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I N T E R N AT ION A L L AW
General Editors: Professor Philip Alston, Professor of International Law
at New York University, and Professor Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor
of Public International Law in the University of Oxford and Fellow of
All Souls College, Oxford.
A Commentary
M A N FR E D NOWA K
E L I Z A BE T H Mc A RT H U R
4.3 Intention
106 Article 1 requires that severe pain or suffering must intentionally be
inflicted on the victim in order to qualify as torture. Purely negligent conduct,
therefore, can never be considered as torture. When a detainee is, for example,
forgotten by the prison guards and slowly starves to death, such conduct cer-
tainly produces severe pain and suffering, but it lacks intention and purpose
and, therefore, can ‘only’ be qualified as cruel and/or inhuman treatment.
¹⁷² Cf. Nowak, CCPR-Commentary, 162 with reference to the relevant cases, such as Grille
Motta (No. 11/1977), Bleier (No. 30/1978), López Burgos (No. 52/1979), Sendic (No. 63/1979),
Angel Estrella (No. 74/1980) and Rodriguez (No. 322/1988).
¹⁷³ Cf. the cases of Bautista (No. 563/1993) and Arhuacos (No. 612/1995).
¹⁷⁴ Cf. Nowak, CCPR-Commentary, 163.
¹⁷⁵ No. 440/1990.
¹⁷⁶ See also Rodley, Current Legal Problems, 478, who indicates that the non-use of the word
‘torture’ in the cases of Birindra and Tshisikedi v. Zaire (Nos. 241 and 242/1987) and in Polay
Campos v. Peru (No. 577/1994) might be explained by the fact that the inhuman and degrading
treatment found in these cases did not take place in the context of interrogation and, accordingly,
the purposive element was not apparent.