1. De Castro vs.

Assidao – De Castro – 545 SCRA 162

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly
nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.

They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license
with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and
had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back
to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective
homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named
Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has
been the one supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against

petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In
her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their

marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to
sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and
possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and
that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he
got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the
child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it
was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have
been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of
nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was
born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In
addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to
undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
with respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be
used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of
his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case.
There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the
parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is
void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an
action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of
the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16

October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was

denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his
marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and
admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu
of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth
being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner
additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action
for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it
was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void
marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no
necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling
of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence
and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and
anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in
view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous
denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required

respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their
respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a

mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she
argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her
child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in
answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court,
petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to
prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the
marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing
the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon
the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to
support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial
court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of
a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees
with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child
of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court
had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second,
whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial

action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is

clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two
marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity
of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in
any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating
that they had been living together for more than five
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity

in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.26 In
the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in
fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with
the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the

same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus,
one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father.
In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption
in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus
stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE

CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the

trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the

petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter,
but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go
to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and
"D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D,"
"D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on
 petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and
"E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166
are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch
70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2
Captioned Annabelle Assidao–De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B.
De Castro.
3
The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig
RTC, presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
4
Records, p. 3, Complaint.
5
Rollo, pp. 92-94.
6
Id. at 37.
7
Id. at 40.
8
Rollo, p. 41.
9
Id. at 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003.
10
Id. at 15-20.

Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000). TOLENTINO, CIVIL

11

CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, 1990 Ed. and SEMPIO-

DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 1991 Ed.
12
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
13
Id. at 135.
14
Id. at 119-126.
15
Id. at 139-144.
16
384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000).
17
Rollo, pp. 174-182.
18
Id. at 183-185.
19
Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704 (1999),
citing TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol.
I, 1987 ed., p. 265.
20
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675 (2000).
21
Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
22
Id. at 132.
23
Family Code, Art. 4.
24
Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which
provides:

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man

and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
25
TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.

Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE

26

REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.

 27
Family Code, Art. 175.
28
Family Code, Art. 172.

In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by

Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as
examples of "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws:" (a) the baptismal certificate of the child ; (b) a
judicial admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the
child is entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e)
admission by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
29
Records, p.6.
30
Id. at 160.
31
Rollo, pp. 93-94

2. Estate of Rogelio G. Ong vs. Diaz – 540 SCRA 480

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution2 of
the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.

A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support

pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne),
represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky),
against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be
rendered:

(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz

as his daughter.

(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support

of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
support.

(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the

sum of P100,000.00.

(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just

and equitable in the premises.4

As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac

City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship
and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married
to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding
solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
Panfilo V. Valdez.5

From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited

and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol
Garden, Tarlac City.

From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was

conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon
Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and
Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the
baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs –
recognizing the child as his.

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and

stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the
father of the child.

Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and

continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to
acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.

After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed
to file any responsive pleading despite repeated motions for
extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its
Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelio’s Answer with Counterclaim and
Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court only
on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a
decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.

In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;

2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support

of P10,000.00 and further

3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the

amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.

On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and
a motion for reconsideration seeking the court’s understanding, as he
was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very
difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that
the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the
case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of
Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8

On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio’s

Motion for New Trial:

WHEREFORE, finding defendant’s motion for new trial to be

impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.

The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the

decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside
but the evidence adduced shall remain in record, subject to
cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the
proceedings.

In the meantime defendant’s answer is hereby admitted,

subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to
defendant’s counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules of
Court.

Acting on plaintiff’s application for support pendente lite which

this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to
pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month from
January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in
arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as
regular support pendente lite during the pendency of this case.9

The RTC finally held:

The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is

the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz

was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the
law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses
Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code).
The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may
have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same Code.
Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must be
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days following the birth of the child because of –

a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual

intercourse with his wife;

b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way

that sexual intercourse was not possible;

c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual

intercourse.

It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese

national and that he was living outside of the country (TSN,
Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year.
Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was
outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever
arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of
plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a

relationship with another man before she met the defendant,
there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with
other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne
Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a
certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different
father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.

The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered

the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with
the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is the
real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when
he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to
motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some
instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne
Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after
she gave birth to Joanne.
 On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne
Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is
but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10

On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne

Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio
Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding
support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed
and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz
shall have reached majority age.11

Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack
of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001.12 From
the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the
Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed,
the case was submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled to another
Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.13

During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s
counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on
21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said
counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate
of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court
of Appeals.15

In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is

hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December
15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an
order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in
coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis.

No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.

In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as

follows:

In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant

Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the proceedings
volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiff’s mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of
paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did
not consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure
notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the
biological father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having
actual sexual relations with plaintiff’s mother. We believe that
DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would
be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present
paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely demise of
defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial
court, in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the
field of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with
whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased
defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor
whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for
support.17

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT
FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE
THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE
 HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO
FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G.
ONG.18

Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be
modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the
trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of
minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor
as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19

From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds
it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of
the appellate court’s decision remanding the case to the trial court for
the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the
DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor
Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the
petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of the DNA
testing.

As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation

of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity

but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as
citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:

Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate

although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor

of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent
case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a

declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive

and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other

than that of the physical impossibility of the husband’s having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in

such a way that access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.24

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a

legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.

There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions

bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the
advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty
whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing.

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic

make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every
cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s
DNA profile can determine his identity.25

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological

sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is
processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual
from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each
person, except for identical twins.

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA

(deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except
in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a
component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an
individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair
follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva,
or other body parts.

The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine).
The order in which the four bases appear in an individual’s DNA
determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a
double stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired
bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs

distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his or
her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as
"polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing
(profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained

or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in
several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA
typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length
polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which
was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37
courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is
known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR
(short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed
of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a
million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving
 the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand,
takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two
(2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than
one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are

determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are
done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known"
print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But
then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show

variations between people. In each of these regions, a person
possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from
each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a
DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother
and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s
DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have
been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s
profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child.
If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.26

In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:

SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule, the

following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles,

results and other genetic information directly generated from
DNA testing of biological samples;
 (d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA
testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which
biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that
person;

(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods

which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples,
the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the
information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples
for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty,
whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct
biological samples originates from the same person (direct
identification) or if the biological samples originate from related
persons (kinship analysis); and

(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for

the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with
the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in
a given population.

Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the

resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of
the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v.
Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:

Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in

the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil.
741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against
the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science,
(had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal
and written, by the putative father."

In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA

as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of
Appeals[G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:

x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional

methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
 expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the
mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny
progress.

The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and

authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002
with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No.
144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and
murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of
the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.

A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April

2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused charged with
rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our
mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific
evidence to still our doubts."

In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434,

161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the
 Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to

satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.
In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged
the strong weight of DNA testing...

Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v.

Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504],
we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA
test results. x x x.

Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court,
petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of
Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing
given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a
remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible
due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of
complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is
more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the conduct of
DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate

court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of
any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to

the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
 subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case;
and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner
does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long
as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic

material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate
objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as

enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA
testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.

And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on
Elections,31this Court held:

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R.

No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated
the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise:
"[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells
of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to."
 It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether
appellant is the father of AAA’s child, which may be
accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of
the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this
Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it
is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily
routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate
that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence
in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:

x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized

by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned
progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing
and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved
into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering.
We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our
stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its
Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,, Nachura, Reyes,

JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with
Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B.
Dimaampao concurring. Rollo, p. 27-43.
2
Rollo, pp. 44-46.
3
Docketed as Civil Case No. 8799; id. at 47-50.
4
Id. at 48-49.
5
Id. at 27.
6
Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr.; rollo,
p. 57-60.
7
Id. at 28-29.
8
SEC. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. – If a new
trial is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
the original judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the
action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded evidence
taken upon the former trial, in so far as the same is material
and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new
trial without retaking the same.
9
Rollo, p. 31.
10
Id. at 61-62.
11
Id. at 62.
12
Id. at 35.
13
Id. at 37.
14
Id. at 135.
15
Id. at 38.
16
Id. at 42-43.
17
Id. at 42.
 18
Id. at 125.
19
Id. at 23.
20
Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA
197, 204.
21
Art. 164 of the Family Code.
22
G.R. No. 124814, 21 October 2004, 441 SCRA 96, 104-
105; Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 123450, 31 August
2005, 468 SCRA 438, 447-448.
23
Article 166 of the Family Code has a similar provision.
24
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, 428 Phil. 628, 640-641 (2002).
25
Herrera v. Alba, supra note 20 at 209.
26
Id. at 204-211.
27
G.R. No. 162571, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 315, 325-327.
28
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, 15 October 2007.
29
Section 3(a) of the Rules on DNA Evidence, id.
30
G.R. No. 172607, 26 October 2007.
31
468 Phil. 421 (2004).
32
Supra note 27 at 339.

3. Social Security System vs. Aguas – 483 SCRA 383

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor
JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian,
ROSANNA H. AGUAS,Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the

Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
66531 and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS)

and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving
spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in
her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child,
Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.2 Her claim for
monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997.3

Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter4 dated

April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister,
contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged
that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more
than six years before, and lived with another man on whom
she has been dependent for support. She further averred that
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter
had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In
support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of
the original birth certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Peña,
showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to
Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the
two were married on November 1, 1990.

As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and

Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September 1997. It also
conducted an investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations. In a
Memorandum6 dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security
Officer who conducted the investigation reported that, based
on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin
and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a neighbor). She
learned that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna;
Jenelyn7 and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo
C. dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before
his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant
with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita
also confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as
he was under treatment.

On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a

certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the
SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their
pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30
days the amount ofP10,350.00 representing the total death
benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to
August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.8

Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a

reconsideration of the said decision.9 However, in its Letter
dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim.10

This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for

the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security
Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998.11 Janet H. Aguas,
who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and
Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was
docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.

The claimants appended to their petition, among others,

photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s
marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3)
Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of
death.

In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn

testimonies and documentary evidence showing the
disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the
claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was
justified in denying their claims.12

In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was

a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate
bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father. They asserted
that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as
husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof, they
attached a Joint Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors,
Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that
Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until
the latter’s death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which was
registered in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that
her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the
alleged infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr.
Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because he
was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the
deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed
that the information the SSS gathered from the doctor was
privileged communication.14

In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured

Confirmation Reports15 signed by clerks from the
corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage
between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the
fact of Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the
fact of Jeylnn’s birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of
Pablo’s death on December 8, 1996.

The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed
the SSS to verify the authenticity of Pablo’s signature as
appearing on Jeylnn’s birth certificate from his claim records,
particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit
application.16 The SSS complied with said directive and
manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis
conducted, Pablo’s signature in the birth certificate was made
by the same person who signed the member’s record and
other similar documents submitted by Pablo.17

The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu

and Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with
regard to their respective sworn affidavits.18 Vivencia testified
that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30
years already; the couple were married and lived in
Macabacle, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a
former neighbor of the spouses, but four years after their
marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Niño
Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the
two, especially during Christmas or fiestas; the spouses’ real
child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an adopted child; the spouse
later transferred residence, not far from their old house, and
Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in the old
house.19

On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a

neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to
the present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and
Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the
children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose
child Jefren is.20

According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and
Rosanna; she was just taken in by the spouses because for a
long time they could not have children;21 however, there were
no legal papers on Janet’s adoption.22 Later on, Rosanna got
pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s baptism, there was a
commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was
claiming that he was the father of the child and he got mad
because the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got
mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them
away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna
separated;23 she knew about this because at that time their
mother was sick, and she would often visit her at their
ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying;
Rosanna was no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet
resided therein; she did not know where Rosanna was staying
now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela Peña were
still living together.24

Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also

summoned for clarificatory questions.25 During the hearing,
Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal
certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas,26 child of Pablo Aguas and
Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and that of
Jenelyn H. dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and
Rosanna Hernandez, born on January 29, 1992.

On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the

claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately
refund to the SSS the amount of P10,350.00 erroneously paid
to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased.
The SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefit to
qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their
absence, to his legal heirs.28

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as

primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted
marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her
marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth
certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother,
Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Peña, were married on
November 1, 1990. The SSC declared that Rosanna had a
child with Romeo dela Peña while she was still married to
Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H.
dela Peña showing that she was the child of Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and that she was born on
January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no
longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death because
of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if
her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there
was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his
legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the records that
Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and
concluded, based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she
was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also
gave credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that
Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. As for
Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was only
adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29

The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said

decision but their motion was denied by the SSC for lack of
merit and for having been filed out of time.30 The claimants
then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of

petitioners. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is
hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of
computing the benefits that may have accrued in favor of
petitioners after the same was cut and suspended in
September 1997.

SO ORDERED.31

In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and

Jeylnn showing that they were the children of the deceased.
According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, these
records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS.
These entries made in public documents may only be
challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law,
and may not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to
the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to
show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he
died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not
properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo
dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have
been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her
not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the
presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to
support from her husband.32

The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision,

which the CA denied for lack of merit.33 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate

court, contending that it

GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA

AGUAS IS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT
UPON THE MEMBER DURING HIS LIFETIME TO
QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE
INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO
SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.

II

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND

JEYLNN AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION
BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO
AGUAS.34

Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as

amended by Presidential Decree No. 735, which defines a
dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna
forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she engaged
in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and
married the latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act
constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to
receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of
adultery is evident from the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela
Peña showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to
Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. Petitioner submits that
Rosanna cannot be considered as a dependent spouse of
Pablo; consequently, she is not a primary beneficiary.35

As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not
entitled to the pension because, based on the evidence on
record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are
not the legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of the
Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of
respondents’ relationship with the member to determine
whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without
correcting their birth certificates.36

Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to

prove that Rosanna committed acts of adultery or that she
married another man after the death of her husband. They
contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned
only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code,
none of which were proven in this case.37

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna,

Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by

the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.38 In an appeal via
certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the
CA.39 It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review,
examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented.40 However, the Court may review findings
of facts in some instances, such as, when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the
CA are contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial
agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.41 The Court finds these instances present
in this case.

At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic

Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735.
Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to
death benefits:

Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the

covered employee’s death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall
be entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his dependents
to the dependent’s pension: Provided, That he has paid at
least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not
satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent
to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however,
That the death benefit shall not be less than the total
contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor
less than five hundred pesos: Provided, finally, That the
covered employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be
entitled to the minimum benefit.

Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary

beneficiaries of an SSS member as follows:

SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the

following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise,
have the following meanings:

xxxx

(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted

child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over
twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or
mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon
the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent
upon the covered employee for regular support.
xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries

and dependent children, who shall be the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and,
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be
the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the
foregoing, any other person designated by the covered
employee as secondary beneficiary.

Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish

his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence, the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact
in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that
level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.42

The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that
only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly
pension.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth

certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was
able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry
showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December
4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on
December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born
during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code,

children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent
Juan Gamboa Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption
–

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly

established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth
of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170,44 and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable.46

Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly

personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs.47 In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged
the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s
status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be
contested.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed

by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was
verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A
birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of
paternity.48

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can

not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception
or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.49 It
should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a
photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. However, the
Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative
weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by
the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without
probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by
the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in
the certificate.

In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of

the facts contained therein.50 Here, the witnesses were
unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but
merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified
that Janet’s adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings;
hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted"
children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof
that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot
consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary
beneficiary.

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to

qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was
"the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2)
that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this
case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the
legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage
certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner.
But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that
she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death
remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are
obliged to support each other,51 but whether one is actually
dependent for support upon the other is something that has to
be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage
alone.

In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the

GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as "one who derives
his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or
subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or
sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power,
or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law
likewise defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse
dependent for

support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the

Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family
for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with
other men, was not dependent on her husband for support,
financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the
Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already

separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the
husband and wife were still living together at the time of his
death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on
the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable
of providing for herself.

Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory

requirements have been complied with, particularly her
dependency on her husband for support at the time of his
death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence
adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived
together as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits
of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made such
declaration.

Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their

testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over the categorical
and straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who
testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for
almost six years before the latter died. Except for the bare
assertion of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there
was no further statement regarding the witnesses’ assertion in
their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablo’s
death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated
after Jeylnn’s baptism as a result of an argument regarding
Romeo dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a
commotion at their ancestral house because Romeo dela Peña
was grumbling why Jeylnn was named after Pablo when he
was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove them away. The
SSC’s observation and conclusion on the two baptismal
certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to
further believe Leticia’s testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna
separated. As noted by the SSC:

It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H.

dela Peña are one and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born
on October 29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan
Cathedral of San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24,
1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez.
Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the other hand, was born on January
29, 1992 to spouses Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela
Peña and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that
Jenelyn dela Peña was born approximately three months after
the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically impossible for
Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in so
short a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac
that Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of
Jeylnn because of the commotion that was created by Romeo
dela Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be baptized using his name
explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish of Sto.
Niño in San Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Peña.
They changed her date of birth also to make it appear in the
record of the parish that she is another child of Rosanna.53

On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that

Rosanna was no longer living at Pablo’s house even before he
died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the
present. Mariquita testified as follows:

Hearing Officer:

Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?

Mrs. Dizon:
Ngayon at kahit na noon.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan namatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

1996.

Hearing Officer:

Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.

Hearing Officer:

So, buhay pa si Pablo ……

Mrs. Dizon:

…. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.

Hearing Officer:

Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh,

dahil namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko,
kapatid ng nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung
nanay ni Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.

Hearing Officer:

Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at

Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo.

Hearing Officer:

Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila

Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.

Hearing Officer:

Saan naman?

Mrs. Dizon:

Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54

In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only

Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate
child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was
merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers
to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.
Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is
likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed
to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she
was still dependent on him for support even if they were
already living separately.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only
Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES- MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

SANTIAGO MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On leave.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola
(deceased), with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-
Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp.
22-29.
2
Records, p. 27.
3
Id. at 98.
4
Id. at 31.
5
Id. at 32.
6
Id. at 33.
7
Referring to Jeylnn.
8
Records, p. 34.
9
Id. at 12.
10
Id. at 17.
11
Id. at 3-4.
12
Id. at 29.
13
Id. at 51.
14
Id. at 47-49.
15
Id. at 55-58.
16
Id. at 59-60.
17
Id. at 236.
18
Id. at 59.
19
Id. at 67-70.
20
Id. at 72-74.
21
Id. at 11.
22
Id. at 18.
23
Id. at 12.
24
Id. at 27-28.
25
Id. at 187.
26
Id. at 233.
27
Id. at 232.
28
Rollo, pp. 49-50.
29
Id. at 47-49.
30
Id. at 52.
31
Id. at 28.
32
Id. at 26-27.
33
Id. at 33.
34
Id. at 9.
35
Id. at 10-13.
36
Id. at 14-16.
37
Id. at 68-70.
38
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 160890, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 637.
39
Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 144 (2002).

Asia Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading

40

Corporation, 452 Phil. 552, 567 (2003).

41
Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 258 (2003).

Anflo Management & Investment Corp. v. Bolanio, 439

42

Phil. 309, 316 (2002).

43
418 Phil. 768 (2001).
44
Article 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register,
if the husband or, in proper case, any of his heirs, should
reside in the city or municipality where the birth took
place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do

not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they reside in the Philippines;
and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child
has been concealed from or was unknown to the
husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted
from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the
child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier.
45
Article 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the
filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration

of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint

 without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the

husband.
46
De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,
supra note 43, at 773-774.

Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450,

47

August 31, 2005.

48
See Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September
2, 2005; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 220 Phil. 116 (1985).
49
Angeles v. Maglaya, supra.
50
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
51
Article 195, Family Code.
52
Re: Application for Survivor’s Benefits of Ms. Maylenne
G. Manlavi, Daughter of the Late Ernesto R. Manlavi,
A.M. No. 10019-Ret., February 22, 2001, 352 SCRA 518.
53
Rollo, pp. 48-49.
54
Records, pp. 222-223.

4. Cruz vs. Cristobal, 498 SCRA 37

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and

ELISA CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,
vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE
CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22

July 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 156, in Civil
Case No. 65035 entitled, "Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal
and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal,
Jose Cristobal, Heirs of Norberto Cristobal and The Register of
Deeds, San Juan, M.M."

Facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the

deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they
are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first
marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are
also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second
marriage to Donata Enriquez.

On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land

with an area of 535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta.
Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).

Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.

More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private

respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject
property and transferred its title to their names.

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the

case between them and private respondents, but no settlement was
reached. Thus, a Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title and Damages
was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to
recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In
their prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition
executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of
TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in
the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the
subject property in accordance with the law of succession and the
payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s
fees andP100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the

baptismal certificates of Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4 and the late Socorro 5were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January
1909, she produced a certification 6 issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that
records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943,
and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as

follows:

Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when
she was only one year and seven months old. She lived with the sister
of her father because the latter married his second wife, Donata
Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with their
father and the latter’s family in the subject property at P. Parada St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila.

She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his
brother Anselmo stayed with her and her auntie while Socorro stayed
with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married.

Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children

from the second marriage lived with them and her aunt Martina
Cristobal.

Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St.,
Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, the property subject of the
present litigation. She has been living in the said property since 1948.
She claimed that there are other houses in the area particularly those
which belong to her half brothers and sisters which were now
converted into factories.

She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square
meters she occupies only thirty-six (36) square meters of the subject
lot.

She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property

among themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share. She
said that she was offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose
between a portion of the land in question or money because one of
the children of defendant Jose Cristobal wanted to construct an
apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask the opinion of
her other brothers and sisters.

Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the

land and she found out that the property belonging to their father
Buenaventura Cristobal had been transferred to the defendants as
evidenced by transfer certificates of title issued under the names of
Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit "E"), Norberto Cristobal (Exhibit "F"),
Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit "G") and Jose Cristobal (Exhibit "H").

She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the
property belonging to her father had been transferred to her half
brothers and sisters with the exclusion of herself and the other
children from the first marriage.

She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among

themselves, however, no settlement was reached therein. This
prompted the [petitioners] to file the present case.

On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that

she was aware that the subject property was owned by her father
Buenaventura Cristobal even before the latter died. She likewise
stated that the [private respondents] are the ones paying the real
estate tax due on the lot.

Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her "Sinumpaang

Salaysay" she claimed that she was a neighbor of Mercedes,
Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose
Cristobal in San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that she knows that
Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s first marriage and the
Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s second marriage.

The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first
family lived right across where she stayed.

Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding

that the fact that Martina Cristobal is the sister of Buenaventura
Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly took
care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were taken care of by
Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter’s second wife, Donata
Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.

When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by

Martina Cristobal together with Elisa. Socorro on the other hand lived
with Mercedes who was then married.

Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I
until they finished high school at the Philippine School of Commerce
in Manila.

When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina

Cristobal took care of Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose
Cristobal.

Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second
marriages lived together with their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long
time.

When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the
lot located at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at
present, Elisa and her family lives in the said vicinity.

Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second
marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built their
houses and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.

She said that the children from the first and second marriages of
Buenaventura Cristobal had a harmonious relationship until sometime
in 1994 when [petitioners] and Elisa Cristobal’s grandchildren were
called "squatters" by the [private respondents] and their grandchildren
for residing in the subject parcel of land.

On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall

the name of the first wife of Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only
knew them to be married although she is not aware of the date when
they were married.

[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they

are brothers and sisters of the [private respondents].

He claimed that the only time when he became aware that

[petitioners] are his brothers and sisters was when he lived with their
aunt Martina.

He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in
question to Elisa Cristobal Sikat was because the [private
respondents] want her to have a piece of property of her own and is
not an admission that she is their sister.

[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal

as their first witness. She testified that her parents, Buenaventura
Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on March 24, 1919 at
San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Out of the said union,
Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal were born.

The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able
to buy a certain property containing five hundred thirty-five (535)
square meters.

Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20,
1980 leaving his wife Marcelina and children Buenaflor and Norberto,
Jr.

The witness presented marked as Exhibit "33" for Norberto, Exhibit

"34" for Florencio, Exhibit "35" for Eufrosina and Exhibit "36’ for Jose
the birth certificates of her brothers and sisters.

On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an

Extrajudicial Partition (Exhibit "D-4") with her brothers and sisters of
the property left by their parents.

She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and
Anselmo never asserted their alleged right over the property subject
of the present litigation.

She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the
taxes due on the parcel of land and that title to the property has been
subdivided under their respective names.

On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away

they were taken care of by their aunt Martina who was the sister of
her father. She testified that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as "Kaka"
and that since the time they were kids, she had known that the
[petitioners] are their brothers and sisters. 7

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment 8 on 11

July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary
value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts
to laches.

Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals

which, in its Decision 9 dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able
to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru
"other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," but
affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their
share of the subject property because of laches.

Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that:

RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO THE CASE AT BAR RESULTING AS IT
DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WHICH ARE
EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY
SUCH PRINCIPLE 10

The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that

the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the claim
of private respondents that they acquired ownership of the entire
subject property and that the claim of petitioners to the subject
property was barred by laches.

Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original
complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC was denominated as
"Annulment of Title and Damages"; nevertheless, the complaint
prayed for the following:

1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants

NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, EUFROCINA
CRISTOBAL and JOSE CRISTOBAL on February 24, 1948 as null
and void for being fraudulent contrary to law on succession.

2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the

Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal to wit:

(a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL

married to MAURA RUBIO;

(b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL,

married to PAULINA IBANEZ;

(c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL

married to FORTUNATO DELA GUERRA; and

(d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL

married to ADELAIDA IBANEZ and/or TCT No. 3993- ( if TCT No.
165035 was cancelled and in lieu thereof to ISABELITA/MA.
VICTORIA, EMMA, MA. CRISTINA, JOSELITO and NELIA, all
surnamed CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE CRISTOBAL, one of the
defendants.)
3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased
BUENAVENTURA CRISTOBAL according to the law on succession
applicable at the time of his death.

4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as

their lawful portions in the inheritance.

5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the following sums

of money, to wit:

a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages

b. P300,000.00 as moral damages

c. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees

d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages 11

While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves
property rights to a piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in the
complaint reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves
hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to their deceased
father’s estate solely, composed of the subject property.

Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC
is denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages," we find it
practicable to rule on the division of the subject property based on the
rules of succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that
the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling. 12

To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone
assignment of error therein, the following need to be resolved first: (1)
whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or not the petitioners
are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by
the private respondents; (3) whether or not petitioners’ right to
question the Deed of Partition had prescribed; and (4) whether or not
petitioners’ right to recover their share of the subject property is
barred by laches.
Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain
facts have been established. Although it is settled that in the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the
appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 13 Since exceptions (4)
and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.

The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners

with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.

Article 172 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall

be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,"
may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14

In the present case, the baptismal certificates of

Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late Socorro 17 were presented. Baptismal
certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove
filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In
the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she
produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records
of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948
were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified

that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community
where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal
with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to
prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate
child. 19

In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable

to present any proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of
filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal.

The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that

petitioners are, indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal
during the first marriage.

As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property

executed by the private respondents among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, which states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be

published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied)

Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons

involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding
on said persons. 20 In the case at bar, since the estate of the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject
property, the partition thereof by the private respondents already
amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s
estate. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents
shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition
executed by private respondents among themselves in 1948.
Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer and registration of the
subject property in the names of private respondents only in 1994
when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina to choose
between a portion of the subject property or money, as one of the
children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment
on the subject property. 21 This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the
status of the subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to
the subject property had been transferred to the names of private
respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of herself
and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal.
The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura
Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the
subject property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the
execution of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on
them. 22 As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private
respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to
also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect
for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to
challenge the said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense
of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned." In Budlong v. Bondoc, 23 this Court has
interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of
the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of
a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership." 24

Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not
affect the right of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this
Court shall then proceed to divide the subject property between
petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession
prescribes.

It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal
property of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second
wife, as the property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their
marriage. 25 Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in
1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil
Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four
children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject
property in accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation
showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the
subject property shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to
Articles 921 26 and 931 27 of the Old Civil Code on intestate
succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.

At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was

only entitled to the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the
Old Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her

spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased,
shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by
way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who
has not received any betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or
widower shall have the usufruct of the third availment for betterment,
such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the
death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.

Donata’s right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her

death in 1936.

Accordingly, the pro-indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobal’s eight

children and their heirs, by right of representation, upon his death in
1930, are as follows:

(1) Mercedes Cristobal- 66.875 square meters

(2) Amselmo Crostobal- 66.875 square meters

(3) Socorrro Crostobal- 66.875 square meters

(4) Elisa Crostobal-Sikat- 66.875 square meters

(5) Norberto Cristobal-66.875 square meters

(6) Florencio Cristobal-66.875 square meters

(7) Eufrocina Cristobal-66.875 square meters

(8) Jose Cristobal - 66.875 square meters

The Court will now determine whether petitioners’ right to their shares
in the subject property can be barred by laches.

Respondents’ defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the

negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or
passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit. 28

In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case.
Note that upon petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the
subject property had been transferred to the private respondents to
the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of
Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their
barangay to settle the case among themselves and private
respondents, but since no settlement was had, they lodged a
complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul private
respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure
or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply
only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable
to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.

Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not

disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the
rights of an owner. 29 Laches is a creation of equity and its application
is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application
be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering
what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. 30

Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal

participation in the partition of the subject property; (2) this case has
dragged on for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners
sustained injury but the exact amount of which, unfortunately, was not
proved, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal
damages. Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered. 31 Where these are allowed, they are
not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but simply in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such
damages should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained by
the petitioners considering the concept and purpose of said
damages. 32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances
cited and the special reasons extant in the present case; 33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:

(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;

(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the

late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal;

(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is

DECLARED not binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did
not participate in the execution thereof;

(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133,
165134, and No. 165135, in the name of private respondents
consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be partitioned and
distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate
certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of
the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and

(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED

THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by
private respondents.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino with
Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya and Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., concurring.
2
Records, pp. 1-6.
3
Id. at 122.
4
Id. at 121.
5
Id. at 123.
6
Id. at 124.
7
Id. at 314-318.
8
Id. at 312-323.
9
Rollo, pp. 16-24.
10
Id. at 8.
11
Records, p. 5.
12
Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil.
269, 304 (1999).
13
Langkaan Realty Development, Inc v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA
542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, 390
Phil. 1228, 1243 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil.
541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil.
275, 282-283 (1998).
14
Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 12, 32-33 (1998);
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, 26 October
1989, 178 SCRA 684, 689.
15
Records, p. 122.
16
Id. at 121.
17
Id. at 123.
18
Id. at 124.
19
Id. at 315-317.
20
Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, 5 March 2001,
353 SCRA 620, 628.
21
TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.

Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20; Ancog v. Court of

22

Appeals, G.R. No. 1122260, 30 June 1997, 274 SCRA 676.

23
G.R. No. L-27702, 9 September 1977, 79 SCRA 24.
24
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
374 Phil. 859, 866 (1999).
25
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on
24 March 1919.
26
Article 921. In every inheritance the relative nearest in degree
excludes the one more remote, except in cases in which the
right of representation exists.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal portions,

subject to the provisions of Article 949 with respect to
relationship by the whole blood.
27
Article 931. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction of
sex or age, even though they spring from different marriages.
28
Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 122249, 29 January
2004, 421 SCRA 310, 323.
29
Tsai v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 606, 621 (2001); Noel v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59550, 11 January 1995, 240 SCRA
78.

Occeña v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, 4 June 2004, 431

30

SCRA 116, 126.

31
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107518, 8 October 1998, 297 SCRA 402, 426, citing
Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV), G.R. No. L-41093, 30
October 1978, 86 SCRA 59, 65.

China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45985, 18

32

May 1990, 185 SCRA 449, 460.

33
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 31.
5. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia 454 SCRA 541

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised
in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;
[2]
that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be
changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting
the adoption, thus:

“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and

in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and
custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than
enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree
No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same

is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate
child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.

SO ORDERED.”[4]

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted
child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an
adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting
parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname
of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4)
adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right
to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
 First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be
an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the
Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that “the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.”[7]
We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which
he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking
of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and
(2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status
in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

“Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use

the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as ‘Mrs.’

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she
shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using
her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall
be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other
direct male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x”

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

x x x”

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Coderecognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

“Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the
wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the
child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to
him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the
surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the
mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David
but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the
effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the
father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in
the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered
in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by

Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use
their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the
Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on
the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane
added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion.”[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear
the surname of the adopters.”[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle
name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for
the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.
[15]
It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
[16]
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when
thePhilippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”[19] secures these rights
and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24],
Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or
claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in
the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to
both her mother and father. She calls them “Mama” and “Papa”. Indeed, they
are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that

the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it

may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.”[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we
find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s
surname “GARCIA” as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in
the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo at 34-36.
[2]
Annex “C”, id. at 33.
[3]
Annex “F”, id. at 41-43.
[4]
Rollo at 42-43.
[5]
Annex “G”, id. at 44-48.
[6]
Annex “H”, id. at 49.
[7]
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p.
8.
[8]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA
189, citing 38 Am Jur, Name 594-595.
[9]
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing
Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I,
1993 ed., 672.
[10]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
[11]
“Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
 expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”
[12]
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10, 1985,
pp. 16-18.
[13]
Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
[14]
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong,
supra.
[15]
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
[16]
Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4
Valverde, 473.
[17]
Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.
[18]
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United Nation
General Assembly/44/49 (1989).
[19]
“Sec. 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and
support in keeping with the means of the family.”
[20]
Id.
[21]
“Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;”
[22]
Supra.
[23]
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
[24]
“Sec. 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However,
if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.”
[25]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205
SCRA 356, citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
[26]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.
[27]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes,
etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
[28]
Paras, supra, p. 91.