),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 112 (1993) (core issue of appeal easily disposed of),
Donovan v Local 2000, PRB Case 1448, 1449 (11/20/03), p (not complex).
Occasionally it acknowledges an issue of first impression.
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 71, 77 n 10 (1996) (whether PRB may consider
an appeal from a ruling by the president that an interpretation of an agreement by the
GM department was obviously correct),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 20 (request that PRB order
UAW to submit supplement for ratification).

The PRB has occasionally reconsidered a decision in a pending appeal.

Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469, 476 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477, 479 (1969) (PRB
reverses award of reimbursed lost wages because appellant did not request them),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 775 (1972) (PRB acknowledges its laxity in enforcing
timeliness of its rules against UAW),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 387, 392 n 3 (1992), part of decision withdrawn, 6 PRB 393
(1992) (in light of article 33 section 2(b), PRB reverses portion of decision allowing
appeal from procedural ruling of chair at meeting),
Moran v Agricultural Implement Department, 6 PRB 303, 309 (1992) (PRB reconsiders
type of relief that it will order for successful appellants in grievance appeals, in light of
historic losses by UAW in arbitration of strong grievances remanded by PRB, and in
light of UAW use of PRB decisions as defense to fair representation suits)
Valdez v Local 31, 9 PRB 298, 301-02 (1996) (PRB decisions over the years saying
officers and agents are not answerable to charges arising out of discharge of official
responsibilities may be wrong in light of article 31 section 9; on the other hand article
31 section 9 may be a relic overlooked by constitutional drafters in 1962),
Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 382 (1997), modified 9 PRB 391, 393 (1998) (in light of newly
appreciated historic separation of machine repair trade and tool and die making trade
in different families, and the "labyrinthine passages of the world of skilled trades," PRB
reverses original decision that local irrationally refused to write grievance),
Noall v Local 599, 10 PRB 371, 376 (1999) (citing rule of Yettaw v UAW, 6 PRB 236
(1992) and supplementing it).
But like the UAW the PRB is bound to enforce union rules and laws
uniformly. Frequently it cites a prior decision, to say it was right. It has
never changed its mind in a later case or admitted an earlier decision was
error.
Davis, 1 PRB 214, 218 (1961) ("The PRB has consistently adhered to the policy, implicit
in all of its decisions starting with the first, of refusing...." [footnote omitted]),
Stevens v Local 595, 2 PRB 493, 499 (1976) ("We continue to subscribe to that
principle...."),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 42 (1995) ("We continue to adhere to this view.")),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331, 344 (1994) ("We continue to adhere to these sentiments."),
Bennett v Local 1853, PRB Case 1429 (4/22/03), p 7 ("We continue to adhere to this
view."),
Golden v Local 974, PRB Case 1455 (11/19/03), p 8 ("We have repeatedly stated in
recent years that...");
compare Davis, 1 PRB 214, 218 n 6 (1961) (relying on unpublished PRB decision),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 529 (1969) (dissent) (questioning whether PRB is
bound by its own prior decisions).

This is in line with its view that filling out the meaning of the constitution
is best done by the gradual method of case-by-case decisionmaking,
constantly making clear how it is applying authority. The other method --
called a "rule-making" approach by the majority in one appeal and called
a "full definition of our jurisdiction" by the minority -- is beyond its
competence.
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 182-83, 187-91 (1976);
see also Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485, 492 (1968) (concurring opinion) (union's
obligation in grievance-processing continues to be developed in light of the
circumstances of each appeal).
The first 11 decisions dealt with the forerunner of the present article 10
section 7. This section bars adherents of certain political organizations,
chiefly the Communist Party, from holding local or international office. A
1957 administrative letter concerned officers who had invoked the fifth
amendment before a congressional committee. It provided for removal
unless the officer presented "clear and sufficient evidence that he is
beyond a doubt not disqualified" from holding office.

In cases ## 1-5 the local union had cleared the local officers and reps
who invoked the fifth amendment. The IEB referred them to the PRB
without decision. Noting no one had appealed and the proceedings were
therefore non-adversary, the PRB upheld the local actions.
Simmons, 1 PRB 1 (1957).

In cases ## 6-10, staff members of the international union invoked the

first amendment in refusing to name names of others, but did testify to
their own past memberships in the Communist Party. The IEB found all to
be qualified to hold office, and referred the matters to the PRB, again in a
non-adversarial mode. Given that none were presently Communists the
PRB upheld that action.
Burns, 1 PRB 5 (undated).

Case # 11 was like ## 1-5, with the exception that the steward refused
to answer congressional questions and invoked both the first and fifth
amendments. He denied ever having been affiliated with the Communist
Party. The PRB disposed of the case as it did ## 1-5.
Trachtenberg, 1 PRB 9 (undated).

Several others of the PRB's early cases concerned communists. In a 1960

decision, the PRB went out of its way to praise as "legitimate and
desireable" the goal of article 10 section 7 of preventing infiltration of
influences such as "the undermining efforts of Communist agencies." I
don't care for such unnecessary and divisive rhetoric.
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160 (1960) (it is legitimate and desirable to prevent infiltration of
Communist agencies into the labor movement to undermine it, but means used to
accomplish end did not conform to constitutional trial procedures),
Davis, 1 PRB 214 (1961) (appeal of IEB requirement in 1961, that appellants execute
non-Communist affidavit as condition of restoration of membership rights suspended in
1953, is to convention because convention rejected appeal of suspension in 1953,
despite that election to appeal to PRB was unavailable in 1953 because PRB didn't exist
then),
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 537 (1969) (foreign control of organization in 1941
would not mean it was foreign-controlled in 1969),
Nickell v Local 590, 2 PRB 47, 51-52 (1973) (grievance claim that union colluded against
appellant because of association with communist moving but unavailing);
compare Smith v UAW, 2 PRB 483 (1976) (member's fear of retaliatory action by UAW);
proceedings, 22nd constitutional convention, pp 201-03 (1970) (motion to report
amendment out of constitution committee, which would have amended predecessor of
article 10 section 7, fails for lack of 450 votes);
see also Nelson Lichtenstein, Reuther the Red?, Labour/Le Travail, Spring 2003 (Walter
Reuther biographer asserts Reuther worked very closely with Communists from late
1935 to early 1937 when he played important roles in the effort to organize General
Motors, Ford, and the Detroit West Side shops; in building the Detroit auto locals he
was friendly and intimate with key Communists, attended Communist-sponsored
events, and spoke for Communist groups; but he did not actually join the Communist
 Party. Other researchers assert Reuther was a Communist Party member. All agree
later he broke with the Party).

I have not reviewed the PRB's convention reports for 1998, 1974, 1972,
1970, and years before 1968, and would appreciate receiving copies from
a member who might have them.

PRB jurisdiction

Table of Contents

Considerations in choosing whether to appeal to the CAC or PRB are

reviewed elsewhere.

Despite holdings in early appeals that the PRB must satisfy itself of its
jurisdiction, it has sometimes proceeded to the merits without
determining that. Otherwise stated, unlike the IEB and despite that article
33 time limits are "jurisdictional," the PRB can assume jurisdiction by
stipulation.
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 162 nn 3-4 (1960) (despite agreement of the parties PRB
examines question independently and concludes appealable matter was an
IEB-imposed penalty under the predecessor of article 31 and therefore it had
 jurisdiction),
Ryan v UAW, 1 PRB 186, 189-90 (1961) (UAW concedes PRB jurisdiction, but
irrespective of positions of the parties PRB must satisfy itself of jurisdiction),
Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606, 606 (1970) (without deciding whether it had jurisdiction over
convention credential challenge, PRB noted the issue and then considered the merits
anyway because jurisdiction was stipulated),
Mosely v UAW, 2 PRB 621, 623-25 (1977) (PRB decides untimely grievance appeal on
the merits because procedural errors should not foreclose examination of narrow
question of improper conduct or motivation),
McGill v Local 387, 2 PRB 759, 761, 765 (1979) (noting several untimely previous
appeals processed because of stipulations of the parties though at the time the
constitution had no provision for waiver of time limits),
Kerik v UAW Ford Sub-Council 3, 2 PRB 772, 775 (1980) (post-IEB-decision waiver of
jurisdictional issue by president's agent in appeal concerning seating of sub-council
delegate);
see also article 8 section 15 (constitutional resolutions and amendments "must" be sent
to the secretary-treasurer not less than six weeks prior to the convention date),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), letter, Ron Gettelfinger to PRB, 1/16/03, pp
21-22 (asserting that word "must" in article 8 section 15 is not mandatory).

Until 1972 all appeals under the constitution required IEB consideration
before PRB consideration. After 1972 the president could decide certain
appeals on his own, but his decisions still had to be circulated to and
approved by the IEB. Despite this, in appeals before and after 1972 the
PRB sometimes proceeded to the merits without an intervening IEB
action; sometimes it remanded for IEB consideration.
Simmons, 1 PRB 1, 3 (1957) (IEB submission to PRB without intervening decision on its
part),
Lain v UAW, 1 PRB 482, 484 (1968), (president, not full IEB, ruled on appeal so PRB
remands it to allow appellants to appeal to IEB),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 514-15 (1969) (need for speedy resolution),
 Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 28 (1973) (local's and IEB's failure to act on valid appeal
not the fault of appellant, PRB decides appeal),
Mosely v UAW, 2 PRB 621, 623 (1977) (where scope of PRB's review is narrow member's
ignorance of proper procedures does not forfeit opportunity for review of his
allegations),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 858 (1981) (appeal remanded to IEB because it had
issued no decision),
EP complaint of Trapane, 3 PRB 15, 20 (1980) (EP complaint against local filed by 11
former employees out of plant for six years directly with PRB without IEB decision,
processed without examining good standing status of appellants because of UAW
waiver of timeliness and other procedural objections),
Darling v Local 499, 3 PRB 55, 59-60 (1980) (failure of president to circulate decision to
IEB so it could give decision was president's fault so despite constitutional violation PRB
jurisdiction not defeated, no remand to IEB because appellant did not request it),
EP complaint of McCue, 3 PRB 91, 92 (1981) (president's agent stipulates to PRB decision
of EPC complaint without intervening IEB decision),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 32-33, 38-41, 47 (1995) (PRB decides merits of claim
that local bylaw was not properly suspended by a 2/3 margin though the IEB decision
did not decide that issue),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 13 (2001) (PRB reviews appeals committee decision
though IEB did not formally adopt it because no party objected),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), pp 7-9 (after president's deliberate refusal
to follow the constitution PRB would have remanded to IEB but for ultimate decision
being so clear),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 8-9 ("In response to the International
Union's failure to investigate aned address appellants' claims, we will take jurisdiction
over these appeals in order to bring this protracted process to a close.").

That a court may have acted in the belief that the PRB has authority to
waive time limits does not confer jurisdiction on the PRB.
Beach v UAW, 1 PRB 502, 505 (1969),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 165, 170 (2002),
 Howell v Local 969, 10 PRB Case 198, 203-04 (1998).

As noted elsewhere, the PRB may not review collective bargaining policy.

PRB procedure

Considerations in choosing whether to appeal to the CAC or PRB are

reviewed elsewhere.

If mailed, the filing date of an appeal is the postmark date. The

constitution doesn't provide for it, but you may also contact the PRB
directly by mail or by fax. In the past it has treated such contact as
sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction timely.
Article 33 sections 3(f), 4(b), (c);
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 28-29 (1973),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856, 858 (1981),
Unit 24, Local 412, 3 PRB 46, 46-47 (1980),
Thompson v UAW, 4 PRB 23, 24 (1983),
Downs v IEB, 8 PRB 548, 549, 552 (1995),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457 (2000), letter, 2/12/99, David Klein to
Ellis Boal, record p 223 (PRB treats inquiry as to status of appeal by appellant, who had
received no decision eight monnths after IEB hearing, as satisfying time limits to appeal
to PRB),
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135 (2001), record pp 37-39, 42 (PRB treats faxed
communication as invoking its jurisdiction).

Ordinarily in my experience, extensions of time are freely granted,

provided the request was made at or before the time a document was
due.
 Compare Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773, 775 (1972) (PRB announces that henceforth
it will default the UAW for untimely compliance with PRB rules).

Occasionally I have requested extensions. But in general it is poor

practice.

Begin your PRB appeal by writing it care of the president's office within
30 days of IEB action. As noted just above you may also begin by
contacting the PRB directly at its offices; but in general it is best to begin
a PRB appeal as the constitution says.
Article 33 section 3(f) (begin PRB appeal by writing it care of the president).

At least one appellant must sign the appeal. The constitution actually
indicates all appellants should sign. But I expect one would suffice, so
long as the appeal specifies the others by name and says it is being filed
on their behalf. If one does sign on behalf of others, make sure that one
has no individual procedural problems. If there are more than two
appellants, they will be asked to designate one as the lead appellant to
receive material in the appeal.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 4(d) (7/1/04) (if appellants number more than
two they will be asked to designate one as lead appellant);
compare Robinson appealing Blandford v Local 659, 6 PRB 219, 225-26 (1991) (current
member who is also a lapsed former member lacked standing to join group appeal
because at the time appeal was filed she was not a member).

PRB rules say the appeal must contain a statement of reasons listing all
arguments on which you rely in disagreement with the IEB. Ordinarily in
my experience the PRB will permit you leave out the reasons in the initial
appeal, provided you promise to provide them within 30 days.
Article 33 section 4(a) (all information in support of the appeal, as specific and detailed
as possible);
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 1 (7/1/04) (statement of reasons including all
arguments on which appellant relies).

Choose the issues and formulate a PRB appeal carefully, as with your
initial appeal.

In one appeal the appellant was allowed to make and prevail, among
other reasons, on an argument he did not present to the IEB.
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), pp 6, 9 (protest to committee election
held less than 30 days after redistricting in violation of local bylaw);
see also Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748, 753-55 (1990) (remand for
investigation by IEB of medical information regarding appellant's heart condition which
he had not previously provided to the union, because UAW attendance counsellor had
told appellant that even if his absences were due to heart condition nothing could be
done to help him);
but see Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 II (6/27/06), pp 6-9 (PRB would have
remanded appeal to IEB based partially on after-acquired evidence but for evidence
being so weak).

After receipt of a timely appeal it will be docketed. You will be issued a

notification of pending appeal. The recording secretary of an involved
local may be asked to distribute the notice, the PRB rules, and the
statement of reasons to other interested parties, and invite them to
participate. The recording secretary can also request permission to
provide notice of the pendency of the appeal in the local newspaper or
other media. (My own view is PRB permission is not necessary.)
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 2 (7/1/04).

As a general rule, issues arising out of the same set of circumstances

should be consolidated as one appeal.
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), pp 12-13.

The PRB has allowed nonparty UAW members to take part in a case as
amicus.
Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 330 (1987), reconsideration denied 5 PRB 337, 338 (1988).

The president and any other interested party must file an answer within
15 days. The answer should respond to each material argument of the
statement of reasons. If the president objects to PRB jurisdiction, he or
she can file a special answer confined to that. The PRB can then either
limit itself to the special answer until jurisdiction is decided, or demand a
complete response from the president immediately. Within 15 days the
appellant optionally can file a response to the president's answer.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 3(a) (7/1/04).

According to PRB rules, at the same time the UAW files its answer the
president must send the PRB a complete set of all the written documents
in the case, including correspondence, briefs or written arguments,
minutes, transcripts, and exhibits previously submitted by the parties at
the local or UAW levels. The constitution actually says this must be done
when the president learns that a PRB appeal has been filed. In practice I
don't know which time limit is observed.
Article 33 section 3(f) procedures;
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 4(a) (7/1/04);
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1464 (4/27/04), pp 7, 9 (despite claim of president's office
that IEB ruled that minutes of local membership and LEB meetings were not to be
distributed, president's office should have required local to forward LEB minutes to the
PRB in connection with appeal).

As a courtesy, I copy all correspondence I have with the PRB to the

president's office and the other parties. The constitution and rules do not
require this. If the PRB receives unilateral correspondence, customarily it
notifies all sides of the receipt and provides copies.

The PRB will compile all the relevant documents into a paginated "record"
with a table of contents. The record in grievance and related appeals may
be limited in accordance with article 33 section 4(i).

For large exhibits such as overtime records and employee plant histories,
instead of the actual exhibits parties may be asked to summarize them
and include the summaries together with an explanation of their
relevance.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 4(b) (7/1/04),
Mingo v Local 1639, 2 PRB 753, 755 (1979) (PRB delays consideration for parties to
comment on transcript of IEB hearing that had not previously been forwarded to it).
Audio and video tapes and material downloaded from the internet not
prepared by a certified court reporter will not be included in the record.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 4(f) (7/1/04),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 102, 106 n 1 (2001) (video tape not reviewed),
Sarnella v Region 5, PRB Case 1353 (10/10/01) p 6 n 5 (motion to review videotaped
evidence rejected);
but see Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102, 106 (1984) (tape of membership meeting
received).

Though not actually included in the documents from the president's office,
the record is considered automatically to include all relevant portions of
contracts, the constitution and formal IEB interpretations, the EPCs, local
bylaws, PRB decisions, and arbitration, agency, or court decisions relied
on by any party. At the PRB's request, a party relying on any of these
documents will furnish copies for inclusion in the record.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 4(b), (c) (7/1/04);
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), p 13 (negotiated contracts are automatically
considered to be part of the record).

You should receive a copy of the record and be asked to review it for
completeness. The decision will be based solely on this record plus
whatever comes out at a hearing if there is one. Be sure to go through
the record, and if necessary ask to supplement it with any missing
materials. File any objections within 15 days.
Hill v Local 212, PRB Case 1471 (5/25/04), p 6 (attempt to correct record came too late),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 15 (omission of document from record may be
 corrected).
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 4(e) (7/1/04).

On the day it was docketed, the PRB decided one appeal on jurisdictional
grounds without providing the record.
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), pp 1-3 nn 2-8 (record cited, not provided).

After development of the record, in communications with the PRB or at a

PRB hearing (if it holds one) always refer to record documents by the
page numbers as paginated by the PRB. That will make it easier for PRB
members and the other side to locate them to see what you are talking
about.

Though not provided in its rules, the PRB will sometimes expedite an
appeal ahead of others previously filed, or even decide an appeal without
IEB fact-finding, typically so it can provide timely relief.
Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention, pp 186-89 (1972) (vice-president notes that
in election appeals time is of the essence);
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 515 (1969) (expedited, only three months left in challenged
suspension),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 111, 117 (1974) (dissent) (due to timing, no remedy available
in contract ratification appeal),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 144, 150 (1974) (dissent) (due to timing, no remedy
available in contract ratification appeal),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399, 406 (1987) (expedited, administratorship or election in light of
imminent plant closing),
Clark v Local 1248, 6 PRB 278, 282 (1991) (IEB urged to give priority to election
appeals),
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7, 10, 12 (1992) (immediate consideration granted
 because of imminence of convention, for appeal relating to convention procedures);
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 137 (2001) (expedited consideration of
administratorship appeal denied),
Lapso v Local 1250, PRB Case 1550 (2/20/07), record p 108, letter, Barbara Klein to Ellis
Boal, 6/26/06 ("[T]here is no authority in the UAW Constitution for the PRB to direct
the IEB to expedite appeals.").

On one occasion the Pthe P RB delayed its consideration of an appeal

pending resolution of parallel criminal proceedings.
Peterson v TOP Department, 8 PRB 289, 301 (1995).

New evidence, oral argument

Table of Contents

Because it is an appellate body, the PRB ordinarily rejects evidence not

previously submitted to the local or IEB. It prefers to rely on IEB
fact-finding. Sometimes however it defers to fact-findings of civil tribunals
such as courts, unemployment agencies, civil service judges, or the NLRB.
Telakowicz v Local 425, 1 PRB 148, 152 (1960) (PRB rejects two witness statements
because of failure to comply with PRB rule for presenting additional evidence),
Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24, 29 (1973) (no remand to IEB because no need for
fact-finding),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84, 88 (1983) (at PRB hearing, for first time appellant receives
 list of 29 persons whose seniority had been broken, PRB discounts list),
Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472, 477 (1988) (PRB rules on IEB record, one of the more
extensive of which it has had),
Sarkissian v Local 6000, 5 PRB 624, 629-30 (1989) (PRB does not normally do
fact-finding, but in this appeal accepts credibility finding of civil service judge),
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 198-200 (1991) (if IEB develops full record PRB and
CAC will not be presented with new issues),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168, 183-84 (1991) (dissent) (PRB regularly receives or elicits
factual data at hearings),
Clark v Local 1248, 6 PRB 278, 280 (1991) (remand to IEB for further investigation),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332, 338 (1997) (NLRB complaint and settlement relied on),
Bee v Local 719, 10 PRB Case 1, 4-5 (1998) (PRB defers to court-enforced agreement
between appellant and company),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 17, 20 n 22 (2001) (PRB utilizes finding of
unemployment agency in parallel claim),
Sasaki v GM Department, 10 PRB 548, 554 (1999) (PRB defers to credibility findings of
civil tribunals and of IEB in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary),
Padilla v GM Department, 11 PRB 336, 340 (2003) (remand to IEB for evidentiary
hearing),
Bringard v Ford Department, PRB Case 1406 (10/29/02), p 6 (PRB credits company and
union over appellant),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) pp 7-9 (PRB poses factual
questions to UAW whereupon UAW reverses course),
Jones v Local 140, PRB Case 1620 (6/24/09) pp 14-15 (as an appellate body, unless
there is compelling evidence to the contrary, the PRB relies on findings of fact made
those who heard the testimony and examined the evidence).

But if you have good cause or if you have consent of the parties or if the
IEB forgot to send something to the PRB or if the PRB requires it, the PRB
will consider a motion for new evidence. Put a request in writing and
state
 reasons for presenting it and why it was not presented at prior
proceedings in the case,

a description of the evidence,

the names of each witness you intend to present, and

the anticipated testimony of each witness.

PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 10 (7/1/04);

Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), pp 5-6,
12-15 (after IEB decision finding appellant's grievance was not investigated rationally,
president submitted new evidence to show IEB decision was based on incomplete
record, but PRB finds the offered evidence does not add substantially to what the IEB
had),
Kibby v Local 148, PRB Case 1624 (6/1/09), p 8 (PRB will not disregard witness
statements which appellant offered to IEB and IEB ignored),
Grima v UAW, PRB Case 1621 (9/16/09), pp 13-14 (these requirements do not apply if
the new evidence consists of negotiated contracts, because they are automatically
considered to be part of the record).

Sometimes the PRB will direct its staff, or ask the IEB, to conduct new
fact-finding. At such hearings probing cross-examination is not feasible.
Unlike in the special procedures for civil rights claims, the PRB lacks
subpoena power.
Alleged EPC Violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142, 188 (1983-85) (PRB special counsel lacks
subpoena power),
Ford v UAW, 4 PRB 268, 269 (1985) (because of disputed issues of fact PRB requested
parties to meet with its staff),
 Brandt v UAW, 5 PRB 337, 344 n 8 (1988) (probing cross-examination not feasible),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399, 406 (1987) (due to imminence of plant closing and need for
speedy adjudication PRB conducts its own investigation),
Mayhew v Local 933, 5 PRB 635, 639 (1989) (appellants objected to PRB request for oral
argument, so PRB sent staff to Indianapolis to conduct evidentiary hearing),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10, 12, 16 (2001) (PRB conducts evidentiary hearing
despite that IEB also conducted one),
compare Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), p 4 (following initial
consideration PRB asks IEB for clarification of local company past practice).

The CAC has a different view, and routinely accepts new evidence.

Usually the PRB does not hold oral argument though you can request it.
Anyway, it is capable of discerning issues without a live presentation.
Sometimes it will call a hearing even without a request if it thinks the
issues are complex, novel, or important.

If it does opt for oral argument it will send out a notice of the time and
place, together with reminders about procedure. Sometimes the notice
will highlight a particular issue it is interested in hearing about.

If the place of argument is over 100 miles the PRB will pay expenses to a
party for attending, not including lost wages. Any UAW member and
immediate family may attend. No video or audio transcription is
permitted. Someone will appear from the president's office to defend the
IEB decision. Occasionally someone from the legal department shows up
too.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 6 (7/1/04).
The requirements of article 33 section 4(h) apply to PRB hearings,
including the requirement that appellant and appellee or their
representatives appear and answer all questions fully and truthfully.

At argument each side gets 40 minutes to present its case. Everyone's

style is different, but of late mine has been to use only a small fraction of
the allotted 40 minutes. I allow the rest for questioning that may be put by
PRB members or the other side. If the whole 40 minutes is not used so be
it. One reason I do this is I usually submit a statement of reasons with
detailed citations and argument before the hearing, and expect PRB
members have read it.
PRB rules of procedure, series 18, rule 6(d) (7/1/04).

If oral argument is held, all bets are off regarding new evidence. After
referencing the rule, a notice of argument typically says
The parties should understand, however, that oral presentations to the Board are not
the equivalent of proceedings in an appellate court. PRB hearings are considerably
more informal and persons present having direct knowledge of the events involved in
the appeal may be requested to explain or render an account of events or
circumstances giving rise to the appeal.

Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511 (2002) , record 158 (notice of

hearing, 7/18/02);
compare Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05), pp 4, 8, 11 (based on
record and on testimony given at PRB hearing PRB makes factual finding that
appellant had completed necessary training, resulting in remand and
direction to IEB to try to reopen and settle appellant's grievance and to
 compensate him for his losses),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05), p
20 (testimony presented at second PRB hearing clarified the issues raised by
appellant's complaint),
Eckert v Region 9, PRB Case 1503 (9/6/05), pp 8, 13 (after oral argument PRB
declines to credit appellant's claims).

Customarily the notice of hearing will identify specific questions raised by

the record, and ask the parties to be prepared to address them. So it is
well to be prepared. But the ultimate decision may have nothing to do with
the questions. In a 2009 appeal discussed more fully elsewhere the notice
asked about (1) the reason a local election committee questioned an
appellant's right to nominate, (2) whether appellants were ever delinquent
in dues, (3) what representations were made to appellants about the
requirements to maintain good standing and what was the local's past
practice in applying article 16 section 19 to discharged members with
grievances pending, and (4) how long a discharged member may maintain
good standing under article 16 section 19. The ensuing decision turned on
the constitutional definition of certification of entitlement for "out-of-work"
credits under article 16 section 19.
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), pp
392-93 (notice of hearing).

Sometimes instead of holding a hearing the PRB will solicit briefs.

Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), p 10.

The PRB announced in 1980 that failure of an appellant to appear for a

scheduled PRB hearing could result in dismissal of the appeal without
regard to its merits. The rule was not applied against an appellee who
failed to appear in a 2000 case.
Bannier, 2 PRB 527 (1976) (appellant Bannier),
Leslie v Local 206, 2 PRB 747, 750 (1978) (appellant),
Valdiserri v Local 699, 2 PRB 876, 876 (1980) (appellants),
Butina appealing Petty v Local 1264, 10 PRB 457, 460 (2000) (appellee Petty),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03), p 4 n 6 (appellee local officers);
compare article 33 section 4(h) interpretation 1 (failure of appellant to appear at IEB
hearing permits IEB to consider appeal withdrawn).

Affirming IEB on different grounds

The president's office has the responsibility of defending an IEB decision

to the PRB. The PRB has occasionally noticed the president defending on
grounds not contained in the IEB decision.
Yettaw v Local 599 I, 8 PRB 28, 30 (1993) ("The Union's arguments ... go to the merits
of the appeal and not to its timeliness, and do not constitute the basis upon which it
decided this appeal."),
Wyatt appealing Miller v Local 2190, PRB Case 1228 (10/15/98) p 6 (PRB rejects
president's argument not relied on by IEB that charge was untimely),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05), p 13 ("The issue was not raised during
the appeal to the IEB and is not part of this appeal.").

Defending on such grounds should be disallowed. The PRB should affirm

or reverse based on what the IEB said in its decision, not what the
president says later. Just because a new argument might convince the
PRB doesn't mean it would have convinced the IEB, particularly in
grievance and bargaining appeals where the IEB's jurisdiction is broader
than the PRB's. If the president's argument is based on new information
not available when the IEB decided, the better practice is to remand for
IEB reconsideration.
Article 7 section 1,
article 33 sections 3(f) limitation, 4(i);
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 164-65 (1960) (IEB finding that appellant was ineligible to hold
office because of relationship to Canadian Communist party set aside because trial
procedures were not followed, even though a new determination utilizing proper
procedures might reach the same conclusion unanimously),
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170, 172 (1961) (appellant entitled to consideration of appeal by
quorum of IEB, not just by president);
Janicki v UAW, 3 PRB 333, 337 (1982) (appellant entitled to the consideration of appeal
by entire bargaining committee not just chairman),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 11, 13, 15 (2001) (IEB orders damages against local in
grievance appeal without finding local had acted irrationally),
Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 569 (2002), record pp 183-88 (after appeal docketed at PRB
president requests remand to IEB for further investigation, remand granted only after
the parties reached agreement as to the terms of the remand).

But the PRB has sometimes affirmed an IEB decision on just such
grounds. At the conclusion of the noted Reed v UAW decision it said: "The
decision of the International Executive Board is affirmed, albeit for
reasons unrelated to those it adopted." While this might be reasonable
where a constitutional interpretation is the basis of the PRB decision I
don't see the justification otherwise.
Foreman v Local 699, 4 PRB 123, 125 (1984) (charge should be disqualified, not because
its basis was political (IEB) but because defamation is not chargeable (PRB)),
Sneath v Local 1309, 5 PRB 299, 302-03 (1988) (revocation of preferred seniority
justified, not because of contract (IEB) but because of NLRA (PRB)),
Robinson appealing Blandford v Local 659, 6 PRB 219, 225-26 (1991) (appeal protesting
company/union decision to terminate apprentices' program denied, not because of lack
of merit (IEB) but because of lack of appellant's standing (PRB)),
Matthes v Local 699, 6 PRB 395, 397 (1992) (hunting with management on union time is
not unbecoming conduct, not because membership should decide the issue (IEB) but
because bylaw didn't prohibit it (PRB)),
Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 573 (2002) (disposition of grievance was not irrational, not
because of appendix A or document 52 or untimeliness (IEB) but because of contract
language (PRB)),
Wartley v Local 849, 11 PRB 421, 424-25 (2001) (charge claiming improper denial of
expense reimbursement was improper, not because of untimeliness, but because it was
an issue for the membership; charge of physical threat was improper, not because of
the lack of a witness (IEB) but because conduct if true did not amount to physical
threat (PRB)),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 511, 515-16, 517, 518 (2002) (appointed
rep's removal for distributing leaflet did not violate EPC, not because Ford department's
rule about involvement in local politics is clear and unambiguous or because there is a
distinction between comments made in a leaflet as opposed to orally at a meeting or
because the local administration had implicitly taken a position on the issue (IEB), but
because Ford department had discretion to find the leaflet political (PRB)),
Genshaw v Local 5960, PRB Case 1447 (11/20/03), pp 6, 9-10 (appeal is untimely (IEB),
appeal is untimely and lacks merit (PRB)),
Keith v Local 524, PRB Case 1458 (2/23/04), pp 1, 5, 8-9 (discharge was solely for
refusal to do job (IEB), discharge was also for harassing co-worker (PRB)),
Thielen v Local 72, PRB Case 1481 (11/22/04), pp 15-16 (PRB would have overruled IEB
but for appeal being mooted by change in company practice),
Larkin v Region 5, PRB Case 1497 (3/17/05), pp 4, 6 (IEB declined to rule on argument
presented to oppose institution of trial proceedings, that only the secretary-treasurer is
authorized to prosecute wrongful use of UAW insignia, and instead dismissed charge on
other grounds; but the president defended IEB decision partially on this basis and PRB
upheld dismissal partially on this basis),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1487 (5/12/05), pp 16-17 (election appeal denied not
 because the local wasn't responsible for the company's discharge of appellant (IEB),
but because appellant didn't file pre-election appeal (PRB)),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05), pp 9, 21 (no ratification of
supplement needed because membership authorized negotiators in previous ratified
agreement (IEB), no ratification of supplement needed because it would give Delphi
members veto power over the national GM agreement (PRB)),
Lamb v Local 599, PRB Case 1544 (10/26/06), p 6 (appellant failed to appear for IEB
hearing (IEB), not all of appellant's absences were covered by doctor's excuses (PRB)).

In one appeal, after an IEB hearing and decision upholding withdrawal of

a grievance which protested a member's forced leave, the president was
allowed to reverse his defense of the IEB without (so far as the decision
shows) supplemental IEB action. The PRB upheld the president's new
view and reversed the IEB.
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03), pp 6-9.

Decisions and remedies

Table of Contents

Though the PRB publishes decisions, the constitution and PRB rules do not
require that the decisions state reasons. But it almost always does state
them.

Helpfully, PRB decisions typically begin with a one-sentence statement of

the issues before it. They also contain pretty accurate summaries of each
party's argument, including the party that lost.

Remedies for successful appellants are discussed more thoroughly

elsewhere.

PRB decisions are usually courteous.

Doyen v Local 6000, 5 PRB 472, 478 (1988) ("appellants have performed a valuable
service" but are wrong),
Allen v Region 3, 10 PRB 238, 241 (1998) ("[Appellant] has shown resourcefulness and
tenacity in the pursuit of [a journeyman's card] in this respect," but appeal denied).

Sometimes they are biting or sarcastic.

Campbell appealing Cox v Local 51, 6 PRB 335, 344 (1992) (recommendation that local
hire an instructor in English composition),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108, 114 (1993) (IEB "may not have realized that it was making
a decision which was directly contrary" to its earlier ruling),
Leventis v Local 909, 8 PRB 541, 547 (1995) ("This is sheer sophistry on [appellant's]
part"),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73 (1996) (assertion that were the UAW to risk
loss of the benefits it derives under the Clayton doctrine that might qualify as the
ultimate irrational act),
Driskell v Local 735, 10 PRB 114, 117 ("paranoiac conspiracy theories"),
Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 612, 614, 620 (2001) (action of TOP council delegates in
staying an extra day at Chicago hotel after conference ended amounted to
"debrief[ing] each other over dinner"),
Colley v Local 235, 11 PRB 235, 240 (2001) (appellant's attempt to preserve damages
claim on appeal by labeling it a motion for reconsideration "is itself disingenuous, since
there was nothing to reconsider as the relief sought had already been granted in full.")
Sometimes a decision will compliment the union on its handling of a
situation.
Haddad v Local 157, 9 PRB 307, 312 (1997) ("Thus we believe that when we are
presented with an instance where a Local Union has taken steps that enhance
democratic processes for its members, we should commend it for its efforts in this
respect."),
Manning v Local 364, 9 PRB 500, 504 (1997) ("We are sometimes publicly critical of the
way in which lower appellate tribunals handle the cases with which they are presented.
It is therefore only fair that when we are presented with an example of excellence in
the processing of an appeal, we commend those repsonsible for a job well done."),
Cardilino v Local 887, 10 PRB 40, 46 n 6 (1998) (election committee's "detailed response
to to each ground asserted in these multiple challenges should serve as a model for
other Election committees"),
Sills v Local 9212, 10 PRB 108, 113 (1998) ("Finally, the settlement of Sills' grievance on
terms which saved his job and his seniority were surprisingly generous, given the fact
that Sills' attendance record was so very poor."),
Ray-Barnett v Local 652, PRB Case 1496 (2/11/05), p 8 ("We commend the Local Union
representatives for the very thorough investigation they conducted in response to
Sanders' and Ray-Barnett's concerns."),
Patterson v Local 848, PRB Case 1509 (5/12/05), pp 8-9 ("At this point [the local]
conducted a thorough investigation in the practice regarding overtime distribution
under the collective bargaining agreement and concluded that the Company's position
could not be successfully challenged."),
Deliso v UAW, PRB Case 1578 (1/24/08), p 9 ("It was remarkable that Local 900 was
able to negotiate a reinstatement of Deliso's seniority under these circumstances."),
Nash v GM Department, PRB Case 1583 (2/12/08), p 14 (UAW obtained "excellent
settlement"),
Pappas v Region 1A, PRB Case 1602 (10/28/08), pp 5-7 ("Pappas was fortunate that the
Union managed to negotiate his reinstatement, because the Company could have
insisted that his seniority had been broken when he failed to report to work while he
was in the Oakland County Jail"),
 Phelps v Local 1292, PRB Case 1614 (4/22/09), p 9 ("There is no question that Phelps
was guilty of the violation for which he was disciplined. The Union obtained a good
settlement of his grievance so that he incurred only a minimal penalty."),
Sallee v Local 933, PRB Case 1627 (6/25/09), p 7 ("This record attests to the remarkable
job this Local Union has done representing Sallee and protecting his job over the
years."),
Furby v Chrysler Department, PRB Case 1636 (1/25/10), p 10 ("We wish there were
some way to convey to this appellant what an excellent settlement his local unon
representatives achieved for him.... We urge the appellant to enjoy the retirement he
has earned and to let go of this vain quest for reinstatment.").

In one appeal the PRB said there was nothing for it to interpret, and
remanded the dispute so the parties could negotiate.
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07), pp 11-13 (affiliation agreement of outside union
to UAW).

Sometimes decisions are mis-stated or ungrammatical. In the noted

decision, the issue was whether the GM department's interpretation of a
contract was obviously correct, not whether President Gettelfinger's
agreement with the GM department was obviously correct.
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), pp 9, 21 ("For
these reasons, we agree that President Gettelfinger's ruling that the GM Department's
interpretation of Paragraph (57) of the Agreement was obviously correct and that no
appeal lies from his ruling in this respect.");
compare article 33 section 2(b) paragraph 4.

Sometimes the PRB gets the facts wrong.

Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), pp 7, 17 (PRB finds that two witnesses
supportive of appellant testified they ended their continual practice of leaving company
 premises for brief periods without punching out around the time that appellant was
discharged for that in 2003, when their quoted testimony actually was that they
continued their practice until 2006).

Sometimes the PRB will be troubled or moved by an oddity or unfairness,

either in a UAW procedure or in one of its own decisions. Occasionally it
will use the occasion to recommend a change.
Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12, 22 (1958) (proxy quorum),
Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133, 135 (1960) (seniority is now a recognized equity and
should be observed except in emergencies),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 512 (1969) (intra-corporation council as subordinate body),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508, 512-13 (1969) (multi-local per capita contract ratification),
Battle v UAW, 1 PRB 606, 613 (1970) (convention rules),
Appeal of Collins, 1 PRB 694, 697-98 (1971) (strike assistance benefits for members who
became delinquent and then corrected the delinquency),
Lynch v Local 302, 1 PRB 787, 789 (1972) (notification of nominations),
Nickell v Local 590, 2 PRB 47, 51-52 (1973) (though powerless to remedy discharge
grievance appeal under pre-1980 standard, PRB asks UAW to redouble efforts for
appellant and advise PRB in the future of efforts on his behalf),
Unit 24, Local 412, 3 PRB 46, 50 (1980) (hearing officers of remanded appeal),
Alleged EPC violations in Region 4, 4 PRB 142, 172-87 (1983-85) (accounting procedures
for special union funds),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222, 228 (1984) (necessary expenses),
Sabin v Local 599, 5 PRB 566, 570 (1988) (strike authorization ballot wording),
Luksch v Local 686, 5 PRB 590, 596 (1988) (EPC bearing on benefit rep positions),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31, 44 (1995) (basis of spousal expense allowance for
convention delegates),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64, 73-74, 78 n 17 (1996) (part of appeal which was
decided under article 13 section 8 arguably should have been circulated to IEB
members, and PRB recommends to president to grant extension of time now to appeal
ruling to IEB),
Valdez v Local 31, 9 PRB 298, 301-02 (1996) (penal sanctions for UAW rep, tension
 between article 31 section 9 reference to "dereliction" and PRB decisions saying officers
and agents are not answerable to charges arising out of discharge of official
responsibilities),
Cain v Local 862, 9 PRB 407, 413 (1997) (charging party should produce substantial
evidence at time of filing charges),
Hite v Local 807, 9 PRB 477, 481 (1997) (election procedure when ineligible ballots are
cast),
Wemyss v Local 594, 10 PRB 119, 121 (1998) ("But life is sometimes unfair...."),
Baxter v Local 659, 10 PRB 337, 340 (1999) (constitution should address procedures for
contract ratification),
Baxter v Local 659, 11 PRB 312, 316 (2001) ("Some clarification to address the role of
challengers might help respond to the procedural misgivings raised in this type of case,
but that is a judgment for the members of the union to make, and to this point they
have not done so."),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390, 405 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (mechanics
by which local lost time is calculated),
Lescoe v Local 900, 10 PRB 603, 607-10 (2000) (retroactive membership policy for new
members allows them to be manipulated in voting because they lack knowledge of the
issues),
Baker v IEB, 11 PRB 439, 444-45 (2002) (short notice of administratorship hearing,
wisdom of article 36 section 11, lack of elections in new local),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 520 (2002) (clarity of Ford department's
restriction on speech of appointed rep),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03), p 10 (PRB responsibility to further
strengthen democratic processes and appeal procedures),
Schultz v Region 5, PRB Case 1498 (3/17/05), p 6 (administrative letter for use by locals
to develop procedures to protect privacy of members' personal information such as
Social Security numbers),
Turner v IEB, PRB Case 1490 (9/2/05), p 14 (if not already in place, regular maintenance
of record of IEB consideration of its delegates' actions with respect to approval of
bylaws),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), p 8 (concurrence) (recommending that UAW
amend article 35 section 3(a) to resolve contradictory language),
Lacey v Region 1, PRB Case 1577 (1/24/08) p 5 ("The termination of an employee with a
 clean disciplinary record for an understandable error such as Lacey's disregards
commonly shared understandings of justice and fair play. Nevertheless, the discipline
assessed in this case apparently did not violate the [contract]."),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09) pp 11-12 (coalition bargaining),
Bradley v Local 3520, PRB Case 1609 (2/23/09), reconsideration denied (4/22/09), p 25
("This was a high profile dispute ... and it focused public attention on the UAW's
appellate processes. [The IEB's failure to hold a hearing] is especially unfortunate given
the political dimensions of appellants' relations to other Local Union members after the
unsuccessful strike."),
Hendley v Region 1, PRB Case 1628 (1/25/10), pp 14, 15 n 61 (unfortunate effect of
constitutional requirement that a grievance be withdrawn before an appeal can be filed
is that liability for a wrongful discharge is transferred from the company to the union;
the convention may wish to consider this).

Sometimes the PRB comments on the facts before it even though it is not
necessary to the decision.
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160, 165 (1960) (describing the goal of action required of AFL-CIO
affiliate unions (preventing infiltration of "the undermining efforts of Communist
agencies" is "legitimate and desireable"),
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 185 (1976) (concurring opinion) ("We have always made
passing comments about matters not strictly relevant to our disposition of the
case...."),
Local 1200 v UAW, 3 PRB 419, 424 (1982) (noting the uncertainty of PRB standards for
review of an administratorship),
Mullins v Local 735, 4 PRB 49, 52 (1983) (commenting on shop chair's abuse of authority
after dismissing untimely charges against him),
Lartigue v UAW, PRB Case 1605 (1/28/09), p 11 (commenting on and suggesting remedy
for disenfranchisement of large group of voters that resulted from hour-long closing of
the polls in ratification ballot, though no violation was found).

In EPC appeals where the PRB has found the accused obviously innocent,
under certain circumstances it may impose a summary non-monetary
penalty against the accuser.
Article 32 section 7;
Page v Local 961, 6 PRB 288, 295 (1991) (concurrence) (election appeal decision does
not foreclose sanctions in a future appeal),
EP complaint of Tucker, 8 PRB 7, 14-15 (1992) (warning to appellant and counsel that
repetition of tactics attempting to involve PRB in political affairs of UAW will result in
penalty),
Yettaw v Local 599, 10 PRB 70, 74-75 (1998), reconsideration denied (7/31/98) (PRB
imposes three-month suspension, then suspends the suspension with a warning
because it is the first time PRB has imposed a penalty on a frivolous EPC claimant),
Novicenskie v Local 1069, 11 PRB 144, 146, 148 (2001) (PRB finds election appeal
frivolous but issues no warning),
Yettaw v Local 599, 11 PRB 191, 196 (2001) (warning of sanctions in future obviously
meritless appeals)
King v Local 600, PRB Case 1528 (4/12/06), pp 9-11 (PRB declines to apply sanctions to
EPC complaint that is completely without substance because complaint was not based
on a false accusation and though appellants were wrong they did not act in bad faith;
but appellants are put on notice that future EPC complaints based only on general
assertions may be met with sanctions);
compare article 31 section 14 (power of trial committee and local membership on
acquittal to determine whether accuser should be reprimanded, suspended, or expelled
for frivolous or insubstantial charge),
Lee v UAW, 11 PRB 546, 549 (2002) (appellant did not correctly initiate EPC claim,
frivolous appeal, no warning).

In general the PRB is powerless to punish frivolous parties in non-EPC

appeals. It must be content to scold them. But in one decision it did assess
interest against the UAW for unfair and unacceptable processing of a
successful appeal for monetary compensation against a local.
Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07), pp 13-14 ("The integrity of the process in
 these circumstances is far more important than the correctness of any individual ruling
involving a relatively small amount of money.");
see also Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 416 (1967) (warning to appellee local where its
tactics were duplicitous and underhanded),
Acker v Local 735, 5 PRB 100, 103-04 (1986) (warning to appellants for abusive
grievance appeals),
Local 148 appealing Powell v Local 148, 8 PRB 129, 136-40 (1994) (on the filing of
improper charges, "[h]ad the Local Executive Board done its job correctly, had the
International Union timely issued an order staying the trial pending resolution of the
appeal, [and] had the Local Union heeded President Bieber's directive to halt the
processing of the chargearge s, none of what eventually transpired would have come
to pass."),
Sievertson v Local 719, 8 PRB 253, 256 (1994) (appeal is frivolous, untimely, and an
impermissible collateral attack on earlier IEB decisions),
Reed v UAW, 10 PRB 568, 570, 573 (2002) (PRB does not act on appellant's request to
punish UAW in grievance appeal rejected by PRB but in which it found IEB's decision
and UAW's defense to be irrational, inconsistent, and incorrect),
Schultz v Region 5, PRB Case 1498 (3/17/05), p 6 ("We strongly urge the membership of
Local 148 to try to rise above their caucus affiliations and begin to conduct the
business of the Local through reasoned debates of the issues at membership meetings,
rather than by means of charges and counter-charges presented under Article 31 of
the Constitution."),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07), pp 16-17
(president's staff failed to communicate adequately with appellant about the status of
his appeal after he won at the IEB level; appellant was entitled to receive prompt and
straightforward responses to his inquiries),
Lombard v UAW, PRB Case 1525 (11/15/06), reconsideration denied (1/30/07),
reconsideration p 2 ("While we agree that the President's staff ought to have obtained
and reviewed a copy of the prior arbitration decision before citing it as a consideration
in its denial of Lombard's claim for damages, the lapse was carelessness and not a
blatant misrepresentation."),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 9-11 ("With one exception, however,
appellants' charges and complaints continue the pattern of abuse of Article 31 and the
Ethical Practices Codes by members of this Local Union, which we have addressed in
 previous cases. [footnote omitted]").

Though the IEB has a time constraint in the constitution for getting
decisions out, it is flexible, and the PRB has sometimes shown impatience
with the slow pace of appeals.
Proceedings, 21st constitutional convention, p 86 (1968) ("It takes somewhat over a
year on the average for a UAW member to bring his case from the first step though th e
final appeal to the Public Review Board or alternatively to the Constitutional
Convention. We, the members of the Board, believe that this period is far too long and
that the Union and the Public Review Board together must consciously endeavor to
reduce the length of time to somewhere in the vicinity of four months from start to
finish.");
compare Voytek v Local 1010, 1 PRB 97, 102 (1960) (PRB warns UAW about its repeated
refusal to notify PRB of pendency of EP claim),
Liddell v Local 600, 1 PRB 413, 416 (1967) (PRB criticizes appellee local's underhanded
delay),
Beck v Local 5, 2 PRB 12, 16 (1973) ("We must therefore be content with an admonition
to the Local and International Union that untoward delays, perfunctory consideration
and disregard of Constitutional requrements for the processing of appeals can only
serve to undermine the whole system of internal remedies."),
Foster v Local 892, 5 PRB 130, 132, 134 (1988) (the average appeal takes about six
months to process at the PRB, this one took 30 for which PRB blames UAW for not
having its facts straight),
Strohmeyer v GM Department, PRB Cases 1434 and 1439 (12/22/03), pp 21-22
(acknowledging long time for resolution of appeal though sole issue decided by PRB
was that president was correct in saying that GM department's interpretation of
contract was obviously correct),
Sonnier v UAW, PRB Case 1548 II (7/19/07), pp 6-8, 14-15 (because of nearly-four-year
delay occasioned partially by unreasonable behavior of appellants' counsel, "equity
favors a dismissal" of charge of unbecoming conduct which otherwise would have been
referred to a trial committee).
Grima v Region 1A, PRB Case 1606 (11/24/08), p 23 (appeal was delayed because
 president referred it to IEB instaed of PRB).

Some years ago (I don't recall why) I calculated the average time it took
to decide the 100 cases in 1983-85 numbered from 601 to 700. After
discounting eight appeals in which no decision was issued and seven
more in which the date of the appeal to the PRB does not appear, the
average period was 8.1 months, with a standard deviation of 3.6 months.
Appeals numbered 618, 633, 649, 651, 653, 664, 667, and 697 produced no decision;
the decisions in appeals numbered 654-57, 670 (I and II), and 686 do not state the
starting dates of the appeal.

Within 30 days of receipt of a PRB decision you may request

reconsideration. The request must be accompanied by a specific
statement of reasons. Ordinarily on reconsideration the PRB will take
account only of the record compiled before its initial decision. A request
to reconsider is not necessary to completely exhaust remedies under
article 33 section 5.
PRB rules of procedure series 18, rule 11 (7/1/04) (reconsideration procedure);
see also PRB rules of procedure series 18, rule 10 (7/1/04) (procedure for asking to
introduce new evidence).

Parties sometimes request and receive corrections of factual errors in

decisions.
Local 2036 v UAW, 11 PRB 135, 140 (2001), last paragraph, last sentence, letter, David
Klein to Ellis Boal, 5/15/01 (at request of appellant summary of its argument changed
from "There is no reason to think that, even with the UAW bringing its "might" to bear,
the administrator will be able to get a contract that the membership will approve." to
 "There is no reason to think that without the UAW bringing its might to bear either the
bargaining committee or the administrator will be able to get a contract."),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511, 516 (2002), fourth paragraph, last line,
letter, Pamela Klingbeil to parties, 11/13/02 (at request of president's office "President"
changed to "Vice-president"),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03), p 1, last paragraph, letter, David Klein to Ellis
Boal, 8/21/03 (PRB declines appellant Davis's request to change statement that prior to
the 2002 convention Davis "announced his intention to retire and support ...
Vadovski...." to "according to the Administration Caucus Davis announced his intention
to retire and support ... Vadovski....").

Very occasionally, the PRB has vacated a decision. Though vacated, a

decision may still stand as precedent.
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469 (1969), 1 PRB 477 (1969),
Calloway v Local 887, 2 PRB 428, 440 (1977) (citing Hopkins),
Gaw v UAW, 4 PRB 280, 284 (1985) (citing Hopkins).
Grant v Local 163 II, 9 PRB 20 (1996) (PRB vacates prior order reported at 9 PRB 5
(1995), but does not withdraw prior decision);
see also Rider v Local 1853, 9 PRB 429, 434 n 4 (1997) (PRB refuses to withdraw
opinion in part because of appellant's history of changing mind).

Constitutional interpretations

The PRB is one of two supreme judicial authorities in the UAW.

Nevertheless, being unelected, PRB members say they are reluctant to
overturn constitutional interpretations of the president and IEB; IEB and
presidential interpretations are entitled to great weight.
But the PRB occasionally does act if it thinks the president or IEB are in
clear error. In one decision it even refused to follow a convention
precedent, despite the uniformity requirement of the EPC.

At issue was the predecessor of article 33 section 5, which allowed

punishment of members who appealed to a civil court for redress without
exhausting UAW remedies. A member had begun libel proceedings against
another member about a leaflet circulated during an election. He had not
appealed first. The IEB summarily suspended the court plaintiff on the
basis of convention's Pizor precedent (described by the PRB), decided
earlier that year.

The PRB admitted the facts in Pizor differed in no material way. But it
reasoned the convention had not considered a point the PRB found
decisive -- the meaning of the word "appeal." Therefore it said it found
little guidance, and reversed. I too disagree with Pizor. But the PRB was
bound to follow it anyway because precedents are controlling.
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35, 40 (1958);
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533, 537-38 (1969) (1941 convention finding that
Canadian Communist Party was foreign-controlled does not mean it was foreign-
controlled in 1969),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92, 107-08 (1974) (convention precedent regarding contract
ratification followed),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125, 140-41 (1974) (convention precedent regarding contract
ratification followed).
Statistics

Table of Contents

Since the beginning in 1957 the PRB has numbered its decisions
consecutively. At the end of 2008 it had reached # 1610, and had issued
1415 published decisions. (Some were settled or withdrawn or otherwise
disposed without opinion.)

Through 2008, the PRB reversed or modified an IEB decision in 148

decisions or about 10½% of the appeals. CAC reversals are discussed
elsewhere.
Szymczak v Dewyea, 1 PRB 35 (1958) (exhaustion of UAW remedies as prerequisite for
member suing a member),
Smith, 1 PRB 44 (1958) (composition of appeals committee),
Egres, 1 PRB 50 (1959) (resignation from local office),
Smith, 1 PRB 66 (1958) (composition of appeals committee),
Gaikowski, 1 PRB 84 (1959) (IEB hearings),
Stephen v Local 92, 1 PRB 105 (1960) (remedy for unfair election),
Lorenz v Local 174, 1 PRB 133 (1960) (full participation of laid-off members in zone
meetings),
Ellis v Lindy, 1 PRB 154 (1960) (scope of penalty imposed by trial committee in
amalgamated local),
Siren v UAW, 1 PRB 160 (1960)(appealability of IEB recommendation),
Oates v UAW, 1 PRB 170 (1961), second decision 1 PRB 174 (1962), third decision 1 PRB
178 (1962) (authority of president to decide appeal to IEB, PRB rejects IEB
interpretation of beginning of time period to appeal local action to IEB),
 Ryan v UAW, 1 PRB 186 (1961) (installation of elected officer pending resolution of
election protest),
Michener, 1 PRB 270 (1962) (election recount),
Weissman v Local 122, 1 PRB 336 (1964) (discharge has no spontaneous effect on the
membership relationship),
Comley v Noble, 1 PRB 347 (1965) (unbecoming conduct),
O'Hara v Local 36, 1 PRB 391 (1966) (installation and backpay after disputed election),
West v Local 738, 1 PRB 430 (1967) (sufficiency of charges),
Dimeo v Local 72, 1 PRB 459 (1968) (plurality voting for LEB members-at-large),
Peterson v UAW, 1 PRB 508 (1969) (suspension without adequate notice and time to
prepare),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522, 527-28 (1969) (IEB decision of unappealed issue,
negligent forgetfulness as basis of grievance appeal),
Bridgewood v Local 707, 1 PRB 533 (1969) (transitory nature of political parties),
Dillon, 1 PRB 559 (1970) (eligibility of candidate who fails to resign from present office),
Harry v Local 774, 1 PRB 576 (1970) (local prerogative to order rerun of non-officer
election),
Payne v Local 453, 1 PRB 580, 587 (1970) (opportunity to cross-examine neutral expert
witness),
Waldo v Local 780, 1 PRB 592 (1970) (quality of democracy and local prerogative to
order rerun in non-officer election),
Garrett, 1 PRB 596 (1970) (journeyperson card),
Robertson v UAW, 1 PRB 632 (1971) (appealability of decisions affecting members as
UAW employees),
Local 952, 1 PRB 647 (1971) (efforts of delinquent candidate to ascertain dues status as
affecting eligibility),
Ruzicka v Local 166, 1 PRB 654 (1971) (validity of charges),
Kizelowicz, 1 PRB 705 (1971) (application for separate skilled trades ratification),
Dietrich v Local 1313, 1 PRB 773 (1972) (removal as steward),
Nettles, 1 PRB 814 (1973) (party status of incumbent committeeperson in election
appeal),
Daly, 1 PRB 816 (1973) (right to ratify transfer agreement),
Dawkins v Local 3, 1 PRB 849 (1973) (timeliness of appeal),
Beck v Local 5, 2 PRB 12 (1973) (effect of appellate delay on remedy in election protest),
 Bolling v Local 306, 2 PRB 24 (1973) (appeal wording, delegate's convention expenses),
Gally v UAW, 2 PRB 67 (1973) (union's settlement of election claim with the DOL had no
effect on members's constitutional challenge to election),
Craig v Local 997, 2 PRB 152 (1974) (plurality election of LEB members-at-large),
EP complaint of Placido, 2 PRB 165 (1974) (timeliness of seniority appeal, posting of
restored seniority),
Rangel, 2 PRB 215 (1974) (evidence regarding whether election violation affected
outcome disappeared),
Tanzella v Local 738, 2 PRB 232 (1975) (IEB refusal to pass on merits of appeal),
Unit 1, Local 412, 2 PRB 251 (1975), 2 PRB 264 (1976) (proportional representation of
unit in amalgamated local),
Dawkins v UAW, 2 PRB 296 (1975) (power of autonomous local to decide it had wronged
a member),
Keown v Local 1587, 2 PRB 308 (1976) (specificity of charges),
Roberson v Local 974, 2 PRB 395 (1976) (lottery as an improper campaign practice,
union newspaper during campaign),
Reid v Local 222, 2 PRB 459 (1976) (service on the election committee while running for
alternate committeeperson),
Stevens v Local 595, 2 PRB 493 (1976) (local's obligation to give accurate constitutional
procedural advice on member's request),
Anthony, 2 PRB 508 (1976) (disqualification of candidate for seniority committee),
Valdiserri v Local 699, 2 PRB 570 (1977) (chargeability of personal use of union charge
account and double-dipping),
Arcaro v UAW, 2 PRB 618 (1978) (ratting to management as chargeable offense),
Spain v Local 1112, 2 PRB 649 (1977) (use of official union information as election
campaign aid),
Laughery v Local 72, 2 PRB 717 (1978), reconsidered 2 PRB 724 (1980) (trial committee
misconduct as justification for IEB review of acquittal on a charge),
Mingo v Local 1639, 2 PRB 753 (1979) (modification of trial penalty),
McCue v Local 1459, 2 PRB 780 (1980) (candidate eligibility in shop committee election),
Local 248 v UAW, 2 PRB 799 (1980) (strike benefits),
Webster v Local 51, 2 PRB 856 (1981) (adequacy of meeting notice, authority of local
president),
St Hillaire v Local 1459, 3 PRB 32, 35 (1980) (timeliness of charge),
Unit 24, Local 412, 3 PRB 46 (1980) (appealability of grievance disposition in which union
prevailed),
Tanzella v Local 738, 3 PRB 67 (1981) (pre-election challenge),
Dillon v Local 735, 3 PRB 152 (1981) (charges of political redistricting),
Resnick v Local 906, 3 PRB 221 (1981) (retroactivity of constitutional change, rationality
of grievance settlement),
EP complaint of Wirth v Local 596, 3 PRB 243, 247 (1982); (appearance of unequal
payment of lost time to witnesses for charging and charged member affected fairness
of trial),
Laney v UAW, 3 PRB 271 (1981) (offsite free-speech violation by union mob),
Janicki v UAW, 3 PRB 333 (1982) (failure of local union to refer member's appeal to full
body for decision),
Seal v Local 216, 3 PRB 338 (1982) (local's obligation to give accurate constitutional
procedural advice on member's request),
James v Region 5, 3 PRB 385 (1982) (rationality of grievance settlement),
Ramey v Local 652, 3 PRB 393 (1983) (slate voting),
Griffiths v Local 148, 3 PRB 425 (1983) (diminished election turnout due to erroneous
election notices),
Local 72 v UAW, 3 PRB 435 (1983) (failure of IEB to consider all issues of appeal),
supplemental decision 3 PRB 440 (1983),
Wirth v Local 596, 4 PRB 1, 3 (1983) (temporary installation to possible appointed
position for member unfairly convicted in trial),
Appeal of Conway, 4 PRB 36 (1983) (absentee ballots),
Drake v Local 659, 4 PRB 84 (1983) (rationality of grievance-handling),
Null v Local 735, 4 PRB 94 (1984) (trial of conduct that has been remedied),
Uhelski v Local 651, 4 PRB 102 (1984) (chair's procedural ruling at local meeting),
Iyun v Local 2166, 4 PRB 209, 211 (1984) (IEB must hold hearing on EPC claim),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222 (1984) (ex post facto bookkeeping rules),
Carstensen v Local 780, 4 PRB 238 (1984) (non-candidate's standing to challenge
election),
Hall v Local 735, 4 PRB 263 (1984) (rationality of grievance disposition),
Ford v UAW, 4 PRB 268 (1985) (ex post facto bookkeeping rules),
Snider v Local 477, 5 PRB 7 (1985) (election rerun based on fraud that could not have
affected the outcome),
Benton v Local 1977, 5 PRB 52 (1986) (remand of grievance appeal to IEB for further
investigation),
George v Region 2A, 5 PRB 204 (1987) (rationality of grievance disposition),
Humphrey v Ford Department, 5 PRB 285 (1987) (rationality of grievance settlement),
Belue v UAW, 5 PRB 399 (1987) (administratorship),
Grigsby v Local 110, 5 PRB 412 (1987) (timing and specificity of charge), Horton v
Local 422, 5 PRB 480 (1988) (chaos at election committee election), Wouster v Local
977, 5 PRB 551 (1989) (company property used to assist candidate,
affect on the outcome),
Sabin v Local 599, 5 PRB 566 (1988) (strike authorization ballot wording),
Williams v Chrysler Department, 5 PRB 748 (1990) (absenteeism grievance occasioned
by heart condition),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775 (1990) (trial of local president's non-attendance at
grievance meeting),
Lawless v Local 854, 6 PRB 39 (1990) (equal application of nomination acceptance cutoff
rule),
Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193 (1991) (IEB hearing procedures),
Yettaw v Local 599, 6 PRB 387 (1992) (appeal timeliness),
Adams v Local 425, 6 PRB 464 (1992) (charge as collateral attack on remedial
proceeding),
Hauben v Local 3000, 8 PRB 1 (1993) (grievance appeal appealed timely),
Yettaw v Local 599 I, 8 PRB 28 (1993), second decision 8 PRB 31 (1995) (appealability
and timeliness),
Eastman v Local 1292 I, 8 PRB 49 (1993), second decision 8 PRB 31 (1995)
(appealability and timeliness),
McKenzie v UAW, 8 PRB 108 (1993) (expenses and fraternal delegates at conventions),
Ward v GM Department, 8 PRB 228 (1994) (removal of appointed international rep),
LaPresta v Local 1112, 8 PRB 266 (1994) (request for procedural advice about appeal),
Peterson v TOP Department, 8 PRB 289 (1995) (discharge grievance involving alleged
criminal conduct),
Sailer v Local 214, 8 PRB 555 (1995) (timeliness of charge filed when rumor becomes
specific),
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996)
(misconduct discharge grievance),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 151 (1996) (absenteeism discharge
grievance),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 213 (1999) (leaving without authorization),
Morris v Local 1853, 9 PRB 225 (1999) (leaving without authorization),
Williams v UAW, 9 PRB 255 (1997), second decision 9 PRB 260 (1997) (timeliness of
appeal),
Feldman v Local 900, 9 PRB 332 (1997) (employer interference in election),
Mieli v UAW, 9 PRB 449 (1997) (free speech and dual unionism),
Vogen v Local 900 I, 9 PRB 614 (1998), later decision 9 PRB 624 (2000), reconsideration
denied (7/19/00) (grievance of probationer),
Taylor v Local 1853, 10 PRB 10 (2001) (mitigation of backpay damages for irrational
grievance-handling),
PochikKapera v Local 372, 10 PRB 52 (1998) (IEB appellate jurisdiction),
Wyatt appealing Miller v Local 2190, PRB Case 1228 (10/15/98) (charges),
Long v Local 22, 10 PRB 206 (1998), supplemental decision, 10 PRB 216 (1999) (area
hire grievance),
Henderson v Local 659, 10 PRB 348, 352 (1999) (charges),
Pearson v UAW, 10 PRB 390 (1999), reconsideration denied (10/28/99) (removal of local
officer after audit),
Austin v Local 594, 10 PRB 439 (1999) (lost time for union trial witnesses),
Warner v Local 599, 10 PRB 575 (2000), reconsideration denied (6/14/00) (union
newspaper article during election),
Nardicchio v UAW, 11 PRB 61 (2001) (removal of local officer after audit),
Hills v Local 961, 11 PRB 77, 80 (2000), reconsidered in 2001 according to Hills v Local
961, 11 PRB 230, 234 n 7 (2001) (charges),
Austin v Local 594, 11 PRB 111, 117, 118 (2001) (lost time for election committee),
Engle in the matter of Ellis v Local 600, 11 PRB 209 (2001) (committeeperson election
recount),
Burdette v GM Department, 11 PRB 303 (2001) (rationality of grievance settlement),
Acton v GM Department, 11 PRB 362 (2003) (rationality of grievance settlement),
Gaines v UAW, 11 PRB 410, 413-14 (2003) (removal as local financial secretary),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03) (LEB liability for discipline for temporary
removal of officer without hearing),
Zavadil v Ford Department, PRB Case 1407 (3/19/03) (rationality of grievance
 settlement),
Lescoe v Local 900, PRB Case 1430 (8/28/03) (too few days between redistricting and
election, member transferred from district to prevent him from being candidate),
Carver v Local 163, PRB Case 1435 (9/25/03) (UAW reps campaigning in election, no
requirement of pre-election protest, IEB should have questioned witnesses present at
hearing),
McComb in the matter of Carnahan v IEB, PRB Case 1453 II (10/25/06) (timeliness of
proceedings under article 48),
Morgan v Local 832, PRB Case 1462 (1/13/05) (rationality of grievance settlement),
Edwards v Local 148, PRB Case 1468 (6/22/04) (membership approval of expenditure
need not precede incurring the expenditure),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04) (adequacy of
IEB hearing to provide EPC appellant due process),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 II (4/12/05) (notice of
adverse personnel actions to employee-members and right to ask for reconsideration
and appeal),
Addison v UAW, PRB Case 1500 (9/2/05), (timeliness of appeal),
Karras v Local 653, PRB Case 1512 (11/22/05) (removal from office),
Frederick-Brown v UAW, PRB Case 1519 (12/21/05, 4/20/06) (eligibility of part-time
employee to run for shop chair),
Franks v UAW, PRB Case 1520 (12/20/05) (obligation of UAW to assist locals and inform
members of their rights and obligations regarding dues in a newly organized unit),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06), (proportional representation among delegates to
joint councils in amalgamated locals),
Reighard v UAW, PRB Case 1532 (1/24/06), p 5 (IEB may overrule decision of the
president),
Dedic v UAW, PRB Case 1562 (7/20/07) (appeal remanded because there was nothing to
interpret),
O'Connor v Local 974, PRB Case 1570 (12/14/07) (bylaw requiring local to pay delegates
lost time and per diems),
Torres v Local 594, PRB Case 1572 (8/10/07) (hearsay evidence in a trial),
Brant v UAW, PRB Case 1575 (12/17/07) (local ordered to pay local president amount
claimed in accordance with local vote, with interest),
Parden v Region 1A, PRB Case 1585 (3/3/08) (rationality of grievance settlement),
 Pederson v UAW, PRB Case 1593 (9/3/08) (timeliness of appeal to IEB),
Alejandro v Local 2244, PRB Case 1597 (10/28/08) (trial verdict),
Otto v Local 1292, PRB Case 1598 (11/24/08) (role of LEB in evaluating corroboration of
charges),
Neely v Region 3, PRB Case 1601 (4/21/09) (rationality of grievance settlement).

Through 2008, I count 47, or a little over 3%, in which there was
controversy of some degree within the PRB. By that I mean a dissenting,
concurring, or other separate statement, an equally divided panel, or a
decision reversed on rehearing.
Turner v UAW, 1 PRB 12 (1958) (trial, notice of hearing, proxy quorum),
Michener v UAW, 1 PRB 270 (1962) (election recount),
Local 257 v Kellog, 1 PRB 309 (1965)(trial procedure),
Pietraszek v Local 3, 1 PRB 340 (1964) (exclusion of PRB from review of bargaining
policy),
Patterson v Local 719, 1 PRB 369 (1965) (ballot-handling, equally divided PRB),
Hopkins v Local 730, 1 PRB 469 (1969), vacated 1 PRB 477 (1969) (ratification of shop
committee's oral agreement),
Pfeiffer v Local 556, 1 PRB 485 (1968) (grievance appeals),
Marshall v Local 1364, 1 PRB 522 (1969) (trial procedure, unbecoming conduct,
remedies),
Sexton v UAW, 1 PRB 729 (1972) (summary nature of article 48 trial),
Kiel v UAW, 1 PRB 738 (1972) (summary nature of article 48 trial),
Liddell v UAW, 2 PRB 92 (1974) (separate skilled trades ratification),
Poszich v UAW, 2 PRB 125 (1974) (separate skilled trades ratification),
Badura v Local 93, 2 PRB 173, 178, 183 (1976) (meaning of "fraud" in grievance-
handling),
Anthony, 2 PRB 508 (1976) (disqualification of candidate for seniority committee),
Bynum v Local 235, 3 PRB 85 (1980) (committeeperson election),
Ramey v Local 652, 3 PRB 393 (1983) (slate voting),
Griffiths v Local 148, 3 PRB 425 (1983) (diminished election turnout due to erroneous
election notices),
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108(1984) (committeeperson election after
redistricting),
Alli v UAW, 4 PRB 222 (1984) (financial reporting to membership),
Obenauf v Local 1112, 5 PRB 62 (1986) (seniority of vacation replacements),
Bradley appealing Glinski v Local 235, 5 PRB 174 (1987) (triability of charges against
shop chair),
Robinson v UAW, 5 PRB 439 (1988) (drug purchaser),
Hein appealing Baudoux v Region 1, 5 PRB 703, 710 (1989) (allocation of settlement of
class grievances),
Wright v Local 1069, 5 PRB 775 (1990) (trial of local president's non-attendance at
grievance meeting),
Merrow v Region 1A, 6 PRB 125 (1991) (dissent unexplained),
Smith v Local 699, 6 PRB 168 (1991) (implementation of umpire's seniority decision),
Zepplin v Local 974, 6 PRB 477 (1993) (rational versus correct),
Yettaw v Local 599 II, 8 PRB 31 (1995) (spousal convention delegate travel as a
necessary expense of a local),
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331 (1994) (standing to file charge and timeliness of local
approval of EPC charge),
Grant v GM Department I, 9 PRB 5 (1995), supplemental decision 9 PRB 20 (1996)
(misconduct discharge grievance),
Thompson v GM Department, 9 PRB 64 (1996) (contract ratification and right to appeal),
Testerman v Chrysler Department, 9 PRB 151 (1996) (absenteeism discharge
grievance),
Rivett v Local 699, 9 PRB 382 (1997), modified 9 PRB 391 (1998) (seniority grievance on
transfer to new skilled classification),
Patterson v Local 599, 9 PRB 421 (1997) (removal from LEB after moving to job in
different district),
Yettaw v Local 599, 10 PRB 70, 74-75 (1998), reconsideration denied (7/31/98)
(sanction for frivolous EPC appeal),
Mertz v Local 2256, 10 PRB 612, 621 (2001) (dissent unexplained),
Austin v GM Department, 11 PRB 82, 91 (2001) (dissent unexplained),
McAuley v GM Department, 11 PRB 474 (2003) (significance of race in rationality of
grievance settlement),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511 (2002) (political activities of appointed
 rep),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511 (2002) (bypass of local step in EPC claim),
Badalamento v Ford Department, 11 PRB 511 (2002) (clarity of Ford department
prohibition on political activities of appointed reps in EPC claim),
Bolen v Local 848, PRB Case 1402 (1/3/03) (explanation of PRB rationale),
Davis v UAW, PRB Case 1441 (4/15/03) (constitutional amendments are inherently
political),
Gaston-Kelley v DaimlerChrysler Department, PRB Case 1476 (9/15/04) (ability of UAW
appointees conducting IEB investigation of top UAW player to do so independently and
thoroughly),
Shotwell v GM Department, PRB Case 1504 (11/29/05) (concurrence unexplained),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06) (recommending that UAW amend article 35 section
3(a) to resolve contradictory language),
Ford v UAW, PRB Case 1529 (5/8/06) (inherently contradictory language of article 35
section 3(a)).

The former executive director

One problem the PRB never explained was the conduct of its executive
director David Klein in a non-UAW labor-related case in 1994. Klein was a
Michigan lawyer. He was not a voting PRB member. But occasionally he
signed a substantive decision. He was, according to the PRB chair speaking
to the conventions in 1986 and 1989 and 1992, "indispensable" to it. The
2003 annual report described him as "highly able and deeply dedicated."
Proceedings, 28th constitutional convention, p 208 (1986),
proceedings, 29th constitutional convention, p 254 (1989),
proceedings, 30th constitutional convention, p 234 (1992);
 PRB 46th annual report (2003), p 7;
Douglas v UAW, 8 PRB 331 (1994) reconsideration denied (1/10/95), p 2 (Klein
signature).

With me, Klein was always straight. But he pleaded no contest and was
temporarily suspended from practicing law in 1994, for unethical conduct
representing an Iron Workers local. The state bar journal noted he gave a
portion of legal fees earned in some matters to the local's business
manager in exchange for referral of those cases; he also had a conflict of
interest with the local's SUB fund. He later retrieved the referral fees and
donated them to charity. As to the conflicted SUB case I don't know what
action he took if any to rectify it. He left the state and retired from law
practice.
Affidavit of David Y. Klein, Attorney Discipline Board, ACB Case 94-100-GA (8/1/94),
Michigan Bar Journal, August, 1994, p 841.

A UAW member with a then-pending case at the PRB wrote Klein asking
for an explanation. He responded denying the accusations only generally;
he enclosed a one-paragraph response of the PRB which also denied the
charges only generally.
Letter, Michael Crowder to David Klein, 1/23/95,
letter and attachment, David Klein to Michael Crowder, 1/31/95.

I sent a similar letter with similar result.

Letter, Ellis Boal to PRB, 11/30/94,
letter George Higgins to Ellis Boal, 12/28/94.
The PRB's report to the 1995 convention gave no details or explanation of
these extraordinary events at the UAW's ethical nerve center.
Proceedings, 31st constitutional convention, pp 232-33 (1995).

At the 1998 convention, Local 1700 proposed a resolution calling for the
UAW to remove Klein as the PRB's executive director.
Resolutions committee resolution # 408, 32nd constitutional convention (1998).

He directed the PRB until December 2003. Barbara Klein succeeded him.
PRB 46th annual report (2003), p 7.

XI. Processing an appeal at the CAC

Table of Contents

The CAC is a standing committee of the convention. Its decisions are final
and binding.
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), pp 5-6 (CAC declines appellants'
invitation to make only factual findings and refer decision itself to the convention).

Considerations in choosing whether to appeal to the CAC or PRB are

reviewed elsewhere.

I cite CAC decisions only from summaries because, as explained

elsewhere, I cannot regularly get original decisions. The summaries I
have go back to 1992; I also have its 1983 report covering the previous
three years.

The CAC is one of two supreme judicial authorities in the UAW.

It is chosen randomly from among the delegates of one-half of the

regions at each convention. Term-limited, members serve for two
conventions. It meets "at least" twice a year, typically in the spring and
the fall, at Solidarity House, and acts on appeals submitted at least 30
days before each meeting. Its decisions are final, binding, and not
appealable to the next convention.
Article 33 section 3(e),
Proceedings, 23rd constitutional convention (1972), pp 190-93 (staggered terms of CAC
members, no appeal to convention from a CAC decision),
Proceedings, 24th constitutional convention (1972), pp 221-24 (staggered terms of CAC
members).

Members and alternates chosen from 6 of the 11 regions were chosen at

the 2002 convention:

Region 1A: Betty Steel, Local 163, member; Ben Palazzolo, Local 723,
first alternate; Dan Skidmore, Local 735, second alternate.

Region 1C: Jerry Shanes, Local 62, member; Terry Norton, Local
 4911, first alternate; Gary Orvis, Local 598, second alternate.

Region 2B: Scott Billock, Local 14, member; Gene Steele, Local 856,
first alternate; Wayne Blanchard, Local 1435, second alternate.

Region 3: Anthony Reams, Local 912, member; Stanley Bradbury,

Local 2317, first alternate; Darla Neville, Local 2382, second
alternate.

Region 4: Hal Prine, Local 1304, member; Cathy Reynold, Local 1866,
first alternate; Randall Mason, Local 543, second alternate.

Region 8: Robert Chapman, Local 3399, member; George Hale, Local

239, first alternate; James Denny, Local 1832, second alternate.
Proceedings, 33rd constitutional convention (2002), fourth day draft minutes, report of
election results, pp 45-48 ("At each convention we have to elect our Conventions's
Appeal Committee, and each region does that to make sure that we have
representation from all of our regions and it's alternated by convention. So this year I
will read off those who were elected to the Appeals Committee.").

Members and alternates from the other 5 regions were chosen at the
2006 convention:

Region 1: Eric Jones, Local 771, member; Mary Gamble, Local 6911,
first alternate; Doreen Yacks, Local 251, second alternate.

Region 1D: Gary Peterson, Local 6000, member; Barbara Ruotsala,

Local 5000, first alternate; Michael Balls, Local 699, second alternate.
 Region 5: Bobby Wyse, Local 249, member; James Brown, Local 276,
first alternate; Leila Tarokh, Local 2865, second alternate.

Region 9: Jeff Glatt, Local 3400, member; Joe Costello, Local 8275,
first alternate; Robert Brant, Local 424, second alternate.

Region 9A: Lisa Daley, Local 571, member; Mary Cunningham, Local
3999, first alternate; Deborah Miller, Local 2377, second alternate.
Proceedings, 34th constitutional convention (2006), fourth day minutes, report of
election results, p 334.

Unlike the PRB, the CAC stands in the shoes of the convention itself, and
can review official collective bargaining policy. The constitution gives the
PRB power, which it has often exercised, to provisionally deny an appeal
which is based on a collective bargaining issue, but at the same time
allow the appellant 30 days to re-raise the collective bargaining issue
before the CAC.
Article 33 section 3(f) Determining jurisdiction

Unaccountably though, in one appeal the CAC held itself without power to
interpret a local collective bargaining agreement. The PRB also holds itself
without this power.
Hahn v 163, CAC, session 1/81.

Also unlike the PRB, the CAC invites all appellants to appear personally,
and submit written and oral argument.
Although the CAC says it can award damages against a local or
international union, as of 1993 it never had. I would appreciate hearing
from members with updated information.
Blalock v TRW, 1993 WL 475982, 144 LRRM 2168, 2173-74 (ED Mich, 1993) (in oral
argument it is stated that CAC has never awarded backpay);
compare Fowler, CAC, session 5/01 (discharge grievance referred back to region for
investigation of absence for attending a funeral, which appellant had documented, and
which contract allows),
Fowler, CAC, session 3/03 (after remand by CAC union arbitrated grievance and won but
appellant received no backpay for time during which the grievance had been
withdrawn; on claim against union for this backpay CAC applies PRB's fraud-
discrimination-collusion-irrational standard to union's action and denies damages).

Its decisions and budget are not published that I know of. I have not
been able to get on its mailing list.
Letter, Ellis Boal to Stan Geis, 9/26/97 (requesting and offering payment to be on CAC
mailing list for decisions and convention reports),
letter, Jay Whitman to Ellis Boal, 10/14/97 (responding to other parts of 9/26/97 letter).

Start an appeal to the CAC by writing it care of the president. I

recommend the same general form as in the initial appeal. If mailed, the
filing date of an appeal is the postmark date.
Article 33 section 4(b).

The appeal must be signed by at least one of the appellants. The

constitution actually indicates all appellants should sign. But I imagine
one would suffice, so long as the appeal specifies the others by name and
says it being filed on their behalf. If one proceeds on behalf of others,
make sure that one has no individual procedural problems.
Article 33 section 4(e);
compare Robinson appealing Blandford v Local 659, 6 PRB 219, 225-26 (1991) (current
member who is also a lapsed former member lacked standing to join group appeal
because at the time appeal was filed she was not a member).

CAC administrative procedures are handled by the IEB. I have an old

undated copy, and a new undated copy, of the CAC rules. The old one
contains a statement read by the chair at the start of hearings. The
statement notes that the CAC has before it all the materials considered by
the IEB plus a "complete summary of the case." I don't know if that
practice continues today. I have not been provided with a CAC
pre-hearing "complete summary" in the hearings I attended. All I have
got has been the record of materials considered by the IEB.
Article 33 section 3(e) paragraph 2 (CAC administrative procedures are established by
the IEB, subject to review by subsequent conventions),
Convention Appeals Committee rules (undated),
Convention Appeals Committee chairman's statement (undated).

According to its name the CAC is an appellate body. At least according to

the PRB, it is not to do its own fact-finding; fact-finding is what the IEB
does.

But the chairman's statement in the old rules says the parties can
"present any new evidence." So the CAC can grant appeals based on new
evidence not presented to the IEB.
Convention Appeals Committee chairman's statement (undated);
Bryant, CAC, session 4/94 (appeal granted, new evidence);
Matweychek, CAC, session 11/95 (appeal granted, new evidence),
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06), p 12 ("Any doubt about the Union's
compliance ... is dispelled by the testimony of Mark Hawkins.... He testified in person
before this Committee and we credit his testimony.");
compare Downs v Local 2250, 6 PRB 193, 200 (1991) (if IEB decision conforms to PRB
rules a complete record will have been made; if and when the appeal arrives at the
PRB or CAC they will not be presented for the first time with new evidence and new
arguments not previously considered).

The new rules repeat several of the rules of the constitution concerning
form and delivery of an appeal, CAC jurisdiction, frequency, location, and
purpose of CAC hearings, CAC administrative procedures, finality of CAC
decisions, and composition of the CAC. Concerning hearings, mostly
tracking article 33 section 4(h), the new rules add:
Appellant is permitted (and shall bear the cost of) counsel or other representative
of her/his choice.

Appellant may submit a brief or other written statement of position.

Appellant and Appellee (or their representatives) are required to appear, along
with witnesses of their choosing.

Appellant must answer fully and truthfully all questions put to them.

All parties must be afforded opportunity to present their positions on all matters
bearing on the action, decision, or penalty under review.

Convention Appeals Committee rules (undated), provided by letter, Dave

 Curson to Ellis Boal, 2/7/06.

I would feel better about these rules if they applied equally to appellants
and appellees. Most importantly, appellees should be required to answer
questions fully and truthfully.

The CAC has dismissed appeals because the appellant failed to appear for
the hearing.
Rushing, CAC, session 10/03,
Gross, CAC, session 3/05.

Unlike at the PRB, someone from the president's office and the legal
department is present to render "technical assistance" if needed. This is
defined as assistance for the purpose of explaining procedures or
interpreting particular sections of the constitution, not assistance in
arguing the pros or cons of the appeal at hand. Though nothing in the
constitution or the CAC rules provides for it, the CAC can request such
assistance out of the presence of the parties, even in appeals to which the
IEB is a party and is represented by members of the president's staff and
the legal department.
Fetting v GM Department, CAC Decision (4/4/06) (presidential assistant Eunice Stokes-
Wilson, conversation with Ellis Boal, after CAC hearing in which presidential assistant
Dave Curson and Michael Saggau of the UAW legal department appeared for appellees,
and Sister Stokes-Wilson and Jay Whitman of the UAW legal department appeared as
CAC technical assistants, conversation confirmed by letter, Boal to Stokes-Wilson,
4/22/06).
The wisdom of such a rule is not apparent, especially given that it is
unwritten and unpublicized. It is the CAC which is to interpret the
constitution and explain procedures for the president's office and the legal
department, not the other way around. The CAC has ample tools for the
task, including its own body of decisions through the years and the PRB's.
UAW procedure prevents the IEB from listening to representatives of one
side of an appeal out of the presence of the other. The same should apply
to the CAC. Even acknowledging the IEB's right to establish CAC
procedures and granting the good faith of all involved, an invitation to
give the CAC technical assistance on an issue where the assistants'
colleagues are arguing one party's side of the same issue, without
allowing the opposing party at least to listen in, does not comport with
UAW traditions.
Article 7 section 1(a) ("The highest tribunal shall be the International Convention...."),
article 33 section 3(e) Jurisdiction and Procedure ("The administrative procedures for the
Convention Appeals Committee in handling appeals shall be established by the
International Executive Board, subject to review by subsequent Constitutional
Conventions.");
special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173 (matters appealed to CAC "will be
considered to have been decided by the Convention....");
Vicola appealing Patrick v Local 653, 4 PRB 108, 112 (1984) (primary but not exclusive
authority for interpreting the constitution is the president, the IEB, and the
convention),
Miller v UAW, 4 PRB 118, 122 (1983) ("Ultimate judicial authority in the Union is vested
both in the Public Review Board and the Convention Appeals committee."),
Taylor appealing Russell v Local 25, 5 PRB 680, 688 (1989) ("Appeals from Article 13 §8
[constitutional] interpretations may be had only to the Convention Appeals
Committee.... [The appeal route of presidential constitutional interpretations given
 under article 13 section 8 is] to the International Executive Board and then to the
Constitutional Convention."),
Cordell appealing McDonaugh v Local 1183, 9 PRB 591, 595 (1998) ("Any material
provided to the International Tribunal should also have been provided to the opposing
party as well.... [I]t is of vital importance that the Tribunal maintain the appearance as
well as the fact of total impartiality."),
Newcomb v Local 1183, 9 PRB 636, 644 n 9 (1998) (IEB commonly accepts or solicits
post-hearing evidede nce, and this is proper so long as all parties are informed),
Shay v Local 163, 10 PRB 555, 558 n 3 (2000) (IEB should not meet privately with one
side before a hearing);
letter, Jay Whitman to Ellis Boal, 10/14/97 (where an appeal is underway article 8
section 13 leaves constitutional interpretation to the tribunal).

Transcripts are made of the hearings, and members may purchase them.

CAC decisions are final and binding.

Article 33 section 3(e),
special note to article 33 of 2006 constitution, p 173.

Unlike the PRB, and like the IEB, the CAC's jurisdiction is unlimited in
grievance appeals. Some of reversal decisions described here indicate the
CAC's mere disagreement with the dispostion of a grievance. In some, the
CAC said new evidence should be examined. In some the CAC remanded
despite doubts whether the appellant would prevail in arbitration.

In 1981-83, of 32 appeals considered, the CAC upheld IEB action in all

but 2, or 6¼%. In 1992-2006, of 189 appeals considered, the CAC upheld
IEB action in all except 27, or 14¼%; 5 others were postponed or held in
abeyance. The 29 reversals and 5 postponements are described below.
PRB reversals are reviewed elsewhere.
Scholbrock v Local 94, CAC, session 1/81 (appellants claimed that the procedure they
followed was consistent with their practice and that supervision was fully aware of it,
the procedure followed was as claimed, and company charged them with the wrong
infraction),
Luna v Local 600, CAC, session 6/82 (appellant's failure to meet precisely the procedures
for bidding for job was not sufficient grounds to deny him promotion, in light of
admission that if he had been given the opportunity to bid he could have been the one
selected),
Ratliff, CAC, session 10/92 (management claimed appellant assaulted supervisor; GM
department reached settlement for $35,000 in backpay which appellant rejected; in
court appellant pled guilty to disorderly conduct not assault; supervisor's word without
more should not be taken over appellant's; no proof or finding of unprovoked assault),
Hester, CAC, session 3/93, (though on an LCA, appellant had nurse call plant within
specified time, and doctor's slips covered entire period he was off),
McTaggart, CAC, session 11/93 (appellant cutter grinder EIT sought to transfer plants to
get more overtime, remanded to determine whether opening appellant sought to fill
involved a requisition for a journeyman),
Bryant, CAC, session 4/94 (appellant discharged under chronic absentee program; he
provided new evidence which was not in IEB record),
Shannon, CAC, session 11/94 (appellant bid out of chipper classification and was
subsequently laid off for lack of work though junior chippers were kept on; after recall
he grieved and company agreed to train him as a chipper; as to backpay company
offered pension credit for time off; remanded so appellant could take his chances
before an arbitrator),
Wigington, CAC, session 4/95 (grievance appeal remanded to IEB due to confusion over
the facts, CAC jurisdiction retained),
Matweychek, CAC, session 11/95 (IEB held appellant had failed to present
documentation or contractual support, appellant introduced new evidence to CAC in
support of claim),
Vargo, CAC, session 11/95 (appellant was placed in job setter position probationarily and
got 12 hours of training and was told he was doing fine; later he was told he had not
successfully completed probation and would be removed from position; but he
 remained in the position two additional weeks; no hard evidence was produced
regarding his failure to perform job; grievance reinstated even though it would be hard
to ask arbitrator to substitute judgment for that of the company and the local),
Wagstaff, CAC, session 11/95 (appellant was terminated for inability to report after state
conviction for possession of marijuana; UAW withdrew grievance; appellant then faced
federal prosecution for the same offense but the federal judge dismissed the case
saying the police search was illegal; appellant has now petitioned the state court for
release on the same theory; CAC puts appeal in abeyance pending outcome of state
proceedings),
Jones, CAC, session 5/96 (grievance was withdrawn, local sent certified letter to last
known address, but it was returned; appellant had moved and notified post office and
secretary of state but not local; during a meeting with the local vice-president he
attempted to change his address but the vice-president said he couldn't personally take
it because he might lose it; he was told to contact the region, he did, was told
grievance was withdrawn, and appealed; president said appeal was untimely; CAC
asked president's office to reverse earlier decision and president's office agreed),
Gallie, CAC, session 4/97 (management claimed appellant intentionally ripped carpets on
an assembly operation; fellow workers wrote statements saying carpets occasionally
ripped normally as part of the job and appellant had previously ripped carpets without
complaint from management),
Matweychek, CAC, session 4/97 (appellant was ordered to do a "hot job" by foreman,
misunderstood order, and did wrong "hot job"; local settled this and other grievances
on the basis of counselling and 1-2 weeks off; during appeal at request of IEB appeals
committee local met with company and discipline was reduced to three days; IEB then
denied the appeal; CAC believed facts did not support a shop rule violation or the
discipline given),
McCalister, CAC, session 3/98 (settlement reached with company that could affect
remedy sought, consideration of appeal postponed),
Norris, CAC, session 3/98 (appellant's wife mailed signed appeal by regular mail, UAW
received it on uncertain date but did not respond; wife then mailed appeal second time;
wife's testimony establishes prima facie case appeal was mailed timely; in the absence
of other evidence wife is credited),
Cook, CAC, session 10/98 (appeal which was dismissed by IEB for failure of appellant to
appear remanded by CAC because of evidence he did not receive notice of the IEB
 hearing and was incarcerated at the time),
Davis, CAC, session 4/99 (appellant was discharged after claimed threatening behavior
supported by statements of co-workers and positive cocaine test; appellant claimed
witness statements were inaccurate and he was returned to work too early from
work-related medical leave; record showed unspecified problems at other Ford plant;
appeal referred back to IEB for investigation of the unspecified problems),
Jackiewicz, CAC, session 4/99 (appeal settled during CAC hearing; the local will address
the problems raised at the hearing concerning the local agreement),
Berstler, CAC, session 4/00 (appellant charged for overtime for taking paid bereavement;
local voted to uphold appeal but company refused to reinstate grievance; at CAC
hearing local asked for remand; IEB did not oppose this and the CAC remanded the
grievance to the local),
Williams, CAC, session 4/00 (appellant took unopened beer can from car in plant lot and
placed it outside the fence for another employee, thinking that this was off company
property; plant rule prohibits use or consumption of alcohol on premises, and penalty is
only "up to" and including discharge; appellant should have received mere oral
reprimand if there was a violation at all),
Norris, CAC, session 11/00 (company notified appellant within five days either to report,
mail form completed by physician, or telephone; appellant telephoned the next day; he
reported and said physician had mailed report five days earlier; he was terminated;
regional rep withdrew grievance at step 3; IEB reinstated it; second regional rep
withdrew grievance at step 3; IEB upheld withdrawal; CAC remands to step 4 to
determine whether appellant literally complied with company letter),
Boswell, CAC, session 5/01 (union settled discharge and backpay to be paid during period
of termination; appellant appealed settlement because backpay was incorrect;
company arbitration manager says shortfall is being addressed and the difference will
be remedied),
Fowler, CAC, session 5/01 (appellant was discharged; one of the absences was for
attending funeral of his cousin; company policy allows one-day absence without pay for
this; appellant had a letter showing he was at funeral, though timeliness of letter is
unclear; referred back to the region),
Harbin, CAC, session 5/01 (five-day quit notice; appellant had groin pain at work and
went to an emergency room; x-rays showed a cancerous mass and appellant scheduled
a pre-operative test and surgery; the company mailed him leave papers but appellant
 paid no attention because of concern about his health; on reporting he was fired and
the company refused to accept medical documentation; evidence showed a urologist
note may have been sent to the company within the five days; appellant may be able
to establish in arbitration the company was notified timely),
Williams, CAC, session 5/01 (appeal held in abeyance),
White, CAC, session 10/01 (registered letter was mailed to appellant and several
unsuccessful delivery attempts were made; appellant's mother was contacted by phone
and asked for a different date and was told to contact the president's office; because a
return receipt had not been received back by the UAW the CAC decided a tracer should
be placed on the letter; appeal held in abeyance),
Hutt, CAC, session 3/02 (appellant was injured by a supervisor at work and went back
and forth on medical; the company doc and appellant's doc disagreed on appellant's
work capabilities and a third doc said he would have a disabled shoulder for at least two
years; it's not clear the union knew of this when the settlement was proposed; the
company terminated his seniority saying he had not submitted medical documentation;
at the fourth step the grievance was settled on the basis of an LCA and a drug test;
appellant refused; there are facts that the company may have withheld from the
union),
Patton, CAC, session 3/02 (company ordered appellant to meet with management and
union to resolve issue; appellant refused to attend and was fired; he had an flawless
record and 16 years seniority; company shop rules do not show wilful insubordination
or disobedience as dischargeable on the first offense; the region's withdrawal decision
was not rational),
Jefferson, CAC, session 3/02 (appellant discharged for assault on a fellow employee;
there were no punches or injuries but there may have been physical contact; another
worker tried to break it up and ended up falling and twisting his knee; at first the
second co-worker said appellant pushed him aggressively but later signed a statement
saying it was accidental; all witness statements said there was no physical assault; the
rep who withdrew the grievance did not interview the witnesses; in a comparable
situation a week later in the same plant where one worker actually did push the other
they each only got a day off; Ford's zero-tolerance policy is therefore not inflexible;
grievance reinstated at step 3),
Harris, CAC, session 3/02 (appellant was granted a personal day and was given a pink
card but supervisor did not inform his substitute; at first appellant was suspended but
 then he worked two weeks while the company investigated but then he was suspended
again; he returned to work on the day indicated but the company fired him for not
having reported on a previous day; the local withdrew the grievance; the shop chair
then discovered a discrepancy in company documentation and asked to reopen the
grievance; the employer did not properly examine all the facts),
Young, CAC, session 9/02 (Ford sent appellant a five-day notice on February 25 and said
she did not report until March 8; but appellant testified she responded on March 4,
which was the fifth calendar day; the record includes a form she says filled out and
submitted to the company and the company acknowledged in writing that day though
there is a discrepancy about the date; she reported again on March 8 and provided
medical documentation; Ford's records indicate she actually had till March 11 to report;
grievance was withdrawn, reinstated, and withdrawn again; grievant may be able to
establish in arbitration she did in fact respond within the time required),
Jenkins, CAC, session 3/03 (in letters before the hearing date appellant asked for hearing
adjournment to he could prepare his case; hearing adjourned),
Wallace, CAC, session 3/03 (appellant discharged for failing to perform work while on
probation; she had a work restriction due to carpal tunnel to avoid vibratory tools; the
day prior she was assigned to such work but did only part of the job for fear of
aggravating the carpal tunnel; the day of the discharge the foreman disagreed she
couldn't do the job and she asked to go to medical; without having the plant doctor
observe the job in appellant's presence the foreman took her to labor relations; the
doctor then examined the job out of her presence and pronounced it within her
restrictions; she was not given the opportunity to return to the job after the doctor's
determination; she did not refuse after the doctor's determination; she was
terminated; the regional rep withdrew the grievance having determined it was
unwinnable; termination was improper; appeal granted).

XII. Addresses
Table of Contents
International Executive Board, c/o President Ron Gettelfinger, 8000 E
Jefferson, Detroit, MI, 48214, 313/926-5201 phone, 313/331-4957
fax, rgettelf@uaw.orgrgettelf@uaw.org , http://uaw.orghttp://uaw.org .

Convention Appeals Committee, c/o President Ron Gettelfinger, 8000

E Jefferson, Detroit, MI, 48214, 313/926-5201 phone, 313/331-4957
fax, rgettelf@uaw.orgrgettelf@uaw.org .

Public Review Board, c/o President Ron Gettelfinger, 8000 E Jefferson,

Detroit, MI, 48214, 313/926-5201 phone, 313/331-4957 fax,
rgettelf@uaw.org rgettelf@uaw.org ,
http://www.uawpublicreviewboard.orghttp://www.uawpublicreviewboard.org .

Public Review Board, 904 Starkweather, Plymouth, MI, 48170,

734/454-9911 phone, 734/454-9905 fax,
prbuaw@att.netprbuaw@att.net ,
http://www.uawpublicreviewboard.orghttp://www.uawpublicreviewboard.org .
Coincidentally, the PRB site went up about the same time I launched
the first release of this manual.

Regions: http://www.uaw.org/about/officers/eboard.html

Region 1, covering the following counties in Michigan: Huron,

Lapeer, Macomb, Oakland, St. Clair, Sanilac, Tuscola, and part of
Wayne (including Detroit). Region 1 also includes Canadian UAW
local unions. Director, Joseph Peters. 27800 George Merrelli Drive,
Warren, Michigan, 48092, 586/427-9200 phone, 586/427-7142
fax. Canadian Office, 220 Wellington Street West, Chatham,
Ontario, N7M1J6, 519/360-9888 and 800/387-0538 phones,
519/360-9222 fax, unionyes@ciaccess.comunionyes@ciaccess.com .

Region 1A, covering most of Wayne County, Michigan (including

part of Detroit), Monroe County, and Washtenaw County, and
extends to the Ohio border. The approximately 150,000 active
and retired members in Region 1A come from Ford, General
Motors, DaimlerChrysler, AutoAlliance, Michigan health care
facilities, state and county offices and facilities, and a variety of
other workplaces. Director, Rory Gamble. 9650 South Telegraph
Road, Taylor, Michigan, 48180, 313/926-5451, 313/291-2750
(phones), 313/291-2269 fax,
http://www.uawregion1a.com/http://www.uawregion1a.com/ .

Region 1C, covering 11 counties in south-central Michigan

including the cities of Flint, Lansing, and Jackson. Director, Duane
Zuckschwerdt. 1940 West Atherton Road, Flint, Michigan, 48507,
810/767-0910 phone, 810/767-3206 fax,
http://www.uawregion1c.org/http://www.uawregion
1c.org/ >/a> .

Region 1D, covering 62 counties, spanning western, central and

northern Michigan, including the Upper Peninsula. The region
includes the cities of Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Traverse City,
Saginaw, Muskegon, Benton Harbor, St. Joseph, Escanaba, and
Marquette. Director, Don Oetman. 3300 Leonard Northeast Grand
Rapids, Michigan, 49525-3363, 616/949-4100 phone,
616/949-6866 fax .
Region 2B, covering the state of Ohio. Director, Lloyd Mahaffey.
1691 Woodlands Drive, Maumee, Ohio, 43537, 419/893-4677
phone, 419/893-4073 fax .

Region 3, covering the states of Indiana and Kentucky. Director,

Maurice Davison. 5850 Fortune Circle West, Indianapolis, Indiana,
4624l, 317/247-5515 phone, 317/247-8218 fax .

Region 4, covering the north-central states of Illinois, Iowa,

Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming, and Montana. Director, Dennis Williams. 2700 South
River Road, Suite 200, Des Plaines, Illinois, 60018, 847/699-2020
phone, 847/699-1725 fax .

Region 5, covering 17 states in the Western and Southwestern

United States: Missouri, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Nevada,
Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Alaska, Washington, and Hawaii. Director,
Jim Wells. 721 Dunn Road, Hazelwood, Missouri, 63042,
314/731-2800 phone, 314/731-2729 fax .

Region 8, covering the Southeast, including Tennessee, Virginia,

West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, the District of Columbia, Maryland, and
Delaware and the following Pennsylvania counties: Franklin,
Cumberland, Adams, and York. Director, Gary Casteel. 151
Maddox-Simpson Parkway, Lebanon, Tennessee, 37090-5345,
 615/443-7654 phone, 615/443-7697 fax,
http://www.uawregion8.net/regionintro.htm
http://www.uawregion8.net/regionintro.htm .

Region 9, covering western and central New York, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, excluding the counties of Franklin, Cumberland,
Adams, and York. Director, Joe Ashton. 35 George Karl Boulevard,
Suite 100, Amherst, New York, 14221, 716/632-1540 phone,
716/632-1797 fax .

Region 9A, covering eastern New York (including New York City,
Green Island and Westchester County), Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine,
and Puerto Rico. Director, Bob Madore. 111 South Road,
Farmington, Connecticut, 06032-2560, 860/674-0143 phone,
860/674-1164 fax .

Web Archival Resource Directory, Walter Reuther Library, 5401 Cass

Avenue, Detroit, MI, 48202, 313/577-4024 phone, 313/577-4300 fax,
http://www.reuther.wayne.edu/ward/uaw.htmlhttp://www.reuther.wayne.edu/ward/uaw
.html .

Walter and May Reuther Family Education Center, 2000 Maxon Road,
Onaway, Michigan, 49765, 989/733-8521 phone, http://www.uaw.org
/about/where/onaway.html .

XIII. Downloadable PRB Materials

 Table of Contents

The following links are to pages on the PRB's website.

Rules of Procedure

Series 18, 7/1/04

Decisions

Most PRB decisions since January 2004, and a few before then, are
downloadable here:f

Case 1453 II Case 1456 Case 1457 Case 1458 Case 1459 II
Case 1460 Case 1461 Case 1462 Case 1463 Case 1464
Case 1466 Case 1467 Case 1468 Case 1469 Case 1470
Case 1471 Case 1472 Case 1473 Case 1474 Case 1475
Case 1476 Case 1476 II Case 1477 Case 1478 Case 1479
Case 1480 Case 1481 Case 1482 Case 1483 Case 1484
Case 1485 Case 1486 Case 1487 Case 1488 Case 1489
Case 1490 Case 1491 Case 1492 Case 1493 Case 1495
Case 1496 Case 1497 Case 1498 Case 1499 Case 1500
Case 1501 Case 1502 Case 1503 Case 1504 Case 1505
Case 1506 Case 1507 Case 1508 Case 1509 Case 1510
Case 1511 Case 1512 Case 1513 Case 1514 Case 1516
Case 1517 Case 1518 Case 1519 Case 1520 Case 1521
Case 1522 Case 1523 Case 1524 Case 1525 Case 1526
Case 1527 Case 1528 Case 1529 Case 1530 Case 1531
Case 1532 Case 1532 II Case 1533 Case 1534 Case 1535
Case 1536 Case 1537 Case 1538 Case 1539 Case 1540
Case 1541 Case 1542 Case 1543 Case 1544 Case 1545
Case 1547 Case 1548 II Case 1550 Case 1551 Case 1552
Case 1553 Case 1554 Case 1555 Case 1556 Case 1557
Case 1558 Case 1559 Case 1560 Case 1561 Case 1562
Case 1563 Case 1564 Case 1565 Case 1566 Case 1567
Case 1568 Case 1569 Case 1570 Case 1571 Case 1572
Case 1572 II Case 1573 Case 1574 Case 1575 Case 1576
Case 1577 Case 1578 Case 1579 Case 1580 Case 1581
Case 1582 Case 1583 Case 1584 Case 1585 Case 1586
Case 1587 Case 1588 Case 1589 Case 1590 Case 1591
Case 1592 Case 1593 Case 1594 Case 1595 Case 1596
Case 1597 Case 1598 Case 1599 Case 1600 Case 1601
Case 1602 Case 1603 Case 1604 Case 1605 Case 1606
Case 1607 Case 1608 Case 1609 Case 1610 Case 1611
Case 1612 Case 1614 Case 1615 Case 1617 Case 1618
Case 1619 Case 1620 Case 1621 Case 1622 Case 1623
Case 1624 Case 1625 Case 1627 Case 1628 Case 1629
Case 1630 Case 1631 Case 1632 Case 1633 Case 1634
Case 1636 Case 1640

Annual Reports

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008