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The Korea Crisis

Author(s): Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 136 (May - Jun., 2003), pp. 20-24+26+28
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 THINK
AA A I IN

By Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang

THE KOREA

North Koreais not crazy,near collapse, nor about to start a war. But it
is dangerous,not to mention dangerouslymisunderstood.Defusing the
threatthat North Koreaposes to its neighborsand the world will require
less bluster,more patience, and a willingnesson the part of the United
Statesto probe and understandthe true sourcesof the North's conduct.

"North Korea Belongs in the 'Axis of Evil"'

No.The only link between North Korea and work together beyond the sale of goods to one
Iran and Iraq, the other two members of the "axis another. Furthermore, North Korea does not
of evil" identified by President George W. Bush in share any religious, ideological, or strategic goals
his 2002 State of the Union speech, is financial. with Iran and Iraq. North Korea's concerns focus
North Korea has sold missile technology to Iran, solely on the peninsula and do not extend to the
as it has to a number of countries, including U.S. Middle East. Although it does nasty things like
allies Pakistan and Egypt. Unlike the original Axis sell drugs and make counterfeit money, North
powers, Japan, Germany, and Italy, which were Korea has not engaged in terrorism in the last 16
joined formally by the Tripartite Pact of 1940, years, and there has never been any link, nor any
North Korea, Iran, and Iraq do not coordinate or suggested, between North Korea and al Qaeda.
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea do share some
VictorD. Chais associateprofessorof governmentand D.S. common traits, the main one being an adversarial
Song-Koreafoundation chair at Georgetown University's relationship with the United States. They are also
EdmundWalshSchool of ForeignService.David C. Kangis authoritarian, have allegedly supported or spon-
associateprofessorof governmentand adjunctassociatepro- sored terrorism, and have programs to develop
fessorat the TuckSchool of Businessat DartmouthCollege. weapons of mass destruction. However, using those
They are coauthorsof NuclearNorth Korea:A Debate On latter criteria,several other countries could fit in the
EngagementStrategies(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, axis. Why not U.S. allies Pakistan or Saudi Arabia,
forthcoming). for example?

20 FOREIGN POLICY
 "KimJong
and
Unpredictable, Undeterrable"
Wrong. KimJong Il is as rationaland calculating
as he is brutal. Dictators generallywant to survive,
and Kim is no exception. He has not launcheda war,
because he has good reason to think he would face
fatal opposition from the United States and South
Korea. In fact, like his father Kim I1 Sung, Kim has
clearly shown he is deterrable:North Korea has not
starteda war in five decades.
Dictators do not survive without sophisticated
political skills. Kim has maintained power despite
intelligenceassessmentsthat his leadershipwould not
survive the death of his father in July 1994. And he
has endured despite famine, floods, economic col-
lapse, nuclearcrises, the loss of two majorpatrons in
Russia and China, and U.S. pressure.There has been
no palaceor militarycoup, no extensivesocial unrest,
no obvious chaos in the military,and no wholesale
"North Korea Poses
Threat to the
Calm down. Whatsparkedthecurrentcrisis
over North Korea's nuclear intentions were revela-
tions last October that Pyongyang has pursued a
secret program to produce highly enriched uranium
that could be used to make nuclear bombs. That
effort violated the Agreed Framework negotiated
between North Korea and the Clinton administra-
tion in 1994, under which the North had agreed to
freeze its nuclear program and accept international
inspections in return for fuel oil shipments and,
eventually, two "proliferation-resistant" nuclear
reactors. The October revelations prompted a stiff
U.S. response that included a cutoff of fuel oil deliv-
eries. North Korea, meanwhile, has kicked out
international inspectors, withdrawn from the Non-
ProliferationTreaty,and begun to restartits nuclear
reactors-prompting fears that the country will
soon have much more than the one or two bombs'
worth of nuclear material typically cited by U.S.
intelligence analysts.
I Is Crazy,
purgeof variousofficials.Moreover,Kim'sdecisionto
proceed with North Korea'stentative and measured
economic reforms is further proof that, however
morally repugnanthe may be, he is also quite capa-
ble of assessingcosts and benefits.
But his rationality does not make him any less
dangerous. Under Kim's rule, North Korea has
engaged in a coercive bargaining strategy designed
to ratchet up a crisis with the United States. Provo-
cations such as test-firing missiles, shadowing spy
planes, and walking away from treaties can grab
attention and even force the United States and its
allies to provide inducements persuading North
Korea back from the brink. A risky approach, per-
haps-but rational, too. If you have little to nego-
tiate with, it makes sense to leverage the status quo
for maximum bargaining advantage.
a Direct Nuclear
United States"
But lost amid all the alarmand blusteris the real-
ity that the logic of deterrence will prevail even if
North Korea develops and deploys a nuclear force.
North Koreapursuesnuclearweapons not for lever-
age but for the same reason that other highly vul-
nerable nations arm themselves: to deter an adver-
sary, in this case a superpower that is armed with
nuclear weapons. But even if the North develops
nuclear weapons, the threat of a devastating U.S.
response will prevent it from ever using them-
after all, unlike shadowy terroristcells, nations can-
not hide from a retaliatory strike.
What about the North's missile threat? Some
analysts claim that North Korea already possesses
a long-range nuclear missile capability.That's false.
The longest-range missile currently deployed by
North Korea is the No Dong missile, which can
carry a 1,500-pound payload approximately 800
miles. However, North Korea has reportedlytested
the No Dong only once. The untestedTaepo Dong 2
MAY I JUNE 2003 21
 ThinkAgain j
can potentially carry a several hundred-pound
payload between 6,000 and 9,000 miles-far
enough to reach the West Coast of the United
States.But without adequatetesting, such a nuclear
missile would be highly unreliable.
The fact is, North Korea could blow up ter-
rorist bombs in downtown Seoul every week if it
had the desire to do so. It could smuggle a nuclear
device into Japan, given the extensive network of
Koreansin that country with ties to the North. For
that matter, why should North Korea develop an
expensive ballistic missile to shoot at the United
States when smugglinga nuclearweapon in a ship-
ping container would be so much easier? The pri-
mary value of the North's missiles is as a military
"North Korea
International
Mostly true. Heraldedfor a halfcenturyas
an outlaw state, North Korea has maintained
some of its international commitments. It is a
member of the Conference on Disarmament,
Biological Weapons Convention, and Geneva
Protocol. After the attacks of September11, 2001,
the country signed on to two U.N. antiterrorism
protocols. During the negotiations for the Agreed
Framework, the United States required the North
to improve relations with South Korea. Pyongyang
eventuallyresponded by agreeingto a summit (just
prior to Kim II Sung's death). As of this writing.
the North has also honored its 1999 ballistic mis-
sile-testing moratorium for four years.
But the North also has a history of engaging in
"North Korea's Political
Collapse Is
Don't bet on it. Observershave predict- regime stability is that social control, however
ed an imminent North Korean collapse since the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The country's eco-
nomic situation is desperate, but signs of politi-
cal collapse are absent. The best indicator of
22 FOREIGN POLICY
deterrent, not as an offensive weapon.
The only nuclearthreatto the United Statesfrom
North Koreais indirect,in thepotentialtransferof such
capabilitiesto thirdparties.Pyongyanghas shown no
aversionto sellingweapons to anyone with the hard
currencyor barterto pay for them. North Korean
nuclearweapons or fissile materialhidden in tens of
thousandsof undergroundcaveswould likelygo unde-
tected even by the most intrusiveinspections.But a
transferof nuclearmaterialwould be a riskyproposi-
tion for a regimethat values survivalabove all else.
Giventhe preemptivemind-setof a post-September11
United States,the North would have to be confident
that any transferwould escape U.S. detection and
thereforethe threatof a massiveU.S. retaliation.
Does Not Honor
Agreements"
"strategicdeception"-signing agreementsto con-
vey reliabilitybut purposefullycheating on them to
its own advantage.The history of inter-Koreanrela-
tions, for example, is littered with pacts that
Pyongyang has not honored, including the 1992
denuclearizationdeclarationin which North Korea
agreed to forgo developing nuclear and nuclear-
reprocessingfacilities. The United States may have
been slow to implement the Agreed Framework,
but the North is blatantlybreakingthe framework's
spirit, if not letter,with its covert uranium enrich-
ment program. But perhaps the best evidence of
strategic deception occurred in June 1950: On the
eve of the Korean War, North Korea put forth a
major peace initiative to the South.
and Economic
Imminent"
vicious, remains solid. Although the flow of
refugees from the North is increasing, there is no
widespread internal migration, and few observ-
able signs of protest.
 Some evidence suggests that North Korea is
serious about normal political and economic rela-
tions with South Korea and the rest of the world.
By December 2002, North Korea had cleared land
mines from sections of the demilitarizedzone (DMZ)
separating North and South Korea. Tracks are
being connected on the Kyonggui Railway, which
would run from South Korea through the western
corridor of the DMZ into North Korea. Pyongyang
has also begun work on a four-lanehighway on the
eastern corridor as well. In July 2002, the central
government formally abandoned the centrally
planned economy and allowed prices and wages to
be set by the market. The government has also cre-
ated three special economic zones to exploit tourism
and investment and amended its laws on foreign
ownership, land leases, and taxes and tariffs.
"China Has the
on North
Yes, but good luck getting the Chinese
to use it. If a state's influence on North Korea is
merely a function of the North's material depend-
ence on it, then China holds the trump cards.
Seventy to 90 percent of North Korea's annual
energy supplies, roughly 30 percent of its total out-
side assistance, and 38 percent of its imports
reportedlycome from China. Beijingplayed a quiet
but critical role in inter-Koreandialogue leading
up to the June 2000 summit. It also influencedKim
Jong II and his decision to tentatively reform the
North Korean economy by hosting Kim in
Shanghai in 2002 and backing the creation of
special economic zones.
Notwithstanding this close history, Chinese
Foreign Ministry officials deny any influence on
North Korea, complaining that "North Korea
doesn't listen to us, it doesn't listen to anyone." But
China's protestations largely reflect its unwilling-
ness to put real pressure on its neighbor. China's
traditional stake in North Korea has rested in
keeping the regime afloat as a geostrategic buffer
against U.S. influence on China'sborder.It also has
no desire to provoke a regime collapse that would
send millions of North Korean refugees flooding
across the border.
Although these reformshave been halting and only
marginally successful, they are also becoming
increasingly hard to reverse.
Though the regime appears resilient, there are
two sources of potential fissures. First, the decid-
edly mixed results of several recent initiatives by
Kim-among them, his decisions to lift price con-
trols and to acknowledge North Korea's kidnap-
ping of Japanese nationals in the 1970s-have
exposed "Dear Leader" to potential disgruntle-
ment in the top ranks. Second, the process of
reform could create cracks in the regime's foun-
dation. As Montesquieu observed, revolutions
don't occur when the people's conditions are at
rock bottom but when reform creates a spiral of
expectations that spurs people to action against the
old stultifying system.
Most Influence
Korea"
A different set of Chinese interests may now
come to the fore. Beijingopposes nuclear weapons
on the Korean peninsula and delivered a dressing-
down to North Korean embassy officials in Beijing
in January about the country's cheating on the
Agreed Framework. For China, nothing good
comes from a nuclear North Korea. Such an out-
come could prompt Japan to move from merely
developing missile defense capabilities to acquiring
ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons. And Taiwan
might also cross the nuclear threshold if the coun-
try's leaders see North Korea successfully guaran-
teeingits securitythis way.While the restof Asia pro-
vides China'seconomic lifeblood, Beijingcontinues
to throw good money,food, and fuel down a rat hole
in North Koreawith little prospectof majorreform.
Chinese policy may change under a new cadre
of leaders such as President Hu Jintao who are
less wedded to the Cold War relationship with
Pyongyang,which used to be characterizedas close
as "lips and teeth." Or more likely, Beijing'shesi-
tation to intervene may be tactical, as it waits for
the United States to do the heavy lifting with North
Korea (despite Bush'srhetoric to the contrary) and
then swoops in to help close the deal and maximize
its influence.
MAY IJUNE 2003 23
 Think Again
"The DMZ
Place in
Yes, if looks could kill. When for-
mer U.S. President Bill Clinton called the border
between the two Koreas the world's scariest
place, he was referring to the massive forward
deployment of North Korean forces around the
DMZand the shaky foundations of the 50-year-
old armistice-not peace treaty-that still keeps
the peace between the two former combatants.
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, there
have been more than 1,400 incidents across the
DMZ, resulting in the deaths of 899 North
Koreans, 394 South Koreans, and 90 U.S. sol-
diers. Tensions have been so high that in 1976 the
United States mobilized bombers and an aircraft
carrier battle group to trim one tree in the DMZ.
The deployments and operational battle plans on
both sides suggest that if a major outbreak of vio-
lence were to start, a rapid escalation of hostili-
ties would likely ensue.
In practice, however, no such outbreak has
occurred.North Korea has faced both a determined
South Korean military, and more important, U.S.
militarydeploymentsthat at their height comprised
100,000 troops and nuclear-tippedLance missiles
"The Clinton Administration's
Toward North
No. The North's breach of the Agreed
Frameworkmay make Clinton'spolicies look inef-
fective, but consider the counterfactual proposi-
tion. If Clinton had not succeededin freezingNorth
Korea's main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon for
nine years, North Korea would today have enough
plutonium for at least 30 nuclear weapons rather
than one or two bombs' worth.
Clinton's engagement with North Korea also
provided a useful test of North Korean intentions
and expectations. Previously,the United States had
little sense of the North's interest in swapping its
proliferation threat for external assistance. True,
the debate between hawks and doves over this
24 FOREIGN POLICY
Is the Scariest
the World"
and even today include37,000 troops, nuclear-capa-
ble airbases,and naval facilitiesthat guaranteeU.S.
involvement in any Koreanconflict.
The balance of power has held because any war
would have disastrousconsequencesfor both sides.
Seoul and Pyongyangare less than 150 miles apart-
closer than New York is to Washington,D.C. Seoul
is 30 miles from the DMZ and easily within reach of
North Korea'sartillerytubes.FormerCommanderof
U.S Forces Korea Gen. Gary Luck estimatedthat a
war on the Koreanpeninsulawould cost $1 trillion
in economicdamageand resultin 1 millioncasualties,
including52,000 U.S. militarycasualties.As one war
gamer described,the deathtoll on the North Korean
side would be akin to a "holocaust,"and KimJong I1
and his 1,000 closestgeneralswould surelyface death
or imprisonment.As a result,both sides have moved
cautiouslyand avoided majormilitarymobilizations
that could spiral out of control.
Ironicallyenough, as for the DMZitself, although
bristlingwith barbedwire and sown with land mines,
it has also become a remarkable nature preserve
stretchingacross the peninsula that is home to wild
birds and a trove of other rare species.
Policies
Korea Failed"
question still has a "he said, she said" quality to it:
Hawks see North Korea'sviolations of the Agreed
Frameworkas evidenceof the North's lack of inter-
est in such a deal; doves see those same violations
as a reaction to the U.S. failure to fulfill the frame-
work and still believePyongyangwill give up nukes
in return for outside support of economic reform.
But now there is a baseline or "data" for a debate
that previously took place at a theological and
ideological level. Before Clinton, there was also no
way to use leverage on a country with which the
United States had next to no contact for five
decades. Since 1994, the North has gained food,
fuel, economic assistance, and diplomatic rela-
[ ThinkAgain]
tions not just with South Korea but also Japan, the
European Union, Australia, Canada, and others.
Ironically, Clinton's carrots have become Bush's
"The Bush Administration
Caused
Current
No. Bush's"axis of evil" speechand his professed
loathing of Kim may have exacerbatedthe current
crisis, but they certainlydid not cause it.
First, North Korea started its covert uranium
enrichmentprogramfor nuclearweaponslong before
Bush took office. As far back as 1997, Pakistani
nuclearscientistswere shuttlingto Pyongyang,pro-
viding technology for uraniumenrichmentin return
for North Koreanmissile systems.
Second,priorto the October2002 revelationsand
despiteBush'soccasionalnegativestatementson North
Korea,the United Stateshad offereda stringof con-
sistentassurancesat lower levelsthat it would pursue
some form of engagement.These assurancesincluded
the creationof a package of new incentivesand the
expressedwillingnessto meet "anytime,anyplace,and
without preconditions."In addition,the Bushadmin-
istrationabandonedseveralinitiativescitedas attempts
to derailNorth Koreanengagement-revision of the
AgreedFrameworkand a push for conventionalforce
reductions-after they provedto be nonstarterswith
"The United States Should
Out of an
UngratefulSouth
Not yet. Massivedemonstrations,Molotov cock-
tails hurled into U.S. bases, and Americansoldiers
stabbedon the streetsof Seoul have stoked anger in
Congressand on the op-edpagesof majornewspapers
about South Korea.As North Korea appearson the
nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the
groundswellof anti-Americanism.They cringe at a
youngergenerationof Koreanswho tell CBStelevision's
investigativeprogram6o Minutesthat Bush is more
threateningthan Kim, and they worry about reports
thatSouthKorea'snew president,Roh Moo-hyun,was
26 FOREIGN POLICY
sticks, enabling the latter to pursue a harder-line
policy by threatening to withhold what was once
previously promised.
the
Crisis"
U.S. allies. Comparedwith the Clinton administra-
tion'seffusiveadvancesto North Korea,Bush'saggres-
sive posturingwas portrayedby some mediaas a dra-
maticshift,butthe U.S.predispositionfor engagement
remained.The North Koreans'response?Theyrefused
to engagein directbilateraldialoguewith the United
States,accusingWashingtonof high-handedness.
Third,thereis no denyingtheharderturnin bothU.S.
statementsandpolicyafterOctober2002. NorthKorea's
perceptionof thepreemptive languagein theBushadmin-
istration'snew national securitystrategyand nuclear
posturereviewcouldonlyhaveheightenedNorthKore-
ans' worst fears. But Bush'sunconditionalrefusalto
talk with North Korea didn't create the crisis. The
administrationbelievesNorth Koreastandsso far out-
side the non-proliferationregimethat negotiatingits
return would be tantamount to blackmail. Should
Pyongyangfirst make compliancegestures,however,
thentheUnitedStateswould be willingto discussincen-
energy,andeconomic
tivesincludingsecurityassurances,
assistance.Soundslike a negotiatingpositionto us.
Pull Its Troops
Korea"
avowedlyanti-American in his youngerdays.
Most Koreanshavecomplicatedfeelingsaboutthe
UnitedStates.Some of them are anti-American, to be
but are
sure, many grateful. South Korea has historically
beenone of the strongestalliesof the UnitedStates.Yet
it would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South
KoreansaboutU.S. policyand the continuedpresence
of U.S. forcesas merelyemotional.Imagine,for exam-
ple, how Washingtonians mightfeelaboutthe concrete
economic impact of thousands of foreign soldiers
monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the
 Think Again
I

nation'scapital,as U.S. forcesdo in Seoul. eraldemocraciesin the world.

But hasty withdrawalof U.S. forces is hardlythe
answerto suchtrans-Pacific anxiety,particularlyas the
U.S.-SouthKoreanallianceentersunchartedterritory.
The North Koreanswould claimvictory,and the Unit-
ed Stateswouldloseinfluencein one of themostdynam-
ic economicregionsin theworld-an outcomeit neither
wantsnorcanafford.Inthelongterm,sucha withdrawal
wouldalsopavethewayforChineseregionaldominance.
Some SouthKoreansmightwelcome a largerrole for
China-a romanticanduninformednotionat best.Bet-
ting on China,afterall, did not make SouthKoreathe
12th largesteconomyand one of the most vibrantlib-
The alternativesto the alliancearenot appealingto
eitherSouthKoreansor Americans.Seoulwould have
to boost its relativelylow level of defense spending
(which,at roughly3 percentof grossdomesticproduct,
is lessthanthatof IsraelandSaudiArabia,forexample).
Washingtonwould runthe riskof jeopardizingits mil-
itarypresenceacrossEastAsia,as a U.S.withdrawal from
thepeninsularaisedquestionsabouttheraisond'etrefor
keepingits troopsin Japan.A revisionin the U.S. mili-
tary presencein Korea is likely within the next five
years,but withdrawalof that presenceand abrogation
of its alliancearenot. IIN

Want to Know More?I

On North Korean history,the classic remains Chong-sik Lee and Robert Scalapino'sCommunism
in Korea (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1972). The best recenthistory is Don Obderdor-
fer's The Two Koreas (New York:Basic Books, 2001). On North Korea'sleadership,one of the few
good works is Dae-Sook Suh'sKim Il-Sung: The North KoreanLeader (New York:Columbia Uni-
versityPress, 1988). The inaugurationspeech of South Korea'snew president,Roh Moo-hyun, can
be found on the Web site of the KoreanInformationService.The KoreanCentralNews AgencyWeb
site offers the North's perspective,served up zany and fresh.

On U.S.-NorthKoreanrelations,see SamuelKim's,ed., NorthKoreanForeignRelationsin the Post-

Cold WarEra (New York:Oxford UniversityPress,1998), Leon Sigal'sDisarmingStrangers:Nuclear
Diplomacy With North Korea (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1998), and Michael May's,ed.,
"Verifyingthe AgreedFramework"(Livermore:Centerfor Global SecurityResearch,April2001). For
a recentroundtablefeaturingthe views of 28 top Koreaexperts,see the February2003 reportof the
Task Forceof U.S. KoreaPolicy,"TurningPoint in Korea:New Dangersand New Opportunitiesfor
the United States,"availableon the Website of the Centerfor InternationalPolicy.A d6jivu-inducing
snapshotof U.S.-North Koreanrelationscirca 1979 can be found in journalistGarethPorter's"Time
to Talk With North Korea" (FOREIGNPOLICY,Spring 1979).

On the historyof nuclearand missileproliferationon the Koreanpeninsula,see JamesClay Moltz

and AlexandreMansourov's,eds., TheNorth KoreanNuclearProgram(New York:Routledge,1999),
PeterHayes'sPacificPowderkeg(Lexington:LexingtonBooks, 1991), and David Albrightand Kevin
O'Neill's,eds., Solving the North KoreanNuclearPuzzle (Washington:Institutefor Scienceand Inter-
nationalSecurity,2000). David Shambaugharguesthat Chinadoes not ultimatelywant to end North
Korea'snuclearprogramin "Chinaand the KoreanPeninsula:Playingfor the LongTerm"(The Wash-
ington Quarterly,Spring2003).

On North Korea'seconomy, see Marcus Noland'sAvoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the
TwoKoreas(Washington:Institutefor InternationalEconomics,2000), Nicholas Eberstadt'sTheEnd
of North Korea (Washington:AmericanEnterpriseInstitutePress, 1999), and Hy-Sang Lee'sNorth
Korea:A StrangeSocialist Fortress(Westport:Praeger,2001).

>>Forlinksto relevantWeb sites, accessto the FP Archive,and a comprehensiveindex of related

FOREIGN POLICY articles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

28 FOREIGN POLICY