165 GT SPS Case Neg

SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>

Mr. Spiegel
SPS Neg
SPS Neg....................................................................................................................................................................1
Strategy Sheet..........................................................................................................................................................3
Ban Space Wep CP..................................................................................................................................................4
Ban Space Wep CP..................................................................................................................................................5
AT Perm...................................................................................................................................................................6
AT Perm (intrinsic).................................................................................................................................................7
AT Perm (severance)...............................................................................................................................................7
AT [some nation] will militarize ............................................................................................................................8
AT Does not solve colonization...............................................................................................................................9
IB solvency ext.......................................................................................................................................................10
...............................................................................................................................................................................10
militerization Solvency Ext...................................................................................................................................11
Co-opt and colonization solvency ext...................................................................................................................12
Topicality: in means in the US.............................................................................................................................13
Inherency frontline ...............................................................................................................................................14
Solvency frontline..................................................................................................................................................15
Solvency ext............................................................................................................................................................16
Solvency deficits -Weather....................................................................................................................................17
Solvency deficits- laundry list...............................................................................................................................18
Competiveness frontline.......................................................................................................................................19
Competiveness frontline........................................................................................................................................20
Competiveness Ext.................................................................................................................................................21
Space is not key to Heg (defensive frontline)......................................................................................................22
Space is not key to Heg (Offensive frontline)......................................................................................................23
Space is not key to Heg (Offensive frontline)......................................................................................................24
Space unpopular (politics links)...........................................................................................................................25
Space spending links..............................................................................................................................................26
Bad Timframe........................................................................................................................................................27
Bad Timframe........................................................................................................................................................28
Space Weps/sps fails.............................................................................................................................................29
Militerization frontline..........................................................................................................................................30
1
SPS Neg
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Mr. Spiegel
Militerization ext....................................................................................................................................................34
Colonization frontline............................................................................................................................................35
DoD CP 1NC..........................................................................................................................................................36
PICS Good..............................................................................................................................................................37
EXT. NASA cant solve..........................................................................................................................................38
Ext. DOD can/NASA can’t....................................................................................................................................39
NASA Brain Drain DA 1/2....................................................................................................................................40
NASA Brain Drain DA 2/2....................................................................................................................................41
NASA Tradeoff DA (Oceans) 1/2........................................................................................................................42
NASA Tradeoff DA (Oceans) 2/2........................................................................................................................43
AT no tradeoff- give incentives.............................................................................................................................44
States Solvency.......................................................................................................................................................45
AT Japan................................................................................................................................................................46
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_________...............................................................................................................................................................46
Search terms...........................................................................................................................................................47
2
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
Strategy Sheet
The best strat would be to run the Ban space weps CP with the net benefit of spending, politics, the NASA shenanigans, or probably
the best argument space mil bad. The colonization ev was really hard to find so I don’t recommend making that an argumentative
staple.
3
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
Ban Space Wep CP

Text: The United States federal government should sign the UN proposed treaty banning
space weapons and engage in multilateral space exploration
Observation one: competition the CP is competitive through the Net Benefit of ________________ and because you can’t ban
and militarize space at the same time
Observation two: solvency
The CP solves the entirely of the aff
A. International treaties solve space militarization
Hellen CALDICOTT, Former Harvard professor and advocate against Nuclear weapons, and Craig EISENDRATH, Senior Fellow at
the Center for international poicy in Washington, D.C. Seved as US foreign Services Officer, 5/1 9/05, <“No Weapons in space” ,
HTTP://WWW.NUCLEARPOLICY.ORG/I NDEX.CFM? PAGE=ARTICLE&ID=2326 >
Finally. a response to any possible arms race in outer space is already available: a draft international treaty forbidding space
weaponization that was proposed by Russia and China in 2002. The United States has been alone among the great powers in
refusing to endorse U.N. General Assembly resolutions on outer space and the draft treaty. Other countries are eager for an
agreement, just as they arc for a nuclear test ban that includes underground testing, an international criminal court, an agreement on
global warming as well as treaties on land mines, small arms and chemical and biological weapons.
In refusing to sign a treaty on space weaponization and these other significant international accords, the United States is virtually
alone in thwarting the world in its efforts to achieve disarmament and environmental sanity through multilateral agreements. In I 967,
the United States led the world in pursuing the Outer Space Treaty, which forbids the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction - but not
non-WMD.
Today, we are the ones obstructing the world in its desire to seal off space as a potential area of
weaponization. U.S. policy is driven not by a need to ensure our security but by lobbyists who need to secure contracts for their
defense industry corporate employers. It is beyond time for the United States to agree to sign an international treaty to prevent
weapons from being deployed in outer space, a policy that would serve the country and not a select group of corporations. The issue
of space weaponization is a test case for this administration to reach out to other nations and to set the safest and most sensible
direction for the nation and, indeed, the world.
B. Space Colonization is contingent on the US effort towards cooperation and disengagement of space
militarization
George Abbey and Neal Lane, 2005 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences <“United States Space Policy Challenges and
Opportunities” http://www.amacad.org/publications/spacepolicy.pdf>
Whatever path the United States chooses to follow with its policies, America does not have a future in space—human exploration,
space science, or commercial space activities—without considerable international cooperation. The degree of cooperation that will
be necessary will not be possible under current export control and other restrictive policies. The International Space Station and the
Space Shuttle programs, as well as many of the most successful robotic science missions, were accomplished with considerable
international involvement and the free exchange of data and technical information. Neither of these programs could have been
successful under any other conditions. The creation of complex systems, which operate in an integrated fashion in order to
support human life in a hostile environment, requires an international partnership, with open discussions and sharing of
information and technology.
As important a role as these matters play in discouraging cooperation with the United States in space, the issue most threatening to
cooperation may well be a growing international perception that the United States intends to control space militarily. Although it
is not the subject of this paper, military space policy is a matter of profound importance to the future of U.S. civilian space
programs and the space programs of other nations.24
4
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
Ban Space Wep CP
C. International space cooperation solves economic security and competitiveness
Robert V. Davis, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space) U.S. Department of Defense Washington D.C.,
February 11-12, 1997 <“SECOND ANNUAL SPACE STRATEGY and ARCHITECTURE SYMPOSIUM
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SPACE: INCREASING COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/speech1.htm>
The Department of Defense is committed to being a leader in this new era of international space cooperation. We have a series of
mutually reinforcing goals for such cooperation. First, we seek to forge closer security ties by: deepening mutual understanding;
strengthening existing bilateral and multilateral defense relationships; developing new security partnerships; and countering
proliferation.
Second, we [The DoD] seek to strengthen our economic security by: sharing or reducing costs; fostering new trade and
investment opportunities; protecting against unwanted technology transfer; gaining access to foreign capabilities and expertise;
and strengthening our industrial and technology bases. This includes protecting the value of intellectual property developed with
U.S. Government support and ensuring that technology transfer resulting from cooperation does not undermine U.S. international
competitiveness and national security.
5
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
AT Perm
1. still links to the net benefit
2. Doesn’t stop space militarization- Attempts to militarize space like the

plan cause global arms races. The perm is uniquely worse because it
would look like the US was using the treaty as a cover to secretly
militarize
3. Doesn’t solve colonization- Deploying space weapons destroy multilateral

approach which is key to colonization. Additionally, space weapons
destroy the perception that space is a place to explore and invest in
decreasing scientific and private sector push for tech development. Only
the CP achieves long term solvency because multilateral approaches are
less of a burden on a single nation state and allow the transfer of ideas
without the counterproductive approach of space warfare.
4. Clear stance against space weapons fosters cooperation
International cooperation in space will be crucial if we are to reap the benefits of scientific research and human exploration. It equally
important to both U.S. national security and international security. International cooperation necessitates a U.S. foreign policy that is
enlightened and multilateral, and that encourages shared values. It also requires credibility and confidence within the world community,
as well as a realistic and credible plan to meet international commitments. The intentions of the United States with regard to future
international cooperation in space, the future of the U.S. human space flight program, and the support of the International Space Station
should not be in question.
5. Perception of space weapons kills multilateral cooperation

Placing offensive weapons in space would be a cause for alarm throughout the world and, in the context of the issues addressed in
this paper, would create a major obstacle to international cooperation in space. American companies could expect an even more
restrictive u.s. export control policy. Such restrictions could further damage commercial space activities and preclude the
willingness of other nations to join U.S.-led programs for both human and robotic space science and exploration missions. The
placement of weapons in space would reinforce n the world community the feeling that the United5tates increasingly is basing its
foreign policy on unilateral initiatives. As such, it would severely impact the progress that has been made over the last fifty years
towards multilateral international cooperation.
6
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
AT Perm (intrinsic)
1. Moving Target – Allows them to randomly add parts to the plan, which is unpredictable and destroys the 1NC strategy, which is key to our
negative strategy
2. Shift Of Advocacy From The 1AC – Unpredictable and kills our ground
3. Utopian – Allows them to make the plan perfect in all worlds during the 2AC, kills competitive equity because we don’t get to do that
4. Voter – Damage is done, they have already destroyed my 1NC strategy, killing competitive equity.
AT Perm (severance)
1. Shift In Advocacy And Moving Target – If the aff can tailor their plan in order to work the best, this justifies advocating only a small part
of the plan in the 2AR, that’s an independent voter for fairness.
2. Destroys Negative Ground – The aff could sever parts of the plan in order to get our of any DA or CP. Gutting negative ground.
3. Perm Must Still Retain A Topical Element – Even if they get to re-plan, their new plan must still enact the resolution.
4. Voter – Damage is done, I have to waster time answering it so punish the aff so you can clean up the debate.
7
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
AT [some nation] will militarize

1. Other countries such as China and Russia are eager for a guarantee from the US to stop attempts to put weapons in
space. We are the only country holding back the banning of all space weapons. Thatt's Calicott and Eisendreath
2. International modeling: If the US takes an ant-militant stance towards space, Every country will follow because of US
leadership and unrivaled space and terrestrial dominance.
3. The US has a distinct role in shaping global space policy which allows them to prevent the development of Space
Weapons
Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The case
against weaponizing” space http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/spacebook.pdf>
The prospects of space warfare are low at present. By virtue of its leadership position in space commerce and military power, the
United States now has unprecedented capacity to shape whether space becomes weaponized. As Philip E. Coyle and John B.
Rhinelander have observed, “Not since the development of the atomic bomb has the United States had an equivalent opportunity
and incentive to show leadership for restraint in the development of a new class of weapons, namely weapons in space.”2 If the
United States exercises restraint in the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, while maintaining readiness to respond if
others do so first, there is a reasonable chance that these thresholds will not be crossed. If, however, the United States takes the
lead in flight-testing and deploying space weaponry, other states will surely follow suit. The salience of space warfare will remain
low if such techniques are not tested or deployed. They can remain even lower if the United States adopts a prudent hedging strategy.
4. If the US takes a multilateralist stance on space, other countries will

follow
Nina Tannenwald, Watson Institute for International Studies Brown University, April 2003, < “Law
Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space”>
Today the freedom of the seas principle is increasingly dysfunctional, but hegemony need not be. The United States should use
its power and position to support the creation of an operational regime for space based on the rule of law, rather than pursue a
short-sighted policy of competition in national dominance there. Security in space will be more effectively achieved through a
rule-based regime than through the deployment of destabilizing weapons systems. The rest of the world is not rushing to
weaponize space, and instead appears ready to follow the U.S. lead in devising new rules for its effective management. In the
long run, the best way to protect U.S. commercial, scientific and security interests in space will be through the stability of the
rule of law, rather than through unilateral assertions of military power. The United States should take the lead in promoting the
transition to a regime of mutual restraint and benefit in space.
8
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
AT Does not solve colonization

1. Long term funding- Only a multilateral cooperative effort will be able to achieve the massive amount of funds needed
to colonize -
2. Tech Sharing- CP allows resource and idea sharing with the other space powers which is crucial to long and and short
term space missions
3. Revitalize NASA – The CP fosters health benign competition and cooperation with China and Russia which is he only
wat to revitalize NASA and create new space exploration tech
4. Stop militarization – Allies will not cooperate with US in space because of the US pursuit of space domination.
Cooperation is critical to letting allies and foes know the US is committed to peaceful space colonization
5. International cooperation is critical to human exploration of space
International cooperation in space will be crucial if we are to reap the benefits of scientific research and human exploration. It is equally
important to both U.S. national security and international security. International cooperation necessitates a U.S. foreign policy that is
enlightened and multilateral, and that encourages shared values. It also requires credibility and confidence within the world community,
as well as a realistic and credible plan to meet international commitments. The intentions of the United States with regard to future
international cooperation in space, the future of the U.S. human space flight program, and the support of the International Space Station
should not be in question.
For many of the reasons addressed in this paper, the United States has lost its credibility as a reliable partner in space and created the
impression that it believes there is only one way—the American way. Either this is the message the Administration wishes to send or
the United States has a serious communication problem. International cooperation in space continues today but, unfortunately, without
U.S. leadership. Europe and Russia are partnering on major activities. Russia and China are working together and have signed
agreements to cooperate on exploration studies. The United States made a great investment over the last forty years to become a leader
in space. Such a role should not be given up lightly. The United States should invite other nations, especially our partners in the
International Space Station program, to actively participate in discussions that will enhance and further future cooperation in space
science and human exploration, including the return of humans to the Moon and travel beyond. The meeting held by NASA in
Washington, D.C. in November 2004 to discuss the exploration program with international partners and representatives from other
countries was an excellent step in that direction. That dialogue should continue and serve as a foundation for improving international
cooperation.
9
SPS Neg
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Mr. Spiegel
IB solvency ext.
International bans on space weapons solve for space militarization and allow
for peaceful development of space
Nina Tannenwald, Watson Institute for International Studies Brown University, April 2003, < “Law
Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space”>
Added to this are the large majority of the world’s nations who are primarily interested in the economic benefits of space.
Most nations would like guarantees that space will not be used against them, and have supported strengthening the legal
regime in space to constrain weaponization. This includes key spacefaring nations. China’s views have been noted, but
Russia has also called strongly for an international treaty prohibiting weapons in space. In September 2001, Russian foreign
minister Igor Ivanov outlined several key provisions for any new treaty on space security: no placing of weapons in orbit,
no use or threat of use of weapons against targets in space, and establishment of adequate verification mechanisms.118
The Russian delegate to the CD reiterated this position in January 2002, calling for a moratorium on placing weapons in space
until a treaty could be achieved.119
In late June 2002, Russia and China submitted a first-ever joint proposal to the CD for an international treaty to ban
space weapons, clearly a response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty several weeks earlier.121
Although there was little new in the substance of the proposal, the fact that it dropped many self-serving provisions and focused
on a few simple points that would have broad international appeal suggests that it was a serious effort. Additionally, the fact
that it was joint suggests that, as critics of missile defenses have predicted, U.S. pursuit of missile defenses is driving Russia
and China together, an adverse outcome for the United States. Canada, France, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and other members of the
CD have also offered proposals to begin negotiations on the nonweaponization of space.122
As David Ziegler notes, “any assertion that the United States should aggressively pursue weaponization in order to beat
adversaries already rushing in that direction is highly questionable.”123
CP solves militarization-enforces treaty

Institute for cooperation in Space (ICIS), 2008, < http://www.peaceinspace.com/sp_faq.shtml>
The outer space peacekeeping agency under the Space Preservation Treaty will be funded, equipped and deployed with the latest
tools of technology and information services that will make it possible to produce a Space Age effective monitoring, verification,
and enforcement system that will be based on enhanced communication and observation, on information sharing, and on technology
applications that will benefit all on earth. With the pooled resources and brains of the many space-faring nations and the developing
parts of the world, this Agency, along with the forthcoming laws, will make it possible to prevent any aggressor that would
attempt to place space-based weapons in outer space above the heads of the people on earth.
10
SPS Neg
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Mr. Spiegel
militerization Solvency Ext.

CP solves space Mill – US leadership prevents
Put another way, the dominant position of the United States provides agenda-setting powers in space. The flight-testing and
deployment of space warfare capabilities is surely inevitable if the United States takes the lead in this pursuit. but not if
Washington maintains prudent hedges against unwelcome developments in
the form of a readiness to respond in kind to any flight tests or deployments of space weapons by weaker states. These hedges, as
discussed in Chapter 3, should be sufficiently persuasive to foreclose such a competition, unless weaker space-faring nations make very
unwise choices. While a hedging strategy is necessary, it is also insufficient. Hedges against the flight-testing and deployment of space
warfare capabilities need to be accompanied by initiatives that underscore the positive and affirming uses of space for the benefit of
humankind. Space assurance, broadly defined, also requires the reaffirmation of existing norms against the weaponization of
space.
The CP avoids an arms race and maintains US hegemony- other nations would follow
Lt Col Bruce DeBlois, Division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National
Reconnaissance Office 1998 , (Winter, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy" Aerospace Power
Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.millairchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html)
Who Is in Charge? Before structuring a national space strategy, we must address the issue of command [authority and
responsibility to set strategy) and control (authority and responsibility to execute strategy). The broad impact of space access
and the issues it raises clearly warrant top-level oversight. Because the executive powers of the president were established
for just such circumstances, the president should be "in charge." Vested in that "charge is both responsibility of providing
vision and authority to set strategy to pursue that vision. What is the Vision? The president must produce and communicate a
clear vision of where the future of the United States in space will be. John F. Kennedy's vision of an American man on the
moon by the close of the 1960s best illustrates a president's ability to focus a nation toward national goals in space. The twenty-
first-century vision should include the United States as world leader in a peaceful space environment characterized by
both extensive, multinational, exploratory ventures and intense commercial endeavors. What Is the Best Strategy for
Pursuing That Vision? To pursue that vision, the president retains the power to set strategy. Based upon the argument presented
above, the best strategy for getting to that vision is one of space sanctuary. As stated, this is not a do-nothing strategy. We
need to undertake intense diplomatic efforts to convince a world of nations that space as a sanctuary for peaceful and
cooperative coexistence and stability best serves all. Treaties must address exactly what constitutes a space weapon,
commitments to not employ them, mechanisms of verification policing, and assurances of punitive response for violations. A
treaty with the clause "the positioning of any weapon in space or attacking any space platform will be considered an act
of war against all signatories of this treaty" would provide formal and instant coalition (or collective security) against any
actor seeking the weaponization of space and would be a natural extension of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Clearly, the
United States has the opportunity and means to lead the diplomatic ventures, as well as the resources to lead in developing
the methods and tools of verification37 and punitive response.38
11
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
Co-opt and colonization solvency ext.

Multi-cooperation in space revitalizes US leadership, prevents space race, and solves for peaceful space colonization
Joan Johnson-Freese YaleGlobal, 13 January 2004 <"Chinese Chess in Space New US manned space program should include China as
a partner">
The third alternative focuses on cooperation. The US has a long and successful tradition of international cooperation in space.
Especially in the areas of space science and environmental monitoring, the US has historically viewed space as an opportunity
to build bridges with countries while simultaneously co-opting them into working on areas of our choice, rather than areas not to our
liking. Cooperation is clearly the better option with China, too. The US could start slowly, rewarding Beijing for reciprocity and
transparency by granting China an increasingly larger role in a joint program of manned exploration and development.
Specifically, a US proposal to multilaterally review and expand the future of manned space exploration - from the ISS to another
lunar voyage or even a Mars mission - on an incremental, inclusive basis would allow Washington to revitalize American space
leadership. Crucially, it would also give the US a means to influence the future direction of the Chinese space program. This
option would counter the prevailing view of the US as a unilateralist hegemon and allow for a focus on infrastructure
development that does not require unrealistic budget burdens. While there is the risk of international politics intruding into the
process over time that is counterbalanced by the vested interest such a program would give participants in system stability.
To be sure, there would be resistance to working with China. Washington is replete with individuals adamantly objecting to cooperation
with China on grounds from human rights to its status as the largest remaining communist country. Isolating China, however, is
increasingly a stance counterproductive to US interests, as a world without China is simply not possible. US and Chinese interests
frequently overlap, on North Korea and the Global War on Terror, for example, not to mention economics.
The United States has a window of opportunity to step in and use space cooperation to its advantage. Because space is considered
so critical to the futures of both the US and China, any activity by one has been considered zero-sum by the other, triggering an
action-reaction cycle and threatening escalation into an arms race of technology and countermeasure development. That direction can
be changed. An inclusive vision will give the US an opportunity to assume the mantle of leadership on a mission that could
inspire the world and shift Chinese activities into areas more compatible with US interests. On the geostrategic Wei Qi board,
cooperation is the best "next move" for the US.
Space exploration requires multilateral cooperation- any attempt at Space weapons destroys exploration
initiatives even among allies
In January 2004, President George W. Bush announced a plan for returning humans to the Moon and eventually flying a manned
mission to Mars. The president’s vision was meant to inspire new advances in space exploration. Yet U.S. space policy remains
hamstrung by internal contradiction. Space exploration on the scale envisioned in the president’s plan is by necessity a cooperative
international venture. Neither the president’s plan nor the prevailing thrust of existing U.S. space policies encourages the type of
international partnerships that are needed. Indeed there is much about U.S. space policy and plans—particularly those pertaining
to the possible deployment of weapons in space—that even our closest allies find objectionable.
12
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
Topicality: in means in the US

A. in means within the limits of
Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 06 (http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?
book=Dictionary&va=in)
Main Entry: 1in

Pronunciation: 'in, &n, &n
Function: preposition
Etymology: Middle English, from Old English; akin to Old High German in in, Latin in, Greek en
1 a -- used as a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position within limits <in the lake>
<wounded in the leg> <in the summer>
B. Violation the Affirmative sends Solar powered Satellites into space

outside of the US’s jurisdiction
C. Standards
1) Limits: Their interpretation allows affs that create renewable energy outside of the United States such as give Iran
Nuke power aff and the solar military aff this explodes neg research because an aff could be written to send alternative
energy to any number of countries. Additionally, for each one of these affs 40 different positive incentive mechanisms
could be applied not to mention negative incentives.
2) Ground: This interpretation severs out of key neg arguments for this years topic such as the states CP and grants the Aff
advantage ground unrelated to alternative energy such as space weaponization and colonization.
3) vagueness: Currently not even one SPS system has been built, which means all the arguments for both sides are just
allegations of what could happen with out any substantial evidence. this destroys any case specific turns or das like the
bats DA for wind or the earthquakes da for geothermal. This also means we can’t run our fossil fuel Das because the
links don’t exist destroying reseprocity
D. Voting issue – T should be judged on a matter of competing

interpretations – it’s not what you do, but what you justify – vote neg to
preserve limits.
13
SPS Neg
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Mr. Spiegel
Inherency frontline
Other sources of renewable energy solve the energy crisis now
Linda Shiner, Air & Space Magazine, July 01, 2008 < " Where the Sun Does Shine Will space solar power ever be practical?"
http://www.airspacemag.com/space-exploration/Sun_Does_Shine.html?c=y&page=2>
If the government put money into space solar power, would taxpayers get a return on their investment? Molly Macauley, an economist
with Resources for the Future, a Washington, D.C. energy and environment think tank, has studied the ability of sunsats to compete
with other renewable energy technologies. It’s a hard case to make, she says. “Advocates of space solar power fail to acknowledge
that technological change and innovation are happening in other types of renewable energy—ground-based solar power,
concentrated solar power, wind, geothermal energy. The ability to compete on a cents-per-kilowatt-hour basis is going to get more
difficult, not less difficult.”
Terrestrial power solves now and is much more market friendly

Leonard David: Senior Space Writer. “Bright Future for Solar Power Satellites” 17 April 2000.
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/solar_power_satellite_000421.html
"But … it's going to be very difficult to make it competitive with terrestrial power," she told SPACE.com. "It's a very hard sell."
"My concern with satellite-solar-power advocates is that they aren't looking over their shoulders to realize that technological change
and innovation in markets is happening within conventional approaches." There have been dozens of approaches to building
power-beaming satellites. "But fundamentally, so long as it costs as much to get to space, we've got a major problem," she said.
14
SPS Neg
DDI 2008 <GT>
Mr. Spiegel
Solvency frontline
1. Lack of construction robots dooms SPS development

Techniques for building sunsats have not come as far. The 1979 study envisioned hundreds of astronaut spacewalkers toiling for
decades. Robotic assembly would be more practical. But despite the sometimes photogenic robots creeping around NASA centers
and university laboratories, the only construction project in space, the International Space Station, is still being assembled by
astronauts.
Not that the field of space robotics isn’t advancing. Robots that may someday build large structures in orbit might look like Roby Space
Junior, a spiderbot created by an institute at the Vienna University of Technology (famous in Europe for creating a tiny robot soccer
team). The four-inch-square Roby was designed to crawl on a vast web-like structure called a Furoshiki spacecraft, a lightweight mesh
that could form the platform for large antennas, sails—or solar collectors. In 2006, the European and Japanese space agencies joined
forces to launch a 65- by 130-foot Furoshiki web and three spiderbots on a sounding rocket that produced a few minutes of
weightlessness. The net deployed, and the robots crawled on it for a few seconds.
The experiment seems typical of recent work on space solar power: ingenious, but a long way from tackling the huge
challenges that space power systems face. The Japanese and European space agencies are funding research, but as of today, there
is no credible project to build systems that will demonstrate all the necessary elements working
together.
2. Solar Flares Can Disable Satellites: 03 Solar Flares Prove.
Sharon Gaudin. “Solar Storms Disrupting Satellites and Power.” October 28, 2003
http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/erp/article.php/3099861
A cluster of solar eruptions on the sun that started last week could cause electrical and satellite disruptions for another week,
according to Larry Combs, a space weather forecaster with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Space Environment
Center in Bolder, Colo. Solar flares, described as large tongues or blasts of plasma, began erupting off the sun on Oct. 19 and are
heading toward Earth. The flares, better known as sun spots, can cause disruptions in electrical utilities, satellite-based
communications, cell phones and pagers, and high-frequency radio systems, such as the kind used in jet airliners and by amateur
radio enthusiasts. ''On a scale of one to five, these flares are about a three,'' says Combs. ''What they're really affecting are power
systems, grids and satellite communications... It can affect communications for airliners flying polar routes or across the Northern
Atlantic. It can even open and close your garage door. During an extreme jolt, it can do all kinds of things.''
High cost of space transportation dooms SPS project

Ralph H Nansen, 2000 (, President, Solar Space Industries, Inc. “The Technical Feasibility of Space Solar Power” Before the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, United States House of Representatives Committee on Science.
http://www.seattlewebcrafters.com/chadlupkes/projects/ralphnansen.php)
The existing space transportation market has not been large enough to justify the huge development cost of a reusable heavy lift
launch vehicle system. However, solar power satellites would create a large enough market if the perceived risk of their commercial
viability is reduced to an acceptable level for the commercial investment community. The commercial investment community has
been unwilling to invest in a long term, high cost project of this magnitude. The recent failure of the Iridium global satellite
communication system has underscored the potential risks with space based commercial systems.
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Solvency ext.
Launch costs render SPS a pipe dream
Graham-Rowe, technology writer, 2006

http://www.channel4.com/science/microsites/G/green_technology/alternatives.html
If solar chimneys sound out of this world then solar power satellites (SPS) will seem even more outlandish. SPS involves placing a
huge arrays of solar cells, covering more than one square kilometre, into space to harvest vast quantities of electricity from the almost
constant sunlight. The energy collected would then be sent back down to Earth in beams of focused microwaves and collected by huge
antenna-like devices called rectennas.
As bizarre and unfeasible as this might appear, Nasa has showed an unfaltering interest in SPS for decades, despite the prohibitive costs
of getting the solar cells into orbit. Given that it currently costs $10,000 to launch one kilogramme into space it's safe to assume
that SPS is still little more than a pipe dream.
High cost of travel and tech development doom space industry
Nagatomo, 95 (Makoto, Solar Energy, Vol. 56, No 1, pp 111-118, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/)
The first is familiar technology available from the industries concerned. It will be most favorable for industry to participate in the
project, but even otherwise, the necessary technology should be available on a commercial basis. Space technology is not attractive to
commercial industries, because it is too expensive and its markets are too small.The third is the promise of low cost space
transportation. Space is unknown territory for ordinary people. Even highly educated people believe that space is only for
adventurers and not for business. The existing commercial launch business is desperate in this respect, but fortunately development
of SSTO (single-stage-to-orbit) vehicles has been started in the United States, and transportation cost is expected to be reduced to an
acceptable level.
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Solvency deficits -Weather

SPS ineffective during bad weather
Richard M. Dickinson, member of the Technical Staff at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
California
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, Jan. 29,1999,<“Lasers for Wireless Power
Transmission” trs-new.jpl.nasa.gov/dspace/bitstream/2014/16855/1/99-0263.pdf>
Both microwave and laser beams are attenuated by the Earth’s atmosphere and its weather-dependent particulate content.
Attenuation due to scattering is highest when the wavelength is comparable to the size of the particles in the atmosphere.
Because of the much shorter wavelength of laser beams, they are much more severely attenuated than microwave beams, to the
extent that power beam interruptions to the terrestrial utility station will occur.
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Solvency deficits- laundry list

Multiple barriers to SPS development now
CNN.com June 1, 2008 < “How to harvest solar power? Beam it down from space!”
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/05/30/space.solar/index.html>
One major barrier is a lack of cheap and reliable access to space, a necessity for launching hundreds of components to build
what will be miles-long platforms. Developing robotic technology to piece the structures together high above Earth will also
be a challenge. Then there is the issue of finding someone to foot what will be at least a billion-dollar bill.
6 reason solvency is unattainable for SPS

Ralph H Nansen, 2000 (, President, Solar Space Industries, Inc. “The Technical Feasibility of Space Solar Power” Before the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, United States House of Representatives Committee on Science.
http://www.seattlewebcrafters.com/chadlupkes/projects/ralphnansen.php)
The key issues that prevented development centered around the size of the program, its cost, safety of wireless energy
transmission, and international implications. These issues were compounded by the lack of the infrastructure required to
support the program and insufficient validation of cost competitiveness with other sources. Also, it is a high technology space
program that is outside the framework of the conservative electric utility industry.
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Competiveness frontline
EU, Japan and Russia are not competitors to the US space program
Gabriele Garibaldi, holds an MIA from the University of Pisa. Freelance analysis, - 5/9/2005 <"Chinese Threat
to American Leadership in Space" http://www.globalpolitician.com/2699-china-america>
The EU and Japan have the economic and technological means to deploy weapons in Space, but they lack both the political will
to challenge Americans and the ability to fund the costs of an independent defense policy: although the U.S. may be aware that the
Europeans are not about to emancipate themselves from their traditional alliance-subordination relationship with the USA, already the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the satellite plan Galileo (the alternative to the American Global Positioning
Satellite) have provoked irritation in their main ally.
Russia has the know-how to compete militarily in Space, but lacks the financial resources. In 2003 its expenses forecast for space
programs was only $300 million, compared to the $3 billion allocated by China and $23 billion invested by the U.S. into NASA and the
myriad space-related programs, including missile defence. But if it had the means, Russia would probably put into effect a space policy
aimed at filling the power gap with the USA and attempt to re-establish a multipolar international order.
Heg has no correlation to economic power
Julius, 05 – Chairman of Chatham House, formerly the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Deanne, Harvard International Review, “US Economic Power,” Winter 2005, vol.26, no.4, p.14-18) // JMP
The concept of national power has both military and economic dimensions. While the two are related, they can also exist
independently. The Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s, for example, was a military superpower but economically weak and
isolated, while Japan during the 1980s was an economic superpower with a weak military. Much attention has been devoted, on both
sides of the Atlantic, to the military aspect of US power and how it is exercised both in unilateral action and through alliances like
NATO. By contrast, the question of economic power has been relatively neglected, perhaps because it is more difficult to define and
measure. This article is an attempt to remedy the imbalance and provoke further discussion on the emerging shape of the world
economy and the ability of the United States to influence it.
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Competiveness frontline
U.S. hegemony is high now and will remain strong – predictions of decline are delusionary
Bret Stephens (Wall Street Journal Asia, “Marinating in ‘Decline’” 2-6-2008, p.14, Proquest) // JMP
In 1788, Massachusetts playwright Mercy Otis Warren took one look at the (unratified) U.S. Constitution and declared that "we shall
soon see this country rushing into the extremes of confusion and violence." This, roughly, is the origin of American declinism -- and it's
been downhill ever since.
A couple centuries later, an international relations theorist at Yale named Paul Kennedy sought to explain the decline of great powers in terms of a
ratio between military commitments and economic resources. The Reagan military buildup and the deficits that went with it, he warned, had brought
the United States to the point of "imperial overstretch." Not quite. Within a few years, the Soviet Union collapsed, Europe and Japan (with no military
burdens to speak of) entered a long period of economic stagnation, and the U.S. consolidated its position as the world's only true superpower.
Declinism is again in vogue. "America's unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American
bullying and construct an alternate world order," writes Parag Khanna in a recent New York Times Magazine cover story titled,
cheerfully, "Who Shrank the Superpower?" In Sunday's Los Angeles Times, Fred Kaplan observes that "the United States can no longer
take obeisance for granted." Mr. Kaplan's new book, "Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power,"
sounds just a bit derivative of Nancy Soderberg's "The Superpower Myth" (2005), Roger Burbach's "Imperial Overstretch" (2004) and
Charles Kupchan's "The End of the American Era" (2003).
American "decline" is the foreign-policy equivalent of homelessness: The media only take note of it when a Republican is in the White
House. Broadly speaking, declinists divide between those who merely accept America's supposed diminishment as a fact of life, and
those who celebrate it as long overdue. As for the causes of decline, however, they tend to agree: declining (relative) economic muscle,
due in large part to the rise of China; an overextended military bogged down needlessly in Iraq and endlessly in Afghanistan; the
declining value of America's "brand" on account of Bush administration policies on detention, pre-emption, terrorism, global warming
-- you name it.
Yet each of these assumptions collapses on a moment's inspection. In his 2006 book "Uberpower," German writer Josef Joffe makes the
following back-of-the-envelope calculation: "Assume that the Chinese economy keeps growing indefinitely at a rate of seven percent,
the average of the past decade (for which history knows of no example). . . . At that rate, China's GDP would double every decade,
reaching parity with today's United States ($12 trillion) in thirty years. But the U.S. economy is not frozen into immobility. By then, the
United States, growing at its long-term rate of 2.5 percent, would stand at $25 trillion."
Now take military expenditures. Monday, the administration released its budget proposal for 2009, which includes $515.4 billion for
the regular defense budget. In inflation-adjusted dollars, this would be the largest defense appropriation since World War II. Yet it
amounts to about 4% of GDP, as compared to 14% during the Korean War, 9.5% during the Vietnam War and 6% in the Reagan
administration. Throw in the Iraq and Afghanistan supplementals, and total projected defense spending is still only 4.5% of GDP -- an
easily afforded sum even by Prof. Kennedy's terms.
Finally there is the issue of our allegedly squandered prestige in the world. There is no doubt America's "popularity," as measured by
various global opinion surveys, has fallen in recent years. What's striking, however, is how little of this has mattered in terms of the
domestic political choices of other countries or the consequences for the U.S.
In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq War, nearly every government that joined President Bush's "coalition of the willing" -- Australia, Great Britain,
Denmark and Japan -- was returned to power. France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schroeder, the war's two most vocal opponents, were
cashiered for two candidates who campaigned explicitly on a pro-American agenda. The same happened in South Korea, where the unapologetically
anti-American President Roh Moo-hyun has been replaced by the unapologetically pro-American Lee Myung-bak. Italy's equally unapologetic pro-
American Silvio Berlusconi seems set to return to office after a brief holiday.
None of this is to say that perceptions about America play a decisive role in the politics of most other countries. It is to say that anti-Americanism, like
illegal immigration, is fool's gold politics. Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel were not installed in office principally to mend relations with
Washington. But to the extent that both seek to liberalize their economies, or strengthen NATO, or take a responsible position vis-a-vis Iran, it brings
them closer to Washington's way of thinking.
Meanwhile, McDonald's -- the icon of everything anti-Americans detest about the U.S. -- is doing a booming business overseas even as sales in the
U.S. flatlined last year. Another icon, Boeing, is having no trouble booking orders (meeting them is another matter) for its new 787 Dreamliner to such
customers as Spain's AirEuropa and Bahrain's Gulf Air. The quintessentially American film, "National Treasure," has earned nearly half its gross
revenue -- about $160 million -- in foreign ticket sales since its release in late December. So much for America's loss of "soft power."
Happily for Mr. Kaplan, I look forward to receiving his forthcoming book. I'll put it right up there on the shelf with another favorite:
"19-0: The Historic Championship Season of New England's Unbeatable Patriots." I'm guessing it will fetch a price on eBay.
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Competiveness Ext.
Economic power is not zero-sum
Julius, 05 – Chairman of Chatham House, formerly the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Deanne, Harvard International Review, “US Economic Power,” Winter 2005, vol.26, no.4, p.14-18) // JMP
What is Economic Power?

The very concept of economic power is more nebulous than that of military power. The ultimate test of military power-war-is the
classic zero-sum game. If Country A has a more powerful military than Country B, then Country A is likely to win in a war between the
two. And in the lead-up to war, Country B is more likely to back down. So having military superiority is clearly n good thing.
There is no parallel in economics because economic competition is not a zero-sum game. Country A may be richer than Country B, but
both will be better off through trade if the other grows richer. In the general case of a free-trade agreement between a rich and a poor
country (say, the United States and Mexico), the poor country gains more. Similarly, in joining a common currency such as the euro,
the poorer countries will benefit more than the richer ones. European experience since 1999 supports this: Portugal and Greece have
grown faster than their historical rates while Germany and France have grown more slowly. But on the economic battlefield, the
success of one country does not imply the defeat of another.
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Space is not key to Heg (defensive frontline)

1. Engagement in Space militarization allows competition in military dominance
Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The
case against weaponizing” space http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/spacebook.pdf>
Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power,
and air power, it is hard to propound compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing
space. The current U.S. lead in the military utilization of space has never been greater and is unchallenged.3 If the United
States pushes to extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others will view this through the prism of the Bush
administration’s national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and preemption. Foreign leaders will not
passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means
to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in
the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely to introduce grave complications for the
terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure.
2. Space weapons will escalate not deter enemies

Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The
case against weaponizing” space http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/spacebook.pdf>
The presumed additional deterrent value of U.S. space weapons is also questionable. If existing U.S. conventional military and
nuclear superiority prove insufficient to deter, it is doubtful that the addition of space warfare capabilities would make an
appreciable difference in an adversary’s calculus of decision. The search to strengthen or supplant nuclear deterrence by means of
space warfare capabilities will therefore appear to many as a quest to escape from, rather than “enhance,” deterrence. When viewed
though this lens, the pursuit of space weapons appears designed less for strengthening deterrence and more for negating the
deterrents of potential adversaries.
To the extent that this perception holds, the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons is unlikely to raise the nuclear threshold, as
proponents claim.
To the contrary, the use of conventionally armed "space-strike" weapons could prompt unwanted escalation by threatening the
nuclear forces of a weaker foe.
In this event, the United States will receive little or no applause of the choice of weaponry used in preemptive strikes.
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Space is not key to Heg (Offensive frontline)

1. Space mill kills traditional heg
The argument presented here is that terrestrial U.S. military dominance would be impaired, rather than enhanced, American
initiatives to weaponize space. While the United States clearly has the ability to outspend competitors, and to produce more advanced
types of space weaponry, weaker adversaries will have affordable. asymmetric means to counter U.S. initiatives in space. as well
as on earth. The net result ofan uneven competition to weaponize space would be that prudent U.S. defense planners could not
count on protecting space assets, d that weaker adversaries could not count on the negation of U.S. advantages. Neither could be
certain of the outcome of space warfare, but both adversaries would have to fear the worst. Because of the vulnerability of space
assets to ASATs, both would need to assume a dangerous
“hair-trigger” posture in space—unless the United States employed preemptive military means to prevent the launch or deployment
of presumably hostile space assets belonging to other states.
2. Russia-China
a. Space mill force China and Russia to engage in a counterbalancing coalition
Nina Tannenwald, Watson Institute for International Studies Brown University, April 2003, < “Law Versus
Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space”>
For several reasons, the first two scenarios are unlikely to lead to stable outcomes. As discussed earlier, U.S. efforts at space
dominance will likely inspire other countries to pursue countermeasures to offset U.S. capabilities, thus risking a never ending
search for security in space that will leave all actors worse off. Some advocates of space weaponization argue that others will be
deterred from responding to U.S. deployment of space weapons for fear of a U.S. counterattack, or out of a conviction that there is no
point competing because the United States will always be ahead. n81 But proponents of this view have so far offered little
explanation of how or why this would be the case. Instead, given the vast U.S. dependence on satellites, other countries merely have to
pursue an “asymmetric warfare” strategy of building antisatellite weapons, and there are multiple and relatively easy ways to do this.
n82 Because of this,
dominance will be very hard to achieve. and will also have adverse consequences for the United States -
including alienating allies, [*380] pushing Russia and China closer together, and placing at risk
other U.S. interests in space. n83
b. Sino/Russian alliance KILLS heg multiple reasons
PETER BROOKES, FELLOW AT THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 8-15, 2005 (AN ALARMING ALLIANCE.
HTTP://WWW.HERITAGE.ORG/PRESS/COM M ENTARY/EDO8 1 505A.CFM
These unprecedented military exercises don’t make a formal Beijing-Moscow alliance inevitable. But they represent a new, more
intimate phase in the Sino-Russian relationship. And China’s growing political/economic clout mated with Russia’s military would
make for a potentially potent anti-American bloc. For the moment, Beijing and Moscow are committed to building a political
order in Asia that doesn’t include America atop the power pyramid. With issues from Islamic terrorism North Korean nukes to
a conflict in the Taiwan Straits the stakes in Asia are huge. Washington and its friends must not waste any time in addressing the
burgeoning Sino-Russian entente.
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Space is not key to Heg (Offensive frontline)
Attacks on satellite could severely damage prospects for escalation control and, in the worst case, could trigger the use of
Weapons of mass destruction against U.S. expeditionary forces, allies, or the U,S. homeland. Sin space warfare would not be
perceived as a trivial pursuit, those nations that could be gravely disadvantaged by the flight-testing and deployment of Space
weaponry are likely to consider equally grave countermeasures. At a minimum, an attempt by the United States to seek space
dominance through deployed war-fighting capabilities is likely to generate the launch of relatively cheap. low—tech. but lethal
ASATs by weaker adversaries. An unequal competition to weaponize space could still place at risk satellites that are essential for
U.S. military communications and early warning in deep crisis. The weaponization of space could thus result in increased U.S.
casualties on the conventional battlefield.
The choice between a competition for national superiority and a strengthened legal regime that preserves and balances the interests
of all in space will have profound consequences. If the United States aggressively moved weaponry into space, it would likely
provoke other nations to pursue countermeasures. with destabilizing consequences for global and national security. In
addilion, by encouraging nations who do not currently have an interest in placing weapons in space to Compete directly and
immediately with U. S. space—based assets, the United States would almost certainly guarantee the toss of the advantages it seeks
to protect. Although an arms race in ASAT weapons is one of the dangers, the threat currently of greatest concern to states such as
China and Russia is the U.S. use of space systems to augment its nuclear and conventional strategic strike capabilities. From the
perspective of these nations, the U.S. decision to expand strategic capabilities into space represents the collapse of the Cold
War bargain of strategic stability based on mutual vulnerability. A military competition in space could thus invigorate a high-
tech arms race and renew emphasis on doctrines of nuclear warfare. n25
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Space unpopular (politics links)

Voters find increasing NASA’s budget unpopular
TEWART M. POWELL, June 17, 2008 Houston Chronicle Washington Bureau, < "NASA popular, but tax hike for funding isn't, poll
finds Most not concerned about China's program, gap in U.S. manned flights"
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/space/5843539.html>
Key arguments being made by supporters of increased NASA funding are not resonating with the American public, a
new Gallup Poll released Tuesday found.
The poll conducted for a business group called the Coalition for Space Exploration found that voters strongly approve of the
venerable space agency's work but are reluctant to pay more taxes to finance new initiatives.
The Gallup survey — released just a day before the House is scheduled to vote on adding $2.9 billion to the NASA budget
— undercut a key argument being used by Texas lawmakers in their bid to persuade Congress to boost spending: that more
money is needed to compete in space against China and to close a five-year gap in manned U.S. space operations between
retirement of the shuttle fleet in 2010 and launch of the Constellation program in 2015.
No support for space weapons
Although SPACECOM and its supporters aggressively assert their views, advocates of weapons in space may be in the minority,
even in the Pentagon. As many observers recognize, the interests of the United States in space are much broader than SPACECOM
presents. U.S. testing and deployment of orbital weapons could make using space for other military and commercial purposes
more difficult. Many in the military, especially those involved in crucial military support activities, are quietly aware of this, as
are officials at NASA and the international space station, and their supporters in Congress.26
Congressional support for antisatellite (ASAT) programs does not appear to be deep or widespread. Serious questions remain
as to whether the threats to U.S. assets in space are really as great as SPACECOM argues, and whether, even if the threats were
real, expensive and difficult space-based weapons would really be the most effective way to deal with them. In many cases, those
wishing to hurt the United States will likely find it much easier, and more effective, to attack terrestrial targets.27
Public support is low for funding manned space programs

Joan Johnson-Freese YaleGlobal, 13 January 2004 <"Chinese Chess in Space New US manned space program should include China as
a partner">
Additionally, Americans' desire and ability to carry the economic burden alone must be considered. Public support for paying the
entire bill for a new manned space program is doubtful. Manned space exploration has been consistently viewed by the public
as a good thing to do, but low on its list of funding priorities.
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Space spending links

SPS cost to must to send into space
Boswell 2004 (David Boswell, expert speaker at the 1991 International Space Development Conference, “Whatever happened to solar
power satellites?”)
Another barrier is that launching anything into space costs a lot of money. A substantial investment would be needed to get a
solar power satellite into orbit; then the launch costs would make the electricity that was produced more expensive than other
alternatives. In the long term, launch costs will need to come down before generating solar power in space makes economic
sense. But is the expense of launching enough to explain why so little progress has been made?
There were over 60 launches in 2003, so last year there was enough money spent to put something into orbit about every week on
average. Funding was found to launch science satellites to study gravity waves and to explore other planets. There are also dozens of
GPS satellites in orbit that help people find out where they are on the ground. Is there enough money available for these purposes, but
not enough to launch even one solar power satellite that would help the world develop a new source of energy?
In the 2004 budget the Department of Energy has over $260 million allocated for fusion research. Obviously the government has some
interest in funding renewable energy research and they realize that private companies would not be able to fund the development of a
sustainable fusion industry on their own. From this perspective, the barrier holding back solar power satellites is not purely financial,
but rather the problem is that there is not enough political will to make the money available for further development. There is a very
interesting discussion on the economics of large space projects that makes the point that “the fundamental problem in opening any
contemporary frontier, whether geographic or technological, is not lack of imagination or will, but lack of capital to finance
initial construction which makes the subsequent and typically more profitable economic development possible. Solving this
fundamental problem involves using one or more forms of direct or indirect government intervention in the capital market.”
Even If Construction Of SPS Systems Is Possible, The Cost Of Production Makes the Systems
uncompetitive, even with subsidies
David Boswell 2004 <“Whatever happened to solar power satellites?”>
Even if a solar power system was built and launched there would still be the economic problem of producing electricity at a cost
that is comparable to other options. Government subsidies can help get this new industry on its feet but it will need to compete
in the market in order to survive. This is a challenge for all emerging renewable energy solutions.
Current non-renewable energy supplies are cheap. Even with the recent increases in the price of oil, it is still historically low. Adjusted
for inflation, gas prices are still much lower than they were during the oil crisis in the 1970s. With current prices there is little
incentive for customers or producers to pursue alternatives. Even if oil prices continue to increase, it is not likely that this will
be enough to drive demand for alternatives. Although we will eventually run out of oil, coal, and other non-renewable energy
sources, in the short term rising oil prices will simply generate more oil.
There are large amounts of known reserves that are too expensive to profitably develop when oil is below a certain price. As soon as
the price increases past a certain threshold, a given field can be developed at a profit. From an economic standpoint, energy
producers will take advantage of this and will make use of their existing infrastructure to extract, refine, and distribute as much
oil as possible regardless of how high the price of a barrel of oil goes.
Solar power satellites will cost a trillion
David Roberts, Grist's staff writer, 6/3/08 http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2008/6/2/104028/8055

The article focuses on the obvious problem: cost. Back in the '70s when the U.S. was looking at this seriously, NASA
concluded getting all the infrastructure up into space would run about $1 trillion.
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Bad Timframe
SPS still light years away
Alan Boyle, Science editor MSNBC, Oct. 12, 2007, <“ "Power from space? Pentagon likes the idea
Frontline soldiers could use energy beamed from orbit, study says"
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21253268/>
Space advocacy groups immediately seized on the idea and formed a new alliance to push the plan. But a representative of the
solar-power industry was doubtful that space solar power would move from the realm of science fiction into reality
anytime soon.
"You've got a lot of technology breakthroughs that you have to make," Mike Taylor, technical services manager for the Solar
Electric Power Association, told msnbc.com.
SPS is 20 years away even with the help of the international community
Judith Burns, Science producer, BBC News, 12/07/07, <“The final frontier for solar energy”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7131617.stm>
Leopold Summerer of the European Space Agency believes the generation of solar power from space may be only 20 years
away.
But he adds that the cost of the undertaking will mean it will have to be another international effort along the lines of the
Space Station.
SPS nowhere near available

Leonard David, Senior Space Writer, Space.com, April 21, 2000, Space Power for an Energy-Hungry
Earth?, http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/solar_power_satellite_000421.html
John Mankins, a NASA manager working with advanced concepts, said the study is consistent with the agency's own studies of
beaming power from space. "The technology to do very large scale solar-power systems that might deliver energy into terrestrial
power markets is not at hand. It's going to take a fair amount of investment and a lot of success in research and development to
mature these technologies to make them available," he said.
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Bad Timframe
SPS won’t be able to be deployed until 2050

Jeff Foust, the editor and publisher of The Space Review, Monday, August 13, 2007, <"A renaissance for space solar
power?"http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1>
[Air Force Lt. Col. Michael ] Smith made it clear, though, that he’s not looking for a quick fix that will suddenly make solar
power satellites feasible in the near term. “If I can close this deal on space-based solar power, it’s going to take a long time,” he
said. “The horizon we’re looking at is 2050 before we’re able to do something significant.” The first major milestone, he
said, would be a small demonstration satellite that could be launched in the next eight to ten years that would
demonstrate power beaming from GEO. However, he added those plans could change depending on developments of various
technologies that could alter the direction space solar power systems would go. “That 2050 vision, what that architecture will
look like, is carved in Jell-O.”
SPS does not currently exist and will not for the next 40 years- all their
evidence is spurred by environmental and high energy hysteria
Dwayne Day, writer for the Space Review, Monday, June 9, 2008 < “Knights in shining armor”
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1>
You may not have noticed, but the space activist community is all worked up about space solar power (see “A renaissance for
space solar power?”, The Space Review, August 13, 2007). It is now the topic of much conversation whenever a group of
space enthusiasts get together. It was recently on the cover of the National Space Society’s magazine Ad Astra. The upcoming
NewSpace 2008 conference will feature a panel on it. The International Space Development Conference in Washington, DC
featured no less than three—yes, three—sessions on space solar power, or SSP, to use the shorthand term, plus a dinner speaker
who addressed the same subject. With all of this attention, one would suspect that there has been a fundamental technological
breakthrough that now makes SSP possible, or a major private or government initiative to begin at least preliminary work
on a demonstration project. But there has been none of this. In fact, from a technological standpoint, we are not much closer
to space solar power today than we were when NASA conducted a big study of it in the 1970s.
The reason that SSP has gained nearly religious fervor in the activist community can be attributed to two things, neither
having to do with technical viability. The first reason is increased public and media attention on environmentalism and
energy coupled with the high price of gasoline. When even Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups are advertised with a global warming
message, it’s clear that the issue has reached the saturation point and everybody wants to link their pet project to the global
warming discussion. SSP, its advocates point out, is “green” energy, with no emissions—other than the hundreds, or probably
thousands, of rocket launches needed to build solar power satellites. The second reason is a 2007 study produced by the
National Security Space Office (NSSO) on SSP. The space activist community has determined that the Department of
Defense is the knight in shining armor that will deliver them to their shining castles in the sky.
Space activists, who are motivated by the desire to personally live and work in space, do not care about SSP per se. Although all
of them are impacted by high gasoline prices, many of them do not believe that global climate change is occurring; or if they do
believe it, they doubt that humans contribute to it. Instead, they have latched on to SSP because it is expedient. Environmental
and energy issues provide the general backdrop to their new enthusiasm, and the NSSO study serves as their focal point. Many
people now claim that “the Department of Defense is interested in space solar power.” But it is not true.
The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that
it is not a viable solution for even the military’s limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar
power does not currently exist… and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development
must occur before it is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access
to space, which no longer seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of
the discussion and hope others solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.
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Space Weps/sps fails

Lack of maneuverability dooms space weapons
Bob Preston and Calvin Shipbaugh, 2002 et al., “Space weapons, Earth Wars,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp.; pg 104
Because achieving particular orbit requires such enormous effort, significantly changing established orbits is not generally
practical. As a result, it is hard to concentrate the efforts of a constellation of satellites in space and time. As defenses,
space weapons are static in the same way that terrestrial fortifications are. Space-based defenses are inherently subjected to
saturation by a terrestrial opponent that is able to concentrate an attack against them in space and time. This limitation
may be an advantage if a limited defense against a limited threat is needed that is observably incapable of destabilizing a
deterrence relationship with another, larger threat.
SPS beaming energy down tech is unproven

The idea of a demonstration satellite was endorsed by Shubber Ali, an entrepreneur and self-described “cynic” who also participated on
the NewSpace panel. “The first step in this case needs to be a cheap, simple satellite, just to prove that we can beam power back
down,” he said. A satellite that generated just 10 kilowatts of power—less than some commercial GEO communications satellites—
could be developed for on the order of $100 million, he said.
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Militerization frontline
Space weaponization diverts attention away from key components of satellite protection
Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President April 18, 2002, <“Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy
Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons” http://cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm>
Currently, the simplest ways to attack satellites and satellite-based systems involve ground-based operations against ground
facilities, and disruption of computerized downlinks. Hacking and jamming also are the least expensive options for anyone
interested in disrupting space-based networks, because they do not require putting anything into orbit. The high cost of space
launch (ranging between $5,000 and $10,000 per pound) is not a trivial matter, even for space-faring nations such as Russia and
China, much less for 'rogue' states such as North Korea or non-state actors.
Indeed, the Space Commission report acknowledges that: "Attacking or sabotaging the supporting ground facilities has long
been considered one of the easiest methods for a U.S. adversary to conduct offensive counter-space operations. Most of these
facilities are relatively easy to get in close physical proximity to or access by way of a computer network, making them a prime
target."
It is true that the incidences of computer hacking against U.S. military, financial and industrial networks continues to
rise and that several countries including China are known to be exploring information warfare capabilities. Many
countries already have developed military electronic jamming systems, and that technology is becoming widely available even
on the commercial market.
It is obvious that the United States must ensure the integrity of its increasingly important space networks, and find ways to
defense against threats to space assets. Still, there is little reason to believe that it is necessary for the U.S. to put weapons
in space to do so. Space warfare proponents are making a suspect leap in logic in arguing that space-based weapons are, or will
soon be, required to protect the ability of the United States to operate freely in space. One could argue much more rationally that
what is needed most urgently is to find ways to prevent computer network intrusion; to ensure redundant capabilities both
at the system and subsystem level, including the ability to rapidly replace satellites on orbit; to improve security of ground
facilities (perhaps moving to underground facilities); and to harden electronic components on particularly important satellites.
Furthermore, the evidence of actual space weapons programs by potential adversaries is thin. There have been Chinese
press reports about China's military researching microsatellites (weighing less than 100 kilograms) or nanosatellites (weighing
less than 10 kilograms) to attack U.S. satellites in space in a future war, but evidence of actual progress is scant. Russia also has
long explored anti-satellite technology, but there is little reason to believe that Moscow has changed its policy against deploying
such weapons (Russia has had a unilateral ban on ASAT testing for some time), especially given the current cash-starved state
of the Russian space program. No other countries have shown visible signs of interest (although obviously any space-faring
nation, such as India or Pakistan, have latent capability).
Space weapons cause global instability and military vulnerability

Bruce M. Deblois, Summer 2003, “the advent of space weapons,” Astropolitics, Vol. 1 No. 1
In this view, a Space weaponizing country creates both the powder keg of global instability (where it has weakened its own
international posture) as well as the spark of regional instability (where it has made itself a target of preemption and escalation).
Coupled with this very unstable environment, it can also be argued that the same country that weaponizes space may actually
damage its own military power. Much of the impetus behind space weaponization stems from perceived military utility, to include
national missile defense applications for boost-phase intercepts, time-critical targeting, and defense mechanism for critical space
systems. Ironically, the posturing of more military assets are already a center of gravity (CoG), or at least a critical concentration
of military force enhancement assets. To deploy more systems in space in an attempt to protect this CoG only complicates the
problem. In spite of the added defenses, the preponderance of threats will remain: denial and deception, electronic warfare (e.g.
uplink and downlink jamming), ground facilities disruption, micro-satellites (e.g. space mines), direct ascent interceptors or even a
nuclear detonation in space
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Space Weaponization causes unrestrained war among nations-multiple reasons
Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich,
Teaching Fellows in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 20N (Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram,
lSlS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a
Crossroads", No. 6 July, http:llwww.isisuk.demon.co.uklO811lisis/uk/bmd/no6.htmI)
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of ‘peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses
over the tendency that I.. . the presence of space weapons ... will result in the increased likelihood of their use.33 This drift
toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnabv: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic
missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in- hand1.34
The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of space borne
weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to
intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile
interceptors based in space can knock
out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling
through the Earth's atmosphere.
The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose’ pressure into strategic calculations, with the specter of
split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger devices. In theory, automation would
enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human
hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict.
Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which
have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking
complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[the odd term
"normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are
inevitable.36 Deployment of space weapons with we-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would
likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. according to retired Lt. Col. Robert
M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous
damage - even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as
a quintessential tool of peace, defense analyst David Langford sees one of the most - destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived:
'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people1.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine
that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological,
and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most
destructive military conflict ever seen.
Space Weapons leads to an accidental nuclear war

Thomas Graham, Jr. 12-8-08 “A Pearl Harbor in Outer Space? Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War”
http://www.counterpunch.org/graham12082005.html
Both the United States and Russia rely on space-based systems to provide early warning of a nuclear attack. If deployed,
however, U.S. space-based missile defense interceptors could eliminate the Russian early warning satellites quickly and without
warning. So, just the existence of U.S. space weapons could make Russia's strategic trigger fingers itchy. The potential protection
space-based defenses might offer the United States is swamped therefore by their potential cost: a failure of or false signal from a
component of the Russian early warning system could lead to a disastrous reaction and accidental nuclear war. There is no
conceivable missile defense, space-based or not, that would offer protection in the event that the Russian nuclear arsenal was
launched at the United States. Nor are the Russians or other countries likely to stand still and watch the United States construct
space-based defenses. These states are likely to respond by developing advanced anti-satellite weapon systems.[1] These weapons,
in turn, would endanger U.S. early warning systems, impair valuable U.S. weapons intelligence efforts, and increase the
jitteriness of U.S. officials.
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3. Economy Turn
A. US push for space weaponization shifts R&D away from the commercial
sector which hurts the US economy
Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President April 18, 2002, <“Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy
Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons” http://cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm>
39
Kubaski and other U.S. industry leaders are predicting little growth in the commercial sector in the near term.
Corporate chieftains at major defense and space firms already are citing missile defense as a much more lucrative future
market than commercial/civil space operations. Such a market assessment by U.S. industry is not without consequences. As
one corporate strategist at a major U.S. defense/space firm explained, market assessments drive where corporate research
and development dollars go.
40
Considering that it is industry, rather than DoD and NASA, that carries the bulk of R&D spending in the defense and
civil space arena, there is some possibility that an emphasis on space weaponization could shift technology investment
from the commercial to the defense world.
Granted, this would hold only for those firms — such as Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co., Raytheon Co., and TRW — that
do large percentages of government businesses, rather than for those companies more vested in the commercial end of space
operations (providing telecommunications and Internet services for example.) Nonetheless, the ramifications of shifting R&D
on market edge in the commercial arena deserve some consideration.
Interestingly, the U.S. industry has not done as well over the past two years as the overall marketplace. Overall, the
worldwide market rebounded in 2000 with a 23 percent growth in revenue, according to the Satellite Industry Association.
The association data show that while the global market for satellite manufacturing grew by 9 percent in 2000, U.S.
revenue declined by 11 percent. Similarly, worldwide revenue in the satellite launch segment grew by 29 percent in 2000,
whereas U.S. revenue grew only by 17 percent.
B. Economic collapse causes extinction
Walter Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April, 2004 America's Sticky
Power, Foreign Policy, Proquest
Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private bonds, direct and
portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A
collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the U nited States. Without their best
customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely
shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear
to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can
turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintaining
its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a collapsing U.S. economy
would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world. That is sticky power with a vengeance. The United States'
global economic might is therefore not simply, to use Nye's formulations, hard power that compels others or soft power that attracts the
rest of the world. Certainly, the U.S. economic system provides the United States with the prosperity needed to underwrite its security
strategy, but it also encourages other countries to accept U.S. leadership. U.S. economic might is sticky power. How will sticky power
help the United States address today's challenges? One pressing need is to ensure that Iraq's economic reconstruction integrates the
nation more firmly in the global economy. Countries with open economies develop powerful trade-oriented businesses; the leaders of
these businesses can promote economic policies that respect property rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Such leaders also lobby
governments to avoid the isolation that characterized Iraq and Libya under economic sanctions. And looking beyond Iraq, the allure of
access to Western capital and global markets is one of the few forces protecting the rule of law from even further erosion in Russia.
China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain wealth that
could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some analysts in both
China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the reigning U.S.
power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the
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global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3
trillion. By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming
increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the
United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off supplies of oil and other key commodities. Sticky power works
both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an increasingly hard time breaking off
commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual dependence is probably good for both sides.
Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.-Chinese
conflict is less likely to occur.
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Militerization ext.
Space defenses are ineffective and are seen as a threat, leading to nuclear war
THOMAS GRAHAM, Jr. 12-8-08 “A Pearl Harbor in Outer Space? Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War”
http://www.counterpunch.org/graham12082005.html
The Russian early warning system is in serious disrepair. This system consists of older radar systems nearing the end of their
operational life and just three functioning satellites, although the Russian military has plans to deploy more. The United States has 15
such satellites. Ten years ago, on January 25, 1995, this aging early warning network picked up a rocket launch from Norway. The
Russian military could not determine the nature of the missile or its destination. Fearing that it might be a submarine-launched
missile aimed at Moscow with the purpose of decapitating the Russian command and control structure, the Russian military alerted
President Boris Yeltsin, his defense minister, and the chief of the general staff. They immediately opened an emergency
teleconference to determine whether they needed to order Russia's strategic forces to launch a counterattack. The rocket that had been
launched was actually an atmospheric sounding rocket conducting scientific observations of the aurora borealis. Norway had notified Russia of this
launch several weeks earlier, but the message had not reached the relevant sections of the military. In little more than two minutes before the deadline
to order nuclear retaliation, the Russians realized their mistake and stood down their strategic forces. Thus, 10 years ago, when the declining Russian
early warning system was stronger than today, it read this single small missile test launch as a U.S. nuclear missile attack on Russia. The alarm went
up the Russian chain of command all the way to the top. The briefcase containing the nuclear missile launch codes was brought to Yeltsin as he was
told of the attack. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian leadership made the correct decision that day and directed the Russian strategic nuclear forces
to stand down. Obviously, nothing should be done in any way further to diminish the reliability of the space-based components of U.S. and Russian
ballistic missile early warning systems. A decline in confidence in such early warning systems caused by the deployment of weapons in space
would enhance the risk of an accidental nuclear weapons attack. Yet, as part of its plans for missile defense, the Pentagon is calling for the
development of a test bed for space-based interceptors as well as examining a number of other exotic space weapons. In an interview published in
Arms Control Today, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the Missile Defense Agency, touted what he said was "a very modest and moderate test-bed
approach to launch some experiments." Obering said the Pentagon would only deploy a handful of interceptors: "We are talking about onesies, twosies
in terms of experimentation."[2] Despite Obering's claims, however, establishing a test bed for missile defense in space, as opposed to current
preliminary research, would be a long step toward space weaponization. Once space-based missile defenses are tested, they are likely to be
deployed, and in significant numbers, no matter if the tests are successful.To see the path that a space test bed is likely to follow,
one need only look at the present ground-based program: the Pentagon claims there is little true difference between a test bed and an
operational deployment. Moreover, in space the deployment could be more dramatic. Although the current ground-based configuration
envisions a few dozen interceptors, continuous space coverage over a few countries of concern would likely require a very large
number of interceptors because a particular interceptor will be above a particular target for only a few minutes a day. Today's missile
defenses provide very little real protection as the United States currently faces no realistic threat of deliberate attack by
nuclear-armed long-range missiles. But space weapons could actually be detrimental to U.S. national security. They would
increase the perceived vulnerability of early warning systems to attack and cause Russia and perhaps other countries such as
China to pursue potentially destabilizing countermeasures, such as advanced anti-satellite weapons.
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Colonization frontline
Space exploration and distant colonization is unnecessary
Robert Shapiro 3/19/2007 (, “WHY THE MOON? HUMAN SURVIVAL!” SPACE REVIEW
MARCH 19TH 2007)
When we face a brand new situation, such probabilities are impossible to calculate. Countermeasures against each individual threat can
of course be taken, but we would also be prudent to back up our civilization and our species. We need to place a self-sufficient
fragment of society out of harm’s way, which for practical purposes means off the Earth. A buffer of empty space would protect that
sanctuary from virtually all of the catastrophes named above. Physicist Stephen Hawking, and a number of others, have called for
humanity to spread out to distant planets of our Solar System. But there is no need to go so far to protect ourselves. After a few
decades—centuries at worst—dust and ash will settle, radioactive materials will decay, and viruses will perish. Earth will once
again become the best home for humanity in the Solar System. Return would be easiest if a safe sanctuary were nearby. In the
more probable instance that only a limited disaster took place, that nearby sanctuary could also play a valuable role in restoring lost
data and cultural materials, and coordinating the recovery. And of course, construction of the rescue base will be much easier if it is
only days, rather than months or years, away. We do not have to build the base from scratch, in an environment of emptiness, as we are
attempting to do with the space station. A suitable platform has been orbiting our planet ever since its formation. On most clear
nights, we need only look up to see it. If I employ the same arithmetic that I use when I insure my home, the cost of the lunar base can
easily be justified.
Colonization start through militant efforts resulting in a slow transition to

civilian sectors
Taylor Dinneman 1/15/2007 (, The Space Review “Independent Space Colonization: Questions and
Implications”)
Once one or more bases are established on the Moon, nations will find themselves exerting control over parts of that body which, in
practical terms, will amount to sovereignty. Within a moon base, even one occupied by only a couple of astronauts, the
government that sent them there will regulate their lives in more or less the same way a government regulates the lives of the crew
of a warship. The ship itself is considered the sovereign territory of the state that owns it while the waters through which it passes may
be international or belong to another sovereign state that is obliged to respect the right of innocent passage. The ship’s crew lacks
anything like the ability to function as free citizens and to buy sell and trade in a free marketplace. One question that advocates for
space colonization have to consider is: how can the transition from a quasi-military lifestyle to a civilian one be handled? The
experience that many communities in the US have had when a nearby military base closed down might be relevant. Another source of
experience might be the transitions from martial law to civilian law that have taken place over the years, including the one that
happened in Hawaii at the end of the Second World War.
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DoD CP 1NC
Observation one is the Plan
Plan Text: The United States federal government should ________________________ the Department of Defense for
______________________________________________
Observation two is solvency
The DoD is capable of building Solar powered satellites by 2025
Noah Shachtman, editor at Wired magazine, and the editor of its national security blog, "Danger Room," which won the 2007 Online
Journalism Award for best beat reporting, June 07, 2007, <“Military Target: Solar-Beaming Sats”
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/06/post.html>
Last month, a man at a bar introduced himself as "Coyote," and told me he was working on the Pentagon's plans to build a string of
satellites that beamed solar rays down to Earth.
My first thought was to call my wife, the psychiatrist.
I resisted, however. And I was glad I did. Turned out the guy was an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, "Coyote" was his call sign, and he
was very serious and (mostly) sane.
The government -- especially NASA -- has, for decades, toyed with the idea of collecting sunshine, and shooting it to power everything
from lunar bases to the terrestrial grid. The space agency just backed a conference at MIT last month on this very subject. But two
problems always arose: the collecting "rectennas" would have to be massive (10 square kilometers, in one estimate), and the costs could
soar even higher.
Now, the Defense Department is going to see if it can come up with ways to overcome these not-inconsiderable obstacles.
Pentagon "officials have decided to examine this concept now because the military is growing increasingly dependent on fossil
fuels -- a dependency that is causing the United States to rely on unreliable sources of energy, pay higher prices and face operational
insecurities linked to the logistical burden of delivering oil on the battlefield," Inside Defense says.
National Security Space Office director Maj. Gen. James Armor has tasked Lt. Col. M.V. "Coyote" Smith and others to make an
official study into the feasibility of space-based solar power by 2025 or 2030, and report back by September. (We first noted the
possibility of this study in April.)
And the DoD solves better- it has a larger budget and will take on the
responsibility that NASA does not want
Dwayne Day, writer for the Space Review, Monday, June 9, 2008 < “Knights in shining armor”
If all this is true, why is the space activist community so excited about the NSSO study? That is not hard to understand. They all know
that the economic case for space solar power is abysmal. The best estimates are that SSP will cost at least three times the cost per
kilowatt hour of even relatively expensive nuclear power. But the military wants to dramatically lower the cost of delivering fuel to
distant locations, which could possibly change the cost-benefit ratio. The military savior also theoretically solves some other
problems for SSP advocates. One is the need for deep pockets to foot the immense development costs. The other is an institutional
avatar—one of the persistent policy challenges for SSP has been the fact that responsibility for it supposedly “falls through the
cracks” because neither NASA nor the Department of Energy wants responsibility. If the military takes on the SSP challenge,
the mission will finally have a home.
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PICS Good
1) This Standard Destroys Counterplans – If they ware right, the negative can
only counterplan with a different agent doing a different action – nothing
would be competitive.
2) Their Choice – Aff determines ground with plan text, we get all else – this
is best for competitive equity.
3) Competition Checks Abuse – There has to be a net benefit proving the CP

doesn’t endorse the plan and provides a reason to reject it.
4) They Have To Defend The Whole Plan – That includes the part of the plan
we PIC’d out of.
5) Reciprocal – A permutation including all of the plan and part of the CP is

legitimate even though it is partially inclusive of the CP.
6) PICs Lead To Better Plan Writing – Because the can get out of our PICs by
writing a better plan text.
7) Maximizes Best Policy Options – Provides best topic education around

plan.
8) Every CP Is A PIC – Because they must include all or part of the plan.
9) No Implication – Not my fault they worded their plan badly, worst case you
reject the CP, not the team.
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EXT. NASA cant solve
That’s the kind of innovation Mankins wants to see funded. But to which federal agency should he apply? Neither NASA nor the
Department of Energy has ever shown much interest in nurturing sunsat technology.
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Ext. DOD can/NASA can’t

NASA lets SPS fall through the cracks only the DoD is championing the program
Another big problem has been finding the right government agency to support R&D work on space solar power. Space solar
power doesn’t neatly fit into any particular agency’s scope, and without anyone in NASA or DOE actively advocating it, it has
fallen through the cracks in recent years. “NASA does science, they do astronauts, and they do aeronautics, but they don’t do
energy for the Earth,” Mankins said. “On the other side, the Department of Energy doesn’t really do energy for space.” That situation,
at least in regards to those two agencies, shows little sign of changing.
Marty Hoffert, a New York University professor who has been a long-time advocate of space solar power, contrasted the current plight
with that of fusion, the one other energy source Hoffert believes could provide energy security to the world. While space solar power
goes virtually unrecognized by the US and other governments, an international consortium is spending up to $20 billion on a
test fusion reactor, ITER, in France. “For half that money I think we could deliver a working solar power satellite, whereas ITER
is just going to show the proof of feasibility” of controlled nuclear fusion without generating any power, he said.
“Certain ideas just fall through the cracks because there isn’t a champion in the agency,” in either the DOE or NASA, Hoffert
said. Enter the DOD
In recent months, however, a new potential champion for space solar power has emerged, and from a somewhat unlikely quarter.
Over the last several months the National Security Space Office (NSSO) has been conducting a study about the feasibility of space
solar power, with an eye towards military applications but also in broader terms of economic and national security.
Air Force Lt. Col. Michael “Coyote” Smith, leading the NSSO study, said during a session about space solar power at the NewSpace
2007 conference in Arlington, Virginia last month that the project had its origins in a study last year that identified energy, and the
competition for it, as the pathway to “the worst nightmare war we could face in the 21st century.” If the United States is able to secure
energy independence in the form of alternative, clean energy sources, he said, “that will buy us a form of security that would be
phenomenal.”
At the same time, the DOD has been looking at alternative fuels and energy sources, given the military’s voracious appetite for
energy, and the high expense—in dollars as well as lives—in getting that energy to troops deployed in places like Afghanistan and
Iraq. Soldiers, he noted, use the equivalent of one AA battery an hour while deployed to power all their devices. The total cost of a
gallon of fuel delivered to troops in the field, shipped via a long and, in places, dangerous supply chain, can run between $300 and
$800, he said, the higher cost taking into account the death benefits of soldiers killed in attacks on convoys shipping the fuel.
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NASA Brain Drain DA 1/2
A. SPS causes NASA budget tradeoff
John P. Schaefer, Chairman of SPS advisory Panel August 1981 <“Solar power satellites” google books>
The broad scope of NASA activities has meant that within and without the agency, there have been conflicts over the relative priority of
scientific v. applications, or manned v. unmanned missions. The SPS could be criticized for diverting funds and attention from
competing programs; interagency squabbling might interfere with the project. Excessive concentration on SPS could prevent NASA
from accomplishing other tasks, although many aspects of SPS development would be applicable to other space activities.
B. NASA budget tradeoff causes US Brain Drain
Dennis Overbye, New York Times staff writer, March 2, 2006 < “Budget Cuts Back Much-Promoted NASA Missions”
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/science/space/02nasa.html?_r=1&oref=slogin>
The cuts have alarmed and outraged many scientists, who have long feared that NASA will have to cannibalize its science
program to carry out the president's vision of human spaceflight.
The new cuts, they say, will drive young people from the field, ending American domination of space science and perhaps
ceding future discoveries to Europe.
"The bottom line: science at NASA is disappearing — fast," said Donald Lamb, an astrophysicist at the University of Chicago
and chairman of a committee on space science for the Association of American Universities.
C. US Brain Drain Causes economic collapse

Rubenstein, economist and Director of Research for the Hudson Institute, 2001 Edward, Reverse Brain Drain, December,
http://www.zazona.com/ShameH1B/Library/Archives/ReverseBrainDrain.htm
Less than competitive wages have created a labor market perversity: unfilled positions amidst a glut of qualified high tech
personnel. The Commerce Department estimates 190,000 vacancies exist in the information technology (IT) industry alone.
Regardless of their source, these job vacancies harm the U.S. economy. A shortage of high-tech workers delays innovation,
reduces the growth of high-wage jobs, reduce U.S. exports, and increases the costs of doing business in the United States.
Chronic job vacancies have forced many U.S.-based tech firms to move their operations overseas
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NASA Brain Drain DA 2/2
D. Economic collapse causes extinction
Walter Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April, 2004 America's Sticky
Power, Foreign Policy, Proquest
Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private bonds, direct and
portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A
collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the U nited States. Without their best
customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely
shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear
to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can
turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintaining
its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a collapsing U.S. economy
would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world. That is sticky power with a vengeance. The United States'
global economic might is therefore not simply, to use Nye's formulations, hard power that compels others or soft power that attracts the
rest of the world. Certainly, the U.S. economic system provides the United States with the prosperity needed to underwrite its security
strategy, but it also encourages other countries to accept U.S. leadership. U.S. economic might is sticky power. How will sticky power
help the United States address today's challenges? One pressing need is to ensure that Iraq's economic reconstruction integrates the
nation more firmly in the global economy. Countries with open economies develop powerful trade-oriented businesses; the leaders of
these businesses can promote economic policies that respect property rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Such leaders also lobby
governments to avoid the isolation that characterized Iraq and Libya under economic sanctions. And looking beyond Iraq, the allure of
access to Western capital and global markets is one of the few forces protecting the rule of law from even further erosion in Russia.
China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain wealth that
could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some analysts in both
China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the reigning U.S.
power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the
global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3
trillion. By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming
increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the
United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off supplies of oil and other key commodities. Sticky power works
both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an increasingly hard time breaking off
commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual dependence is probably good for both sides.
Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.-Chinese
conflict is less likely to occur.
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NASA Tradeoff DA (Oceans) 1/2

NASA is resisting SPS now while trying to maintain a balanced budget-forced
SPS will collapse the program
Taylor Dinerman, The Space Review staff writer Monday, May 19, 2008 < "NASA and space solar power"
NASA has good reason to be afraid that the Congress or maybe even the White House will give them a mandate to work on
space solar power at a time when the agency’s budget is even tighter than usual and when everything that can be safely cut has
been cut. This includes almost all technology development programs that are not directly tied to the Exploration Missions System
Directorate’s Project Constellation. Not only that, the management talent inside the organization is similarly under stress. Adding a
new program might bring down the US civil space program like a house of cards.
In the mid-1990s, urged on by the new chairman of the House Science Committee’s space subcommittee, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA),
NASA did conduct a so-called “Fresh Look” study of space solar power. According to John Mankins, one of the world’s greatest
authorities on space solar power, “Several innovative concepts were defined and a variety of new technology applications considered
including solid state microwave transmitters, extremely large tension stabilized structures (both tether and inflatable structures), and
autonomously self assembling systems using advanced in-space computing systems.” Concluding his 2003 paper on the study, Mankins
wrote:
The economic viability of such systems depends, of course, on many factors and the successful development of various new
technologies—not least of which is the availability of exceptionally low cost access to space. However the same can be said of many
other advanced power technologies options.
There was no follow-up to this study, partly because of a lack of urgency in the era of cheap energy that existed a decade ago and also
because NASA did not, and does not today, see itself as an auxiliary to the Department of Energy. NASA does science and
exploration and not much else. Along with its contractors it can develop new technologies that apply directly to those two
missions, but outside of that it will resist being forced to spend money on projects that it does not see as falling within those two
missions.
NASA key to understanding ocean changes and setting appropriate pollutions

standards accordingly
Lynn Chandler, 21.09.2007 <“NASA celebrates a decade observing climate impacts on health of world's oceans"
http://www.innovations-report.de/html/berichte/umwelt_naturschutz/bericht-91472.html
NASA and GeoEye's SeaWiFS instrument has given researchers the first global look at ocean biological productivity. Its data
have applications for understanding and monitoring the impacts of climate change, setting pollution standards, and sustaining
coastal economies that depend on tourism and fisheries.
"SeaWiFS allows us to observe ocean changes and the mechanisms linking ocean physics and biology, and that's important for
our ability to predict the future health of the oceans in a changing climate," said Gene Carl Feldman, SeaWiFS project manager at
Goddard.
Researchers used SeaWiFS data to identify factors controlling the unusual timing of the 2005 phytoplankton bloom in the California
Current System that led to the die-off of Oregon coast seabirds. The blooming tiny microscopic plants are key indicators of ocean
health, form the base of marine food webs, and absorb carbon dioxide – a major greenhouse gas – from Earth's atmosphere.
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NASA Tradeoff DA (Oceans) 2/2

Ocean destruction causes planetary extinction
Craig 2003 [Associate Prof at Indiana U School of Law, Robin Kundis, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection”,
McGeorge Law Review, Winter, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155, p. 264-266, LN]
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in
political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and
dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that
intact coral reef ecosystems provide. More generally, "ocean
ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the
elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less
abundant but necessary elements." In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the
planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine
ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly
dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. Most
ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the
ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef
system. Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for
marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness.
However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable
force and merit." At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The
United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even
though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that
most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the
United States has
within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much
about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the
biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and
dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique. The Black Sea is a
microcosm of what is happening to the ocean systems at large. The stresses piled up: overfishing, oil spills, industrial discharges, nutrient pollution, wetlands destruction, the introduction of an
alien species. The sea weakened, slowly at first, then collapsed with shocking suddenness. The lessons of this tragedy should not be lost to the rest of us, because much of what happened here is
being repeated all over the world. The ecological stresses imposed on the Black Sea were not unique to communism. Nor, sadly, was the failure of governments to respond to the emerging crisis.
Oxygen-starved "dead zones" appear with increasing frequency off the coasts of major cities and major rivers, forcing
marine animals to flee and killing all that cannot. Ethics as well as enlightened self-interest thus suggest that the
United States should protect fully-functioning marine ecosystems wherever possible - even if a few fishers go out of business as a result.
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AT no tradeoff- give incentives
1. cross apply the Dinerman card from the 1nc NASA will resist any project
out side its two missions
( )NASA has no room for more programs
Until the shuttle is retired and NASA has a new and secure method of getting people into space, either with the Orion capsule on
top of the Ares 1 or perhaps another rocket, or using the SpaceX Dragon capsule and Falcon 9 combination, there is no room for any
other major programs. It will require all they can do to cope with their current programs and to deal with a new president and his
or her administration. They don’t need any more distractions right now.
( )NASA does not have or want the authority to control SPS- even if funds and
authority were given NASA would resist
NASA is not the US Department of Spatial Affairs: it does not have the statutory authority to control, regulate, or promote
commercial space activities such as telecommunications satellites, space tourism, space manufacturing, or space solar power. Such
powers are spread throughout the government in places like the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, the Department of
Commerce, and elsewhere. Even if NASA were somehow to get the funds and the motivation to do space solar power, these other
institutions would resist what they would recognize as an encroachment on their turf.
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States Solvency
The states can fund NASA in everyway to develop space solar satellites-Epscor
proves
Maine Space Grant Consortium, 2008,
http://www.msgc.org/programs/research/MaineNASAEPSCoRProgram.php
The goal of NASA EPSCoR (Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research) is to enable Maine and the other 24
eligible NASA EPSCoR states, with seed funding, to develop an academic research enterprise directed toward long-term,
self-sustaining, nationally-competitive capabilities in aerospace and aerospace-related research. This capability will, in
turn, contribute to the state's economic viability and expand the nation's base for aerospace research and development.
Statistical Profiles of all states from NSF Science Resources Studies Division are available. Specific objectives of the Maine
NASA EPSCoR program: -Contribute to and promote the development of research infrastructure in Maine in areas of
strategic importance to the NASA mission; -Improve the capabilities of Maine to gain support from sources outside the
NASA EPSCoR program; -Develop partnerships between NASA research assets, academic institutions, and industry;
-Contribute to the overall research infrastructure, science and technology capabilities, higher education, and/or economic
development of the state; and -Work in close coordination with the NASA Space Grant program to improve the environment
for science, mathematics, engineering, and technology education in the state. The Maine Space Grant Consortium has oversight
responsibility for the NASA EPSCoR Program. The NASA Space Grant Director also serves as the State NASA EPSCoR
Director. The Maine Space Grant Consortium, through the NASA Space Grant/EPSCoR Director, is responsible for the overall
development and direction of the program, the activities of the research groups and/or individuals, construction of a timeline and
milestones, achievement of program milestones, goals and objectives, and national dissemination of research results. NASA
EPSCoR funds are awarded to the Maine Space Grant Consortium, and subrecipient awards are made to participating
institutions.
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AT Japan
China is taking multiple steps to modernize their military now and are
preparing for war now proving they are a threat – other claims are merely false
rhetoric and their authors failed history.
Nyquist, expert in geopolitics and international relations, 2005 (JR Geopolitical Global Analyst "Recent China Revelations"
WeeklyColumn July 1] [ct] [http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0701.html)
China’s war preparations are deliberate, and the implications should not be passed over lightly. China is a highly secretive country,
like all communist countries. The objective of communism is world revolution, the overthrow of global capitalism, the destruction
of the free market, the elimination of the international bourgeoisie and the disarming of the United States. We should be puzzled,
indeed, if Chinese policy did not follow the communist line (however deviously). Given all this, it is difficult to account for the
dismissive attitude of U.S. intelligence experts when regarding Chinese intentions. The China problem is a serious one. “The people
… of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite,” said Chairman Mao in 1964. “The people of all continents
should unite … and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend
world peace.”
In terms of today’s peace movement, Mao’s sentiments are up-to-date. They are, I think, a founding inspiration. The supposed
“death of communism” may have eliminated a few soiled terms, but not the main idea. The label on old hatreds may be changed,
but the content remains the same. And because America is asleep, and the market is buzzing with Chinese goods, the U.S.
government has turned a blind eye. The truth about China is worse than inconvenient. It is painful. So a special context has been
devised for dismissing inconvenient facts. This context is inculcated at graduate schools, think tanks and in government. The
context for understanding international affairs must not admit the existence of a coordinated, secretive and dangerous combination
of countries motivated to overthrow the United States. In other words, the existence of a “communist bloc” cannot be admitted. And
China’s role within this bloc – above all – must be rated as a “crackpot notion.” And yet, the existence of something identical to the
old communist bloc – whatever we choose to call it – is indicated by actions across the board by Russia, the East European satellite
countries, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and China. Some ideas fall from fashion. But truth is always true, fashion or not. U.S.
experts failed to connect the dots regarding China’s development of a long-range cruise missile, a new attack submarine, new
ground-to-air missiles, a new anti-ship missile (for sinking U.S. aircraft carriers) and more. China is preparing for war against the
United States, specifically. As absurd as it sounds to the economic optimists who think trade with China guarantees peace, the U.S.
and China are bound to collide. Anyone who thinks otherwise doesn’t have a sense of history, doesn’t understand communist
thinking or the overall policy Beijing has consistently followed since 1949. Communist countries periodically experiment with
capitalism, they always seek trade with the West, and they always sink the money and technology they gain thereby into a military
buildup. Ultimately, they don’t care about the prosperity of their people, the state of the national infrastructure, personal or press
freedom. Some believe that we mustn’t say that China is a threat. Such a statement would be akin to self-fulfilling prophecy. But an
honest appreciation of Chinese actions should not be disallowed by an appeasing diplomacy or wishful thinking. The job of the
analyst is not to guarantee good relations with countries that are preparing for destructive war. The job of the analyst is to see war
preparations, diplomatic maneuvers and economic policies and draw a common sense conclusion about them. If world peace
depends on hiding China’s military buildup, then world peace is like your fat uncle dressed in a Santa Claus suit. Saying it’s your
fat uncle may ruin Christmas for your little sister, but Santa Claus isn’t a real person – and never will be.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Ban CP solves – Treaty prevents Japanese development of space weapons
DOD CP solves- extend Day 08 lager budget and responsibility means The DoD can solve for the Japan adv as well as the rest of the
aff
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Search terms
.
Nasa on the chopping block
Tradeoff
Finite
Resources
Personnel
Feasibility – Credibility
Politics links
Elections link
Energy Not their role- collapse ability
Accidental launch
Colonization
moon funding cut
limited amount of people: program will not work well if new program
nuke war prevents colonization
going to space
no sex in space
Plan CM aff
DoD CP
NASA Tradeoff
Funding Tensions
Budget set tight now, zero-sum
Plan is expensive
X is on the chopping block, would be cut
X is good
47

165 GT SPS Case Neg

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SPS Neg

DDI 2008 <GT>

Ban Space Wep CP

Observation two: solvency

The CP solves the entirely of the aff

A. International treaties solve space militarization

Ban Space Wep CP

C. International space cooperation solves economic security and competitiveness

2. Doesn’t stop space militarization- Attempts to militarize space like the

3. Doesn’t solve colonization- Deploying space weapons destroy multilateral

4. Clear stance against space weapons fosters cooperation

5. Perception of space weapons kills multilateral cooperation

AT [some nation] will militarize

4. If the US takes a multilateralist stance on space, other countries will

AT Does not solve colonization

5. International cooperation is critical to human exploration of space

CP solves militarization-enforces treaty

militerization Solvency Ext.

Co-opt and colonization solvency ext.

Topicality: in means in the US

Main Entry: 1in

B. Violation the Affirmative sends Solar powered Satellites into space

D. Voting issue – T should be judged on a matter of competing

Terrestrial power solves now and is much more market friendly

1. Lack of construction robots dooms SPS development

2. Solar Flares Can Disable Satellites: 03 Solar Flares Prove.

High cost of space transportation dooms SPS project

Graham-Rowe, technology writer, 2006

High cost of travel and tech development doom space industry

Nagatomo, 95 (Makoto, Solar Energy, Vol. 56, No 1, pp 111-118, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/)

Solvency deficits -Weather

Solvency deficits- laundry list

6 reason solvency is unattainable for SPS

Heg has no correlation to economic power

What is Economic Power?

Space is not key to Heg (defensive frontline)

2. Space weapons will escalate not deter enemies

Space is not key to Heg (Offensive frontline)

a. Space mill force China and Russia to engage in a counterbalancing coalition

b. Sino/Russian alliance KILLS heg multiple reasons

Space is not key to Heg (Offensive frontline)

Space unpopular (politics links)

No support for space weapons

Public support is low for funding manned space programs

Space spending links

Solar power satellites will cost a trillion

David Roberts, Grist's staff writer, 6/3/08 http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2008/6/2/104028/8055

SPS nowhere near available

SPS won’t be able to be deployed until 2050

Space Weps/sps fails

SPS beaming energy down tech is unproven

Space weapons cause global instability and military vulnerability

Space Weapons leads to an accidental nuclear war

B. Economic collapse causes extinction

Colonization start through militant efforts resulting in a slow transition to

Observation two is solvency

The DoD is capable of building Solar powered satellites by 2025

3) Competition Checks Abuse – There has to be a net benefit proving the CP

5) Reciprocal – A permutation including all of the plan and part of the CP is

7) Maximizes Best Policy Options – Provides best topic education around

EXT. NASA cant solve

Ext. DOD can/NASA can’t

NASA Brain Drain DA 1/2

A. SPS causes NASA budget tradeoff