CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES (SET 5)
Stonehill v. Diokno 1 D Valmonte v. De Villa 5 D
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 1 D Umil v. Ramos 5 D
Roan v. Gonzales 1 FT David v. Arroyo 6 D
Alih v. Castro 3 FT Malacat v. CA 6 D
People v. Malmstedt 4 D People v. Marti 7 D
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STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
[GR L-19550, 19 June 1967]
FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government,
Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel
Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado
Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino
(Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of
First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian
Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different
dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace
officer, to search the said persons and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: “Books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers)” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is
described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code.” Alleging that the search
warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court
the original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was
partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents
and things seized from the offices of the corporations are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al.
ISSUE: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the
contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers
and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places
besides their residences.
HELD: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are
in the nature of general warrants and that, accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void.
No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the
Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of
the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants
authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether
the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to
be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
However, the documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into
(2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group,
Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
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Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC 7 D
People v. Bongcarawan 8 FT
Lim v. Felix 9 D
People v. Sucro 10 D
parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations,
to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity. With respect to the documents, papers and
things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June
1962 Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on
the documents, papers and things seized in the residences, in
effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence
against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants
for the search of 3 residences are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences is made permanent, that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards
the documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29
places, offices and other premises.
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BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
[GR 64261, 26 December 1984]
FACTS: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño,
Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2
search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were
seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after
6 months following the raid to question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of
the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the
articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the
RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
ISSUE: Whether allegations of possession and printing of
subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of search
warrants.
HELD: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating
that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession
or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885,
as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars
1
as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause,
said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not
suffice.
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ROAN v. GONZALES
[G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986]
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the
ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less if
we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do
annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is
the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That
right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history
to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even
then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was
monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from
which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the
Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few
libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to
dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are
among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the
ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all
the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor-
respondence shag be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety and order
require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the
victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military
authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used
as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.
He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which
we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent
judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searched
two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found
in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live
bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable
cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized
officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. No less important, there must be a specific
description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant. 5
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Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v.
Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente
J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose
was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in
the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the
United States which served as our model it was then already
embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless,
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill
of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was
thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the
Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in
what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal
or city judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the
respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this is
not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of
the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit
executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa
personally filed his application for a search warrant on
May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company
of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a
police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at
Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not
yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same
before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on
the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if
he knew and understood the same," and only because "the
application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The
suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all
if the affidavit had already been completed when it was
submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching
questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He
did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach
them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to
him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl be
found later that his declarations are false.
2
 We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted
with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions
in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to
have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he
was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose
depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the
search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is
to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the
warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses
themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the
depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence
informers," shows that they were in the main a mere
restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that
they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to
them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful
remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the
petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition
candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not
excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have
put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and
alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the
witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to
the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was
supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything
through an open window of the house while he was near the
gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons
were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the
caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his
presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that
these acts were against the law. These would have been
judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead,
the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant
invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever
defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in
writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the
military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to
sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they were
conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military
and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner
had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a
previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our traditional
Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the
repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here,
as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
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The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the
eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per
se and therefore could have been taken by the military
authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said
articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could
be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search
is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid
search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military
officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to
be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol
and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could
have just entered the premises and looked for the guns
reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first
secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so
indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such
a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was
suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be
validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly
as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search
may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the
person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise
be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be
inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and
contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of
probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally
removed from the operation of the rule because of their
mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has
also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without
warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer
comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of
the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim
that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is
that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain
view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is
that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally
and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later
expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding
that there may be occasions when the criminal might be
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief
Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was
nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited
Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that
it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for
illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case,
however, the said articles must remain incustodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming
to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search
warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal
procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural
flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null and
void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August
6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
3
 -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
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ALIH v. CASTRO Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the

Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were
suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the
[G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987]
constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As
eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred
parte Milligan:
Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces
raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally
ammunition and other explosives. in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man
"zona," which was not unlike the feared practice of
than that any of its provisions can be suspended
the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up
during any of the great exigencies of government.
the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a
hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the
last part is not included in the modern refinement). The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the
time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to
seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify,
resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as
assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against
presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and
the petitioners.
deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected
in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The
soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and
in a number of casualties. deserved the arbitrary treatment they received to take them
into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also
fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning,
petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of
and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-
unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection.
The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles,
one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted
ammunition found in the premises. criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona,"
they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not
in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a
were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
pronounced by the military.
injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover
the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used
as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to
against self-incrimination. the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the
innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the
Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a
that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor
prayer for the return of the articles alleged to have been
of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved
illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of
sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is
the regional trial court, Zamboanga City. 5After receiving the
entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest
testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, he
criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would
submitted the report and recommendations on which this
condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a
opinion is based.
majority of one.

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition

on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as
required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said
report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with
avoidance.
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in
force at the time of the incident in question, provided as
follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution
when they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every
appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was
incumbent on them, especially during those tense and tindery
times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law,
which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the
respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the
authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause
to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to
make the raid without a search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid
because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the
petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they
could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a
preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why
they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way
into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.

Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required
search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it
such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they
was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law
were acting under superior orders. There was also the
enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any
suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
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4
house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground
that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well
delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search
warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and
functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged
into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their
superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's
house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank.
Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official
intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free
regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter;
the rain may enter. But the King of England may not
enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules
of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed,
being committed, or just committed, what was that crime?
There is no allegation in the record of such a justification.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule
113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in
the recent case of People v. Burgos.
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was
violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition
taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in
any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles
are "fruits of the poisonous tree. As Judge Learned Hand
observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
the wrong be repressed. Pending determination of the legality
of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis,
subject to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding
courts may decide.
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-
testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The
prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other
dreaded operations should remain in the past, banished with
the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial.
We must be done with lawlessness in the name of law
enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must
not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, "It is
time that the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be
discarded and that there be a return to the force and rule of
law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and
democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full
protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as
a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty,
including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on
November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the
articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said
articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of
the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT
[GR 91107, 19 June 1991]
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FACTS: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the 3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He
had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the
evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a
bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May
1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer
14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The
order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30
pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that
they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on Malmstedt’s waist. Suspecting the bulge on
Malmstedt’s waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt’s
passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed
to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When
Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed
4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana,
when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from
the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was
invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed that
there were also bulges inside the teddy bears which did not feel
like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the
headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the
teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which
established the objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt
claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in
his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by
him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple
whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to
take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the
bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station. An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt
entered a plea of “not guilty.” After trial and on 12 October
1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and
sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be
searched without an issued warrant.
HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the
search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may
be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances. Section 5 provides that “a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when he was
transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
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5
 VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
[GR 83988, 24 May 1990]
FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of the National
Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Right (ULAP) filed a petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or
elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning
of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for
the protection of the people. They aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-
ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin
Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur
Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off
inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Valmonte also claims
that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints
where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up
without a court order or search warrant. They further contend
that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the
National Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme Court’s
decision dated 29 September 1989, Valmonte’s and ULAP’s
petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or
banning, was dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion
and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
ISSUE: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for
government officials for warrantless search and seizure and,
thus, are violative of the Constitution.
HELD: Nowhere in the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May
1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and
under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that
checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government
is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people
are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by
the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints
will have absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going
events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for
checkpoints manned by either military or police forces.
Although no one can be compelled, under our libertarian
system, to share with the present government its ideological
beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and
economic policies or performance; one must concede to it the
basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power,
to pursue its program of government intended for public
welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government
has the equal right, under its police power, to select the
reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The
checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a
certain extent, on motorist’s right to “free passage without
interruption”, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves
only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as
long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. These routine checks, when conducted in
a fixed area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are
generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
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extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause
which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. By the
same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing
passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an
international airport, is a practice not constitutionally
objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety,
and necessity. Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does
not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the
military manning the checkpoints. The Court’s decision was
concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing
the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power
implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse
in a particular situation is a different “ball game” to be resolved
in the constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks
the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the
military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist
to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who
man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the
scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and
civilly for their abusive acts.
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UMIL v. RAMOS
[GR 81567, 9 July 1990]
Facts: On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA
Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot
wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person,
who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before,
or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred
to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural
was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who
went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and
fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified
as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred
to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with
the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority.” (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was
amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at
the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus
was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil,
Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj.
Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen.
Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February
1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against
them, and they were accordingly released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any
warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion.
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested
just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came
a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense,
the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether
as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them
in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
6
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder
acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities.
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DAVID v. ARROYO
[G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006]
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, claiming that there was a leftist-rightist plot to
topple her administration. A week after, the president lifted PP
1017, declaring that the alleged “conspiracy” has been
successfully dealt with and that peace and order has been
restored.
Following the issuance of PP 1017, police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist and his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan,
during a dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.
On February 25, 2006, at about 1:00 o’clock in the morning, the
police, on the basis of PP 1017, raided the Daily Tribune offices
in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday
issue. Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper and outside the building. The
search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building.
David was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No.
880 (Public Assembly Act) and Inciting to Sedition. He was
eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of David, et al. and the
warrantless search of the Daily Tribune’s offices were valid.
RULING: The arrest of David and the search of the Daily
Tribune’s offices were invalid and unconstitutional.
ON DAVID’S ARREST
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and xxxxx
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies
petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that
the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that
some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust
Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner
David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was
not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the
charge ofviolation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
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ON THE SEARCH OF DAILY TRIBUNE’S OFFICES
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and
seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction
may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or
night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Note: PP 1017 was declared partly unconstitutional due to the
invalid searches and seizures allowed under it.
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MALACAT v. CA
[GR 123595, 12 December 1997]
FACTS: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in
response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo
Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of
the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo,
Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of
them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near
the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon
two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised
of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men
were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.” Yu
and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points
and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police
officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up
with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu
recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25
August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2
others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching
Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the
latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought
to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom
of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did
not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered
from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment
on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio,
entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and
explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However,
several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994
but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that
the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a
“stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while
the police officer seeks to obtain more information”; and that
the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a
lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD
1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as
maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of
appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant
to the exception of “stop and frisk.”
HELD: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
7
same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”
The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here,
there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on
Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to
conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-
and-frisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s
claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted
to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other
than that his eyes were “moving very fast” — an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was “discovered” “inside the front waistline” of
Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu
and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was
indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s
rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III
of the Constitution.
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PEOPLE v. MARTI
[GR 81561, 18 January 1991]
FACTS: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing
therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland.” Anita Reyes did
not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the
former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti’s
representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on
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top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before
delivery of Marti’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau
of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the
contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti’s packages was
opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks)
dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and
took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing
a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail,
inasmuch as the latter’s stated address was the Manila Central
Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti
for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision,
convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in
relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.
ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of the accused’s constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State.
HELD: In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The contraband herein, having come into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
the accused’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure,
the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search
and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is
made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the
act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.
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WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION v.
NLRC
[GR 113271, 16 October 1997]
FACTS: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July
1989, Catolico received a memorandum from Waterous Vice
President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter’s
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the
same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning
her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without
consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the
company’s control of purchases and, besides she was not
authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the
first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but
explained that her act was “due to negligence,” since fellow
employee Irene Soliven “obtained the medicines in bad faith
and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was
8
given a charge slip by the Admitting Department, Catolico then
asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989,
Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico
against the “rush delivery of medicines without the proper
documents.” On 29 January 1990, Waterous Control Clerk
Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity
involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez
talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied
having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice.
However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to
P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of
fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her
“talagang ganyan, bukas.” It appears that the amount in
question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co
asked Catolico to explain, within 24 hours, her side of the
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give
her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from
1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was
informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she
would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the
interests of the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990,
Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice
266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In
said letter she protested Saldaña’s invasion of her privacy when
Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter
15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel,
explained that the check she received from YSP was a
Christmas gift and not a “refund of overprice.” She also averred
that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang
from an earlier incident between her and Co’s secretary, Irene
Soliven. On 5 March 1990, Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda
Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her
termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of
the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May
1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair
labor practice against Waterous. Nevertheless, he decided in
favor of Catolico because Waterous failed to “prove what [they]
alleged as complainant’s dishonesty,” and to show that any
investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and
suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not
be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded
separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month’s pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the
additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension “representing
30 days work”; for a total of P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably
appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were
not able to prove a just cause for Catolico’s dismissal from her
employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of merit,
but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by
deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was
already included in the computation of the aggregate of the
awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the special
civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from
one of its regular suppliers is contrary to the injunction against
unreasonable search and seizure and a person’s right to privacy
of communication.
HELD: In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The
Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People
vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives
rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no
violation of the right of privacy of communication, and Waterous
was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business
communication in which it had an interest. However, Catolico
was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that
an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity
connotes every kind of assistance that management must
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accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for
his defense, including legal representation. Although Catolico
was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed
from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by
her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel.
No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined
through said letters. The Supervisor’s memorandum spoke of
“evidence in [Waterous] possession,” which were not, however,
submitted. What the “evidence” other than the sales invoice
and the check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico’s
dismissal then was grounded on mere suspicion, which in no
case can justify an employee’s dismissal. Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an
employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness,
whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown
to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the
term “trust and confidence” is restricted. Thus, the decision and
resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason for
upholding the Labor Arbiter’s decision, viz., that the evidence
against Catolico was inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which was set aside.
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PEOPLE v. BONGCARAWAN
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002]
This is an appeal from the Decision dated December 27, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal
Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y
Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425[2] as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an
Information which reads, thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu,
weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding
license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by RA 7659.[3]
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an
interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from
Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the
vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its
security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from
passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the
culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel
security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect
whom they later found at the economy section.[4] The suspect
was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The
accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go
back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily
searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by
two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his
baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought
this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the
accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting
the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately
reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called
the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.[5] At about 6:00 a.m.,
Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie
9
Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast
Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized
items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight (8)
small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.[7] When
asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that
he was just requested by a certain Alican Alex Macapudi to
bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan City.[8] The
accused and the seized items were later turned over by the
coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought
the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,[9] while the packs of
white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office
in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic
Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu,
weighing 399.3266 grams.[10]
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March
11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where
he met Alican Alex Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in
Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a
Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan
City, and to give it to Macapudis brother at the Iligan port. He
boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a
big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or maleta containing
the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the
Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.[11] He stayed at cabin no.
106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was
about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and
positioned himself at the economy section to be able to
disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a
friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5)
members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he
recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told
him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily
went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was
frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he
went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and
Macapudis Samsonite suitcase. He left the
small maleta containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that
they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When
requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused
to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was
not his and had a secret combination lock. The security
personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white
crystalline substance inside which they suspected to be shabu.
They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him
to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the
Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.[12]
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan
y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13,
1999 until the present, the period of such preventive detention
shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of
his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of
Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG
CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
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THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE
APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.[14]
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant
contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened
and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He
also contends that People v. Marti[15] is not applicable in this
case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform
the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution.[16] Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent
to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that
protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case
of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the absence of governmental
interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.[19] The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant
was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after
they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of
the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out
without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not
apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant
that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security
personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked
to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the
case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of
the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of
the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other
agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant
contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and
he had no knowledge that the same contained shabu. He
submits that without knowledge or intent to possess the
dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged.
[21]
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.[22] The first two elements
were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact
undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,
[23] this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the
possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the
possession or control of such articles.[24] It has been ruled,
however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge oranimus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation
of such possession.[25] Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted
to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.[26]
10
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His
testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was
not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to
disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge,
the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not
be disturbed on appeal.[27]Moreover, evidence must be
credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this
case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to
get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected.[28] Why he got
the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which
had a combination lock known only to the owner remains
unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small maletafor inspection for fear that its contents consisting
of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,
[29] but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and
also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches.[30]
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be
owned by him.[31] To overcome this presumption, it is
necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican
Alex Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented
no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial
judge:
First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he
really exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that
Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a
stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were
presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh
and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the
Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has
friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could
testify and support the claim of the accused.[32]
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the
case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-
appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than
bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of
dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or
intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting
accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
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LIM v. FELIX
[G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991]
FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed
by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An
investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the
designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC
Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi
City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor
Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and
Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
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After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued
an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:
“. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given
by the witnesses for the prosecution during the
preliminary examination in searching questions and
answers, concludes that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
named accused in the amended complaint, namely,
Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog,
Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente
Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime
Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.”
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the
respondent court several motions and manifestations which in
substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the
transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of
a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be
issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been
personally convinced of such probable cause.
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court
conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima
facie case against them in the light of documents which are
recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.
It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the
respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose
testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against
them.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying
for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners
herein. The judge wrote, “In the instant cases, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause
that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all
the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed
upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with
the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder.
Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such
duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of
probable cause, each information is complete in form and
substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court
finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification
in each information...”
Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix (statement
immediately preceding this paragraph, italicized).
ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail
by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists.
RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio
S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July
5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner
for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be
necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive
the Judge's examination should be. Usually, this depends on
the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise
sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested
in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge
must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary.
As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented
documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the
general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in
the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial
the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest
should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the
preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the
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evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of
the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases.
In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by
responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound
discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when
having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave
error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having
before him any other basis for his personal determination of
the existence of a probable cause.
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PEOPLE v. SUCRO
[GR 93239, 18 March 1991]
FACTS: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of
the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi,
Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the
activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by
Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about
5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under
the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street.
Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a
chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel,
taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from
the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then
return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie
Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and
again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt.
Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi
instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments.
At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to
report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante,
was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt
Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt.
Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his
team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and
Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing
the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which
turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted,
Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from
Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to
overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C. Quimpo and
____
*Credits to lawnotes.berneguerrero.com, www.lawphil.net, www.scribd.com
Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag
from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-
INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for
analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana.
Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of “not guilty” to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding
Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of
P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is
lawful and consequently, whether the evidence resulting from
such arrest is admissible.
HELD: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is
considered lawful. The rule states that “A peace officer or
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;” An offense is committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that
probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among
the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the
actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted
surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances
(monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for
the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling
marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus, as there is
nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance
with the requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits
obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
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