The "new" U.S.
strategy in Central Asia The regime of Askar Akayev was toppled down in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 after a week
04/ 04/ 2006
MOSCOW. (Andrei Grozin for RIA Novosti.) - U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman said in
Astana the other day that Kazakhstan should lead the effort to develop the energy sector
infrastructure and set up additional transit routes for energy resources.
Although he talked exclusively about energy resources, it is worth noting statements by
high-level U.S. officials, if only to find out whether the U.S. has embarked on a new policy
in Central Asia.
At first, there was no new policy. Events in "the new Asia" were of interest exclusively to
its neighbors. Moscow and Tehran took an active part in the settlement in Tajikistan and
were successful. China not only reached an agreement with Kazakhstan on localizing
separatist movements, which tried to set up strong points on Kazakh territory for action in
Xinjiang in the first half of the 1990s, but also resolved bilateral territorial issues.
Kyrgyzstan also worked toward settling the border problem with China. Despite a host of
subjective problems, Turkmenistan developed effective trade and economic relations with
Russia and Iran. Moscow and Beijing
facilitated the involvement of all postwar Asian republics, except Turkmenistan, into the
Shanghai Five (Shanghai Cooperation Organization - SCO), which is seeking to implement
a number of major transportation,economic and trade projects and promoting good
neighborly relations within the SCO.
Until September 2001, the United States, and the West in general, paid little attention to
the region. They merely mentioned its huge energy potential and were not too active in
defending the few local dissidents. For a long time, the U.S. had a very cautious, if not
hostile, approach to the newly independent Asian republics. The West was convinced that
Muslim Central Asia was a convenient bridgehead for the dynamic growth of Islamic
radicalism. But experience shows that post-Soviet Asia has proved capable of political and
business cooperation with the world powers, while Islamic extremism has not yet become
firmly established in the region. It has been engaged in a long struggle for this goal, but
quite often without much success.
Until recently, Washington's economic and defense cooperation with these countries was
based on unilateral advantage and minimal costs.
There are reasons to believe that Washington has drawn some conclusions from its Iranian
experience of 1979, when the Islamic revolution destroyed in less than a month and a half
the United States' 10-year-plus work with the Shah regime. The latter looked fairly pro-
Western, but was burdened with clan corruption and the poverty of more than 80% of its
population. The situation in the post-Soviet Asian space is pretty much the same.
The U.S. is pursuing its strategy on several levels. It is flirting with the top echelons of local
power, promising to help them solve their major domestic problems, and making some
moves to the West-oriented local opposition, funding it through various NGOs as a
potential "reserve." The U.S. is stepping up its economic influence in the region, relying on
its new military bases.
At the same time, the U.S. effort to expand its military presence in the area has led to
negative domestic processes in newly independent Asian countries.
of disorders and pogroms in its southern regions and the capital. Events of the last few
months show that tensions in the republic have been escalating. In all probability, it is
bound for long-time instability due to a violent change of power.
In the last three years, domestic protests have been growing in Uzbekistan and the
government will unlikely be able to suppress them. Given the high birth rate, the skidding
Uzbek economy cannot provide stable jobs and enough pay for the residents of agrarian
regions.
The Uzbek authorities counted on economic and military-strategic partnership with the
U.S. in hope of getting help in solving economic problems. But by late 2002, Tashkent
became wary of excessive dependence on the U.S. in different spheres due to the
appearance of American military bases on Uzbek territory.
After the suppression of riots in Andijan, Western government and human rights
organizations launched a full-scale information war against Uzbekistan. Tashkent parried
the appeals for stronger economic and political pressure on the regime with the
withdrawal of the U.S. base from its territory, the full-scale re-orientation of its foreign
policy in regards to Russia and China and entry into the Eurasian Economic Community.
Having lost its positions in Uzbekistan, the U.S. is rushing to build a new strategy in Central
Asia.
Now the U.S. is trying hard to turn Kazakhstan into its "strategic regional partner."
Washington has been very complimentary of Astana of late and is even actively lobbying
the idea of the Kazakh leaders (which appeared on the eve of the presidential elections in
the republic in December 2005) about the republic's special mission as the regional leader
in Central Asia andthe Caspian area. That is the gist of statements that the U.S. Energy
Secretary made in Astana. Mostly, he was talking about the U.S. desire to achieve early
completion of the Kazakh-Azerbaijani talks on transporting Kazakh energy resources via
the BTC pipeline.
It is easy to see why Washington is eager to see Kazakhstan in the role of the leader - after
a setback with Tashkent, it does not have other options since Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
are the only post-Soviet Central Asian republics that can claim the role of regional leader.
In addition, Astana'spragmatic Caspian policy allows American multinationals to freely
invest in oil production and control a huge share of profits - if oil business is based on
physical control of oil reserves, the distribution of profits fromoil sales is even more
important.
At the same time, the signing of the intergovernmental agreement onKazakhstan's joining
the BTC pipeline has been suspended more than once andWashington is getting nervous.
Speaking of Astana's potential domination ofthe region, the U.S. is striving for its own
supremacy there. It presentsits desire to "rule" in the Caspian area in a very attractive
package - astable and predictable investment climate in Kazakhstan will not only attract
more investment, but will also create more jobs, explained Bodman.In the next five years,
the amount of investment in Kazakhstan could double, he said.
The Kazakh authorities keep talking about their country joining the ranks of the top ten oil
producers in the next 10 years. In light of this, it does not make sense for Astana to give
up its maneuvering between the world centers of power, a policy which has brought it so
many dividends.
But it should not forget that having launched several velvet-type revolutions in post-Soviet
space, the West has radicalized the struggle forinfluence in the former Soviet republics
since late 2003. They have exacerbated the struggle of the political elites there.
Eventually, allthese games in Central Asia could end badly. For all the talk about "a
strategic partnership" and promises of lavish investment, the U.S. will never change its
strategy of rotating elites in post-Soviet republics.

Andrei Grozin is the head of the department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Institute of
the CIS Countries.