EN BANC

G.R. No. 92403 April 22, 1992

VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order seeks to nullify the resolutions
issued by the respondent Civil Service Commission, namely: (1) Resolution No. 88-820 dated November 7,
1988 reversing the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board dated February 5, 1988 which sustained
the decision of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports dated May 4, 1987 upholding the
appointment of Mr. Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I in the DECS, Division of San Pablo City; and (2)
Resolution No. 90-224 dated February 27, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration with prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Victor A. Aquino, then holding the position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San Pablo City,
was designated on July 20, 1984 as Officer-in-Charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional
Director Saturnino R. Magturo (Annex "H", petition, p. 55, Rollo) in view of the retirement of the Supply
Officer I, Mr. Jose I. Aviquivil.

Prior to such designation, or from the period February 16, 1984 to June 16, 1984, petitioner was
designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing the duties and
responsibilities of the Supply Officer I (p. 55, Rollo).

Two (2) years thereafter, or on September 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent of City Schools of San
Pablo City, Milagros Tagle, issued a promotional appointment to private respondent Leonarda D. de la Paz
as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City. She assumed and performed the duties and
functions of the position and received the compensation and benefits therefor.

At the time of her appointment, private respondent was then holding the position of Clerk II, Division of
City Schools of San Pablo City. From August 25, 1976 to September 1983, she was designated as Assistant
to the Supply Officer (DECS decision, p. 31, Rollo). The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her
appointment as permanent "provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee,
no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely
affect the approval of (the) appointment" (Annex "A", Comment of CSC, p 164, Rollo).

One (1) month after, or on October 20, 1986 petitioner filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning
the qualification and competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.

In a decision dated May 4, 1987, DECS Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sustained the protest of petitioner
and revoked the appointment of private respondent as Supply Officer I thus:

From the foregoing comparative statement of the qualifications of Mr. Aquino and Mrs. de la
Paz, apparently the former has a decided advantage over the latter in terms of education,
experience and training. Further examination of the comparative statement shows that Mrs.
de la Paz has had no relevant in-service training course attended and completed.
Accordingly, therefore, Mr. Aquino is preferred to Mrs. de la Paz for appointment as Supply
Officer I.
 xxx xxx xxx

Based on all the foregoing and as records further show that Mr. Aquino is competent and
qualified to hold the subject position and possesses the eligibility requirement, this Office
finds the instant protest meritorious and hereby rules and so rules that Mr. Aquino be
appointed Supply Officer I in place of Mrs. de la Paz, whose appointment thereto is deemed
revoked. (p. Annex "C", pp. 30-31, Rollo)

Private respondent then filed her petition for reconsideration of the aforequoted DECS decision but the
same was denied by Secretary Quisumbing in a Resolution dated August 11, 1967.

On the bases of the aforementioned rulings of the DECS Secretary, petitioner Aquino was issued a
permanent appointment dated August 11, 1987 as Supply Officer I by the DECS Regional Director Pedro
San Vicente effective October 26, 1987. On the date of effectivity of his appointment, petitioner assumed
the duties and functions of the position. The said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional
Office IV on October 27, 1987.

For her part, private respondent de la Paz filed on October 16, 1987 a notice of appeal with motion to
maintain status quo to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which, on February 5, 1988, rendered a
decision upholding the appointment of Aquino as Supply Officer I (Annex "D", petition pp. 33-35, Rollo).

From the decision of the MSPB, private respondent appealed to public respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC).

In Resolution No, 88-820 dated November 7, 1988, public respondent CSC found the appeal of private
respondent meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner Aquino and restoring private
respondent de la Paz to her position as Supply Officer I, DECS, Division of San Pablo City under her
previously approved appointment (Annex "B", petition, pp. 26-29, Rollo).

From said decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order. Finding no merit to the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, public respondent
CSC issued Resolution No. 90-224 dated February 27, 1990 denying said motion (Annex "A", petition, pp.
21- 24, Rollo).

Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of public respondent Commission's action on petitioner's
appointment.

Two (2) interrelated issues on the extent of authority of the Civil Service Commission to pass upon the
contested appointments were raised by petitioner which could be simplified into whether or not public
respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of
petitioner Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City as it found private
respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.

In assailing the two (2) CSC Resolutions revoking his appointment, petitioner invokes the ruling of this
Court in the case of Santiago v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA
733 and Galura v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. 85812, June 1, 1989 (En Banc resolution) that the Civil
Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested
solely in the appointing authority. The Civil Service Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its
will for that of the appointing authority.

In support of petitioner's cause, the Solicitor General stresses the wide latitude of discretion given to the
appointing authority in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil
service which was emphasized by the Court as rationale for the rule laid down in Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 69137, August 5, 1986, 143 SCRA 327, Central Bank v. CSC, G.R. No. 80455-56, April
10, 1989, 171 SCRA 744, Patagoc v. CSC, G.R. No. 90229, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 411, that public
respondent CSC, not being the "appointing power" in contemplation of law, has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position and that the
Commission has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
We have consistently applied the above doctrine in many cases with similar factual circumstances, but we
see no compelling reason to apply the same in the instant case. In the cases cited above, We ruled that
the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it (CSC) believed
that another person is better qualified than the appointee for it would constitute an encroachment on the
discretion solely vested on the appointing authority. The situation is different as in the instant case, where
the Civil Service Commission revoked the appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein,
principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior appointee, private respondent herein, to the
contested position had already attached (see CSC decision, pp. 28-29, Rollo). It must be noted that public
respondent CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the
appointment of private respondent who was first appointed to the contested position.

The records show that private respondent was issued a permanent appointment on September 19,
1986 as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City effective September 30, 1986. On the basis
of the of said appointment which was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office No. IV, private
respondent assumed and performed the duties and functions of the position as Supply Officer I and
received the compensation and benefits of the said position in accordance with the mandate of Section 9
par.(h) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807, as amended). In consonance with the doctrine laid down in
Villanueva v. Balallo, G.R. No. L-17745, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 407, that an appointment is complete
when the last act required of the appointing power has been performed, but later qualified in Favis v.
Rupisan, G.R. No. L-22823, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 190, that the acts of the head of a department or office
making the appointment and the Commissioner of Civil Service acting together, though not concurrently,
but consecutively, are necessary to make an appointment complete, the permanent appointment
extended to private respondent, under the circumstances of the case, is deemed complete. As such, she is
entitled to the protection of the law against unjust removal.

The conclusion of respondent Commission in the questioned decision that private respondent is more
qualified than petitioner merely supports the validity of the restoration of private respondent to her
previously approved appointment considering that she meets the prescribed qualification standards
required of the position of Supply Officer I and the appropriate civil service eligibility, to wit:

EDUCATION: Bachelor's degree with training in Supply Management

EXPERIENCE: None required
ELIGIBILITY: Supply Officer; Career Service (Professional)

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in
the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the
position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away
from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing (Mitra v. Subido, G.R No. L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.

There is also authority for the rule that when the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has
accepted the office and done what is required of him upon its acceptance, his title to the office becomes
complete, and he can then be removed only in the regular way (Mechem, Law of Public Offices and
Officers, Sec. 461, p. 294, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137). The appointing power can not
effect his removal indirectly by rescinding or revoking his appointment after it is complete.

There is thus reasonable ground for the rule that the moment the discretionary power of appointment has
been exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said appointment
cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified
than the first appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee should possess the
minimum qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX-B,
Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the appointing authority is
allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment.

While a protest is a made of action that may be availed of by the aggrieved party to contest the
appointment made, the protest must be "for cause" or predicated on those grounds provided for under
Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807), namely: (1) that the appointee is not qualified; (2)
that the appointee is not the next-in-rank; and (3) in case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by
original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given
by the appointing authority.
We have defined the concept of "for cause" in connection with removal of public officers in the case of De
los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950, 87 Phil. 289, as follows: "It means for reasons
which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is legal cause, and
not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is
implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or
without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public."

The ground relied upon by petitioner in his protest that he is more qualified than private respondent in
terms of education, experience and training does not fall within the meaning of "for cause" contemplated
by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution which would warrant the revocation, if not
removal, of the appointment of private respondent. Neither does it fall under the grounds of appeal
contemplated under Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807). Therefore, the protest of
petitioner did not adversely affect the approval of the appointment of private respondent.

Even on the assumption that the revocation of private respondent's appointment was validly exercised by
DECS Secretary Quisumbing, still the appointment extended to petitioner was tainted with irregularity as it
was issued before the finality of the decision on the protest in violation of CSC Resolution No. 83-343 which
prohibits the issuance of an appointment to protestant (petitioner) if the protest case is not yet finally
resolved, since there is no vacancy in the position pending resolution of the protest case. There can be no
appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment
validly terminated (Costin v. Quimbo, G.R. No. L-32271, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 159). An appointment
to an office which is not vacant is null and void ab initio (Morata v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18975, May
25, 1964, 11 SCRA 42).

CSC Resolution No. 83-343 provides, thus:

An appointment though contested shall take effect immediately upon issuance if the
appointee assumes the duties of the position and (the) appointee is entitled to receive the
salary attached to the position. Likewise such appointment shall become ineffective in case
the protest is finally resolved in favor of the protestant, in which case the protestee shall be
reverted to his former position. (p. 223, Rollo)

Records reveal that the decision of the DECS Secretary revoking the appointment of private respondent
was rendered on May 4, 1987 and the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was denied
on August 11, 1987. The appointment issued to petitioner as Supply Officer I was dated August 11, 1987
and he assumed the position on October 26, 1987 (date of effectivity of his appointment) as reported by
the Schools Division Superintendent of San Pablo City (pp. 77-78, Rollo). From all indications, the
appointment of petitioner dated August 11, 1987 was issued with undue haste before the finality of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration.

While it is true that the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in making his choice in the
selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service, we cannot, however,
give a stamp of approval to such a procedural irregularity in extending appointments, as in the instant
case, to the prejudice of the right to security of tenure of the incumbent to the position.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 4, 1987 and the resolution dated August
11, 1987 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. The Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports is hereby directed to restore private respondent Leonarda de
la Paz to her previously approved appointment as Supply Officer I, DECS, Division of San Pablo City.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 101646 February 13, 1992

DR. MARIQUITA J. MANTALA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. IGNACIO L. SALVADOR, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and DR. JULIA P.
REGINO, respondents.

Araceli Baviera for petitioner.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for private respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

At issue in this certiorari proceeding is (a) the validity of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional
Trial Court over the matter of who is entitled, under the law and rules governing the civil service, to a
contested position in the Department of Health, as well as (b) the correctness of said Court's decision on
the question.

It appears that sometime in July, 1988, Dr. Mariquita J. Mantala, a private medical practitioner, was given
by the Secretary of Health a temporary appointment to the then vacant position of Division Chief, Medical
Division III, Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the TB Control Service, Office of Public Health, of the
Department of Health.

That temporary appointment was shortly made subject to a formal protest filed by Dr. Julia P. Regino with
the Committee on Evaluation and Protest of the Department of Health. Dr. Regino claimed that it was she
to whom the appointment should have been extended since the post of Medical Officer III then held by her
was next-in-rank to the office in question, and moreover she had been in the service for thirty-five years.
However, the Committee on Evaluation and Protest ruled adversely to her and upheld the Health
Secretary's appointment of Dr. Mantala as Division Chief.

Dr. Regino appealed to the Merit Systems Board of the Civil Service Commission. On December 14, 1989,
the Board rendered a verdict adversely to Dr. Mantala and in Dr. Regino's favor. This decision the
Department of Health appealed to the Civil Service Commission.

Some three weeks later, or more precisely on January 8, 1990, Secretary Bengzon made Dr. Mantala's
appointment as Division Chief permanent. He also filed, under date of January 23, 1989, a motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned decision of the Merit Systems Board which was, however, denied,
on February 12, 1990.

Secretary Bengzon thereupon took the case up to the Civil Service Commission. In its Resolution dated
June 14, 1990 (No. 90-553), the Commission dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Merit
Systems Board in Dr. Regino's favor.
On a motion for reconsideration, however, the Commission, by its Resolution No. 90-1012 dated November
14, 1990, set aside the resolution of dismissal and upheld Dr. Mantala's appointment. It declared "that
insofar as overall rating of the qualification, attitude and performance (was concerned), Dr. Mantala
outscored Dr. Regino," and that the appointing authority is not limited to promotion in filling up vacancies
but may opt to fill them by the appointment of persons with civil service eligibility appropriate to the
position. Dr. Regino filed a motion for reconsideration stressing her status as "a qualified next-in-rank"
officer. This was denied, the Commission declaring that it would "not delve into who is more qualified or
who possesses more impressive qualifications" in deference to the discretion lodged by law in the
appointing authority.

No appeal was taken from said Resolution No. 90-1012. It consequently became final and executory.

In the meantime, or more precisely on March 12, 1990, Dr. Regino instituted an action of quo warranto and
mandamus in the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City against Dr. Mantala, Secretary Bengzon and other
officials of the Department of Health, claiming that having an established right to the position of Division
Chief in question, she should be installed therein (Civil Case No. Q-90-5486). This resulted in a judgment
dated August 30, 1991 which —

1) annulled and set aside Dr. Mantala's appointment as Chief of Medical Division III in the
Tuberculosis Control Service, Office for Public Health Services, Department of Health;

2) directed the Secretary of Health to withdraw Dr. Mantala's appointment and "issue in its
place one for . . . Dr. Julia P. Regino and, without delay, to forward the latter's promotional
appointment to the Civil Service Commission for approval pursuant to law;" and

3) declared Dr. Mantala "not entitled to said office and ousting her therefrom . . .

Hence this petition for review on certiorari in which it is prayed that the Regional Trial Court's decision be
reversed.

The petition has merit and will be granted. The decision of August 30, 1991 is fatally flawed. It was
rendered without jurisdiction, and it runs afoul of established doctrine.

Disciplinary cases, and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees in the civil service —
including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
reassignment, demotion and separation," and, of course, employment status and qualification standards —
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Constitution declares the
Commission to be "the central personnel agency of the Government," 1 having power and authority to
administer the civil service; 2 to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
before any of its offices; 3 and to render decision in "any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution," which decision, or order or ruling "may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." 4

On October 9, 1989, pursuant to the constitutional authority on it conferred, the Civil Service Commission,
in its Resolution No. 89-779, approved, adopted and promulgated its "Rules on Administrative Disciplinary
Cases and Rules on Protest Cases." Part B of said Rules, entitled "B. Rules on Protest Cases," inter alia sets
out with particularity the Commission's jurisdiction broadly set forth in the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 3. Final Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Civil Service Commission shall exercise final and
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Merit Systems Protection Board
and the Civil Service Regional Offices involving contested appointments or promotions.

and prescribes the procedure (Rule IV) governing protest cases. Said protest cases are described as
follows: 5

(a) An appointment made in favor of another next-in-rank employee who is not qualified;

(b) An appointment made in favor of one who is not next-in-rank;

 (c) An appointment made in favor of one who is appointed by transfer and not next-in-rank,
or by reinstatement or by original appointment, if the employee making the protest is not
satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for
such appointment.

These protest cases are decided in the first instance by the head of Department or agency, subject to
appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, whose decisions are in turn subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. The latter's decision may, in turn, be brought to the Supreme Court.

It was thus error, because beyond its competence, for the respondent Trial Court to take cognizance of the
quo warranto and mandamus action instituted by Dr. Regino which was in essence a protest against the
appointment of Dr. Mantala. Moreover, this protest, as already stated, had earlier been submitted by
Regino herself to the civil service adjudicatory system laid down for the purpose in accordance with the
Constitution, the law, and the Commission's rules. Dr. Regino appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
Board from the decision of the Secretary of Health rejecting her protest and upholding the appointment of
Dr. Mantala. She ventilated her position in the appellate proceedings instituted by Dr. Mantala in the Civil
Service Commission, in connection with the latter's attempt to overthrow the adverse judgment of the
Board. When the Commission, in its Resolution of November 14, 1990, eventually sustained Dr. Mantala's
appeal, Dr. Regino filed a motion for reconsideration. It was only after the Resolution of November 14,
1990, in Dr. Mantala's favor, became final and executory by reason of Dr. Regino's failure to take an
appeal therefrom — and evidently to remedy this fatal procedural lapse — that the latter thought of filing
her quo warranto and mandamus action in the Regional Trial Court. Such a stratagem cannot be allowed to
succeed.

Even on the merits, Dr. Regino's cause fails. For one thing, the Commission's conclusion — "that insofar as
overall rating of the qualification, attitude and performance (was concerned), Dr. Mantala outscored Dr.
Regino" — is basically a factual one and may not be reviewed on certiorari; and its legal opinion — that the
appointing authority is not limited to promotion in filling up vacancies but may opt to fill them by the
appointment of persons with civil service eligibility appropriate to the position — is entirely in accord with
law. For another, the now firmly established doctrine is that the discretion exercised by the appointing
power in extending an appointment to a given position to one of two or more employees possessing the
requisite minimum qualifications for the position, will not generally be interfered with and must be
sustained, and the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply
because it believes that another employee is better qualified, for that would constitute an encroachment
on the discretion vested sole in the appointing authority. 6

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of August 30, 1991, is hereby ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE, and Resolution No. 90-1012 dated November 14, 1990 of the Civil Service Commission upholding
Dr. Mantala's appointment to the contested position, which has long since become final and executory, is
hereby declared to be determinative and conclusive of the controversy at bar and, if not yet carried out,
must now be forthwith executed. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93935 February 9, 1994

FELIPA GUIEB, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and MILAGROS MARCALINAS, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner.

Alcantara Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner seeks to set aside the resolutions 1 of the public
respondent Civil Service Commission which upheld the protest of private respondent Milagros Marcalinas
against the appointment of petitioner to the position of Administrative Officer I, Department of Agriculture,
Office No. VI, Iloilo City.

The salient facts are few. The reorganization of the Department of Agriculture was called for by Executive
Order 116 dated January 16, 1987. On December 16, 1988, petitioner was appointed to the position of
Administrative Officer I, Department of Agriculture, Region VI.

The appointment triggered a protest from the private respondent. On January 27, 1989, she filed her
protest with DA-Reorganization Appeals Board headed by then Undersecretary Dante Q. Barbosa. On
February 14, 1989, Undersecretary Barbosa referred the protest to their Regional Director VI, Iloilo City for
comment. On April 11, 1989, said Regional Director, Emigdio L. Fabella, submitted the following
Comments:

1. That the recommendation of the Chairman of the Regional Placement Committee did not
violate the provisions of Section 12 of
RA 6656 and Sections 8 and 9 (3) of the Rules on Government Reorganization and pertinent
provisions of PD 807 due to the following reasons:

(a) That Section 12 of RA 6656 provided for the promulgation by the CSC of
the necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of RA 6656.

(b) That Section 8 of Rules on Government Reorganization provided for the

creation of a Placement Committee for the Department or Agency.

(c) That no section of PD 807 is specifically cited to have been violated by the
Regional Placement Committee.

2. The fact that Mrs. Guieb is a detailed DA employee in Region 6 and that her plantilla item
belongs to Region XI should not disqualify her from selection and placement in Region 6
because nowhere in the CSC Rules on Government Reorganization can one find a provision
prohibiting the selection and placement to a second level position of an employee who does
not belong to a particular region of an Agency.

3. In the selection and placement of Mrs. Guieb to the position of Administrative Officer I for
the DA Iloilo Provincial Office, nepotism as contemplated in PD 807 was not committed by
the Chairman of the Regional Placement Committee because prior to the reorganization,
Mrs. Guieb was already an Administrative Officer I of the Department of Agriculture and her
placement will only be a reappointment.

4 Although the appellant claims that she is more qualified than the appellee, the appellant
held an Accountant I position which is not comparable to the position of Administrative
Officer I. On the other hand, the appellee held the position of Administrative Officer I and is
detailed to the Iloilo Provincial Office. She is reappointed to the same and comparable
 position upon recommendation of the Provincial Agricultural Officer of the Iloilo Provincial
Office.

The appellant's protest against the appointment of all provincial Administrative Officers in
DA Region 6 anchored on the grounds (sic) that she is more qualified than all of these
appointees is a sweeping presumption. While factors upon which qualifications are based
such as education, experience, training, performance, potential, punctuality and public
relations are good criteria in the selection and placement of personnel, there are other
factors which are very important considerations in the selection and placement of personnel
and one of these is the recommendation of the supervisors.

The management places a considerable importance to the recommendations of the

respective Provincial Agricultural Officers in the selection and placement of provincial
personnel because the PAOs are in a better position to know who can promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the provincial offices. This is in consonance with the provisions on procedure
of DA MC #7, dated October 9, 1987, which states:

5.1. The supervisor/head of unit, office, agency shall be required to submit

his/her recommendations for the placement of personnel under their
respective jurisdiction.

In this case, Mrs. Guieb was the recommendee of the PAO of Iloilo. The other PAOs have
their own recommendees for the position of Administrative Officer I. These recommendees
as contained in the Personnel Placement List were subjected to a careful review and
adjustments were made when the exigency and the interest of the service had to be given
utmost importance and consideration.

On the other hand, the appellant was not accommodated in the adjustments made because
some incumbents have to be given priority as well as the final recommendations of the
respective PAOs.

Attached is the machine copy of a letter to the PAO of Antique recommending the recall of
the appellant due to some problems in human relations.

This reaffirms the importance of the recommendations of PAO in the selection of provincial
personnel.

Despite the pendency of her protest with the DA-Reorganization Appeals Board, private respondent, on
July 10, 1989, file a Complaint with the respondent Civil Service Commission alleging the same grounds.
Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas then wrote to the former Secretary of Agriculture, Carlos C. Dominguez, to
comment on the Complaint. She was informed that Regional Director Fabella had been previously required
to comment on the protest. Regional Director Fabella was then asked by the respondent commission for
his side of the protest. He furnished Chairman Sto. Tomas with copies of the minutes of the meeting of the
Placement Committee and the comparative assessment of the applicants for the contested position.

On February 14, 1990, the respondent Commission promulgated its Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Commission finds the protest of Mrs.
Marcalinas meritorious. Thus, this Commission rules that her appointment as Administrative
Officer I in DA Region VI be given due course. On the other hand, this Commission sees it
proper that Mrs. Guieb be returned to her organic region (Region XI) without prejudice to her
assuming a position that is similar or comparable with what she was occupying when
detailed in Region VI.

On July 5, 1990, petitioner filed the petition at bench. She urged: (1) she was denied due process as she
was not furnished a copy of private respondent's protest; and (2) her proposed appointment was not a
violation of the law on nepotism. Required to comment in behalf of the respondent Commission, the
Solicitor General opined that the "CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in appointing private respondent to the position of Administrative Officer I, DA, Region VI, Iloilo
City." 2 The CSC then, on its own, defended its position. 3

We grant the petition.

The power of the respondent Commission over the appointments is defined in section 9(h) of PD No. 807,
thus:

Section 9. Powers and Function of the Commission. — The Commission shall administer the
Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service, except those of the presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, police forces, fireman, and jail guards, and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the
appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved
by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the
appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided,
finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and
employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as
herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from
the issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.

As early as August 5, 1986 in Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 4 this Court has spelled out the
parameters of the power of the respondent Commission to approve or disapprove appointments to
positions in the civil service, viz:

It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article V

of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power to "approve" and
"disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shall have inter
alia the power to:

9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in

the civil service, except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility
or required qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)

However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it
clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to
be employed by the Commission when it acts on or as the Decree says, "approves" or
"disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities.

We have reiterated this ruling in an unbroken stream of jurisprudence. 5 Despite these unending iterations
and reiterations, respondent Commission appears to disregard its constitutional duty to pay obeisance to
decisions of this court. Respondent Commission's cavalier attitude has already drawn a strong rebuke from
this Court in Lapinid vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., 6 thus:

The Court believes it has stated the foregoing doctrine clearly enough, and often enough, for
the Civil Service Commission not to understand them. The bench does; the bar does; and we
see no reason why the Civil Service Commission does not. If it will not, then that is an
entirely different matter and shall be treated accordingly.
 We note with stern disapproval that the Civil Service Commission has once again directed
the appointment of its own choice in the case at bar. We must therefore make the following
injunctions which the Commission must note well and follow strictly.

Whatever the reasons for its conduct, the Civil Service Commission is ORDERED to desist
from disregarding the doctrine announced in
Luego v. Civil Service Commission and the subsequent decisions reiterating such ruling. Up
to this point, the Court has leniently regarded the attitude of the public respondent on this
matter as imputable to a lack of comprehension and not to intentional intransigence. But we
are no longer disposed to indulge that fiction. Henceforth, departure from the mandate of
Luego by the Civil Service Commission after the date of the promulgation of this decision
shall be considered contempt of this Court and shall be dealt with severely, in view
especially of the status of the contemner.

While we appreciate that fact that Commission is a constitutional body, we must stress, as a
necessary reminder, that every department and office in the Republic must know its place in
the scheme of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts
are subject to reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its decisions even if
the Commission may not agree with them.

The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it disobeys at its peril.

The resolution in the case at bench was issued by the respondent Commission on February 14, 1990. It
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration on May 25, 1990. In both resolutions, respondent
Commission does not appear to have made any reference at all to the repeated rulings of this Court
regarding the limits of its power to approve or disapprove appointments in the Civil Service. Likewise, the
Memorandum of the respondent Commission filed on June 6, 1991 or after our warning in Lapinid, supra,
continued to ignore the Luego doctrine and its numerous reiteration. Indeed, respondent Commission
refused to see the light despite the Comment of the Solicitor General which stressed its indefensible
position. Clearly, the resolutions in question were promulgated in utter and unjustifiable disregard of our
unbending line of decisions drawing the limits of its power over appointments starting with the case of
Luego, supra. This stubborn refusal to submit to the rulings of this Court in light of our prior warning in
Lapinid, supra, appears nothing less than contumacy. But more than contumacy, the arrogance of trifling
with the pronouncements of this court by an agency of government itself cannot but weaken the rule of
law. As a creation of the Constitution, the respondent Commission should be the last to trivialize the
judiciary, one of the three most important touchstones of our democratic government. Regardless of the
views of the respondent Commission, it is this court that has been endowed with the exclusive and
ultimate authority to interpret the laws of the land, including the fundamental law itself, which often times
requires throwing light to the many intersecting shadows that blur the boundaries of power of our different
branches of government. Our people have entrusted to this Court the power to be the final arbiter of all
questions of law and the rule of law demands that as disputes ought to reach an end in the interest of
societal peace, submission should follow this court's final fiat. To undermine the authority of this Court as
the final arbiter of legal disputes is to foster chaos and confusion in our administration of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the resolutions dated February 14, 1990 and May 25, 1990
in CSC Case No. 568 are annulled and set aside. The protest of private respondent against the
appointment of petitioner as Administrative Officer I in DA Region VI, is remanded to the
DA-Reorganization Appeals Board for further proceedings and appropriate disposition. The respondent
Commission is, hereby, reprimanded for its continuing defiance of the rulings of this Court beginning with
Luego, supra. Its repetition will invite a more severe sanction to the members of the respondent
Commission in their personal capacities. No costs.

SO ORDERED.