International Conference Underground Construction Prague 2010-Transport and City Tunnels. 14-16 June 2010 Prague, Czech Republic.

Design and construction issues of a motorway tunnel close to an active

fault.
A. Alexandris, E.Griva, M.Abarioti, & P. Vettas
OTM S.A. Athens, Greece

J. Makadasis, J. Bournazos
AKTOR S.A. Athens, Greece

SUMMARY: There is a general consensus in the engineering community that underground structures are not
particularly vulnerable to earthquake effects and frequently, seismic effects are neglected in routine tunnel
design. However, the possibility of a rock tunnel to suffer direct fault induced shearing during an earthquake,
may question the safety or even the feasibility of a project. The Knimis tunnel, a twin tube motorway tunnel
2500 m long, has been constructed in central Greece during 2003-2006 in close proximity to an active fault,
whose presence affected to a large extent design procedures, and decisions. The ability to avoid crossing the
fault and coping with the earthquake shaking induced deformations, allowed a safe tunnel construction. In the
present paper, the geologic and tectonic environment of the project is outlined, the earthquake hazard and
relevant risk assessment is presented and the design constrains and objectives of the tunnel project are de-
scribed. Experiences from the construction are also summarized.

1 INTRODUCTION The project is located in the southern coast of

The Knimis tunnel is part of a new 21 km long motorway
section of the Athens–Thessaloniki national road (PA-
THE) build from 2002 to 2006 in order to by pass two lo-
cal towns and to upgrade the pre-existing road to current
traffic requirements and modern safety standards. The
2500 m long twin bore tunnel has been excavated mainly
through dolomites and limestones. An active seismic fault
which from the initial design stages has been identified to
cross the motorway alignment close to (or at) the tunnel
entrance portal affected considerably the design consid-
erations of the entire highway project (Alexandris et. al
2004).
N.Evoikos gulf (Central Greece), which is a region
known for its seismic activity attributed to a fast tectonic
extension. The new motorway is running along a narrow
strip of coastal land formed by the continuous action of
active faults shown in figure 1. Motorway alignment im-
provements in this area necessitated the construction of a
long tunnel under the Knimis mountain. Inevitably the
motorway alignment had to cross the active faults identi-
fied in the region. The tunnel in particular is exposed
both to near field strong ground motion as well as fault
rupture hazards.

Figure 1. Geological formations and neotectonic structures of the project area. The motorway alignment is noted with a dashed line.
Neotectonic zones ΡΖΑΚ and ΡΖΚΒ correspond to A.Kostandinos and Kamena Vourla fault zones respectively (Kranis H. 1999).
 2 GENERAL DESIGN ISSUES

2.1 Geologic and Tectonic Setting

The mountainous range of Knimis is formed by crystal-
line carbonate rocks, limestones and dolomites of Trias-
sic-Jurassic age (Tr-J in fig.1). In the coastal area the car-
bonate bedrock is covered by thick deposits of more
recent Pleio-Plistocene marls or clays and conglomerates
(Ne-in fig.1). Normal active faults (barbed lines in fig. 1)
separate the carbonate bedrock and the Pleio-Pleistocene
sediments. Talus material and recent Quaternary sedi-
ments have been accumulated in the throwing part of the
faults (Qs in fig.1). These normal faults are the boundary
faults of the N.Evoikos tectonic graben which has been Figure 2 Low angle satellite view of the Knimis Mountain
formed by ongoing active crustal extension in NNE-SSW (from North to South). Tunnel alignment and active fault trace
direction active since Early Miocene. This tectonic de- are also shown.
formation results to the progressive uplift of the southern In figure 3 approximate epicentres of historical earth-
mountainous part and the subsidence of the northern quakes, according to the Ambraseys 1996 catalogue, are
coastal area, a process profoundly affecting the geomor- presented (numbers indicate year of occurence). Both the
phology of the region as can be observed in figure 2. Atalanti fault zone and the Sperchios fault zone are asso-
The master faults have been mapped at a regional scale ciated with historical earthquakes. For the Arkitsa–
among others by Roberts and Jackson (1991) and are pre- Kamena Vourla fault zone there is no reliable historical
sented in figure 3. Three major fault zones trending SE- seismicity record. The length of the entire Arkitsa–
NW can be distinguished. To the south, the Atalanti fault Kamena Vourla fault zone is 35-40 km, and on the basis
system (1), known in Greece for the 1894 devastating of fault-magnitude empirical relations it was assessed that
earthquake, prevails. To the north the Arkitsa–Kamena it is capable of producing a magnitude 6.8 to 7.0 earth-
Vourla fault zone (2) dominates, and intersects the mo- quake. Segmentation of the fault is claimed to reduce the
torway alignment. The North-North Western part of the magnitude of the characteristic earthquake, but the inter-
N.Evoikos graben is bounded by the more complex Spre- action between the fault segments may result in their si-
chios valley fault zone (3). All those fault zones are seg- multaneous reactivation.
mented with the constituent faults arranged in a relay
fashion or connected with transfer faults (Kranis 2002).

Figure 3 Seismic source considered in the seismic hazard analysis and locations of historical earthquakes occurred within the zone
Epicentres are after Ambraseys 1996: Numbers indicate year of occurrence. Faults are from Roberts and Jackson (1991). (1) Ata-
nandi Fault Zone, (2) Arkitsa–Kamena Vourla Fault Zone, (3) Sperchios valley Fault Zone.
 International Conference Underground Construction Prague 2010-Transport and City Tunnels. 14-16 June 2010 Prague, Czech Republic.

0.8
Area Source
2.2 Seismic Hazard Assessment 0.7
Line and Area Source
0.6
A tunnel constructed in the near field area of a major
fault is exposed both to strong ground motion and fault 0.5

PGA (g)
rupture hazards. In the particular project the two hazards 0.4
have been treated separately. For the strong motion haz- 0.3
ard a probabilistic approach has been adopted, while for 0.2
the fault rupture hazard a deterministic approach has been 0.1
considered more appropriate.
0
Recent (instrumental) seismicity of the region shows
only a moderate level of seismic activity, but the histori- 10 100 1000 10000
cal record is rich in strong earthquakes. In figure 3 the Return Period (Years)
approximate epicentres of historical earthquakes ranging Figure 4 Seismic hazard curves in terms of peak ground accel-
from 6.0 to 7.0 are presented. The 20th century instru- eration, calculated considering the area source of figure 2 or al-
mental seismic record does not contain an earthquake lar- ternatively a linear (fault) source.
ger than M=6.0 in this zone.
The seismic hazard calculations were performed fol- The fault displacement hazard is not confined to the
lowing Cornell’s (1968) methodology. Two seismicity fault zone only. At the crossing point of the main fault
models were considered. In the first model the seismicity the motorway is exposed to principal faulting (Youngs et
is assigned to the area source, presented in figure 3. In the al. 2003). However the entire length of the motorway
second model the earthquakes with magnitude greater situated on the hanging wall area is exposed to distrib-
than 6.0 are attributed to a linear source trending parallel uted faulting with expected fault displacements even
to the sea shore and the smaller earthquakes are treated as higher than the main fault. In the contrary, in the footwall
background seismicity. Seismic hazard curves calculated area the distributed faulting and related hazard is much
using the two models are presented in figure 4. It is ob- smaller, both because the expected fault displacement
served that the fault model and the area source model magnitude is very limited (some centimetres) and be-
lead to similar acceleration levels for return periods up to cause the probability of observing ground deformations
500 years, while for longer return periods the fault model in this zone is also much smaller.
leads to considerably smaller accelerations. The peak In that respect some residual risks exist even if the tun-
values for ground acceleration and velocity were taken nel alignment is not crossing the main fault and the tun-
directly from the hazard curves and the design spectrum nel structure is located entirely on the footwall area. Tun-
of the seismic code was found to cover reasonably well nel emergency and safety systems should consider the
the expected spectral shapes by a comparison of the de- case of limited fault displacement induced structural
sign spectrum with the spectra of a group of selected near damage of the tunnel linings. It is also advised to main-
field acceleration time histories. tain the existing motorway and use it as an emergency by
The probability of reactivation of the Arkitsa - Kamena pass if a temporary suspension of the tunnel operation for
Vourla fault zone with subsequent fault displacements, repairs is necessary.
has been assessed on the basis of a characteristic earth-
quake model. On the basis of the available earthquake 2.3 SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA
historical record and estimates of deformation rates on
the N.Evoikos graben the return period of a characteristic The seismic design criteria follow a performance based
earthquake (M=6.8-7.0) is between 700 and 1400 years. design approach. Within this framework, three perform-
On that ground the probability of reactivation of the ance levels have been specified (Serviceability, Damage
Arkitsa-Kamena Vourla fault zone within the next 50 Control and Survival) and have been associated with ap-
years, is roughly estimated to be between 1% and 8%. propriate return periods and strong ground motion design
The fault displacement hazard has been assessed on the values shown in table 1, which are based on the seismic
basis of a field mapping of active faults (Pavlides et al. hazard calculations presented in the previous paragraph.
1997) and on subsequent estimates of expected fault dis- While for design levels 1 and 2 the design will be as
placements. The displacement potential of the main fault per code requirements, for survival level inelastic analy-
was assessed on the basis of empirical relations that relate ses may have to be performed to assess expected defor-
fault length with fault offset or earthquake magnitude mation for this level of excitation and respective collapse
with fault offset. The 1894 Atalanti earthquake provides mechanisms. Design of safety systems and evacuation
an analogue of the design earthquake and fault displace- procedures should consider the probable effects for this
ment estimates for primary faulting are compared with level of shaking (or fault rupturing).
observations and measurements provided by contempo- Table 1 Design seismic motions and associated return periods.
rary sources. The coseismic fault displacements for an Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
M=6.8÷7.0 earthquake is estimated from the Wells and Service- Damage Survival
Coppersmith (1994) empirical relation to be from 0.50 m ability Control
to 2.00 meters with an average value of 1.00 m. This Return period (yrs) 100 yrs 500 yrs 2500 yrs
value is consistent with the average vertical throws meas- Peak Ground Accel-
0.15 g 0.30 g 0.50 g
ured after the M=6.8 Atalanti earthquake of 1894, which eration (g)
is reported to be 1.0 m (Pantosti et al. 2001). Peak Ground Velocity
10 cm/sec 25 cm/sec 100 cm/sec
(cm/sec)
Figure 5. Encountered geology along the tunnel. Latin numbers indicate rock mass categories and respective tunnel support classes.
Our assessments, presented in the previous paragraph, tion of the round length and some presupport measures
classify a probable reactivation of the main fault as a level (spiling rods) was necessary to control ravelling. The re-
3 event where assurance of life safety and reparability of maining 5% of the length, located mainly in the tunnel
the tunnel is sufficient. Imposed fault displacements of portals, was excavated by forepolling in more friable rock
significant magnitude in tunnels surrounded by competent mass with a strong tendency to overbreak and ravel. No
rock, where soil structure effects are not important, result water inflow was encountered which made tunneling eas-
automatically in extensive lining damage which can lead ier and safer.
to tunnel collapse and closure. Average fault displace-
ments of the order of 1.0 m, expected in the main fault
trace, are considered intolerable for the tunnel lining and
the general suggestion is to avoid crossing the fault by a
tunnel structure. Smaller shear deformations of the order
of some centimetres, expected in the footwall area are
considered tolerable since they do not endanger loss of
life with appropriate engineering design and may be re-
pairable.

3 TUNNEL CONSTRUCTION

3.1 Tunnelling Conditions

The host carbonate geologic formation (dolomites and
limestones) has been strongly affected by the action of the
normal faults of the current extensional phase, but also by
previous thrusting phases. As a result, a distinct brecci-
ated structure has been evolved which characterizes the
entire geologic formation. A series of photographs of a
rock sample in different magnification, shown in figure 6,
depict the presence of this distinct brecciated structure in
a wide range of scales (meter, centimeter, millimetre and
micron). This particular characteristic influences the
strength and deformability properties of the rock mass but
also its response to tunnelling. In the entrance portal area
250µm
of the tunnel, which was closer to the main fault and the
fracturing effect was more pronounced, the rock mass had
a strong tendency for ravelling during tunneling. In the
remaining part of the tunnel the rock mass exhibited satis-
factory self supporting properties along with easy frag-
mentation during blasting and excavation.
The intensively fractured nature of the rock mass de-
scribed previously questioned the rock mass rating criteria
set by the design for the selection of the appropriate sup-
port classes during construction. With gradual adjust-
ments in the construction procedure it was made possible
to optimise the support measures and increase the round
length sufficiently to accelerate construction. In overview,
in the 75% of the tunnels length, the rock mass rating Figure 6. Photographs of borehole cores (upper images) and a
(RMR) was in the range of 40-60 and was excavated in thin section micro-photography in polarized light (lower pic-
two phases (crown and bench) and supported by fibre re- ture). The brecciated structure of the rock sample is observed in
inforced shotcrete and swellex rock bolts. In 20% of the a wide range of scales (meter, cm, mm and micron).
tunnel length the RMR was in the range 30-40 and reduc-
 International Conference Underground Construction Prague 2010-Transport and City Tunnels. 14-16 June 2010 Prague, Czech Republic.
Figure 7. The fault plane at the entrance portal area, during the
site investigation works.
Figure 8. Location of the tunnel portal behind the fault trace.
3.2 FAULT CROSSING.
The design of the tunnel entrance portal located in the vi-
cinity of the active fault was a critical task. During the site
investigation campaign the fault mirror has been uncov-
ered by removing talus material accumulated in front of it
and was precisely mapped (fig. 7). The general suggestion
was to cross the fault as oblique as possible and to avoid
crossing the fault by a tunnel structure. By raising the
alignment of the motorway in the entrance portal area and
by designing a fairly deep approach trench it was made
possible to cross the fault without tunneling and form the
portal entirely at the footwall area immediately behind the
fault trace (fig. 8).
The rock material behind the fault as described previ-
ously was a heavily sheared and fractured dolomite which
necessitated the use of forepolling umbrellas to protect the
tunnelling works by ravelling. The close proximity of the
two bores at this section dictated particular support meas-
ures to preserve and reinforce the thin pillar. A dense pat-
tern of fibre glass nails and of steel reinforcing dowels
with two side plates was used for this purpose. The tun-
nelling stages followed at this critical section are pre-
sented schematically in figure 9.
3.3 FINAL LINING
A conventional cast in situ permanent lining was designed
and lined most of the tunnel length, were rock mass qual-
ity was reasonably good and no indication of a fault pres-
ence emerged during tunnelling (fig. 10). For the entrance
portal area, where rock mass quality was inferior due to
the proximity of the active fault and some risk of small
co-seismic permanent deformations existed, a closed ring
permanent lining was designed.
Figure 9. Tunnelling stages in the portal area immediately be-
hind the active fault. The small clearance between the two
bores necessitated the reinforcement of the remaining rock col-
umn with rock dowels.
The structural analysis of the various sections of the fi-
nal lining has been undertaken considering beam spring
models loaded with rock and other design loads. The geo-
static rock loads have been evaluated on the basis of em-
pirical correlations with RMR.
For the seismic analysis of the tunnel linings horizontal
displacements were imposed on the supporting springs of
such a magnitude to produce the same racking deforma-
tions to the model with the propagating seismic waves.
The raking deformations were estimated independently
following the simplified procedure proposed by Penzien
J.(2000), considering soil-structure interaction effects.
The high flexibility of the lining increases the free field
racking deformations by factor of 2.8, but due to the high
shear wave velocity of the host rock the wave propagation
shear deformations are generally very limited even for the
Level 3 earthquake. The calculated racking deformations
for design level 2 and 3 are shown in table 2.
Table 2 Permanent lining seismic racking deformations
Design Level 2 Design Level 3
Rock mass
PGV=20cm/sec PGV=100cm/sec
Class
γff γssi γff γssi
PGVd/Vs γff×Rssi PGVd/Vs γff×Rssi
ΙΙΙ 0.23‰ 0.64‰ 0.70‰ 1.96‰
ΙV 0.28‰ 0.78‰ 0.88‰ 2.45‰
V 0.38‰ 1.05‰ 1.17‰ 3.24‰

Figure 10. Upper figure: Tunnel standard cross section. Lower
figure: Tunnel cross section in weak rock conditions and fault
zones.
3.4 Emergency and Safety Facilities
The emergency operation plan of the tunnel considered
road accidents followed by fire, as well as tunnel block-
age due to fault action. The main effort is focused on the
provision of backup systems on critical fire safety sys-
tems, and system control evacuation, in order to increase
the redundancy of the safety system. A cornerstone of this
approach was the decision to construct a second control
building (one at each portal) and to provide control of all
critical systems by separate cables to both centres.
A longitudinal ventilation system was adopted consid-
ering fresh air requirements but also certain other advan-
tages over semi transverse or transverse ventilation sys-
tems, such as simplicity and redundancy. It is noted that
that break down of an individual jet fan in a longitudinal
ventilation system does not affect the function of whole
system. Moreover semi-transverse and transverse systems
require the construction of a concrete ceiling for air ducts
in the roof, which is more vulnerable during an earth-
quake than the tunnel lining itself.
Cross passages every 350m have been constructed to
provide escape routes to pedestrians from one tunnel to
the other. In the middle of the tunnel route, a wider cross
connecting gallery equipped with appropriate fire proof
doors, allows the prompt approach of emergency vehicles.
Two emergency parking bays have also been constructed
in each bore. The general layout of the system is pre-
sented in figure 11. Tunnel junction locations have been
identified to be weak points during earthquake shaking.
For this reason it was decided not to locate the connecting
gallery directly on the parking bay but spaced a few me-
ters apart as shown also in figure 11.
Figure 11. Upper figure: General layout of the tunnel system.
Lower figure: Parking bays and pedestrian escape gallery con-
figuration.
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The seismic hazard study undertaken for the project has
been directed by the late professor D.Papastamatriou. Our
work benefited by fruitful discussions with Prof. S. Pav-
lides on the tectonics of the area and the fault characteris-
tics. We also thank Dr B.Pine from Golder Associates and
J.Daller from CEA Bauconsulting GMBH for discussions
and advice on seismic risk mitigation. The permission of
EYDE-PATHE (ministry of public works) to publish this
paper is greatly acknowledged.
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