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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the relationship between national politics and local
violence in the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 election. Focusing on the Kibera
slum, the article shows that while the area’s ‘big man’ Raila Odinga at
times appeared to have a strong hold over his constituents at the grassroots,
patrimonialism and big man politics cannot provide a full explanation of the
post-election violence. Instead, local socio-economic factors played a key
role and lent the conflict its own specific dynamics. The article also shows
that while Raila’s strong patron–client relationship with Kibera residents
has empowered him as a national politician, in his current role as Prime
Minister this relationship restricts his political room for manoeuvre. Thus
the focus on Raila’s ‘big man’ status in Kibera illustrates the pressures
faced by Kenyan politicians in mediating between their public roles and
the demands of their constituents.
581
582 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
displaced persons (IDPs), while the economic loss was estimated to run to
billions of dollars.1
The 2007 elections and subsequent violence have been extensively
discussed,2 and there is general consensus that it is an oversimplification
to see the violence as an ethnic, or tribal, problem. Instead most analyses
emphasize ‘underlying precipitating factors’, while ‘the elections provided
the spark that ignited them’.3 Some of these underlying causes are identified
as historical grievances over resources (mainly access to land), deliberate
weakening of government institutions (like the judiciary), and the gradual
loss of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force, allowing the large-scale pro-
liferation of militias and gangs, which were in turn used and mobilized by
politicians in their pursuit of electoral victory. Other factors include eco-
nomic and political exclusion, as well as the strongly ethnicized discourse
of Kenyan politics.4
While these analyses point to the complexity and historical roots of the
post-election violence, they all, to varying degrees, emphasize the impor-
tance of ethnicity and patron–client relations in Kenyan politics. This ar-
ticle follows this lead, and seeks to investigate the relationship between
national politics and local violence in more detail. Focusing on Kibera, the
stronghold of Raila Odinga, the article explores the relationship between
‘big man’ politics and violence at the grassroots. Kibera was one of the
areas most affected by the post-election violence – shops and houses were
looted or destroyed, people killed, and for several weeks angry crowds en-
gaged the police in running battles.5 Raila Odinga has been the area’s MP
since 1992, and Kibera is his main support base. As the article shows, Raila
1. Human Rights Watch, ‘Ballots to bullets: organized political violence and Kenya’s cri-
sis of governance’ (HRW Report, March 2008); International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya in
crisis’ (Africa Report No. 137, 21 February 2008). See also the so-called ‘Waki Report’
(2007) of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, headed by Judge Waki,
<http://www.eastandard.net/downloads/Waki_Report.pdf> (17 April 2009).
2. See, for example, the special issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2, 2 (2008).
3. Susanne Mueller, ‘The political economy of Kenya’s crisis’, Journal of Eastern African
Studies 2, 2 (2008), pp. 185–210.
4. Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, ‘Democratization, sequencing and state failure in
Africa: lessons from Kenya’, African Affairs 108, 430 (2008), pp. 1–26; Nic Cheeseman, ‘The
Kenyan elections of 2007: an introduction’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (2008);
Mueller, ‘The political economy’; Michael Bratton and Mwangi Kimenyi, ‘Voting in Kenya:
putting ethnicity in perspective’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (2008), pp. 272–89;
Mwangi wa Githinji and Frank Holmquist, ‘Kenya’s hopes and impediments: the anatomy of a
crisis of exclusion’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (2008), pp. 344–58; Gabrielle Lynch,
‘The fruits of perception: “ethnic politics” and the case of Kenya’s constitutional referendum’,
African Studies 65, 2 (2006), pp. 233–70.
5. The author worked in Kibera between 1998 and 2002, and has since 2003 undertaken
research there, mainly on the Nubi community and Kibera history. Research for this article
was conducted from January to July 2008, and is based on over a hundred informal, semi-
structured interviews and oral testimonies, as well as newspaper articles. Informants were of all
ages, sexes, ‘classes’, and ‘tribes’, and many were interviewed several times. To protect them,
no names or other personal details are given.
ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KIBERA 583
power. According to Mueller, political parties in Kenya, like ‘big men’, are
driven by ‘ethnic clientism, with a winner-takes-all view of political power
and its associated economic by-products’.15 As a result, it is not uncom-
mon for political leaders to move from party to party, and take their ethnic
following with them. By the same token, alliances with other parties, in
or outside government, are made and unmade with seemingly little regard
for political ideology or agendas. For example, in the 1992 elections Raila
Odinga was in FORD-Kenya, in 1997 in NDP, in 2002 in NARC/LDP,
and in 2007 in ODM. He was imprisoned by President Moi several times
in the 1980s, but nevertheless joined his government in 2001, before again
returning to the opposition in 2002.
For ‘political tribalism’ to be successful, politicians will have to suppress
local debates expressing ‘moral ethnicity’, that is, ethnicity and more com-
plex forms of identification springing from ‘below’, as an ordinary aspect of
daily life and social intercourse. As Lonsdale describes it, in such everyday
engagements, ethnicity is imbued with moral values, civic virtue, and re-
sponsibility, and is not necessarily disruptive within communities.16 At this
moment in time, however, it seems that Jacqueline Klopp might be correct
in wondering whether moral ethnicity can present a serious challenge to
political tribalism. Her case study of Nandi nationalism, like this study of
Kibera, shows that there is resistance at the grassroots level to the politics
of ethnic hatred. However, given the success of this political strategy, the
current political elite may well prove reluctant to abandon political tribalism
and its accompanying violence.17
Today, Raila Odinga is one of Kenya’s leading big men. As ODM’s charis-
matic Luo leader, he is the MP of Langata Constituency in Nairobi, a
position he has held since 1992 when the first multi-party elections since
1966 were held. Gabrielle Lynch aptly describes him as ‘a man who stirs up
the strongest of emotions – be it Railamania or Railaphobia. Yet, love him
or hate him, Raila holds considerable political clout, because of his fiercely
loyal support base.’18 There was never any doubt that Raila would retain his
parliamentary seat; he has a large Luo following in the Kibera slum, which
is only a small part of Langata constituency (probably less than 2 percent
of the area, but with more than 60 percent of its population). Raila’s sup-
port base followed him from party to party, and has kept him in Parliament
since 1992, in what appears to be an almost paradigmatic illustration of
the patron–client relationship in Kenyan politics. Raila appears at times to
15. Mueller, ‘The political economy’, p. 186.
16. Lonsdale, ‘Moral ethnicity’, pp. 132, 141; Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Courting the Kalenjin: the
failure of dynasticism and the strength of the ODM wave in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province’,
African Affairs 107, 429 (2008), pp. 541–68.
17. Jacqueline Klopp, ‘Can moral ethnicity trump political tribalism? The struggle for land
and nation in Kenya’, African Studies 61, 2 (2002), pp. 269–94.
18. See also Lynch, ‘The fruits’, p. 255.
586 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
have almost total control over his constituents, drawing large crowds when
visiting Kibera. But the reality on the ground is not quite so straightfor-
ward. The following sections analyse how Raila’s ‘big man’ machinations
in Kibera (may) have contributed to the post-election violence. It provides
an account of the flow of events in Kibera, before analysing the underlying
causes of the violence. A key factor here is how, during the violent episodes
of the last 15 years, the Luos have managed to turn large parts of Kibera into
‘Luo territory’, chasing away the (mainly) Kikuyu landlords. It also shows
how Raila’s recent half-hearted attempts, as Prime Minister, to correct the
situation have not endeared him to his Luo voters in Kibera – he has to walk
a tightrope between being Raila the Prime Minister and Raila the Luo ‘big
man’. As such, Raila faces considerable pressures in mediating between his
ethnic Luo status and his public role as Prime Minister.
Kibera
Kibera is an informal settlement within the city of Nairobi, started more
than 100 years ago as a settlement for retired Sudanese soldiers of the British
colonial army in East Africa. It is now (allegedly) the largest slum in sub-
Saharan Africa, with an estimated population of 600,000.19 The Nubis,
descendants of those Sudanese soldiers, still live in Kibera as a distinct
group. They are a small minority, but they do wield some power as they
own an estimated 15 percent of the rental houses. Much of the rest of the
rental accommodation is owned by Kikuyus.
Kibera is Kenya in microcosm, and is home to members of all Kenyan
(African) ethnic groups. The settlement is divided into a number of ‘vil-
lages’, each with its own characteristic ethnic make-up, and although most
villages have people of all ethnic groups, often one group is dominant.
For example, Gatwikira is dominated by Luo tenants, while Laini Saba is
a Kikuyu stronghold – but both areas also have residents of other ethnic
groups. As is clear from this brief description, Kibera’s demography is more
complex than can be captured here, and for the purpose of this article, the
focus is on the Kikuyus and Luos, the main ‘actors’ in the post-election vio-
lence. Because of the villages’ different ethnic characteristics and locations
relative to the main road, each village experienced different levels of vio-
lence; some were seriously affected, others hardly at all. To understand these
issues, a brief look at the historical context of Kikuyu and Luo presence in
Kibera is necessary.
The first Kikuyus came to Kibera as early as the 1920s, and more followed
during the next decades as Kikuyus lost most of their land to the white
settlers and were desperately looking for places to settle. From the early
19. Estimates vary between 250,000 and 1.2 million people, but there are no reliable statistics.
ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KIBERA 587
20. There are no real statistics on Kibera landlords; this figure comes from the chairman of
the Kibera Landlord and Housing Cooperative, a (Kikuyu) landlord organization.
21. ‘Census of August 23rd, 1948’ (13 September 1948, Kenya National Archives RCA
(MAA) – 2/1/3 ii).
22. Philip Amis, A Shanty Town of Tenants: The commercialisation of unauthorised housing in
Nairobi, 1960–1980 (University of Kent, unpublished dissertation, 1983), pp. 166–7.
23. Marie-Ange Goux, ‘Les événements de Novembre–Décembre 2001 à Kibera: crise
d’origine interne ou externe?’, L’Afrique Orientale (Annuaire 2002), p. 328; Michelle Osborn,
From Forest to Jungle: Tracing the evolution of politics in Kibera (Oxford University, unpublished
MS thesis, 2006), p. 38.
24. The claim here is not that there were no Luo landlords, but that there were relatively few.
25. Again, it must be stressed that no reliable statistics are available.
588 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Figure 1. Kibera.
any rent at all. In the ensuing clashes 15 people were killed, houses went up
in flames, and thousands fled Kibera.26
As a result, in the Luo-dominated areas of Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo,
hardly any rents, or only substantially lower rents were paid. The absentee
landlords, almost all Kikuyu, but also some Nubi, lost control over their
rooms, as most gave up and stopped coming for the rent. Their tenants
thus became the de facto owners of the rooms. The small Kikuyu resident
landlords, who had not been actively involved in the actual fighting, again
suffered more, as tenants basically refused to pay rent to them (as Kikuyu). A
number of Kikuyus (an estimated 20 percent)27 left Gatwikira and Kisumu
Ndogo, though the majority stayed and tried to make do with what the
tenants gave them; sometimes half the rent, sometimes nothing.
In other areas with a high percentage of Luo tenants, like Shilanga (and
even Kianda), many Luos and even people of other tribes also temporarily
stopped paying rent. However, after negotiations between landlords and
tenants, rent levels went down in most parts of Kibera, and most tenants
resumed payment. In the main Luo-dominated areas, however, it was both
difficult and risky for landlords to take action against non-paying tenants,
and the situation of non-payment of rent persisted up to the elections of
2007, and formed an important part of the local dynamics of the post-
election violence.
lived for generations. Kikuyus took revenge and attacked Luos and Luhyas
in Kikuyu-dominated areas like Limuru and Kawangware.
Shops and houses were looted all over Kibera, mainly those belonging
to Kikuyus and known PNU supporters. Toi Market, an informal market
mainly controlled by Kikuyu traders, went up in flames. Burning of property
was not widespread, however, as the risk of burning down hundreds of
houses (including those of the perpetrators themselves) is high in a place
like Kibera, and fire was therefore generally avoided. During the violence,
people were beaten up and robbed, some were killed, and women and girls
were raped. Much of the violence was simply looting; though the main
actors were male youths, there were also many adults, girls and children
involved. Looting groups were often randomly formed; youths from all
parts of Kibera, and even from outside, took part. Looters were of all ethnic
groups, including Kikuyus. According to most informants, the violence was
mainly instigated by youths from Gatwikira, the Luo area: ‘Groups of youths
came looking for Kikuyus, especially youths from Gatwikira. Many people
followed those groups for their own safety – if you don’t join them, you are
seen as against them.’30 These Gatwikira groups were said to have been
organized by local (youth) leaders, often linked to ODM. They went all
over Kibera; after the initial ‘shopping spree’ at Kikuyu shops and houses,
they turned to the property of people of other ethnic groups. Police did
not do much to stop the looting, often just standing by and watching – but
sometimes they became actively involved, opening the padlocks with their
guns and going in first.31
The areas mainly affected were Kianda and Olympic, the richer parts
of Kibera. In other areas looting was limited, sometimes because they were
protected by neighbourhood vigilantes, sometimes because most shops were
owned by non-Kikuyu residents. The upper part of Kikuyu-dominated Laini
Saba was guarded by Kikuyu vigilantes and escaped most of the looting. In
revenge, Luos living there were told to leave; sometimes they were beaten,
while their homes were looted and occupied by Kikuyus, often those fleeing
other parts of Kibera. Luos fleeing Laini Saba often found refuge in other
villages, in rooms deserted by Kikuyus. Notably, there was not much killing
in Kibera, as the aim of the violence was to chase away the Kikuyus and
loot.
Most Kikuyus left almost as soon as the violence started, certainly in
areas with a high Luo or Luhya population, leaving all their belongings
behind. Their shops and rooms were then looted and immediately occupied
by others. Very few Kikuyus stayed, mainly young men who were born in
Kibera: ‘I had no problem, the guys that came to the house, I know all of
The vigilantes continued their nightly vigils for a few weeks. In some
‘tribal hardcore’ areas like Laini Saba and Gatwikira they also checked
people during the day, asking for ID: if you were of the wrong ethnic group,
you could be in serious trouble, and some people were killed. There were
also clashes between different vigilante groups, notably the groups from
Gatwikira and the ‘defence force’ of Laini Saba, in which a number of
people are reported to have been killed. Youths who initially had made
money from looting now – as ‘vigilantes’ – started levying taxes on the
inhabitants for ‘protection’ when out in the streets at night. Some put up
roadblocks on Kibera Drive to collect money from passing traffic. Others
offered their services to Kikuyus who needed to transport their belongings
out of Kibera or to newly arrived Luos and Luhyas,37 chased away from
Kikuyu-dominated areas, who were shown houses vacated by the Kikuyus.
During negotiations between PNU and ODM to solve the crisis, ODM
called several times for nationwide demonstrations to put pressure on
Kibaki. One of the most popular slogans during this period was ‘No Raila,
no peace!’, a slogan that resonated particularly strongly in Kibera. Demon-
strations were invariably stopped by security forces using water cannon
and teargas, resulting in more clashes all over the country. In Nairobi, the
security forces tried to stop people from Kibera participating in demonstra-
tions – they were forced to turn back into Kibera, where they would go on
a rampage, looting and fighting the police. The main road, Kibera Drive,
was subsequently barricaded by youths to prevent the police from entering
Kibera.
As the violence continued, life in Kibera became more difficult: in most
areas the shops were either empty after looting, or had closed as a security
measure. Fresh food, if available, was very expensive. Supermarkets near
Kibera could not always be reached, and even if most of the loot was for
sale in the streets of Gatwikira, it was at highly inflated prices that few could
afford. Some food aid was given by some churches and the Red Cross, but
this was insufficient to cover the needs of the population.
The first wave of violence lasted for about a week. After that Kibera
calmed down, and some shops opened again here and there. The situa-
tion nevertheless remained very tense, pending negotiations between ODM
and PNU. After former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived on
22 January to mediate, the situation improved and most vigilante groups
stopped their nightly vigils. However, the assassination of the ODM MP
Melitus Mugabe Were, seen as politically motivated, triggered renewed at-
tacks on Kikuyus, with groups dominated by youths from Gatwikira going
from door to door to flush out all remaining Kikuyus. This time more
Kikuyus were killed, causing revenge killing of Luos and Luhyas in Laini
Saba. In total around 60 people may have been killed in Kibera, about half
of the total of those killed in Nairobi.38
Throughout February, sporadic fighting continued in Rift Valley and
Western Kenya, but Kibera remained relatively calm, though tense, as
people were anxiously waiting for an agreement between the parties. On
28 February, when negotiations seemed to have ended in failure and ten-
sion was rising, a power-sharing agreement was suddenly announced –
Kibaki remained President, Raila became Prime Minister. Demonstrations
planned for that day were called off, and calm was restored instantly almost
everywhere. People had been waiting for the agreement, expecting that ev-
erything would go back to normal. This is not what happened, however, as
few Kikuyus returned to Kibera.
In relatively quiet parts of Kibera, where Kikuyus and Luos had lived
together peacefully for many years, a considerable number of Kikuyus came
back: not to live there, but to re-open their shops. Its high population density
makes Kibera a good place for business, and most burnt-down shops have
been rebuilt, and many re-opened. But, as one shopkeeper expressed the
common sentiment: ‘Even if we do business here, we do it in fear.’39 In most
other parts of Kibera, the areas with a majority of Luo or Luhya tenants, very
few Kikuyus returned. Those who did experienced aggression and threats,
so that some were even too scared to talk; they were harassed, and some
had to run for their lives again.40 Importantly, Kikuyu landlords received
little assistance from the local authorities (the District Officer and Chiefs)
to recover their rooms, as even the authorities were afraid to go into these
areas. It would be risky for the landlord as well, because ‘the police is not
going to guard me day and night; the Luos will just kill me the next day’.41
Most Kikuyus, afraid to come back to Kibera, preferred to wait for things
to cool down. The announcement on 13 April 2008 of a new Cabinet with
Raila as Prime Minister did not change the situation: Kikuyus remained
unwelcome.
As this discussion demonstrates, one effect of the post-election violence
was to bolster the process of growing Luo dominance in Kibera. In partic-
ular, the Kikuyu landlords have been almost completely removed from the
Luo hardcore areas of Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo, where the Luos have
become the de facto owners of the houses. In the areas around Gatwikira,
the same process is now in its initial stages, as many Kikuyu landlords have
lost control over all or a large proportion of their rooms. In most cases rent
38. Interview, Luo youth involved in data collection for local NGO, Gatwikira, 21 April
2008. The Waki Report estimates 125 deaths in Nairobi – see table on p. 308.
39. Interview, Kikuyu businessman, Kianda, 20 March 2008.
40. Interviews, Kikuyus, mainly small landlords (male and female) from Gatwikira, in IDP
camp, April 2008.
41. Interview, Kikuyu landlord, IDP camp, April 2008.
594 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
is not paid, certainly not by Luo tenants. These areas are now in a similar
situation to Gatwikira before the 2008 violence.
46. Interviews, Luo and non-Luo informants in Gatwikira, March 2008. See also Anderson,
‘Vigilantes’, and Mueller, ‘The political economy’.
47. See also Anderson, ‘Vigilantes’, p. 551; Mueller, ‘The political economy’, pp. 189–94;
PeaceNet, ‘The quest’, pp. 27–30.
48. Interview, Luo man, Kibera, 14 April 2008.
49. 200 Kenyan shillings is the daily rate for unskilled casual construction work.
596 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
tenants refused to pay rent because, as they claimed, ‘Raila told us not to
pay rent.’50 While the veracity of these statements is difficult to ascertain,
what matters in this context is the perception that political support results
in material reward. In the recent clashes, these material rewards have been
substantial: the proceeds of the looting; the burnt-down Toi Market, first
Kikuyu-controlled, but now rebuilt and in the hands of Raila supporters;
and, most importantly, the expansion of ‘Luo territory’ in Kibera where no
rent is paid, and where Luos have effectively taken over from the Kikuyus
as the new landlords.
The question is whether this was part of a ‘Grand Plan’, a reward for
Raila’s supporters. Understandably, many Kikuyus do believe that the vio-
lence was part of a plan to rid Kibera of Kikuyus and take over their rooms
and businesses. Several people mentioned that before the elections Kikuyus
received threats like ‘after the elections, this shop will belong to me’, and
that Luos were already ‘booking’ houses and shops that had been marked for
takeover.51 All this seems to indicate a certain amount of advance planning.
Kikuyu informants frequently claimed that it was probably not planned at
a top ODM level, but at a lower, local, level: the ‘smaller’ politicians, like
councillors, the party people on the ground, the youth leaders (the people
based in those unofficial party offices), that must be seen to champion the
Luo cause to climb the ranks. Evidence from the Rift Valley also suggests
that local leaders have considerable autonomy and that they organize the
youths and pay them part of what they receive from ‘above’.52 There was
a general belief amongst Kikuyu informants that if Raila had won the elec-
tions, it would have been worse for them: they would have been removed
from Kibera with even more conviction, violence and impunity, since the
Luos would expect to be protected by the new President himself. This may
be true, considering that the local Kibera administration hardly intervenes,
and the District Officer and the Chiefs are said to be scared of the violent
and fanatical Luos in Gatwikira, and of Raila’s connection there.
50. Information from at least 6 non-Luo people who understand the Luo language.
51. Different informants, April/May 2008. See also Mueller, ‘The political economy’, p. 203.
52. See the HRW report, ‘Bullets to ballots’, pp. 35–9.
53. Quite unsuccessfully in the Rift Valley; see ‘Don’t return, refugees warned’, Daily Nation,
1 April 2008, p. 34.
ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KIBERA 597
action would have to be taken by the government against them, but that
he himself was not in charge of that. With this diplomatic statement, ‘Raila
the Prime Minister’ confirmed that the occupation of rooms is illegal, but
at the same time, ‘Raila the Luo politician’ condoned it by not telling his
people to get out of the rooms or pay rent. By not taking a position, his
actions show that patron–client relationships can be more complicated than
‘one leads, the others follow’, with the patron in total control.
Raila’s Luo constituents expect resources, protection, and other advan-
tages at national level from their ‘big man’ Raila. His earlier call for blan-
ket amnesty for all post-election violence offenders can be seen in that
light: as most people arrested nationwide were ODM supporters, Raila
was expected, maintaining the patron–client relationship, to try and protect
them.54 Being in such a powerful position, his supporters would expect even
more from Raila – helping them to stay in their newly occupied houses, thus
keeping their reward for supporting him. This puts him in a difficult posi-
tion, caught between being the Prime Minister and being the Luo politician.
He is, to a certain extent, a prisoner of the political game he plays, and his
choice is in fact very limited: as Prime Minister he must be seen to follow the
rule of law. However, this risks alienating many of his supporters in Kibera,
and thus might ultimately affect his prospects of re-election and his political
career. According to unofficial reports, Raila had some informal meetings in
Kibera in which he was told by his supporters that any attempt to get them
out of their new houses would be at the peril of losing their support. Never-
theless, in October 2008 Raila’s personal assistant Edward Ketta went, with
the local administration, to Gatwikira for a meeting with the ‘support base’,
and announced that people should leave the occupied houses. The crowd
reacted violently and Ketta had to leave in a rush, his car damaged. This
seems to indicate that Raila is not able to exert complete control over his
support base, and that key constituents in Kibera do not automatically ac-
cept his authority. After this Raila’s discourse changed; at his ‘homecoming
party’ on 29 November 2008, while PNU minister Martha Karua was jeered
when she asked Raila to help out in the ‘house issue’,55 Raila defended his
people by saying that many Luos were chased out of Kikuyu-dominated
areas, and had also lost property. Nevertheless, recent developments have
indicated that Raila’s support in Kibera is being undermined by his failure to
deliver, as Prime Minister and as Luo leader. His popularity in Kibera (and
nation-wide) is decreasing because of rising prices of basic commodities,
54. ‘Raila: free youths without conditions’, Daily Nation, 30 May 2008, p. 1.
55. ‘Raila opens up’, East African Standard, 30 November 2008, <http://www.eastandard.
net/archives/InsidePage.php?id=1144000484&catid=4&a=1> (30 May 2009).
598 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
56. See also ‘Dozens dash for maize flour for the poor’, Daily Nation, 10 Decem-
ber 2008, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/500856/-/u0kgb3/-/index.html> (30 May
2009); ‘The coalition has failed and should resign’, East African Standard, 1 March 2009,
<http://www.eastandard.net/InsidePage.php?id=1144007737&catid=259&a=1> (30 May
2009).
57. In the 2007 parliamentary elections he had only 70 percent of the votes against his
nearest PNU rival Stanley Livondo’s 28 percent. <http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/
default.asp> (17 April 2009). Reliable sources claim that Raila had been afraid he would lose
these elections.