SEMI-AUTO: NOT NECESSARILY A

DISADVANTAGE

Militarily, there are certainly good valid reasons for the use of
fully automatic fire by dismounted infantry, especially for the Squad
Automatic Weapons and genuine light or general purpose machine
guns. The use of and need for shoulder-fired full-auto in the
individual’s rifle, on the other hand, can be of rather dubious value,
except perhaps for room clearing at spitting distances.

Clint Smith of Thunder Ranch probably put it best when it

comes to shoulder-fired full-auto rifles: “They only turn money into
noise.”

In his extensive study on small arms use during the Korean

War, US Army historian General S.L.A. Marshall considered semi-
automatic weapons such as the M1 Garand an asset rather than a
liability.

“Suffice to say now that any trend toward eliminating the semi-
automatic, hand-carried weapons in favor of full-automatic weapons
in the hands of all infantrymen should be vigorously combated. In
perimeter defense, the time almost invariably comes when the
automatic weapons run short of ammunition, with the local issue still
to be decided. This is the crisis of the contest, when decision may
swing either way, depending on which side is most, capable of
delivering the last few volleys.

The semi-automatic weapons are conservers of ammunition.

Apart from their great value in the hands of a good marksman at any
stage of the fight, they compose the weapons reserve which
becomes of inestimable value in the last hours when both sides are
near the point of exhaustion. In the infantry company data from
Korean operations there are numerous examples wherein the
retention of the position depended finally on fire from the M1, and rifle
fire finally decided the issue. The troops who carry the weapon
almost unanimously recognize the vital importance of this factor. On
the basis of their experience, they would not concur in any suggestion
that the line could be strengthened by fitting it exclusively with full-
automatic power.”

The semiautomatic M1 Garand holds the line in Korea.

S.L.A.M. noted there were virtually no occasions in which the

M1 Garands ran completely out of ammunition, even when the
carbines, BAR’s and machine guns had “shot their wads” entirely. He
also claimed that at least 50% of the North Korean and Red Chinese
casualties came from small arms, since the Communists quickly
adopted the tactic of “hugging the belt”, i.e. closing with UN forces to
such short ranges that artillery and air strikes could not be used due
to the proximity of friendly forces and the danger of friendly fire
casualties. The VC/NVA were also to use this tactic, often effectively,
in the Vietnam War to help negate the overwhelming firepower
advantage of the American military.

As an aside, while the assault rifle crowd quickly grabbed onto

SLAM’s 300-yard figure for all the range that’s necessary for the
infantryman’s rifle, they ignored his firm opinions about not needing a
full-auto rifle and that the M1 could indeed be effective well past 300
yards if the men were given increased live-fire training.

Full auto fire is especially futile when it comes to the full-power

big-bore battle rifles. While a magnificent battle rifle, it was quickly
seen that the full-auto capability on the M14 was nothing but a waste
of ammunition and in American service the weapon was soon
changed to semi-auto only. With the FAL, the sheer uncontrollability
of fully-automatic fire led the British and former Commonwealth
nations…Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand…to adopt semi-
automatic only weapons, the so-called Inch Pattern FAL, L1A1, or
SLR (Self Loading Rifle).

This did not appear to handicap the infantry units’ effectiveness

when armed with these semi-auto rifles and in fact served to enhance
individual marksmanship.

One former British infantryman summed things up well: “The

reason as to why the British forces did away with auto fire on their
SLR is because it was bloody pointless; if you have ever shot an
AK47 then you will know that on auto they shoot up into the air. The
SLR would have done pretty much the same! A waste of ammo and
tax payers’ money…”

Some estimates claim that American troops in Vietnam, once

armed with the full-auto M16, expended around 200,000 rounds of
small arms ammunition per enemy casualty. For Aussies of the well-
trained Royal Australian Regiment, armed with the semi-auto SLR,
275 rounds were expended per enemy casualty. This while the
Aussies looked down on body counts as a measure of success, and
tended not to “extrapolate” their body counts to please the brass hats.
 The Australian method of fighting involved small, professional
and very stealthy patrols in which they usually got the jump on the
enemy. For instance, over a third of the Australians’ enemy contacts
were ambushes. In 34% of the cases, the Aussies ambushed the
VC/NVA while in only 2% of the contacts did the enemy manage to
surprise the Australians in their own ambushes. Aussies initiated
contact with the VC/NVA over 75% of the time while it was the
VC/NVA who initiated contact against American forces 80% of the
time.

One SAS study of Australian actions in Vietnam claimed that,

despite the usually quite timely and relatively heavy air strikes and
artillery support the infantry enjoyed in that war, some 70% of enemy
casualties were inflicted with infantry small arms...and the majority of
those small arms were semi-auto SLRs.

A continent away, Rhodesian Security Forces fighting

Communist terrorists who usually always greatly out-numbered them
deigned the use of full-automatic on their South African manufactured
R1 FALs.

Rhodesian troopies used aimed single shots or double-

taps to break up Communist ambushes.

“Like most of the Rhodesian Security Forces, the change lever

on my FN was set for semi-auto only. I had the option of having this
changed to include full-auto, but decided against it. Through practice,
I could put down a devastating barrage of accurate semi-automatic
fire that just could not be matched on full auto. I have never had
much faith in full automatic fire capability in a full bore battle rifle,
simply because you generally waste ammunition without hitting
anything after the first shot has been fired. The recoil generated by
the powerful 7.62mm NATO round makes the gun virtually impossible
to control…”

Another Rhodesian veteran noted another advantage of well-

aimed semi-automatic fire that most people wouldn’t think of.

“Terrorists generally fired on fully automatic – ‘spray and pray.’

This would often start high, and would rise. The indiscriminate use of
ammunition on fully automatic usually meant they would run out long
before the Rhodesian troops.”

During the Falklands War, British forces were armed with semi-
automatic SLRs while the Argentineans had the equivalent Metric
FAL with full-automatic capability. Much ado was made about the
Argentine forces’ “firepower advantage” with their full-auto FAL’s, but
it didn’t change the course of battle.

British Paras re-zero their SLRs on the ground in the

Falklands. You'd think someone deploying from 689-foot
elevation Ft. Drum, NY to the Hindu Kush would do the same,
but you'd be wrong.

One British Para color sergeant didn’t seem to notice a big

disadvantage with the SLR’s semi-auto only action: "I picked four
blokes and got up on this high feature, and as I did so this troop of
twenty or thirty Argentines were coming towards us. We just opened
fire on them. We don't know how many we killed, but they got what
they deserved, because none of them were left standing when we'd
finished with them."
 On the other side, most (not all) Argentine troops were poorly-
trained young conscripts serving (suffering?) under a frighteningly
large number of very bad, abusive, negligent, and self-centered
officers who sometimes vanished when the shooting started. Under
such circumstances many an FN magazine was dumped in the
general direction of the enemy on full auto with negligible effect.

Proving the axiom that there are no bad soldiers, just bad
officers, one Argentine infantryman recalled serving under an
efficient, conscientious former commando major who trained his
troops thoroughly and well. Said the veteran, “I was issued with a
FAL 7.62 millimetre rifle… The main emphasis in shooting was
making every bullet count.” His company was one of the few to put up
fierce resistance and during the Battle of Mount Longdon, even
though they were outnumbered, they fought the British Paras almost
to a standstill for 12 hours and inflicted heavy casualties.

In 1983, after the Falklands War, a unit of the 7th Gurkha Rifles
conducted a joint training exercise with the American 75th Army
Rangers at Fort Lewis, Washington. The Gurkhas are a warrior race,
and well known as some of the toughest light infantry on the planet;
the Rangers were suitably impressed.

“Unlike American forces, who believe in small-caliber, fast-

shooting semi- or full-auto rifles, Gurkha riflemen carry British-made
FN semiauto only rifles in 7.62mm NATO caliber. Their legendary
steel-clad nerves, which according to numerous reports allow them to
return slow fire even when being shot at by automatic weapons,
account for their philosophy of ‘one kill for one shot’. And that’s how
they’re trained…they make every shot count.”…

The Gurkha’s CO said, “We find that the extra weight of the
larger caliber doesn’t matter with the Gurkhas, because they’re so
strong, but the increased range and killing power possible with the
7.62, plus the effectiveness of aimed fire, makes them a very deadly
soldier in combat…”

“Aimed-fire marksmanship is a continuing part of Gurkha

training, and they are virtually all expert shots. In the self loading rifle,
or SLR, class in the 1981 Bisley Championship shoot in England, the
1st Bn, 7 GR took first place in all-Army competition. They expect to
finish first in the 1983 Championships.”

Things to make you go, "Oh shit!"...Gurkhas, Kukris, and

SLRs, oh my.

Afghanistan, 1985: An American Army officer and analysis

chastised a Soviet force in Afghanistan for shooting up too much
ammo on full-auto: “…an air assault company runs out of ammunition
in a day’s combat. This is partially due to the Soviet philosophy that
small arms fire suppresses enemy fire and eventually may kill the
enemy. The West wants to kill enemy with small arms fire and uses
crew-served weapons to suppress enemy fire. The standard Soviet
assault rifle’s selector switch goes from safe to semiautomatic to full
automatic. The West sees semiautomatic as the norm. Perhaps the
Soviets needed to devote more time to rifle marksmanship for a
guerrilla war. It saves on ammunition and consumption.”

(Pet peeve time. I certainly never saw all this emphasis on well-
aimed semi-automatic fire and marksmanship during my service time
in various combat arms units.)

Fast forward to Afghanistan 2006. An American Special Forces

company and the Afghan Army commandos they have trained move
up a ridge to take control of a dominant hill known as Sperwan Ghar
to overlook a battlefield where insurgents and conventional infantry
are slugging it in order to call in air and artillery strikes.

“A group of insurgents on the top watched the soldiers

approaching. When the task force got to within a few hundred meters
of the hilltop, the insurgents opened fire from three sides with RPGs
and small arms. The commandos fought for 20 minutes, until they
nearly ran out of ammunition. They then broke contact and moved
back towards the southern edge of the valley to await resupply by
helicopter.”

Examining the math, if we assume the “official” basic load of M4

ammunition, 120 rounds, we get ten shots per minute, or one round
every six seconds. And this does not include time spent in taking
cover, mag changes, movement, stoppages, etc. The unofficial figure
I hear bandied about the most for ammo loads in Afghanistan is more
often 600 rounds, which would amount to one shot every two
seconds.

The report, BTW, did not mention casualties for either side,
even though I’m willing to bet the Taliban expended a helluva lot
more ammunition than the friendlies did. So much for criticizing the
Russians looking at this example of the West’s skill in marksmanship
and semi-auto fire, even by elite troops.

For the small group or even larger military units in rough

country, fully-automatic rifles can actually be a liability when it comes
to ammunition conservation and re-supply. As SLAM noted, full-auto
“firepower” poured out early in the fight can easily leave you sucking
hind tit and reaching for the bayonet or E-tool when the action comes
to a head. Not even modern Western armies can always count on
fresh ammunition being only a radio call away when it comes to
mountainous country, thick rain forests, bad weather, or intense
enemy fire on helicopter LZ’s.

So don’t feel too bad about having “only” a semi-automatic rifle.

As Douglas Bell said, “At 600 rounds per minute, how many minutes
can you carry?”
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