People v Musa

FACTS:
Accused men are appealing the finding of guilty by the lower court based on the
contention, among others, that the trial court gravely erred in admitting the seriously flawed out-
of-court identification by the witnesses. Issue now arises as to whether the witnesses’ out-of-
court identification were reliable and credible considering that “when these witnesses went to the
police station, their minds were ready to accept that the persons they would identify were the
suspects robbery” (as contended by the accused men).

HELD:
Argument of accused men misplaced.
SC explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine their
its (sic) where it was held: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways.
It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify
the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-
court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure (People v. Rivera).
In CAB: (1) witness had good view of suspect from where she was sitting, (2) no
competing event took place to draw her attention away from the holdup, (3) identification took
place in sufficient amount of time, (4) witness described suspect to police prior to ID, and (5) no
persuasive support for contention of unduly persuasive procedure in ID-ing of suspects. Hence,
witness testimony was reliable hence admissible.

Aquino v Paiste

FACTS:
Petitioner, together with other women, are being accused of estafa. They allegedly sold a
fake gold bar to respondent. Before the case was filed, petitioner executed an instrument holding
herself liable to the respondent for half the amount that was swindled from the latter. Instrument
of amicable settlement was signed by petitioner. Said instrument included a stipulation that
“accused/respondent waives her right to counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights
made by an NBI agent in the presence of a lawyer” Atty. Uy in the NBI-NCR office. When the
case reached the court, said instrument was used as an additional proof of petitioner’s guilt. Issue
arises as to whether the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence
considering it was allegedly executed without counsel.

HELD:
Evidence admissible. When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR to
be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee
for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was
provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.
First, presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests
are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned.
Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. was not presented as witness and that
what petitioner and Atty. supposedly conferred about was likewise not presented. It is a basic
principle that consultation and information between counsel-client is privileged and counsel may
not divulge without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in a case has full discretion to
choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to bolster its case. Court cannot second guess
the reason of the prosecution in not presenting Atty.’s testimony, more so on account of the
counsel-client privileged communication. Further, petitioner could have asserted its right "to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses,” where she could have
compelled Atty. to testify. She did not.
Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty.’s appointment during the time
she was in the NBI and when she signed the amicable settlement. When "accused never raised
any objection against the lawyer’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer" the
accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer (People v. Jerez). In the CAB, petitioner is
deemed to have engaged Atty. when she conferred with him and signed the amicable settlement
with waiver.
Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty., she executed the amicable settlement. She was
provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however,
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." An amicable
settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission
but is a contract between the parties. Thus, the presence of Atty. safeguarded petitioner’s rights
even if the custodial investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence,
coercion, or intimidation.
Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an
admission, the document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her
constitutional rights were violated. Petitioner’s allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation
remain but bare allegations. Allegations are not proof.

People v. Serzo

FACTS:
Accused was charged with murder. Arraignment was set but accused appeared without
counsel. The trial court appointed a lawyer as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only.
Accused, however, moved that the arraignment be reset and that he be given time to engage a
counsel of his own choice, which the trial court granted.
Accused again appeared without a counsel de parte. He was nonetheless arraigned with
the assistance of Counsel de oficio. He pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial was waived and the case
proceeded to trial. In several instances accused appeared in court without counsel but was given
a counsel de oficio. At times, he refused asking for time to look for his own counsel. This
happened several times. He also refused to sign the minutes of the hearing on several occassions.
Subsequently, accused was found guilty.
Issue arises as to whether the lower court erred in not giving the accused time to engage
counsel of his own choice.

HELD:
Lower court did not err. The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our
Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial
and even on appeal, the accused is given the option to be represented by a counsel of his choice.
But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during arraignment and trial, the court
shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the accused's
option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction
reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights
of the state and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
Accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-
appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is
immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. Court is obliged
to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the states's and the offended party's
equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. The court may restrict the accused's
option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the
chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a
valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
Also, the right to counsel de parte, like other personal rights, is waivable so long as (1)
the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally,
knowingly and intelligently made.
Duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is not mandatory where the accused has
proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but, when the time for
the presentation of the evidence for the defense was due, he appears by himself alone because of
the inexcusable absence of his counsel (Sayson vs. People). The right to be heard and to reopen
the case (and send it to trial anew) could not be allowed if doing so would sanction a plainly
dilatory tactic and a reprehensible trifling with the orderly administration of justice.

People v. Domingo Reyes

FACTS: