1857281853

America or Europe?
Also by Jeremy Black and published by UCL Press

European warfare, 1660–1815
America or Europe?
British foreign policy,
1739–63
Jeremy Black
University of Exeter
© Jeremy Black, 1998
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.

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First published in 1998 by UCL Press
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Contents
Preface vii
Abbreviations ix
Maps xi
1 Introduction 1
2 International developments 8
3 Britain and the War of the Austrian Succession 29
4 Anglo-French relations, 1740–56 45
5 The crown and Hanover 81
6 Parliament 104
7 Diplomats and ministers 131
8 Pitt and moves towards new strategies,
1755–63 144
9 Defence, foreign policy and strategy 164
10 Conclusion: Europe or America? 175
Notes 185
Index 213
v
For
Bill Gibson, Robert Harris
and Murray Pittock
Preface
I began working on a sequel to my British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole

(Edinburgh, 1985) soon after it was published. The book has been
longdelayed, however, because of the complexity of the period, the range of
sources I had to consult, and my own interest in other projects. I am most
grateful to Steven Gerrard for his patience. The passage of time has made the
book more topical. This reflects both greater historical interest in the
development of Britain’s imperial power and also modern awareness of the
importance, complexity and contentious nature of foreign policy and
international relations. I am most grateful to the British Academy and the
University of Durham for their support of the research on which much of
this book is based, to Merton College, Oxford, for electing me to a visiting
fellowship in 1986, enabling me to read relevant pamphlet material in the
Bodleian Library, to the Huntington Library for appointing me to a visiting
fellowship in 1988, which permitted me to work in relevant collections,
including Grenville, Loudoun and Montagu papers, and to the Beinecke
Library for giving me a visiting fellowship in 1991, which enabled me to
work on the Weston papers at Farmington. I am most grateful to Her Majesty
the Queen for permission to work on the Cumberland and Stuart papers in
the Royal Archives, to the late Duke of Northumberland for permission to
work on the Alnwick papers, the Marquess of Bute for permission to work
on the papers of the 3rd Earl, to the late Earl Waldegrave for permission to
work on the papers of the 1st Earl, to the Earl of Malmesbury for permission
to work on the papers of James Harris, to Lady Lucas for permission to work
on the Lucas papers in Bedfordshire Record Office, to John Weston-
Underwood for permission to work on the papers of Edward Weston, to the
Trustees of the Bedford Estate for permission to work on the papers of the
4th Duke, and to Robert Smith for granting me early access to the Bowood
and Wolterton collections after their deposit in the British Library. I am very
grateful to two anonymous readers for their reports and to Wendy Duery for
vii
PREFACE
her secretarial support. I have benefited from the opportunity to advance

some of the ideas in this work in lectures at the University of Cambridge and
the Institute of Historical Research. This book is dedicated to three other
eighteenth-century specialists whose scholarship I greatly respect and whose
friendship I value.
viii
Abbreviations
Add. Additional Manuscripts

AE Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris
AN Archives Nationales, Paris
Ang. Angleterre
AST, LM, Ing. Turin, Archivio di Stato di Torino, Lettere Ministri,
Inghilterra
Aylesbury Buckinghamshire Record Office, Aylesbury
Bayr. Ges. Bayerische Gesandtschaften
BL British Library, London
Bod. Bodleian Library, Oxford
Bowood Papers of the 1st Marquess of Lansdowne, originally
held in Bowood
BVC Bibliotheque Victor Cousin, Paris
Chewton Waldegrave Papers, papers of James, 1st Earl
Waldegrave, Chewton Hall, Chewton Mendip
Cobbett W.Cobbett (ed.), Parliamentary History of England
[36 volumes] (London, 1806–20)
CP Correspondance Politique
CRO County Record Office
Cumb. P. Cumberland Papers
Dresden Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Kabinett, Gesandtschaften,
Dresden
Eg. Egerton manuscripts
EHR English Historical Review
EK Englische Korrespondenz
Farmington Lewis Walpole Library, Farmington, Connecticut
HHStA Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilung, Vienna
HL Huntington Library, San Marino, California
HP History of Parliament Transcripts, London
ix
ABBREVIATIONS
KS Kastan Schwarz
Leeds, Vyner Vyner MSS., Archive Office, Leeds
Marburg Staatsarchiv, Bestand 4: Politische Akten nach Philipp
d. Gr., Marburg
MD Mémoires et Documents
Munich Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich
NeC Clumber Papers, University Library, Nottingham
NLS National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
NSTA Niedersachsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Hanover
Pol. Corr. R.Koser (ed.), Politische Conespondenz Friedrichs des
Grossen [46 volumes] (Berlin, 1879–1939)
PRO, SP Public Record Office, State Papers, London
RA Royal Archives, Windsor Castle
SRO Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh
sup. supplément
Trevor Trevor Papers
WW Wentworth Woodhouse MSS., Archives, Sheffield
Note on dates
All dates given are new style aside from those indicated as old style by (os).
Old style dates were eleven days behind.
x
Chapter One
Introduction
For several decades the study of international relations has not been at the
centre of historical inquiry, the position it once enjoyed, or, as in Britain,
shared with constitutional history. As a consequence, the perspectives that the
study of foreign policy can offer to those interested in other aspects of political
history have been generally neglected, while the scholarship, suppositions and
received wisdom of the great age of the subject, 1870–1930, are reiterated with
little refinement. Whereas once every scholar of eighteenth-century Europe
had a view on the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, now few, if any,
know them and students are referred to the musty pages of Sir Richard
Lodge’s epic of erudition, though not insight. The foreign policy of the period
is seen largely in terms of tedious and inconsequential diplomacy, while
interest in international relations has been replaced with social, economic and
cultural concerns. Britain, particularly England, is generally regarded as a
“polite and commercial” society, not a bellicose one, and the ties that bound
her to the Continent are neglected in line with the common tendency to treat
her as distinct, a country separated from Europe by more than the dictates of
syllabuses, those mute sustainers of outdated intellectual baggage.
And yet, foreign policy was crucially important in the eighteenth century,
especially in its middle decades. Between 1739 and 1763 Britain was involved
in two major wars. In 1739 British ministers had gone to war with Spain
unwillingly, fearing that Spain’s ally France would intervene to decisive effect
and that Britain would be exposed to defeat and possibly invasion on behalf of
“James III”, the Stuart claimant to the throne. Western Europe appeared to be
dominated by France, and Britain was widely seen as unstable, or, at least, an
undesirable alliance partner. The Champion, an influential London opposition
newspaper, railed at British impotence in 1741:
When I compare our present deplorable plight with the august figure we
made in the last general war [War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–13] —
1
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1739–63
When I look back and see France, so lately at our mercy, a miserable
suppliant, and now behold her enthroned among the stars, with almost all
the princes of Europe kneeling at her footstool. When I behold Great
Britain, on the other hand, who was then a queen among the nations,
with fortune, victory, and empire in her train, when I behold her, now
without interest, without importance, without allies…scarce the shadow
of what once she was, I am tempted to think our triumphs were
imaginary, our glory a dream, and our very power itself but a castle in the
clouds, which melted with the first breeze that blew… The universal
monarchy we have so long dreaded, thanks to our own supineness, is
nearer being accomplished than ever.
And yet, by 1763, France and Spain had been defeated in European waters
and in the colonies. Jacobitism had been crushed and French attempts to
exploit it had been unsuccessful. The naval struggle between Britain and the
Bourbons had been settled twice, in 1747 and 1759, in successive wars, in
favour of the former. Britannia really did rule the waves. Thanks to this naval
success, Bourbon colonies had been vulnerable to attack, forced to rely for
their defence on British logistical problems and the strong grasp of silent
diseases, such as malaria and yellow fever, rather than on reinforcements from
Europe. British gains in the War of Jenkins’ Ear with Spain, which had begun
in 1739 and broadened out in 1743, when fighting began between Britain
and Spain’s ally France, into an aspect of the multi-faceted War of the
Austrian Succession (1740–48), had been modest: Porto Bello, an important
port on the Caribbean shore of the Isthmus of Panama, had been seized
temporarily from Spain in 1739; Louisbourg, the fortress guarding the mouth
of the St Lawrence, had been captured from France in 1745 and retained for
the rest of the war. And yet these acquisitions had demonstrated that,
although the commitment of British forces to conflict on the Continent with
France could be as unsuccessful and costly as domestic critics claimed, it was
nevertheless possible to use British naval strength in order to make a decisive
contribution to the trans-oceanic struggle for mastery. This had not been the
case in previous British conflicts with France (1689–97, 1702–13) and Spain
(1718–20).
The following war was for Britain the inappropriately named Seven Years’
War (1756–63): fighting with the French in North America in fact began in
1754, while hostilities with Spain did not commence until 1762. In the
conflict, British naval power could not save the British-ruled Mediterranean
island of Minorca from French capture in 1756, but it was decisive elsewhere.
French plans to invade Britain were smashed in naval defeat in 1759, while
maritime hegemony enabled British amphibious forces to shatter French
power in Canada, the West Indies and West Africa. In the brief war with Spain,
Havana and Manila, the two major island centres of the Spanish overseas
empire, were both captured, while a seaborne British army saved Portugal,
2
INTRODUCTION
Britain’s vulnerable but economically crucial ally, from being overrun by Spain
in 1762. At the close of the war, Britain had avoided subordination to France
and had defeated her in the maritime and colonial struggle. Britain was the
major European power in both India and North America, the most powerful
European state on the world scale.
The causes and consequences of these events are contentious and involve
complex questions about both the nature and capabilities of the British state
relative to other powers, and developments in international relations. As such
they indicate the multifaceted nature of the study of foreign policy, its position
at the crux of a number of crucial and interrelated questions. Among those that
will be examined in this book are how far and why did Britain become
increasingly concer ned with colonial questions and how far this
complemented or clashed with issues of continental diplomacy and national
secur-ity and, in wartime, with a distinct Euro-centric strategy? In short, in
peace and war was it a question of Europe or America, or Europe and
America?
Secondly, what were the most influential pressures and ideas in the
formulation and execution of foreign policy and how far did they alter during
this period? These questions obviously raise important points about the nature
of the British government and state, and the functioning of the political
community in this period. How were different ideas and pressures reconciled?
Did they clash, and, if so, why, to what effect and with what changes through
time? How far did political practice accord with constitutional theory? How
influential was the public discussion over foreign policy and what light can a
consideration of public opinion throw on the openness of government to
external ideas? What did public opinion mean?
Foreign policy is a crucial sphere for the discussion of these and other
questions, not only because it was important but because it was believed to
be so. Foreign policy was a sphere in which monarchs and ministers had both
considerable interest and ideas of their own and, in so far as this led to clashes
over policy, it provides an opportunity for assessing the nature of power and
influence within the political community. However, views were far from
static, and the causes and impact of changes in ideas concerning foreign
policy are themselves important questions. This is especially so in considering
the extent to which, first, views within Britain were based on a shrewd
assessment of the situation abroad, and, secondly, the extent to which the
extent and nature of changes on the Continent were appreciated. The
relationship between foreign and domestic problems and pressures was a
dynamic one. The extent to which there was an informed debate within
Britain requires examination, as does its relationship with ministerial and
partisan politics, but so does the whole question of the development and
influence of a “Patriotic” discourse in the field of foreign policy. This is
related to wider questions of the nature and growth of nationalism and the
impact of xenophobia. Rule Br itannia was political slogan as much as
3
patriotic exhortation. Foreigners kicked into the filthy gutters of London

were aware of the vigour of British xenophobia.
Xenophobia did not win wars. The third issue that must be faced is why
Britain won her struggle with France. Political, governmental and financial
considerations are clearly central, but so also were diplomatic and strategic
issues. The two powers were not alone in the international “system”, and the
relationship between British foreign policy and the Anglo-French struggle
needs to be stressed. It is related to the fourth question, namely, why hostilities
began between the two powers. If Britain is assumed to have been on an
inevitable course for maritime hegemony, a power fuelled by commercial
growth and bellicose nationalism, then this question might appear unnecessary,
as indeed is any serious discussion of foreign policy, for the course, if not the
timing of conflict with the Bourbons, seems clear. In short, Britain and France
were bound to be adversaries in both peace and war in a struggle inspired by
mercantilist goals.
However, any serious examination of the period reveals the central role of
policy options and gover nmental choice. Ministr ies might appear
inconsequential: Britain and Spain began war in 1739, Britain and France
fought from 1754, although, in both cases, most of their ministers sought the
continuation of peace. This has to be discussed in the context of the origins of
eighteenth-century wars and, more generally, in light of the nature of the
international relations of the period. Here, a stress on system and predictability
appears inappropriate, and, instead, the insecure and often kaleidoscopic nature
of diplomatic alignments can be related to the insecure and frequently volatile
character of court policies. The extent to which British policy should be seen
in this light requires examination and raises the contentious question of
parallels and contrasts between Britain and the Continent and the related,
largely overlooked, issue of convergence or divergence. Given the importance
of foreign policy to all the states of the period, this question can be raised
profitably and discussed in terms of both the formulation of policy and its
execution.
Both Br itish politics and European international relations changed
substantially in this period. Britain witnessed the triumph of stability in the
1740s, a decisive decade in which the Whig “Old Corps” survived both
unpopularity and the toppling of its leading political figure, Sir Robert
Walpole, while a modus vivendi between monarch and ministers was successfully
sketched out and Jacobitism was crushed. After the turmoil of the 1741 general
election and the subsequent fall of Walpole in 1742, the Whigs triumphed in
the elections of 1747 and 1754, and, although Jacobite intrigues continued, the
ministerial crisis of 1754–7 did not raise fundamental questions of political
stability.
On the Continent the period witnessed the Austro-French “Diplomatic
Revolution” of 1756, a diplomatic realignment whose importance has been
somewhat exaggerated, and, conversely, in the earlier War of the Austrian
4
INTRODUCTION
Succession, an attempt to recast the territorial situation in central Europe

fundamentally by partitioning the Austrian dominions. The significance of both
the attempt and its failure has been somewhat overlooked. Britain’s role in
both the War of the Austrian Succession and the “Diplomatic Revolution”
requires re-examination, not least in order to prevent too insular an
interpretation of the development of her foreign policy. The last is a danger if
attention is centred on colonial struggle and the discourse of patriotism.
Instead, it is appropriate today to consider the nature of change in a past
multipolar international “system” dominated by rivalry.
The study of mid-eighteenth-century British foreign policy therefore offers
a number of perspectives. They are held together by the issue of the political
relationships between the government of Britain and that of other states (an
abstraction that frequently dissolves under scrutiny into the often arbitrary and
changeable views of unpredictable monarchs), and the factors that influenced
these relationships. It is surprisingly difficult to establish these. The sense that
somehow diplomatic history must have been “done” in the past, that a
complete and comprehensive nar rative exists that simply requires
reexamination in light of the priorities of succeeding generations, is misplaced.
The sequence of events is often unclear, let alone their cause. Although some
subjects have been studied in detail, many were not and much is still obscure.
For example, Britain’s continental policies in the last years of Walpole’s
ministry require examination, and there is no decent study of either Lord
Carteret, who effectively directed foreign policy in 1742–4, or his foreign
policy. The question of George II’s role during the War of the Austrian
Succession underlines the pressing need for a scholarly biography of the king.
British policy towards Italy and in the confused Baltic politics of the mid-
1740s, the tenuous but significant contacts between Britain and France in
1742–6 and the abortive Anglo-Spanish discussions after the death of Philip V
in 1746 are all lacking in clarity.
In the postwar period (1748–54), the Imperial Election Scheme and Anglo-
French colonial disputes have been studied in detail, but they have not been set
within the context of a comprehensive study of British policy, of which
important aspects, such as Britain’s role in the Baltic crisis of 1747–51, remain
unclear. The outbreak of war with France and Britain’s continental diplomacy
in 1755–6 have been extensively studied, as have been Anglo-Prussian relations
during the Seven Years’ War, but the seriousness of the crisis in British foreign
policy of 1756–7 has been generally underrated and the policies and attitudes
of George III and the Bute ministry (1762–3) not placed in the context of a
long-lasting debate over Britain’s continental policy.
If particular aspects of policy remain obscure, the same is also true of much
of the public debate. There is need for more detailed attention to the content,
development and impact of Tory and “Patr iot” views and for study of
parliamentary debates. However, as with politics and government more
generally in this period, there are significant problems with the surviving
5
sources. First, the “official” sources, the diplomatic and other governmental
correspondence, are concerned rather with the execution of policy than its
formulation. Diplomatic instructions are often infrequent, elliptical or bland,
and conciliar records are relatively rare and generally provide little indication
of the discussion that took place. There is no equivalent of the French Mémoires
et Documents series in the records of British foreign policy. In a small political
society, in which government took place in the context of the royal court and
its ethos and methods, policy was frequently decided orally, not by an exchange
of memoranda.
Secondly, the surviving records of individual ministers and other politicians
are very patchy. Wary of governmental interception of the post, politicians in
opposition preferred to rely on face-to-face discussion, which, anyway, was the
obvious medium for everyone during the parliamentary session, the most
sustained period of political activity, when everyone who counted was in
London. The preservation of the papers of those who held important office is
patchy. If it is very extensive for Newcastle, Holdernesse and Hardwicke, this is
not the case for Carteret and, still more, Harrington, a long-serving Secretary
of State. Very little correspondence survives for George II, a man who
preferred hunting and reviewing soldiers to writing memoranda.
The nature of the surviving evidence ensures that in many cases the scholar
should advance his or her views with caution. To be definite is often to base
too much on a small selection of sources and to overlook their limited value, if
not ambiguity. Any assessment of cause and influence is necessarily indefinite, a
central part of the educational value of history. This study will reveal that
approaching the major questions from a number of perspectives can lead to
subtly differing conclusions. That is scarcely surpr ising. Contemporary
commentators were divided in their analyses, they were not fools, and it is
inappropriate for the historian to assert certainties. They are certainly not a
reflection of the surviving sources.
The crucial questions are approached more than once in this text, precisely
because they yield different interpretations in particular contexts. This explains
the structure of the book. A series of chapters that are organized in a
chronological fashion are followed by several organized around themes, before
another chapter moves on to consider the somewhat different situation during
the closing conflict of the period. The advantage of adopting this approach is
that it ensures that what may appear clear-cut from one angle, for example the
role of Parliament, is revealed as more complex, and sometimes therefore more
important or a more fruitful way of approaching the subject.
The structure of the work also seeks to suggest another variety of approach.
The book is designed to be read as a whole and it is best to do so, but it is also
organized so that those wishing to approach particular topics or periods can do so
without having to read the remainder of the work. This approach, followed also in
British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole, may make the book appear as a series of
essays, but it reflects the manner in which books frequently are read or used.
6
INTRODUCTION
The structure of a book guides its readers; the terms employed by historians
also necessarily influence them. The use of national units, such as France or
Spain, or of institutional groups, such as the French government, entail
implications of consistency, stability and unity that are misleading. Similarly, the
language of growth and decline suggests a rhythmic, even predictable, flow of
affairs. “Policy” suggests consistency, “decisions” choice. The use of such
phrases as aggressive or expansionist also imply judgements that have not
always been demonstrated. It is simple to state these points, less easy to suggest
how they should be confronted. To discuss, each time policy or decisions are
referred to, the nature of the group that took the decision is not possible in any
project that seeks to range widely. Vocabulary is limited, no word without
connotations. Inevitably the old phrases and words recur. Nevertheless, when
they do so, it is necessary to remain on guard against the implications that too
easily flow. In addition, periodization always involves difficulties. Historical
figures do not all conveniently die or discern new problems and opportunities
or respond to a new context at the same moment. The balance of change and
continuity that all were aware of is difficult to delimit.
7
Chapter Two
International developments
…he who will judge rightly of the conduct of affairs, must not judge of
this or that particular part alone, but must consider the general principle
on which our conduct proceeds, what the effects of it have been and
will be.
—Viscount Bolingbroke, former Secretary of State, 17361
…the Parties are so jumbled together, and the one rule, which is left to
judge by I mean that of interest, is become so perplexed and doubtful,
that I should be sorry to be obliged to give my opinion where we ought
to be.
—Edward Weston, former Under Secretary, 17482
Politics must change with the situation of things…

—Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Northern
Department, and effectively British Foreign Minister, 17493
A brief account of international relations and the course of British foreign

policy is an essential preliminary to any analysis of this policy. British policy has
to be understood in the context of the wider developments that provided
challenges and opportunities. It is also appropriate to judge the relevance and
success of policy in this context, although, equally, it is crucial not to lose sight
of the domestic context and the resulting requirements and expectations upon
policy.
However, brevity can be misleading, especially given the complexity of
developments in this period. The danger of any summary is the tendency to
create a schematic impression. Major events, or rather those that appear full
of importance and consequence in hindsight, necessar ily provide the
chronological structure of such a summary, dictate the emphases and thus
appear to occur as a result of preceding such events. Issues and developments
8
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
that greatly concerned contemporaries, for example, in 1736–40 the Jülich-

Berg question or in 1749–50 Russo-Swedish relations, are omitted or
understated because they did not appear to have direct consequences, or at
least those anticipated at the time. Even those that were important in their
consequences, for example, the “diplomatic revolution” of 1752, the
settlement of differences between Ferdinand VI of Spain and Maria Theresa
of Austria, are slighted because the standard schematic interpretation places
more weight on other developments, in this case the more f amous
“Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756, the new Austro-French alignment. Yet the
settlement of Austro-Spanish differences was an important prelude to the
improvement of Austro-French relations. It was also to be important to
Britain, ensuring that the divisiveness that had provided her with a major
entrée into the politics of Souther n Europe, and also provided an
opportunity for securing the alliance of Austria or Spain, was no more.
Furthermore, a shortage of space and a desire for clarity and explanation
produce an emphasis on order and policy, causes and results, as opposed to
disorder and confusion. This is matched by the tendency to simplify
decisionmaking processes and to see policies as arising directly from pressures.
The ambiguity of influence is replaced by the need and desire to attribute
cause briefly. Policy, the government, mercantile influence, Parliament, the
aristocracy, the court, the army, are all presented as clear and distinct activities,
influences and bodies whose conscious interaction determined events, for
example, the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739.
Moreover, there is a strong tendency to simplify, consolidate and reify
attitudes or ideas, whether, in the case of Britain, assumptions that can be
described as isolationist or interventionist, “blue water” or continental, or,
more generally, moods and policies, ranging from aggressive to pro-Prussian.
Chronological shifts in emphasis are often neglected. The whole problem
culminates in the understandable use of countries or monarchs as a shorthand
term for complex processes of decision-making. There is comparable stylistic
pressure to prefer the staccatos of active assertion to the more balanced
equivocations of subordinate clauses and the passive tense.
All these drawbacks can be found in the following survey. The statements
made could be clarified and qualified at length, just as individual footnotes
could easily stretch to page length. The survey should therefore be seen as a
short introduction, some aspects of which will be discussed subsequently, that
serves to present the protagonists and to offer only the briefest of accounts of
their motives and policies. Brevity makes this introduction excessively
mechanistic, and, at all times, it is necessary to appreciate the fluidity of
“policies”, the existence of debate and dissension and the prevalence of choice
in uncertainty rather than system and predictability.
In the period 1683–1789 there were three decisive confrontations in
European international relations. The first was the defeat of the Turks in 1683–
99, a defeat that was consolidated by Austrian victories in the war of 1716–18.
9
Though the Turks were not driven from the Balkans, as was hoped, their defeat
at Vienna (1683) and their subsequent loss of the kingdom of Hungary marked
a dramatic alteration in the European relationship between Christendom and
Islam, one that subsequent Austrian failures in 1737–9 and 1788 were not to
reverse. The second decisive confrontation was between Peter I of Russia and
his enemies in the Great Northern War (1700–21). Peter not only decisively
defeated Charles XII of Sweden and conquered the eastern Baltic provinces of
the Swedish empire, but he also both destroyed the Swedo-Polish-Ukrainian-
Tatar alliance that Charles had sought to create in 1707–9, and repelled in
1719–20 an Anglo-French attempt to organize a European coalition that would
force him to return his Swedish conquests. Challenged unsuccessfully by
Sweden in 1741–2, the effect of Peter’s triumph was farreaching. The buffers
between Russia and the German states had been fatally weakened, and Russia
was thereafter to dominate eastern Europe until confronted by western or
central European powers. Economically directly linked to the west through
Peter’s Baltic conquests, such as Reval and Riga, Russia developed
considerably in ways that would have surprised Peter’s predecessors.
The third decisive confrontation was more drawn out. It was between
Britain and France, and, though it involved both conflict and rivalry in Europe,
not least in the British Isles, through France’s sponsorship of the Jacobites, its
most decisive consequences were in the colonial and maritime sphere. In 1740
Britain and France were both important colonial and maritime powers, though
neither ruled the extent of territory or number of people that Spain possessed.
By 1815 Britain was clearly the leading European commercial, colonial and
maritime power. Her success owed much to the course of the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic wars (1792–1815): the successes of British naval power, the
pressure of French commitments and demands, and vulnerability to Britain
that the conflicts placed on Spain, the United Provinces and Denmark, and the
longevity of the wars that allowed Britain to mount numerous amphibious
operations once the maritime structure of the French empire had been
destroyed.
However, British predominance had already been clearly established in the
period covered by this book, especially during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63).
This maritime predominance was reflected in Britain’s conquests during the
conflict, the position of strength from which she negotiated and the ability of
her naval power to intimidate France and Spain in the immediate postwar
years. This success was to be challenged dur ing the War of Amer ican
Independence (1775–83), though the effectiveness of the maritime threat
posed then by the Bourbons (France and Spain) has generally been
exaggerated. The situation in 1778–9 was definitely one of the Bourbons
challenging Britain and seeking to take advantage of her American difficulties.
It was not initially a conflict between powers in an equal position, and, for the
Bourbons, success was to be measured in forcing Britain to return past gains, an
aspiration reflected in the determination of Vergennes, the French foreign
10
minister, that the Peace of Paris of 1763 should not serve as the basis of the
eventual negotiations.
The period 1739–63 saw two major wars in the European world, and
Britain played a major role in both.4 The conflicts are generally known as the
War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War, and the dates usually
given are 1740–48 and 1756–63, but these titles and dates suggest a false
coherence, a deceptively united European international “system”. Britain, for
example, went to war with Spain in 1739–the War of Jenkins’ Ear—but did not
begin hostilities with France until 1743.
The War of the Austrian Succession takes its name from the struggle over
the Habsburg inheritance that followed the death of Emperor Charles VI on
20 October 1740, and the succession of his elder daughter, Maria Theresa.
The Habsburgs ruled a number of territories that are collectively, though
somewhat inaccurately, referred to as Austria. They included most of modern
Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Silesia (modern south-west Poland),
Transylvania (north-west Rumania), Slovenia, Croatia, the Austr ian
Netherlands (Belgium and Luxemburg), the Duchies of Milan, Mantua,
Parma and Piacenza in northern Italy and a number of small territories in
south-west Germany.
In addition, since 1438 the elected position of Holy Roman Emperor had
been held by a Habsburg. By the early eighteenth century this post was a
source of prestige and a measure of judicial authority rather than of power in
the Empire (essentially modern Germany and Austria), but, as it was held by
men, its fate became uncertain with the death of Charles, for he left two
daughters but no sons. In 1713 Charles had promulgated the Pragmatic
Sanction, by which he stipulated the indivisibility of his inheritance, the
reversion to female in the absence of male descendants and the succession of
his children rather than Maria Josepha and Maria Amalia, the daughters of his
elder brother and predecessor Joseph I.Maria Josepha married the heir to a
leading German ruler, the Elector of Saxony, the future Augustus III of
Saxony-Poland in 1719, and Maria Amalia married Charles Albert, the heir to
another, the Elector of Bavaria, in 1722. Though Charles ensured that the
marriages were accompanied by solemn renunciations of all claims to the
succession, Augustus and Charles, who succeeded in 1733 and 1726
respectively, were eager to press claims. Maria Theresa married Duke Francis of
Lorraine, who in 1737 became Grand Duke of Tuscany, a consolation for the
loss of Lorraine to the father-in-law of Louis XV of France.
They were not alone in casting eyes on the Habsburg inheritance. Charles
Emmanuel III, king of Sardinia (1730–73), and ruler of Savoy and Piedmont as
well as that island, sought gains at the expense of the Milanese and of the
republic of Genoa, an Austrian ally. Philip V of Spain (1700–46) wanted
Austrian Italy, including the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, for his sons by his second
marriage to the Parmesan princess Elisabeth Farnese. The eldest son, Don
Carlos, had in 1734, during the War of the Polish Succession, conquered the
11
kingdom of Naples from the Austrians, but the second son, Don Philip, was still
unprovided for.
Ger man, Italian and Spanish ambitions had to wait for a suitable
opportunity. That was provided not so much by the death of Charles VI but by
the willingness of France to abandon the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction
she had accepted in 1738 as part of the Third Treaty of Vienna, and thus to
destroy the entente between France and Austria that had followed their conflict
in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5). Initially the pacific octogenarian
Cardinal Fleury, who had been first minister to his former charge Louis XV of
France (1715–74) since 1726, had intended simply to deny the Imperial
election to Francis, rather than to support claims on the Habsburg succession.
Edward Finch, the British envoy to Russia, observed that “the fate of Europe
may greatly depend on his faith or ambition” and “that guarantys like young
beauties with small blemishes in their character have now a fine opportunity to
reestablish their reputation”. It was and is unclear whether Fleury would have
died as the peacemaker who goes to see God, as Finch wondered,5 because the
unexpected invasion of Silesia on 16 December 1740 by Frederick II (the
Great, 1740–86), the young new ruler of Prussia, dramatically altered the
situation by substituting action for negotiation and by forcing other powers,
including France and Britain, to define their position.6
The state known as Prussia stretched from the Rhine to the Niemen. It
included Brandenburg, one of the eight Electorates of the Holy Roman
Empire, with its capital at Berlin; the actual kingdom of Prussia, otherwise
known as ducal or East Prussia, with its capital at Königsberg; most of
Pomerania; the Hohenzollern share of the Jülich-Cleve succession: the
Rhenish Duchy of Cleve and the counties of Mark and Ravensberg; and a
number of Westphalian territories, including the secularized prince-bishopric
of Minden. Under Frederick William I (1713–40), the army had risen to
80,000, the second biggest, after that of Austria, of any German state. The state
was internally stable and the nobility were accustomed to the idea of state
service, especially in the army.
However, although the growth of Prussian power had been a marked feature
of the previous century, Prussia was not unique in this respect. Austrian
Habsburg territorial expansion had been considerable; it centred on Italy and
Hungary. Russian power expanded east, south and, crucially for Europe, west.
The efforts of Tsar Alexis in the Thirteen Years’ War (1654–67) to gain a Baltic
coastline by driving the Swedes from Livonia and to dominate Poland had
been thwarted by both powers, but they had been overcome by Alexis’s son,
Peter I, the Great (1682–1725) in the Great Northern War (1700–21).
Thereafter, Prussian rulers were uneasily conscious of Russian strength, and
those who wished to put pressure on Prussia, for example George II in 1733–
4, turned to Russia.7
Austria and Russia had been allied since 1726, but the Tsarina Anna (1730–
40) died three days before her ally Charles VI, to be succeeded by her great-
12
nephew, the two-month-old Ivan VI (1740–1), and a weak and divided regency.
When Guy Dickens, the British envoy in Berlin, stressed Prussian vulnerability
in February 1741 and thus the need for caution, Frederick replied that he was
certain of Russia and therefore not worried about his other frontiers,8 which
included that with Hanover. Frederick’s invasion of Silesia, on parts of which
there was a long-standing Hohenzollern claim, was successful. However, initial
attempts to force Maria Theresa to accept territorial losses failed, despite
British pressure on Austria to end the conflict by making concessions to Prussia
before other powers, principally France, took the opportunity to attack.
As a result, Frederick signed the Treaty of Breslau with France on 5 June
1741, renouncing his claim to Jülich-Berg (the succession to which by the
Wittelsbach claimant was supported by France) and agreeing to support
Charles Albert of Bavaria in the Imperial election. In return the French
guaranteed Prussian possession of Lower Silesia, and promised military
assistance for Bavaria and diplomatic pressure on her ally Sweden to attack
Russia. The Swedes did so in July 1741. On 15 August 1741, French troops
began to cross the Rhine. In addition, France and Frederick successfully
encouraged other powers to join the attack on Maria Theresa. A grand strategy,
both military and diplomatic, was being put in place. A French advance towards
Hanover forced George II to abandon his attempt to create an opposing
coalition, and on 25 September 1741 he was obliged to promise neutrality and
his support for Charles Albert as Emperor.
The designation of the conflict as the War of the Austrian Succession
therefore appears well founded, although the initial attempt to reconfigure
much of central Europe was unsuccessful. In late 1741 the Austrian empire
appeared close to dissolution, Linz falling on 14 September, Prague on 26
November. There seemed to be only one issue in international relations: the
redrawing of the map of the Empire in order to destroy the chance of any
revival of the Anglo-Dutch Austrian alliances of 1689–97 and 1702–13 and
thus to give France diplomatic hegemony. In October 1741, Sir Charles Wager,
the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote angrily of the German princes, “what
destruction is coming upon them; if they tamely submit to be pissed upon by
an insolent nation; to whom they are superior in all things, could they but join
together”.9 With French backing, Charles Albert of Bavaria was crowned at
Frankfurt as the Emperor Charles VII on 12 February 1742.
However, the possibility of achieving decisive victory had been exaggerated,
while Austr ian military resilience had been underrated. The Austr ians
recaptured Linz in late January 1742, seized Munich on 12 February and in
July began to besiege Prague, which the French abandoned on 16 December.
Arthur Villettes, British envoy in Turin, had complained on Christmas Day
1741 that “the general system of politics at present reaches no farther with
most princes, than to come in for a share of the spoil”,10 but, by the following
year, it was no longer clear who would be able to allocate gains.
As alliances dissolved, the war became less focused. From 1742 the war was
13
more clearly a number of confrontations and conflicts, with different causes,

chronologies and consequences, interacting to a considerable extent but far less
than was hoped by those who sought to benefit from such interaction. Louis
XV was abandoned by some of his allies, Frederick II in June 1742, Augustus
III in July 1742, Sweden in August 1743, and the new Elector of Bavaria,
Maximilian Joseph, in April 1745, although Frederick attacked Austria again in
the Second Silesian War (August 1744–December 1745). Spain fought on
alongside France, but other powers came to the assistance of Maria Theresa.
British troops landed in the Austrian Netherlands on 20 May 1742, and both
marched into the Empire and began fighting with the French in 1743,
although war was not declared until the following year. In order to fight
France, the British government effectively abandoned the pursuit of the
conflict with Spain over Caribbean trade, the War of Jenkins’ Ear, that they had
begun in 1739.
Under the pressure of rapidly altering diplomatic and military situations,
rulers and ministers changed their policies or emphasized different aspects and
approaches. This was not simply a necessity for the weaker powers, forced to
respond to developments that it was difficult to control. Indeed, Frederick II
complained in October 1745 that so many unexpected events occurred that he
could not judge anything with certainty. Andrew Mitchell, British envoy in
Berlin, wrote to a fellow diplomat in 1763 “I think in great affairs and between
great princes, whilst anything remains unsettled, nothing can be said to be
done”.11 A lack of consistency was also apparent at the level of the strongest
powers. Despite the tendency among foreign commentators to misunderstand
Russian policy as largely a matter of responses to financial inducements and to
act accordingly, it was far from constant. It is easy to appreciate why a scholar
of Russian policy wrote, more generally, of Europe in this period that
the conduct of diplomacy between battles is a phantasmagoric frenzy of

confusion. It poses the ser ious problem of separating traditional
objectives from expedient bargains, and cleaving doctrine concepts from
empirical moves…entering the pirouette spirit prevailing in most cabinet
councils, one finds it exceedingly inappropriate to render those dogmatic
statements on such terms as inevitable partnerships, long-time historical
trends and immutable drives.12
Nevertheless, although there is much that is still unclear, and modern research
had cast new light, for example, on Austro-French negotiations during the
war,13 it would be inappropriate to see only confusion. Instead, an inability to
achieve and secure objectives was the dominant theme, an understandable
consequence of the multipolar nature of international relations and the
difficulty of achieving decisive victory. A window of opportunity for a major
shift had been lost in late 1741. British mediation helped to produce the secret
Austro-Prussian Convention of Kleinschnellendorf, by which the ground was
14
laid for a separate peace. Though Frederick’s path thence to the Austro-
Prussian Peace of Breslau of 11 June 1742, by which he gained most of Silesia,
was far from straight, his betrayal of France fatally weakened her cause. The
Bavarian envoy in Paris complained that Frederick, in violating everything that
had been established to ensure the fulfilment of their promises, had disgraced
mankind.14 The successful Russian invasion of Swedish-ruled Finland in 1742
and the determination of the new British ministry led by Lord Carteret to
support Austria were also important.
However, it was not only French plans that were thwarted. The prospect that
Austria would follow up her successes in 1742–3 by dominating the Empire
and seeking to regain Silesia was ended when Frederick defeated her again in
the Second Silesian War (1744–5) and forced Maria Theresa once more to
recognize the loss of Silesia in the Treaty of Dresden (25 December 1745).
Similarly, British hopes that they would be able to follow up the landing of
troops in the Austrian Netherlands in 1742 and the victory of Dettingen over
the French the following year by decisively pushing back France’s eastern
frontier, possibly forcing her to accept the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, thus
reversing the gains of nearly a century, proved illusory. French schemes for a
retaliatory invasion of Britain in support of the Jacobite (Stuart) claimant to
the throne, both in early 1744 and in the winter of 1745–6, were thwarted by
poor weather and the British navy respectively, while the Jacobite rising of
1745 was defeated the following year at Culloden. With Francis of Lorraine’s
election as Emperor in 1745, the Austro-Bavarian Treaty of Füssen and the
Treaty of Dresden, hostilities largely ceased in Germany.
The war in Italy was far from static, although the ambitious plans of both
sides, including the Austrian attempt to drive Carlos from Naples and the
Spanish plan to conquer Milan, Parma and Piacenza for Don Philip with the
assistance of France, proved abortive. British pressure on Mar ia Theresa
obtained the promise of Piacenza and part of the Milanese for Charles
Emmanuel III in the Treaty of Worms of September 1743, and, although the
king signed a secret armistice with the Bourbons in February 1746, he swiftly
repudiated it, and the Austro-Sardinian victory at Piacenza on 16 June 1746
crushed Bourbon hopes in northern Italy. The attempt to exploit the victory
by invading Provence at the end of the year was a failure, and the Austrians
were expelled from captured Genoa by a popular revolt in December 1746.
North of the Alps, the centre of attention had shifted from Germany to the
Austrian Netherlands, which had been neutral in 1741–3, as earlier when
France attacked Austria in the War of the Polish Succession in 1733–5.
Hostilities began there in 1744, but the Anglo-Dutch-German forces were
hindered by quarrels over strategy and financing and by serious failures to
maintain the stipulated size of their contingent, or to produce it on time on the
part of the Austr ians. These problems helped to ensure that, after an
unsuccessful offensive in 1744, the allies were generally on the defensive. The
French, under the most distinguished member of Augustus II’s large
15
illegitimate progeny, Marshal Saxe, scored a number of successes and were

more successful than Louis XIV had been. After winning the battle of
Fontenoy on 11 May 1745, Saxe obtained the capitulations of Ghent (15 July),
Bruges (19 July) and Ostend (23 August). In 1746 most of the Austrian
Netherlands fell to France, Brussels on 21 February, Mons on 10 July, Charleroi
on 2 August, and Namur on 1 October. Saxe defeated the Duke of
Cumberland, second son of George II, at Roucox in 1746 and at Laffeldt in
1747, a year which also saw the overrunning of Dutch Flanders and the fall of
the great Dutch fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, while Maastricht fell in 1748.
These failures exposed the folly of assuming that it would be possible to
revive the successes of John, 1st Duke of Marlborough at the head of an Anglo-
Dutch-Austrian alliance in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13).
Defeat helped to lead to an Orangist coup in the United Provinces in 1747,
William IV reviving the authority once enjoyed by William III after 45 years of
republican control. This was encouraged, abetted and applauded by the British,
Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Southern Department, being sure
that it “must give more weight to the king, and more stability to the affairs of
Europe than any event that has happened this century”, except the Hanoverian
succession. William was George IV’s son-in-law and the British had supported
his coup. Their hopes were to be cruelly disabused. There was no Dutch
revival,15 and by 1748 the prospect of the French conquest of more of the
United Provinces helped to lead the Dutch and the British to push through
peace with France, despite the unwillingness of their Austrian ally.
The preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were signed on 30 April,
the definitive treaty on 18 October 1748. Given the extent of French
conquests—far greater in the Low Countries than at the end of any previous
war—the ter ms they accepted were sur pr isingly favourable for their
opponents. The French were concerned at the movement of a British-
subsidized Russian army towards the Rhine, and they needed peace. The
French economy had been hit by a poor harvest, her finances by the costly war
and her foreign trade by British naval victories in 1747.
The peace stipulated the return of all conquests, which included, besides
French gains in the Low Countries, Madras in India, captured by the French
from the British East India Company, and Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island,
seized by the British from France in 1745. In comparison to the peace
settlements that had ended the wars of the Spanish and Polish successions, and
the bolder plans of the combatants in the early stages of the conflict, relatively
little land changed hands. Despite Austrian reluctance, Charles Emmanuel III
received the lands he had been ceded at Worms, bar Piacenza, which Don
Philip gained with Parma. Louis XV had to agree to recognize the Protestant
succession in Britain and to expel Charles Edward Stuart (Bonnie Prince
Charlie), the elder son of the Jacobite claimant James “III”. Disputes over the
frontier between the French colony of Québec and the British North
American colonies were referred to commissioners.16
16
The diplomatic alignments of the postwar world had already been

established. The Austro-Russian alliance of 1746, and its Swedo-Prussian and
Swedo-French counterparts of the following year, cemented two conflicting
blocs that confronted each other until 1756. As a result, British hopes in 1748
of recruiting Frederick II to the Anglo-Austro-Russian alignment were
misplaced. The Russian Chancellor Alexis Bestuzhev-Riumin planned war to
overthrow the hostile Swedish government in 1749. However, Danish,
Austrian and British unwillingness to support Russian action, which in light
of French and Prussian backing for Sweden would have caused a major war,
led the Russians to desist from the scheme. The “Hats”, the anti-Russian
party that controlled the Swedish government, in turn abandoned changes
that might strengthen royal authority, a course Russia feared, and tension
between the two powers, and between Sweden and Denmark, slackened
considerably in 1749–51. The situation in Sweden demonstrated the
interrelationship of foreign policy and domestic political developments in a
state like Britain with a powerful constitutional assembly and a developed
public politics.17
International hostility also diminished in Italy, although without the serious
crisis that had characterized Baltic affairs in 1749, and in line with the 1748
peace settlement. A treaty of defensive alliance, based on the settlement and
guaranteeing each other’s Italian possessions, was signed at Aranjuez on 14 June
1752 by representatives of Maria Theresa, Francis I, Charles Emmanuel III and
Ferdinand VI, Philip V’s successor as King of Spain. This settlement ended the
Italian question and ensured that Italy was mostly peaceful until 1792. The long
period of peace reflected the acceptable division between Spanish and Austrian
spheres of influence established in 1748 and the crucial shift in Spanish policy
following the succession of the pacific Ferdinand VI (1746–59). He had little
sympathy for his half-brothers, Don Carlos and Don Philip, and was less
quixotic than his father, Philip V.Ferdinand was in turn succeeded by Carlos, as
Charles III (1759–88). He was more interested in colonial than Italian
questions, an interest that was to lead him to war with Britain in 1762 and
1779.
The element of compromise present in the Baltic and Italian settlements
was lacking in that devised for Germany and the Low Countries by Newcastle,
who, after he succeeded Carteret as the most influential Secretary of State in
1744, was in effect Britain’s foreign minister. Rather than negotiating with
France or her ally Prussia, whose alliance with France was not as solid as was
feared,18 Newcastle sought to strengthen what he called the “Old System”, the
alliance of Britain, Austria and the United Provinces. Newcastle believed that
what he saw as the French challenge could be contained only by such a
system.19 He did so in a consciously anti-French and anti-Prussian fashion.
Under the Barrier Treaty of 1715, Dutch garrisons had been accepted in a
number of fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands in order to defend the Low
Countries from France. The Barrier had failed the challenge in 1744–6, the
17
Earl of Sandwich, one of the British Plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle,

writing to Newcastle in October 1747 that “the great point of France during
the whole war, has been the destruction of the Barrier…we shall then be
entirely open to their attack, whereas they will have a chain of fortresses that
will render their frontiers impenetrable”.20 The resultant French advance only
made Newcastle more determined to rebuild and strengthen the system and to
obtain Austrian assistance to that end.
Newcastle also actively sponsored the Imperial Election Scheme, a plan for
the election as King of the Romans, and therefore next Emperor, of Maria
Theresa’s eldest son Joseph, the future Joseph II.21 This was not a new plan.
George II had advocated the idea in January 1745, after the death of Charles
VII,22 but it was not taken up until after the war. Then the support of most of
the Electors was obtained as a result of major British diplomatic efforts and, in
part, through the payment of British subsidies. However, a lack of Austrian
enthusiasm ensured that propitious circumstances in 1749 were not exploited
and, thereafter, French, Palatine and, in particular, Prussian opposition, the
difficulty of keeping the willing Electors in line and a lack of determination on
the part of the Austrians, who objected to the idea of obtaining Electoral votes
by concessions, led to the failure of the scheme. A much disappointed
Newcastle, who had put a great deal of effort into the scheme, blamed the
Austrians for its failure.23 Newcastle really needed Frederick’s support, but
Austro-Prussian animosity rendered that unlikely, and the collective security
system the British supported helped to exacerbate Frederick’s hostility towards
Britain and make him hope unrealistically that a counter-league could be
created.
Frederick was reduced in 1752 to asking for French pressure on the Turks to
declare war on Austr ia and Russia. While the French government was
distracted by domestic, constitutional and religious disputes, especially
controversies over Jansenism, Frederick felt that he was having to respond to
apparent threats, such as the Imperial Election Scheme or in 1752–3 the
prospect that Maria Theresa’s brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, would
become next king of Poland and make it a hereditary kingdom to the great
benefit of Austria.24
Although the Anglo-Austro-Russian alignment had serious weaknesses, its
apparent strength intimidated Frederick and therefore offered Hanover some
security against Prussian attack, which was indeed feared in 1753. The Imperial
Election Scheme had not achieved its purpose, the nullification of the
consequences of the Franco-Prussian alliance, in part because the Austrians felt
it unnecessary. Br itish support for the “Old System” can be seen as
anachronistic, a repetition of ideas made outdated by the rising importance of
Austro-Prussian competition and the decline in French interest in continental
terr itorial expansion. If the Austrian government, especially under the
influence of Count Kaunitz, envoy in Paris 1750–3 and chancellor from 1753,
is seen as actively seeking French backing for the reconquest of Silesia, a
18
dynastic, religious, economic and geopolitical duty for the Austrians, then
British hopes of keeping the Anglo-Austrian alliance alive appear futile.25
However, Kaunitz sought British support for action against Frederick, and,
far from getting steadily worse, Anglo-Austrian relations were actually better in
1754 than in 1748.26 In addition, although the British found Russian financial
conditions for any alliance exorbitant, both powers remained interested in
strengthening their links. Tsarina Elizabeth (1741–62) was bitterly opposed to
Frederick, who had thwarted her on a number of occasions, and her enmity
coincided with Maria Theresa’s desire to regain Silesia and George II’s wish to
protect Hanover.
Thus, British talk of shared interests and the “Old System” was not
redundant, although they placed excessive weight on the benefits to be gained
from the support of the United Provinces. In fact it was divided politically,
especially after the death of William IV in 1751, and increasingly weak in
military strength and government finances. Nevertheless, in any likely future
conflict with France and Prussia, the Dutch would be of strategic importance,
their army and navy were not inconsiderable, and the country, if not the federal
government, was still wealthy. Frederick II appeared the likeliest cause of
conflict in 1753–4, and the shared animosity of George II, Maria Theresa and
Elizabeth towards him offered a strong and stable response.27
The breakdown of these shared views helped to precipitate the “Diplomatic
Revolution” of 1756. The crucial new developments that constituted this
revolution were alliances between Britain and Prussia, and France and Austria,
both negotiated in 1756: the Convention of Westminster of 16 January and the
First Treaty of Versailles of 1 May. These treaties can be traced to skirmishes
over the Anglo-French frontier in the Ohio valley in 1754. There is no reason
to believe that the “revolution” would have occurred in the form it did but for
the chain of events that began with the flaring up of what had hitherto been an
inconclusive dispute over a distant frontier. Had Maria Theresa and Elizabeth
attacked Frederick anyway, as they had intended to do, George II would
probably not have joined them (unless Frederick staged a pre-emptive stroke as
he was to do in 1756), but he would certainly not have allied with Prussia.
Similarly, Louis XV would probably have felt obliged to support his ally
Frederick. Kaunitz did not want to break with George II, and in 1755 he was
still devoting considerable attention to the alliance with him, because he feared
that attempts to improve relations with Louis XV, at whose court anti-Austrian
attitudes were well-established, would fail.
The Commissioners instructed to settle Anglo-French disputes over North
American frontiers had failed. Tension increased as the British encouraged the
Miami and Huron Native Americans to trade with them and the French
responded vigorously, while the British feared that French plans to link their
colonies of Canada and Louisiana by a series of forts would create a barrier
against British expansion. Concern increased in 1753 when the French began
to establish new posts in the upper Ohio valley, and Robert Dinwiddie, the
19
Governor of Virginia, was ordered to use force to defend British claims.28 In

July 1754, a force of Virginia militia under George Washington sent to resist
French moves was defeated, and the British ministry responded by sending
troops to North America. Newcastle wanted only limited action, but pressure
from bellicose colleagues led to an expansion of plans into a major attack on
French America. 29 This reflected a political atmosphere in which North
America seemed of growing direct interest to Britain, her economy, her
maritime and global strength and the balance of her power with France.
The French government did not want war but felt obliged to respond to
British preparations by, in turn, preparing an expedition to reinforce French
North America. Negotiations in early 1755 were hampered by mutual distrust
and it proved impossible to devise a satisfactory solution to the Ohio dispute.
British ministers stressed the strength of bellicose domestic pressure.30 Rouillé,
the French foreign minister, argued correctly that the chance of successful
negotiations was really ended by the British refusal to suspend military steps.31
On 21 April 1755 Admiral Boscawen sailed for American waters, ordered to
prevent French reinforcements from reaching Canada. On 3 May the French
fleet sailed from Brest and on 10 June they were attacked by Boscawen,
although he failed to inflict serious losses, a failure that left the French stronger
in Canada and was thus to be important in the subsequent course of the
struggle in North America. 32 This led to a breach in diplomatic relations,
Mirepoix being recalled from London and Bussy from Hanover on 18 July.
War was not declared by Britain until 17 May 1756 and by France until 9
June 1756, and contacts continued until then in a vain attempt to maintain the
peace that has received insufficient attention. Other rulers, such as Frederick II
and Maria Theresa, were inclined to doubt the possibility of war.33 However,
both gover nments tur ned their attention to diplomatic and militar y
preparations for conflict. In 1755–6 the possibility of a French attack on
Hanover, the Low Countries or mainland Britain, and of supporting Prussian
action against Hanover, obliged the British ministry to seek firm commitments
of support from their allies. Fear of French attack and a lack of sympathy for
the British position in America made the Dutch unwilling to offer help,34
while Kaunitz had no intention of being dragged into war for the sake of
Britain. Refusing to reinforce the Austrian Netherlands, and thus cover the
United Provinces from French attack, he made only vague offers to protect
Hanoverian neutrality.35
The British government had more success with Elizabeth of Russia, who
was not exposed to French attack and for whom much-needed British
subsidies would be useful in preparing for war with Frederick. Negotiations,
begun in 1753 under the pressure of fears of a Prussian attack on Hanover, had
flagged due to disputes over the size of the subsidy and over the causes that
would oblige Russia to deploy troops outside her frontiers. They were revived
by the new envoy, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, who reached St Petersburg
in June 1755. 36 Br ibes, the promise of larger subsidies and Elizabeth’s
20
willingness to grasp the opportunity led to the conclusion of an agreement on

30 September 1755. This renewed the treaty of defensive alliance of December
1742 and provided for a British subsidy of £100,000 per annum in return for
Russia maintaining an army of 55,000 men in Livonia, from which East Prussia
could be threatened.37 The British ministry hoped that the agreement would
have a favourable impact on Austrian policy.38
The agreed terms reflected the standard goal of British negotiations with
Russia since 1741–acquiring the support of the Russian ar my in any
confrontation with Frederick II and, more generally, the major role of Russia
in European affairs in the eyes of outsiders, namely as opponent to France’s
allies, usually Sweden, Poland and Turkey, but also and indeed principally
Frederick since 1741. As Elizabeth and her Chancellor, Bestuzhev-Riumin,
wanted to seize East Prussia in order to exchange it with Augustus III of
Saxony-Poland for Courland, the agreement was welcome to her.
However, George II and his ministers saw Russia as a means to a different
end—the security of Hanover—and, unexpectedly, in late 1755 a chance of
supplementing this by gaining the support of Freder ick was offered.
Concerned about improving Anglo-Russian relations, Frederick approached
George II through the Duke of Brunswick39 in June 1755.40 Still bound to
France and unwilling to provide a unilateral guarantee for Hanover, Frederick
was cautious, until he received in December a copy of the Anglo-Russian
agreement and British proposals for better relations with Prussia. The British
sought a Prussian guarantee for Hanover.41 Alliance with George II would
apparently free Frederick from the Russian threat, whereas he would be
exposed to a British-subsidized Russian attack if he provided Louis XV with
assistance. As a result, Frederick responded favourably to the British approach
and, by the Convention of Westminster of 16 January 1756, Britain and Prussia
guaranteed their respective possessions and agreed to maintain peace in the
Empire by jointly opposing the entry of foreign forces.
Neither Frederick nor the British saw the Convention as the cause of any
fundamental change in international relations or as incompatible with their
existing alliances. For the British, it simply strengthened the existing collective
security system, achieving what had been hoped for in 1740 and 1748. For
Frederick, it made Russian attack less likely. However, the new agreement led
to major changes, although not a complete change round or “revolution” in
international relations, for Austria and Russia remained close allies until
Elizabeth’s death in 1762. The Convention helped drive Louis XV towards
Austria. Despite Kaunitz’s efforts, relations between the two had hitherto not
improved significantly. On 10 August 1755 Count Starhemberg, the Austrian
envoy in Paris, reported that he was certain France would attack Austria. Three
days later his opposite number, Aubeterre, responded sceptically to Kaunitz’s
assurances of good wishes, suggested that Austria would act if France attacked
Hanover and added that Maria Theresa would never abandon George II.
Rouillé was sceptical about Austrian promises that they would not take part in
21
any Anglo-French conflict. 42 Kaunitz also approached Louis through his

influential mistress, Madame de Pompadour. Louis found Frederick an
irritating and presumptuous ally and was tempted by the idea of dividing
Britain from her traditional ally, but it was not clear that Austria would be a
reliable ally for France, and strengthening her by accepting a reconquest of
Silesia contradicted traditional French assumptions.
The situation was changed by the Convention of Westminster. The
Prussian envoy in Paris had warned Frederick in November 1755 that the
French gover nment was ver y wor r ied by reports of Anglo-Prussian
negotiations, but Frederick does not appear to have appreciated the likely
reaction in Paris: on 20 January 1756 he told the French envoy Nivernais,
who had been sent to renew the Franco-Russian treaty, that he was keen to
do so.43 However, French anger led Louis’s council to decide on 4 February
not to renew the alliance with Prussia. The Convention also angered the
Austrians, who still sought to regain Silesia. On 6 March Maria Theresa
ordered her envoy in Russia to hinder the implementation of the Anglo-
Russian treaty, while Starhemberg was informed that she was prepared to
accept a French attack on Hanover. On 1 May France and Austria were
linked in a defensive alliance, the First Treaty of Versailles. It specifically
excluded the Anglo-French war, which had passed its initial limited and
somewhat phoney stage on 18 April 1756, when French troops landed on the
British-ruled Mediterranean island of Minorca. Maria Theresa was therefore
not obliged to take part in the war on the side of France, but her promise of
her neutrality destroyed the “Old System”.44 When Robert Keith, the British
envoy, reproached her with this, Maria Theresa retorted that the British had
done so by the Convention of Westminster,
that the account of that treaty had struck her like a fit of an apoplexy
…she would own freely to me, that she, and the king of Prussia, were
incompatible together, and that no consideration upon earth, should ever
make her enter into an alliance where he was a party.
Keith replied that this attitude laid Freder ick “under a necessity of
endeavouring to secure himself, by the ruin of the House of Austria”.45
The new Austro-French alliance helped Russian plans for war with Prussia,
as it appeared increasingly likely that such a conflict would benefit from
Austro-French support, not least crucial financial aid. On 26 March 1756 the
newly established “Conference at the Imperial [Russian] Court” produced an
extensive plan for war.46 At the same time, the Russian government made it
clear to Hanbury-Williams that they regarded the Anglo-Russian agreement of
the previous September as relating only to action against Prussia and would
therefore not provide assistance against any other power, an interpretation that
he rejected without effect. Elizabeth lent her support to her ViceChancellor,
Count Voronzov, who favoured a French alignment and sought to overthrow
22
Bestuzhev-Riumin and his anglophile policies. 47 Frederick stressed the

importance of retaining the Russian alliance to the newly-arrived British
envoy in Berlin, Andrew Mitchell—“while Russia was secured the peace of
Germany was safe”48—but it became increasingly clear that British influence in
St Petersburg had collapsed.49
Convinced, with reason, that Elizabeth and Maria Theresa were planning
to attack him, Frederick decided on a pre-emptive stroke, despite British
advice that he remain on the defensive. 50 Rather than attacking Maria
Theresa, George II wanted Frederick to assemble a corps in his Rhenish
territories, Cleves and Mark, in order to block a possible French advance
towards Hanover.51 However, as so often, the British found that their allies
had a different agenda. Frederick was already withdrawing troops from the
Rhineland,52 and on 28 August 1756 he invaded Saxony in order to deny a
base to his opponents: Saxony was a sphere for manoeuvre between Prussia
and Austrian-ruled Bohemia.
This was a dangerous move. Louis XV felt obliged to help Augustus III, his
heir’s father-in-law, and Freder ick’s move helped to precipitate both
rapprochement between France and Russia, between whom relations had been
cool since 1725, and a deepening of the Austro-French alliance. Elizabeth
acceded to the First Treaty of Versailles on 30 December 1756, and concluded
an offensive alliance with Austria the following month. On 1 May 1757, by the
Second Treaty of Versailles, Louis XV promised Maria Theresa an army of
105,000 and a substantial subsidy to help effect a partition of Prussia.53
In so far as the British ministers had anticipated war with France in 1755,
they had hoped that their continental allies would deter France from
compensating for her colonial and maritime weaknesses by attacking Hanover
and the Low Countries. In what was certainly a case of looking at the last war,
George II and his ministers wished to avoid a repetition of French successes in
1741 and 1745–8. However, thanks to Austrian and Dutch reluctance and to
the British failure to consider the problems of reconciling Elizabeth and
Frederick, they had failed. In consequence, the continental and Anglo-Bourbon
conflicts in 1756–63 were more closely aligned than was necessary.
Furthermore, this interaction worked to the disadvantage of Britain. The
notion that Br itain conquered America in Germany has been repeated
frequently, and employed, in addition, to explain why an isolated Britain was
unsuccessful in the War of American Independence. However, this analysis
ignores both the extent to which the notion was advanced by contemporaries
for partisan reasons and the dangers that faced British policy as a result of the
continental commitment. William Pitt the Elder, 1st Earl of Chatham, who was
identified, both then and subsequently, with the policy of conquering America
in Ger many, was in fact very hesitant about military and diplomatic
intervention on the Continent. Justifying his views in 1756–7, Pitt told the
House of Commons in December 1761 that he had then opposed the Anglo-
Russian agreement “upon this principle: that the forwardness of this House to
23
engage itself to defend the electoral dominions [Hanover] would bring on the
invasion of them as a certain consequence”. He added,
The German war proved a millstone, I say, as it was then managed, for
when I opposed the sending of British troops into Germany, your
business was so far from being done then as it has been since in America
and in the East Indies, that you had not even sufficiently provided for the
preservation of your own coasts or colonies anywhere.54
The loss of Hanover at any stage in the Seven Years’ War would have exposed
the British government to the politically hazardous task of regaining it at the
subsequent peace by making and then returning colonial gains; rather as Cape
Breton had been returned in 1748. In addition, by being allied with Frederick,
in place of Elizabeth and Maria Theresa, George II had acquired both an
unpredictable and a vulnerable ally. In 1743–8 George fought Louis XV as part
of the stronger European bloc; in 1756–63 as part of a distinctly weaker one,
and this contrast must be heeded in any discussion about the advisability of
conquering America in Germany.
George and his ministers were swiftly made aware of their difficult situation.
In 1756 Minorca was lost. British naval power was humiliated when, in the
face of a French fleet, Admiral Byng failed to relieve the defenders on 20 May.
Outnumbered, they surrendered on 29 June. The political consequences were
serious, helping to precipitate the fall of the Fox—Newcastle ministry. In 1757
the victor of Minorca, the Duke of Richelieu, invaded Hanover. The
vulnerability of the Electorate had led to consideration of neutrality, but the
French would only accept that if they were granted a right of transit for their
troops, terms that were judged unacceptable. 55 An outnumbered Army of
Observation of Germans, mostly Hanoverians, Hessians and Brunswickers,
under Cumberland, was defeated at Hastenbeck on 26 July 1757 and retreated.
On 8 September Cumberland agreed to the dissolution of his army by the
Convention of Klosterseven.56 Hanover had fallen. As British forces had failed
to seize Louisbourg as planned, there appeared no possibility of exchanging
colonial gains for Hanover. There was both despair and anger in London. The
Earl of Hardwicke, former Lord Chancellor and long friend and adviser to
Newcastle, wrote to him that “to propose a peace to a victorious enemy under
such a losing game is a most disagreeable disadvantageous thing, but a
mitigated ruin is better than a total one”.57
The Convention was to be disavowed, the bulk of the Electorate recaptured.
Nevertheless, the events of the autumn of 1757 are a reminder both of the
rapid changes of fortune that characterized a conflict that is too often discussed
without sufficient stress on this volatility, and also of the difficulties facing
British policy. The relationship between continental and colonial commitments
posed major problems for the British government. The political storm over
Klosterseven led to a greater British military, diplomatic, financial and political
24
commitment to Germany. Under a subsidy treaty signed on 11 April 1758,

Frederick and George agreed not to carry on separate negotiations, the British
agreed to pay a subsidy of £670,000 and George II, as King and Elector,
promised to maintain an army of 55,000 in Hanover to cover Frederick’s flank.
Under this treaty, renewed in 1759 and 1760, Britain provided valuable
financial and military assistance to the outnumbered and financially exhausted
Frederick,58 absorbing the bulk of the French military effort.
Victories such as Minden (1 August 1759) and Wilhelmstah (24 June 1762)
denied the French control of Hanover. Attacks on the French coast, designed to
divert forces from the war with Frederick and actively pressed by Pitt, were less
successful, though Cherbourg was temporar ily seized in 1758 and its
fortifications destroyed, while the island of Belle Île off the Breton coast,
captured in 1761, was held until the peace. A planned French invasion of
Britain in 1759 was thwarted by the British naval victories of Lagos (Portugal)
on 19 August and Quiberon Bay on 25 November 1759.
Trans-oceanic naval and army superiority, and growing success in the
handling of amphibious forces, led to the capture of all the major centres of the
French empire bar New Orleans: Louisbourg and the West African slaving base
of Goree (1758), Québec and Guadeloupe, an important West Indian island,
(1759), Montréal (1760), Pondicherry, the major French base in India (1761)
and Martinique, another important island in the Caribbean (1762). British
success against France owed much to the neutrality of Spain, which had “been
nursed like a tender child” in the early 1750s.59
However, Charles III, who succeeded to the throne of Spain in 1759, was no
anglophile, and he was concerned about a fundamental shift of maritime and
colonial power towards Britain. His attempt to mediate in the conflict was
unsuccessful, while Anglo-Spanish relations were embittered by a number of
disputes, including that over the British presence on the Mosquito coast of
Nicaragua, whence logwood was exported, an aspect of the long-standing
Spanish concern over Br itish breaches of the Spanish commercial and
territorial position in the New World.60
Charles’s attitude helped to encourage French firmness in the face of stiff
British territorial demands during abortive Anglo-French peace negotiations in
the summer of 1761. Similarly, the French devoted major efforts to securing
Charles’s alliance, the Duke of Choiseul, foreign minister 1758–61, writing
that he had applied most effort to this end.61 On 15 August 1761 the Third
Family Compact and a secret convention were finally concluded, obliging
Louis to support Charles in his commercial and colonial disputes with Britain,
and Charles to declare war on Britain by 1 May 1762 if peace had not been
concluded.62 Attacks on Gibraltar, Ireland and Jamaica were discussed, as was
pressure on Portugal, a leading commercial partner of Britain, to abandon her
alliance. The determination to hit British trade is especially interesting. This
was seen as a way to harm British public credit, and the Bourbons accordingly
tried to put pressure on Portugal, Naples and Tuscany.63
25
Pitt, the volatile and egocentr ic Secretary of State for the Southern
Department, responded to the new alliance by proposing a pre-emptive attack
on Spain, resigning on 5 October 1761 when his plan was rejected. However,
the failure of negotiations led to a British declaration of war on 2 January
1762. The Spaniards proved far worse prepared than they had assured the
French and lost Havana and Manila to British amphibious attacks in 1762.
Charles III hoped that gains in Portugal would compensate him for losses
elsewhere, regaining colonial losses in Portugal, but his army was not in a
position to repeat Frederick II’s success in Silesia. The invading forces had
some success in April and May, but a British expeditionary force helped to
stiffen the Portuguese defence and thwart Charles.64
Anglo-French discussions through Sardinian intermediaries reflected the
financial exhaustion of both powers, their desire for an end to the war and
their unhappiness with their allies. The last was especially acute between
Frederick and both George III, who had succeeded to the throne on 25
October 1760, and his leading minister, the third Earl of Bute, Secretary of
State for the Northern Department, March 1761–2, and First Lord of the
Treasury, May 1762–Apr il 1763. Preliminar ies of peace, signed at
Fontainebleau on 3 November 1762, led to the Peace of Paris (10 February
1763).
The terms were better than any that Britain had hitherto received from the
Bourbons, reflecting her greater success in this war and the absence of any
need to make concessions for her allies. France agreed to restore lands captured
from Britain’s German allies: Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick, but not
from Prussia; to return Minorca and to recognize the British gains of Canada,
Senegal in West Africa and the West Indian islands of Grenada, Tobago,
Dominica and St Vincent. Britain returned several important conquests—
Guadeloupe, Martinique, St Lucia, Goree, Belle Ile and Pondicherry—to
France and left the French a part of the valuable Newfoundland fishery, which
was believed to be a vital way of training sailors for royal navies. Havana and
Manila were restored to Spain, but she yielded East and West Florida to Britain,
receiving Louisiana from France in compensation. 65 Though not free of
controversy, the terms fortified the impression created by the war: that the
colonial and maritime balance of power had been destroyed and that Britannia
ruled the waves.
Frederick had not been so fortunate, although, given the odds against him,
he had done remarkably well. Whereas Britain was able to cope with her
enemies separately, defeating France before fighting Spain, Frederick faced
simultaneously the enmity of Russia, Austria, France and, from 1757, Sweden.
He received Br itish financial and military support, but although of
considerable assistance against France, British, Hanoverian and Hessian forces
played no role against Frederick’s foremost military rivals, Austria and Russia,
and the British refused to send to the Baltic the fleet that he demanded
26
repeatedly. Indeed, although British relations with Austria, Russia and Sweden
were very poor, war was not declared.66
Frederick’s survival was the product of good fortune, determination and
military success, not only a number of stunning victories, such as Rossbach,
Leuthen, Zorndorf and Torgau, but also the advantage of fighting on interior
lines against a strategically and politically divided alliance. Russian interests
entered on East Prussia and Poland, the Austrians were most concerned by
Silesia, and, after Rossbach and the repudiation of Klosterseven in late 1757,
the French devoted their efforts to the Westphalian conflict with the
Britishfinanced and partly manned Army of Observation. Frederick’s task was
far harder than in the First and Second Silesian Wars. He told Mitchell on 28
June 1759 that “what chiefly distresses him is, the number of his enemies”.67
Russian enmity was crucial, but so also was that of Maria Theresa, because he
was very much the major target of Austrian action, as he had not been for most
of the 1740s. Thus the opportunistic diplomacy which Frederick had then used
so skilfully was of little value during the Seven Years’ War.
Although Frederick survived the war, he faced serious setbacks during the
conflict. In 1756 he benefited from surprise and his opponents’ lack of
preparations. The Saxon army was forced to capitulate on 16 October 1756.
The summer and autumn of 1757 was a period of particular difficulty, with a
Russian invasion of East Prussia, a Swedish invasion of Pomerania, the French
conquest of Hanover, the raising of the siege of Prague and the end of the
Prussian invasion of Bohemia after the Austrian victory at Kolin (18 June), and
the Austrian capture of Berlin and most of Silesia. There was despair at the
Prussian court, Frederick’s eldest brother, August William, who was to be
disgraced for failure, writing to the former French envoy of the need for peace
and criticizing his brother.68 Frederick himself was driven to negotiations with
the French, seeking to bribe Madame de Pompadour, while he also pressed the
British to stage a diversionary attack on the French coast.69 Concern was felt
throughout Britain, Richard Tucker writing to his MP brother from Weymouth
about how “greatly mortified” people were.70 Frederick urged the British to
negotiate with the French, adding “everything must be done to dissolve this
triumvirate of France, Austria, and Russia: while that lasts, there is no safety”,71
a clear warning that the continental war could not be left to take care of itself
while the British pursued the maritime struggle with France.
Frederick’s victories at Rossbach (5 November) and Leuthen (5 December
1757) stabilized the situation and encouraged the British to commit troops to
Germany, rather as the American victory at Saratoga and their creditable effort
at Germantown in 1777 were to encourage French intervention. Though the
Russians conquered East Prussia in 1758, their invasion of Brandenburg was
blocked by Frederick at Zorndorf. Thereafter, Frederick was hard—pressed
throughout and desperate on many occasions, but an absence of co-ordination
by his opponents and Frederick’s determination to fight on prevented the
overthrow of Prussian power.
27
Although Frederick survived, the Anglo-Prussian alliance did not. Tensions

in what had anyway been a weak link based largely on expedience could not
be contained when the growing desire for peace led both powers to
concentrate on their own interests and to consider alternative alliances.72
Britain thus ended the war with the Bourbons defeated at sea and in the
colonies, and with the French system in disarray on the Continent. However,
greater national confidence in Britain could not disguise Britain’s isolated
position and the dangers of a Bourbon revanche warned of by critics of the
Peace of Paris were to excite governmental attention.73 In the 1760s, however,
this concern focused far more on the maritime and colonial dimension and far
less on Europe than had been the case in the late 1730s.
28
Chapter Three
Britain and the War of the
Austrian Succession
Having provided an overview, it is necessary to turn back from the relatively

well-studied 1750s and 1760s, because British foreign policy in the 1740s is a
subject that has received relatively little attention.1 Since Sir Richard Lodge’s
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740–1748 appeared in 1930 there has
been little of importance devoted to this subject. His book, although firmly
based on thorough research, was flawed on several counts. In a text of 411
pages it was extraordinary that Lodge reached 1743 by page 4. His perfunctory
treatment of the events of 1740–42 and his neglect of trends in British foreign
policy in the late 1730s led to an unbalanced account that suffered from its
failure to assess elements of continuity and change. Those accustomed to
Lodge’s other works could not have been surprised by his failure to consult
diplomatic archives in other countries.2 This was an extremely unfortunate
omission, as it is impossible to provide either an adequate narrative or an
intelligent assessment of the foreign policy of a state if the archives of its allies
and opponents are neglected. Furthermore, it was by no means, uncommon in
the interwar years for scholars to consult archives in more than one country.
Paul Vaucher had done so to brilliant effect in his Robert Walpole et la politique
de Fleury (Paris, 1924) and Arthur Wilson was to do so in his French Foreign
Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury (1936). Given the role of
Hanover in British foreign policy, it was unfortunate that Lodge did not choose
to work there, doubly so as the bombing and floods of the 1940s destroyed
most of the material that would have been so useful.3
Lodge’s account of foreign policy centred on British diplomacy. Foreign
policy was the prerogative of a small group, and domestic pressures on the
formulation and conduct of foreign policy were substantially discounted.
Lodge did not consider the extent and nature of parliamentary and mercantile
influence, nor did he study the impact of public opinion. This largely reflected
the prejudice that so many diplomatic historians of the period had in favour of
their accustomed sources and their lack of interest in the workings of the
29
Br itish political system. More recently, Graham Gibbs has shown how
eighteenth-century foreign policy can be better understood when diplomacy is
placed in the context of the politics of the period, and in particular the role of
Parliament and of the press. There is a clear need for his lead to be followed in
order to examine the way in which foreign policy was influenced by the views
and interests of the political nation.
This is especially important in the case of the War of the Austr ian
Succession, when domestic British politics were in turmoil and ministries
unstable. Foreign policy was a major element of political debate within the
ministries, in Parliament and in print. The conduct of foreign policy was not
protected from the impact of political strife. Secretaries of State and many
diplomats, such as Robert Trevor, were political figures subject to removal for
political reasons. Foreign policy was not conceived or conducted by a large
bureaucracy, but by a small group of men, most of whom were parliamentarians
and acutely aware of the sensitivity of the political nation to issues of foreign
policy. The two Secretaries of State sat in the House of Lords and were
expected to play a major role in defending ministerial policy, particularly
foreign policy, whilst several diplomats were MPs.
It is clear that Lodge’s approach is an unsatisfactory one, and that British
foreign policy during this period is a field that requires research. This is
apparent when general works on eighteenth-century British foreign policy are
considered. They are forced to depend heavily on Lodge, and suffer as a
consequence. J.R.Jones produced the surprising comment that the causes of
the War of the Austrian Succession “largely lay well outside the range of British
knowledge and interests”.4
The causes of the war were indeed complex, but they were closely related
to some of the major preoccupations of British foreign policy in the 1730s,
and, indeed, the 1740s as a whole provided an opportunity to test, during a
period of crisis and war, assumptions and expectations engendered during the
previous period of peace. Between 1725 and 1735 British foreign policy in the
age of Walpole has been well covered, but after 1735 there has been far less
attention, except in the important field of relations, principally colonial and
commercial with Spain. Vaucher’s study, mentioned above, devoted its section
on Anglo-French relations in the late 1730s largely to the Spanish issue, a
subject that was also covered ably by Richard Pares.5 There are no major works
on relations with Austria and Prussia in the period. 6 Lodge’s book on
eighteenth-century Anglo-Prussian relations suffers from a failure to consider
Prussian sources adequately and has little to say about this period.7 Hanover in
the 1730s requires study, and there is nothing comparable to Uriel Dann’s
interesting work on the relationship between Hanover and Britain in the
period 1740–60.8
As a result it is difficult for historians to appreciate the relationship between,
foreign policy in the late 1730s and during the War of the Austrian Succession.
The supposedly pacific and isolationist policy of the late 1730s has been
30
BRITAIN AND THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
associated with the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole (1721–42), while the more
aggressive and pugilistic policy of 1742–4 has been associated with Lord
Carteret, Secretary of State for the Northern Department in those years. As a
result, it is easy to suggest that the change in British policy corresponded with
and was a consequence of the change in the ministry. However, a consideration
of the foreign policy of the late 1730s suggests that the conventional view of
Walpole’s foreign policy requires correction.
The fact that Walpole was opposed to military intervention in the War of
the Polish Succession (1733–5) has been used to character ize him as
isolationist. In fact, the British attempt to end the war by the use of good
offices, and the active policy Britain followed during it, in encouraging states
such as the United Provinces and Denmark to oppose the French, in staging a
major naval mobilization and in intervening actively to attempt to thwart
French schemes in Russia, Sweden and Turkey, would suggest that the situation
was more complex. Walpole was ready to send a substantial naval force to the
Tagus in 1735–7 to support Portugal against a threatened Spanish attack, and in
the late 1730s the British ministry took steps towards the development of an
alternative to the Anglo-Austrian alliance, which had collapsed in 1733.
Approaches were made to Russia for an alliance, and interest was displayed in
better relations with Prussia, where it was hoped that the eventual death of
Frederick William I and the accession of Frederick II, George II’s nephew,
would lead to an alliance. This interest in a northern alliance system, which
owed much to Walpole’s brother Horatio, indicates the extent to which foreign
policy in the late 1730s was by no means stagnant, and calls into question the
view, expressed by Stephen Baxter and, for a later period, Michael Roberts,
that eighteenth-century British foreign policy was conservative, trapped in a
straitjacket of past concepts and unable to innovate.9
By suggesting that foreign policy in the late 1730s was different to the
accepted interpretation, it becomes necessary to re-examine the diplomacy of
both the last three years of the Walpole ministry and of Carteret.10 It is wrong
to argue that Carteret’s policy of a strong alliance against France originated in
the spring of 1742 when Walpole fell. The opposition indeed condemned
Walpole for allegedly failing to halt French progress in Europe. Sir James
Lowther, an opposition MP, wrote to his Cumbrian agent in April 1742, “The
troops are getting ready to embark immediately for Flanders. The French seem
to be startled now, we should have [had] no chance of preserv-ing the liberties
of Europe, if Sir Robert had continued in the direction of foreign affairs.”
In fact, the Walpole ministry had set out to create such an alliance in late
1739, when it became clear that war between Britain and Spain was inevitable.
It was widely believed by the ministry, British diplomats and the press that
France would support Spain, and that a united Bourbon pact would prove a
redoubtable opponent. In August 1739 Newcastle informed Hardwicke, “We
take it for granted, that France will join Spain, and that we shall be attacked at
home…” Freder ick William I drew the attention of Dickens to the
31
consequences of French intervention, “if France joined with Spain we [the

British] should to be sure stand in need of land forces”. The British envoy in
Paris, James, 1st Earl Waldegrave, sought to persuade Fleury “that his siding
with Spain in her unjust practices is the sure way to engage a general war,
which will probably end in a general alliance against France and Spain. I have
put him in mind of past times, and the distresses France was in the years 10 and
11, [1710–11]…”11 Far from relying on the pacific instincts of Fleury, the
ministry feared war with France. Newcastle told the House of Lords in
November 1739, in an interesting speech which throws light on the British
perception of the French constitution,
…notwithstanding the great age of the present prime minister of that

Kingdom, notwithstanding his present peaceable disposition we cannot
entirely trust to it: we know he can alter that disposition, when he finds
it proper or necessary so to do; we know the animosity that has so long
subsisted between that nation and this: we know the regard the people of
France have for the royal family of Spain; and therefore the prime
minister of that Kingdom, notwithstanding the arbitrary form of their
government, may, like the ministers in other countries, be forced to
chime in with the general inclinations, perhaps the general whim, of his
countrymen. Many things may induce the French to alter their present
measures, and as their king is absolute master within his dominions, the
effects of that alteration may, and probably will be instantaneous.12
The ministry believed that it would be impossible simply to fight a naval war
against the Bourbons. France could threaten Hanover with ease and, by
menacing the United Provinces, could prevent them from offering Britain the
assistance she considered herself entitled to by past agreements. Foreign troops
might be needed to defeat an invasion, for, as Newcastle pointed out in the
speech above, “the coast of France lies more convenient for invading this
kingdom, than any other coast in Europe”.
Convinced that they would need military assistance, the British ministry sought
in late 1739 and in 1740 to construct an anti-French alliance. This policy was the
product neither of the War of the Austrian Succession nor of Carteret.
Furthermore, the Secretaries of State of this period, Newcastle and Harrington,
were to hold that office throughout much of the War of Austrian Succession. By
the spring of 1740 the diplomatic strategy that was to be associated with Carteret
had been clearly enunciated, and in March Fleury told the Swedish envoy Tessin,
“L’Angleterre voudrait voir toute l’Europe contre nous.” The despatch of a French
fleet to the West Indies to prevent Britain overthrowing the Spanish Empire
increased tension. The Lord Privy Seal, Lord Hervey wrote “so black a prospect I
never saw”. Hardwicke told the House of Lords that war with France was likely
“unless His Majesty can form such a confederacy upon the continent, as will make
it dangerous for any power in Europe to disturb the tranquillity thereof”.13
32
The search for an alliance system represented a rejection of pressure for a

policy of national self-sufficiency that had played a major role in the agitation
for a maritime war with Spain in 1738–9. The notion that such a war could be
successful was linked to a sense that Britain could abstract herself from
European diplomacy and its commitments, and, indeed, that it was desirable to
do so. Sir William Keith wrote in the Citizen of 27 July (os) 1739:
every transaction of that kind during the last century, has operated
strongly to the disadvantage of Britain, by draining her of her treasure,
and encouraging other nations to become her rivals in trade; he
judiciously prefers a powerful armament by sea, and looks on a British
admiral, at the head of his fleet, to be by far the best ambassador and
plenipotentiary, that can be made use of in a conjuncture such as the
present’.
An emphasis on self-sufficiency was linked to a sense of the transience of

international relations and the ingratitude of allies. Thus, Keith found
such an universal change in the face of public affairs throughout all

Europe, from what it was thirty years ago: the political views of every
state seem to be inverted, and their former schemes wholly abandoned.
Great Britain, which then made so glorious a figure at the head of a
grand and powerful alliance, in defence of the liberties of Europe… is
now insulted by some, and despised by others, of those very powers, who
at that time acknowledge themselves to have owed their preservation to
the benignity of her councils, and the force of her arms.
An anti-French alliance intended to intimidate France was not the same as an

alliance intended to fight France, but the French decision in 1741 to exploit
Maria Theresa’s accession by attacking Austria produced this shift. The situation
was made more complex by the unexpected Prussian invasion of Silesia in
December 1740, and by the Hanoverian neutrality negotiated in September
1741 when Marshall Maillebois’s army threatened to invade Hanover. During
the Wars of the Spanish and Polish Successions, Hanover had been able to rely
for its defence on the army of the Empire, which had operated against France
on the Rhine with a substantial Austrian contingent. In 1741, however, that
army did not exist. Charles-Albert of Bavaria, one of the French-supported
pretenders to a share in the Austrian inheritance, was elected Emperor as
Charles VII in January 1742.
The impact of the double crisis of 1741–the apparent imminent collapse of
Austria and the vulnerability of Hanover—on British policy and on British
public attitudes was serious. In late 1741 there was in Britain a collapse of
credibility in ministerial foreign policy. The successful Spanish invasion of Italy,
despite the presence in Spanish waters of a substantial British fleet, was blamed
33
by the opposition on the Hanoverian neutrality, and ministerial denials had

little impact. Furthermore, the progress of the war with Spain in the Caribbean
had failed to live up to initial British hopes. The deteriorating international
situation played a role both in the general election of 1741 and in the
parliamentary crisis of 1741–2 that led to the fall of the Walpole ministry.
Of the opponents of Walpole who came to power in the 1740s, two,
Carteret and Stair, greatly influenced foreign policy in 1742, whilst another
two, Chesterfield and Sandwich, were to be very influential in the later stages
of the war. The manner in which those self-styled Patriots who came to power
failed to implement Patriot plans for domestic reforms, such as triennial
parliaments and place bills, is well known. There was also a process of
compromise and adaptation in foreign policy, but, in fact, the Patriot position
was less clear and consistent than is generally appreciated.
The positions of Stair and Carteret indicate some of the ambiguities of the
Patriot legacy. Though Stair had served as envoy in Paris in 1715–20 during the
negotiation and first years of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, he had always
been critical and suspicious of the French, sufficiently so as to lead to ministerial
reprimands and the eventual French demand for his recall.14 During the Walpole
ministry there had been no doubt of Stair’s opposition to France and partiality for
Austria.15 In March 1742 he was appointed envoy to The Hague, charged with
bringing the Dutch into active measures against France, his appointment a clear
sign of the desire for action. Until November 1743 Stair, both at The Hague and
in command of the Pragmatic army, the largely British force that was sent to help
the Austrians, fervently urged the prosecution of the war with France with the
utmost vigour. In August 1742 the well-informed, long-serving Sardinian envoy in
London, Ossorio, referred to Stair as disposing of all the states of Europe as if he
was ruler, and in November Stair wrote to Trevor,
I am sure it is both the Interest and the Glory of the King our Master
and of our Country, to remain fir mly united, according to our
Engagements, with the Queen of Hungary. If we continue to govern
ourselves by that plain and simple politick, we shall have all the weight
that we can desire to have in Europe, we shall be lookt upon by every
Prince and State as the disinterested restorers and Protectors of Liberty,
and in a little time, we shall come to have a great deal of influence on the
Counsels of the Republick [United Provinces], much more than we have
had for twenty years past, whilst we valued ourselves upon our skill of
negotiating more than upon our good faith, in following the interest and
honour of the Nation.16
Stair’s vigour was applauded by the opposition press, but it fell foul of George
II’s concern for Hanoverian interests and of the reality of betrayal, compromise
and difficulties which characterized the kaleidoscopic international relations of
the 1740s.17
34
Carteret’s vigorous espousal of the anti-French cause was marked by a

certain degree of pragmatism. Secretary of State in 1721–4 during the period
of alliance with France, Carteret had been regarded as untrustworthy, if not
pro-Austrian, by French diplomats, whilst he had proclaimed his support for
Austria to the Austrian diplomat Pentenriedter. 18 An anonymous French
memorandum of 1736 claimed that he was less pro-French than most British
politicians, and this was to be proved correct.19 In the House of Lords in May
1739 he argued that the recently signed treaty with Denmark was “only a good
beginning. Not of use on the continent, unless you gain Prussia.” In 1741 he
called in Parliament for help to be given to Austria, and wrote that Parliament
looked upon it “as a national concern”.20
When Carteret took over the effective conduct of foreign policy, he sought
to implement ideas that have been subsequently praised by historians. More
pragmatic than Stair and the Opposition, he was prepared to accommodate
himself to George II’s Hanoverian interests. Therein probably lay the source of
his influence over the king, for, as with Townshend in 1729–30, and Newcastle
in the early 1750s, George II was happiest with Secretaries of State who
appreciated his Hanoverian concerns.21 These were not simply schemes for
aggrandisement, as they were often portrayed by opposition spokesmen.
George was primarily concerned with the security of Hanover, particularly
after Freder ick II’s invasion of Silesia drove home the power and
unpredictability of Hanover’s Prussian neighbour.22
However, Carteret’s policies provide a classic instance of the significance of
one of the most important but neglected fields of research in this period, the
relationship between domestic and foreign policy. For an exper ienced
politician, a former holder of high ministerial office and a long-standing
parliamentarian, Carteret’s neglect of the domestic context of foreign policy
was remarkable. This was particularly so as the country where he had served as
British envoy with considerable success, Sweden, was one where the close
interrelationship of domestic politics and foreign policy was clear. Abroad with
George II in 1743, Carteret failed to keep his ministerial colleagues in London
informed of policy; “the Coffee House joke is that Ld C was looking over the
map and by some accident the ink fell down and blotted out England, since
which he has never thought of it”. Carteret claimed that international relations
moved too fast for consultation with the ministers in London.23
Carteret’s adventurous policies for an anti-French league led him to seek to
arrange territorial settlements of disputes in Italy and the Empire, the boldness
of which was criticized in Britain. He was compared on several occasions with
Don Quixote.24 Carteret’s alliance strategy would arguably have been harmless
enough during peacetime, not too different from the Anglo-French-Spanish
alliance he had been involved in during the early 1720s, or Newcastle’s
Imperial Election scheme of the early 1750s. However, his wide-ranging plans
were far more dangerous because they were developed in war.
Like his former patron, James, Viscount Stanhope, whose intellectual ability
35
and ambitious foreign policy played a major role in landing Britain in a war
with Spain in 1718 that coincided with a domestic political crisis, Carteret
helped to create a very dangerous situation. His vigorous anti-French policy
led to war between Britain and France, and thus French support of the Jacobite
invasion plan of 1744, support that was more dangerous than the Spanish
support for Jacobite schemes that Stanhope provoked in 1719. There had
always been French sympathy for Jacobitism and a willingness to contemplate
military support for the Jacobites. It was the policies of the Carteret ministry
that turned the sympathy that had failed to produce action in 1733 and 1740,
when the Jacobites urged the invasion of a divided Britain, into the support
that led to French troops being assembled near Dunkirk for an invasion in the
spring of 1744. If Carteret underestimated the Jacobite threat this was true of
most of the ministers of the period, but not of Walpole. Furthermore, Carteret’s
policies were threatened by his failure to understand the danger posed by
Jacobitism and by French support for it.25
Carteret’s failure fully to appreciate the difficulties of alliance politics is
surprising given his experience. He underestimated the difficulties of settling
differences between the two major pillars of his alliance strategy, Austria and
Sardinia, and also between Austria and Bavaria. Carteret also failed to grasp the
difficulties of bringing the United Provinces to escalate hostilities with France.
In August 1743 the British envoy in Vienna, Thomas Robinson, reminded
Carteret that he had repeatedly said,
that in a triple alliance it is not sufficient for one, or other, or two of the
parties, to be of this or of that sentiment; and that notwithstanding that
the greatest complaint of this Court is the want of a system at this time
of day, yet nothing more can be said, till the Courts of Vienna and Turin
are upon such a footing, as to have a confidence in each other jointly
with the King, when, and when alone the only plan to be formed, may
be laid upon that true foundation.26
Parliamentary speakers and the press returned constantly to the theme of the
French threat to the international system and discussed it in terms of the
balance of power and the liberties of Europe.27 Public and ministerial war aims
and discussion of international relations interacted. In 1744 Trevor wrote from
The Hague that French support for the Jacobites
gives a flat lie to the boasted moderation, and innocence of her views;
and must convince every subject of the Republick as well as of England,
that not only the possessions of the House of Austria, and the Balance of
Power, but even our own liberties, and religion, are struck at by that
ambitious power.
The following year Harrington blamed French support for Jacobite efforts
36
against George II on their “resentment for the generous stand he has made in
the defence of the Liberties of Europe”. The language used by contemporaries
was very ambiguous, doubtless part of its attraction. Phrases such as “Balance of
Power” and “Liberties of Europe” were capable of many interpretations. In
1746 Frederick the Great told Thomas Villiers, then Minister Plenipotentiary
in Berlin, that he hoped the Austrians would lose territory in Italy. Villiers
commented, “His Prussian Majesty acknowledged, that a Balance of Power
should be maintained in Europe, but is jealous of, and dreads the great weight
of Austria.” Villiers tried to persuade Count Heinrich von Podewils, the
Prussian foreign minister, that French ambitions in the Austrian Netherlands
threatened the whole of Europe “by representing in a true light the danger to
all Europe, particularly to His Prussian Majesty, from the increasing power of
the House of Bourbon, to prevail on him to persuade his master to save the
Low Countries from the ambition of France”. However, Podewils told Ginkel,
the Dutch envoy in Berlin, that he disagreed “as he sincerely wished for the
preservation of a just Balance of Power in Europe; but would not allow, that a
like equilibrium was endangered by the progress of the French arms in the
Low Countries”. The ambiguity of the language employed was obvious, and
Villiers himself told Podewils “that if we and His Prussian Majesty really
pursued different systems, no great service, no cordiality, whatever expressions
might be employed, could be expected on either side”.28
Many of the key parliamentary debates of the early 1740s were devoted to
foreign policy. Only a minority of the MPs and peers spoke in the debates, and
it is unclear how far the language used in the debates was an attempt to
persuade undecided parliamentarians. Clearly there were constraints created by
the royal prerogative in foreign policy, but the record of debates suggests that
most topics were touched on and that the opposition displayed very little
respect for the royal prerogative. The information available to parliamentarians
was of high quality, given the difficulties of procuring reliable information
concerning the plans of other states. It was not too different from the
infor mation available to the ministry. Foreign envoys sought to keep
parliamentar ians sympathetic to their cause by providing them with
information. In 1741 several MPs asked Haslang, the Bavarian envoy, for
Bavarian memoranda, whilst Parliament could expect to receive information
from ex-diplomats. 29 In the November 1745 debate on the navy, Horatio
Walpole “went thro’ the whole state of Europe”.30 Ministers frequently used
anticipated parliamentary opposition as an excuse to refuse requests from other
powers, but it is also clear from other correspondence between ministers that,
even when the ministry possessed a workable majority, it was concerned about
the parliamentary implications of foreign policy and the likely views of
domestic critics. In 1740 Newcastle stressed, in a letter to Hardwicke, the need
not to give any handle, by any engagements we should contract with Prussia,
to the Court of France, to say they had, and always intended, to observe a
37
perfect neutrality, with regard to our disputes with Spain; But that we had
forced them into the war, by entering into engagements with Prussia,
directly contrary to those, we knew, they had contracted with the Court of
Palatine; and this would be resounded here, much to our disadvantage.
In 1745 Harrington, a minister not noted for expressing concern about

Parliament, reported to Newcastle on talks he was conducting at Hanover with
the Bavarian envoy, Count Königsfeld: “I see no great prospect of our being
able to conclude anything with that Prince, which will be justifiable in
Parliament.”
In 1747 Henry Pelham, brother of Newcastle and from 1743 1st Lord of the
Treasury, drew attention to the interrelationship of foreign affairs, ministerial
strife and parliamentary peace,
Our Parliament is undoubtedly a good one; and could the King’s servants
but agree in what is proper to be offer’d to them, I am confident they would
meet with no negative. But the perplexed and dangerous situation of affairs
abroad makes it very difficult to reconcile minds as to the proper remedy.
It was generally agreed that news of the situation abroad affected parliamentary
business.31 In addition, ministers were aware that foreign powers paid great
attention to parliamentary developments. In November 1740 Hardwicke made
this point in the House of Lords:
the weight His Majesty’s councils may have at present with the several
courts of Europe: and can anything add to this weight so much as a
prevailing opinion abroad, that there subsists an entire harmony between
His Majesty and his Parliament; that his people place an entire
confidence in his wisdom and conduct, and that the whole power of the
British nation will be applied as he shall think fit to direct it.
The following March Fleury and the French foreign minister Amelot discussed
Parliament with Anthony Thompson, Waldegrave’s chaplain, who was
responsible for British representation in Paris from November 1740 until the
rupture of diplomatic relations in March 1744, his low rank indicating the
poor state of relations. In 1743 Carteret wrote to Newcastle from The Hague
and attributed the “happy change in this Country since I was here in October
last” primarily to parliamentary developments,
They have a good opinion of the stability of our affairs in England,

which they had not when I was here last, but the great majority which
His Majesty had in Parliament all the last session had an excellent effect
here, and the more because it was not expected; this they have frankly
owned to me.
38
Carteret returned to the theme of the impact of domestic support on the

foreign perception of British strength and determination in 1762.32
It is clear from foreign diplomatic correspondence that European states did
indeed place great weight on Parliament, though it is apparent that continental
rulers did not find it easy to appreciate the workings of the Br itish
parliamentary system or the issues at stake. They were also conscious of the
significance of British ministerial instability. In March 1746 Villiers reported
from Berlin,
On the 2d inst. Count Podewils told me, that he was informed by a

courier from M.Andrie, that many of His Majesty’s principal Ministers
and high Officers of State had resigned their employments; which
extraordinary event he thought was very unfortunate, as it must retard
the dispatch of business in a most critical time, and might put our Allies
under great difficulties and doubts, very pernicious to England. He asked
who could tell but what the Dutch, dispirited by the loss of Brussels,
might now send orders to M.Twickel to sign immediately a peace, or a
neutrality, with France.
To Podewils’s suggestion that the ministerial change might affect British policy,
Villiers replied
that the noblemen, said to have flung up their posts, had ever been, and
were still I was convinced, so zealous for the present reigning family, that
it could in no respect relate to the unnatural rebellion in Great Britain,
or occasion the least alteration in the principles of our government with
regard to the King of Prussia.33
The impact of Parliament on the British ministry and on other states was the
most important instance of the influence on policy of the British system of
government. Another more nebulous sphere was that of the impact of the press
and of public opinion, especially in the major cities.34 There are important
conceptual problems in the discussion of public opinion. Public opinion on
foreign policy intersected most obviously with dissension over domestic
politics in the dispute over the role of Hanover and of Hanoverian troops, an
issue that was raised in Parliament, the press and within the ministry.35
It is difficult to assess the effects of the agitation. Opposition politicians
claimed that their moves to prevent a continuation of subsidies to Hanover
were popular. George Bubb Dodington warned the Commons in December
1743:
If every man in this House were to be silent upon that head the people
without doors would soon find out what tools they were made of; they
would soon perceive their being sacrificed to the interests and views of
39
Hanover; and this would render every honest man in the nation not only
discontented with our public measures, but disaffected to the illustrious
family now upon our throne; the necessary consequence of which would
be, that our present constitution must overturn our present establishment,
or our present establishment must overturn our present situation.
The following month, Sandwich called upon the Lords to heed the general
voice:
It may be hoped that these sentiments will be adopted, and these

resolutions formed by every man who hears, what is echoed through the
nation, that the British have been considered as subordinate to their own
mercenaries, mercenaries whose service was never rated at so high a
price before, and who never deserved even the petty price at which their
lives used to be valued; that foreign slaves were exalted above the
freemen of Great Britain, even by the King of Great Britain, and that on
all occasions, on which one nation could be preferred to the other, the
preference was given to the darling Hanoverians.
In the same debate, the Duke of Marlborough declared:
It is not possible to mention Hanover, or its inhabitants, in any public

place, without putting the whole house into a flame, and hearing on
every hand expressions of resentment, threats of revenge, or clamours of
detestation. Hanover is now become a name which cannot be mentioned
without provoking rage and malignity, and interrupting the discourse by
a digression of abhorrence.36
James, thirteenth Earl of Morton, a keen supporter of Sir Robert Walpole (by
this stage Earl of Orford), agreed that the people were opposed to the
continuance of the Hanoverian subsidies, but argued that “the man who would
gain the people’s favour by injuring their interest, is not a friend, but a
sycophant”. The Swedish scholar Kalm, visiting England on his way to America
in 1748, went on a trip from London to the countryside near Little Gaddesden
and “saw a watermill at one place, which differed in nothing from ours more
than that here there were quartered a frightful number of large rats, which they
called Hanoverian rats”. A sixpenny opposition ballad of 1744 claimed
Abroad our gallant Army fights

In Austria’s Cause, for G-rm-n Rights
By English Treasure fed
Hessians and Hano— too
The gainful Trade of War pursue,
With C—T [Carteret] at their Head.37
40
The Pelhams were probably encouraged in their opposition to Carteret’s

policies by the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary agitation, Chesterfield,
in opposition, praised Newcastle for his opposition to the Hanoverian
subsidies. Newcastle, however, was careful to maintain the formalities of
ministerial advice. In June 1745 he wrote to Harrington, then with George II
in Hanover, that the ministers in London offered suggestions “from a sense of
our duty to His Majesty, and a just concern for his service, and that of our
country”. The following month, the ministers emphasized their “duty to the
King” when pressing the importance of detaching Frederick II from France.38
The issue of Hanover is a good instance of the manner in which
eighteenth-century British foreign policy was debated widely. As royal concern
was most marked in the case of Hanoverian interests, the issue also provides an
opportunity to assess the role of the King in foreign policy and his strength in
domestic politics. In recent years there has been a substantial reassessment of
the role of the eighteenth-century British monarchy, with important work by
Blanning, Clark, Gregg, Hatton and Mackesy. Light is thrown on George II’s
influence in foreign affairs by work by Black, Dann and Owen.39 It could be
suggested that the ministerial instability of 1742–6, although it exposed
George to defeats in the field of domestic politics, in particular his failure to
support Carteret effectively in both 1744 and 1746, gave him more leeway in
the field of foreign policy than he would otherwise have possessed. It is
instructive to compare 1729, when the ministers in London sought to
influence George’s and Townshend’s negotiations in Hanover with the
Wittelsbachs, 1735 and 1741, when there was anxiety in London over George’s
negotiations whilst in Hanover, and 1743, when the impotence of the London
ministers was seen clearly. The extent to which ministers were forced to defend
the Hanoverian subsidies in the sessions of the 1740s is an indication of the
power of George, for there is little doubt about their disquiet on the subject.
The issue of Hanoverian subsidies was the public expression of much wider
disquiet about the influence of Hanover on British foreign policy and the role
of Hanover in British public life. Subsidies were an issue that could be readily
grasped and on which a popular campaign could be mounted.
It was, in contrast, far more difficult to debate the major impact of Hanover on
policy, namely, the attempts in 1744–7 to create an alliance directed against Prussia
that in some forms included the idea of a partial partition of Prussia. These
schemes, strongly supported by George II, could be defended on diplomatic
grounds. Prussia had shown that it was hostile to Britain and an unpredictable
force; her enmity to Austria distracted Austrian attention from the war with
France. In 1741 it had been hoped that a lasting Austro-Prussian settlement could
be negotiated. Horatio Walpole had written to Trevor of Frederick II, “Europe is
undone if he once joins heartily with France; and we must gain him as the only
way of salvation.” Trevor himself had noted that the Dutch were “sensible how
absurd, and unnatural it was for the Maritime Powers, unless in a case of the last
necessity, to come to any open breach with the House of Prussia”.40
41
George II was less prepared to tolerate Prussian aggrandizement. His

longstanding quarrel with Prussia was exacerbated by personal pique,
specifically the rejection of his patronage by his nephew, Frederick II. On 6
January 1741 George responded to the Prussian invasion of Silesia by telling
the Saxon envoy, Utterodt, that Frederick could not be trusted, that the flimsy
nature of his pretexts over Silesia meant that no one could feel secure in their
German possessions, that Hanover was exposed and that Frederick was a ruler
for whom ambition and aggrandizement were the sole guides. Opposition to
Prussia became George’s leitmotif in the war, but it never became one of the
British war aims, in so far as the latter were ever officially articulated. Frederick
was convinced, with reason, that George worked secretly to defeat his British
ministry’s efforts for better Anglo-Prussian relations.41
If ministerial speeches in Parliament can be taken as a source for war aims,
then it is clear that opposition to Prussia was never given the priority that
France enjoyed, although there is no doubt that many politicians and, in
particular, diplomats became very concerned about Prussian policy. Hardwicke
wrote of the 1744 Prussian invasion of Bohemia,
That your Ladyship may see Monsr. de Prusse’s reasons for disturbing
both the queen of Hungary’s repose and mine, I take the liberty to send
you inclosed one of his authentic manifestos, printed at Berlin, which he
has dignified with the new affected title of Exposé. But new ways of
acting require new terms to justify them; and he must find out still more,
before he will be able to convince the world that perfidy is Patriotism, or
that an enterprize manifestly concerted in time and manner only to create
a diversion in favour of France, was design’d merely to preserve the
rights of the Germanic Body and its head.
However, the London ministers urged the subordination of opposition to Prussia

to the war with France, Newcastle writing in 1745, “We are sensible, that many
arguments may be used, to shew, how desirable it would be, for the good of
Europe, to reduce the power of the King of Prussia: But, as we humbly apprehend,
there cannot be shewed any possibility of doing it at present; all those arguments
are out of the question.”42 Flemming, the influential Saxon envoy in London,
argued in 1745, in a dispatch intercepted and deciphered by the British ministry,
that the only way to get Britain to act against Prussia, as the Saxons wished, was by
co-operating behind a “mask” that stressed the French threat. Newcastle regarded
moves against Prussia as a dangerous diversion:
how little…was to be expected from France, if the King of Prussia was

not previously detached…We are sensible, that many arguments may be
used to shew, how desirable it would be for the good of Europe, to
reduce the power of the King of Prussia: But as we humbly apprehend,
there cannot be shewed any possibility of doing it at present; all these
42
arguments are out of the Question…the Question appears to us, not to

be, whether the King of Prussia shall retain Silesia, or not; But whether
H.M. and the States should have the merit of obtaining it for him.43
The ambiguity in British aims, which essentially put George II in opposition

to most of his ministers, was matched by one within the alliance. Austria was
most concerned with Prussia, and, as Robinson had warned in August 1744,
was ready to consider a unilateral peace with France in order to concentrate
her efforts against Prussia.44 Uneasy about Austro-French peace feelers, the
British ministry was very concerned about the military consequences of
Austria’s priorities, the withdrawal of Charles of Lorraine from the Rhine in
1744 in order to confront Frederick and the poor state of Austrian forces in the
Austr ian Netherlands. 45 Austr ian policy prefigured the “Diplomatic
Revolution” of 1756 and represented a continuation, to a certain degree, of the
preoccupation with east-central Europe that had played such a major role in
Austrian policy in 1726–33, and of the Austro-French alliance of 1735–41.
Newcastle complained in August 1745,
the behavior of the Queen of Hungary, in totally abandoning the

Netherlands; and the refusal of the Court of Brussels to let the places
there have the defence, which the nature of their situation gives them, by
the inundation; have raised here the utmost resentment against the Court
of Vienna, and rendered their cause much less popular, than it formerly
had been. And when it shall be known, that the Court of Vienna has
formally refused to lessen the number of their enemies, at present so
numerous, by making up with the King of Prussia, and persist in
pursuing their own particular views, and interests, at the expence of their
allies, there will be very little room for them to hope for any assistance
from this country in the support of those measures.
Trevor hoped that the Austrians would send troops to the Austrian Netherlands
in order to “sweeten humours in England”. When in September 1747,
Sandwich, British Minister Plenipotentiary at the peace talks at Breda, had a
long conversation with his French counterpart, Puyzieulx, he did not hide
British anger at Austrian conduct. The following month George II told Ossorio
that he was totally fed up with the Austrians.46
Such attitudes were not new. In the late 1730s the British responded to the
Austro-French alignment by hoping that relations with Prussia and Russia
could be improved and by talking of a Protestant alliance. As the Russians were
not Catholics, they could be incorporated into the idea of a Protestant alliance.
Frederick II’s policies made such a solution difficult during the 1740s, though
there was still considerable press support for the idea of a Prussian alliance. The
renewed efforts devoted to winning Russian support at the end of the war
were a response to both suspicion of Prussia and anger with Austria.
43
Part of the problem in assessing the 1740s is psychological. The War of the
Austrian Succession lacked the heroic qualities and the successes of the War of
the Spanish Succession and the Seven Years’ War. It appears to many to be of
limited significance. Such a view is a false one. The conflict was of great
importance in European international relations, British policy and the British
public debate about foreign policy, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In
domestic British politics the war was of major significance, as is shown in the
chapters on the Crown and on Parliament. It was a vital element in ministerial
and parliamentary politics, and in the crucial issue of the relationship between
the Crown and the rest of the political system.
44
Chapter Four
Anglo-French relations,
1740–56
When it is once taken God knows what will be the consequence, but the
least bad must be bad enough.
—Chesterfield on impending fall of Bergen-op-Zoom, 17471
the taking the proper measures for maintaining and improving the Old
Alliance…only solid system of Europe…I am afraid your Royal Highness
will find this more difficult with our friends in England, than your Royal
Highness imagines, I doubt the great objection to me and my politics is
my known and firm resolution never to vary from that principle
—Newcastle to Cumberland, November 17482
Any account of how Britain achieved naval and colonial mastery by 1763 must
necessar ily include a discussion of such matters as naval strength and
administration, military planning, the neutrality of Spain until 1761 and the
too-oft overlooked question of respective financial strengths.3 It is important to
remember the role of chance, not least in the defeat of the French invasion
plans of 1759 at Lagos and Quiberon Bay. It is also necessary to look at the
objectives of British policy and power, not least the deter mination to
concentrate resources on North America. This constituted an obvious contrast
with Britain’s previous conflict, her participation in the War of the Austrian
Succession. Britain signalled her commitment to fight in 1742 by sending
troops to the Austrian Netherlands, whereas in 1755 she ordered her ships to
prevent the despatch of French reinforcements to Canada. In 1743 Britain’s
military effort had centred on the western parts of the Empire, where George
II fought an unexpected battle at Dettingen, in 1744–8 on the unsuccessful
defence of the Low Countries.
In the Seven Years’ War, in contrast, there was no possibility of Britain
defending the Low Countries. The Austrian-ruled Netherlands were then
allied to France, while the United Provinces were neutral. As an ally of
45
Frederick II and in order to protect Hanover, British troops did campaign in

Ger many from 1758, 4 but the military commitment to the Continent
was relatively far less than in the previous war. This was due to the interwar
shift in British views on foreign policy, and indeed on Britain’s place in the
world.
Another shift was that in Anglo-French relations. The two powers had
been allied in 1713–14 and 1716–31. Thereafter relations were poor for a
decade, but conflict was avoided, both dur ing the War of the Polish
Succession (1733–5) and on account of the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish
War of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739. 5 However, from 1742 until 1763 relations were
dominated by war and the threat of war. The cross-currents and ambiguities
that had affected British diplomacy and debate about foreign policy in 1713–
31, with Austria, Spain and Russia at times appearing as serious threats, were
replaced from the early 1740s by a concentration on France that was to last
until after the Napoleonic wars despite inter national changes and a
ministerial anti-Russian interlude in 1789–91 during a period of French
weakness.6 Though not to the same extent, British enmity rose as a priority
for French foreign policy.
Two other important topics can be discerned in a consideration of Anglo-
French relations in 1740–55. The first is the causes of war, for Britain and
France went to war twice in this period, though in the second case formal
hostilities were not declared until the French invasion of Minorca in 1756.
Secondly, the per iod invites consideration of the relationship between
shortterm developments in international relations and those in the longue dureé.
It also invites discussion of the extent to which an international system existed
and the relationship between that, the activities of particular states and the
actions and views of individual monarchs and ministers.
There have been valuable studies of British public7 and ministerial8 attitudes
towards mid-century foreign policy, including two centring on changing
attitudes towards colonial commitments.9 However, there is room for a fresh
re-examination of the subject based both on a wide range of manuscript
sources and on the contemporary word of print, and by looking at the situation
against the background of a period when hostility to France and concern
about the colonies had not been axiomatic.
Indeed the impetus behind British foreign policy in the years 1714–39 had
been distinctly continental rather than specifically anti-French. This owed
much to a generally unwanted feature of the Protestant Succession, the defence
of Hanover, which had aroused considerable public debate.10 However, though
the Hanoverian Succession altered the political context of the debate about
Britain’s relations with the Continent and specifically interventionalism, the
essential direction of British policy had been laid by William III following his
invasion of 1688, the most successful early moder n example of the
combination of domestic intrigue and external intervention. 11 William had
ensured that Britain would be concerned about continental developments,
46
ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS, 1740–56
specifically French progress, though the negotiation with Louis XIV of the
partition treaties for the Spanish Succession in 1698 and 1700 demonstrated
that this did not have to be through conflict. This was to be underlined in
1713–14, in the brief period of co-operation that followed the Peace of
Utrecht, in 1716–31 during the Anglo-French alliance, and in 1734–5, in the
negotiations at The Hague during the War of the Polish Succession. There was
no obvious reason why this pattern should not be maintained: r ivalry
moderated or even diminished by negotiations, but such a pattern did not
characterize Anglo-French relations during the period 1740–55, and when it
was next seriously attempted, in 1772–3, in response to the First Partition of
Poland, it rapidly proved a non-starter.12
The failure to ease relations in mid-century was not due to the French. As
in 1772–3 and 1786, it was the French who launched the major attempt to
improve relations, that made by their foreign minister, Puysieulx, in the
aftermath of the War of the Austrian Succession. There was no comparable
effort by the French in Walpole’s last years as minister or when he fell in
1742, but the situation then was hardly auspicious. France trod a difficult
course in 1739–40, neither seeking to tie her foreign policy to the interests
or quixotic policies of her ally, Philip V, by joining him in his war with
Britain, nor wishing to needlessly antagonize Spain or, more dangerously,
allow Br itain to make major Car ibbean gains by maintaining a str ict
neutrality. The message that France did not wish to see such gains was
delivered and backed up by the dispatch of Antin and a powerful French fleet
to the West Indies in 1740.
However, the British ministry, under the pressure of a bellicose public
opinion that had played a role, albeit not the sole one, in leading to war with
Spain, 13 was in no position to accept French guidance, let alone French
mediation. Waldegrave made it clear to Newcastle that French restraint owed a
lot to Fleury, “I can observe no disposition in him to quarrel with us, adding
they know, they cannot undertake anything against us, but at a great expense
and hazard; for they cannot depend upon any support from Spain.” Fleury told
Waldegrave that “he was under a sort of necessity of having everything done
under his eye, hinting that he could not be sure any other way, that his
directions would be followed”.14
Whether or not an understanding could have been reached with France
over the Caribbean in 1740, there was no basis for one over the Austrian
Succession, once Fleury’s pacific inclinations had been swept aside. Frederick
II’s invasion of Silesia suddenly and unexpectedly made international relations
more volatile and abruptly increased the opportunities, the stakes and the
dangers, not least the danger that, by not acting, France would not only be
unable to advance her own interests but would lose the possible support of
other powers. This raised volatility increased the pressure for action on Fleury.
Just as in Britain politicians had to consider the possibility that Walpole would
not survive the Parliament due to be elected in the elections of 1741, so the
47
octogenarian Fleury appeared an inappropriate first minister for a period of

opportunity.
As French policy moved towards war with Austria, the scope for any
AngloFrench understanding diminished. This was highlighted by the
domestic political situation in Britain. When in 1741 the threat of a French
invasion of Westphalia led George II to sign a neutrality convention for
Hanover, abandoning his attempts to create an anti-Prussian alliance and
agreeing to vote for the French-supported Charles Albert of Bavaria as next
Emperor, in short accepting a French-inspired German settlement, this
caused a political storm in Britain and was not welcomed by the British
ministry. Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied George II to
Hanover, informed Thompson that the Convention “is purely an Electoral
affair, and does not in the least tie up His Majesty’s hands, as King, or engage
him to anything relating to his future conduct, as such, or to the affairs of
England”. 15
This constitutional distinction convinced few in 1741; no more than it was
to do so at the time of the Fürstenbund (anti-Austrian League of German
princes) in 1785. Politically the episode was charged with significance. It was
believed to provide concrete demonstration of the way in which Hanover
controlled British policy. The domestic storm over the episode, and the manner
in which the new ministry that replaced that of Walpole in 1742 pressed
successfully for the abandonment of the Convention, set the tone for Anglo-
Hanoverian relations for the rest of George II’s reign. It was made clear that
Britain could not be bound publicly by a Hanoverian arrangement, and that
even the suggestion that such was a possibility had to be avoided. This was a
marked contrast both to the period of George I’s diplomacy in the Great
Northern War and to the episode in 1729 when British support had been
promised against a threatened Prussian attack on Hanover.16 George II was
forced to conceal his anti-Prussian diplomacy in the latter stages of the War of
the Austrian Succession. In addition, in 1757 the Convention of Klosterseven,
by which Cumberland, commander of the Army of Observation that had failed
to defend Hanover against a superior French force, agreed to disband the army,
was disowned by George II under pressure from his British ministers, despite
the fact that the army included no British troops.17
The reception of the neutrality convention of 1741, and later of Klosters-
even, demonstrated that it would be impossible to arrange an understanding
between Britain and France through Hanover or by threatening Hanover.
British ministers were not open to suggestions or pressure this way, or at least
did not wish to be, and most, but not all, British ministers were not interested
in centring Britain’s foreign policy on the defence of Hanover. This was a
marked contrast to the role of the Hanoverian minister Münchhausen in 1748
in fostering the idea of British diplomatic intervention in the Empire in order
to create a collective security system aimed against France and Prussia, an idea
48
that was to serve as the basis of the Imperial Election Scheme but that would
also protect Hanover.18
The failure to maintain pressure on George II via Hanover served like the
fall of Walpole to exacerbate Anglo-French relations in 1742. It would be
wrong to attribute this to France. She could no more control British politics
than prevent Frederick II from settling with Austria, thus altering the military
balance in the Empire, to the advantage of Hanover and the detriment of
Bavaria. Louis XIV might have helped to bring down Charles II’s leading
minister Danby, but Britain in 1741–2 was a different political world to 1678–
9. In 1741 the French envoy Bussy denied reports that France had sought to
finance opposition electoral activity.19 While it was in France’s interest for
Britain to be weak, and there was also much support for the Jacobites in
French political circles, it was not in French interest for the Walpole ministry
to be replaced by the more bellicose opposition Whigs.
If political attitudes made compromise with France difficult in 1740–42, it
is reasonable to consider the source and strength of these attitudes, for anti-
French feeling dur ing the war s of 1689–1713 had not prevented a
subsequent reconciliation. A major problem was that the Anglo-French
alliance of 1716–31 had not been based on empathy and had put down no
political roots. This was even more true of the attempts to improve relations
in the 1730s, and in not only The Hague conferences of 1734–5 but also the
discussions of 1736–7: the suggestions of co-operation over the Jülich-Berg
question, the replacement of the provocative French envoy Chavigny by the
more conciliatory Cambis, the British attempt to bribe the French foreign
minister Chauvelin—all had been part of the world of largely secret
diplomacy. There had been no ministerial defence of good relations with
France, no attempt to explain the need for an understanding with her. The
ministry’s public position had not been helped by divisions within the
government over neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession and by the
need to rely on essentially prudential reasons when defending Br itish
neutrality. As a result, the public debate over foreign policy in 1733–5 had
been largely surrendered to the opposition, as it was also to be at the time of
the controversy over Spanish depredations on British trade in 1738–9; or at
least they had been able to take the initiative with their reiterated and related
charges of ministerial failure to defend national interests and a serious
deterioration in international relations.
The French refusal to press their military and diplomatic advantages in the
1730s20 had ensured that there was then no international crisis leading Britain
close to war in which the British ministry would be forced to take note of
domestic political views, as it was obliged to do over Spanish depredations.
During the War of the Polish Succession, the neutrality of the Austrian
Netherlands had been respected, and Belle-Isle’s successful campaign in the
Moselle valley in 1734 had not been followed up by an invasion of northern
49
Germany. In order to obtain peace with Austria in 1735, France had allowed
her alliance with Spain to collapse.
In 1741, however, the situation was very different. In place of the distant
throne of Poland, the integrity of the Habsburg inheritance was at stake. The
French might respect the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands until 1744,
thus denying the British the most obvious invasion route into France, but it
was not clear that this respect would last, while elsewhere a comprehensive
recasting of the European system appeared to be a prospect. This apparently
vindicated hostile British views of France and made the task of suggesting any
accommodation with her impossible, despite the fact that Britain was already
involved in a popular war with another power, Spain, and that, as was pointed
out, opposition to France would necessarily reduce the effort made against
Spain. The Commons motion of 1741 for a subsidy to Maria Theresa saw both
government and opposition speakers in harmony. Walpole’s protégé Pelham,
then Paymaster General, warned of
what may be expected from an emperor whose elevation was procured

by the forces of France…they may all conspire to dismember the empire
into petty kingdoms, and free themselves from the dread of a formidable
neighbour, by erecting a number of diminutive sovereigns, who may be
always courting the assistance of their protectors…Thus will the House,
by which Europe has been hitherto protected, sink into an empty name,
and we shall be left to stand alone against all the powers that profess a
different religion, and whose interest is opposite to that of Great Britain.
William Pulteney, the leader of the opposition Whigs in the Commons, replied,
“I shall not delay, for a single moment, my consent to any measures that may
re-establish our interest on the continent, and rescue Germany once more
from the jaws of France.”21
That May, however, Bussy sent a lengthy report to Amelot, explaining why it
was in the British interest to try to negotiate differences with France. He
pointed out British vulnerability to invasion, the financial strains of war and
the difficulties of relying on Austria, and suggested that it would be in Britain’s
interest to settle the pretensions of the various claimants on the Austrian
succession jointly with France.22 This vision of Anglo-French cooperation was
to be offered on a number of occasions during the century, but, as in 1741, it
ignored not only British domestic political pressures but also the state of
international relations. There was no basis of trust in Anglo-French relations, a
situation exacerbated in 1741 by the suspicion that France was supporting the
Jacobites.23 Nevertheless, despite the absence of any AngloFrench co-operation,
Bussy argued that the fall of Walpole would be bad for France. He stressed
national antipathy to France, in contrast to Chavigny, who had stressed popular
hostility to Walpole in his reports in the 1730s. On 1 January 1742 Bussy wrote
of the hostile views of the nation towards France and the black jealousy with
50
which French superiority was seen, especially at sea, and doubted that France
could find a more favourable ministry.24
It might therefore be asked whether the move towards Anglo-French
hostilities should be seen as inevitable, a necessary consequence of Walpole’s
fall in early 1742 and the rise of Carteret and of Stair, men who in 1723 had
been referred to as members of la cabale autrichienne by the French charge
d’affaires.25 In qualification of this view it should be pointed out that the two
powers did not formally declare war until 1744 and that eighteenth-century
international conflicts included numerous instances of incomplete hostilities,
combatants who were not at war with all their allies’ enemies or who were
fighting as auxiliaries only. There was also the obvious points of political choice
and international circumstances. In 1742 the new ministry had the choice of
escalating the war with Spain, over which Walpole had been criticized for not
prosecuting it vigorously enough, or of sending military forces to the
Continent to oppose France in a commitment whose future extent it would be
difficult to envisage or control. International circumstances might not be
propitious for British intervention, though Austrian successes in the winter of
1741–2 helped to encourage a sense that the French might have been
overambitious.
The unpredictable nature of the situation and the extent to which a
measure that might appear clear in its likely meaning and/or consequences was
not necessarily so to contemporaries were suggested in a letter written by John
Drummond MP, an important figure in London mercantile circles who had
been a supporter of Walpole and was now one of the new government. He
mentioned the British troops to be sent to the Austrian Netherlands, adding
“this shows our readiness to do our duty to the Queen of Hungary and to
secure the Barrier of which our King is guarantee…this will rather prevent a
war with France than bring it on”.26
Bussy promptly warned Paris that the new ministry intended to assist
Austr ia, 27 though the rumours that flourished in the volatile political
atmosphere that accompanied and followed the fall of Walpole ensured that
contrary reports were received, including the inaccurate suggestion that an
envoy, possibly Chesterfield, would be sent to Paris to attempt to negotiate a
peace favourable to Maria Theresa.28 The French ministry was, however, under
no illusions about the intentions of the new ministers, Amelot writing to the
French envoy in Madrid that the government was considering the state of its
frontier defences.29
An important feature of the discussions about Anglo-French relations in this
period, especially at ministerial level, was that they centred on the state of
continental affairs. There was scant consideration either of Anglo-French
relations in the colonies or the impact on them of conflict between the two
powers. Indeed, one consequence of the events of 1742 was a move away from
concern with the colonies. Not only was the Caribbean war with Spain
substantially abandoned, but the fact that Britain and France were not formally
51
at war, but were instead involved as auxiliaries, limited the possibilities of trans-
oceanic confrontation between them. As Thomas Anson pointed out in 1743,
“We have been fighting all summer in Germany with the French, without a
war.” At that stage, there was no conflict between the two powers in North
America, the West Indies or the Indian Ocean.
Carteret set out the objectives of the new ministry clearly in a letter to Stair
of May 1742,
His Majesty and this whole nation being fully convinced that it is upon
the preservation of the House of Austria in a condition to resist the
mischievous attempts of that of Bourbon, that the maintenance of the
common liberties of Europe, the support of the Empire, the continuance
of the Protestant religion, and the security and independence of both the
Maritime Powers [Britain and the Dutch] do chiefly depend.30
Thus Br itish interests were to be identified with a particular state of

continental affairs, one that in the circumstances of 1742 dictated conflict with
France. This was a radical shift from Walpolean precepts and indeed from
William III’s willingness to settle the Spanish Succession with Louis XIV
without consulting the Austrians, although Carteret, in his successful pressure
on the Austrians to yield territory to Prussia and Sardinia, was to reveal that his
view of the “preservation of the House of Austria” was not that held in Vienna.
Stair was also clear about his anti-French views, writing in June 1741, while in
opposition,
I was always of opinion that it was absolutely necessary for the very
being of this nation to support a balance of power in Europe, and that it
was the interest of this nation to be on the side of the House of Austria,
both because the House of Austria was the weakest, and because the
House of Austria was not our rivals in trade, nor could be our rivals in
point of power at sea.
In office the following May, Stair wrote to Robinson,
I have never been nor understood to be a partisan of the House of

Bourbon; I have almost always had occasion to consider that House as
too strong, and therefore I have been of opinion, that it was the interest
of the king and of the nation of Great Britain, to put their weight into
the scale of the House of Austria; this doctrine I have preached at a time
when it was neither safe nor fashionable so to do, I think so still.
In 1757 the Earl of Holder nesse, Secretary of State for the Northern
Department, described France as “the constant…enemy of England”.31 Such
remarks might suggest an immutable hatred of France located firmly in a longue
52
dureé of attitudes that constituted an important factor in the structure of British

foreign policy, but Carteret and Stair, like Newcastle, who was to organize a
continental anti-French diplomatic strategy of containment in 1748–55, had
held responsible posts during the period of the Anglo-French alliance, Carteret
and Newcastle as Secretaries of State and Stair as envoy in Paris. Carteret and
Stair had eventually fallen in large part because of their views, while Newcastle
had keenly supported the reconciliation with Austria in 1731, but all had been
prepared to act in accordance with the alliance.
This willingness and the subsequent vigour and str idency of their
antiFrench views can be considered from a number of aspects. In the 1720s and
1730s France definitely became a more vigorous, powerful and diplomatically
active power, the contrast between her military forces at the time of the War of
the Quadruple Alliance with Spain (1718–20) and during the War of the Polish
Succession (1733–5) being especially instructive. Thus, a rational explanation of
views changing in response to alterations in international relations can be
advanced, though it scarcely testifies to the quasi-emotional force of the
arguments advanced. It is also possible to locate a shift in the British political
context. In its early days, the Anglo-French alliance had appeared to be closely
linked to the Hanoverian Succession, as indeed it was. The French had refused
to support Jacobite schemes and the Pretender had been unable to base himself
near Paris, as he had done under Louis XIV. After the suppression of the
Jacobite Atterbury Plot of 1722 the Succession appeared to be less under
threat, a view confirmed by George II’s peaceful accession in 1727 and by the
Jacobite failure to benefit markedly from the Anglo-French breach of 1731.32
This encouraged a consideration of national interests that did not centre on the
defence of the Hanoverian Succession and thus, diplomatically, on the
maintenance of the Anglo-French entente. That entente had not of course been
solely intended or maintained for that purpose, but royal and ministerial
concern about the defence both of Hanover and of the Hanoverian Succession
had given it an impetus and located it in the world of domestic politics.
The other important reason for a shift in consciousness was the
development and definition of opposition Whig views. There had been
opposition Whigs before 1725, both in 1717–20 and in the Cowper Group of
the early 1720s.33 They had not, however, concentrated their attacks on foreign
policy, largely because there were more tempting targets: the radical domestic
programme of the Stanhope—Sunderland ministry and the attempt to “screen”
the South Sea Company. The “new” opposition that began in 1725 devoted far
more attention to foreign policy. This was a measure of Walpolean caution in
domestic policy, the sense that policy could now be criticized without
accusations of Jacobitism and a growing concern about the implications of
British foreign policy. It was one thing to fight Spain and seek to resist the
advance of Russia in the late 1710s, quite another to appear ready in alliance
with France to attack Austria after the negotiation of the Treaty of Hanover in
1725. Support for Austria was to be the central theme of opposition Whig
53
thinking on foreign policy. It was glanced at in the pseudonymous name of the

author of the Craftsman, the most influential opposition newspaper, Caleb
d’Anvers (of Antwerp, a leading town in the Austrian Netherlands), and
repeated in press and Parliament.
As a cause, support for Austria lacked the immediacy, emotional fervour and
populist possibilities of the Spanish depredations on British trade, which were
to create political difficulties for Walpole in 1729 and 1738–9, but it did offer
a means to analyze international relations and British foreign policy while
providing a historical framework that linked the opposition critique to the
anti-French Whig heroes, William III and Marlborough. These views were
developed in 1725–42 without having to confront the reality of difficulties in
Anglo-Austrian relations.34 They were to guide foreign policy from 1742 until
1755, providing the crucial politically acceptable or plausible continental
anchor for an interventionalist diplomacy that support for Hanover and
opposition to Prussia could not offer, as George II was made to realize.
Carteret and Stair, therefore, acted with the vigour of men who had been
preaching in the political wilderness for a long time a policy that suddenly
seemed to be both really necessary and possible, thanks to a happy combination
of domestic and international circumstances. In such a situation, talk of Anglo-
French ar rangements and negotiations appeared both dangerous and
superfluous, and Carteret failed to follow up discussions with Bussy in March
1742.35 This was to remain the case until difficulties and failure in war and
growing problems with allies lent urgency to the possibility of peace
negotiations. It was believed that France could not afford a long war,36 and the
French were well aware of the determination of the new ministry. In June 1742
Amelot wrote to Fénelon, the French envoy at The Hague, that France wanted
peace, but did not doubt that the principal opposition would arise from the
British, who, he wrote, wanted “rétablir la Cour de Vienne dans son ancienne
splendeur, mais qui de plus sont animés contre la France d’une fureur qui va
jusqu’ au fanatisme”. Fénelon, employing language similar to that which the
British opposition had used against France for several years, wrote that Britain
wished “se rendre arbitre despotique des affaires de l’Europe”.37
The mood in Britain in the summer of 1742 was optimistic. Drummond
wrote in June, “our present great comfort is the King of Prussia’s
accommodation with…the Queen of Hungary [Maria Theresa] and her
Hungarian Majesty’s forces good success against the French and their allies in
the Empire …our army which is shipping off with all expedition…will be
increased if necessary”. George Harbin added in August,
If our politicians have good intelligence, the French are to be driven out
of Germany: confined to their own country: Germany to be parcelled
out to confederate princes: The new works of Dunkirk entirely to be
demolished: and the ambition of France rendered incapable of disturbing
the peace of Europe for some ages.38
54
This optimism flew in the face of the recent experience of the war with Spain,
namely deflated hopes, but reflected the hopes of a new government and an
apparently propitious international situation.
Optimism was to last until late 1743, when the failure to exploit Dettingen,
the realization that the issue of f avour for Hanover would cause a
parliamentary storm and growing divisions within the ministry over Carteret’s
failure to consult his colleagues all led to an appreciation of the domestic
political implications of the war. The following year, the international situation
deteriorated when France supported the Jacobites openly, Britain became a
pr incipal in the conflict and Freder ick II’s attack on Austr ia f atally
handicapped her war effort against France and, therefore, her ability to further
Britain’s goals.
The British found, as the French had earlier done, both in the War of
Spanish Succession and in that of the Austrian Succession, that the window of
opportunity created by favourable diplomatic and domestic circumstances in
the early stages of a conflict could not survive the problems and exigencies of
alliance politics and the pressure of failure. The British lost the ability to
determine how far they should intervene because interests they judged vital
were directly affected by French support for the Jacobites and by successful
French military action in the Austrian Netherlands. In October 1743 the
veteran diplomat Horatio Walpole sent his former protégé Trevor, now envoy
in The Hague, the accurate prediction that the ministry would survive
parliamentary attacks “but yet I don’t see so clearly as I could wish how we
shall make a good end of this war”. Carteret was needlessly optimistic about
the value of Britain’s alliances and her relative diplomatic strength vis-à-vis
France, although necessarily so from his own point of view as his views about
France had not diminished in their intensity and he argued that it was crucial
to maintain a balance of power against her. Carteret told the House of Lords in
December 1743
there is an enemy at once nearer and more powerful, an enemy which

equally in peace and war endeavours our destruction, and whose trade
and armies are equally to be dreaded; an enemy so artful, that even the
utmost friendship which can subsist between us, is only an intermission
of open hostilities.39
However attractive this view might be for a domestic audience, especially at a

time when Carteret was trying to restore his domestic credentials in the face of
criticism for apparently favouring Hanover, it was one that was to cause
considerable difficulties for British foreign policy. The argument that France
could not be trusted limited Britain’s room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis both her
allies and France, and that at a time both when wars generally ended as a result
of unilateral negotiations and when such negotiations were common during a
war.40 British intransigence also made subsequent compromise at a time of
55
peace politically less palatable, and encouraged the French to concentrate their
efforts against Britain, in particular by supporting the Jacobites in 1744–6.41
French support for the Jacobites was the immediate cause of the formal
outbreak of war in 1744, just as the French attack on Minorca was to be in
1756. In neither case were these immediate causes the first instance of fighting,
let alone of confrontation or hostility between the two powers. In both cases,
they were of importance, however, because there was no sharp divide between
war and peace in this period, but rather a continuum, including states of
undeclared war, that could enable powers to retain a degree of freedom of
choice about their commitment to the struggle. A formal declaration of war
lessened this dramatically, as well as ensuring that a conflict would have to be
waged in order to obtain the best peace terms. French support for the Jacobites
was an unambiguous declaration of hostility, and one that caused Britain very
considerable problems in 1744–6. It marked the culmination of Jacobite
aspirations and the French recognition that their conflict with Britain was not
a limited war subject to limitations and compromise. By supporting the
Jacobites, the French were seeking a radical solution, a total victory both
diplomatically and militarily, in stark contrast to the usual portrayal of ancien
régime warfare and international relations as limited in their aim.
The 1744 war was a failure, a French invasion attempt thwarted more by
Channel storms than by the British navy, but French successes in the Austrian
Netherlands the following year offered the prospect of a militarily more secure
road to victory. Rather than relying on the vagaries of wind and naval success,
as in 1744, or on the unpredictable nature of the relationship between George
II and his British ministers by threatening Hanover, as in 1741, and as was
suggested again in May 1745,42 it was clearly possible for the French to achieve
success in the Low Countries. Chesterfield reflected in July 1745,
I look upon Flanders now as gone and whatever else the French have a
mind to, as going. Where then are we? What will our friend Louis XV say
to us? I fear he will think himself in a situation to dictate, rather than
propose. The only way therefore in my opinion to converse with
him upon equal terms is first to whisper and agree with Antimac
[Frederick II].
Newcastle was struck by the melancholy and almost desperate situation of

things in every part of Europe.43
In that situation the government was willing to negotiate with France,
though the ministers in London expressed a clear preference for settling with
Prussia first, Newcastle writing in July 1745,
were it possible to flatter ourselves with the hopes of making a tolerable

general peace under these disadvantageous circumstances, it would,
undoubtedly, be best of all; and as we consider the detaching of France, in
56
no other light, than that of making a general peace; it is from the

difficulty, or impossibility, of doing this, at present, upon tolerable terms,
that we give the preference to that which we think may be obtained, vizt
an accommodation with the King of Prussia.44
The context, ministerial correspondence in a period of anxiety about a

deteriorating military situation rather than a parliamentary statement designed
to elicit support, was different, but Newcastle’s language was not that of
Carteret, who had indeed been forced out in February 1744 by opposition
from his fellow ministers. Newcastle’s language was that of prudential
assessment, of finding the best time for successful negotiations. He was willing
to support talks through Bussy, while writing “no kind of judgment can be
formed either as to the real intentions of the court of France, to come to an
accommodation at all; or, if they were so disposed, as to the conditions upon
which that accommodation was to be made”. 45 However, the prospect of
exploratory talks was swept aside by the ‘45, the landing of Bonnie Prince
Charlie in Scotland and his subsequent invasion of England. There is no
scholarly account of Anglo-French discussions or negotiations during the war,
with the exception of Lodge’s book, which concentrates on the last years of
the war and omits French and many British sources.46 The very infrequency of
earlier direct contacts suggests that hostility between the two powers had
become one of the most pronounced elements in international relations.
The events of 1745–6 set the tone for the rest of the war. The French-
supported Jacobites were unable to challenge the Hanoverian Succession
successfully, although the British government remained concerned about
Jacobite schemes for the remainder of the war. Conversely, the British and their
allies were unable to defeat the French in the Low Countries, and by 1747 the
French had successfully invaded the United Provinces, an ample demonstration
of the strength and success of the French military machine. Hopes that the
British-supported Orangist takeover of Holland and Zeeland in 1747 would
lead to a great strengthening of the Dutch state, closer relations with Britain
and a revival of the anti-French alliance, proved misplaced.
The French success further exacerbated the security situation in Britain.
Newcastle’s private secretary, Andrew Stone, wrote from Whitehall in August
1745,
We hope we shall soon have a pretty strong squadron in the Channel: But
I know too well, the great delays and uncertaintys that service is liable to,
to depend very much upon it. When Ostend is gone (as it will soon be)
I tremble to think of the constant alarms we shall be subject to; and of
the effects those alarms will naturally produce.47
Indeed Ostend, a possible invasion base, fell to the French soon after.
Any peace would have to be a compromise. The dream of a dictated peace,
57
such as Louis XIV had nearly been brought to accept in 1709–10, was clearly
no longer on the agenda. However, the realization that peace would have to
entail compromise helped to awaken divisions within Britain over foreign
policy. These centred on what should be the top priority in the peace
negotiations. Essentially the clash was one of America versus the Continent (of
Europe), national interests versus those of allies and the maintenance of a
collective security system. Such a contrast in Anglo-French relations was new,
although there was a significant precedent in Anglo-Spanish relations. By the
Treaty of Seville in 1729 the Walpole ministry had agreed to support Philip V’s
interests in Italy, against the wishes of Austria and her British supporters, in
order both to seal the dissolution of the Austro-Spanish alliance of 1725 (the
Treaty of Vienna) and to obtain a satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Spanish
differences, particularly over Caribbean trade. However, this was not a case of
the British government prefering maritime to continental interests, because the
logic of the British alliance system, especially the alliance with France, dictated
an effort to win over Spain and such an effort required a settlement of
commercial and colonial differences.
In contrast, Anglo-French colonial disputes had played little role in
AngloFrench relations, either in the wars of 1689–1713 or in the creation,
course and collapse of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31. The opposition
attempt to inspire a parliamentary storm in 1730 over French aggression in St
Lucia had failed. Concern over French schemes in the West Indies lacked the
political resonance and popular interest aroused by Spanish policies there or, in
1730, by French works at Dunkirk.
The situation was to be very different by the late 1740s. The retention of
Cape Breton Island and the French base of Louisbourg on the island was to be
a major political issue in 1745–8. The capture of Louisbourg, the leading
French fortress guarding the approaches to Canada, was popular in Britain,
Philip Yorke writing to his brother Joseph in August 1745 “the surrender of
Cape Breton has put our merchants in high spirits…being the best managed
expedition of any that has been undertaken during the whole course of the
war”. Its capture had been suggested to the Privy Council in 1740.48 Aside
from the intrinsic importance of the gain, the political climate was propitious
for a new stress on the value of colonial conquests. By 1745 both public and
ministerial disenchantment with Britain’s allies, continental commitments and
the role of Hanover were all far advanced. The hope that the fall of Carteret in
1744 would both ease these concerns over Britain’s continental policy and
would lessen George II’s zeal for both Hanover and anti-Prussian policies was
not realized. Old England, a leading London opposition newspaper, painted a
dire picture in August 1745,
we may soon expect to see England the wretched appendix of a

despicable corner of Germany; we may expect to see the Hanoverian
sergeants beating up for recruits on the streets of London, and a bill
58
brought in for cancelling the few articles of the Act of Settlement still in
force…a Broad-bottomed ministry, whose sole merit in the opposition
was to oppose the encroachments of Hanover, and whose merit in the
administration has been to encourage them.49
The Opposition press was obliged to concentrate on Hanover, because it was

not informed of the details of Britain’s troubled relations with her allies, but
ministers who were also complained about them. Newcastle drew attention to
the role of political opinion in his complaints about the failure to defend the
Austrian Netherlands adequately,
the behaviour of the Queen of Hungary [Maria Theresa], in totally

abandoning the Netherlands; and the refusal of the court of Brussels [the
government of the Austrian Netherlands], to let the places there have the
defence, which the nature of their situation gives them, by the
inundation [opening dykes]; have raised here the utmost resentment
against the Court of Vienna, and rendered their cause much less popular,
that it formerly has been. And when it shall be known, that the court of
Vienna has formally refused to lessen the number of their enemies, at
present so numerous, by making up with the king of Prussia, and persist
in pursuing their own particular views and interests, at the expense of
their allies, there will be very little room for them to hope for any
assistance from this country in the support of those measures.
And yet, Newcastle also asserted the strategic need for the support of
continental states that he felt Britain had “in all events, the recovery of
Flanders is so capital a point for this country, that we cannot but humbly hope,
that it will take place of all other considerations”.50 This view was shared by
Stair, who wrote the same month that he was not afraid “of the Pretender nor
of an invasion on any part of Great Britain but if the machine of the alliance
should happen to fall to the ground I’m afraid the affairs of this nation will be
found to be in a very dangerous situation whatever some people have been in
use to say”.51
Thus, the guidelines of a future clash were already evident. Whatever the
problems with Britain’s allies, ministers held that they were needed. The
maintenance both of these alliances and of the strategic situation in the Low
Countries threatened to compete with overseas priorities. This was to become
a pressing diplomatic and political problem, because of the failure to reverse
France’s gains in 1745 and also her subsequent success in making further gains.
This owed something to the diversion of British troops to fight the Jacobites in
1745–6, more to the Austrian failure to meet their quotas, and much to French
military skill, especially that of Saxe.
The French attempt to regain Cape Breton by a naval expedition fell victim
to Atlantic storms and disease in 1746, but they were to succeed in their goal as
59
a result of their campaigning in the Low Countries. Furthermore, British hopes

of an expedition to Canada in 1746 were abandoned. Indeed, the following
year the President of the French Council of Marine suggested that French
pressure in the Low Countries would prevent the British from sending troops
to North America, that, in short, the French could hold Canada in Europe.52
The peace negotiations of 1748 served to reconcile the different political
expectations and contrasting military successes of the combatants. France
returned her acquisitions in the Low Countries, Britain Cape Breton. This was
criticized in Britain, where the propaganda and polemic of naval strength
against Spain in 1738–9 was now employed against France. Thus, any stress on
a shift in British attitudes towards France and a newfound emphasis on trans-
oceanic rivalry has to be contextualized by reference to a continuation in the
maritime and colonial discourse of British power and interests.
This striking shift reflected, first, naval and colonial success against France in
1745–8, a contrast to the situation during the last war with France, that of the
Spanish Succession, which had been essentially characterized by victories on
land; secondly, the compromising of the only major victory on land—
Dettingen (1743)–by accusations of royal favour for Hanover; and, thirdly, the
growing importance of maritime and colonial affairs in the British perception
of France. The power that in 1733 and 1741 had appeared poised to repeat
Louis XIV’s triumphs on the Continent was, by 1748, increasingly seen as a
maritime rival; and whereas the warfare of 1743–8, particularly 1745–8, had
shown that Britain could not resist France’s power on the Continent, this had
not been the case at sea. Typical of the jingoistic propaganda was a ballad of
early 1748 that was dubious about the likely results of the peace negotiations at
Aix-la-Chapelle, preferring to rely on naval strength
If Britain’s sons all Gallic arts despise,

Why listen we at Aix to Gallic lies?
If on our navy Heaven confers success,
Why this long quibbling, and this fine address? …
Why not our wooden world in motion keep?
Say, is not Britain regent of the deep?
Superior force invincible is ours. …
If the Grand Monarch will insist on things
Beneath the dignity of generous kings;
Let him insist—and if he’s e’er so stiff
Man well the fleet.53
Such arguments ignored the practical problems of employing naval power to

achieve diplomatic ends, 54 and therefore played no part in the British
ministerial debate of 1747–8 over the peace negotiations, but they helped to
shape public attitudes towards France. The extension of the application of such
views from Spain to France was arguably the most important shift in public
60
consciousness in the 1740s. The public was eager to see Britain as a successful
naval power. The authorized account of Anson’s circumnavigation of the world
in 1740–44, in which the latterday Francis Drake successfully and profitably
attacked the Spaniards in the Pacific, appeared in 1748 and went through five
printings.
The extent of the public under discussion is difficult to assess. It was
essentially urban,55 and the notion of there being only one public opinion is of
course misleading, although the public culture of the period emphasized a
homogeneity of proper opinion as of proper conduct. Furthermore, just as the
voices of those who did not want conflict with France, such as most Catholics
and those who traded with her, were muted, so the public voice of those who
were opposed to aggressive policies and war was less obvious than those who
stridently proclaimed a definition of national interests in terms of hostility to
France. Opposition to high taxes and concern about the size of the national
debt could be a coded or not so implicit call for peace, but they were not
dominant themes in the public debate, though they were important
considerations for Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury from 1743 until his death
in 1754, as they had been earlier for Walpole.
Carteret, now Earl Granville, told the Sardinian envoy in December 1751
that Nova Scotia might be a second Jenkins’ Ear, an issue over which the
nation drove the government to war. Mirepoix reported that Newcastle
sincerely wished to settle the issue, but would be more affected by other
pressures, such as parliamentary opinion.56 Yet it would be wrong to place too
much weight on the public debate and the role of public opinion. They are too
often employed as explanatory devices when the structure of the political
system and the detailed development of affairs have not been adequately
probed. Hostility to France and the call for “blue water” policies against her
neither prevented the government from negotiating peace in 1748 and,
subsequently, successfully defending its terms in Parliament, nor stopped
Newcastle from developing and following an agenda for British foreign policy
in 1748–53 that centred on continental affairs. Newcastle was able to
concentrate in 1748–53 on planning means to prevent a repetition of the
varied strategic problems of 1745–8, ranging from the weak state of the Barrier
in the Austrian Netherlands to the need to confront the possibility that both
France and Prussia would be hostile. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest
that altering perceptions played an important role in explaining the difference
between the Anglo-French conflict that began in 1754 in North America and
escalated to a full-scale war and earlier conflicts whose origins, course and
consequences were essentially European. However, the causes of the conflict of
1754 should be related to the background of recent Anglo-French relations, in
particular efforts to ease tensions in Europe.
Eighteenth-century wars commonly ended as a result of collapses of
alliances, and the coming of peace, in turn, further exacerbated this situation.
Thus the Franco-Spanish alliance that had challenged Austria for control of
61
Italy during the war of the Austrian Succession was replaced by an Austro-
Spanish understanding that excluded France, while Spanish neutrality for much
of the Seven Years’ War crucially helped to swing the balance of maritime
advantage against France.
Puysieulx, French foreign minister at the end of the War of the Austrian
Succession, hoped to improve relations with Britain. Hardwicke’s son, Joseph
Yorke, Cumberland’s aide-de-camp at Culloden, who was sent to Paris in early
1749 as Secretary of Embassy, wrote to his influential father, a key ally and
confidant of Newcastle and Pelham, in March 1749
to convince your lordship how much the French ministry have deceived
themselves with false hopes of drawing England into a connection with
them, since first the negotiation was begun at Aix-la-Chapelle, that St.
Severin, their plenipotentiary there, had returned from the Congress
saying that he founded his glory on having sowed the seeds of dissension
between the courts of London and Vienna, and having made an
irreparable breach between them and that from this notion came French
offers to unite with us, in pacifying the rest of Europe.
Later that month Yorke reported his discussions with Puysieulx:
that minister is not displeased with what I told him, though he certainly
wished a little more readiness to connect with them; however I hope this
way of proceeding will take away those violent jealousies, he certainly
had conceived of the designs of England in the North [the Baltic], and I
really believe he is satisfied, at present, of the king’s desire to maintain
the public tranquillity.
Yorke added the following month that Puysieulx had told him both that
Austria would draw Britain into a war and that she had approached France at
Aix-la-Chapelle:
it appears to me very plain, that Mr. Puysieulx wants to persuade us, to

enter into some defensive, if not offensive engagements with his
court…he went even so far as to say, he thought that England and France
should tell the rest of Europe, that they would unite their force against
whoever should attempt to disturb the peace; that we should always find
them ready to oblige us, in everything, and he hinted, though they were
only hints, at some marine disputes, which he gave me to understand,
they should be ready to determine amicably, and in our favour.
Yorke regarded the approach as dangerous, informing his father, “I am really

always alarmed, when anything is said to me that tends to separate us from our
allies.”57
62
French good wishes were to be demonstrated by their efforts to keep the

peace in the contemporary Baltic crisis caused by the prospect of an attack by
Russia, a Br itish ally, on France’s ally Sweden, although Puysieulx was
concerned about the British failure to consult France adequately in the crisis.58
Puysieulx’s views are of considerable interest in the prehistory of the
“Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. They indicate a conviction that diplomatic
links were not immutable, an equally correct assessment that the Anglo-
Austrian alliance, which had essentially revived from 1741 under the pressure
of war, was weak, and a belief that France could best defend her interests in a
changing international system by co-operating with Britain. This analysis was
facilitated by the strains in France’s alliance with Frederick II. Furthermore,
Frederick’s relations with George II had not improved after the war and thus
did not represent an impediment to better Anglo-French relations.59
Puysieulx’s attitude suggests that the eventual French acceptance of the
Austrian approaches that led to the First Treaty of Versailles of 1 May 1756
should not be seen as revolutionary as it is sometimes presented. Indeed, in July
1748 Richelieu wrote to Puysieulx proposing an Austro-French rapprochement.
Furthermore, the discussions and suggestions of new alignments in 1748–9,
which included possible agreements between Britain and Prussia, Austria and
France and Britain and France, throw a new light on the somewhat schematic
arguments used to explain the events of 1756 from a systemic perspective.60 It
is clear both that different arrangements were envisaged once peace had been
negotiated and that the order of realignments that occurred in 1755–6 was not
the sole possible one. The extent to which opportunities were missed in 1748–
9 is open to discussion, but the role of chance in 1755–6 is worth underlining
because it encourages caution in adopting too forthright an approach to the
questions of 1748–9. It was the unexpected Anglo-French North American
crisis of 1754–5 that led Britain to turn to Prussia in 1755 when hopes that
Austria would agree to protect Hanover proved misplaced. Had this crisis not
occurred then the British ministry would probably have maintained its hopes
about Austria. That would not have prevented the planned Austro-Russian
attack of Prussia, but such an attack would not have led Britain to come to
Frederick’s assistance, though she would not have assisted Austria either, unless
possibly France had attacked the Austrian Netherlands.
If chance played a major role in 1755–6, it is inappropriate to mimic the
Duke of Newcastle in his certainties about British national interests in 1748–
54. Newcastle did not subscribe to a view of international relations as fixed,
although he clearly felt that they ought to be. He put so much effort into
fostering Anglo-Austrian relations 61 precisely because he believed that if
Austria was mishandled the alliance would not survive. Newcastle wrote to
Cumberland in October 1748,
I can see the follies, and the vanity of the court of Vienna, but I see the
danger and ruin of being dependent upon France. I was once catched in
63
the year 1725 when the Hanover treaty was made. I got out of it in the
year 1730 [sic for 1731] by the [Second] Treaty of Vienna …no
considerations shall ever catch me again. Whenever it will go no longer
upon the old foot I shall not help its going at all.62
His commitment was shared by Cumberland, and in July 1748 Pelham wrote
that both had a
very commendable partiality for that power [Austria], founded upon

principles of the truest policy, and most extensive good to Europe, but I
flatter myself I shall not offend, when I suggest that you have met with
but unequal returns. They [the Austrians] have never come up to their
engagements in any one particular.63
Newcastle’s commitment to what he termed the “Old System” was personal,

but he also had specific, pragmatic reasons for querying suggestions of better
relations with Prussia and France. The former he feared would endanger
Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-Russian links, while he was also concerned about
the strength of “the military party in France”. 64 The threat of improved
relations with France and a peace signed without Austria could be used by the
British to push Austria into accepting the terms of Aix-la-Chapelle,65 but
suspicion of France remained strong. On that ground Newcastle opposed
George II’s suggestion that France be asked to make a promise not to oppose
his views on Osnabrück, telling Münchhausen, the head of the Hanoverian
administration, of
the difficulties that from the experience of above twenty years together
both in the present and late reign, had arose to the King, as King and
Elector, from applications of this sort to the court of France, who had
never failed to give into them, in order to embarrass affairs, and influence
the King’s conduct with regard to the great system of Europe, and that
the same experience had also showed us, that these facilities in the part
of France had never been of any service to the Electorate, but to distress
and confound them.66
The matter was not pursued, and Newcastle’s attitude revealed the wishful
thinking in Puysieulx’s suggestions of better Anglo-French relations and
implied that as the Imperial Election Scheme was defined and developed by
Britain it would not be in association or even co-operation with France.
While it might be possible for the British government to make transitory
use of France, as in setting peace terms or easing the Baltic crisis, difficulties in
Anglo-Austrian relations were also seen by the government as temporary.
Sandwich wrote in 1748 to Keith, the newly-appointed minister at Vienna, “in
the sort of scene that you and I are engaged in fluctuations will frequently
64
happen, but where people mean the same thing at the bottom, and pursue a
system, matters generally subside in the end, which I flatter myself is the
present case”. The press recalled problems with allies during the recent war,
Henry Fielding writing in February 1748 that, when the “Broad Bottom”
ministers had joined the government in November 1744, they had found “that
of our allies, all of whom were weak, some of them indifferent, and those who
were most in earnest, were pursuing interests separate from that of the
common cause”. Yet this criticism of Carteret’s policies did not prevent his
successors from seeking to maintain his alliance system, both during the war
and subsequently.67
It could be argued that Anglo-Austrian differences over the following seven
years were to prove Sandwich wrong, but, equally, it could be said that the
alliance served Britain’s purpose until the crisis of 1754–5 pushed the defence
of Hanover to the forefront of ministerial attention. The assessment hinges on
the questions of whether Britain had any viable alternatives, and what would
have happened had she not had her Austrian alliance. That, of course, would
have depended on the degree of royal and ministerial commitments to the
Continent, but, given that these were strong, it is reasonable to point out that
the British position would have been weaker but for the Austrian alliance,
however imperfect that might have been. Hanover would certainly have been
more vulnerable to the Prussian attack that was feared in 1753.
The notion floated in late 1748 of a German collective security system
without Austria was not credible. It was proposed by the Ansbach envoy, Baron
Seckendorf, to Münchhausen, Newcastle commenting,
The immediate business is to preserve the Margraviates of Bareith and

Ansbach from falling into the King of Prussia’s hands, but he has opened
a very extensive scheme to His Majesty’s German ministers, of creating a
party in the Empire, which I am afraid might give some umbrage to the
Emperor and the Court of Vienna, as if the Imperial authority was
infringed.
Münchhausen was told by Newcastle very plainly that “we had spent twenty
millions for the support of the House of Austria this war and that I hoped that
would not be all set aside by a coup de plume”. He put much effort into easing
Münchhausen’s suspicions of the Austrians and indeed claimed the credit for
bringing the minister “off from all his resentment to the Court of Vienna and
prejudice against a King of the Romans”.68 In contrast, in 1756–7 the British
government, by then leaning towards Prussia, was concerned to block links
between Austria and Hanover.
Policy was different in the early 1750s. A German alliance system without
Austria could only be credible if Prussia was a member, but an alignment with
Frederick would bring the enmity of Austria and Russia, and, without an
alliance with Austria, it would be impossible to win Russia over. As France was
65
allied to Prussia and Sweden, the danger of heeding her suggestions of co-
operation was that Britain might lose her freedom of manoeuvre and become
committed in the Baltic crisis to hostility to Russia and thus Austria.
In July 1750 Puysieulx argued that if only Britain and France could develop
mutual confidence they would realize the futility of their alliances, which,
according to him, were both valueless and costly.69 Indeed, the British failure to
align with France later in the century has been criticized and there has been
reference to “the series of sterile confrontations with Britain’s colonial rivals,
France and Spain”.70
However, though it may seem attractive and plausible to portray the two
traditional rivals co-operating against the rising powers of eastern Europe, the
practicalities of this prospectus appear to have been largely overlooked. Had
Britain accepted French leadership, then she would have been obliged to
support France’s traditional protégés, Sweden, Poland and Turkey, powers that
it would have been difficult to assist other than by what had already appeared
in Peter I’s reign and was to appear again in 1791 as the overrated factor of
naval power. Co-operation with France in 1748–9 would also have entailed
support for Frederick II, a course that was scarcely likely to recommend itself
to those who envisaged a stable collective security system, for Fredrick was still
seen, with much reason, as an aggressive and unpredictable ruler.
The failure to reach an understanding with France did not lead to a rapid
deterioration in relations. The French government was absorbed in domestic
problems and, to the irritation of Frederick, averse to taking an assertive role in
international relations. Prepared to defend their diplomatic interests and
unenthusiastic about the Imperial Exchange Scheme, the French were
nevertheless not the active force in diplomacy they had been in the late 1730s,
nor were they seeking to assemble a coalition of allies that would stand them in
good stead in an imminent or developing crisis, as they had been in 1732–3
and 1741. In Europe, France acted as a satisfied power, not one seeking
territorial expansion. Indeed, the French settled their frontier differences with
a number of weaker powers, including Geneva (1749), Salm (1751) and
Württemberg (1753).
It was not surprising that the principal panic to affect British foreign policy
in the period 1749–53 arose, in 1753, from suspicion of Prussian actions rather
than French. Prussia appeared more of a problem than France to George II and
his ministers in this period. Valory, the French envoy in Hanover, reported in
June 1750 that Newcastle believed, or seemed to believe, that Frederick was a
dangerous ruler determined to animate other powers against each other in
order to be able to fish in troubled waters.71 The collective security system
developed by Newcastle had thus overcome what had been a major political
problem during the War of the Austrian Succession, the contrasting concerns of
George II and his ministers about Prussia and France respectively. Hanover
now seemed secured by British policy. In April 1751 the Austrian and Russian
envoys gave Newcastle Austrian and Russian declarations containing a guaranty
66
of Hanover in case it was attacked on account of George II’s accession to the

1746 Austro-Russian treaty, and all three agreed that the declarations “were
considered as part of the treaty of accession and equally binding with that
treaty”.72
As the likeliest attacker of Hanover was Frederick II,73 this agreement, and
indeed the entire thrust of British policy, could be seen as serving to protect
Hanover, without implying that that was the sole purpose. As such it could be
seen as part of the gradual process of reconciliation between George II and the
Pelhams that included such moves as accepting the appointment of Carteret,
now Earl Granville, as Lord President of the Council in June 1751. This process
was one in which the Pelhams had made much of the running, and indeed they
had been criticised from 1744 for continuing the broad direction of Carteret’s
foreign policy. Newcastle saw the Imperial Election Scheme and the other
policies he fostered as designed against both France and Prussia, but much of
the impetus behind the policies derived from the anti-Prussian attitudes of
George, Cumberland and the Münchhausens. The policies were essentially
formulated in 1748 when George and Newcastle visited Hanover, and major
efforts to forward them were made on the subsequent visits in 1750 and 1752.
These visits served to provide a context of policy-making in which the
immediate focus of concern with Hanover and German politics then detracted
from other issues.
The stress on the Imperial Election Scheme helped to exacerbate relations
with France and Prussia, both of which sought to prevent the Electors from
lending their support. In July 1752 Newcastle wrote from Hanover to his
fellow Secretary of State, Holdernesse,
the King is far from thinking that the Court of France has acted with
that fairness and sincerity which His Majesty’s behaviour towards them
(particularly in this last negotiation), has deserved: in which the King has
performed every part, that was to be expected from him; and the court of
France have done the reverse, throughout the whole…this behaviour in
the Court of France, this departure from their most solemn promises, is,
in a great measure, owing to that ascendance, which the King of Prussia
has gained over their councils…There is too much reason to fear, that,
however justified His Majesty’s conduct will undoubtedly be, in the
opinion of all the world; the disappointment of this measure will, and
must, tend to increase his Prussian Majesty’s credit, and influence over
the French councils; and, jointly, create such a power, as may not only
affect the independency of the Empire; but, in its consequences, that of
all Europe. And the Court of France have sufficiently show’d, by the
return which they have made, in this instance, to the King’s confidence
and communication with them, the little dependence, that is to be had
upon them; and, consequently, how dangerous and impracticable, any
system, to be formed with them, must prove in the event.
67
The letter also included a reference to royal support for a firm stance towards
the French in West Africa.74 Yet less attention was devoted to such disputes than
they merited.
The Imperial Election Scheme, a project that did not command wide
support within the British ministry, thus served to provide instances that
apparently demonstrated the accuracy of Newcastle’s fears of French
intentions. Had Britain not supported the scheme it is possible that her
continental foreign policy would not have given rise to such occasions, but,
equally, the alignment with Austria and Russia and the link with Hanover
would have served to maintain tense relations with Prussia and, therefore, her
ally France, while Anglo-Russian relations would have led to tension with
France’s other allies, Sweden and Turkey.
It might appear paradoxical to argue, on the eve of an Anglo-French war
that was to break out as a result of colonial differences, that it was Britain’s
continental policy that principally served to exacerbate relations. There were
important colonial disputes, in North America over the Canadian border and
Nova Scotia, in the West Indies over Tobago, in West Africa and India, and they
featured in Anglo-French diplomacy in 1749–53.75 The British government
pressed for satisfaction on contested colonial issues, especially in 1749 over
Tobago. That year, the government founded Halifax in order to strengthen the
British presence in Nova Scotia. The recent peace treaty had confirmed the
cession of Acadia to Britain, but had not specified its boundaries, and this
proved a basis for dissension. It would be possible to paint a dire picture of
mutual mounting concern, especially in North America, that appears to point
towards inevitable conflict.76
However, it is worth noting that ministerial attention in both Britain and
France was directed rather to European affairs and that there were signs of a
relative absence of anxiety on colonial matters, Newcastle writing to a
colleague in July 1750 “our late enemies seem disposed to be quiet, and… to
do us justice in America, which is a great point”.77 Yorke, writing to his brother
the following month from Paris, was less optimistic, but also less alarmist than
William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, an influential advocate of a
forward policy in America, who argued, in Yorke’s words, that the fate of
North America and indeed of our marine depends on the success of

Nova Scotia. I believe it is of great consequence, but I can’t imagine it is
so nice an affair as he represents it. We continue to say here that we desire
peace, and so we do I believe, but we shall not be so ready to give up any
pretensions we may have in the New World, of which England is so
jealous.78
Newcastle did not want war with France, and he argued that, by strengthening
Britain’s continental position, he would make France less likely to challenge
her:
68
I was always of opinion that the more we strengthened ourselves, and our
system upon the continent, by measures, and alliances, pacific and
justifiable in themselves, (provided as the same time, that we adhered
strictly and religiously to the terms of our Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle), the
more France would covet our friendship, and be more disposed to
preserve the peace, and this, the present experience shows to be the
case.79
Thus, Britain could maintain her position in America through alliances in

Germany. This analysis overlooked the role of developments within France and
failed to give any weight to the possibility of what actually occurred, an
escalating trans-oceanic crisis that neither government wanted. Indeed,
Newcastle’s policy of deterrence through strength, both in Anglo-French
relations in general, and in continental international relations, was to fail
precisely because the mechanistic, systemic approach he adopted was
inadequate. It was unable to cope with the strains and ambiguities of alliance
politics seeking to reconcile different interests and to comprehend adequately
the possibility of an unwanted crisis in which both governments felt it
impossible to back down. The French were not to be deterred from reinforcing
Canada in 1755 by Britain’s European alliances, although they helped to
prevent France from attacking Hanover. In the meantime, the tension that led
to the development and strengthening of the alliance system, and was created
by it, did not create an atmosphere in Anglo-French relations that would be
conductive to their peaceful settlement. This argument can be pushed too far.
Newcastle was not the hawk in Anglo-French North American disputes, while
negotiations over the North American border were conducted in Paris. Yorke
wrote in September 1750 about Nova Scotia, “I hope as this Court seems
really desirous of living at peace with us, that we shall be able to settle these
points amicably, I dare not flatter myself that it will be speedily.”80
However, while proclaiming that they were fulfilling their obligations, for
example, over the demolition of the works at Dunkirk,81 the French saw no
basis for trust in Anglo-French relations. Puysieulx complained in December
1750 that British policy since the signature of peace scarcely suggested any
desire to develop good relations. Instead, he claimed that Britain negotiated
alliances as if on the eve of war, pursued the Imperial Election Scheme in an
offensive fashion and treated French support for Prussia as a crime. Puysieulx
added that Britain appeared to be preparing an invasion of Canada.82 The
optimistic hope of better relations, of a new international order, had therefore
been replaced by 1750 by French resentment at Br itain’s continental
diplomatic strategy and by anxiety about her American plans. It was this
anxiety that helped to lead to French projects that were viewed in turn as
aggressive by Britain, and that led to confrontation in the Ohio river valley.
However, conflict did not come for several years, and indeed, in December
1750 Mirepoix, the French Ambassador, sought to reassure Puysieulx about
69
British intentions. He argued that Britain was not in a state for war and stressed
the role of George II’s concern about Hanoverian vulnerability to Prussian
attack as the basis for British diplomacy. This diplomacy was thus presented as
essentially defensive, despite the suspicions it gave rise to. Mirepoix also argued
correctly that Britain had no offensive plans in Canada, but he warned that
domestic factors might affect her policy towards Nova Scotia and other
problems, specifically that concern about parliamentary criticism would
prevent any acceptable settlement.
Mirepoix argued that of the four most influential ministers, Bedford,
Hardwicke and Pelham sought peace, while only Newcastle would support
George II’s desire to take a major European role. He added, nevertheless, that,
although British policy was essentially defensive, it might lead to offensive
action by Britain or her allies.83 Mirepoix’s analysis was a perceptive one, but it
was not to guide French actions in North America.
Arguably, had France had more confidence in the extent and purpose of
British intentions, provocative moves and, ultimately, war would have been
avoided and France would not have lost Canada. However, British policy
appeared especially transitory in this period, because of the advanced years of
George II, born in 1683, and the opposition of his heirs, Frederick, Prince of
Wales, and, later, Frederick’s son, George, to his ministers. More to the point,
yielding pretensions was regarded as a dishonourable step, and moreover one
that was imprudent, because it would encourage further demands for
concessions. The tradition in Europe was of long-standing legalistic disputes,
especially in the Empire and Italy, while colonial controversies, for example,
that over Sacramento, the Portuguese colony on the north shore of the Plate
estuary, could be both long-lasting and conducted without leading to hostilities
in Europe. This was also the experience of Britain and France. Conflict in India
in the early 1750s between their East India Companies played little part in
diplomatic relations between the two powers, and did not lead to war between
them. Newcastle noted in June 1753 of negotiations concerning India, “This
negotiation was purely between company and company; though the East India
Company would (as became them) do nothing without His Majesty’s
permission.”
The French were concerned that the pressure of British westward expansion
in North America would undermine the security of their colonies there.84
They saw no reason to yield points that would assist this process, and were
anyway aware that the central concern of British policy in 1749–53 was
European. Despite Puysieulx’s fears in late 1753, there was no reason to
anticipate a Br itish attack on Canada, and the number of reports and
instructions devoted to American affairs in the French diplomatic series
Correspondance Politique Angleterre does not jump until 1754. Other colonial
quarrels in the years before were settled or conducted without the outbreak of
war, Yorke writing in September 1752, “I am very easy about the coast of
Africa. France will never attack us where we are strongest, and therefore we are
70
mad, if we are not so everywhere, where we can.”85 In the winter of 1752–3

the British appealed for French pressure on Frederick II to moderate his
threats to Saxony and Hanover, action that did not stem from any trust in
French intentions, but that would hardly have been taken had negotiations over
America been so tense that the ministry feared to show any weakness.86 Indeed
Newcastle argued that there was a relationship between Britain’s colonial and
continental strength, that America could be endangered if Hanover was lost,
when in February 1753 he expressed the hope that France would interpose
with Prussia.87 Yet Newcastle did not trust the French. He feared that French
military encampments might be connected with those of Prussia,88 and that
Frederick II would press for French support over the eventual succession to the
crown of Poland, “though perhaps, this may be too strong, and too uncertain a
measure, for France to come into at present; there is, however great reason to
believe, that the court of France are preparing measures so, as to be able to
strike, and with effect, whenever the case shall happen”.89 Given that a major
war had broken out when the Polish throne was last contested in 1733, it was
sensible for rulers and ministers to anticipate that another conflict might thus
arise, and it was reasonable for Newcastle to anticipate that Britain might not
be neutral as she had been during the last Polish succession war.
Allegations of French works at Dunkirk in clear breach of treaty obligations
also aroused distrust. Yorke thought them worth fighting over, while the
London press discussed the issue, the opposition Protester bitterly criticizing,
the government.90 There is no doubt from Newcastle’s correspondence that he
distrusted France, even though he appreciated that her government was less
aggressive that that of Prussia:
The late letters from Mylord Albemarle [envoy in Paris], have brought
nothing, that can give any room to guess, what may be the final
resolution of the court of France, upon the two material points, now
depending; the election of the King of the Romans; and the particular
disputes with the King of Prussia. Mor. de St. Contest [French foreign
minister] varies his manner of talking almost in every conversation.
Sometimes he talks plausibly, and pretty satisfactory upon both points;
and afterwards, in the next conversation, appears as difficult, and as
unreasonable as ever. I think, their present view is, not to break the
peace; but the King of Prussia will certainly carry them great lengths, if
he shall think proper to insist upon it; and, therefore, we should always
endeavour to prepare for the worst.91
This was scarcely an optimistic assessment, and it helps to explain both why
Newcastle continued his attempt to breathe life into the Anglo-Austro-Russian
system and why he was to be filled with foreboding when the situation in
America deteriorated. However, as Anglo-French hostility still revolved around
continental issues in 1753, it was not surprising that Newcastle, who had been
71
more interventionalist than his ministerial colleagues for a number of years,

especially over the issue of subsidies for possible allies, should inform the
Sardinian envoy, Perron, in August 1753 that he was alone in his view that
Britain should adopt a firmer view in order to make France more tractable
while his colleagues feared war.92
As 1754 opened, Mirepoix was not greatly concerned about British policy.
He reported that the British government had no plans which could threaten
peace, that Pelham was too occupied with domestic and financial problems to
support Austrian and Russian schemes and that George II’s concern about
Hanover, and the need for possible Austrian and Russian pressure on Prussia,
had not led to ministerial support for these schemes.93 Mirepoix did however
touch on British domestic sensitivity to colonial issues, though the problem in
question was not North American. He reported that news of French naval
moves led the British government to press for the despatch of help to the
Indies, principally in order to end criticism in London. Mirepoix nevertheless
warned that, although the British government wished to settle disputes, France
should take precautions, while St Contest wrote that Britain would be unable
to intimidate France over the Indies. 94 Mirepoix’s confidence in British
passivity was somewhat hit by Pelham’s unexpected death, 95 but he was
hopeful that domestic political problems would dissuade the government from
taking a more forceful role abroad.96 Rather than suspecting colonial trouble,
Mirepoix reported that Newcastle sought good relations, and that the only
danger came from his complaisance towards George II’s pro-Austr ian
sentiments, an analysis whose stress on the Continent accorded with
Newcastle’s views of the previous September.97 Bar the affairs of India, there
was little diplomatic activity in Anglo-French relations in May or early June
1754, and Mirepoix took leave of absence as a result of this lull. St Contest was
unhappy about this, but because of his concern about developments in India,
not America.98
North America had been a cause of diplomatic activity and ministerial
concern for a number of years, but its sudden rise to prominence in the
summer of 1754, with the outbreak of fighting in the Ohio valley, was a
surprise. Nova Scotia had not been a serious point in dispute since 1751.
Horatio Walpole, a diplomatic veteran of the Anglo-French alliance, was aware
of the importance attached to the issues at stake but hopeful that they could be
settled without war. He wrote in July 1754 to Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-
Governor of Virginia, of his
concern at the unjust attempts of the French upon the boundaries of our
colonies; if they go on in the project they seem to have in view, they will
encompass all our norther n colonies in the back by a chain of
communication between the rivers Canada, and Mississippi, and come
masters of all the Indians, and the trade on that continent, which require
our utmost attention, and exertion of strength to prevent it, but as it is a
72
common cause to all our northern colonies…they might I am fully

persuaded, consider ing their connection and the number of their
inhabitants, soon disperse the French and their Indians, and disappoint
their dangerous schemes, which at the beginning may be done, if
cordially undertaken, without any great expense, and they might think fit
to retire at once; before the councils of France shall have openly owed it,
and made it a matter of state; but if they are suffered to make a strong
settlement there and get together forces enough to support it, it may
occasion troubles between the two nations of such expense and extent as
may make it difficult to put an end to.99
North American differences were not, however, as easy to overlook as problems

in India. St Contest’s replacement, Rouillé, certain that the French had only
maintained their rights and repelled force by force, argued that border
problems could be dealt with by the commissioners already empowered to do
so, but added ominously, but accurately, that once clashes had begun their
consequences would be difficult to contain. He stressed French moderation,100
but in late September 1754 the British decided to send two regiments to
America in order to conduct offensive operations. The most recent discussion
of the subject has concluded that this was due to the bellicose views of
Cumberland and two ministers, the Earl of Halifax, President of the Board of
Trade, and Henry Fox, the Secretary-at-War. Halifax, a keen supporter of a
British presence in Nova Scotia, had pressed in 1751 for the permanent
stationing of British warships there.101 Weakened by the death of Pelham,
Newcastle was unsettled by the difficulties created by an increasingly
contentious political situation.
Foreign diplomats less well-informed about ministerial disputes stressed the
danger of parliamentary opposition.102 The session was imminent, problems of
management considerable in the volatile political world created by Pelham’s
death and, as over policy towards Spain in 1739, the prospect of parliamentary
difficulties interacted with ministerial disputes. The imminence of the session
obliged the ministry to have a policy, though it would be misleading to suggest
that Cumberland and Halifax were pr imar ily swayed by parliamentary
considerations. Halifax had long been associated with Nova Scotia, while Fox
was Cumberland’s ally. Knowing that military matters were under the sway of
George II and Cumberland, Newcastle gave way to Cumberland, ensuring that
“from mid October American issues suddenly ceased to matter in the struggle
for the leadership”. Furthermore, Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote of the first day of
debates in the Commons that the opposition “expostulated …chiefly upon the
American affairs, but declared they would not directly oppose it, as the
appearance of unanimity was at present very necessary with regard to our
foreign affairs”.103
The decision to send reinforcements to America and to adopt an aggressive
plan of operations made war with France more likely, though Newcastle hoped
73
that an escalation in stages would leave room for negotiations.104 There was an
element of wishful thinking, comparable to his hope in 1731 that France
would accept the Anglo-Austrian Second Treaty of Vienna, but Newcastle had
no choice in light of George’s support for Cumberland. Whereas in 1744 and
1746 it had proved possible for the Pelhams to drive George into parting with
Carteret, in 1754 Newcastle was not supported by a united ministry, while the
point at dispute, opposition to apparent French aggression in North America,
was one that was popular. The specific political impact of the shift in public
consciousness over colonial disputes, especially North America, was limited,
but there seems little doubt that in late 1754 the prevalent opinion in political
circles was of a need to stand up to France, and that this was not really related
to the more general problems of Britain’s diplomatic standing towards France
and other European powers. The fall of Cape Breton in 1745 and naval
victories over France in the War of the Austrian Succession had encouraged an
optimistic assessment of Britain’s chances in a future conflict, one that was fully
reflected in the press. 105 A front-page essay in the opposition London
newspaper Old England on 15 December 1750 (os) began,
The all-grasping views of the House of Bourbon have been so manifest

for half a century past, that it is equally the duty of politicians to watch
over and expose, and of princes to obstruct and restrain them…The two
heads of France and Spain are continually aiming at new
encroachments…The practices now on foot to wrest from us the best
part of Nova Scotia, and establish French colonies in defiance of our
better right, and a mutual agreement to leave them in a neutral state, in
the islands of Tobago, St. Lucia, and others, cannot but raise the
indignation of every Briton at this time.106
The French had indeed occupied Tobago and St. Lucia. The French ministry
was kept fully informed of this agitation. One set of newspaper verses
surviving in the French archives ended with a call for naval action against
France:
To settle this point send out forty good sail,

With Warren or Hawke [leading admirals] to inspect each minutia:
They’ll teach us to whom shall belong without fail
Tobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia,107
the last a reference to a dispute in the West Indies. Such items carried no
reference to the cost of conflict, the difficulty of keeping hostilities local, the
possibility of French pressure on Hanover and the Low Countries and the
danger of invasion of Britain. The experience of 1739, when the United
Provinces had refused to provide assistance to Britain against Spain, was a
warning of possible isolation, and in March 1754 the French envoy in Vienna
74
reported Austrian displeasure with British naval preparations, on the grounds

that Britain might be thus distracted from European affairs and that hostilities,
once begun, would spread to Europe.108 Yorke wrote from The Hague that
France “feels too strongly her own force in this part of the world, where the
false politics of the Court of Vienna leaves us naked and defenceless”, a
reference to the weakness of the Barrier fortresses and the vulnerability of the
Austr ian Netherlands and, therefore, the United Provinces. European
commitments would also entail a level of expense that would test the ministry’s
parliamentary strength, as the Bavarian envoy warned in October 1754.109
The French, however, as Newcastle correctly told Perron, did not wish to
fight. Rouillé could not imagine that the British would use open force and he
decided to send Mirepoix back to London, whence Boutel, however,
meanwhile warned that the British reinforcements sent to America and the
terms of the royal speech suggested that George would not keep the peace.110
Mirepoix arrived in London on 8 January 1755, his mission made more
important by the death of the Earl of Albemarle, the British envoy in Paris, the
previous month.
In his audience with George II on 10 January, the King told Mirepoix that
he sought peace but was determined to protect his subjects, goals that the
ambassador unsurprisingly declared were shared by Louis XV. The same day
Newcastle told Mirepoix of his desire for peace, but he added, untruthfully,
that the troops being sent to America would only be used for defence, and that
they were destined less against France than to contain the colonists who for
long had shown scant obedience to the orders of the British government. The
better-infor med Robinson, now Secretary of State for the Souther n
Department, drew attention to the differences between British and French
maps of the interior of America.111 Newcastle and Robinson told Mirepoix,
and Newcastle and Holdernesse told Perron that the ministry was affected by
the domestic pressure for action,112 and Mirepoix stressed the need for France
to take precautions.
Naval armaments by both powers increased tension and distrust. Robinson
wrote to Benjamin Keene, the envoy in Madrid, “We have, on one side, polite
and handsome professions, from M. de Mirepoix, of His Master’s sincere desire
for peace; on the other hand, every letter from Paris, and other ports, brings
advice of the great armaments making at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort…. We
shall not, we must not, be behind with them.”113 While Mirepoix stressed the
need for speedy action to stem the developing crisis, the French ministry was
unwilling to make the sort of concessions that were necessary. Rouillé
correctly argued that the Br itish were not telling the truth about the
reinforcements they were sending to America, suggested that Britain would
accept an armistice only in order to reinforce her American colonies and
claimed that the French position on the Ohio was no threat to these colonies.
He pointed out that the Appalachians were a considerable obstacle.114
However, such remarks were no longer appropriate. Robinson pressed
75
Mirepoix on the need for a quick and definite settlement, citing the position
of the ministry “vis a vis la nation”, while Mirepoix wrote of the need for both
speed and precautions. He argued that the British nation was strongly animated
against France and the government weak.115 Rouillé however replied in terms
of distrust and argued that George II should assure Parliament of France’s
sincerity.116 Conferences between Mirepoix and the British ministers failed to
provide a satisfactory solution to the Ohio dispute, while Rouillé pressed the
need for the government to oppose popular agitation for war.117
On 25 February 1755 Rouillé sent a long instruction to the Due de Duras,
the French envoy in Madrid, which revealed his opinion of the role of British
domestic pressures. He noted that the British ministry cited the clamours of
the nation to justify their considerable armaments, but he argued that it was
only a pretext and that Britain sought war. Rouillé claimed that the king’s
speech to Parliament, and “indecent writings” the government made no effort
to suppress, were responsible for inciting the hostility of the people to France,
and he stated that the ministry could stop this agitation, which had no
reasonable foundation. Rouillé’s mistaken assumptions about the nature of
British politics and the degree of control the government could exert ensured
that he failed to appreciate the pressures under which the British ministry felt
it was operating.
Rouillé continued by arguing that the Spanish colonies were the true
British objective and that French America was simply a preliminary barrier for
them, an obvious plea for Spanish support that also testified to concern about
the likely scale of British intentions. More generally, the French consistently
argued that British support for the balance of power was a sham, as the British
sought no such balance outside Europe, but, instead, maritime hegemony and
colonial conquest. Bonnac reported from The Hague that Yorke had said that
Britain would never yield over the Ohio, while Yorke clearly laid out a major
obstacle to successful negotiations when he reported being told by Bonnac
that what had alarmed his court, was, the refusal we made to send orders
to the governors in America, to suspend hostilities, which we avoided by
offering to treat upon those orders, whilst our succours would have an
opportunity to arrive in those parts, and perhaps obtain a superiority,
which would render the negotiation more difficult and complicated; He
added the most pacific declarations
In short, the resort to force ensured that the need for an armistice was as much
an issue as the points at dispute. Yorke replied
that what seemed to me to have given rise to the expressions which had
alarmed his court, was the idea that France meant to continue in
possession during the negotiation, of what their governors had unjustly
possessed themselves of.118
76
The French had already decided to send reinforcements to Canada, a decision

that accorded with Mirepoix’s warning of the need to prepare the defence of
Cape Breton and of the despatch of British reinforcements,119 but that made
the success of negotiations unlikely. Though certain of Mirepoix’s desire for
peace, the British ministry had already concluded that France was unwilling to
offer acceptable terms. Robinson noted that France sought “to confine the
present negotiation to a bare provisional cessation des voyes de fait [an
armistice], in order to find the means afterwards, for an amicable conciliation”,
while Britain sought a definitive settlement, adding, “The pretext of the war
will be, la Gloire du Roi. The truth will be, their desire to keep les pretentions
et droits, founded upon Mr. de la Salle’s discoveries, eternally undecided; and
more particularly to have an opening into the Bay of Fundy.”120 Six days later,
on 17 March 1755, Rouillé ordered Mirepoix to make no overture and
informed him that Louis XV regarded the negotiations as completely broken
off, unless, as seemed unlikely, the British proposed more reasonable conditions.
He also argued that there was a danger that Britain would take French
moderation as timidity. Rouillé was sceptical about the position of Newcastle
and Robinson, being convinced that they sought to justify to the nation the
heavy costs of their armaments, and unimpressed by the value of any
ministerial pacific intentions that “could not defeat popular clamour”. 121
Perron reported that both Mirepoix and the British government thought war
inevitable and that Newcastle was being swept along by a bellicose torrent.122
Negotiations continued in London between Mirepoix and Robinson,123 at the
same time as both powers prepared their forces.
Preparations and public hostility themselves did not have to lead to war, as
the Anglo-Bourbon crises over the Falklands (1770) and Nootka Sound (1790)
were to illustrate, but in both those cases it proved possible to negotiate an
agreement before there had been any clashes, other than the initial precipitants
of the crises. In 1755, in contrast, as Rouillé pointed out, the chance of
successful negotiations was really removed by the British refusal to suspend
military steps.124
Whereas the initial check to distant British interests in 1770 and 1790 did
not expose other British possessions to attack, concern about the American
frontier in 1754 was rapidly transmitted to the centres of colonial life in North
America. A military response by the British army seemed more necessary, if
only to lend support to, and control, the likely actions of colonial forces.
On 5 May 1755, two days after the French fleet had sailed from Brest for
Canada, Mirepoix reported that Boscawen, who had sailed on 21 April, had
been ordered to attack it, orders that the British ministry denied having
given.125 The London negotiations served to reveal the incompatibility of the
two governments’ views on America, at the same time that Mirepoix remained
convinced that George II and Newcastle wanted peace.126 Holdernesse, who
accompanied George to Hanover as Secretary of State, wrote thence on 20
May, referring to the Mirepoix—Robinson negotiations, “You will see His
77
Majesty is still willing, if possible, to bring these matters to an amicable

conclusion and to prevent the melancholy effects of a general war,” but, having
mentioned the sailing of the Brest fleet, he added that “as far as human
foresight can reach, every measure has been taken that may enable His Majesty
to resist the efforts of the French in that part of the world, and to recover such
of His Majesty’s possessions, as have been unjustly invaded”. Later that month,
Holdernesse added,
the operations at land, on the continent of America, will probably have

been begun by His Majesty’s troops during the course of the month of
April; and I will not take it upon me to prophecy, whether the French
will, or will not, look upon voyes de fait in that part, as justifiable causes
of a declaration of war on their side, against His Majesty, or of their
taking violent measures against his allies in Europe, or against his
dominions upon the continent.127
Any idea of a predictable international system had clearly broken down, while,
as towards Spain in 1739, the British were having to consider the consequences
of continuing negotiations and preparing for war at the same time. Robinson
wrote on 16 June:
we have not been amused; every thing is in motion, to recover

selfevident encroachments in America. Our colonists, with the few
regular troops there, will be beginning to beat up the French quarters, in
five or six places, at a time, where they have been silently creeping in
upon us. What may happen at sea, God knows. We look upon our
American colonies in the north, as blocked, if not besieged; We have
indeed thrown some few troops into them, but shall hardly be in a
disposition to let the French reinforce the troops they are besieging us
with. We have acted steadily and uniformly…If France is willing to do us
justice; she may do it with honour, by doing it at once, before she knows,
that we have done it for ourselves in North America. If she only waits to
know what is done there, in order to revenge herself here—alors comme
alors.128
This was the language of one of the more pacific members of the British
ministry, but, by June 1755, it was difficult to envisage successful Anglo-French
negotiations and, therefore, from the British point of view, it was necessary to
act swiftly against French encroachments. Rouillé argued that French policy
would be determined by British action.129 On 10 June 1755 Boscawen attacked
the French ships sailing to Canada, although the main fleet was not sighted.
Before the news reached the French court at Compiégne on 17 July, Mirepoix
had already been ordered to tell the British government that he would only
remain in London if serious negotiations began. On 18 July he was recalled, as
78
was Bussy from Hanover. Robinson had told Mirepoix that it was impossible
England could see with indifference so great a reinforcement of French troops
sent to North America, and assured him that Boscawen had misinterpreted his
instructions, but unsurprisingly the French were unimpressed. Holdernesse
refused to give Bussy the explicit answer he demanded that Boscawen had not
received orders to attack the French ships.130
Contacts continued after the breaking off of Anglo-French diplomatic
relations, an example of negotiations on the brink of full-scale war.131 However,
both gover nments tur ned their attention to diplomatic and militar y
preparations for war. The diplomatic moves were to provide an instructive
lesson in the fragility of international links. Not only were the French to be
disappointed by the response of their Prussian and Spanish allies, but the
British were to find that their Austrian and Russian alliances collapsed. The
diplomatic realignments of this period, commonly summarized by the phrase
“Diplomatic Revolution”, have been discussed in terms of long-term shifts in
the international system.132 These were clearly of considerable importance, but
it would be foolish to ignore the role of chance and of short-term problems in
this period. Just as British diplomatic strategy in the post-war period had been
concerned with continental problems, especially the Imperial succession and
the security of Hanover, and had not considered adequately the possibility of a
colonial war, so Austria and Russia had seen Britain in terms of continental
relations, as indeed had Frederick II France.
Given the immediacy of diplomatic activity over continental issues, and the
apparent success in 1749–53 in solving colonial disputes or letting them
continue without apparently serious consequences, this was not surprising.
Britain and France could present themselves as “satisfied” powers, with no
aspirations for Continental conquests (though France sought gains in the
Austrian Netherlands during the Seven Years’ War),133 but this did not describe
their colonial position, and it was difficult to relate colonial aspirations to the
desire of eastern European allies for greater power. It was not surprising that
alliances based on essentially European problems and issues failed in 1755–6 to
meet requirements resulting from an unwanted and unexpected colonial war.
Equally, it was not surprising that Newcastle, the British minister most
concerned with continental diplomacy, should have been disinclined to
support a forward policy in America.
However, his anxiety about possible European consequences was not shared
by the bulk of the British political nation. There had been a definite shift in
consciousness towards knowledge of and interest in the situation in Nova
Scotia or west of the Appalachians, rather than in Flanders or the Rhineland. It
is unclear how strong the latter had been in the 1740s: the apparently
remorseless pressure of Louis XIV and the wars fought against him in which
Britain had played a prominent role had arguably raised interest earlier, only
for it to be dissipated after 1713, as attention switched to the Baltic, the
Mediterranean and the Caribbean and as concern about France declined.
79
Nevertheless, North America had not been a key political issue in the early
1740s, as it was to become a decade later. Then, North America served to focus
concern about Anglo-French colonial rivalry at a time that public anxiety
about their respective continental positions had diminished.
This had little effect on the ministry during the years 1749–53, a period of
relative diplomatic and domestic quiescence, and its impact on government
policy in 1754–5 should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the political world
in London influenced the British response in North America, even if years of
diplomatic distrust were also of great importance, as was the intractable nature
of the particular points in dispute. However, had war broken out in the Baltic
in 1747 or over Hanover in 1753, it is difficult to see the same alignments that
were to develop in 1756 existing earlier in these very different situations.
The role of chance and short-term problems should not be discounted in
discussing the “Diplomatic Revolution”. If that was true of Anglo-French
relations, it was also true of those between other powers. One does not need to
dwell solely on the role of monarchs, for example, an earlier accession by the
pro-Prussian Peter III of Russia. Much of the diplomatic agenda, though
presented in terms of immutable long-term interests, was more transient, either
in its importance or in the extent to which particular views were pressed at
specific junctures. As it was those junctures that led to war, the reasons for
specific concurrences of events are of considerable scholarly interest.
80
Chapter Five
The crown and Hanover
A substantial reassessment of the role of the monarchs has been central to the
study of eighteenth-century British high politics in recent years. This
reassessment has rested on an examination of the political position of the rulers,
not on a reappraisal of the constitutional consequences of the “Glorious
Revolution” of 1688 and the subsequent Revolution Settlement. Foreign
policy is important to this re-examination, for it was in that field that the
monarchs were of greatest constitutional and political importance and were
most concerned and active. This concern owed much to the foreign origin and
continental commitments of William III (1689–1702) and the Hanoverians,
especially George I (1714–27) and George II (1727–60). George III (1760–
1820) was far less concerned with Hanoverian interests and continental
commitments.
The monarch’s role in foreign policy also reflected the central concern of
rulers in ancien régime Europe. The defence of a monarch’s inheritance and
people in peace and war was foremost among his duties. By the eighteenth
century this defence was generally more pressing than the defence of the faith,
and certainly more urgent and feasible than the preservation of law and order
and the administration of justice.
Ancien régime European governments were particularly subject to the
friction of distance, the dissipation of authority in the face of unresponsive
subjects, and officials and landowners whose willingness to co-operate could
not be taken for granted. Foreign policy offered an attractive alternative. It was
a field in which, generally, there was relatively little need to seek co-operation.
Diplomats were appointed, paid and dismissed by, and answerable, to rulers.
However much the fighting of wars might depend on financial support from
constitutional assemblies, the Estates of Continental Europe, they commonly
had no authority in the field of foreign policy, nor any wish to acquire any. The
extent to which many “states” were in fact amalgamations of areas with
distinct histories and constitutional identities, politically united only in the
81
person of their joint sovereign and in his court, further increased the
importance of monarchs, because it was only in foreign policy that these
entities truly acted as one “state”.
It is important to consider Britain-Hanover in this light. Prior to the Union
of 1707 England and Scotland had acted as one in foreign policy, although
there had been tensions between the two Parliaments. However, the position
involving Hanover was far more complex and was to be one of the leading
political problems in the mid-eighteenth century, one that threw the role of
the monarch into prominence. Given the contentious nature of the Hanoverian
connection, especially in the 1740s and 1750s, it is impracticable to separate
the issue of royal influence in the formulation of foreign policy from that of
Hanoverian concerns, for the latter gave force and direction to royal initiatives
and concern.
The Electorate of Hanover was geographically part of the north-west of
modern Germany and was constitutionally one of the eight Electorates in the
Holy Roman Empire, the loosely united assemblage of terr itories that
comprised modern Germany and Austria and some bordering areas and was
presided over by an elected Emperor, a post filled for over two centuries by the
ruler of the Habsburg territories. As with most German principalities,
Hanover’s frontiers were established by feudal, not geog raphical,
considerations, but most of the Electorate was between the Elbe and the Weser,
the North Sea and the Harz mountains. However, there were also important
sections between the Elbe, Mecklenburg, Holstein and the Baltic, and also west
of the Weser. These frontiers lacked strong natural defences and had not been
supplemented by any system of fortifications. As a result, Hanover was
vulnerable to attack, and dependent for its defence on the size of its army. This
was, like that of most German principalities, modest in size, 21,000 strong in
1739, 26,400 in April 1742.1 Such a force did not place too heavy a burden on
a primarily agrarian economy that was not particularly advanced, by the
standards of the age, and it was sufficient for pursuing small-scale quarrels with
weak neighbours, such as the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin or the Prince-
Bishop of Hildesheim.
However, other, and more powerful, German rulers could intervene in such
quarrels and Hanover suffered from its military weakness. The Hanoverian
army offered no real protection against attack by powerful rulers, while
Hanover’s geographical and international position made it liable to pressure.
The Electorate’s trans-Elbean terr itory, the Duchy of Saxe-Lauenburg,
occupied in 1689, made Hanover particularly sensitive to developments in the
Baltic, especially in Mecklenburg and the Schleswig-Holstein isthmus. Her
western possessions made her concerned about events in the Westphalian
Circle. Hanover lay astride any Russian advance into northern Germany, any
Danish moves south into Lower Saxony, any French attack on the western
frontier of Brandenburg, and any attempt by the Electors of Brandenburg
82
THE CROWN AND HANOVER
(Kings in Prussia) to amalgamate or otherwise link up their widely separated

territories in Westphalia and the Lower Rhineland with Brandenburg.
Some rulers wished to create geographical links between their territories.
Augustus I of Saxony, who became Augustus II of Poland in 1697, and his son
Augustus II/III (1733–63) both wished to create a land bridge across the
Austrian-ruled Duchy of Silesia, between Saxony and Poland. Irrespective of
such aspirations, it was clearly worrying for the Electors of Hanover that there
were Danish possessions not only to the north of Hanover but also to its west:
Oldenburg and Delmenhorst; Prussian territories to both east and west.
If Hanoverian security dictated a search for allies, it was by no means clear
whom to turn to. The usual pattern was two-fold: alliances with neighbouring
second-rank powers—Denmark, Hesse-Cassel and Sweden—and the search for
a more substantial friend. In 1741 the Danes were pressed to send assistance
against a threatened invasion. However, the first group was simply not powerful
enough. Bereft of a major ally in 1741, George was forced to accept an
ignominious neutrality convention. Only four states were powerful enough to
offer convincing assistance—France, Prussia, Austria and Russia—and much of
the course of British foreign policy in 1714–56 arose from the efforts to win
such assistance and their implications. After the end of the Anglo-French
alliance in 1731, Austria was the obvious choice, but by 1732 it was clear that
Austria would not endanger her Prussian alliance for the sake of Hanover.
Austrian military defeats in 1733–4, 1737–9 and 1741 underlined a diplomatic
failure that was apparent before the Austro-French reconciliation in late 1735
and, more obviously, their alliance in 1756.
Hanoverian vulnerability in the face of continued Prussian antagonism in
the 1730s led George II to plan for the accession of Frederick II and to seek
Russian support. The concomitant of the latter was a downplaying of Anglo-
Swedish relations. The British were fortunate that French attempts to woo
Russia, as in 1733 and 1741, were less persistent than those of Britain: in the
late 1730s the French preferred to seek the alliance of Sweden.
The British search for Russian assistance not only helped Hanover. Russia
was a useful partner for Britain, as it could act in a variety of spheres. It was
also vital to prevent Russia from joining Britain’s enemies. The Russian refusal
to join the powers attacking Austria in the early stages of the War of the
Austrian Succession was crucial to Austrian survival. As France made gains
during the war, so British ministers and diplomats became more anxious for
Russian intervention. In 1742 Carteret hoped that the Russians would make a
secure peace with Sweden “that they may have their hands free to act in a
greater, more useful and more salutary manner”. Five years later, Cumberland’s
secretary, Sir Everard Fawkener, noted, “We should never negotiate anything
for good without a force. That from Petersburg will be an essential one, if we
can have it.” Hanbury-Williams also sought Russian intervention: “We have
too long fought with the French upon unequal terms. Shall we never come
into the field with equal numbers.”2 A Russian alliance was seen by the mid–
83
1740s not only as a protection of Hanover, but also as vital for the European
balance of power. As a result, British relations with Denmark and Sweden,
especially the vexed question of the Swedish succession, became substantially
an extension of Anglo-Russian relations. The pivotal nature of Russia in both
British policy towards the Baltic and Hanoverian security was now established.
Geographically exposed, Hanover was also threatened as a consequence of
the dynastic link with Britain in 1714. An attack on or threat to the Electorate
was an obvious pre-emption of or response to unwelcome British moves, an
apparently safe way to influence the conduct of Britain by intimidating the
King-Elector. Conversely, the dynastic link provided a dynamic to British-
Hanoverian policy that posed both opportunities and threats. Throughout the
union there were always two distinct international realities. It was always clear,
when a formal treaty was signed with other powers, which country was
committed by its King or Elector, and separate treaties were signed on
occasions when the head of state committed both countries at the same time.
The administration of the two units was also separate.
Nevertheless, too much can be made of these distinctions, and it is wrong to
see the designation of the successive Georges as His Royal and Electoral
Majesty as mere etiquette.3 Although British ministers struggled to maintain
the distinction, both in discussion with foreign envoys and when faced with
domestic criticism,4 it is not surprising that their arguments were greeted with
general scepticism, and such issues as marital links with other ruling families
eroded the distinction.5 Furthermore, at times ministers sought to stress the
common interests and bonds of Britain and Hanover. In 1751, when Newcastle
complained of Prussian conduct, he wrote “one sees the affectation of
distinguishing the King from the Elector”. Six years later, the British ministry
pressed its hostility to a Hanoverian neutrality, although constitutional niceties
were observed:
this transaction, which His Majesty has, in the most gracious manner,
condescended to communicate to his English servants, who, though they
did not dare to presume to offer their humble advice to the King, in
regard to the affairs of his Electorate, yet they thought it their duty to lay
at His Majesty’s feet their opinion, as to the support England ought to
give the King, if His Majesty should be advised, by his Electoral servants,
no longer to understand a Convention made under the circumstances of
that of the 10th September, and already broke by the enemy, to be
binding upon the King.6
The personal union of Britain and Hanover was but one instance of a common
pattern in the period 1680–1770. William III of Orange had ruled Britain and
been stadhouder of most of the Dutch provinces between 1689 and 1702.
Saxony and Poland were ruled by the same man between 1697 and 1704, 1709
and 1763; Sweden and another German territory, the Langraviate of Hesse-
84
Cassel, by Frederick I of Sweden between 1730 and 1751. None of these links
was sustained, but, in contrast, the dynastic link between England and Scotland
in 1603 led to the union of the two crowns and to that of their parliaments in
1707, while the Electorate of Hanover was itself the recent product of the
fusion of the inheritances of several branches of the house of Brunswick-
Lüneburg and did not subsequently divide. Dynastic accretion was the classic
route to growth in the early modern period, as the history of Spain, Austria,
and seventeenth-century Prussia, or rather of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern
families, demonstrated.
However, territorial amalgamation through dynastic means posed serious
political problems, in terms of management as much as policy, and it is in this
light that much of the debate over foreign policy in Hanoverian Britain can
best be understood. Though George I in his will stipulated an eventual division
of Britain and Hanover after the death of his then sole grandson, Frederick,
later Frederick, Prince of Wales, the electorate going to Frederick’s second son,
if he had one, and, failing that, to the Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel branch of the
house of Brunswick, he had, in the meantime, essentially created a new state. In
common with the general European trend, this did not lead, however, to novel
constitutional, political or administrative arrangements.
Instead, it was a personal union, a territorial agglomeration, given common
purpose at the international level by the dynastic concerns of the ruler. This
was recognized by foreign diplomats, impatient with the attempts of their
British counterparts to differentiate between the two dominions. In January
1742 Hardenberg, the Hanoverian envoy in Paris, assured Fleury of the Elector
of Hanover’s good intentions, but refused to answer questions about the King
of Britain. Amelot commented in a letter intercepted by the excellent British
deciphering department, that Fleury made it clear that pushing the idea of one
person having two roles created an impression of bad faith. Faced by Austro-
Hanoverian moves in 1745, Frederick II asked his envoy in London whether
he should regard the King of England as one or two people,7 in short whether
Britain was not, through the King, a party to these moves.
Hanoverian ministers were aware that their views were judged abroad in the
light of responses to British policy and interests. They were faced in 1727,
1729, 1730, 1741, 1753, 1757 and 1772 with threatened attacks designed to
influence British conduct. The monarchs appreciated the consequences of the
personal union, but the bulk of the British political nation, understandably, did
not, and this provided a basis for political discord. The rule of the Hanoverians
posed not simply a question of dynastic legitimacy, but also one of political
intention. Intended to stabilize the Protestant Succession after the failure of
William III and Anne to produce direct heirs, Hanoverian dynasticism was a
destabilizing force in British politics. As the modus operandi of this dynasticism
was foreign policy, it is scarcely surprising that the latter constituted a major
topic of political debate.
The royal role in the for mulation and conduct of foreign policy, a
85
characteristic of all monarchical states in this period, and a long-standing

source of controversy in Britain, was thus given point as an issue in British
politics by the diplomatic and domestic consequences of royal intervention
arising from the interests of the personal union. It is this that dynasticism really
denoted, but in British political debate it was commonly misunderstood as
Hanoverianism. However, the charge of Hanoverian counsels failed to do
justice to the divisions within the government of the Electorate, divisions that
were at times quite marked. It also neglected the extent to which dynastic
interests were often different from those of the Electorate, as understood by
Hanoverian ministers, and also the degree to which the royal conception of
Hanoverian interests was different from the ministerial conception, not least
because it was often subsumed within these dynastic views.
It has been argued that on occasion Hanover suffered as a result of the
connection with Britain, 8 and this was certainly a view held at the time.
Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied George II to Hanover in
1741, claimed that “there is no manner of doubt but that the measures His
Majesty shall pursue, as King, will be revenged upon him, as Elector, unless
timely care be taken to prevent it”. He was correct. The advance of a French
army towards Hanover forced George to agree to support the French candidate
for Emperor. To a certain extent, however, the question of how far Hanover
suffered as a result of the connection is poorly posed, because the Electorate’s
difficulties arose as a result of the personal union and the interests and views
that this represented, as interpreted by the successive Georges.
The period 1739–63 saw fresh challenges to the position of the Electors of
Hanover in northern Germany after a decade when the situation had generally
not seemed too alarming. Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia in December 1740
launched a period of instability in Germany and war across much of Europe,
and Hanover was affected both directly and indirectly. Although peace came in
1748, Hanover’s position remained precarious, thanks to the recent growth of
Prussian strength, and it was also seen in this light as Frederick II was believed
to be unpredictable and was allied to France. When Frederick William I of
Prussia had threatened to invade Hanover in 1726–7 and 1730, Georges I and
II had been able to turn to French support, but the collapse of the Anglo-
French alliance in 1731 had meant the end of such assistance and reassurance.
However, although Prussian invasion of Hanover was feared in 1752 and 1753,
it was French troops that were to invade, in 1757 during the Seven Years’ War.
North-west Germany remained a sphere of operations for the remainder of the
conflict, the Electorate’s position strategic because it covered Prussia’s western
frontier, and part of the Electorate was still occupied by the French at the close
of hostilities.
Given these challenges, it was not surprising that George II took an active
role in continental diplomacy, but until the mid–1750s this looked back to the
position in 1714–30. Then Hanoverian concerns had been pushed to the top of
the agenda of British diplomacy by the later stages of the Great Northern War
86
(1700–21), the rise of Russian power in the Baltic and its direct impact in
Germany in 1716–17, and the attendant conquest and distribution of much of
the Swedish empire. A stress on Hanover had subsequently arisen from the
British confrontation with Austria in 1725–31 and with Prussia in 1726–31.
This emphasis was domestically controversial. Particular diplomatic and
military moves, such as the confrontation with Austria, were judged unwise by
some. Furthermore, the pursuit of interests and acceptance of commitments
that did not accord with traditional British ones and that could be presented as
Hanoverian provided critics of successive Whig ministries with an opportunity
for arguing that they were betraying both national interests and their supposed
role as balancers of royal power.
These arguments were to be repeated in the 1740s, and, indeed,
opposition writers of the period, such as James Ralph, as well as speakers in
Parliament, directly referred to the events of 1714–30 when discussing
current issues in foreign policy.10 In part, the controversy was familiar, but it
was also different, looking back in one respect to the disputes over William
Ill’s foreign policy, but also suggesting a new agenda for debate with the
r ising prominence of the contrasting of continental and oceanic
commitments. Whereas in 1714–30 the response to the growing power of
Russia and Austria was the central issue in British diplomacy, and one that
did not strike any favourable resonance in terms of British public debate over
foreign policy, in the 1740s and 1750s a traditional theme was dominant: how
best to respond diplomatically and militarily to French power. This had been
a central question during William Ill’s reign and, in one respect, relations
with Hanover were simply a more acute form of the commonplace problem
of co-operating with allies and defending the exigencies of alliance
diplomacy from domestic criticism. However, in the 1740s and 1750s the
problems of French power and the response to it were increasingly seen more
in global terms and less in European.
Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia was made without the support of France,
and George II’s hostile response to his nephew and one-time hoped-for
protégé threatened to open a gap between his own policy and that of the
British, then at war with Spain and fearing the entry of her ally France. George
took a major role as Elector in trying to create an anti-Prussian coalition, but,
although he threatened the use of Hanoverian troops, 11 such activity could
only be convincing if supported by Britain. On 26 December (os) 1740 Trevor
was ordered to stir up the Dutch against Prussia and to ascertain from their
leading ministers whether, if George II acted in support of Austria and “His
German Dominions should be attacked, as they lie by their neighbourhood to
those of Prussia, so much exposed, in resentment”, the Dutch would provide
assistance. In April 1741 Parliament offered support to Hanover, as part of a
plan designed to help Maria Theresa against her Prussian assailant, thus
prefiguring Pitt’s support from 1758 for the despatch of British troops to
Westphalia to support Frederick II in the Seven Years’ War. As on the latter
87
occasion, this approach was seen as a means to help Hanover without inspiring
serious controversy.
In 1741 Parliament provided a vote of credit to enable George as king to
fulfil his obligations to Maria Theresa, and assured him of support in the event
of an attack on Hanover. Moving the Address in the Commons, Thomas
Clutterbuck, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, declared that “we ought to
pronounce that the territories of Hanover will be considered on this occasion
as the dominions of Great Britain, and that any attack on one or the other will
be equally resented”. Pulteney, however, sought to separate the issues of Austria
and Hanover in order to provide a focus for attacks on the government. He
supported aid to Austria, but was opposed to giving any guarantee for Hanover.
Pulteney referred to the Act of Settlement of 1701, the constitutional basis of
the Hanoverian succession, which stipulated that the monarch should not enter
into a war for the sake of foreign dominions not belonging to the British
crown.12
Nevertheless, support for Austria covered the gap between George’s views
and British hostility to the Bourbons. Furthermore, the Franco-Prussian
alliance of 1741 and British success in 1742 in breaking this and in reconciling
Prussia and Austria, albeit temporarily, helped to lessen tension over disparate
aims. A somewhat far-fetched parallel was provided by the French entry into
the War of American Independence in 1778. That lessened domestic political
opposition to the British government’s use of force in America.
However, from the outset in the 1740s there were clearly differences in
emphasis, if not policy, between ruler and ministers. It is necessary, first, to
consider how and to what extent George II was able to advance his views and
what the political consequences were. Subsequently, attention will be devoted
to George III, who came to the throne in 1760, and for whom Hanoverian
concerns were not foremost, at least in his early years as monarch.
George II had two different sets of ministers and diplomats whom he could
use to advance his views, and he was also able to do so through his frequent
meetings with foreign envoys. Although his opportunities for personal
diplomacy with other monarchs were slight—none came to London, and on
his frequent trips to Hanover, unlike his father, he was never invited to
Berlin—George II’s continental trips did provide opportunities for meeting
foreign ministers and senior diplomats and gave him a chance for taking a fresh
look at affairs. Furthermore, both in Hanover and en route, George could meet
British diplomats, especially those accredited to The Hague. British envoys at
nearby courts, especially Berlin and Dresden, travelled to Hanover when the
king was there. As king, George was also able in Britain to discuss diplomatic
relations with British ministers other than the relevant Secretary of State and
thus at times to undermine the position of that minister. George also saw
foreign diplomats in London. In January 1750 he told the Sardinian envoy he
was furious with Austria, but, at the same time, he sought to lessen Austro-
Sardinian differences.13
88
The importance of Hanover ian diplomatic representation has been

underestimated. Although no longer regularly represented in, for example,
France and Russia, Hanoverian diplomats were present at crucial moments, for
example, in Paris during the winter of 1741–2, while the regular representation
in Vienna and Regensburg underlined the continued importance of German
disputes and matters of Imperial jurisdiction. Hanoverian diplomats provided
George II with sources of information and channels of communication that
were outside the control of the Secretaries of State. This ensured that it was
important for British ministries to win the co-operation of their Hanoverian
counterparts. British diplomats encountered difficulties as a result of the
actions of their Hanoverian colleagues; although it was also convenient to
blame them for problems that were not their fault. Thus, in 1739, at a time of
poor Anglo-Austrian relations, Robinson complained about the consequences
of the pursuit of one of George II’s favourite goals, the succession to East
Friesland, over which he was in dispute with the Hohenzollerns,
the Electoral Minister has had orders to desire of this court [Vienna] the
confirmation of the Electoral Pacta Conventa about the succession of
Ostfrise, which both for the timing of it, and the manner of doing it
…and that too when this court thought that all had been asked of them
that was wanting at present, gives a real concern to those here who wish
well to us, and a pretext to others to countercarry us in everything else.
The following January Robinson was concerned about Hanoverian policy in

the forthcoming election of a new Emperor. He wrote to one of Harrington’s
Under Secretaries,
You will easily imagine why I trust with you for Lord Harrington’s use,
rather than to a dispatch, the inclosed papers. One a letter from the
Regency at Hanover without the King’s order, to the Elector of Mainz
…The King our master has not yet declared his personal view, not even,
as appears by the letter, to his own Regency, which makes it the more
extraordinary that they should so hastily adopt a doctrine, that for what
they may know or foresee may thwart his Majesty in quite different
views…what you will easily perceive is, that the Elector’s Minister very
often comes across the King’s. This is and has been so much the case that
I have often seen by one blind and random shot overturned
his own best endeavours. In September 1741, Frederick II drew attention to

serious discrepancies between what he was told by the royal and Electoral
envoys, telling the British envoy, the Earl of Hyndford, “when you My lord call
a thing white that Sweicheldt calls it black, and when you call it black he calls
it white”.14 The following spring, Hardenberg continued to act in accordance
with the Hanoverian neutrality until the new British ministry was able to
89
persuade George II to abandon the policy.15 Although sympathetic towards

Maria Theresa, 16 Hanoverian ministers had been greatly affected by the
Electorate’s vulnerability. Horatio Walpole commented on the Hanoverian
response to the Prussian invasion of Silesia in December 1740,
our master is divided between resentment and fears; he cannot bear to

think of augmenting the ter r itor ies of his Electoral neighbour
[Brandenburg-Prussia] on one side, and he justly apprehends that his own
dominions should fall first a sacrifice should be stir on the other. His
servants I think are all here of one opinion, blame and abhor the
extravagant step, but see no remedy but palliating and accommodating
remedies.
Exposure to possible French and Prussian attack in the summer of 1741 had a
serious effect on Hanoverian self-confidence, leading to support for neutrality
and its maintenance. Ernst, Freiherr von Steinberg, head of the Hanoverian
Chancery in London in 1737–48, spoke with regret of British efforts in the last
days of the Walpole gover nment to encourage the Austr ians and the
consequent delay in negotiating peace.17
Significant differences between, and a sense of a clear clash between, British
and Hanoverian objectives were not restricted to 1740–2, but can be found
throughout the period.18 They were most acute in the case of relations with
Prussia and most serious during the War of the Austrian Succession and again
in 1756–7, when the issue of Hanoverian neutrality again became prominent.
Differences were least serious during 1748–53, when the close relationship
between Newcastle and the most influential Hanoverian minister, Gerlach
Adolph, Freiherr von Münchhausen,19 and their shared interest in the Imperial
Election Scheme and in giving an anti-Prussian direction to British policy
reduced tension.
George II continued to entrust his Hanoverian envoys with confidential
tasks. George was also, however, able to instruct British diplomats to further
Electoral goals, a situation that helped, as much as clashes with Hanoverian
diplomacy, to sustain criticism by British envoys. In addition, his views were of
considerable importance in the composition of the British diplomatic corps, all
appointed by him, in theory his choice, and all paid out of the king’s civil list,
which accounted for George’s reluctance to promote diplomats to more senior
and expensive ranks.
Diplomats could find it time-consuming and irritating to be instructed to
support Electoral interests. In October 1747 Hanbury-Williams reported, “I
have the Hanover affairs at this court [Dresden] put into my hands,” adding,
next month, that it had obliged him to postpone a journey to Vienna.20 The
same year, Sandwich successfully pressed the Dutch to hire a German regiment
in accordance with George’s wishes. 21 The attempt in 1747–8 to persuade
Spain to pay money it owed to Hanover was more time-consuming and led
90
Horace Walpole, an MP as well as a letter writer, to complain that the ministry

was seeking repayment of this debt rather than reparation for attacks on British
trade.22 It would be mistaken, however, to suggest either that relations in this
period were invariably poor or that the British ministry necessarily yielded to
Electoral demands. In 1748 Newcastle encouraged Sandwich to ignore orders
about preventing Frederick II from obtaining any guarantee from the peace
negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle for his possession of East Friesland. Frederick
had seized East Friesland in 1744 on the death of the last duke, to the impotent
fury of George.23
And yet, co-operation between British and Hanoverian ministers was the
dominant theme in 1748, one to which George II contributed, and which set
the scene for close relations between Newcastle and Münchhausen in the
following years. After six days “wading through the mud of Westphalia” to
Hanover, on his way to Berlin, Henry Legge was given very useful information
about the situation there by Münchhausen. In July George sent Bussche, his
envoy in Vienna, to the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. Newcastle was not shown
his instructions, but was informed that they related to the Elector’s interests in
Osnabrück and East Friesland. However, George clearly did not wish to
complicate Sandwich’s negotiations with the French Plenipotentiary, St
Severin, Newcastle writing to the Earl,
‘I am persuaded you will give Mor. Busch all the assistance you can in
carrying it through. But as it is a very nice and delicate affair and ought
to be conducted with great prudence and discretion; I have the
satisfaction to assure you that Mor. Busch is directed to take no step, nor
make any application to Mor. St. Severin, but in concert with you and by
your advice: And therefore, at the same time, that I am very earnestly to
recommend to you, to give Mor. Busch all the assistance in your power; I
am persuaded, you will take great care not to give Mor. St. Severin any
advantage over you, nor to put it into his power to make any ill use of
the confidence reposed in him: For His Majesty has the immediate
conclusion of the general pacification so much at heart; and is so
desirous, that the negotiation should not be obstructed.
By 1748 Hanoverian ministers could be praised. Aside from Newcastle’s high

opinion of Münchhausen, he also found “Mor. Busch a very sensible and
discreet man…with the rightest notions…for supporting the true system, that
ought to be observed and followed by the Maritime Powers”. Pelham was
“sorry to lose” Steinberg when he resigned his London post, because “he was
a good natured innocent man”.24
The implicit bargain between king and British ministers that had helped to
bring governmental stability in the latter stages of the War of the Austrian
Succession was to be sustained in the post-war years: a degree of mutual
understanding and co-operation to which Newcastle’s willingness to play an
91
active role as standard-bearer of continental interventionism and opponent of

Prussia was crucial. Horace Walpole complained in 1749 that Newcastle
“Hanoverizes more and more every day”,25 but, once a German league was
seen as important and the Imperial Election Scheme centred on just such a
league, Hanoverian advice and assistance was valuable, to an extent that had not
been the case for the British ministry for many years.
However, there was an undisclosed tension between Electoral goals and
those of Newcastle in 1748–56. This tension was to have serious impact in
1756–7, under the strain of a deteriorating international system and a breakdo
wn of co-operation between the British and Hanoverian ministries. The
Hanover ian ministers were most concer ned about the secur ity of the
Electorate, and, to that end, supported better Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-
Russian relations and a league of German princes. In contrast, Newcastle’s
prime purpose was creating an alliance system aimed against France. The
position of Prussia was crucial. Newcastle was angered by Prussian conduct in
a number of disputes with Britain, especially over financial and commercial
issues—the Silesian debts and the Emden Company, but was essentially
concerned about her as an ally of France, to him the principal threat, while the
Hanoverians considered Prussia as the major challenge to their position.
Evidence for George II’s views is less than complete. The political history of
monarchical attitudes and the royal courts is rarely easy to study, but the
problem of sources is more serious for the first half of the eighteenth century
than for the second. For a var iety of reasons that are unclear, the
correspondence of European monarchs in the later period was more extensive
and has been printed at length, in contrast to that of their predecessors in the
first half. This contrast is particularly marked in the case of Frederick II (1740–
86), when contrasted with his father, Frederick William I (1713–40), though it
is also true of those of Catherine II, “the Great” (1762–96), Joseph II (1765–
90) and Gustavus III (1771–92). Possibly it owed something to the differing
styles of eighteenth-century kingship, as Enlightened Despotism replaced late-
Baroque monarchy, and to the interest of late nineteenth-century historians in
what then appeared to be a heroic period of national monarchy, only a century
distant.
In the case of Britain, the heroism was attributed to the opponents of
George III, but the position with regard to sources was similar. George III’s
correspondence runs to eleven fat volumes although they include letters to the
king. The surviving letters of George I and George II are very scanty. Their
preference for reviewing troops and hunting rather than the convenience of
future “history bigots”, as Hervey termed them,26 ensured not only that it is
difficult to provide a standard against which the supposed novelty of George
III’s attitude towards his position as king and consequent policies could be
judged, but also that the role of the two monarchs in foreign policy, as in much
else, is obscure. Even that expert champion of continental sources, Ragnhild
Hatton, made little of the last six years of George I’s reign, summarized very
92
cursorily in her biography, and it remains one of the most obscure periods in
eighteenth-century British political history.
The few surviving items of correspondence in the hand of George II are
very brief, and consist largely of scribbled comments on pieces submitted to
him for approval.27 It is ironic that the Royal Archives in Windsor Castle
contain more material on the Jacobites than the Hanoverians for the reigns of
George I and George II. Little survives for Frederick, Prince of Wales, and the
Cumberland Papers at Windsor are substantially devoted to military matters.
They appear to have been weeded for political items, although there are two
other reasons why Cumberland’s papers are more plentiful for 1747 or 1757
than 1750 or 1753. First, he was away from London in 1743, 1745–8 and 1757,
and, secondly he held important official positions in 1745–8 and 1757, and
these produced institutional correspondence.
Absence of monarchs and ministers from the centre of government
generally led to an increase in correspondence, of both institutional and
personal nature. Thus, there are usually more letters surviving between British
politicians for the summer months, especially the late summer, when many
were away from London, than for the early months of the year, when all who
were fit were generally in London for the parliamentary session. In this respect,
the fact that George II, like his father and like George III in his early years as
king, rarely travelled far in Britain is important. The monarchs might move
between the royal seats in the Thames Valley, but none was far from London,
unlike Compiégne, where Louis XV went on a number of occasions, which
was some distance from Paris. When in England, George I and George II were
usually to be found at St James’s or, in the spring and summer, Kensington
Palace and Hampton Court. Neither visited the north of England, the
Midlands or the West Country; let alone Scotland, Wales or Ireland, which did
not see a British monarch at any time during the century. In contrast, George
II visited Hanover while Elector in 1729, 1732, 1735, 1736, 1740, 1741, 1743,
1748, 1750, 1752 and 1755. Each trip lasted several months. George was
accompanied by a British Secretary of State, Townshend in 1729, Harrington in
1732, 1735, 1740 and 1741, Carteret in 1743, Newcastle in 1748, 1750 and
1752, and Holdernesse in 1755. In 1736 Walpolean distrust of Harrington led
to Horatio Walpole accompanying George as acting Secretary.
Although George II’s absence from London did not lead to his writing
letters to ministers there, the Secretary of State accompanying him
corresponded with his opposite number in London, as indeed did the Under
Secretaries and these papers have survived in State Papers Regencies.28 They
provide a valuable guide to policy-making, while the Secretary in Hanover
frequently commented on the views of the monarch. In addition, the Secret-
ary in Hanover corresponded, separately from his London counterpart, with
British diplomats, the correspondence surviving in State Papers Foreign but
bound in separate volumes. State Papers Regencies can be supplemented by
confidential correspondence between the Secretary in Hanover (and others
93
with him) and politicians in Britain. This is especially valuable for the years
when Newcastle went, for he was a man devoted to self-justification and had a
mistaken belief in his ability to persuade others. Holdernesse’s correspondence
is also helpful, Harrington’s less so, while Carteret’s refusal to explain what was
going on aroused fury in London. The wartime destruction of Hanoverian
material, especially the series Hanover 9, the post–1705 foreign policy
documents, exacerbates the problem for the modern scholar. Government
papers were also destroyed in a fire at the palace in Hanover in 1741.29 These
losses increase the importance of British sources for understanding the impact
of Hanover, although that also ensures that Hanover as an issue is overly seen
in, and from, a British perspective.
The survival and importance of State Papers Regencies directs attention to
the role of institutional practice, in this case the correspondence between
Secretaries of State, in providing records for royal activity. However, the fact
that the king settled matters in discussions with his ministers and the oral
nature of court politics creates serious problems. Military and diplomatic
correspondence were generally handled outside the cabinet. There are accounts
of what George II said in meetings. Newcastle often told Hardwicke and
Pelham what the king had said, and foreign diplomats who were granted
audience would report at length on what they were told, but these accounts
were dependent on memory, not note-taking, and were not made by the king.
They can be supplemented by comments about royal attitudes, but these have
to be used with care, especially those in well-known sources, such as the
Memoirs of Hervey and of Horace Walpole. It is going too far to claim, as has
been done, that “such writings are on the whole vindictive nonsense” and that
“contemporary memoirs and letters can only be used occasionally in the study
of administrative history of this period”.30
The surviving sources for the “administrative history” of foreign policy,
the diplomatic correspondence, do not suffice as a source for the study of
foreign policy. It has been argued that the very nature of diplomatic
documents is not helpful in ascertaining the link between diplomacy and
“profound causes”, because diplomatic correspondence is most likely to
emphasize the immediate and tactical, while the language employed
reinforces the assumption that non-diplomatic calculations are of little use
and throws no light on unspoken assumptions. 31 There is much truth in this,
although, in fact, the instructions sent to British envoys often included a
lengthy discussion of the central themes of British foreign policy. These were
necessary because the nature of eighteenth-century communications ensured
that it was not sensible to emphasize the immediate and tactical. Diplomats,
especially those at some distance from London, had to be given discretion to
discuss and negotiate.
However, the value of these instructions to historians has to be questioned.
First, the explanations of Br itish policy were often intended for
communication to foreign monarchs or ministers, and thus tended to
94
emphasize good intentions and common diplomatic interests. Secondly, they

provide little guidance as to the priorities of British policy. Thirdly, they offer
few suggestions as to the process by which policy was formulated. Fourthly,
they were often designed to be understood in the light of supplementary
private instructions, which do not always survive, or not always with them.
In addition, the value of diplomatic correspondence in general was limited
by the reluctance to commit material to paper, especially in secret negotiations.
Sir Cyril Wych reported from Russia in 1742 “of the danger of giving
anything in writing to this court, so liable to revolutions, and of naming
persons, who by a sudden change may rise from nothing to the head of affairs”.
Carteret replied by instructing him to avoid written communications.32 The
following year, Count Finckenstein, Prussian envoy in Hanover, found it
impossible to get anything in writing from Carteret about possible measures to
negotiate a peace for Charles VII (Charles Albert of Bavaria as Holy Roman
Emperor). Advocating negotiations with Prussia in August 1740, Sir Robert
Walpole and the Lord President of the Council, the Earl of Wilmington, both
experienced politicians, proposed discussions rather than the exchange of
memoranda, as the former method was better “for opening and explaining the
sentiments on both sides”. Nine years later, Keene reported,
I shall punctually observe His Majesty’s injunctions to be cautious in

treating by for mal offers in wr iting, and being appr ised of the
inconveniencies that method is subject to, I never intended to follow it,
but in commercial affairs where it is necessary because memorials of that
nature are usually remitted to other places.33
One important cause of reluctance was fear of loss of secrecy on the part of
allies, the Austrians being hesitant about confiding in the Dutch for that reason
in 1743,34 and the danger either that the threat of compromising material
would be used in order to exert pressure or that it would be exposed in order
to create embarrassment.35 In early 1743 the British government discovered
from postal interception that their domestic opponents were seeking copies of
documents about the 1741 Hanoverian neutrality from the French, and that
the latter were willing to agree provided that their revelation would help
France.36
On the other hand, Frederick II was worried about the imprecision of oral
negotiations, in terms both of precision of thought and accuracy in reporting,
and in 1752 instructed his envoy in Paris to ensure that memoranda were used
by both powers.37 Frederick’s comments are an instructive qualification of
many sources, for much correspondence consists of subsequent accounts of
audiences, council meetings and conversations. However, these are still useful,
like contemporary letters and memoirs in general, because they can be
evaluated, whereas much that might have been of value was either never
commented upon in writing or the accounts have been destroyed, at the time
95
or subsequently. Knowledge of the government’s postal interception system led

to hesitation about committing ideas to paper. In the 1730s Townshend noted,
I never write anything but what I desire the ministry may see. There is
no great skill nor dexterity in opening of letters, but such is the fate of
this administration that they have managed this affair in such a manner as
to lose all the advantage of it. Sir Robert having complained to a friend
when he was last in these parts, that they had lost all the intelligence they
used to get by the Post-Office which was owning plainly that people
were grown wiser than to write anything of consequence by the post.38
Not all injunctions to destroy letters were heeded, many letters surviving with
such instructions on them, but an unknown number were observed. Newcastle
wrote to Sandwich in January 1748, “I will begin with giving you the
satisfaction of knowing, that the moment I had read your letter twice over, I
bur nt it myself; so that affair is safe.” 39 Much mater ial was destroyed
subsequently, in order to avoid possible political retribution or inconvenience.
Keene’s papers were burned in 1739, Sir Robert Walpole’s hastily weeded
when he fell in 1742, Cumberland’s when he died in 1765. The accidents that
a civilization vulnerable to fire suffered frequently could also be fatal,40 while
heirs could destroy papers that they felt it would be inconvenient to have kept.
After the death of Frederick, Prince of Wales in 1751 his papers were burned.
When William Pulteney, 1st Earl of Bath, died in 1764 his brother, General
Pulteney, destroyed all his papers, thus preventing Bath’s chaplain, John
Douglas, from writing his biography. This was particularly unfortunate because,
certainly in the 1740s, Bath had kept significant records:
Lord Bath is wonderful angry at the disgrace of his friends, complains of

the perfidy of the Pelhams, says he kept a journal of all that passed
between the Duke of Newcastle and him in the spring of 1742…as to
the journal I am assured he has kept one these ten years, setting down
each night the day’s conversation.41
As a result, while surviving papers of the period can give us in all cases only an
imperfect account, for many individuals we have mostly only the imprint in
the rock.
Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss George II’s attitudes and thus to probe
the problems that they created for his British ministers. In the Commons
debate of 6 December (os) 1743 on continuing Hanoverian troops in British
pay, Dodington, a former diplomat and Lord of the Treasury, argued that
a good minister considers only the true interest of his master, and
endeavours to make his passions and affections subservient to his interest;
whereas a parasitical and bad minister considers only the governing
96
passion of his master, and in order to gain personal favour applies himself
solely to the indulgence of that passion.42
Dodington’s argument helps to explain the continued political importance of

the monarch, while Hanover was the “governing passion” he referred to.
At the outset of the period, the position of the Electorate was apparently
relatively favourable. The Emperor Charles VI had abandoned his attempt of
the late 1710s and 1720s to enforce and extend Imperial authority and
challenge the Protestant princes and was deeply involved in an unsuccessful
war with the Turks (1737–9). Although George II had very poor relations with
Frederick William I, he hoped that the accession of the latter’s son Frederick,
George’s nephew and second cousin, whom he had secretly provided with
money, would lead to an alliance, a hope shared by British ministers. It was also
hoped to win the alliance of Russia. Such a pact would guarantee Hanoverian
security, while hopefully leaving George free as Elector to maintain his interest
in aggrandisement, specifically East Friesland, which he very much wanted to
gain.43
Conflict involving Hanoverian troops broke out not over East Friesland, but
over the territory of Steinhorst on the frontier of Saxe-Lauenburg and
Holstein, which was disputed between George and Christian VI of Denmark.
Rejecting George’s suggestion of negotiations, the Danes sent troops to
occupy Steinhorst in late 1738, but they were driven out with casualties by a
larger Hanoverian force. George used Trevor to obtain Dutch pressure on
Christian, Trevor being instructed by Harrington, who was given information
on George’s orders by Steinberg.44 Although there were military moves and
talk of war, including hopes in Sweden that a conflict might enable the Swedes
to regain Bremen and Verden, which had been lost to Hanover in the later
stages of the Great Northern War,45 a settlement was reached. The major
German rulers, Charles VI and Frederick William I, had both urged peace,46
which was arranged through Christian’s cousin and friend, Count Stolberg of
Wernigerode.47
The significance of the episode was twofold. First, as pointed out in the
press, it had threatened the attempt to thwart French approaches and to renew
the Anglo-Danish treaty of 1734, 48 which was now of greater importance
because of Sweden’s move into the French camp in 1738. Thus, the pursuit of
Hanoverian ends had compromised British foreign policy. Secondly, the crisis
clearly indicated that George’s success in defending, let alone advancing,
Electoral interests would depend on the position of Hanover vis-a-vis
international alignments. He was fortunate that Charles VI, then relatively close
to France, and Frederick William I, who was being approached by her, did not
seek to exploit the crisis. Aside from the Rhineland, the Empire had been
peaceful for the 1730s: Frederick William had followed a cautious policy in the
War of the Polish Succession (1733–5), and the conflict anticipated over the
succession to the Rhenish duchies of Jülich and Berg, contested by Frederick
97
William and the heir to the Elector Palatine, had been averted. This relative
calm had allowed princes without much military power, such as George as
Elector, to overlook their weaknesses, although there had been Prussian threats
to invade Hanover during a Jülich-Berg crisis in 1738. The situation was to be
less favourable after Frederick II brought war to northern Germany and
greater uncertainty to George and Hanover.
In 1739 British foreign policy was dominated, not by developments on the
Continent but, by deteriorating relations with Spain; and these related to the
New World, not the Mediterranean. As was invariably the case, George took far
less of an interest in maritime and colonial affairs than in their continental
counterparts. The potential clash between, on the one hand, his determination
to defend Electoral pretensions over East Friesland and his opposition to
Prussian gains from Jülich-Berg, and, on the other, hopes for a Prussian alliance
among his British ministers, was postponed by a general sense that nothing
could be expected from the splenetic and unpredictable Frederick William.
Although five years younger than George II, his health was poor, and his
imminent death had been widely anticipated since 1734, when he had had a
severe illness. Furthermore, as Karl Philipp, Elector Palatine, whose apparently
imminent death was expected to trigger the Jülich-Berg crisis, did not die
until 1742, the Empire remained deceptively calm.
The Hanoverian ministry was worried about French diplomatic moves in
Denmark and Sweden,49 but it was only the prospect of France joining Spain
in war with Britain and attacking Britain’s continental dependencies—
Hanover and the Dutch—that really excited concern in London about the
situation in Europe. Furthermore, this was less urgent in early 1740 than the
threat of French naval intervention in the Caribbean. Indeed that summer the
balance of military need was suggested by discussion of the possibility of
Britain purchasing arms from Hanover, although the idea was rejected by the
Lords Justices, the ministers left with responsibility for government in Britain
while George II was abroad, because they were “afraid of impertinencies here
upon it”.50
The death of Frederick William in 1740 appeared to offer George an
opportunity to escape from his isolation and initially provided no threat to
Hanover. At first, there was optimism about the chance of better relations, and
in June 1740 Münchhausen went to Berlin in order to win Frederick II’s
support.51 However, difficulties were soon anticipated on account of Electoral
interests. In July Harrington sent a private letter in his own hand from Hanover
to Newcastle:
I will venture in great confidence to acquaint you there are certain

disputes and pretensions subsisting betwixt the Houses of Hanover and
Prussia, which though they may appear to the rest of the world not to
deserve so immediate an attention as other matters of a more general
nature I fear however that till those are adjusted, in which I foresee great
98
difficultys like to arise, the general matters will go on but lamely and this
is one principal reason why I am not overfond of a journey to Berlin as
yet.
Four months later Count Osterman, the Russian foreign minister, himself a
German by birth, told the British envoy, Edward Finch, that he was very
worried that “there might be a difference of interest between the two
Electorates which might have some influence on the counsels of the two
kings”.52 These comments echoed those made earlier about East Friesland by
Horatio Walpole, and might suggest that a clear case could be made out of
Hanoverian concerns preventing alliance with Prussia, yet another example of
the Electorate preventing British attempts to win the support of the powers of
eastern and central Europe.
The situation was in fact more complex. There is little sign of pressure for
aggrandizement from the Hanoverian government,53 and, far from there being
a simple question of arranging the terms for a reconciliation between George
II and the Hohenzollerns, Frederick was in fact seeking the best terms for his
alliance from both George and Louis XV. The crucial issue was the Jülich-Berg
inher itance, towards which France was best placed to help Prussia.
Furthermore, far from there being a clear contrast between British ministerial
enthusiasm for winning Frederick by making concessions and reluctance on
the part of George unless he won equal concessions, as has been argued,54 the
British ministry was itself split. Fears were expressed that Frederick would
expect too much and that supporting him over Jülich-Berg would lead to war
with France in the interests of Prussia and Hanover.55
George II, like his ministers, hoped to win Frederick’s support, but was
concerned about the extent and implications of his demands. Long-held vague
views about how Prussia could join in to support the balance and “liberties” of
Europe, repeated to Frederick in August 1740 by the British envoy, appeared
redundant in light of Frederick’s stress on the interests of rulers. His demands
for British support over Jülich-Berg, Mecklenburg and East Friesland 56
threatened not only Electoral interests, but also British relations with other
powers. To build up the strength of a ruler who could not be relied upon was
dangerous, and, in part, unnecessary, because, although it is not clear how far
the connection was made by contemporaries, there were signs of a possible
major improvement in Austrian relations with both Britain57 and Hanover,58 as
well as the successful negotiation of an AngloRussian alliance.59 The last was
seen as an important deterrent to any Prussian pact with France.60
As conflict with France in the West Indies appeared more likely in
September 1740, however, the ministers in London became more interested in
the idea of winning Frederick’s alliance. 61 However, given the extent of
Prussian expectations, this was unrealistic, and criticism of George II for his
attitude towards Frederick62 is misplaced. The situation changed on 20 October
1740 with the death of Charles VI. George was a guarantor of the Pragmatic
99
Sanction. Co-operation with Frederick on this basis was sought,63 but his
invasion of Silesia was to compromise such hopes.
The complex differing interests, cross-currents and tensions of 1740 were to
be repeated on other occasions in the period; indeed, in 1741 George II’s
negotiation of a neutrality for Hanover undercut attempts to create a league to
support Maria Theresa. Towards the end of the War of the Austrian Succession,
Horatio Walpole made a major effort to regain influence and to press the case
for a Prussian alliance and for Britain refusing to allow Austrian opposition to
Prussia to prevent such an alliance. George II, however, proved a formidable
opponent. Horatio wrote to Pelham in August 1747 that “the master will not
hear of Prussia, and the servants, partly will not, and partly dare not propose
it”.64
Later, the tensions within the “Old System” can in part be considered
against the background of the ambiguous Hanoverian response to Imperial
authority, the difficulties of reconciling German patriotism, loyalty to the
Emperor, confessional feeling and particular interests. The “System” served
royal and Hanoverian ends by essentially acting as a deterrent of Prussia, while
appearing also as an anti-French step, thus being acceptable to British opinion.
The coming of peace in 1748 enabled the shelving of differences between
anti-French and anti-Prussian goals. Indeed the position was eased from the
point of view of the British ministry, for accusations of a subordination to
Hanoverian ends were less publicly convincing in the period 1748–55 as a
result of an agenda of Anglo-Prussian differences, including the Emden
Company (a Prussian East India Company), Silesian debts and maritime prizes.
Hanoverian commitments focused the issue of royal control, and did so in a
fashion that was often contentious within both the formal mechanisms of
politics and the wider public political world. If only for that reason, George
III’s public distancing from his grandfather’s Hanoverian commitments helped
to “depoliticize” the issue of the royal role in foreign policy, although this
owed more to the rise of the king’s domestic political position and views as a
source and issue of contention. Furthermore, foreign and domestic policy were
in part joined in that George III’s favour for Bute was blamed by many for the
replacement of Pitt in 1761 and for the peace negotiations in 1762–3.
Nevertheless, it proved easier to sustain a critique of Bute’s supposed influence
on domestic matters rather than his role in foreign policy.
Foreign policy and the Electorate of Hanover clearly contributed to royal
unpopularity in mid-century, especially in 1743–4, but it may be asked how far
they weakened the crown. Certainly the contention arising from Hanoverian
issues made it unlikely that British resources could be extensively used to serve
Hanoverian ends. If that is seen as the prime objective of the monarchs then
they failed. The period was one in which the gap between Hanoverian and
Prussian power widened, and was brutally displayed with the fate of East
Friesland. Yet, Britain-Hanover was not like England-Normandy in the late
eleventh century: circumstances and political cultures were totally different. If
100
George II adapted with difficulty to the rise and manifestations of Prussian

power and to Frederick the Great’s wilfulness, he was guided to that end by
the majority of his British advisers, and those who viewed Prussia unkindly
were convinced that they did so for British ends. Clearly such ends were open
to multiple interpretation and to contention, but it is striking how clear
ministers were on the need to advance Hanoverian interests only if they
corresponded with those of Britain.
George II was certainly weakened in the successive domestic political crises
that accompanied and followed the fall of Walpole by the degree to which
Hanover was both involved in European power politics in a period of war and
change, and vulnerable. This made it far less likely that he could sustain a
breach with politicians, in or out of office, who enjoyed the confidence of
Parliament. Carteret failed to cope with the compromises and nuances that the
situation called for. He understood the implications of the Hanoverian link in
diplomatic, but not domestic, terms.
Yet it may be argued that both monarchs and monarchy were less weakened
by the Hanoverian connection than might otherwise be anticipated. Indeed
one consequence of greater political and public concern with the maritime
and trans-ocean world was that it became easier to pursue British foreign
policy on the Continent in the early 1750s with less public contention.
Nevertheless, Hanover was a cause of significant political and printed debate in
both 1755 and 1757 as Britain went to war again. Hanover remained a central
concern of George II in his less active last years, but this helped to define his
grandson and heir’s hostility to Electoral considerations, a response, as with his
opposition to involvement in British general elections, that was at once
pragmatic and idealistic. As Prince of Wales, the future George III wrote to
Bute in 1759, “as to the affairs on the Weser they look worse and worse; I fear
this is entirely owing to the partiality [George II] has for that horrid Electorate
which has always lived upon the very vitals of this poor country”. As king,
George III showed his determination to end Britain’s involvement in the
German part of the Seven Years’ War:
though I have [Hanover ian] subjects who will suffer immensely

whenever this kingdom withdraws its protection from thence, yet so
superior is my love to this my native country over any private interest of
my own that I cannot help wishing that an end was put to that home …I
think if the Duke of Newcastle will not hear reason concerning the
German war that it would be better to let him quit than to go on with
that and to have myself and those who differ from him made
unpopular.65
George III’s largely indifferent attitude towards Hanover indeed worried

British ministers concerned about the policy and its political resonances.66
George III’s break with his grandfather’s ministers was intertwined with the
101
break with the policies of the 1750s. It was not only that the alliance with
Prussia was lost, but that the gap was not filled by an alliance with another
major continental power. The motives for such an alliance—George II’s
anxiety about Hanover, ministerial concern about this anxiety and the sense
that defensive arrangements for Hanover could and should serve as the basis for
a British alliance system—had been largely lost, certainly in so far as activity
was required to mould circumstances. More generally, the interventionist habit
of mind and the concomitant diplomatic assumptions had been lost as far as
Europe was involved.67 George III might be very gracious to Carteret, now
Earl Granville, soon after his accession, but he had little interest in the views
that that minister had once stood for. Though Lord President of the Council
until 1763, Carteret was one of yesterday’s men.
In March 1761 Haslang pointed out that the pr ince-bishopr ic of
Hildesheim, which the neighbouring Electorate of Hanover had long sought,
was both vacant and actually occupied by George III’s forces. George II had
wished to gain the territory, but George III did not share his grandfather’s
views. Three weeks after reporting that Hildesheim was vacant, Haslang
observed that the predilection for Hanover was no longer so strong and
suggested that there would be no territorial cessions elsewhere in order to
make gains for the Electorate. Three months later, when Bussy began peace
negotiations with the British ministry, he was told by Carteret that the British
had little interest in Hanoverian affairs. In July Haslang noted that whatever
happened in the Empire would have little effect on British government policy,
adding, “It is no longer the times of George II.”68 Bute told the Sardinian
envoy, Count Viry, in October 1761 that France would not gain better terms if
she captured Hanover, a statement given authority by its source, the royal
favourite. A month later, Newcastle referred to Bute and his supporters when
he wrote to the Marquess of Rockingham, a political ally, “There are many
who are for abandoning the German war, and giving up Hanover, and our
allies. That is what I can never consent to, nor, I believe, any of our friends. I
have talked very plainly to the King, and My Lord Bute upon it.”69
Although Hanover did not play a major role in British diplomacy or public
debate in the 1760s, the very role of the king in ensuring this indicated the
continued importance of the crown in the field of foreign policy. In some
respects, the shift was as abrupt and striking as that of France from hostility
towards alliance with Austria in 1756 or that of Russia similarly toward Prussia
in 1762. Yet this shift was both accomplished by a monarch whose
constitutional and political positions were more circumscribed than those of
most of his continental counterparts and also led to far less unpopularity than
that resulting from Louis XV’s change of policy. Whatever his supposed naïveté
in domestic political management in the 1760s, George III was personally
responsible for a shift in foreign policy that was both to contribute to the
revival of royal popular ity dur ing his reign and to ease the situation
confronting British diplomacy.
102
An emphasis on the position and policies of the monarch offers an

important link between foreign policy and political history. It widens our
understanding of the former and, by making clear the continued role of the
monarch in a crucial sphere, underlines the significance of foreign policy for
both the political history and debates of the period and contemporary
assessments of the constitution. In 1753 Frederick II, whose central concern
with Britain was its foreign policy, wrote to his envoy in London that “when
you say that such a thing could make an impression on the nation I regard the
word nation as inappropriate, as I know that at present the king gives whatever
impression he pleases to the nation which he governs absolutely”. Two years
earlier, Frederick had been convinced that Britain would not be able to sustain
its alliance system, both because of its financial problems—the national debt—
and because the death of George II would lead to a minority. In 1753 Yorke
wrote to his brother from The Hague,
I am convinced that the constitution of no country is so little known as

that of England, half the world imagine that all government is confusion
with us; and the other half that our kings are as arbitrary as any other, and
that all they do in a view to satisfy the nation is pure grimace.70
103
Chapter Six
Parliament
The country, which supplies the crown with the sinews of war, has a
right to inspect into the conduct, and to demand satisfaction, of those
who either in the field, fleet or Cabinet abuse their trust. The sovereign,
no doubt, has the right in himself to make peace, and to declare war; but
the subject has reserved the power to try and to punish those, who dare
to give him bad advice: by which the blood and treasure of the nation
shall be misapplied or squandered away; and the glory and interest of the
crown and kingdom be diminished and injured.
—Monitor, 15 October 1757
To turn from crown to Parliament, monarchs to parliamentarians, is to adopt

another perspective on foreign policy, and, again, one where theory and
practice did not always coincide. The influence of Parliament on the
formulation and conduct of foreign policy was both direct and indirect.
Parliament had responsibility in the field of finance, and, thus, of supporting
the military expenditure and subsidies to foreign powers that were judged
necessary for the pursuance of policies. In addition, foreign policy was debated
in both chambers of Parliament, being, generally, the single most important
topic in the major parliamentary debates, such as those on the Addresses of
Thanks at the crucial start of the session. Foreign policy also played a major
role in debates over the size and funding of the armed forces. Thus, foreign
policy posed in an acute for m the serious problem of parliamentary
management.
Parliament’s indirect influence is difficult to gauge and was an issue over
which contemporaries were divided. The extent to which British policy, and
the foreign response to British views that played such a large role in shaping
British policy, was affected by the existence of Parliament, and the consequent
need for government to consider how best to win parliamentary support or
reply to parliamentary criticisms, was unclear to contemporaries. Parliament
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PARLIAMENT
was often cited in their discussion of foreign policy, whether by ministers

stressing the need to settle matters before sessions, British diplomats concerned
about the detr imental consequences for their gover nment’s image of
parliamentary contentions, or foreign diplomats seeking to assess the stability
and intentions of the British ministry. Joseph Yorke observed in 1754 that it
was “very agreeable…to see the supply voted as it is…it puts a stop to all
disadvantageous reports in the foreign world, where it was imagined that some
difficulties would be thrown in the way of the administration”. The major set-
piece occasions of the debate over foreign policy occurred in Parliament.
Ministers emphasized the problems posed by parliamentary management,
Holdernesse responding in 1749 to Dutch pressure for a subsidy to the Elector
of Cologne by laying “great stress upon the difficulty I supposed His Majesty
would be under from the nature of our constitution in granting subsidies to
foreign princes in time of peace”. Five years later, Holdernesse’s reasons for
delaying talks for renewing the subsidy to Bavaria included “His Majesty,
having called a new Parliament, is desirous of knowing the sense of his people
before any final determination is taken upon any measures of expence”.
Indeed, there was considerable public criticism of such subsidies. The very
practice was presented as alien to national interests. However, foreign envoys
sometimes argued that British ministers encouraged parliamentary pressure in
order for the government to be able to use it as an argument to gain its ends.1
The Lords was more securely managed during this period than had been the
case, for example, during the reign of Queen Anne, and it was in the House of
Commons that the government was most seriously assailed, especially over
subsidies held to benefit Hanover in 1742, 1744 and 1755, or over peace with
France in 1762; in the last, the Lords, unlike the Commons, did not divide. In
1758 Hardwicke noted a limitation of the role of the Lords in a crucial sphere
when he suggested to Newcastle that there would not be any debate there over
the issue of a subsidy to Prussia: “As this will be a message of supply, Your
Grace knows better than anybody that the return of the House of Lords can
only consist of assurances of support.”2
As far as the political position of Parliament was concerned, there were no
significant constitutional and institutional changes after the Septennial Act of
1716 established that general elections had to be held at least every seven years,
instead of three as under the Triennial Act of 1694. The influence of Parliament
as a crucial institution and a sphere of politics, and in terms of its impact on
policy at specific conjunctures, var ied in response to domestic and
inter national circumstances, but there were no fundamental changes.
Parliament’s importance was greatest in periods of international crisis, for it
was then that it was necessary to demonstrate governmental strength and to
obtain specific acts of support, especially backing for treaties and grants for
increased military expenditure or for subsidies to foreign allies. Thus, at the
height of the political crisis of early 1742, occasioned by Walpole’s fall, John
Drummond MP assured Onslow Burrish, a British diplomat, “we voted
105
unanimously I may say 35,000 land forces, above 10,000 marines and
everything else on the same foot as last year”.3 Four years later, the need to
consider parliamentary views was indicated by Trevor when he wrote to
Burrish about the latter’s negotiations with German rulers for troops to help in
the war with France:
if you can anywise in the Title, Preamble, or [word obscure] hook in, that
these troops are to be an accretion to the strength of the Maritime
Powers [Britain and the Netherlands], though in fact paid by the
Republic [Netherlands], and to the Common Cause, rather than as it was
an augmentation of the National Militia of the States, it would have a
good appearance, and effect in our Parliament.4
The political crisis that preceded, accompanied and followed the outbreak of
the Seven Years’ War led to a renewed emphasis on the international value of
parliamentary backing for the government, necessarily so in light of foreign
concern about the stability of the government, voiced by Frederick II among
others. Thus, after the formation of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry in 1757,
Holdernesse wrote to inform Burrish that the Addresses of Thanks had passed
unanimously in both Commons and Lords, adding that it “cannot fail of having
the best effects, by showing their steadiness and zeal, to enable His Majesty to
act with the utmost vigour, in the prosecution of such just, and necessary
measures”. Parliamentary support could also appear useful for domestic reasons.
In October 1762 the capture of Havana led to debate within Britain as to
whether peace with Spain should be made without a territorial gain in return
for the restitution of the conquest. Henry Fox argued that if the Cabinet
consisted of persons who had weight and courage, I would certainly

propose what I thought best for the King and his people and pursue it
without previously consulting Parliament. But, besides what has lately
appeared of irresolution, the Cabinet is composed of persons who bring
no weight to the scale of gover nment, either of author ity or
connections…I shall be glad then, in this ugly situation to have the sense
of parliament. Not for security but to remove difficulties. The objection
of its letting down government is obviated by its having been done
before, and in times when prerogative was carried high, and it would
obviate the great difficulty because the greatest coward would sign what
the Parliament authorised, without considering that he was not secured
by it.
In addition, there was always interest in the composition of the parliamentary

opposition. Thus, in November 1761 Newcastle was concerned that speeches
in the Commons indicated “that the measure of abandoning the continent is
not entirely the produce of these young hot heads”.5
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PARLIAMENT
The constitutional possibilities of Parliament’s role in limiting governmental

plans could not, in general, be pushed because of the political fact of
ministerial power. In 1751 Yorke wrote from Paris, “The Parisians say their
Parliament [Parlement] is less corrupt than yours, for that their remonstrances
are different from your polite addresses.” However, in 1762 Bute felt it
necessary to warn that for Parliament to interfere “with respect to the manner
in which the war is to be carried on” was a direct infringement of the royal
prerogative. Ministerial control of parliamentary proceedings could not be
taken for granted, and both parliamentary management and policy choices
were important for this reason. In 1749 Newcastle referred to it costing him “a
great deal of pains to get” a payment for Mar ia Theresa through the
Commons.6
Until the death of Charles VI, and more obviously the commencement of
the War of the Austrian Succession in December 1740, the parliamentary
debate in the field of foreign policy was dominated by the question of Anglo-
Spanish relations, first in peace and then in war. Waldegrave was certain of the
interrelationship of the negotiations with Spain and the parliamentary
situation. In June 1739 he wrote to his counterpart in Madrid that the latter’s
reports
I fear will bring our friends at home under great difficulties…the

warmth which has been expressed in the House of Lords upon the past
delay of the payment of the ninety five thousand pounds, will…leave no
room for future management in case this last dispatch arrives before the
Parliament be up.7
A common theme united the parliamentary discussions, namely, the extent to

which the government could be relied upon to defend national interests. The
decision to go to war with Spain initially undercut the opposition, as it was
what they had been pressing for. In the Commons’ debate on the Address in
November 1739, Pulteney indicated
a dislike for the past measures, yet spoke warmly for the present
Establishment and Royal family and for vigorously and unanimously
supporting the King in the war, and letting every thing give way to the
common national cause and the support of this Government. He
concluded with saying I third the motion and when the question was put
Sir John Hynde Cotton8 gave the only negative.
Pulteney’s counterpart in the Lords, Carteret, told the house that “no war was
ever entered into with greater unanimity amongst all ranks and degrees of
men”. The opposition leaders, however, had to try to maintain a distinct
position, and Pulteney said “he would not have it thought he was making
advances to some Gentlemen (meaning the Ministry). He scorned it, and he
107
also despised any unjust mean suspicions from any other quarter (meaning his
own party, or rather perhaps the Torys).”9
The marked divisions in opposition ranks prior to the shattering of their
unity in 1742, divisions that helped to lead to the latter, were revealed in the
Lords’ debate on the Address in November 1739. The debate also indicated the
range of information available to peers.
Lord Carteret spoke in the House of Lords in the same way that Mr.
Pulteney spoke in our House and was not for dividing, but the Question
on which they divided, was moved by Lord Chesterfield and seconded
by Lord Scarborough. Lord Talbot made a speech an hour long most of
which he read out of a large paper like a lawyer’s brief, he went over all
the treaties that have been made, and all the forces and taxes that have
been raised for near twenty years. He voted with the Minority but his
speech might have served many other occasions as well as this.10
The divisions within the opposition could however be papered over by

attacking the ministry. After an initially quiescent start to the 1740 session, due
to poor weather delaying the return of many from the Christmas recess and a
sense that there would not be any major debates,11 the attack was mounted on
“that old and stale question the place bill”.
The decision to focus initially on a well-established measure designed to
reduce the government’s influence in the Commons reflected the greater
appeal of this issue once war with Spain had broken out, for domestic issues
were “safer” in political terms, less likely to be affected by unexpected
international developments. The government’s majority was smaller than
predicted,12 attendance in the Commons at a high level,13 always a good sign
for the opposition, and they then decided to raise the issue of the Convention
of the Pardo by which the government had mistakenly announced that it had
settled differences with Spain in 1738. This reflected one of the principal
problems facing the opposition in their discussion of foreign policy, their
limited access to information about policy and the extent to which it was
therefore difficult to mount an informed critique. This accounts for their
frequent request for papers, which served to demonstrate the restrictions under
which they operated, and the sense that the government had followed, and was
following, secret, and thus suspect, policies.
On 21 February (os) 1740 Pulteney introduced a motion for an enquiry into
the conduct of the authors and advisers of the Convention of the Pardo. His point
that “discontents at present lie smothering under the hopes of a successful war, but
they are far from being removed or extinguished” was both a confession of the
opposition’s difficulties and a warning to the ministry. Pulteney attacked the
ministry from the perspective of the Whig legacy by comparing the Convention
with the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, a Tory measure abhorrent to Whigs, and he
made his motion in the very words of the first motion for an enquiry into the
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PARLIAMENT
earlier peace. Sir Robert Walpole, in reply, addressed the question of the
unpopularity of ministerial policy, offering a sceptical assessment of public opinion
and a prudential defence of the government’s position. Walpole also cast doubt on
the value of popular views on war, defended his position over the Convention and
attacked Utrecht.14 By the last, he asserted ministerial commitment to the Whig
legacy and trying to unite the Whigs against the Tories, or, at least, to increase
tension between opposition Whigs and Tories.
These arguments were to be deployed not only in reply to criticism of
policy toward Spain in both peace and war, but also, later, in response to the
agitation over Hanoverian subsidies in 1742–4. The latter was the highpoint of
parliamentary agitation over foreign policy in the period, but it was one that
took place against a very different international background to that of 1739–
40. The conduct of the war with Spain provided opportunities for allegations
of a lack of ministerial effort and competence, attacks that did not appear stale,
but that instead focused the events of the day on a continued critique of a
ministerial failure to defend national interests.
On the other hand, the outbreak of war on the Continent produced a less
certain situation. In the Commons’ debate on 13 April (os) 1741 on a motion
for a subsidy to Maria Theresa, Pelham asked “how can we know what may
determine the course of that flood of power, which is now in a state of
fluctuation, or seems driven to different points by different impulses?” He also
commented on the difficulty of discussing the situation, saying, “It is not to be
supposed that such members of this House as are not engaged in public affairs,
should receive very exact intelligence of the dispositions of foreign powers.”
In reply, Pulteney offered an ambitious but, in terms of domestic politics,
acceptable definition of national goals in which “we may become once more
the arbiters of Europe, and be counted by all the Protestant powers as their
protectors; we may once more subdue the ambition of the aspiring French, and
once more deliver the house of Austria from the incessant pursuit of those
restless enemies.” However, although he was correct to argue that it was
necessary to reconcile the interests of Austria and Prussia, Pulteney can hardly
be blamed for failing to explain how this could be achieved. His assertion of
British capabilities was more problematic:
our fleets are sufficient to keep their dominion of the ocean, and
prescribe limits to the commerce of every nation. While this power
remains unimpaired, while Great Britain retains her natural superiority,
and asserts the honour of her flag in every climate, we cannot become
despicable, nor can any nation ridicule our menaces or scorn our alliance.
We may still extend our influence to the inland countries, and awe those
nations which we cannot invade.15
The repetition of such remarks indicated the problem of expectations that

confronted all British ministries in this period. It also indicated how the fate of
109
military operations could provide opposition politicians with a basis for

criticism of the government that was far easier than that provided by the
complexities and secrecy of diplomacy. It was easier to criticize in war than in
peace, easier to attack military operations than diplomatic negotiations,
although, in reply, in wartime ministerial supporters could press home the
charge of encouraging national enemies against critics.
This was very much the case after the fall of the Walpole ministry of 1742. It
was not easy to grasp the details of Carteret’s interventionist diplomacy in 1742–
4, but it was possible to understand the argument that the payment of subsidies for
Hanoverian troops, the terms of these subsidies and the conduct of George II
when in command of his Anglo-German army in 1743 all constituted proof of a
failure to heed national interests. This took on added weight because of hostility
within the ministry to Carteret, not least on the grounds of his interventionist
policies. While ministers did not publicly oppose Carteret’s policies in Parliament,
they benefited from the clear warnings being sent to George II about the
weaknesses of his minister and the liabilities of his policies.
The discussion of Hanoverian subsidies led to the raising of broader issues
of foreign policy. In the Commons debate on the Address on 18 November
(os) 1742, the issue of parliamentary authority was raised, a reflection of what
has been pointed out in another sphere, namely, the unsettled nature of
constitutional conventions in this period.16 John Tucker recorded,
There were some warm expressions of a too dangerous use of the Royal
Prerogative and endeavours used to show those Ministers had not given
wholesome council who advised the King to prorogue the last session in
that precipitate manner while it was in the midst of an enquiry from
which the nation had very great expectations, or to order the Hanover
troops to march in the manner and at the time these had done without
previously mentioning it to the Parliament, that they were bad
precedents and might be attended with the worst of consequences.
To quote only such arguments would suggest that the debate was somewhat
abstract and uninformed by any knowledge of or reference to specific
international developments. However, the same letter included an account of
the speech of Sir John Barnard, an independent Whig who was a prominent
London marine insurer and had been Lord Mayor. The notion of displaced
effort he advanced was not novel, but its use in the War of the Austrian
Succession was important and prefigured Pitt’s wider employment of the idea.
Sir John Barnard told us that though no other nation would give any
assistance, it was our interest to use single endeavours to prevent the
growth of an exorbitant power in France and that this step His Majesty
had taken to cause this body of Hanoverians to march into the Low
Countries was the wisest and best measure that could be followed and
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PARLIAMENT
that our sending the English forces last summer into Flanders had
effectually prevented the French from sending any succours to their
distressed armies in the Empire and given the Queen of Hungary an
opportunity of making that head against them which has brought her
into her present advantageous situation—he took notice as well as many
other people of the inconsistency of giving any opposition to this
measure with the repeated desires of this Parliament last year to persecute
the war with vigour.
John Campbell, a member of the “Old Corps” of ministerial Whigs and a Lord
of the Admiralty under Walpole, recorded Barnard making his point with a
homely image: “... said in supporting the Queen of Hungary we did not fight
others’ battles but our own, as we would exert ourselves to the utmost to
extinguish a fire in our neighbours’ house to prevent our own being burnt
next.”17
One marked change in the political atmosphere in the early and mid–1740s
was the growing sense of international crisis. Opposition writers had long
sought to inculcate such a sense, but the immediate threats that had been
depicted had been largely domestic ones, dangers to the constitution. There
had been dire warnings of the threat posed by French intentions and rising
power, but their immediacy had been lessened by the cautious nature of
French policy, especially after 1735. More generally, it had been difficult to
sustain an atmosphere of threat in the 1710s, 1720s and 1730s except in so far
as commentators were concerned about foreign support for Jacobitism and its
domestic support. Alliance with France had lessened concern about both
French policy in Europe and Jacobitism. Spain and, even more, Austria were
difficult to prevent as serious threats to Britain on the Continent and with
regard to Jacobitism, particularly after the failure of the Spanish invasion plans
in 1719. There was no serious challenge to British naval dominance. Ministerial
writers had sought to rouse concern, especially during the confrontation with
the Austro-Spanish Alliance of Vienna in 1725–9, but there was nothing that
approximated to earlier fears of Louis XIV.
Once the Anglo-French alliance collapsed in 1731 fears of France rose, but
they were lessened by Fleury’s cautious policies in both peace and war. As a
consequence, opposition commentators, having castigated the government for
failing to act against France during the War of the Polish Succession, were able
from 1738 to present France as not sufficiently threatening to prevent war with
Spain. Furthermore, once the war had broken out, these same commentators
urged that all military resources ought to be employed against her. In contrast,
ministerial spokesmen had pressed for caution, emphasizing the danger of
French intervention. Thus, in 1739, as Newcastle pointed out, it was the
government that warned of a dangerous international situation, while the
opposition saw threats to British trade but, more vociferously, opportunities for
imperial expansion at the expense of Spain.
111
The situation altered dramatically in 1741 as Austria appeared near collapse

under the threat of French, Bavarian and Prussian power, thus making readily
apparent and accentuating what had hitherto been hypothetical dangers from
France. Opposition politicians continued to argue that Britain’s international
agenda should be dominated by Spain and continued to press for a
concentration of military effort against her, but their attitude appeared
increasingly inappropriate. Indeed, opposition views were to fracture with the
reorganization of the ministry in 1742. Those who remained in opposition
continued to focus on the need for effort against Spain, while their former
colleagues, led by Carteret and Pulteney, joined a ministry that had already
shifted its attentions to the situation on the Continent, regarding a war in
which Britain was not involved as more important to her interests than one in
which she was a key combatant.
This division in the opposition was not the central factor that explained
why only some of its members were willing to join the ministry. Domestic
political factors, specifically the treatment of Walpole and the extent of
incorporation of the opposition within the government, were more important,
and opposition views on foreign policy were to diverge along these already
existing fault lines. Yet these differences were to provide important issues for
dissension and debate once the new political alignment became clear: those
still in the opposition, whether Tories or Whigs, criticized the ministry,
including their former colleagues, for continental interventionism, support for
Hanover and the greatly diminished resources devoted to the “Blue Water” war
with Spain. The political realignment therefore brought together all those who
believed Britain should play an active role in continental diplomacy. Indeed,
from 1742 commitment to such a view was an implicit condition of active
membership in the government at the senior level. This was one of the reasons
why the demands of Pitt for senior office proved so contentious in the mid–
1740s and mid–1750s.
The belief that Britain should play an active role was linked to concern
about developments on the Continent. This was related to anxiety about the
secur ity situation in Br itain. Rising alar m on the part of minister ial
parliamentarians was to reach two peaks, a short one at the time of the French
attempt to invade England in February 1744, and a more sustained one, from
the landing of Bonnie Prince Charlie and the fall of Ostend in the summer of
1745 to the thwarting and defeat of the Franco-Jacobite threat to Britain early
the following year. However, concern about the possibility of Bourbon action
on behalf of the Jacobites did not commence in 1744. It existed from the
outset of the war with Spain in 1739 and indeed played a major role from then
in naval strategy and in ministerial attention to Franco-Spanish relations.
By 1742 anxiety about the possibility of a Spanish invasion on behalf of the
Jacobites had abated, and it was clear that France was too busy in her new war
with Austria to aid Spain against Britain, as had been feared in 1740–1. At that
point, there was little prospect of French support for the Jacobites. However,
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PARLIAMENT
the raising of the Hanoverian issue in Parliament served to excite concern

among ministerial parliamentarians and to move the issue of the succession to
a more central place in political debate. Thus the opposition parliamentary
campaign acted as a focus for constitutional, political and international fears
and expectations across the political spectrum. Campbell wrote to his son in
December 1742,
I am well infor med that the gover nment know the Pretender’s
instructions are to run down Hanover as much as possible, and say
nothing of him, which is no doubt the wisest counsel that ever was taken
by his Court, for if the present settlement was overturned, he must come
in; and it is a much easier task by false assertions and suggestions to set
the People against the Government they live under; than to raise a zeal
for him, in any but old women (whether in petticoats or breechs) upon
the old absurd notions of indefeasible hereditary right, and absolute
passive obedience to lawless tyranny…I have intended to write to Brett
about the garden ever since I came to town, but could never find leisure,
as he is one of the Political Club, he will not wonder that public affairs
take up all my time, and that I am more concerned to preserve the
Queen of Hungary’s dominions than to improve my own.18
Rather than treating the Hanover agitation of 1742–4 and the response to the
Jacobite threat in 1744–6 as separate, it is appropriate to note that they were
related problems as far as many parliamentarians, both “Old Corps” and
Jacobite, were concerned. The issue of the succession thus played a major role
in the public debate in 1742–6, one that was far more wide-ranging than any
concentration on the immediate crisis of 1745–6 might suggest.
The resonances of the Hanoverian issue helped to decide, and thus weaken,
the opposition, especially once Britain’s situation in the war deteriorated.
When the Hanoverian issue had been raised in Parliament in late 1742, the
situation was not too bad, but by January 1744 it was clear that George II’s
victory over the French at Dettingen the previous year was not going to lead
to a collapse of the French position, as had originally been hoped. The
worrying international situation helped divide the opposition. Pitt and George
Lyttelton, both still opposition Whigs, argued that the Hanoverian troops in
British pay should be discarded, but that British troops should continue to be
stationed in the Austrian Netherlands, a measure that was designed to serve
tactical political ends and yet also reflected the changing military situation. Pitt
wished to appeal to the Pelhams and to encourage them to act against Carteret,
but he also felt that the Tories and other all-out opponents of the ministry were
failing to appreciate the need to abandon rigid views in face of changes in
British policy and were unable to distinguish sufficiently between help to
Hanover and a national commitment to the anti-French cause on the
Continent. The need for the latter also led Horatio Walpole to complain about
113
the way in which British parliamentary news was being published in the
Amsterdam press. He especially regretted the publication of a translation of the
Lords Protest about the subsidies paid for Hanoverian troops.19
Thus the parliamentary debate reflected international as well as domestic
changes. John Owen’s presentation of the political history of the period largely
in terms of domestic, factional manoeuvres is less than the complete picture.20
The Hanoverian issue in its broadest sense helped to drive the Whigs together.
It made it clear that Carteret’s foreign policy was vulnerable in Parliament, that
the Pelhams needed to recruit opposition Whig support if they were to feel
secure there, and that co-operation with the Tories in a dangerous international
situation was not without hazard for opposition Whigs. These related
realizations, driven forward in an atmosphere of growing crisis, lay behind the
consolidation of the Pelham ministry, based on widespread Whig support,
between 1744 and 1746, and they also helped to ensure the marked slackening
of the public debate that followed the consolidation. In February 1744 Haslang
sent details of the very strong Lords protest over the Hanoverians, but added
that it would have no consequences other than that of raising tension, because
the ministry was certain to gain its point, thanks to its secure majority.21 The
new policy of comprehension that the political crisis occasioned led in
December 1744 to the inclusion of several Tories in the ministry under Earl
Gower, and consequent divisions among the Tories.22
Carteret’s fall in November 1744 was followed by a less tense parliamentary
atmosphere in the discussion of foreign policy. The reconstitution of the
ministry brought several prominent Opposition Whigs, including Bedford,
Chesterfield, Pitt and Sandwich, into office. The direct payment of Hanoverian
troops was ended. George II was obliged to be more cautious in his unpopular
plans for action against Prussia. These changes helped to ensure a different
agenda of parliamentary discussions, one in which dissension over foreign
policy became less politically significant. This remained the case for the
remainder of the decade, with the prime locus of conflict over foreign policy
becoming the Council, not Parliament. Tucker noted in December 1746, “The
army was voted yesterday without opposition.”23
These political changes ensured that the parliamentary debate over the
peace terms was muted. There was to be no controversy akin to that over peace
terms in the last major struggle in which Britain had been engaged, the War of
the Spanish Succession (1702–13). The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was not to
have the resonance of the Treaty of Utrecht in terms of the British public
debate, either then or subsequently. This owed much to the differing nature of
the political alignments of the two periods, and also to the extent to which the
succession was still apparently an open issue in 1713,24 while in 1748 that was
no longer the case. In addition, the sense of betrayal of purpose that underlay
the “No Peace Without Spain” argument in the War of the Spanish Succession
had been already exhausted in the War of the Austrian Succession, as the war
against Spain, with its intoxicating prospect of Caribbean conquests, had been
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effectively abandoned without lasting gains from 1742. Furthermore, the

successes of the earlier conflict, which had made Utrecht seem such a
disappointment to many, had not been matched in the War of the Austrian
Succession. There was therefore little sense that victory had been thrown away.
The government also helped to defuse a possible political crisis by calling
the next general election a year earlier than necessary. They did so because they
feared the electoral and thus parliamentary consequences of a bad peace,
Newcastle writing to Cumberland:
any final conclusion of the war, by almost any peace that can be obtained,
would undoubtedly give strength to opposition, raise some flame in the
nation, and render the choice of a Parliament more difficult…The
present New Opposition is yet unsupported, unconnected, and not in
high reputation; what the course of a year may produce nobody can tell;
unfortunate public events, or private disappointments, and personal
views, may render that opposition formidable, what at present is far from
being so.25
By 1748 it was generally, and indeed correctly, believed that peace was
necessary and undesirable terms inevitable, and, in addition, Parliament posed
few problems of management. In November 1748 Newcastle wrote about the
likely parliamentary view, “I think we can have no opposition. There are few,
very few, who don’t seem pleased, and own how well, and how soon, our great
affair has been brought to a conclusion.” William Murray, the Solicitor
General, later Earl of Mansfield, speaking in the debate on the Address on 20
November 1748, claimed that peace had been necessary because of the
vulnerability of Britain’s Dutch ally and the dangerous state of public credit,
both reasonable claims:
we had for three years preceding met every year with a signal defeat, and
every defeat was attended with the loss of whole countries, and many
fortified towns.
One of the Under Secretaries, John Potter, wrote that even “those who are
constantly inclined to grumble…were glad to find the affair so well over”.26
As from 1710 in the War of the Spanish Succession, and from 1761 in the
Seven Years’ War, there had been a growing political and public desire for
peace, and the interaction of the two created opportunities and difficulties for
politicians. However, whereas there were major changes in ministry on the
other two occasions, in 1710 and 1761–2, changes that were necessary in order
to push forward the peace process, in 1748 peace was obtained without any
such alteration, and this helped to ensure political stability over the following
six years. Pelham in particular was sensitive to public concerns. He wrote in
1748 after a visit to his Surrey constituency, “we had a full meeting of
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gentlemen, and almost all in good humour. Our peace is popular with all
parties.” This was not, of course, the case. There was criticism, although more
of the failures of the war than of the fact of peace. An Ode for the Thanksgiving
Day by “Titus Antigallicus”, complained of “Britain’s eclipse and England’s
lost, lost glory”.
Nevertheless, peace was widely sought. 27 Pelham declared, “Peace you
know is my mistress; and war a rival I fear, as well as watch.”28 He was the man
for the moment, a minister who could see through peace without sowing
political discord, dividing the government or losing control of Parliament.
The relative quiescence of the parliamentary response therefore reflected
more than just the strength of the ministry after the 1747 general election,
although that was definitely important. Replying to Murray in the debate on
the Address in November 1748, Dr George Lee, who argued that there was not
“one English article” in the peace, explained the pessimism of the opposition
speakers, “all questions must, in this House, be determined by numbers”.29
Whatever its internal disputes over foreign policy, the Pelham ministry was far
from weak, and was therefore not vulnerable to opposition parliamentary
campaigns, especially as peace lessened the scope for attack.
The government did indeed face parliamentary criticism of its foreign
policy over the next few years, but its solid control of both chambers
combined with the absence of any grave crisis, to leave the ministry in a strong
position. There was a significant difference between parliamentary attacks that
were unrelated to any urgent problem, the situation in 1748–53, and those that
interacted with a grave crisis, as in 1739 or 1742–4. There was criticism of the
terms of Aix-la-Chapelle, but foreign envoys of long standing were struck by
the absence of anything interesting in Parliament to report,30 and by the
government’s secure control of the Commons. 31 Zamboni noted popular
concern that Gibraltar would be exchanged with Spain for an equivalent, but
argued that, even if the ministry sought to do so, they could count on
Parliament’s support.32 As no such plan was attempted, Zamboni’s assessment
was not tested, but it indicated the apparent strength of the government’s
position, because the Walpole ministry’s belief that it would not be able to
push through such a plan had been an issue in the 1720s.
Given that one of the most important aspects of Parliament’s role in foreign
policy was the impression created either of the strength and stability of the
government, or of the opposite, the situation in 1747–53 was very notable. The
reports of foreign envoys in general presented a picture of a ministry securely
in control of Parliament and little subject to extraparliamentary pressure. This
contrasted not only with the situation in the obviously tumultuous years from
1739 to 1746, but also with the preceding period of Walpolean stability, when
diplomats had frequently commented on newspaper and other criticism of the
government. The contrast is particularly apparent in the despatches of long
serving envoys, such as Zamboni, who had sent reports from Britain since
1723, Ossorio, who had arrived in 1730, and Alt. Indeed, a marked feature of
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the diplomatic reports on British politics in the period 1747–53 was their
overwhelming concentration on struggles within the ministry rather than a
discussion of Parliament or extra-parliamentary developments comparable to
that earlier in the century.
Parliament was not neglected. In April 1749 Puysieulx ordered the French
envoy, Durand, to be very attentive to what happened at the end of the session,
as government policy was then often revealed. Puysieulx added that one of the
principal objects of Durand’s mission was the acquisition of information about
British domestic affairs, specifically divisions in the Council, the strength of the
political parties, the views of merchants and of public opinion, national
resources, government finances and, in particular, the state of the national
debt.33
Thus, Parliament was of value to foreign governments because of the light it
could throw on British policy and the indications it could provide about the
strength and stability of the ministry, but by 1749 a more discriminating
assessment of its importance was being offered. The extent to which Parliament
was not kept informed, but was instead managed, was more readily apparent.
The var ious measures of minister ial strength and stability were better
appreciated. Parliament, which had so long served as the central sphere in
which these could be judged, an obvious product of its prominence and its
historical and constitutional importance, was less obviously crucial during the
Pelhamite ministry. Cumberland’s assessment in April 1749 of “the weak and
virulent minority”, that it had “diverted themselves and teased us”, was of
wider applicability than the particular issue he was referring to.34 The state of
the nation’s finances, judged serious and therefore likely to lead to a pacific
policy by Durand35 and of the ministry, seemed of greater consequence than
the situation in Parliament.
Given George II’s age, it is not surprising that the reversionary interest was
of consequence. Frederick, Prince of Wales’s views were sought by foreign
envoys, and in February 1750 he promised Haslang that he would not oppose
subsidies to Bavaria, 36 in contrast to his usual opposition at this stage to
government policies. However, the parliamentary impact of the reversionary
interest was lessened by the strength of the ministry and the absence of any
serious international or domestic crisis, a marked contrast to the situation in
1717–20 during the Whig Split, when George II had been Prince of Wales and
in opposition to his father. Dodington, who left the government to join
Frederick in 1749, soon complained to the Prince about the state of the
opposition and thus helped to divide it further. He criticized
the impracticability of uniting any four efficient persons, upon any

principle, or plan that may serve, or save their country: The disregard I
have met with in endeavouring to unite them; the want of concert in the
Lords, even in this great point: the total neglect of the Commons, in not
so much as asking what we would do, or our opinion what was to be
117
done: the impropriety, as well as total inutility of appearing in publick,

alone, or with a very few, and those, of no consequence, nor following
the same method and plan of reasoning.37
The opposition sought issues on which they could attack the ministry in
Parliament for failing to defend national interests. In February 1750, twenty
years after Walpole had been criticized on the same head, the opposition
complained that France had failed to fulfil her undertaking to destroy the
defences of Dunkirk, as agreed by the Peace of Utrecht and confirmed by the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Pitt, as Paymaster General, replied on behalf of the
ministry that the sole alternative to negotiation was war, that Britain was in no
state for conflict, that the motion was dangerous as it would incite popular
pressure, and, in reply to Egmont’s claim that Pitt had formerly adopted the
same position, added that it was necessary for nations to follow a prudential
course, a novel position for Pitt.38 The ministry won the division by 242 to 115.
Mirepoix was sure that the parliamentary strength of the ministry would
encourage Newcastle to press for a more interventionist role for Britain.39
Indeed, the fact that, as Earl Granville (as Carteret now was) noted in January
1750, “there is no appearance of any considerable matters to come on” in
Parliament40 can be seen as a condition of British support for the Imperial
Election Scheme. It is doubtful that Newcastle would have been able to prevail
over Pelham’s hostility to peacetime subsidies, a contentious policy, had there
been more parliamentary hostility to the ministry.
Parliament provided an opportunity for attacking government policy, but it
was also the body to which the ministry had to bring financial requests.
Whereas Walpole had followed the apparent conclusion of the international
crisis that had begun in 1725 and ended in 1731 with a new Anglo-Austro-
Spanish alignment by ending the controversial subsidies to Hesse—Cassel,41
Newcastle did not abandon the expensive and controversial policy of subsidies
that had been employed during the War of the Austrian Succession. Instead,
these subsidies were now focused on the Imperial Election Scheme and
Parliament was asked to vote them.
On 22 February (os) 1751 the Commons debated the subsidy to the Elector
of Bavaria. It is clear from accounts of the debate that it was an informed
discussion. Indeed, the debate can stand as an example of the nature of the
parliamentary discussion of foreign policy. The surviving sources also offer a
warning about the problem of the nature of the evidence. If the historian had
only Horace Walpole’s brief account to rely upon, he would be able to say little
about the content of the speeches, an all too common problem. The far longer
account in Cobbett’s Parliamentary History is much more valuable, although it
offers no guidance as to the quality of the speeches, and thus of their impact.
The report sent to Newcastle by his Under Secretary and general factotum,
Andrew Stone, himself an MP, is also very important. It offers a lot of guidance
as to what was said in the debate.
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Mr. Pelham opened the Debate; He said, that he was no friend to

subsidies in time of peace and that he should not have been for this
subsidy, if it had not been of a different nature from most others. That the
great object with him, was the preservation of the Peace, and that this
subsidy had an immediate tendency to that: that the uniting the Elector
of Bavar ia to the House of Austria (who had so often been the
instrument of France to embroil Europe) and the securing the Imperial
dignity to the House of Austria, by the election of the Arch-Duke, would
probably be the effect of this treaty—that he neither knew nor believed,
that there would be any other demands of this nature, and that, if these
great points could be secured, for so small an expense, as our quota of
this subsidy; he could not but think, that they would be very cheaply
purchased. He entered into the particulars of the treaty—explained the
affair of Mirandola—and the transaction with the Court of Vienna for
bringing them to contribute to the subsidy—and accounted for the
Empress Queen’s not being a party to the treaty—He said a great deal in
defence of the measure—that he believed, France was, at present, sincere
for preserving the peace and that he was not at all apprehensive that this
would make France alter their system. But possibly, that this great work
might, at last, be concluded by the general consent of all parties.
Samuel Martin, a follower of the Prince of Wales, made some sensible points in
return:
He represented the success of the Election as doubtful—The ways, by

which it was pursued, inconsistent with the Laws of the Empire; and the
aggrandising the House of Austria, as an object, that might be dangerous
to this country—But that, supposing it right, The Imperial Dignity was
nothing but a name—and the real strength of the House of Austria
consisted in the Hereditary Dominions etc.
He was answered by Lyttelton, now a Lord of the Treasury, who revealed a

knowledge of the Imperial constitution:
showed that the election was not inconsistent with the constitutions of
the Empire, which he supported by good authorities—that it was a great
and useful measure, and that the expense was inconsiderable. That
nobody would be more against a subsidiary system, than himself but that
this was not to be considered in that light, but as a means of preserving
the peace of Europe, and establishing a system for that purpose.
Murray “seemed to give general satisfaction” with his speech, which, judging
by the account in Cobbett, showed a considerable knowledge of German
history and the Imperial constitution. As Stone noted, “He went into the
119
particulars, that had been mentioned relating to the laws of the Empire, about
elections.” Egmont, in reply, raised some practical points and also the role of
Parliament. He asked
how could we depend upon the Elector of Bavaria? Would not he still be
French, in his heart, as his family had always been?…would not other
Electors, Saxony, Palatine, Mayence, and Treves, expect to be paid also?
and who could find money for that? that he acknowledged, there would
be some utility in this election, if it could be obtainedBut that, otherwise
this subsidy would be flung away. If we had subsidies to give, why did not
we give one to Denmark? But that his greatest objection to this Treaty
was, that it was made without the consent of Parliament and that, (if
Parliament could have concurred no other wise) it would have been
better, to have applied for a vote of credit, with a view to have applied it
to this object, than to have taken no notice of Parliament at all.
Egmont’s intelligent observations about inter national diplomacy were

countered by Pelham’s suggestion that Egmont was opportunistic, that the
government had tried, but failed, to gain the alliance of Denmark, “though he
doubted not, if it had been done, it would have found fault with”.42
Pelham’s claim was not without point, but it is also clear from Stone’s
account, and that in Cobbett, that the Commons was offered both a wide
range of infor mation and a reasoned account of the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposal. This is worth stressing as there has been a
tendency to underrate the sophistication of parliamentary debates of foreign
policy, and thus to present parliamentary pressure as essentially political in
origin but uninformed by any particular analysis of the problems facing the
country.
This is misleading. It does less than justice to the knowledge of many
parliamentarians, which in part stemmed from their own experience. A
number of Secretaries of State and diplomats, both serving and former, were
members of one or other house, and some took an active role in debate. This
can be seen in January 1752 in the debates over the subsidy to the Elector of
Saxony. Two former experienced envoys, Walpole and Robinson, and one less
experienced diplomat, Legge, spoke in the Commons on 22 January (os).
Another speaker, Sir William Yonge, formerly a Lord of the Treasury, a Lord of
the Admiralty and Secretary of War, and then, for reasons of health, holder of
the sinecure post of Joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, was provided with copies
of the documents relating to the treaty by Newcastle. Another government
speaker, Murray, offered the Commons details of French subsidies. Horace
Walpole recorded that his uncle Horatio “showed how well he knew where
the weakness of such treaties lay”. The government’s majority was very
substantial, 236 to 54, Newcastle writing that the treaty was approved “by a
majority of five to one in the House of Commons; and the arguments in favour
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of this measure were so strong, and so well supported, that I am persuaded, it

will meet with universal approbation throughout the whole kingdom”.43
Yonge’s account of the debate throws valuable light on the issues raised:
It was opened and the motion for the subsidy moved by Mr. Pelham:
who spoke extreamly well, and urged the advantage of a King of the
Romans very strongly, but I thought rather coolly of subsidy treaties in
general, but pressed the compliance with this as a consequential measure
of the treaty with Bavaria, which had received the approbation and
sanction of Parliament. He was answered by our old friend Horatio
Walpole who spoke ¾ of an hour against the treaty and exhausted all that
could be said on the subject. But I was sorry for his indiscretion, when
he spoke against subsidy treaties in too extensive a manner, and put every
man in mind of the preventive measure of his brother, which included
many such. But the weakest part of his speech, in my opinion, was his
examining seriatim the articles of the treaty…However he ended with
declaring he should vote for the question…His reasons were that as the
treaty was made he would not subject the King to any disgrace from his
Parliament, nor lessen that influence which he actually had, and always
ought to have with the powers of Europe.
He was answered by the Solicitor General who spoke well to the
point…I got an opportunity of speaking, as I had been desired by the
Duke of Newcastle who had enabled me to do so, and in answer to
another gentleman who examined the value of the articles of the Treaty I
said, that if we obtained nothing by it, but what was in the Treaty I would
not have given my vote for one farthing; but if in consequence we had
the word of a king [Augustus III] for what was of the g reatest
consequence to this nation, explicitly and free from all objectives, it was
worth double the sum, and the word of a sovereign prince so solemnly
given, was as satisfactory to me, as any treaty, for that one was easily
broken as the other. And that I had confidence and reason for that
confidence, that such assurances were given. This I had foundation for
saying, the Duke of Newcastle having put into my hands very kindly all
the letters and documents relating to this treaty, from beginning to end
both in and out of cypher. And I had a hint, that it was properer to come
from one who was not a minister than from one who was. The debate
was concluded by Mr. Legge, who spoke short, but with great weight,
who told us from his own knowledge, that all had been done that could
be done to conciliate the King of Prussia, and particularly the obtaining
the guarantee of the Empire for his possessions in Silesia, in hopes it
might have produced a harmony between him and the House of Austria,
without which it could not have been obtained; and which would not
have been obtained, but from the influence of our king on that court and
on other princes of the Empire. That as the option, which was easy to
121
make, between a very great and permanent power, and a great power
indeed but very precarious, depending on the life of one able man
[Frederick II], with the support of another great power of an opposite
interest [France], and subject to be reduced by any one or two shocks
which time or accidents might produce…Upon the whole the
opposition was trifling.44
Foreign envoys had correctly predicted large majorities, Alt arguing that unless
some unexpected incident arrived the session would be very tranquil.45 The
government was not seen as unstable.
When the Lords debated the treaty on 28 January (os) 1752, the opposition
was opened by Bedford, until recently a Secretary of State, and other speakers
included a current Secretary, Newcastle, another former Secretary, Granville,
and a former diplomat, Sandwich. Bedford spoke very well, offering a skilful
account of the international situation and Britain’s position. Newcastle’s
speech, in which he attacked reliance only on “our wooden walls”, was
muddled, and Granville was criticized for displaying “much wit but no
argument”. On the other hand, he pointed out with reason that guarantees
were of limited value in international relations. Despite Bedford’s able speech,
the motion was rejected without a division, a reflection of the government’s
strength in the Lords, while George II refused to speak to Bedford for some
time, itself a valuable help to the ministry.46 The following day the ministry
displayed its strength in the Commons, easily defeating a Tory motion for
declaring against subsidy treaties in time of peace. The debate revealed Tory
concern about taxation.
Subsidy treaties continued to be an important focus of parliamentary
discussion of foreign policy until the breach with Frederick II in 1762. They
provided the major occasion for such discussion, and served to raise both
general questions of the purposes of British foreign policy and specific points
about the value or otherwise of particular alliances in different conjunctures.
The need to win parliamentary approval for such treaties ensured that the
debate over foreign policy was often presented in terms that related to cost and
value, but that also reflected a more general approach to the discussion of
policy, one that was appropriate to a commercial society where national taxes
played a major role. Old England, an opposition London newspaper, in its issue
of 1 August 1752, referred to “that ridiculous balance of power, to maintain
which we are at this juncture so solicitously lavishing away our time and
treasure”. A facetious essay in the issue of 8 February 1752 stated,
As the disapprobation of foreign subsidies has, we have seen, found itself

in the senses or understanding of Britain, it will demand our closest
attention effectually to countervail these operations of nature, or, as Mr.
Locke would say, these prejudices of education. The structure we are here
to raise for the public good, will therefore find its basis in that great
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man’s system of no innate ideas…the present purpose, which is to make

us approve foreign politics, demands no more than that all the books
which have been wrote, regarding the particular interests of this
kingdom, should be burnt. Polity, History, and Geography, are all the
offensive studies…all knowledge of men, of the trading interests, and of
the advantage of our situation, are utterly lost and dead.
The quality of the parliamentary debates was, as already indicated, reasonable

but varied. Precisely because the debates could serve to raise both general and
specific points, the content of speeches was very diverse. If it is assumed that all
speakers should have offered a detailed account of the international situation in
order to throw light on the diplomatic problems and choices facing Britain,
then it is clearly possible to adopt a critical attitude. However, a uniformly
critical approach is inappropriate precisely because speakers presented the
situation in different lights, not least in order to make very disparate political
points. This helps to explain why it is so difficult to judge Pitt, a speaker whose
oratory should not be treated as if it were a thesis.
Aside from the scanty nature of the sources, there is also the problem of bias
in those that survive. It is likely that many sources, particularly the press,
simplified the arguments in order to present two clear-cut positions, and
deliberately stressed rhetorical stances at the expense of cautious discussion and
the use of evidence. It has been argued that the legislative approach to foreign
affairs is more partisan and less intellectual than the executive approach.47 This
is possibly the case, but it does not preclude intelligent discussion of foreign
policy by a legislative assembly.
Alarmist sentiments were frequently voiced by opposition speakers, but not
only by them. In December 1743 Lord Raymond told the Lords that the
opposition were “the favourers of France, and the betrayers of the great cause
of universal liberty”. 48 Other ministerial speakers also implied that their
opponents helped France, either deliberately because they were Jacobites, or,
without intention, because they were more concerned to weaken the
government than to consider the possible detrimental consequences of their
criticisms.
In judging opposition rhetoric it is necessary to consider the particular
problems opposition peers faced. As the Tory Earl of Lichfield correctly told
the Lords in December 1743, “as this House has not of late years been let into
any secret relating to our foreign transactions…we can judge from nothing but
public appearances”.49 It is therefore not surprising that, as Hardwicke pointed
out, opposition speakers offered little proof in support of their arguments.50
Furthermore, criticism of the role of the monarch had to be indirect. The
opposition were also appealing to a wider public of the British public nation,
European powers and posterity, and, in appealing to such an audience, it was
possibly felt best, either by the speakers or the reporters, to adopt a broad and
rhetorical approach.
123
The nature of the international system was part of the problem in discussing
foreign affairs. Dynasticism provided the principal theme and idiom of the
system, and the monarchical control of foreign policy in most states kept it
secretive. Given their volatility, it was difficult to assess, let alone predict, the
policies of other states. Dramatic reversals of policy produced an atmosphere of
uncertainty in which rumour flourished and conspiracy was believed in
because often true. In such a situation it was necessary to judge actions and
policies that seemed contradictory, ambivalent and difficult to establish.
As a result, it was simpler to adopt a broad brush approach, and also to
discuss policy in terms of history and to assess intentions in the same terms.
Thus, it was argued that the plans of France could be gauged by considering
her past policy, an analysis aided by the belief that for each state there was an
obvious natural interest dictating a particular course of policy. Parliamentarians
who discussed international relations in such a fashion were simply sharing in
the common terminology and analytical methods of the day, devices employed
by statesmen as well as journalists. The frequent discussion of past events was
also a function of a political society where legitimacy derived from such events,
for example, the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, and the response to them.
More generally, to suggest that parliamentary discussion of foreign policy was
designed to serve a political purpose does not imply that it was without
standards or quality.
Given the similarities between some of the crises facing Britain, it is also
inappropriate to criticize the speakers for returning to the same themes.
Themes recurred, such as the extent to which foreign powers should be
subsidized, and the respective importance and value of “Blue Water” and
continental problems and strategies. On 10 December 1755, when Parliament
debated the subsidy treaties with Hesse Cassel and Russia, Henry Fox, recently
appointed Secretary of State for the Southern Department, attacked Pitt and
said that “the fatal distinction, if it had prevailed, of Englishman and
Hanoverian…had been attempted again without success this summer”. The
Commons discussion on 10 December included references to the international
position in George I’s reign, that on 12 December to Edward III and Elizabeth
I’s use of German troops, evidence of the sense of continuity that was such a
feature of the period. Pryse Campbell was in no doubt of the importance of
the domestic political context of the debates. On 18 December he ascribed his
recent faults as a correspondent to the “Hessians, Russians, Cossacks and
Calmucks, [who] last Monday put the finishing strokes to the Treaties, which
lost several gentlemen their places, and gave places to others, I have got
nothing and only lost my dinner every day they came before us”. 51 The
government’s majorities were substantial, 318 to 126, 289 to 121, 263 to 69
and 259 to 72 in the Commons, 85 to 12 in Lords.
The parliamentary weakness of the opposition in both chambers was
therefore readily apparent in December 1755. The political crisis that had
followed the death of Pelham on 6 March 1754, a major domestic
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discontinuity, did not offer the opposition opportunities comparable to those

present in 1741 after the general election and the failure to secure a
reconciliation of George II and the Prince of Wales. Nor should the necessary
parliamentary consequences of the parlous international position in 1756 and
early 1757 be overemphasized. The very difficult situation in 1747 and early
1748 had not led to a collapse of the ministry’s position in Parliament. It was
instead the crisis within the government that was so serious in 1756–7;
although the creation of a viable leadership in the Commons was a key issue.
Parliamentary debates were largely of consequence only in so far as they
influenced this crisis, providing opportunities for trials of strength.
Once the political crisis had been resolved in the shape of the stable
Newcastle-Pitt ministry (1757–61), then Parliament became of less political
consequence, though it remained important as a crucial component of the
system of assured public finance that enabled the British government to fight
the Seven Years’ War with such persistence.52 Parliament might have been the
scene for more serious attacks on the ministry had the limited military success
of 1755–7 not been subsequently transformed into glorious victory, but, as a
consequence of both victory and ministerial stability, Parliament was quiescent,
certainly compared to the situation during the Nine Years’ War, the War of the
Spanish Succession and in 1741–5.
Government unity was only lost in 1761–2, with the crises that led to the
resignations of first Pitt and then Newcastle, but, again, that was a crisis within
the ministry. Furthermore, their hesitation in attacking the new ministry, the
general desire for peace, 53 the popular ity of the new king and the
government’s success in both war and peace blunted the force of parliamentary
criticism. The Peace of Paris encountered more parliamentary attacks than that
of Aix-la-Chapelle had done, a measure of the loss of government unity and
the stronger sense that Britain had had a bad deal, but the situation was
essentially the same. The ministry carried the Address of Thanks in the
Commons by 319 to 65. Claims that this majority was obtained by bribery
were inaccurate. As so often in Hanoverian Britain, it was the parliamentary
strength of the government rather than the vigour of its critics that was most
strikingly apparent to observers, both domestic and foreign, and their view of
ministerial power owed much to this strength. The government was sufficiently
confident of its majority to discuss the terms of the Definitive Treaty before
Parliament had considered the Preliminary Articles.54
It is important not to present a crude contrast of parliamentary pressure and
government conduct of foreign policy, to exaggerate the difficulties of
parliamentary pressure or to ignore the advantages that Parliament offered. In
1747 Horatio Walpole noted governmental reliance on parliamentary support,
although the ability to win such support did not necessarily entail success
abroad, a valuable qualification on any argument that presents domestic
structural features alone as responsible for Britain’s rise to great power status:
“Our ministers in England have no plan for peace or war, but we shall depend
125
upon a great majority in Parliament; for God’s sake what will that do, why vote
what you please; will votes without means and men extricate us from these
endless difficulties.”55
The decision in 1748 to return the popular gain of Cape Breton to France,
despite vociferous demands that it be retained, suggests that domestic
opposition was far from being a determinant of policy, as also does the success
in pushing through peacetime subsidies to allies in the early 1750s, despite
claims that Parliament would never accept them. Government success at
general elections and the resources available for parliamentary management did
not prevent serious criticism of British foreign policy, but it lessened their
impact. It is salutary to contrast the criticism of peacetime subsidies with their
minor role in the general election of 1754.
In general, successive governments enjoyed the support of Parliament, and
foreign policy was no exception. This ensured a degree of financial support that
was crucial. The British system of public finance rested on a parliamentary-secured
public national debt, and this enabled successive governments to finance war
expenditure by borrowing at a lower interest rate than that open to their rivals.
Furthermore, British tax rates were higher than those in France, and the ability to
sustain these was a consequence of both the strength of the economy and the
degree to which the role of Parliament facilitated consent. Parliament thus helped
to enlarge the power of government. “No Pelham, no money, was the City cry” in
1746 when George II attempted to engineer Carteret’s return. With Pelham at the
Treasury, however, large sums were raised. When First Lord of the Treasury,
Newcastle also took care to “talk to the most knowing people in the City …upon
the present state of credit”.56 The Monitor claimed on 6 September 1755 that “he
who has the longest purse will wear the longest sword”. On 15 July 1758 the
paper crowed
What a prodigious sum of money! No less than ten millions four

hundred thousand pounds and upwards has been cheerfully and
expeditiously granted and raised for the service of the current year. Such
is the spirit of this nation, when they are satisfied with a minister, and
approve of the measures pursued by the Cabinet.
By regarding Parliament partly as a sphere in which the disputes of politicians

in and out of favour could be contested, it can be seen as a stage for, rather
than a source of, political difficulties. These difficulties were not unique to
Britain, but were an essential feature of court-based political systems that
lacked the organization and attitudes of disciplined parties. Conversely,
Parliament offered a solution to the most serious domestic problem of the
states of eighteenth-century Europe: public finance. It provided a means for
linking government to the politically powerful throughout the country, a
means whose constitutional and institutional expression was the voting of
substantial sums for approved policies.
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PARLIAMENT
The contrast between Britain and her continental counterparts was not
solely a matter of sums raised and the speed with which they were voted and
produced. It was also a matter of lower rates of interest, flexible financial
methods, sources of revenue that could be anticipated without difficulty and
relatively low collection costs, in both administrative and political terms.
Politically, this led to the voting and collection of large sums without
significant levels of public disorder. Parliamentary financial arrangements and
taxation were accepted as legal even if they could produce criticism. While
many continental states, not least France, found it difficult to devise politically
acceptable methods to raise taxation, largely because the politically and socially
powerful were unwilling to increase their commitments, parliamentary
taxation and a parliamentary-funded national debt raised the substantial sums
that funded Britain’s wars without creating political, regional and social
divides.
More generally, the ability of the British state to provide subsidies to other
powers 57 was an indication of the fundamental strength provided by the
combination of parliamentary government and burgeoning commerce. In
1757, before the period of repeated success in the Seven Years’ War, Newcastle,
then First Lord of the Treasury, noted that there appeared to be no difficulty in
meeting the new commitment to provide greater support to Prussia, “towards
that I have already been offered near six millions…and all this money will be
borrowed (if necessary) something under 3½ per cent; when France gives 11
per cent and cannot fill the subscriptions”. He made the same point to foreign
envoys. The role of trade was such that in wartime great pain was taken to
protect British and attack enemy trade, and this policy was also pressed in
Parliament and print.58
Yet it is necessary to be cautious before assuming that British foreign policy
served the ends of commerce. Any stress on royal influence in foreign policy, on
strategic considerations and on the exigencies of alliance politics lessens the
role of commerce. There is no doubt that the latter was of great importance,
but its importance in foreign policy has been exaggerated. Commercial
interests often had contradictory views, for example, those of the Royal Africa
Company and private traders over the regulation of the trade to West Africa. In
1752 the Steadfast Society of Bristol agreed to spend up to £200 in lobbying
Parliament against the monopoly of the Levant Company in the Turkey trade.59
Much lobbying was at cross—purposes. Furthermore, the vociferous and public
nature of lobbying should not lead to its impact being overemphasized.
It is true that British diplomats frequently intervened on behalf of their
merchants. In 1748 the consul at the crucial Mediterranean port of Leghorn
(Livorno) was ordered to preserve British commercial privileges from any
innovations whatever, and his efforts were supplemented by the envoy in
Florence. The following year, Bedford instructed Keene in Madrid to “insist
that the trade between the two nations should be on the same footing as it was
before the war”. Keene indeed sought to do so. His negotiations led to the
127
commercial treaty of 1750. This both settled most outstanding differences and
led to a reduction in tension that greatly helped trade.
This was not the limit of British governmental efforts. Newcastle moved
in 1752 to protect the export of paper hangings to Russia and also discussed
with merchants the challenge posed by Frederick II’s plan for an East India
Company: “Everybody here, and, particularly, the trading people of all kinds,
are most zealous for taking all possible measures for discouraging, at once, the
new Emden Company, as far as the Law of Nations will justify us, in so
doing.” The following year he wrote to Keith in Vienna concerning the
situation in the Austrian Netherlands, “our manufacturers in Yorkshire are
already full of complaints upon their head; and if they were, by such a
Convention, to be precluded from all hopes of redress, there would be no
standing their importunities”. Holdernesse observed in 1755, “I am too
sensible of the consequence of our trade to India to suffer it to be
diminished”.60
Ministers were expected to heed commercial pressure, and frequently did so.
In early 1749 Bedford was pressed by a general meeting of London merchants
engaged in the West Indies sugar trade over the position of certain Caribbean
islands, and received from Hardwicke “the third volume of the British Merchant,
in which are contained the tracts concerning the Spanish duties”. Two years
later, Newcastle instructed the envoy in The Hague “to follow the directions of
the East India Company in helping them in their quarrel with the Dutch
company”. Requests from British merchants trading with Hamburg in 1762
led to pressure on Denmark not to attack the city in order to pursue its
demand for a loan.61
However, ministers could be resistant to mercantile pressures. In 1746
Viscount Barrington, a Lord of the Admiralty who was to have a long
ministerial career, took part in a parliamentary debate on convoys and escorts
in which he “spoke much of the disposition in merchants to complain of
government—and abused insurers extremely”.62 Commercial tended to be
subordinate to political interests. For example, complaints over Danish and
Swedish protectionist legislation did not lead to the serious reprisals that were
threatened.63 In 1742 the Swedish envoy in London was incorrect when he
feared that British mercantile complaints about Swedish privateering would
lead to the despatch of a British fleet to the Baltic.64 Indeed, as far as the Baltic
was concerned, although British envoys complained about commercial
grievances, the ministry rarely made then a central plank of policy, and most
complaints were far from effective. The Baltic was primarily a sphere of
political interest for George II and his ministers, and that dictated British
policy.
To that extent, British critics of the Hanoverian orientation of foreign
policy were justified. This was not, however, an issue in commercial relations
elsewhere in Europe, while, outside Europe, British ministries were more
willing to heed maritime and imperial interests. Considering how best to settle
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PARLIAMENT
disputes with Spain over the British cutting of logwood in Central America,
Keene could
not conceive any other method than that of calling for such people as
Alderman Baker and his friends who know by practical experience the
whole scope and nature of this logwood business, recommending to
them the form of as many proposals as they can prudently imagine or to
serve instead of another in case the more advantageous ones can not pass.
That these projects after being examined in Council may be remitted to
me with proper instructions and authority.65
Baker was one of the leading London merchants trading with North America
and bought much land in Georgia. He had been Chairman of the East India
Company and was then Deputy Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company as
well as a government supporter in Parliament. Although it was often difficult to
detect, individuals like Baker wielded considerable influence, and thus fuelled
contemporary concerns about a “monied interest” dictating policy.
It was sometimes argued that a policy of continental interventionism was
necessary for commercial reasons, although such an argument could serve to
defend both a general line of policy and specific moves that could also be
seen as detrimental towards trade. Criticizing Austrian conduct over the
Barrier, Newcastle wrote in 1753, “The power and influence of this country
depends upon the extent of our trade. It is that consideration that engages us
in the support of the Continent, and it is for that reason that we are so
strictly and I hope ever shall be united to the House of Austr ia.” The
economist Josiah Tucker, author of The Important Question Concerning Invasions
(1755), was another opponent of the notion of maritime self-sufficiency. The
support given to Portugal in 1762 was justified on the grounds of its
commercial importance to Britain. In 1750 the prolific political writer John
Campbell argued that
the reciprocal connections resulting from trade have quite altered the
state of things and produced within these two, or at most these three
centuries past, a kind of system in Europe, or in the Christian parts of
Europe at least, by which every state is led to have a much greater
concern than formerly for what may happen to another…we may
therefore safely say that the balance of power…was created by trade, and
must continue to be the object more especially of trading countries, so
long as they preserve their commerce and their freedom.66
However, the argument that Britain’s continental trade should lead her to
intervene in disputes there was rejected by some commentators, such as the
London Chronicle of 26 January 1762. An anonymous contribution in the issue
of 27 February 1762 asked whether “it is idle and absurd to think of exerting
129
our power in the defence of the Portuguese, merely because they are our best
customers, and pay us annually a considerable balance in treasure”.
Parliament and Trade, the state in the mid-eighteenth-century world with
the most effective representative system and the growth in Britain’s global
power: the connections are seductive.Yet, as already suggested, the situation was
far more complex than a schematic interpretation might suggest. It is necessary
to return these various factors to their several contexts, to rediscover the play
of contingency, to recover narrative. In addition, it is important to appreciate
the role of choice, to understand that national interests were disputed and
policies subject for controversy. The growth of Britain’s power was achieved in
a competitive world in which policy choices were debated and frequently the
cause of political contention. Foreign policy was a matter of process as well as
structure and individuals played a major role. The role of chance is frequently
presented in dynastic terms: What would have happened had such a monarch
died? However, the parliamentary process can also be seen in such a light. Pitt
was the most famous mid-century parliamentarian but his rise owed much to
the death of a man of different capabilities and views, Henry Pelham. The
variety of possible standards that existed is suggested by a letter of 1748 from
Legge to Pelham:
a minister with your intentions and possessed of the means, as you are,
who will take every opportunity of retrenching expenses, reducing
interest, adding to the Sinking Fund and paying our debts as fast as is at
all consistent with public safety, will in a few years deserve better of
Great Britain and make a much greater future himself than all the heroes
whose ashes repose in Westminster Abbey have ever done.67
130
Chapter Seven
Diplomats and ministers
That ministers and men in power grow callous after a certain time, I am
well convinced, as that misers do, and will equally stand the laugh; nay,
even laugh themselves first. Prints, pamphlets, caracaturas, burlesque
songs, and all the train of booksellers, or rather scribblers’ venom, is as
indifferent to them as the hiss of an upper gallery to a very impudent
player; who calls them canaille, fellows of no taste, spirit or genius.
—Centinel, 17 October 1757
Diplomats
In this period Britain became the most powerful maritime and trans-oceanic
power in the world, but her diplomacy remained centred on Europe.
Diplomatic relations with non-European powers became more frequent, but
they were generally ad hoc and much less common than with European states.
Furthermore, they were often handled by military personnel or by the agents
of British commercial companies, particularly the East India Company in Asia,
rather than by diplomats accredited by the crown. This reflected a lack of
certainty about how best to handle relations with non-European powers. The
calibre of diplomats is difficult to assess, especially if their necessary social skills
are considered: ability in negotiation was tested less continually than court
skills, for influence often reflected the ability to make the right impression at
court. Rulers and ministers frequently complained that envoys exceeded
instructions, for example, Legge in Berlin in 1748, but it was difficult to
provide orders that would comprehend all eventualities.
In practice, any account of British diplomacy in this period has to take note
of two aspects, first, permanent or “structural” factors that affected its conduct
and, secondly, specific political crises. Structural factors were of varying
131
intensity. At the level of the individual diplomat, the most important was the
financial. The private correspondence of diplomats was dominated by issues of
pay and expenses. Both were commonly in arrears and each, especially the
latter, was regarded as insufficient. Such complaints were of course not unique
to the British, but they reflected several more general facets of the diplomacy
of the period that are important. First, much of early modern government was
undercapitalized. It is of course true that most government in most periods has
been short of funds, but, in comparison to the nineteenth and twentieth
century, governments did not benefit from an important industrial base, the
infrastructure of credit was less developed and their creditworthiness was
limited.
The financial problems of British diplomacy were however exacerbated by
another “structural” feature of British foreign policy: the role of Parliament.
After Henry VIII failed to use the despoliation of the monasteries permanently
to increase the capital base of British monarchy, the crown was generally
dependent, especially in periods of warfare and international confrontation, on
financial support from Parliament. This was rarely adequate, and fiscal
exigencies therefore affected the operations of all areas of British government,
including the diplomatic service; although such exigencies were scarcely
unique to Britain.
If Parliament is also taken as the symbol and fulcrum of public politics and
public political pressures in the period, then it is important to consider the
impact on British diplomacy of the reluctance of the political nation to
support a substantial standing army. There were of course other reasons why
the British army should be smaller than that of France. Britain had a smaller
population, as an island, had both an important alternative of military
commitment in the shape of the navy and was faced with the problems of
amphibious operations. Nevertheless, the growing gap between British and
French military capability on land in the seventeenth century is instructive, and
the same was true, after 1660, in comparison with Austria, Prussia and Russia.
Whereas Henry VIII in the 1540s and Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s had been
able both to deploy substantial forces and to send them to the Continent, the
British forces sent thereafter were increasingly effective only as part of
coalition armies arrayed against France (as with the forces sent in the 1690s,
1700s, 1740s and 1750s), were a smaller percentage of the French army and
were dependent on a favourable political environment in Britain. When this
was lost, then the consistency and thus effectiveness of British diplomacy
appeared compromised.
It is difficult to point to any change in the calibre of British diplomats
during the period under consideration.1 Instead, variations in their importance
and success can be more directly ascribed to Britain’s relative power. Aside
from direct representation by George I and George II when they travelled
abroad, diplomats, whatever their merit, were most heeded when Britain was
seen as powerful: more important for example in 1750–2 than in the late
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DIPLOMATS AND MINISTERS
1730s. The situation also of course reflected more general facets of the
diplomacy of the period, especially the extent to which individual diplomats
were seen as representing the views of the crucial figures in the British
government. This issue remained a problem after the “Glorious Revolution” of
1688, as first William III and later the Hanoverians sought to pursue their own
agendas in foreign policy and clashed accordingly with ministers and
politicians. Nevertheless, despite serious clashes over the alleged role of
Hanoverian interests, it proved easier to reconcile royal and parliamentary
differences, or, looked at differently, to finesse royal views, than had been the
case under the Stuarts. In part, this was because the “Glorious Revolution” had
settled the religious issue. It was no longer the case that a royal foreign policy
could be presented as Catholic or crypto-Catholic, and this greatly lessened the
severity of disagreements over foreign policy, not least by weakening its
ideological dimension and by ensuring that it could not be placed so centrally
in domestic politics.
As continental European commentators pointed out, the British had a
hypocritical notion of international relations. Successive governments sought
to create and sustain what they termed a balance of power in Europe, while
seeking unrestricted power in the oceanic and colonial spheres. In theory, this
subverted the logic of British diplomacy, but, in practice, there were more
pressing reasons why continental states would not support British interests and
respond to British approaches. The most significant were, first, repeated British
refusals to make the commitments required by putative allies, indeed to see
alliances as mutual and dynamic, and, secondly, and related to the first, the
nature of European power politics. States such as Austria, Prussia, Russia and
Savoy-Piedmont had little interest in Britain’s trans-oceanic policies and were
not outraged by British gains in this sphere. Indeed the major expansion of the
British empire in mid-century aroused little response in much of Europe: the
rise of Prussia was of greater concern. This was not true of other major
European colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, France and the Dutch—and, to a
considerable extent, they formed a different diplomatic system alongside the
British.
British diplomats had few problems in seeing Britain as part of a European
system guided by common rules, rather than as separate from such a system.
The value and beneficial nature of such a system was outlined by many
commentators, especially after the abatement of religious hostility at the level
of international relations led to a search for secular rationales of diplomatic
policy. The maintenance of “the” (not a) balance of power became the end of
diplomacy. The apparent precision and naturalness of image and language of
balance greatly contributed to their popularity in an age in thrall to Newton
and mechanistic physics. Furthermore, balance served as an appropriate leitmotif
for a culture that placed an emphasis on the values of moderation and restraint,
and for an international system and diplomatic culture organized around
principles of equality or at least the absence of hegemony. In 1769 the
133
influential historian William Robertson, in his History of the Reign of the

Emperor Charles V, presented the balance as a product of
political science…the method of preventing any monarch from rising to

such a degree of power, as was inconsistent with the general liberty
…that great secret in modern policy, the preservation of a proper
distribution of power among all the members of the system into which
the states of Europe are formed…From this aera [the Italian Wars of
1494–1516] we can trace the progress of that intercourse between
nations, which had linked the powers of Europe so closely together; and
can discern the operations of that provident policy, which, during peace,
guards against remote and contingent dangers; which, in war, hath
prevented rapid and destructive conquests.2
Robertson’s book provided empir ical underpinning for the notion of

contemporary Europe as a system that had devised a workable alternative to
hegemonic power, and an alternative that was better, not only because it
facilitated internal development, but also because competitive, but restrained,
emulation gave Europe an edge over non-European powers. Thus Edward
Gibbon, who stood unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1761, subsequently argued
that
the balance of power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our
own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternatively exalted or
depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general
state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners, which so
advantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and
their colonies…The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutual
influence of fear and shame…In peace, the progress of knowledge and
industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals; in war,
the European forces are exercised by temperate and indecisive contests.3
This perspective, a European version of universalism particularly suited to a

Britain that did not seek continental conquests, described the ideal vision of
the diplomatic world of Europe between the Peace of Westphalia and the
French Revolution. It was expressed in such diplomatic concepts and devices
as collective security and the congress system.
Yet, just as Gibbon’s account excluded the “barbarians” from his “one great
republic” of Europe, so also the diplomatic world was very brittle. That it
excluded women and the bulk of the male population and reflected the world
of orders and privilege that dominated and manipulated society is scarcely
surprising, but was to ensure that revolution, nationalism, people’s warfare and
people’s diplomacy all were to pose serious challenges. Simultaneously, the
combined effect of Eurocentric ideologies and a diplomacy of force and
134
coercion was to ensure that it remained natural to resort to violence as

European horizons widened.
Mid-century diplomats
In European diplomacy the Br itish followed similar practices to their

continental counterparts. Issues such as appointment, control, remuneration
and training were similar and handled essentially in a common fashion.
However, foreigners in the service of the British crown became less common
in the diplomatic service. One major difference arose from Britain’s island
nature. This could lead to serious problems in communications. Adverse winds
could prevent messengers sailing or lead to them being blown off course. At a
crucial moment, a courier from Berlin landed in Whitby not Harwich in
November 1757. The following month, Mitchell found himself under “the
greatest perplexity” because contrary winds had detained Holdernesse’s
instruments and the “state of affairs” had recently changed considerably.4
Diplomacy was not taught, but was an adjunct of gentility, a consequence of
breeding. Diplomats were the personal representatives of the sovereign and
their readiness for office was seen as a product of their social rank. This was
often closely related to the diplomatic rank of the official appointed, and thus
selection was an expression of regard, respect and reciprocity. Thus poor
relations were reflected by George II being represented at Berlin only by a
Secretary in 1745 and 1747, and by nobody from May 1747 until the following
April, again from November 1748 until 1750, and from 1751 until May 1756,
and at Paris by Antony Thompson, the former ambassador’s chaplain, from
October 1740 until the French declaration of war in March 1744.
Diplomatic representation in 1739–63 naturally divides into three periods,
defined by war. In 1739–48 war led to the end of diplomatic relations with
both Spain and France and had effects on links with their allies. In contrast, as
the British government made a major effort to create and sustain antiBourbon
alliances and to ensure that they had the desired military consequences, so
British diplomacy became much more active, certainly in contrast to the
position in 1736–8.
Peace in 1748 brought a resumption of relations with France and Spain,
but those with Prussia and Sweden remained cool. The active Br itish
diplomacy of the interwar period, particularly the attempts to win Spanish
support and to push through an Imperial Election Scheme in the Empire,
placed considerable pressure on diplomats. Several, especially Keene (Madrid
1749–57), the Earl of Rochford (Turin 1749–55), Yorke (Paris 1749–51, The
Hague 1751–80) and Keith (Vienna 1748–57), were impressive diplomats,
though by no means always successful. In some respects, the interwar period
represented a peak in British diplomatic activity, but it ended in failure and
135
isolation. Only a limited amount of the blame attaches to individual

diplomats, and indeed, with the possible exception of Hanbury-Williams and
Russia, no Br itish diplomat of the per iod was as responsible for the
deterioration of relations with a foreign state as, for example, St Saphorin had
been with Austria in the mid–1720s.
The third period was that of the Seven Years’ War. Britain had few allies and
much of Europe was opposed to her or unsympathetic. Diplomatic relations
were cut or diminished. Missions closed and much of the business of
diplomacy was limited to wartime details, for example, the conduct of neutral
trade. Attempts to reawaken diplomatic links or to divide opponents were
generally tackled by special missions. The ver y scale of diplomatic
correspondence diminished and was certainly in no way comparable with the
position during the War of the Austrian Succession.
Professionalism is an important theme in cur rent studies of
eighteenthcentury Britain, and it is appropriate to consider diplomacy in this
light, both because of its importance and because there were aspects of the
career that required knowledge. It is certainly possible to detect elements of
career progression and specialization in the records of some diplomats.
Robinson served in a junior capacity in Paris (1723–30) before taking on
responsibility at Vienna (1730–48), being a Plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle
(1748) and serving as a Secretary of State (1754–5). Andrew Mitchell
proceeded from Brussels (1752–5) to Berlin (1756–71). Rochford served at
Turin (1749–55), Madrid (1763–6) and Paris (1766–8) and became Secretary
of State (1768–75).5 Long tours of duty at particular posts encouraged a degree
of familiarity with their problems and language. Appointed to Madrid in 1749,
Keene had earlier served there in 1727–39. Walter Titley served at Copenhagen
from 1729 until his death in 1768.
Such long tours created a danger that diplomats would “go native” and
become overly sympathetic to the views of the court to which they were
accredited. It was certainly the case that some diplomats became very popular
at their posts: Titley was possibly the best example. In 1758, when Mitchell was
recalled in response to Pitt’s wishes, Frederick II made it clear that he wanted
him to keep his post. However, the danger was more complex. Whatever the
length of their mission, there was the possibility that diplomats would become
overly involved with a group or faction at their post and that this group would
be unsuccessful. The fault was most excusable if the group was pro-British, but
diplomats risked totally alienating other ministers or courtiers if they overly
committed themselves to such a group. This proved a particular problem for
British envoys in St Petersburg, Vienna and Stockholm, but less so for
counterparts where government was less divided and where factions were
under greater control, for example, at Berlin. HanburyWilliams’s links at St
Petersburg in 1757 to the young court of the heir, the future Peter III, and his
wife Catherine harmed Anglo-Russian relations: the reversionary interest in
Russia had to wait until Elizabeth died in 1762.6
136
In most spheres of public life, training was on the job. Some diplomats
acquired experience through posts on the staffs of envoys, such as Trevor with
Horatio Walpole and Keith with Sandwich, though there were examples of
aristocratic and non-aristocratic envoys appointed to responsible posts without
any such experience. Envoys were also briefed in London. En route for Vienna
in 1752, the Earl of Hyndford wrote to Onslow Burrish, then at Munich,
“Before I left London I went through all your correspondence for above
eighteen months past, with the Duke of Newcastle, and I admire your
distinctness and punctuality.”7
That year Burrish had to select a secretary. The recommendations he
received throw light on what was expected and on the role of personal
connections in filling posts. The eventual choice, William Money, was “very
sober, honest…wr iting a ver y tolerable hand, which is capable of
improvement…having some knowledge both of the French and German
languages, but, particularly, of the latter”. The son of a clerk in the office of the
Southern Secretary, Money was only 15, but he was recommended by
Newcastle. Arthur Villettes, Minister in Switzerland and for merly first
Secretary and then Resident in Turin, wrote on behalf of a Mr Barbauld,
When he came to me at Turin, I already had a secretary who was every

way qualified for business and the entire trust I reposed in him, but
could not go through with the extensive correspondence and the
immense load then on my hands. Mr. Barbauld therefore came only as
an assistant…My other secretary had the cyphering and decyphering of
all the letters I trusted out of my own hands, and the copying over fair
my dispatches to His Majesty’s ministers at hand. To Mr. Barbauld’s
share fell most of those I sent to the King’s ministers abroad, and to the
fleet, together with the copies of them all for my own use…He writes
a very fair hand, having been bred to trade; and was not slow in
copying of my letters or other papers either in English or French
which he understands well.8
Language was less of a problem than might have been expected, as French
increasingly became the diplomatic lingua franca. However, there were courts
where this was not the case, and German, Italian and Spanish were important
diplomatic languages: many British diplomats were insufficiently familiar with
other languages than French.
The choice of envoys was not easy. Royal support was generally necessary
and envoys who fell foul of the monarch could lose their posts. In 1748 George
II was furious with Legge’s conduct in Berlin. Confidence in envoys was
particularly important because the so-called “English plan” of conducting
diplomacy was for negotiations to be handled by Britain’s envoys rather than
by foreign diplomats in London. The latter were suspected as likely to intrigue
with British opposition politicians, and at times their conduct could lead to
137
serious tension, as with the collapse of Anglo-Prussian relations at the close of

the Seven Years’ War: Michell, the Prussian envoy in London, actively intrigued
against the government.
Most British diplomats appear to have discharged their tasks to the
satisfaction of the Secretaries of State. As several of the latter had been
diplomats, they were well aware of the problems of diplomacy. Diplomatic skill
and influence are difficult to assess. Diplomats could be influential at courts
with which diplomatic correspondence was episodic, but there was also room
for influence when instructions were more frequent and ministers in London
more concerned.
The emphasis placed by modern scholars on individual diplomats varies in
part in accordance with their conception of how the international system
operated. Any stress on such impersonal factors as geopolitics or long cycle
theory can diminish the role allocated to individuals, but other approaches are
possible. It is sufficient to note that British diplomacy in mid-century was not
obviously worse than that of other major powers. No major British diplomat
provided information for foreign powers as the French diplomat and foreign
office official François de Bussy did for the British to whom from the 1730s he
was agent 101. A numerous Scottish contingent, particularly Keith and
Mitchell, was especially talented and energetic.9 British diplomats disagreed
with each other, but this was not unique to Britain and it ensured that different
expert opinions were presented to the government.
Ministers
On my own account, I would not give three farthings to make one man
Secretary of State rather than another. Lord Holdernesse is as agreeable
to me as Sir Thomas Robinson, and Sir Thomas as Lord Holdernesse, or
any other. I shall look upon you as the Foreign Minister in both cases,
and who writes the letters to the foreign courts is no concern of mine.
—Pelham to Newcastle, 1750
For mal minister ial responsibility for foreign policy belonged to the
Secretaries of State for the Northern and the Southern Departments, and was
divided between them on geographical grounds. The Secretar ies were
generally talented and many had diplomatic experience, a ready contrast with
British Foreign Secretaries in the twentieth century. In 1754–5 both the
Secretaries had such experience and at least one had such experience until
1748 and from 1751 until 1761. This did not necessarily mean that the
Secretary was therefore more competent. Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse,
Secretary of State 1751–61, had not been a distinguished diplomat at Venice
(1744–6) or The Hague (1749–51), and his secretarial position was largely
138
due to his compliance with Newcastle’s views. Holdernesse wrote to Yorke

from Hanover in 1755,
You will now see…why I have remained silent so long; I wanted to hear
from England…I did not know myself what to write or what to advise,
till I knew how far our friends would authorize me to go; and I am sorry
to tell you that I meet with little comfort from thence …I hope the
Duke of Newcastle will let you know his thoughts upon the present very
critical situation of affairs, for my opinion is of little consequence.
Newcastle was certainly very pleased with the choice. Holdernesse was a
pliable peer without political weight, and Newcastle was disenchanted with
secretarial colleagues who thought for themselves: he had broken successively
with Townshend (1730), Carteret (1744), Harrington (1746), Chesterfield
(1748) and Bedford (1751). Horatio Walpole commented on Newcastle’s
“humours” in 1740. In 1749 Newcastle complained about Bedford both failing
to consult him and sending absurd instructions, although he was later to claim
that the decision to dismiss him was taken by George II. The following year,
Newcastle made clear his opposition to Halifax gaining the post: “He is so
conceited of his parts, that he would not be there one month, without thinking
he knew as much, or more, of the business than any one man; and I am sure it
would be impracticable to go on with him”. Pelham was convinced that
Newcastle was happy to receive Granville’s advice “provided he is not in office
to give him disturbance”. 10 Yet pliability alone was not enough. Robinson,
Secretary for the Northern Department in 1754–5, had had a distinguished
diplomatic record and was close to Newcastle, but he was a poor House of
Commons manager and did not hold his post for long. James, 2nd Earl
Waldegrave, noted of Robinson, “Sir Thomas, tho’ a good Secretary of State, as
far as the Business of his Office, and that which related to foreign affairs, was
ignorant even of the language of an House of Commons controversy.” 11
The last point was crucial. The particular problems facing the government
varied in nature and intensity and this led to different pressures on Secretaries
of State, but the defence of the government’s position in Parliament was one of
the most important tasks. This was less serious for an individual Secretary if he
had a more active colleague in the same House. While Newcastle was one of
the Secretaries of State, his counterpart, if in the Lords, was liable to find
himself with limited political responsibilities. It was therefore possible for
Harrington (1730–42, 1744–6) and Holdernesse (1751–61) to concentrate on
foreign policy and play a relatively minor political role. Office was not the key.
A pamphlet of 1756 referred to
those ingredients which compose the power a British statesman may aim at.
It is not any peculiar office, rank, or station, but a secret energy and
confidence annexed to it, without which that office or station may not give
139
the possessor that full sufficiency and content that may be the object of his
ambition. Therefore be not surprized that a man with us may be Secretary
of State, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Paymaster of our Forces, or in any
other post to which you are used to annex the idea of our Premier, and yet
not possess that plenitude of power which constitutes a minister, and which
ambition may think its due. Indeed the terms minister and ministry are so
vague and ill-understood in our language, as well as constitution, that I find
it difficult to form, much more to give a true idea of it.12
The Secretaries who were of greatest importance as policy-makers were

Carteret, Newcastle and Pitt. Each sought to dominate policy-making and
Newcastle’s determination to have his way was in part responsible for the fall
of several Secretaries: Carteret (1744), Chesterfield (1748) and Bedford (1751).
Newcastle continued to take a close interest in foreign policy when he moved
to the Treasury in 1754.
The Duke of Newcastle
Carteret and Newcastle were both interventionists and were both obliged to
adapt to the views and concerns of George II. There were significant
differences between them, but the similarities were more important. Having
successfully displaced Carteret in 1744 and resisted his return in 1746, the
Pelhams continued both to concentrate successfully on the war with France
rather than Spain, and to confront France on the Continent.
However, though maintaining the main themes of Carteret’s anti-French
policy, the Pelhams discarded George II’s hostility to Prussia as a needless
diversion of resources and efforts that should be directed against France. This
was to be a policy for peace as well as war. Frederick II noted in July 1748 that
when Newcastle had recently left London for Hanover he had said, “il fallait
aussi travailler a un concert dans l’Empire pour établir la tranquillité sur un
pied solide en faveur de la reine de Hongrie”.13
Newcastle felt that the crisis of the Austrian Succession War, with all the
problems it had posed for Britain, had arisen from Austrian weakness. This had
been due to two developments—the particular problems that had affected
Austria, the crisis of Maria Theresa’s succession, which had revealed domestic
political and military weaknesses, and, arguably more serious, the failure of the
Austrian alliance system in 1740–1.
Newcastle devised his diplomatic strategy to keep the peace by avoiding the
repetition of the crisis of 1740–1. This was to be achieved by two means. Most
importantly, a strong collective security system was to be created that would
assist any individual member if intimidated. Secondly, and this arose more
slowly, the Imperial Election Scheme would be supported.14
140
Newcastle intended to subordinate other objectives to this plan, as he made

clear in response to the prospect of serious negotiations with Prussia in 1748.
He wrote to Pelham that July,
My friend Legge [envoy in Berlin], is tempting us in his private

correspondence: But I do not think, that the bait will take. I really hope,
and believe, everything will be done, that I think right: That is, that the
King of Prussia will have his guaranty, for Silesia, and Glatz; and, if,
afterwards, he will concur with the Maritime Powers, and the House of
Austria, in the support of the Old System; (in which, he ought to think
himself as much interested, as anybody,) he will be admitted. But, if
nothing will satisfy him, but overturning the House of Austria; and
entering into separate measures with the Maritime Powers, for that view;
the receiving him, upon that foot, would be destruction; and the giving
him the least expectation of it would create the greatest confusion
imaginable…Don’t imagine, I say this, to make my court [to George II].
It is my real opinion; and you know, it has always been so.15
Two days earlier, Newcastle had told the Prussian envoy at Hanover that an
alliance of Austria, Britain and Prussia was a necessity,16 but it is clear that he
was only interested in such an alliance if, as Frederick was clearly not willing
to do,17 Prussia was prepared to surrender her room for diplomatic manoeuvre
and became a staunch supporter of stability and the Anglo-Austrian axis.
Newcastle wished to plan for eventualities, indeed believed it necessary in
face of what he saw as nefarious French and Prussian schemes, but was averse
to committing Britain and her allies to measures that might provoke the very
threats he feared. In a volatile international situation this approach was to prove
unsuccessful in 1755–6.
A question mark can therefore be placed against the capacity of Newcastle
and his ministerial colleagues to appreciate fully the problems of alliance
diplomacy. It is necessary to be cautious before decrying the capacity of past
ministers, faced as they were by a great variety of problems and uncertain of
the views of other powers. However, this very dynamic character of alliances
made any rigid analysis of international relations unsatisfactory. Newcastle can
be criticized for advancing just such an analysis, although so long as the
Franco-Prussian alliance continued the antagonism of Austria and Russia
towards Prussia and of Austria and Britain towards France appeared to make an
effective alliance between the three powers necessary and practical.
However, as with the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, such a collective
security system operated best when the powers felt threatened and was
conversely prone to tension and to unilateral negotiations at other times. The
Austrian refusal to see the Imperial Election Scheme in the urgent and
challenging light that Newcastle saw it in led to their unwillingness to commit
themselves to the degree that he considered essential.
141
Similarly, the Russian refusal to dispense with subsidies as the price for their
military preparedness against Prussia harmed Anglo-Russian relations. The
government found the Russian proposals of 1753 for an alliance unsatisfactory.
Newcastle, who was pressed hard by Pelham on the cost, explained that the
proposals departed from what was for him the central point of any alliance, a
partnership of mutual interest:
That the interest of Russia is particularly concerned (independently of all

other considerations) that the peace should be preserved and that no
further encroachments or acquisitions should be made, in defiance of it,
by the King of Prussia, sufficiently appears, by the solemn and unanimous
opinion of the Russian Senate.
That that can be done, no way, but by having a strong force in Livonia,
must be notorious to everybody who knows the situation of those
countries.
That that was the measure generally followed by Russia, is also beyond
dispute…From these premises it is very surprising to the King, that a
subsidy of £230,000 per annum should be demanded, singly for having
such a body of troops in those places, where the interest of Russia
required they should be, and where from your accounts, His Majesty had
reason to think they actually were.18
Alas, from Newcastle’s point of view, his foreign policy was to fall foul, first, in
1755–6 to the refusal of allies to subordinate their views to those of Britain
and, more generally, to the kaleidoscopic nature of international relations,19
and, secondly, in 1761–2, to the collapse of domestic political support for
interventionism and expense. 20 These failures were all the more striking
because in each case the situation had appeared promising.
A pamphlet of 1755 that defended British commitments on the Continent
claimed “it would be no purpose to be constantly sending fresh reinforcements to
the New World, if we did not first appoint proper checks upon the power of
France in Europe”.21 Newcastle was optimistic at the outset of 1756. He
anticipated co-operation with Prussia if the French invaded Germany and wrote
that “all the good consequences which we proposed from the Russian treaty have
already in great measure happened”. The ministry hoped that the treaty with
Prussia would effectually secure the “peace of Germany” and, indeed, saw no
reason to renew the subsidy with Bavaria.22 However, the policy of “checks”
failed and instead it was France that was to be allied with the strongest states on
the Continent. The Duke was bitterly criticized for his foreign policy by
contemporaries. One anonymous pamphlet of 1757 addressed to him, A Letter to
His Grace the D-of Ni-E, claimed of his administration that
the Treaties concluded in it have shown neither knowledge in the

interests of England, of Europe, nor of human kind; it has been attended
142
with endless expense, and incredible increase of debts, dur ing

unsuccessful wars, unretrieved in times of perfect tranquillity…a general
contempt for England, her politics and powers, has taken place of esteem
in the minds of all the kings and potentates of Europe.23
It is dangerous to judge with the benefit of hindsight, but in 1755–6 Newcastle

suffered from his tendency to calculate the affairs of Europe as if they were
those of Parliament, and in 1761–2 he failed to understand and respond to
shifts in domestic political opinion. A French visitor described him as very
vivacious and in perpetual motion, “the man in the world the most fertile in
ideas, but the most incapable of combining them, of establishing a policy and
of executing it”.24 Similar criticisms were voiced by others. Old England of 1
July (os) 1749 referred to “the over busy agitations that appeared in his mien”
and predicted that Bedford would be dismissed for failing to support
Newcastle.
Owen’s Weekly Chronicle of 15 April 1758 emphasized “the perpetual
fluctuation of human affairs which makes it necessary to vary the regards of
nations, according to the coincidence of repugnancy of their several interests”
and commented on the short-lived nature of the alliance systems that followed
the War of the Austrian Succession, adding “how vain is all human policy!” The
Whiggish tendency to assume that it was possible to create a predictable
system, and to improve it through intervention, reached a high point during
British diplomacy in mid-century. It was not a diplomacy that was to succeed.
143
Chapter Eight
Pitt and moves towards new
strategies, 1755–63
The failure of a system, 1755–56
Keeping the peace by, in Anglo-Hanoverian eyes, keeping France and Prussia
in their places through a collective security system entailed two major linked
problems. It made Britain dependent on her partners and it left unclear which
of France and Prussia was to be regarded as the major challenge. A similar
difficulty had faced the Alliance of Hanover in its confrontation with Austria
and Spain in 1725–9, and had also affected British foreign policy during the
War of the Austrian Succession. However, rather than being able in some
fashion to choose what should be seen as the major challenge, the British were
obliged in part to act with reference to their allies. Similarly, shifts in the
attitude of Britain’s allies towards France and Prussia affected relations with
these allies.
This was to be crucially demonstrated in 1753–5, when a decisive shift
occurred from regarding Prussia as the major challenge to seeing France in that
light. In 1753 Austrian and Russian support had been sought to intimidate or
dissuade Prussia; by 1755 Britain was in effect at war with France and her
concern with keeping the peace in Europe centred on the need to stop the
war spreading there. Britain thus sought Austrian support against France, a vital
difference from her earlier anti-Prussian policy, which had accorded well with
the Austrian desire to reconquer Silesia.
All systems for keeping the peace naturally encompass different interests and
aspirations, and their success is difficult to assess. Arguably, Frederick’s betrayals
of treaties, the shock of his invasion of Silesia in 1740 and his attack on Austria
in 1744 led Britain and Hanover to exaggerate the threat Prussia posed to
international peace and to them in the post–1748 period. Frederick was clearly
not averse to further gains, but the Prussian strategic position had deteriorated
markedly since 1740, for Prussia was now the principal enemy of the
Continent’s two largest military powers, Austria and Russia, and both made
144
PITT AND MOVES TOWARDS NEW STRATEGIES, 1755–63
major improvements in the effectiveness of their armies in the early 1750s. It

was not obviously the case that this made it impossible for Frederick to risk
other entanglements, but Anglo-Hanoverian fears of him can appear slightly
implausible in the light of Prussian vulnerability. The effective ending of the
Italian question as a result of the settlement of Austro-Spanish differences
further strengthened the Austrian position, and was seen in this light by the
British.1
Leaving aside the question of exaggeration, British concern for Hanover
and the Low Countries appeared to dictate alliances with Austria and Russia,
but what it did not do was clarify the terms upon which such alliances should
be based, nor did it suggest the direction in which they should develop.
Essentially, Britain-Hanover sought reactive alliances that would maintain the
peace by responding to real and threatened breaches of it, but it was difficult to
bind allies to what might appear an essentially passive and fruitless diplomatic
strategy. Given Russian determination to influence developments in Poland
and Sweden, and Austrian aspirations for the reconquest of Silesia, this peace
strategy was likely to collapse in the long term, even had the unexpected
outbreak of hostilities in distant North America not led Britain to seek
unilaterally a change in the direction of both her foreign policy and her
understandings with other powers. The Austrians were assured in 1755 that
“His Majesty adopts the general principle laid down by the Court of Vienna;
that the assistance the allies are to give each other, ought to be mutual and
reciprocal, and not unilateral”,2 but, in practice, the British request that the
Austrians help them to preserve the peace on the Continent was a unilateral
demand, for there was no real reason for an Austro-French conflict in 1755,
unless Austria chose to attack Prussia.
The British ministry had been provided with plenty of warnings about
Austrian concern with Prussia. In May 1755 Keith reported from Vienna,
this Court have always their eyes upon the King of Prussia;—they are in
perpetual uneasiness about him, and his motions; and their measures are,
and always will be, determined by what they think their interest with
regard to that Prince. Monsieur Kaunitz said the other day, that he hoped
His Majesty did not consider the Empress [Maria Theresa], as his ally
only against France, but likewise against the King of Prussia, who, though
not so powerful as the other was fully as dangerous. He observed that this
new power had quite changed the old system of Europe; and that
nothing could set it to rights, but making ourselves sure of the Russians.
Kaunitz had been warned about domestic pressure for Britain to concentrate
on maritime and colonial disputes with the Bourbons, not on German affairs.3
He discerned correctly the major change that resulted from the rise of Prussia
and the consequent inappropriateness of the “Old System”. Whereas in the
Nine Years’, Spanish Succession and Austrian Succession wars it had been
145
possible for Britain to treat France’s allies as essentially subordinate to her and
therefore a facet of the problem posed by France, as seen for example in the
treatment of Charles Albert of Bavaria in the 1740s, 4 this was no longer
plausible in the case of Prussia; for, although Britain might still regard her thus,
Austria and Russia saw her as an entirely different problem.
The failure of British foreign policy was therefore related to a major shift in
the European system. The problems this shift created had been grasped by
exponents of approaches to Prussia, such as Horatio Walpole. In seeking an
understanding with Frederick in 1755 in order to preserve the peace of the
Empire and the security of Hanover, George II and his British and Hanoverian
ministers revealed flexibility, but it was flexibility that was circumscribed by
the policy of protecting Hanover and the Low Countries, and it was a policy
that was to leave British foreign policy dangerously exposed in 1756. This crisis
was to provide Pitt with opportunities and problems.
Pitt and foreign policy
He was and is to be associated with a very different foreign policy than that of
Newcastle. He was seen as the strategist of empire. His rise to office owed
much to the apparent failure of the Pelhamite system. In 1751 and again in
1754 Pitt had been denied the Secretaryship of State he sought by George II
and the Pelhams. In December 1756, after the resignation of Newcastle in
October, Pitt was appointed Secretary for the Southern Department. Thus, it is
understandable that Pitt’s policies are seen as different from those of Newcastle.
That was true to a considerable extent, but Pitt had in fact been an office
holder in 1746–55. Although his post, Paymaster General, was not a leading
one and did not relate directly to foreign policy, Pitt was obliged to defend
government policy in the House of Commons. The shifts in his position during
the 1750s reflect not only the pressures and expediencies of his own career, but
also the problems and uncertainties affecting British foreign policy.
In February 1750 Pitt replied to charges of inconsistency arising from his
defence of the government’s position over Dunkirk:
upon some former occasions I have been hurried by the heat of youth, and
the warmth of debate, into expressions which upon cool recollection, I have
deeply regretted…Nations, as well as individuals, must sometimes forbear
from the rigorous exaction of what is due to them. Prudence may require
them to tolerate a delay, or even a refusal of justice, especially when their
right can no way suffer by such acquiescence.
In December 1759, responding to pressure for the retention of Louisbourg, Pitt

was to argue, “he could not foresee what might happen, nor could anyone
146
engage what might be the terms of a future peace which depended on

contingent events”. 5 When, in January 1751, the opposition attacked the
Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty of October 1750, in which the Spanish claim
to a right to search British merchantmen in the West Indies had not been
explicitly denied, Pitt defended the treaty in the Commons. He argued that he
had been wrong to criticize Walpole in 1739 for failing to secure the same
repudiation: “I have considered public affairs more coolly and am convinced
that the claim of no search respecting British vessels near the coast of Spanish
America can never be obtained, unless Spain were so reduced as to consent to
any terms her conqueror might think proper to impose.” Pitt defended the
treaty because of the favourable terms obtained for British trade and because it
would serve as a basis for better Anglo-Spanish relations, a departure from
standard opposition views. It had been a commonplace that good relations
with France and/or Spain were impossible and that instead they were to be
regarded as enemies. In contrast, for many decades, ministers had argued not
only that good relations, however difficult to obtain, were possible, but also that
they were essential in order to keep France and Spain apart: diplomacy was
thus expected to compensate for the failure to keep the Bourbons from Spain
in the War of the Spanish Succession and for the consequent danger of co-
operation between the two leading naval powers after Britain. In 1751, as over
Dunkirk the previous year, Pitt did not shirk the unpleasant task of explaining
the limits of national power, even if he knew he could rely on the solid
Pelhamite parliamentary majority. He also had to avoid the easy recourse of
demagogy with its litany of historic hatreds and ancestral rivalries. This was not
only an issue for the British. Keene wrote from Spain in 1755 that “long
habitudes of being slaves to France and of hearing ill of the English create
prejudices not easy to be eradicated”. He pressed for “much circumspection
and complaisance on the part of our officers towards Spaniards and Spain.
Much depends upon it, and I hope they will be taught to forget the Spaniards
are our enemies.” Keene, however, had little time for Pitt. He referred to “the
noise and malice of the Pitts of Europe and the Pitts in America, with all their
abettors”.6
Pitt faced a more difficult task in defending the subsidies negotiated in
order to win German support for the Imperial Election Scheme. In January
1751 he was described as making “a great panegyric on the Duke of
Newcastle’s German negotiations”. The following month, Pitt defended the
subsidy to the Elector of Bavaria as necessary for the preservation of the peace.
Pitt’s stance was criticized, both then and subsequently. Horace Walpole
criticized Pitt for praising Newcastle’s interventionism in German politics and
pro-Hanoverian foreign policy, when he had condemned Carteret for the same
policies in the mid 1740s. In 1743 Pitt had told the Commons that, although it
was in Britain’s interest to preserve the balance of power, “as we are the most
remote from danger, we ought always to be the least susceptible of jealousy, and
the last to take the alarm”. In 1751 Pitt was to be attacked by Egmont: “How
147
thus having thrown off all regard to former character or professions he

remained an advocate for that lamentable Peace of Aix la Chapelle. How
strenuous an advocate to subsidies to Saxony and to Bavaria in lieu of professed
peace.”7
It was easy, as Egmont did, during wartime to condemn the earlier
compromises of peace, but Egmont also exaggerated Pitt’s influence. Pitt
certainly indicated unhappiness with Newcastle’s policy. He wrote to Horatio
Walpole, praising him for his Commons speech criticizing the Saxon subsidy
treaty, which, Pitt claimed,
breathes the spirit of a man who loves his country. If your endeavours
contribute to the honest end you aim at, namely, to check foreign
expenses, and prevent entanglements abroad, under a situation burdened
and exhausted at present, and liable to may alarming apprehensions in
futurity, you deserve the thanks of this generation, and will have those of
the next.8
As so often in his career, Pitt was torn between the claims of posterity and the
pressures of the present.
Pitt certainly gave indications of concern over the Bourbons. In 1750 he
pressed on Newcastle his concern about French threats to Nova Scotia. In
January 1751 he attacked and voted with the opposition against Pelham’s
successful attempt to reduce the size of the naval establishment. In September
1753, although Pitt pressed for “some savings in the army in Scotland and
Gibraltar, in order to provide for the expense of” a projected subsidy to Russia,
he also urged Newcastle “to adhere to our points with France, as to Dunkirk
and the West Indies”. Pitt’s argument that a Russian army able to intimidate
France’s ally Prussia would help achieve this aim9 accorded with Newcastle’s
diplomatic strategy, but his concern about France was instructive.
This concern was to interact with Pitt’s thwarted ambition and the
deteriorating international situation in 1754–6. The failure to appoint Pitt
Secretary of State when Pelham died in 1754 angered him, but the worsening
international situation led to attempts to win him round in 1755. However, Pitt
made clear views on foreign policy that did not accord with those of the
government, particularly George II. On 9 August 1755 Pitt outlined to
Hardwicke his views on
the support of the maritime and American war, in which we were going
to be engaged, and the defence of the King’s German dominions if
attacked on account of that English cause. The maritime and American
war he came roundly into, though very onerous, and allowed the
principle, and the obligation of honour and justice as to the other, but
argued strongly against the predictability of it; that subsidy treaties would
not go down, the nation would not bear them; that they were a chain and
148
a connection, and would end in a general plan for the Continent, which
this country could not possibly support.10
These views and his lack of parliamentary support, ensured that Henry Fox,
not Pitt, succeeded Robinson as Secretary of State in September 1755. Two
months later, Pitt launched a bitter parliamentary attack on the subsidy treaties
and contrasted the defence of Hanover with that of Britain and America. His
speeches helped to make such a contrast a major public issue and also defined
Pitt’s position in totemic terms. The issue of Britain’s relationship with the
Continent was not only intertwined with domestic politics; it was also, under
the pressure of war, increasingly posed as a contrast with commitments to
America, and with a view of Britain’s present and future as an imperial power
that was a trading, trans-oceanic, maritime polity. Power was increasingly seen
as a function and cause of wealth, maritime strength and colonial possessions
and trade.
Thus the choice was no longer largely defined in terms of continental
interventionism versus a Tory, agrarian withdrawal from abroad, albeit one that
was tempered by a degree of “blue water” raiding and cheap colonialism.
Instead, “blue water” was transformed into Britain’s destiny. It was to be a
feature in which the state invested heavily and took a major role. This was seen
most clearly in the dramatic shift in the despatch of regulars abroad. Prior to
the Seven Years’ War, very few regulars were sent to Canada and India, and in
military terms the direct trans-oceanic British impact was essentially naval. This
altered with the despatch of the regulars that conquered Canada, Bengal and
the Carnatic.
The reconceptualization of Britain, her role in the world and empire was
one of the major changes that took place in the mid-eighteenth century. It was
to be as far-reaching in its impact on British history as the long period of
demographic growth that began in the early 1740s, and it was to be a shift
closely linked to Pitt. When in October 1756 failure in the initial stages of the
Seven Years’ War and a collapse of nerve within the ministry led to a
government offer of the Secretaryship to Pitt, he replied by demanding a
rejection of the past: Newcastle must resign and an inquiry be established into
setbacks in Minorca and North America. Foreign troops in British pay must be
dismissed.
Pitt as Secretary of State
George II rejected the terms, but, convinced of the difficulty of the situation,
Newcastle resigned anyway, leading to the creation of a ministry around Pitt
and the Duke of Devonshire, a Whig stalwart. In office there was to be a
contrast between Pitt’s public position and the policies of the government. This
149
was a frequent feature of his career that led to charges of hypocrisy and
inconsistency. However, in part they reflected the exigencies of the
international situation and, more particularly, the extent to which there was
never a government of Pittites. The King’s speech to Parliament, written by
Pitt and delivered on 2 December 1756, promised that “the succour and
preservation of America cannot but constitute a main object of my attention
and solicitude”. Yet, alongside this, the government supported subsidies for an
Army of Observation composed mostly of Hanoverians and Hessians, designed
to protect Hanover and to cover Prussia’s western frontier. The criticisms this
aroused reflected sensitivity to the Hanoverian issue and the extent to which
commitment to the Continent was seen in those terms.
For tactical political reasons, Pitt sought to refute this assessment, but his
arguments also revealed the extent to which, as with his comments on Russia
in 1753, he was willing to see continental allies as a device to secure British
interests. Pitt did not offer a vision of Europe as a collective security system,
but instead saw the Continent as a series of problems the solution to which had
to serve British interests. On 17 February 1757, on his first appearance in the
Commons as Secretary of State, Pitt delivered a message calling for
extraordinary supplies to meet the French threat “against His Majesty’s
Electoral dominion, and those of his good ally the King of Prussia”. Support
for an Army of Observation to protect Hanover was presented as a means to
enable George to fulfil his engagements with Frederick II, and on the 18th
£200,000 was obtained without any opposing vote. Pitt’s tactics were
successful: Frederick was regarded very positively by many of those who had
views on foreign policy, being widely seen as a Protestant hero.11
The consistent development of a domestic and foreign policy system was,
however, swept aside by ministerial instability. This was due not to Pitt’s
inconsistency, but to that of George II and Newcastle, both of whom wished to
get rid of him. In addition, Cumberland was not happy at the prospect of going
to command the Army of Observation in Hanover while Pitt remained in
office. On 6 April 1757 Pitt was dismissed.
This dismissal ushered in a period of acute confusion. As with the shortlived
appointment of Carteret in 1746, governmental change was flawed by the
absence of a stable and strong ministerial team that could be put in place.
Furthermore, domestic opinion was volatile and divided. The press was
contentious, and, in addition, Pitt’s dismissal was followed by the so-called
“rain” of gold boxes, the presentation to him of the freedom and compliments
of thirteen cities: an assertion that Pitt was popular.12
A stable and peaceful international system might have permitted the
creation of a ministry strong enough to resist Pitt and his discourse of
Patriotism, but the war that Britain was involved in was central to the crisis,
not least because it ensured that there was no sense of predictability in
developments. The deterioration in Britain’s position in 1755–6 had exposed a
serious weakness in the political system, the limitations of parliamentary
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management, specifically the inability of Newcastle to lead the “Old Corps”

Whigs through an acute crisis. The situation in 1757 was no better. That July,
Charles Townshend wrote to his mother,
How do projectors, for all ministers are little more in times of so much
danger and national weakness, propose to continue even a
disadvantageous war for another year; when the siege of Prague shall be
turned into a siege of Berlin; Hanover garrisoned by France; Ostend a
French port; and England, sinking’ under its own debt and expences,
shall be the only fund and purse for carrying on every other prince’s war
in our alliance? Indeed, Lady Townshend we are undone.13
France was a member of a coalition that appeared to face the happy prospect of
continental invincibility, and there was no reason to believe that Cumberland
and the Army of Observation would be any more successful than George II
had been in Hanover in 1741. Furthermore, the initial stages of the colonial
war had yielded little success. Aid to Hanover was George’s vulnerable point.
He hoped that Frederick would send Cumberland assistance, but Frederick
himself was hard pressed. Success in obtaining parliamentary support on 18
February 1757 did not lessen governmental vulnerability on this score.
George and Newcastle swiftly realized that the best solution was a ministry
in which Pitt played a role but accepted most of their views, including a
central position for Newcastle. Pitt returned to the Secretaryship in June 1757
in a ministry dominated by the Old Corps.
This ministry was swiftly to face a serious crisis in foreign policy, in many
respects a repetition of that of 1741. Cumberland was defeated by a larger
French force at Hastenbeck on 26 July, Hanover was overrun, and on 10
September Cumberland agreed to the disbanding of the Army of Observation
by the Convention of Klosterseven. This exposed Prussia’s flank, but Hanover
also threatened to abandon Prussia as a result of George II’s interest in
negotiations with Austria for a neutrality for the Electorate.
This was a crisis akin to that which Carteret had cut through in 1742. Pitt
did likewise, demanding the repudiation of the Convention and the
abandonment of the approach to Austria. Had Pitt been an isolationist, he
might have welcomed Hanoverian neutrality, as it would have freed Britain
from a need to consider the Continent. In January 1758 the French foreign
minister argued that if Britain no longer had to bear the cost of the defence of
Hanover to send assistance to Prussia, she would be able to concentrate on her
navy and on fighting France overseas, in short that Europe was an alternative to
America. 14 A belief in Britain’s “blue water” destiny unconnected in any
fashion to Europe might have led to a willingness to consider the
abandonment of Prussia. This had been the implications of Pitt’s public
“Patriot” stance when in opposition, and it was one that was still advocated by
“Patriot” newspapers. In its issue of 30 July 1757, the Pittite Monitor had
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warned against being involved “in a war on the Continent for the pretended
preservation of the balance of power”.
Returned to office as a colleague of Newcastle, Pitt, however, was seeking
to establish a different policy, to define an interventionism and an alliance
system that would serve British interests without the overreach associated with
Carteret. Pitt sought to combine prudence abroad and acceptability at home,
treating himself as the prime definer of both. Such a policy was difficult given
the international system. Indeed, in August 1757 Pitt secretly adopted a
controversial policy earlier associated with his uncle, James, Vis-count
Stanhope, the return of Gibraltar. Pitt was ready to return the base if Spain
provided help in reconquering Minorca, and thus went to war with France.
Ironically, he sent his instructions to Benjamin Keene, the perennial envoy in
Spain, who had negotiated the Convention of the Pardo that Pitt had attacked
in the Commons in 1739. Pitt offered a pessimistic account of the situation,
but also a defence of interventionism and the interests of Hanover:
the formidable progress of the arms of France, and the imminent dangers
to Great Britain and her allies resulting from a total subversion of the
system of Europe…it is impossible to pass in silence that affecting and
calamitous part of the subversion of Europe, namely the French
conquests and desolations in Lower Saxony, which affords the afflicting
spectacle of His Majesty’s ancient patrimonial dominions, transmitted
down with glory in his most illustrious house through a long series of
centuries, now lying prey to France…nothing can shake His Majesty’s
firmness, or abate…concern for…his crown, and the rights of his
kingdoms; nor can any events withdraw the necessary attention of his
consummate wisdom from the proper interest of Europe, or divert his
generous cares from endeavouring to prevent the final overthrow of all
system and independency among the powers of the Continent.
Despite governmental hopes about the possible results, especially an alliance

between the two powers, Pitt’s approach did not need to be followed through:
the Spaniards were not interested and, in part, Pitt was trying to win their good
wishes. However, the proposal indicated the extent to which Pitt was willing to
compromise traditional Patriot opinions. Indeed the Monitor was reminding its
readers about Spanish depredations on British trade.15
In the winter of 1757–8 Pitt played a major role in securing a political
settlement that tied the defence of Hanover to British direction and identified
it with the Prussian alliance, a policy he had anticipated when earlier
supporting the grant for the Army of Observation. This was crucial to the
disavowal of the Hanover neutrality convention and thus to the revival of a
commitment to Prussia and the Continent that had in effect been surrendered.
The alliance with Prussia served to legitimate the commitment to the
Continent for Pitt and many others. It diverted attention from the issue of
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Hanover and provided a plausible basis for policies that would have been
condemned had they been linked only with the Electorate. The Monitor
claimed on 22 April 1758 that
under the direction of Providence, this nation has after a course of sixty
years bad policy in the support of the popish house of Austria, been
forcibly driven by her natural-enemies to an alliance with the only
power upon earth that is capable of assisting us in the defence of the
Protestant faith, and by his military capacity, to reduce the common
enemy…to an incapacity of disturbing the peace of his neighbours for
the future. Such alliances are agreeable to the constitution and interest of
these kingdoms. They are according to that model of sound politics,
which were laid down by the ministers of our Elizabeth [I], who could
never be persuaded to take any further share in the troubles on the
continent, than was necessary to facilitate the schemes of their own
government. But it is very wide of those continental measures, which of
late years have loaded this nation with heavy debts for the support of
armies in the time of peace, and for taking upon us the greatest burden
in every quarrel raised by the house of Austria.
Such comments might be regarded as an example of what Richard Rigby MP,

the Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, referred to as “all the trite
nonsense of popularity”.16 However, they also demonstrate the extent to which
the Prussian alliance provided the possibility for bridging the traditional
antithesis of pro-Hanoverian ministerial continental interventionism and
“patriot” isolationism, a br idging that Pitt represented and helped to
popularize.
At the cabinet on 7 October 1757, Pitt’s suggestion that Britain agree to
pay the entire cost of the Army of Observation provided the Convention was
disavowed was adopted.17 A subsidy for Prussia was agreed, but Pitt rejected
Frederick’s pressure for the despatch of British troops to cover his western
front. This policy, agreed at the cabinet on 23 February 175818 was in turn
reversed under the pressure of apparent military necessity when British troops
were committed to defend the Prussian North Sea port of Emden, a goal
pressed by Freder ick and by Ferdinand of Brunswick, Cumberland’s
replacement in Germany. Pitt presented the despatch of troops as a necessary
step that did not divert manpower from North America, and this was necessary
for both himself and public opinion. In the summer he agreed to the despatch
of substantial British reinforcements to Ferdinand’s army.
Yet this was a more limited commitment to continental warfare than that of
Britain in the Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Succession. This reflected the
diplomatic situation—the narrower base and more restricted range of Britain’s
alliance system, but, although that was substantially due to shifts in European
power politics, it also in part accorded with developments in British political
153
attitudes. In late 1758 George II and Pitt made sympathetic noises about better
relations with Bavaria, and in January 1759 George went as far as to say to
Haslang, the Bavarian envoy, that it was time to think of another Emperor, as
the present one, Maria Theresa’s husband, Francis I, was a threat to the
constitution of the Empire.19 This approach, which was without result, was a
measure of desperation at the alarming state of the war in Europe and also
indicated the manner in which the Austro-French alliance made George search
around for allies.
The commitment to Prussia and to Ferdinand’s army was the backdrop to
Britain’s colonial conflict with France, a conflict that became the focus of
public attention in a manner that had generally proved elusive in 1743–8.
Louisbourg fell in 1758, followed by Québec in 1759 and Montréal in 1760.
The French fleet was heavily defeated in two battles in 1759: Lagos and
Quiberon Bay.
There was also success in India. Robert Clive’s victory over the Nawab of
Bengal, Surajah Dowla, at Plassey on 23 June 1757 is well known, but was in
fact the culmination of a period of concerted land—sea operations that
reflected the effectiveness of the British military system and its range. The
Nawab had stormed Fort William at Calcutta on 20 June 1756. Robert Clive
was sent from Madras with a relief expedition, but Fort William itself was
regained largely thanks to the guns of the British naval squadron under Vice-
Admiral Charles Watson. Close-range fire from Watson’s warships was also
instrumental in the fall of the French fort at Chandernagore in March 1757.
Pitt was not responsible for the initial build-up of British strength there, but he
sent reinforcements to India in 1759 and 1760, was more aware of the
importance of India than George II or Newcastle, and was rewarded when
France’s remaining possessions there fell in 1760 and early 1761. The French
bases in West Africa had already fallen.
There was nothing inevitable about the disposition of British troops: the
threat of French invasion until 1759 and the pressure of the French in
Germany ensured that there were powerful alternative calls to those for
transoceanic deployment. Pitt was determined to maintain substantial forces in
North America, and the British devoted far more military and financial
resources to North America in 1755–60 than the French: British expenditure
on the conquest of Canada has been estimated at £80 million. After the fall of
Minorca to the French in 1756, Newcastle had hoped to regain it as part of a
peace in which North American conquests gave the British a strong position.
Pitt was even more convinced of the value of such conquests, not least because
he was readier to grasp the value of Britain becoming a stronger imperial
power. Pitt’s priorities also reflected the direction of public attention. An
officer in North America was informed by a London correspondent that “the
great and favourite object is your continent of North America”.20 Pitt had
helped to free Britain from the mesmerized state of 1756 when the prospect of
French invasion had led to an essentially reactive strategy.
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The appropriate choice of military objectives and the winning of public

support for policy were both important because Britain did not enjoy a lead in
military capability sufficient to guarantee success. Indeed, the British navy was
very similar to its opponents in the weaponry it employed. Sir Thomas Slade,
Surveyor of the British Navy 1755–71, worked from Spanish and French
warships captured in the 1740s to design a series of two-decker 74-gun
warships that were both manoeuvrable and capable of holding their own in the
punishing close-range artillery duels of line of battle engagements. Fourteen
were in service by 1759 and they played a major role in the British victories of
the war. This was part of a system in which European powers copied each
other’s developments in weaponry and tactics. A gap in weaponry capability
was therefore not responsible for British success.
However, the British showed in the Seven Years’ War that they could be
more effective than their European opponents—France and, in 1762, Spain—
in conflict outside Europe. The British revealed a greater capability to apply
force at particular points. The British navy was more effective than its
opponents. This was largely due to its extensive and effective administrative
system, to the strength of public finances, to a more meritocratic promotion
system and more unified naval tradition than that of France, to good naval
leadership and to the greater commitment of national resources to naval rather
than land warfare, the last two both encouraged by Pitt.
Commitment to naval and colonial warfare was a political choice that
reflected the nature of public culture and national self-image, but was not made
inevitable by them. Pitt played a major role in this choice. Essentially, he cut
across the monarchical emphasis on conventional land campaigning on the
Continent. In the War of the Spanish Succession the focus of fame and heroism
had been the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns in Germany and the Low
Countries. In the period 1739–48 there had been considerable public support
for Vernon’s capture of Porto Bello in 1739 and Warren’s of Louisbourg in
1745, but the centre of military attention in the later stages of the war had
been George II at Dettingen and then Cumberland’s campaigns in the Low
Countries.
The Seven Years’ War was different. Cumberland was defeated at
Hastenbeck and thereafter played no military role. Britain was not without
heroes on the Continent, and the Marquess of Granby’s fame and popularity is
still today reflected in pub signs, but the commander at the greatest “British”
victory on the Continent, Minden (1759), was Ferdinand of Brunswick. He
was popular in Britain, but his resonance in terms of British politics and public
culture was limited. The same was true of Frederick the Great, whose fame
surpassed that of any British commander on the Continent.
Instead, on land it was Wolfe at Québec, a colonial conquest, and at sea
Boscawen at Lagos and Hawke at Quiberon Bay, who came to personify and
focus British notions of heroism and leadership and thus to play a major role in
British self-identification. Pitt was their political counterpart, his significance
155
symbolic as much as to be found in his actions. Pitt was obviously flawed, but
he could serve as a hero in a way that George II and Newcastle could not.
Thanks to his commitment to the Prussian alliance from 1758, Pitt was no
isolationist, but he was determined to ensure that British policy was not
distorted for Hanoverian ends. When Bussy told Pitt in June 1761 that France
would expect compensation for her Hanoverian conquests, on the grounds that
France had diverted resources from the defence of her colonies in order to
pursue her operations on the Continent, Pitt replied that the argument would
have had a great effect during the reign of George II, but that the situation had
changed. This was a position that Choiseul, the French foreign minister, found
difficult to accept, though he had already commented in February 1760 that it
would not matter to Pitt if France devastated Hanover.
Bussy returned to the subject when he saw Pitt on 23 June 1761. He
claimed that the Electorate of Hanover should be regarded as a province of
England, because George II, as King, had broken the 1757 Convention of
Klosterseven for the disbandment of the Hanoverian Army of Occupation,
and because the army commanded by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick for the
defence of Hanover acted in accordance with George’s orders and for “the
cause of England”. Bussy reiterated the charge that French losses in the
colonies were due partly to their operations on the Continent. Choiseul was
determined to establish the principles of compensation and equivalence. Pitt
was willing to offer the return of Guadeloupe as compensation for the
French evacuation of occupied Hanover ian, Hessian and Prussian
territories,21 but that reflected his understanding that such territories had to
be regained and was part of a determined policy of retaining most colonial
gains.
Success helped to redefine Britain. There had initially been no plan to
conquer the French empire, still less that of Spain. Indeed, the British had
taken pains not to anger Spain for most of the war. The East India Company’s
rise to dominance in Bengal and the Carnatic was also unexpected.
Yet once won, these gains appeared natural and necessary, so much so that in
the latter stages of the conflict there was a bitter debate about which conquests
to hand back at the close of a war22 that few had earlier anticipated winning.
By the close of 1759 Britain really did rule the waves, and optimism about her
naval capability and potential grew. “Constantia Fearnought” in the Union
Journal: or, Halifax Advertiser of 27 May 1760, urged the despatch of a fleet to
the Baltic “to act with vigour and spirit, and push the Empress of Russia
home”, a bold and foolish proposal that would have greatly extended Britain’s
commitments, but that reflected the sense of potency that followed the
victories of 1759. In addition, Britain was also the most successful transoceanic
land power. Spain might rule more territory, but Britain was a dynamic and
growing trans-oceanic power with extensive possessions in both Asia and the
New World.
The possible future need to make difficult choices had been anticipated as
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soon as conquests were made. The Monitor in its issue of 19 November 1757
condemned the restoration of Cape Breton in 1748: that of 7 October 1758
stressed the necessity of retaining Cape Breton at the even-tual peace whatever
Prussia’s requirements then were; in short that Britain was to make peace on
the basis of the uti possidetis, not the status quo ante bellum. There was to be no
compromising exchange of gains as in 1748, and no return to an unsatisfactory
past. Victories, and the prospect of fresh success, led to calls for the retention of
additional gains. Increasingly, these were presented as designed to prevent any
future Bourbon war of revanche from being likely to succeed. “Ibericus”,
writing in the London Chronicle of 7 January 1762, pressed for the conquest of
Spanish Florida and French Louisiana in order to complete the British empire
in North America: “it will fix our colony’s security beyond the reach of rival
states in future times to endanger”. In the London Evening Post of 25 May 1762,
“Anglicus” made the same point about Louisiana.
The failure of the 1761 Anglo-French negotiations threw fresh pressures on
British finances and military resources, and raises questions about the
intentions of the ministry. In June 1761 the French government had offered
the cession of all of Canada bar Cape Breton Isle. The latter was to be retained
so that French fisher men could dr y their catches from the valuable
Newfoundland fishery. It was to remain unfortified. Thus its proposed return
would have been very different to that after the War of the Austrian Succession.
In addition, the French offered to return Hanover and to exchange Minorca
for Guadeloupe and Goree. Pitt, however, did not wish to return Goree, a
valuable slaving station, and was opposed to France retaining her fishing off
Newfoundland, which was seen as a crucial training ground for sailors, and
thus a vital source of naval manpower.
Pitt’s negotiating position was handicapped by differences of opinion over
terms within the ministry and by the attempt to widen the situation to include
Spain. Bussy argued that a satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Spanish maritime
and colonial differences would have to be part of any Anglo-French agreement,
an idea Pitt rejected in late July when he reiterated his view that France should
be totally excluded from the Newfoundland fishery.23 Despite this, the French
insisted on the right to retain her Newfoundland fishery, and on 19 August
the British cabinet agreed, Pitt unwillingly concurring for the sake of
unanimity.24
It was too late. On 15 August 1761 France and Spain had signed the Third
Family Compact.25 This was a serious blow for Britain. France and Spain were
the two strongest naval powers after Britain. Spain’s entry into the war altered
the strategic situation in European and Caribbean waters. The separation of
France and Spain had been a crucial goal of British policy since 1748, and on
many occasions earlier in the century, and, as Secretary of State, Pitt had striven
to keep Spain out of the French camp. United, the two powers were both in a
stronger position to press their claims on Britain. Spain was committed to
helping France militarily after eight months, a period long enough to permit
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negotiations, but there was little incentive now for France to be conciliatory.
Unlike in the War of Austrian Succession, Spain was not distracted by Italian
interest and ambitions.
In fact, Spain’s entry into the war was to make little difference: Britain was
to triumph in the subsequent conflict. Yet this was far from inevitable, and
indeed the Monitor exaggerated what could be achieved at the expense of
Spain. The British government did not want war with Spain, and in 1761 it
failed to prevent it. Part of the blame for the situation was directed at Pitt.
Choiseul was offended by Pitt’s “hauteur” and his “shocking” projects, the
Spanish envoy Fuentes blamed the war on Pitt, while Richard Wall, the Irish-
born Spanish Secretary of State, was also angered by his “hauteur” and
described Pitt as a devil. Elizabeth Montagu, no friend of Pitt, made a different
criticism when she wrote to her MP husband that “our pretty conquests in
America though they serve to make rejoicing and illuminations do not give us
power to control the Grand Monarque in his conduct towards Spain as the
Duke of Marlborough’s victories did”.26
Pitt certainly lacked any mastery of the conciliatory diplomatic arts, and
ministerial colleagues, such as Newcastle, Hardwicke and Granville, thought his
instructions to the British envoy in Paris, Hans Stanley, intemperate and
offensive. The public, demonstrative aspect of Pitt’s personality and politics and
his craving for popular support were seen as having much effect on his
ministerial conduct.27 Pitt had no experience as a diplomat and his instinctual
distrust of the Bourbons exacerbated the consequences of his autocratic
temperament.
Yet, the Bourbons displayed a less than total commitment to peace. At the
ministerial meeting on 14 August the disagreement over Pitt’s strident draft
was interrupted when Bute read a letter from Choiseul to the French envoy in
Stockholm, a copy of which had been obtained by Britain’s excellent postal
interception system: Choiseul stated that France was determined to continue
the war, but would negotiate with Britain in order to conceal her purpose. The
central question in 1761 was not whether Anglo-French differences could be
settled, but whether France would be able to win Spanish support and thus, it
was generally thought, fight on with more success and oblige Britain to be
more accommodating.
Pitt can be criticized for his failure to prevent a deterioration in Anglo-
Spanish relations, but, like Britain, Spanish policy had changed with a new
monarch. Charles III (1759–88) was more concerned with maritime and
colonial issues than his predecessor had been, and in 1760 Spanish policy
became less conciliatory. Spain claimed rights under the Peace of Utrecht to
the Newfoundland fishery and refused to accept any longer what she saw as
illegal British cutting of logwood in Honduras. Pitt was not accommodating on
either head, although he did seek to avoid provocations, pressing the Admiralty
to respect Spanish territorial waters and arranging for the release of a Spanish
ship held at Portsmouth. However, he felt the Newfoundland fishery important
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and Spanish claims in the matter undeserved. In addition, Pitt’s position was
undermined by the Spanish belief that his more pacific ministerial opponents
would overthrow him.
Pitt was to break with his colleagues in October 1761 over relations with
Spain, not the previous summer over negotiations with France. That reflected
his willingness to settle with France if satisfactory terms could be obtained.
Arguably Pitt overly delayed the offer of reasonable terms, but in 1762,
without Pitt, a pacific ministry was still to find negotiations with the Bourbons
difficult and divisive.
The failure of the negotiations forced the government to confront the
possibility of war with Spain. Pitt, supported by his brother-in-law Richard,
2nd Earl Temple, the Lord Privy Seal, pressed for an immediate declaration of
war, telling the cabinet on 18 September 1761 that “loss of time [is] loss of
opportunity. Whatever is dangerous will be more so 6 months hence; no safety
but acting with vigour…an immediate action gives us the best chance to
extricate ourselves”. They had a clear sense of the danger posed by closer
Franco-Spanish relations.
The other ministers disagreed. They did not want to widen the war, were
especially concerned about the possible financial burdens, and hoped that
Spain would not take action against Britain. The exact details of the Family
Compact were unknown, and the ministers doubted that Britain had sufficient
grounds to attack. Instead, they proposed pressing Spain to deliver a categorical
assurance of her friendly intentions. It was hoped that this would not drive
Spain closer to France. Unwilling to agree with their colleagues, Pitt and
Temple declared they would draw up a separate minute for George III, an
unconventional step. This stated that the combination of France and Spain in
enmity to Britain required “necessary and timely measures”, the breaking of
diplomatic relations.
When the issue was debated anew on 21 September, Pitt pressed for the
recall of the British envoy and then an immediate declaration of war, and made
it clear that he would not be bound by the collective decision, an attitude that
was seen as unreasonable. Pitt and Temple then signed their minute and
withdrew.28 On 2 October Pitt attended the cabinet for the last time prior to
his resignation. He argued that Britain must attack Spain while she was
unprepared for war, and then the other ministers reiterated their view that this
would only drive Spain and France together. Newcastle voiced his fear that
war with Spain “would render the present load of expense much more
insupportable”.29
Pitt’s resignation on 5 October 1761 stemmed from his unwillingness to
follow a policy that he believed wrong. As was predicted, Pitt was in part
vindicated by the outbreak of war that winter. Lyttelton identified that as likely
to be the crucial element in the public response:
I want much to know whether it is probable that by Pitt’s going out we
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shall be saved from a war with Spain. The opinion of the public as to the
wisdom of his conduct will greatly depend on that question. For, if it be
inevitable, some will think he was in the right to desire to act a la
Prussienne and strike first, while the enemy was unguarded and more
vulnerable than afterwards. Our people naturally love violent and spirited
measures, without troubling themselves much about forms. But if Spain is
not determined to make war upon us, few persons I believe will approve
of our making it upon them.30
In both 1743 and 1755 the British had fought the French without being at war.
However, Pitt’s attitude to the conduct of government in 1761 made it
impossible to hold the government together. In light of tensions within the
ministry, the hope of averting war with Spain and a growing desire for
peace with France, Pitt’s determination to force the pace for war was
inappropriate.
Pitt resigned over war with Spain, rather than the continuance of subsidies
to Prussia and other aspects of continental interventionism. As a consequence,
success in the war with France, with which Pitt was closely associated, was not
compromised as far as most contemporaries were concerned by continental
interventionism. Instead, Pitt was associated in 1762 and, subsequently, not only
with a war with Spain that appeared inevitable in hindsight, but also with a war
that brought great success in 1762. This success, and continued victories over
France in 1762, especially the capture of Martinique, lessened public concern
over the failure to secure peace in 1761.
This was important in the anchoring of a public perception of Britain as a
necessarily imperial maritime power. The situation was in fact very dangerous.
It was difficult to be optimistic about the position on the Continent. There was
little reason for confidence that Frederick the Great would be able to hold off
his assailants for ever or to negotiate a satisfactory peace. Spain was a major
power whose energies had not been dissipated by recent conflict, and Portugal
appeared a vulnerable British ally. Although France had been gravely weakened
as an imperial power by the collapse of her position in Canada and India, she
had felt able to reject British terms in 1761.
For all these reasons, the failure to negotiate peace in 1761 was serious. It
was not of course simply or solely Pitt’s fault: French and Spanish policy and
responses were not dictated by the views of Britain, whatever many British
politicians and commentators might imagine. Yet it was precisely this blinkered
attitude that ensured that the fortuitous success of 1762 was important in
leading to an absence of any serious widespread critique of the commitments
assumed to arise from Britain’s apparent maritime destiny.
The successes of 1762 might appear inevitable. The French navy had already
been devastated, its British counter part had been battle-hardened and
considerable experience had been built up in amphibious operations. Britain
was far more prepared for war than had been the case in 1755–6 and far more
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ready for attacks on the Spanish empire than in 1739–42. Cartagena

successfully resisted British attack in 1741, but Havana fell in 1762. In 1739 the
British government decided not to attack the Philippines; in 1762 Manila was
captured. According to the Salisbury Journal of 4 October, the news of the
surrender of Havana arrived during a choral concert in the city’s annual music
festival: to shouts of applause, the choir at once burst into the song “Britons,
strike home”.
It is therefore easy to treat 1762 as a second “year of victories” that was an
inevitable postscript to that of 1759, a necessary consequence of Pitt’s policies
and British naval dominance. This would be misleading. Havana proved a
difficult objective and a third of the British force was lost to malaria and yellow
fever. The force sent against Manila was small and vulnerable to the weather,
and it was necessary to rely upon a rapid attack rather than a protracted
siege.
These and other problems were not made obvious to the British public; no
more than those created by the defence of Portugal. In the autumn of 1762 the
Portuguese pressed for more British military support and Treasury backing for
Portuguese borrowing in London. Hardwicke pointed out that Britain could
hardly conquer Peru or Mexico,31 but the jingoistic press suggested otherwise.
The London Evening Post of 30 January 1762 contributed to a heady sense of
potential when it reported:
As the Spanish colonies on the South-Sea [Pacific] are extremely ill

fortified and badly garrisoned, depending for their preservation more
upon their situation than strength, a company of merchants in Bristol and
Liverpool are fitting out a large fleet of privateers, to sail immediately
against them. There is scarce any risk but doubling Cape Horn, and,
provided they choose the proper season, they may even clear that
without danger. This once effected, nothing can hinder them from laying
the whole coast under contr ibution, or taking possession of their
settlement, if they find it convenient.
In the following issue, that of 2 February, the paper proposed the conquest of
the isthmus of Darien.
It was easy in 1762–3, and subsequently, to adopt the position that peace
was appropriate because of the cost of war, but, also, thanks to British success.
In such a context, it was reasonable to debate whether the peace terms were
overly lenient to the Bourbons, but there was little public sense that the war
had been a risk. The glow of success had shadowed the problems and failures of
the early stages of the conflict with France. This attitude led to a post-war
confidence, indeed complacency, that was to have serious consequences for
Britain’s international position.
It is usual to trace the American Revolution in part to the Seven Years’ War,
specifically to the desire by the British government to address the financial
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strains created by the war,32 and to the lessened need of the colonies for British
protection once the French had been driven from Canada. The security of the
colonies had been the British objective when troops were sent to North
America in 1755. There were additional factors that affected the British ability
to handle controversies with the colonies and the subsequent conflict. First, a
sense of confidence in Br itain’s inter national position led successive
governments to neglect the danger and dangers of such controversies.
Alongside specific concerns about the danger of a war of revanche by the
Bourbons, not least in North America,33 there was a degree of confidence
resting on Britain’s recent success. This received powerful support from the
marked reduction in interest in continental international relations and in
concern about Hanover that followed the accession of George III and the
decision to abandon the Prussian subsidy. This shift in attitude closed a major
source of vulnerability.
Secondly, the British failed in the post-war period to match Bourbon naval
construction. This was to have dire consequences in 1778–81, contributing
directly to the failure at Yorktown in 1781.34 It may seem paradoxical to note a
failure to match the naval schemes of opponents as part of an argument that
Britain became more clearly a maritime state with imperial aspirations and
ethos, but this failure owed much to the strong position of the British navy in
the early 1760s and to the Bourbon realization that it was necessary to beat the
British at sea. It was clear from the Seven Years’ War that threatening Hanover
and Portugal was no substitute and that the Jacobite ploy was finished. It was
also clear that a powerful Britain would be in a position to take more Bourbon
colonies in any future conflict. It was far from clear that the next Anglo-
Bourbon war would arise from a revolution within the British empire and thus
find Britain vulnerable, or, indeed, that the following war would see Britain as
part of an unsuccessful coalition challenged by the dynamism of Revolutionary
France.
Instead, it was possible that in any resumed Anglo-Bourbon conflict the
British would retake the gains handed back in 1763 and continue by attacking
Louisiana and Latin America. In Britain, there was some concern about the
expansion of the British empire, especially on the grounds that it might lead to
a weakening of the state by introducing a weakening craving for luxury or by
emigration. George Bubb Dodington, a former Lord of the Treasury created
Lord Melcombe in 1761 who had influence with Bute, sent him a
memorandum that argued,
As to colonies, in general, it may be worth serious consideration whether

the trading part of the world is, or is not, large enough to employ every
branch of trade which you can furnish, in its most ample extent? If it is,
ought you to be over-fond of new settlements, unpeopled, or (which is
full as bad) peopled by savages, where you must furnish not only
manufacturers, but hands to prepare the returns for them; and lose more,
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possibly, by the diminution of your people, than you gain by the returns
of your merchandise?35
This, however, was not a view that prevailed in the midst of war and victory.
Most commentators were only too delighted to see evidence of Britain’s
strength and imperial expansion. The Monitor saw the fall of Martinique as a
mark of providential support.36
Given the shift in Britain’s global position, it is not surprising that British
public opinion did not look back on 1761 as a year of failure and mixed
opportunities. As a result, the problems created that year by Pitt’s attitude both
towards the Bourbons and to his relations with this ministerial colleagues were
not appreciated.
163
Chapter Nine
Defence, foreign policy and strategy
how misguided and erroneous a notion…which has crept into the minds
of our people, and only of later years…that Britain can, with safety to
herself, be wrapped up in her own natural and internal strength, however
great, or be detached from every other part of the world; and particularly
that she can, without hazard, lose or renounce all connections with the
continent.
—Anon., Occasional Reflections on the Importance of the War in America,
and the Reasonableness and Justice of supporting the King of Prussia
(London, 1758), p. 48
Foreign policy must be approached from a number of different angles, but one
of the most important in this period was that of the national defence. Indeed, a
stress on this point helps to overcome the somewhat artificial distinction
between peacetime diplomacy and wartime planning and action. Much
peacetime diplomacy was a preparation for, or, more commonly, against war,
while the exigencies and options of wartime planning arose in part from the
successes, commitments and failures of earlier diplomacy. Britain was at or
close to war for much of this period and her impact on the Continent was then
felt most forcefully. It was also then that Britain’s relations with her allies and
enemies had their greatest impact on British politics and public debate, on her
economy and society. Large numbers of men served in the armed forces, both
the army and the navy. Many were sent abroad, but those who remained at
home, both regulars and others specially mustered, such as the militia, still
faced the threat of action. Large sums were raised in taxation, but war and
military preparations still had to be financed largely on credit. It was directly as
a result of war that the national debt rose from £50 million in 1720 to £76
million in 1748 and £133 million in 1763. This debt, and other related
financial problems, overhung the political system and played a major role in a
government policy in peacetime.
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DEFENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGY
War then had its consequences everywhere: they did not cease with the end
of hostilities. From the price of every taxed good to the sight of crippled ex-
soldiers seeking alms, the after-effects of conflict pressed home throughout the
country. Crime rates rose as disbanded soldiers and sailors were cast adrift with
few resources.1 In wartime the impact was also universal: fewer farm hands for
the harvest; an interruption of coastal trade bringing less coal to London; the
anxiety for those who served that it too often overlooked in a society
mistakenly defined as habituated to pain, loss and suffering.
And yet the costs of war did not prevent Britain from engaging in conflict,
nor did they stop some politicians from urging a resort to hostilities.
Sometimes the politicians were out of favour and seeking an opportunity to
embarrass the government for essentially domestic reasons. This was an
important element in pressure for war with Spain in 1739 and with France in
1754. At other times, such pressure arose essentially from within the ministry
and in general reflected international rather than domestic concerns. This was
true of the decision to fight France in 1744. There was no ideological aversion
from war in the British political system: it was always an option. In considering
conflict, British ministers tended, however, to see it largely in defensive and
reactive terms; indeed, both diplomacy and war were seen largely in terms of
the defence of national interests. This was a characteristic feature of British
policy after the Glorious Revolution, and marked an abrupt shift from the
more aggressive attitude that had characterized participation both in the three
Anglo-Dutch wars and in the Anglo-Spanish conflict of 1655–60.
In contrast, governments after 1688 saw themselves as essentially concerned
to defend national interests, not least as represented by the maintenance of
current international boundaries, rather than as required to act in any
aggressive manner to that end. This stress on a reactive position was epitomized
in the treaties Britain signed. In peacetime, they were invariably defensive, not
offensive. Governments did not only think and negotiate in a defensive
framework; they also presented themselves in that light. For British policy to
be defensible, politically moral, it had to be defensive. That was the theme of
innumerable ministerial speakers in Parliament. It was also the theme of pro-
government writing, such as the pamphlets produced to defend a peaceful
settlement to Anglo-Spanish differences in 1738–9, or Samuel Johnson’s
Thoughts on the Late Transactions respecting Falkland’s Islands (1771).
Appeals to the national past presented England/Britain not as pacific but as
responding to foreign threats. Thus Elizabeth I, a heroine of the
eighteenthcentury press, was seen as a robust assertor of national interests and
defender of Protestantism against Philip II. Her war with Spain was held up to
the Commons as a model by Pulteney in his speech in the debate on the
Address on 15 November (os) 1739.
The press tended to offer an account in which defence rested on self-
reliance, not alliances. This self-reliance was generally seen to centre on naval
power, but there was also support for a militia, for the people under arms,
165
rather than a regular army under the control of the government. The Daily Post
of 16 August (os) 1745 asked
When Charles the Great of France [Charlemagne] had conquered the

greatest part of Italy and made himself master of all Germany, what
notions had the people of England of the balance of Europe? They
undoubtedly thought themselves safe enough; everybody fit to bear arms
was a soldier; and so they did not dream of making alliances with either
the Greek Emperor, or the Saracens, to pull down the Emperor of the
West, lest he should, for want of other employment, pay this island a visit.
This defensive mentality was not restricted to British policy towards the affairs
of the Continent; it also characterized trans-oceanic relations with European
powers. Thus, of her wars with Spain, the world’s leading colonial power, that
of 1718–20 arose from the apparent need to resist Philip V’s aggressive schemes
in Italy, that of 1739–48 from pressure for action against Spanish restrictions on
British trade in the Caribbean, and those of 1762–3 and 1779–83 in response
to a decision by Charles III to support his principal foreign ally, France, which
was at war already with Britain. In 1770 and 1790 Britain and Spain nearly
went to war, in each case as a result of British anger about what appeared to be
an act of aggression: the Spanish seizure, first, of Port Egmont, the British
settlement on the Falkland Islands, and later of British merchantmen in Nootka
Sound on Vancouver Island. Similarly, the conflict with France that broke out
in 1754 and broadened into the Anglo-French aspect of the Seven Years’ War
arose from British concern that her North American colonies would be
restricted to the Atlantic littoral by French attempts to link their colonial bases
in Canada and Louisiana.
Any presentation of policy as defensive faces the criticisms, first, that all
powers adopt that approach in order to put the best gloss possible on their
policies and, secondly, that British policy, both in peace and in war, was not
seen in that light by many contemporary commentators. There is considerable
force in the for mer argument, not least because such presentation was
necessary in order to activate the defensive clauses of one’s own treaties and
prevent opponents from doing the same. The need for a defensive presentation
of foreign policy was readily apparent in states, such as Britain, Sweden and the
United Provinces, where the constitutional need to explain foreign policy in a
representative institution provided opportunities for domestic criticism.
The second point reflects both the extent to which there was an active
public debate over international relations, in which the actions and apparent
intentions of all participants were scrutinized and judged harshly, and the
alleged specific characteristics of British policy. She was attacked for seeking
maritime and commercial dominance, for extolling the balance of power on
the Continent of Europe, whilst destroying it on the oceans of the world. In
1749 the Spanish government objected to British plans for an expedition to
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the Pacific and the establishment of a base on the Falkland Islands. French
envoys in Spain argued that the British intended to attack the French colonies
first and then to move on against those of Spain, and therefore that the
Spaniards should help preserve the French empire as “their barrier”.2
The notion of a maritime balance was not new. Indeed, the Citizen, which
had as a subtitle “The Weekly Conversation of a Society of London Merchants
on Trade, and other Public Affairs”, in its issue of 9 February (os) 1739 warned
that “The just balance of power amongst the European nations might as
eventually be broken and destroyed, by an unjust and partial monopoly of the
medium of commerce, as by any particular state engrossing to itself too large an
extent of dominion, and other branches of power.” This was intended as a
warning against France, as earlier in the seventeenth century such comments
had been directed against the Dutch, but in the eighteenth century it appeared
most appropriate to direct such remarks against the British.
This criticism became of greater weight in the mid-eighteenth century.
The force of the argument owed much to anger about the British treatment
of neutral trade during her wars. It also reflected two mid-century shifts in
an international system that was far from constant, and that it is very
misleading to treat as such. First, Britain’s crushing defeats of French naval
power in 1747 and 1759 and her capture of most of the bases of the French
and two of the leading bases of the Spanish overseas empires in 1758–62
seemed indeed to destroy any sense of a maritime balance and thus to justify
criticism of the British position. French trans-oceanic trade suffered greatly.
The French Company of the Indies had a major loss of assets as its ships and
commercial installations were destroyed, incurred a heavy debt and collapsed
in 1769. It was in no position to compete with the British East India
Company.
Secondly, there was a shift both in France’s position in the European system
and in her foreign policy, one in which she came to play a smaller and less
assertive and aggressive role. As a result, the French challenge that had helped
to lead other powers, most obviously the Dutch and Austria, to look to
Britain for support, ceased to figure in international relations, other than for
Britain.
In addition, although individual British moves might arise in response to
hostile acts by others, as in 1754, 1770 and 1790, British policy can be seen as
aggressive from two points of view. First, the actual response was bellicose,
reflecting a clear determination to get her way by intimidation, if not force.
Second, there was a more ambiguous sense that the expanding nature of British
trade and settlement, the dynamic character of her empire, were themselves
aggressive in a world of competing empires and a close mercantilist
relationship between territory and trade. Thus, British interests with a degree
of governmental support pressed to open the Spanish empire to trade, legal or
illicit, helping to lead to war in 1739, sought to open both the trans-
Appalachian hinterland of North America and unsettled parts of Spanish
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America to trade and settlement, helping to lead to war in 1754 and nearly to
conflict in 1770 and 1790, and sought to make the Pacific an ocean open for
opportunity, not closed to all bar Spain.
These varying impressions complicated and at times confused the response
of contemporaries, who were anyway affected by the partisan pressures of
specific domestic and international debates. In hindsight, the theme of
aggression may appear apparent in a period in which more of the world
came to be ruled by Britain. In 1688 the British empire was comparatively
modest. Aside from a few possessions in Sumatra, India, West Africa and the
Caribbean, and the island bases that naval power helped to secure, such as
Bermuda, the Bahamas and St Helena, the empire was essentially restricted to
North America: barren wastes round Hudson’s Bay, and a thin strip along the
eastern seaboard. This inheritance was to grow by conquest and settlement.
The most dramatic growth was in North America. Georgia (1732) was
founded, the frontier of settlement pushed often far from the coast, and new
towns included Baltimore (1729), Richmond (1733) and Savannah (1733).
The claims of the Hudson’s Bay Company were recognized by the Peace of
Utrecht of 1713, as was British possession of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.
The Seven Years’ War (1756–63) and the subsequent Peace of Paris (1763)
added Canada and Louisiana east of the Mississippi, both from France, and
Flor ida from Spain. Br itain had clearly supplanted France as a North
American power, was best poised to profit from difficulties in the apparently
weak Spanish American empire, and now shared with Russia and Spain the
position of a major power on the frontier between European and non-
European societies.
Thanks to her mid—century gains, Britain became clearly the strongest of
the European maritime and colonial powers. Only thus was she able to resist
Napoleonic France. In the long-term, it was this feature of Britain’s
international history that was most distinctive and important. Aside from the
myriad consequences for British society, economy and public culture of this
colonial and maritime success, the impact of empire as a proof of providential
favour and a pointer to mission and purpose, themes that can readily be
sketched out throughout the following centur y, there were also the
consequences for the Continent. What has been recently ter med the
Napoleonic integration of Europe 3 failed in large part due to British
opposition. The political, cultural and social consequences were crucial: the
distinctive feature of European society was its division among a number of
competing states, and this was to remain the case as industrialization,
urbanization, mass literacy and mass politics spread.
If this opposition to Napoleon was the most important contribution that
pre-Reform Britain made to European history, it is all too easy to see it and
her related imperial strength as the obvious theme of the previous century, an
end planned and pursued. Such an interpretation is misleading, but it is
appropriate in one respect to stress the long-term consequences of the wars
168
being discussed. By indicating their central importance, both for Britain and
for Europe, it is easier to understand why foreign policy and war were so
important to the politicians and political nation of the period, and why it is so
misleading to marginalize them or to treat them essentially as an aspect of
apparently more significant autonomous developments, such as economic
growth.
Instead of focusing on maritime and colonial growth leading to an imperial
struggle with France that was to culminate in a major role in the defeat of the
first serious modern attempt to conquer, or unify, depending on one’s
viewpoint, Europe, it is possible to adopt a different perspective on British
foreign policy. This analysis is centred more obviously on fear and defence, and
on short-term responses to particular crises that in sum suggest a far weaker
state, less clear in its objectives and less abstracted from shifts in European
power politics than the former interpretation implies.
The need to defend what successive governments defined as vital national
interests arose from two related problems. The first was the recovery of French
power under Louis XIV after just over a century (1559–1661) of domestic
division and international weakness. By 1688 Louis XIV had the largest army
seen in western Europe since the days of Imperial Rome. He had also
developed the strongest navy hitherto seen by France, a navy supported by
good logistical and manning systems. France, the most populous state in
western Europe, was now reasonably united and her government relatively
prosperous. Foreign rulers sought the patronage and pay of Louis.
This recovery, which was maintained under Louis XV, was made more
threatening for Britain by the direction of French interest. Whereas Louis
XIV’s predecessors had concentrated on seeking Italian gains in 1494–1559,
Louis XIV was more interested in the Low Countries. He wanted to dominate,
though not acquire, the United Provinces (modern Netherlands), while the
Spanish Netherlands (Belgium and Luxembourg, though with important
differences) were seen as a likely acquisition, either from territorial gains as a
result of war, or as a consequence of the French claim on the Spanish
succession on the death of the childless Carlos II. The French threat was not an
idle one. The potential reach of French forces had been shown by the invasion
of the United Provinces in 1672, French forces advancing to seize Utrecht and
to threaten Holland.
This challenge, or variations thereon, was to remain a major problem for
Br itish foreign policy throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. It played a major role in causing war between the two powers in
1702 and 1793. The British were to devote much effort in both peace and
war to thwarting France. Spain’s inability to defend the Netherlands led the
British to support their acquisition by Charles VI, the ruler of Austria, at the
Peace of Utrecht. The vulnerability of the region led Britain to support the
Bar rier, the Dutch-garrisoned fortresses near the French frontier. The
protection of the Austrian Netherlands was seen by the British as the central
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task of the “Old Alliance”, the new defensive system of Britain, Austria and
the Dutch, created in 1689 and lasting, though with some very bumpy
passages, until 1756.
And yet the region continued vulnerable. French forces advanced into it
during the Nine Years’ War (1689–97), occupied it at the beginning of the War
of the Spanish Succession, and in 1745–7 overran the Austrian Netherlands.
Indeed the last conflict amply demonstrated the vulnerability of the Austrian
Netherlands, and yet also its importance to Britain, for from there invasion of
both Britain and Britain’s crucial Dutch ally could be threatened. In the
summer of 1745 Marshal Saxe took Ghent, Bruges and Ostend with little
difficulty. The following year Brussels, Antwerp, Mons and Namur followed. Far
from being inconclusive, as often presented, ancien régime warfare was delivering
decisive military victory to the French. In 1747 they invaded the United
Provinces, storming her principal fortress, Bergen—op—Zoom. Maastricht fell
the following year. Richard Rolt, a contemporary historian of the conflict,
claimed in 1750 that France “could only promise Great Br itain what
Polythemus did to Ulysses, ‘To be the last devoured’”.
French forces were not to mount a comparable challenge in the Low
Countries until November 1792, although then, following their victory at
Jemappes, the Austrian Netherlands fell even faster. French success in 1745–8,
however, served both to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Low Countries
and to focus attention on the deficiencies of the interventionist theme that had
characterized Br itish policy towards the Continent since the Glorious
Revolution. In the short term this led to major British efforts to strengthen the
Barrier after the War of the Austrian Succession. To the British, this was a
crucial aspect of the “Old System”. Sandwich and Robinson claimed in 1748
that “the possession of the Low Countr ies by the House of Austr ia
conformable to the Barrier Treaty, is so absolutely connected with the
necessary dependence of the Maritime Powers, and of that family upon one
another”.4 Unfortunately, the Austrians were disenchanted with their position
in the Austrian Netherlands, angry with being asked to accept a strategic
situation that essentially favoured others, while unable to enjoy the economic
benefits that they felt they deserved. Tripartite negotiations over the Austrian
Netherlands, involving Austria, Britain and the Dutch, were to play a large role
in post–1748 diplomacy. They centred on trade5 and defence, specifically the
state of the Bar rier fortifications, to the upkeep of which the Br itish
government did not wish to contribute.6 It is easy to overlook the negotiations
in a period when histor ians search for intimations of the Diplomatic
Revolution, because they did not lead to anything major, but, instead, they
played a role in the continuing process of frustration and tension that marked
relations within the ‘Old System’.
Concern about the Austrian Netherlands also led in 1755, when war with
France seemed imminent, to major attempts to secure the defence of the Low
Countries. The failure of these attempts played a major role in the shift in
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British alignments that year towards first Russia and then Prussia, a shift that
was an important part of the so-called Diplomatic Revolution of 1756.
In the long term, French successes in 1745–8 exposed the limitations of the
entire thrust of British policy since the Glorious Revolution: the interlinked
creation of a European collective security system in which Britain played a
major role, and a definition of British national interests that include first the
somewhat nebulous preservation of the balance of power in Europe and,
secondly, as an epitome of this, the exclusion of France from the Low
Countries.
Paradoxically, France was to be excluded from the Low Countries not by
Britain, but by a diplomatic development that was not welcomed by British
ministers and politicians: the Astro-French “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756.
This neutralized French expansionism in French, Germany and northern Italy.
Indeed, it was a precondition of British colonial gains, for a vulnerable Austrian
Netherlands would otherwise have offered the French gains that could have
been exchanged for British colonial conquests, as in 1748. This underlined the
role of contingency and indeed served to prefigure a second chance event in
European international relations that facilitated the growth of British power:
the failure of Napoleon and his continental opponents to agree terms in 1813
or early 1814.7 In late 1757, at a moment of crisis in the Seven Years’ War,
Mitchell reported from Prussia, “If the Empress of Russia should die, I hope
not a moment will be lost to improve an event that may still save the whole.
How melancholy it is to think that the fate of Europe should depend upon
such accidents!”8
The mid-century defination of British interests and of the agenda for
British policy was not abstracted from the bitterly partisan nature of British
politics and public debate. Any association of specific views with particular
political groupings invites qualification, understandably so in light of the
amorphous nature of political parties and the shifts in international relations.
Nevertheless, especially after the exclusion of Tories from office and thus the
responsibility of power in 1714, it is reasonable to discern a basic distinction
between an interventionism associated with Whigs and a more circumscribed
sense of national interests held by the Tories. The latter was in part cause and
consequence of both Tory reluctance to see Britain take an active role in
continental affairs and their scepticism about the chances of a successful
resolution of international problems.9
The collapsing of Whig/Tory political distinctions that was particularly
associated with George III began earlier. The Jacobite strain in Toryism, which
had done much to sustain Whig/Tory distinctions and divisions, collapsed. A
British pamphlet of 1756 addressed to Louis XV claimed that
The race of your old friends, whom you used to know by the name of
Tories, is extinct and lost. If a love of liberty, zeal for the commerce and
glory of Britain, and for that basis of it, the Protestant succession in the
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illustrious House of Hanover, are criterions of Whiggism; we are a nation

of Whigs.
The decline in Whig/Tory distinctions was linked to shifts in attitudes towards

national interests and foreign policy. In 1748, Viscount Tyrconnel, a prominent
Lincolnshire landowner and long-serving Whig who had both supported and
opposed the government as an MP in 1729–41, observed that “if a nation can
ever learn wisdom by past sufferings, we shall never more enter into a
consuming land war, we shall leave the balance of power upon the continent,
and the liberties of Europe, a couple of cant words”. Cr iticism of
interventionism and support for “blue water” policies within ministerial
circles, for example, by the 4th Duke of Bedford, Secretary of State for the
Southern Department 1748–51, was picked up by foreign envoys.10
In 1757 Cumberland complained, “I am very fully convinced that the Tory
doctrine of a sea-war, which we are following, will be repeated by our
childrens’ children.”11 He had opposed Pitt’s rise to power. Support for a “sea
war” reflected not simply a view on strategy,12 but also a sense of identity and
interest. The sea was “our proper element”, according to an article in Old
England of 1 June (os) 1751 attacking the conduct of the recent war.
The shift in political attitudes reflected in part the impact, both on
government and more generally, of Tory views via the intermediary of
opposition Whig politicians and journalists. Many of the politicians entered
government in the 1740s and 1750s. George Grenville, an influential supporter
of disengagement from war on the Continent, was an opposition Whig who
had gained office at the end of 1744. Newcastle resignedly wrote in April
1762, “let Mr. Grenville carry on his mar itime war as he pleases”. 13
Furthermore, there was a prudential as well as a polemical dimension to this
shift. Continental interventionism had not worked. It had not won the War of
the Austr ian Succession, nor fulfilled the expectations of the Br itish
government during the subsequent peace. The alternative appeared more
promising, and not solely to British commentators. Bussy, who had a long
experience of British politics, reported in 1751 that a “blue water” policy
would be favourable precisely because Britain would not need to concert
operations with allies.14
The terms of the domestic political debate and the constitutional and
institutional limitations and problems created by the role of Parliament were
dynamic features in the formation of British foreign policy, not abstracted from
it and acting simply as negative constraints on an otherwise clear set of
objectives and priorities. In their own way, they increased the sense of threat
and danger referred to already. A paranoid sensibility has been discerned in
Anglo-American culture in the second half of the eighteenth century, and,
without being fanciful, it can be extended throughout the whole period. It
drew on both international and domestic sources, and its most potent impact
was in contributing to the anxiety that was characteristic of the discussion of
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foreign policy in the period. There was frequent emphasis on a threat from
France. “Camber” referred to the “encroaching ambition” of the French when
warning of their moves in the West Indies in the London Evening Post of 27 May
(os) 1749. He warned of the possible loss of the sugar trade and also drew
attention to the threat to the Newfoundland fishery posed by the French
recovery of Cape Breton. Later that summer, Bedford responded to news of
Spanish warships searching British merchantmen in the Caribbean off Nevis by
writing to Keene, “You know how extremely jealous this nation is of the least
encroachments of this nature…the least spark of this sort must, if not timely
prevented, kindle a flame.” Pressing for efforts to separate Spain from France,
Old England claimed on 21 December (os) 1751 that “the exorbitant power of
the House of Bourbon is a subject worn…threadbare by my indefatigable
brethren of the quill”. Such an emphasis could also serve domestic political
purposes by creating the impression that the government was failing to respond
and was thus part of the threat.15
Widespread paranoia owed much to tension over the second set of vital
national interests and related problems. In addition to concern over the
situation on the Continent already referred to, a separate issue was posed by
the British question, the struggle over who was to rule Britain and what the
relation between the constituent parts of the British Isles was to be. This
question brought a measure of unity to the per iod from the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 to the effective crushing of Jacobitism as an indigenous
military option at the battle of Culloden in 1746 and in the subsequent
“pacification” of the Scottish Highlands. After that, concern about Jacobitism
markedly lessened, in part also thanks to the coming of peace in 1748.
Nevertheless, the government maintained its surveillance, and Frederick II’s
interest in supporting Jacobitism gave rise to particular concern. Newcastle
commented in 1753, “As it is possible that some encouragement may be given
to the Jacobites from thence, care is taken to have all the coast of Scotland
watched and well guarded.”16
Thus, it is possible to present British strategic thinking and foreign policy in
the period 1739–63 from an essentially defensive viewpoint, certainly until
after the defeat of the French Brest fleet at Quiberon Bay in 1759. In 1756
Newcastle was concer ned about the possibility and consequences of
cooperation at sea between the two Bourbon powers. Indeed his question,
“Where would have been our superiority at sea?” was justified. In 1746–55
France and Spain launched warships with a total displacement of around a
quarter million tons while Britain only launched about 90,000 tons. Naval
power was more than a matter of numbers of warships, but, on that head,
Britain had lost her clear superiority. To that extent, critics of the government’s
concentration on continental affairs were justified.17
That the period was one of growing imperial power does not detract from
this viewpoint, and to concentrate on this strength and power would be to
misunderstand the perspective and anxieties of contemporar ies, both
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politicians and commentators. It was not clear to foreign commentators that

Britain could afford another war. Doubts about the stability of her finances
were voiced by Mirepoix and Frederick II. 18 Furthermore, there was anxiety
within Britain about French plans and activities outside Europe, especially in
North America and India. In 1752 the British government was concerned
about French expansion at Britain’s expense in West Africa. Newcastle wrote
from Hanover that George II “extremely approves the directions for fitting
out, with the greatest expedition, a stronger squadron for the coast of Africa,
than the French will have there. In the present circumstances, there is no
other certain way of doing with them, but by being stronger where we
can”.19
174
Chapter Ten
Conclusion: Europe or America?
I have had the honour of first pointing out to the public a deception,
which had generally prevailed over the kingdom…your Lordship, upon
the present happy change [said] that I now saw the fruits of my work.
Israel Mauduit, author of the isolationist Considerations
on the present German war (1760) to Bute, December 1762
America was the choice made in 1762–3. The Bute ministry negotiated the
Peace of Paris, its gains including Canada, from France, and Florida, from
Spain. It also abandoned the Prussian alliance, making little effort to keep
relations cordial with Frederick the Great.1 George III was closely identified
with a specific “Patriotic” agenda, the rejection of his grandfather’s tradition
of intervention in German affairs for Hanoverian ends and, more generally, a
wish to limit Britain’s commitments to European allies.
The break with this tradition was dramatized by the controversy over the
Peace and, in particular, the rejection of the Prussian alliance. Pitt and his
supporters, now in opposition, defended the alliance in Parliament and the
press. On 9 December 1761 Pitt refuted criticism of his subsidy treaties and
“justified the German war, both as Hanover had been invaded on our account,
and as a diversion—spoke of the burden it was to France…justified his phrase
about Hanover’s being a millstone round our necks, that it was now so round
that of France—gave the highest encomiums of the King of Prussia and Duke
Ferdinand”.2
The following May, when the vote of credit for the war was debated, Pitt
insisted that Britain could and should continue financing her German war at
the same time as she continued to fight elsewhere. He pressed for the
maintenance of good relations with Prussia and claimed that “Continental
measures had been practised by all our great princes”.3 Yet, no longer in office,
Pitt was routinely in the minority. As in 1713, peace was popular and support
for allies limited. War-weariness and the greater popularity of “blue-water”
175
policies had sapped public support for the British commitment to Prussia.
Pitt’s intransigence and the obvious preferences of George III reduced support
within political circles, and in so far as the cause of allies commanded
favourable attention it was that of Portugal, threatened by Spain, rather than
Prussia.
The reassessment of the Prussian alliance was linked to renewed criticism of
Hanover. Having served to distract attention from Hanover and to limit
antagonism towards continental engagements, the disintegration of the alliance
was linked with both. However, in obvious contrast to earlier periods of
marked hostility towards continental commitments, in 1762 Hanover played
only a relatively minor role and the king was not criticized. The move to
restrict British commitments and to limit policy to recognizably British goals
came from the monarch. Bute emphasized the role of George III and the
continuation between criticism of continental interventionism during the
successful last years of George II’s reign and the policy of the new government.
In April 1762 he sent Mitchell, still envoy in Berlin, a letter stressing the
financial costs of interventionism, a topic on which he had taken care to
inform himself carefully,
There were not in the late reign wanting many worthy men, who though
unable to stop the torrent, saw with great anxiety the vitals of this
country daily exhausting; without the least prospect of putting an end to
a war that however proper under certain limitation became frightful
when carried to the annual expense of 20 millions, and that part of it
alone regarding Ger many above 8, a sum almost incredible when
compared to the utmost laid out in any one year of Queen Anne or King
William’s wars; the King on mounting the throne beheld with the
utmost horror the situation he was to act in.
Bedford complained in the Lords that Frederick II was paid “for fighting his
own battles against our natural allies”.4
Financial concerns were not new. Indeed, 13 years earlier, Newcastle had
linked political reluctance to taxation with the problems facing his foreign
policy when he told the Sardinian envoy that he was completely discouraged
by the obstacles he encountered not from the opposition in Parliament, where
the government had a massive majority, but within the majority itself, “because
most of them only think of making themselves popular, and to that end only
seek the means to cut taxes”.5 Such an attitude hindered, but did not prevent,
Newcastle’s efforts to grant peacetime foreign subsidies; by 1762 hostility to
expenditure, specifically foreign subsidies, in both war and peace, had greater
public voice and had become government policy. This shift was part of a
process in which cost became more central to the public discussion of foreign
policy. In 1746 Trevor had expressed his concern: “What will, I fear render this
land war unpopular in England, and consequently impracticable, is our allies
176
CONCLUSION: EUROPE OR AMERICA?
presumption upon our opulence; and expecting to be paid and prayed for
fighting their own quarrels.” In the event, this had not proved crucial in the
public debate in the latter stages of that war, but the situation was to be
different towards the close of the Seven Years’ War. Sir William Irby, who had
stood down as an MP and was about to be created Lord Boston, wrote to
another MP in March 1761 that “our expences to carry on the war are beyond
conception, millions after millions must and will be raised …it is difficult to
know how we shall be able to carry on the war much longer or how to make
a safe and honorable peace”.6
The Briton, a weekly newspaper established by Bute, admitted in July 1762
that there was a danger of Hanover being invaded if Britain refused to assist
Prussia, but added
it is the duty, the interest of the Germanic body to see justice done to
any of its constituent members that shall be oppressed: but should they
neglect their duty and interest on such an occasion, I hope the elector of
H.....r will never again have influence enough with the K?g of G…t
B…?n, to engage him in a war for retrieving it, that shall cost his
kingdom annually, for a series of years, more than double the value of the
country in dispute.
The paper calculated the annual cost of the “herculean task” of the defence of
Hanover as £6 million. The previous month, the paper had condemned the
Monitor for using the “old hackneyed expressions of the balance of power, the
Protestant religion, and the liberties of Europe”. Such criticism indicated the
paradigm shift in attitudes towards foreign policy.7
At the same time as George III and the government sought to disentangle
themselves from the “German war”, they were willing to consider a revival of
the search for allies. This was not intended to repeat the subsidy-offering
diplomacy of Newcastle, but the major powers whose alliance was sought were
the same: Austria and Russia. An alliance with Austria offered the prospect of
Austrian attacks on Spanish interests in Italy. The Earl of Buckinghamshire was
appointed envoy to Russia, Viscount Stormont to Vienna and Steinberg, who
had represented Hanover at Vienna before the war, resumed his mission. These
approaches were in part a reaction to the end of the Anglo-Prussian alliance,
and a natural response to the sense of reopened diplomatic possibilities that the
prospect of every peace brought in this period.8
There was, however, no comparable attempt to use British diplomatic assistance
to support Hanoverian interests in north-west Germany. There, the death on 7
February 1761 of the Wittelsbach pluralist Clement-Auguste, Archbishop-Elector
of Cologne and Prince-Bishop of Hildesheim, Münster, Osnabrück and
Paderborn had produced a tremendous opportunity not only for ecclesiastical
place-seekers and the advocates of secularization, but also for those who wished to
enhance their influence in this region. However, George III made little attempt to
177
intervene in the elections, in marked contrast to the position in the 1720s when
they had last been conducted. Furthermore, despite reports of plans in 1761 and
1764, George did not visit Hanover. As a result, his British ministers also did not
go there and Hanover ceased to be the episodic focus of British foreign policy.
The possible importance of royal visits was indicated by the role of Frederick,
Duke of York and Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück, George III’s second son, who
went to Hanover in the 1780s and then helped to improve relations with
Frederick II. Moreover, the suggestion in September 1762 of the Hanoverian
minister Baron Behr that a German league of at least the leading Electors be
formed so that the participants were not always at risk of being invaded on the
slightest pretext9 was not followed up.
Ironically, Pitt, a politician who had made his name by attacking Hanoverian
commitments, was in turn strongly criticized from 1761 for his support for
continental measures.10 This was not simply a matter of those in office being
castigated by opponents, as was indeed in part the case with Pitt when troops
were sent to Germany in 1758. Instead, Pitt was being criticized by the
government and its supporters in Parliament and the press. Furthermore, this
criticism aroused little response. Pitt’s supporters preferred to focus on the
return of captured territories, such as Martinique and Guadeloupe, to the
Bourbons, rather than on the breakdown of Continental measures.
There had been a major shift in both attitude and policy. The shift in policy
was an aspect of the sea-change in politics that followed George III’s accession
in 1760. There was a sea-change in generations: the political leaders of the
1760s, such as George III, Bute and Grafton, were not men who looked back
to, or indeed remembered, the crises and anxieties of the 1710s and 1720s, as
George II and Newcastle had done. To the new generation the succession was
not and had not been in danger. Factious opposition and party rule were seen
as threats, not Jacobitism.
This had a direct consequence in the field of foreign policy. There was no
longer any question of a Bourbon-supported Jacobite invasion or rising, and
thus no need to win foreign support to thwart it. Equally, the ghost of Louis
XIV had been laid. France no longer appeared a great threat in Europe,
although Newcastle conjured her up as such when, in January 1762, he
emphasized the continued importance of the British commitment to the
Continent:
the recalling our troops from Germany and abandoning the continent
entirely would now render the House of Bourbon absolute master of all
Europe, enable them to oblige every neutral power to submit… We
should be reduced to that miserable condition of defending ourselves at
home…excluded from all commerce abroad, and all connection with the
other powers of Europe.
This view was dated, and Newcastle complained of being ignored by Bute.11 It
178
reflected geopolitical assumptions rendered anachronistic by the crushing of

Jacobitism, the defeat of the French navy and the growth in British amphibious
capability, and exaggerated the threat from France. She had emerged from the
War of the Austrian Succession without any gains or an alliance system that
served aggressive purposes, and was to do the same after the Seven Years’ War.
The prestige of French armies, high after the victories of 1746–7 (which had
compensated for earlier defeats in the War of the Spanish Succession), had been
shattered by Frederick the Great at Rossbach in 1757 and further damaged by
the British at Minden in 1759.
France now seemed a lesser power, and the rising states of central and
eastern Europe did not appear a significant threat to British interests. In 1791,
in the Ochakov Crisis, Britain was to come close to war with Russia in an
attempt to force her to return gains from the Turks. There was no hint of any
such development three decades earlier. Europe no longer seemed a threat in
the early 1760s, certainly no longer a threat to Britain.
Yet this was more than simply an exercise in calculation and realpolitik.
There had also been an important shift in emphasis. Interest in the notion of a
balance and of a British-led and sustained alliance system determined to
maintain such a balance or, better still, to preside over a reality and process of
collective security, had collapsed. Newcastle was certain there had been a major
change of policy. In August 1762 he told Lyttelton that his
difference of opinion with My Lord Bute did not singly depend upon
the peace; for that I should be equally zealous after the peace, for
establishing some plan of connection with, and support of the Continent;
that that was contrary to My Lord Bute’s opinion, and that of those he
consulted, and was directed by.
Hardwicke was more specific when he told Bute the previous month that
Newcastle and
his friends adhered to the two grand points, upon which the great
difference had broke out viz. the support of the German war and the
preserving of the connection with the King of Prussia, united as he is,
with the Emperor of Russia [Peter III]; and England’s availing itself of
both those powers in war and in peace.
However, in February 1763, Newcastle was more interested in a return to the

Grand Alliance with Austria and the Dutch. He had indeed taken soundings of
such a possibility in January 1762. The Austr ian response had been
unfavourable.
Though desirous of better relations with the major continental powers,
George III and his new ministry were not willing to bind Britain to extensive
diplomatic commitments. This was revealed clearly by the unwillingness to
179
accept Russian demands for support in Poland and against the Turks. The
Russian minister, Count Panin, told Buckinghamshire in September 1763 that
when England proposed to enter into an alliance with Russia, it must be

with a view of interesting herself in the affairs of the North, and, in that
case, the system of Europe could not be too comprehensive, for, unless
we secured Russia against the attacks of her neighbours, she would be
very little able, upon any emergency to assist us.
Buckinghamshire, however, made it clear that in his view Turkey, with

which Russia might go to war, had nothing to do with the affairs of
northern Europe. That December, Sandwich, now Secretary of State, wrote to
the Earl,
Your Excellency will continue the same language with respect to their
idea of receiving any pecuniary aid from Great Britain, which neither
the present situation of affairs in Europe, nor the state of a country, just at
the end of a bloody and most expensive war, nor the necessities of
alliance, given any room to expect or desire…nor does the situation of
his kingdoms require that the King should purchase or solicit an alliance,
in which the interests of Russia are at least as much connected as those of
Great Britain.
This emphasis on reciprocity represented a return to the governmental and

public language of the mid–1750s, but the context was now one of more
circumscribed and less active aspirations. A contributor to the Royal Magazine
stated that he knew “of no alliance we have for some time made, that has been
of any essential service to our nation”.12
Hardwicke warned of the danger that “having pursued too violent a system,
we should come to have no system at all”. Britain was perceived by foreign
diplomats as a state that did not wish to take an active role in continental
disputes.13 This view was fortified in 1763 by the British response to two issues
that were to cause greater concern and local conflict within a decade, the
future of Poland and of Corsica. Responding in July 1763 to the movement of
Russian troops into Lithuania, Kaunitz suggested that Austria, Britain and
France should co-operate in preventing Russia and Prussia from dominating
Poland, while the French envoy in London pressed Britain to take a stand.
Sandwich told the Russian envoy that the British government was opposed to
any partition of Poland, but it was clear that the government did not intend to
act. In southern Europe, Sardinian hopes that Britain would take a more
forceful role after the Seven Years’ War were also soon shown to be without
substance. The new Sardinian envoy, Count Marmora, pressed Sandwich on the
importance of keeping Corsica out of Bourbon hands, but Sandwich revealed a
lack of interest and Marmora suggested that the government was not really
180
concerned about foreign affairs. The government had already issued an order in
Council prohibiting contact with Corsican opponents of the island’s pro-
French ruler, the republic of Genoa.14
A British-led interventionist alliance system was not to return until William
Pitt the Younger negotiated a triple alliance system with Prussia and the
United Provinces in 1788. It collapsed in the Ochakov Crisis of 1791 at the
first challenge: Russian obduracy. Subsequent attempts to create a league
directed against first Revolutionary and then Napoleonic France failed in the
1790s and 1800s.
This shift in emphasis away from Europe was the other half of the process
more generally understood as a rise of interest in empire. It was in part a
matter of decades, traceable back to the anti-Spanish agitation of the late
1730s, but yet also the development of a brief period, the years 1754–61, a
parallel to Jonathan Clark’s emphasis on the importance of conjunctural shifts,
in his study of domestic high politics in 1754–7.15
Earlier in the century, there had been concern about Catholic leagues and,
more specifically, the alliance of powerful Catholic powers that threatened to
dominate the Continent, for example, the Alliance of Vienna in 1725–9 and the
Franco-Austrian alignment of the late 1730s. These fears were alert to the
circumstances of the time, for example, to the growth of Austrian power under
Charles VI, but they also looked back to a imaginative construction of a Europe
that was dominated or in danger of dominance by international Catholicism
and, more specifically from the 1660s, Bourbon France. Transoceanic expansion
by Britain was not antipathetical to this situation, but it was largely irrelevant
in imaginative terms, although the global commercial opportunities tapped by
such expansion were important to Britain’s ability to play a role in Europe,
significantly so from the 1700s. Indeed, the War of the Spanish Succession was
in part a case of Germany and the Low Countries won through the trade of
India.16
By the early 1760s Britain’s situation was seen very differently. The balance
of power ceased to play a prominent role in ministerial or public discussion of
foreign policy. Instead, now the crucial struggle was for maritime mastery, and
this mastery was central to both competing interests in North America, the
West Indies and the Indian Ocean, and trans-oceanic trade. By 1763 Britain
was the most powerful European state in the world. Between 1763 and 1793,
whether at peace or war, she struggled to retain and strengthen this position.
However, ministers were determined to retain the ability to define what
policies should be followed in order to obtain these goals and refused to yield
to jingoistic pressure for war. The British stance might appear aggressive,
especially to continental commentators who queried the existence of a
maritime balance of power and criticised wartime Britain’s policy towards
neutral traders, but there was no master plan to use naval power to drive the
other European powers from their empires. No British government sought
unprovoked war for the sake of seizing new ter r itor ies. Instead, the
181
preservation and defence of existing territories were the central concern of

government. In 1754–5 the government saw itself as responding to French
aggression in North America. In 1761 Bedford suggested to Bute that “we
have too much already, more than we know what to do with, and I very much
fear, that if we retain the greatest part of our conquests out of Europe we shall
be in danger of over-colonising and undoing ourselves by them, as the
Spaniards have done”.17
Nevertheless, although governments saw themselves as responding to
aggression, the sphere of interests they were supposed to protect had widened
greatly. This was true both geographically and in terms of public assumptions.
In late 1762 John Paterson claimed that
The general, almost universal, cry is that the great acquisitions we have
made, the flourishing condition of our trade, the spirit and experience of
our troops by sea and land, and the distresses of our enemies entitles us to
the most advantageous terms of peace; of which an exclusive right to the
Fisheries, as the great source of trade and maritime power, is almost
universally esteemed the most essential, and indeed the sine qua non.
Whatever falls short of this will most certainly occasion clamour.18
Despite such claims, France retained a right to fish off Newfoundland in the
Peace of Paris, and the terms were approved by Parliament. Yet, as more
generally with the heated debate whether Britain should retain her conquests
in Canada or the West Indies, it was the extension of the geography of concern
and claim that was most striking. In 1748 members of the government had
been interested in gaining Ostend, seeing it “as some satisfaction for the
cession of Cape Breton”, although this was not a view that enjoyed much
political, still less public, resonance. Indeed a French agent who spent the
winter of 1746–7 in Britain reported public pressure for attacks on French
colonies and commerce and widespread hostility to any return of Cape Breton.
This was not a view restricted to London. It was disseminated throughout the
country by the press.19 At the same period, as earlier in the century, there had
also been public concern about the state of Dunkirk,20 although far less than in
1730.
By the mid–1750s, North Amer ica increasingly excited interest and
concern. Britain was presented even more clearly as a maritime power, but its
maritime nature was seen as oceanic in concern and scope, not restricted to the
Narrow Seas. From mid-century maritime mastery was seen not only in
prudential terms, the support on which empire, security and trade rested, but
also as an imaginative imperative that had political consequences. Proposals
from Arthur Dobbs, Governor of North Carolina, sent to Bute by Dobbs’s
brother, provide one of the most powerful examples of this consciousness. They
are particularly interesting as they look ahead to nineteenth-century notions of
Britain’s global role. Instead of preserving liberties in Europe, Britain was to
182
spread liberty in the world, using her constitution as a model. Prior to taking
up his post in North Carolina in 1754, Dobbs had been an energetic Irish
landowner and parliamentarian concerned to improve the Irish economy and
discover a north-west passage to the Orient. In 1762 he offered a scheme for
the improvement of the New World under the aegis of Britain and to her
profit:
to publish manifestos in the Spanish tongue on landing…declaring the

Spanish colonies free states to be governed by laws framed by themselves
after the model of British liberty under the protection of Britain as a
perpetual ally with a free trade most favourable to Britain …to retain, as
cautionary pledges of the future friendship and fidelity of those colonies,
Vera—Cruz, Havana, Portobello and the isthmus of Darien, Carthagena,
Hispaniola and the other Spanish islands. Spanish Florida to be entirely
ceded to Britain…to send missionaries to civilize and Christianize the
natives where the Spaniards have no settlements and to form them into
regular polities under the direction of governors truly Christian and
educated for that purpose in Britain at the expense of the public.21
Naval and colonial victories brought more of the world within Britain’s real
and imaginative grasp. Greater interest was not restricted to mercantile and
political circles. The commemoration of Admiral Vernon’s success at Porto
Bello in 1739 and thereafter can be traced through society. In Durham, Dove
and Booth increased attendance at their “mathematical lectures” by promising
to exhibit fireworks in honour of Vernon’s birthday immediately afterwards.
Vernon ceramics constituted the most prolific output of commemorative
pieces since the beginning of the century. One of the inexpensive London
newspapers, the Penny London Post, devoted several issues in March 1749 to
printing Vernon’s speech on the encouragement of naval service. Maritime
mastery was increasingly seen as Britain’s destiny, part of the identity of both
state and people, a process to which the victories and campaigns of the Seven
Years’ War contributed greatly.22
Such a claim may seem overblown. The identity of Irish farm workers or
Scottish colliers, to say nothing of many others, may seem to have had little to
do with the actions of Hawke or Boscawen. In part, this is true, although, at the
material level, the movement of coal along the east coast of Britain and the
supply of Irish foodstuffs to the British military both depended on naval
hegemony. War affected the entire economy.23
The agricultural sector suffered when conflict with the Bourbons hit grain
exports, although it did so less in the 1740s than in previous conflicts. The Bath
Chronicle of 12 February 1761 printed an article from a “country gentleman”
pressing for peace, complaining about a lack of workers and stating that “corn
is sunk below what our farmers call a living price, for want of export”.24 The
issue had become controversial in early 1748 as pressure mounted for a ban on
183
exports. 25 They were attacked in some papers, for example, the General
Advertiser, and defended in others. The Jacobite’s Journal of 13 February (os) 1748
ascribed the rise in the price of wheat to exports, “to the great joy of the poor
farmers, whom some of their worthy countrymen wished to have deprived of
this providential benefit”. Soon after the end of the war, William Mildmay saw
British grain ships in Marseille.26 Supporting peace, the Briton of 3 July 1762
emphasized the fiscal strains of war and its detrimental impact on the labour
market, although, in general, shortages of labour were met by the hiring of
those previously unemployed. Other papers of the period, such as the London
Evening Post, stressed the burden of the war on the “landed interest”. More
generally, war exacerbated inflation, affected patterns of demands and created
strains in the commercial and financial systems. Trade was hit by foreign
privateers and the number of bankruptcies increased.
War also brought benefits. The needs of the army and navy led to
expenditure that stimulated demand across much of the economy, although it is
difficult to assess its extent and impact. In 1744 “all the ropers at Poole” were
making cordage for the navy,27 while the price of wool rose in response to
demand for uniforms.28 The imperial project, or at least projects, brought
economic expansion in such areas as the fur trade.29 Exports rose dramatically
during the later years of the Seven Years’ War.
More generally, the notion of identity, of Britain as a global state and
military power, reached out into the country through the press and through the
foreign goods spread in an increasingly consumerist society, especially tea,
coffee, sugar and cotton.30 If the notion did not encompass everyone, it did not
exist against, and in opposition to, another notion of Britain’s identity as part
of Europe, with cor responding political and military interests and
commitments. Instead, the notion faced a more local set of concerns and
interests and one that was not articulated at the national scale.
This shift in the conception of the national destiny was not understood by
Newcastle and only partly grasped by Pitt. George III’s views were in accord,
but that was largely due to his reaction to his grandfather and his Hanoverian
identity and commitments. Yet political leadership by Pitt in the mid–1750s
and by George III in the early 1760s did play a role. Their determination to
break with the systems they confronted was important. However, any single
explanation of what was a complex and multifaceted shift must be suspect. The
imaginative recreation of Britain as a global state with a maritime destiny
reflected an interaction of shifts in attitude and changes in political contexts
and policies. The failure of Newcastle’s European collective security system
project was crucial. That was also a failure not only of policy and of an
understanding of European international relations, but also of Europe as a
definition of British identity and interest.
184
Notes
Unless indicated, the place of publication for all books is London.
Chapter Two
1. Bolingbroke to Sir William Wyndham, 5 Jan. (os) 1736, Petworth House

Archives, 23, p. 46.
2. Weston to Thomas Robinson, envoy in Vienna, 2 July (os) 1748, BL, Add.
23829, f. 16.
3. Newcastle to Philip, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor, 25 Aug. (os)
1749, BL, Add. 35410, f. 127.
4. A recent brief introduction is provided by J.Black, Europe in the eighteenth
century, 1700–1789 (1990), 289–94. A longer chronological account, as well as
discussion of the mechanics of international relations and of their practice and
theory, can be found in Black, The rise of the European powers, 1679–1793
(1990), 66–118, 149–207. Important recent work includes R.Browning, The
War of the Austrian Succession (New York, 1993) and M.S.Anderson, The War of
the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748 (Harlow, 1995).
5. Finch to Robert Trevor, envoy at The Hague, 15 Nov. 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor
24.
6. J.Black, “Mid-eighteenth century conflict”, in The origins of war in early modern
Europe, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1987), 225–7.
7. W.Mediger, Moskaus Weg nach Europa: Der Aufstieg Russlands zum europäischen
Machstaat im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen (Brunswick, 1952).
8. Dickens to William, Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the Northern
Department, 4 Feb. 1741, PRO, SP, 90/49; Pol. Con., i, 91; H.Branig, Preussland
und Russland wahrend Des Ersten Slesischen Krieges (Berlin, 1930).
9. Wager to Trevor, 18 Oct. (os) 1741, Aylesbury, Trevor 29.
10. Villettes to Horace Mann, envoy in Florence, 25 Dec. 1741, PRO, SP, 105/
282, f. 29.
185
NOTES
11. J.Black, “The problems of the small state: Bavaria and Britain in the second
quarter of the eighteenth century”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 5–36;
Pol. Corr., IV, 312; Mitchell to Earl of Buckinghamshire, 2 Feb. 1763, Norwich,
Norfolk CRO. Hobart N.R.S. 21/22 74 xl.
12. S.Horowitz, Franco-Russian relations, 1740–1746, PhD thesis (New York
University, 1951), vi–vii.
13. R.Butler, Choiseul, vol. I (Oxford, 1980).
14. Grimberghen to Haslang, Bavarian envoy in London, 30 June 1742, Munich,
Bayr. London 379.
15. Newcastle to William, Duke of Cumberland, 22 Apr. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P.
21/314; H.L.A.Dunthorne, “Prince and republic: the House of Orange in
Dutch and Anglo—Dutch politics during the first half of the eighteenth
century”, in Essays in European history in honour of Ragnhild Hatton, J.Black and
K.W.Schweizer (eds) (Lennoxville, 1985), 28–32.
16. C.Baudi di Vesme, La pace di Aquisgran (Turin, 1969).
17. J.R.Danielson, Die nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746–51 (Helsingfors, 1888).
18. R.N.Middleton, French policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle,
1749–1753: a study of the pre-history of the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, PhD
thesis (Columbia, 1968).
19. H.M.Scott, “‘The True Principles of the Revolution’: the Duke of Newcastle
and the idea of the old system”, Knights errant and true Englishmen: British
foreign Policy, 1660–1800, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1989), 60–77.
20. Sandwich to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1747, BL, Add. 32810, f. 125.
21. D.B.Horn, “The origins of a proposed election of a King of the Romans”,
EHR 52, 361–70, 1927; R.Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the
Imperial Election Plan, 1749–54”, Journal of British Studies 7 (1967), 28–47.
22. Harrington to Philip, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, envoy at The Hague, 29 Jan. (os)
1745, PRO, SP 84/408, f. 124.
23. Newcastle to Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the
Southern Department, 26 July 1752, PRO, SP 36/119, f. 138–9.
24. Frederick, Mémoire sur les affaires de Pologne, Jan. 1753, AE, CP Prusse 171,
f. 112–13.
25. H.Schlitter (ed.), Correspondance secréte entre le Comte A.W.Kaunitz-Rietberg… et
le Baron Ignaz de Koch, sécretaire de I’impératrice Marie-Thérèse, 1750–1752 (Paris,
1899); J.Strieder, “Maria Theresia, Kaunitz und die österreichische Politik von
1748–1755”, Historische Vierteljahrsschrift 13 (1910), 494–504; W.J. McGill,
“The roots of policy: Kaunitz in Vienna and Versailles”, Journal of Modern
History 43, 1971; Joseph Yorke, envoy at The Hague, to Robert Keith, envoy at
Vienna, 13 June 1756, BL, Add. 35480, f. 194.
26. R.Browning, “The British orientation of Austrian foreign policy, 1749–1754”,
Central European History 1 (1968), 299–323.
27. Keith to Newcastle, 31 July 1753, PRO, SP 80/192.
28. Earlier scholarship can be approached through L.H.Gipson, Zones of
international friction: North America, south of the Great Lakes region, 1748–1754
(New York, 1939); G.F.G.Stanley, New France: the last phase, 1744–1760
(Toronto, 1968); W.J.Eccles, The Canadian frontier, 1534–1760, 2nd edn
(Albuquerque, 1983). For more recent work, R.White, The middle ground:
Indians, empires, and republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650–1815 (Cambridge,
186
NOTES
1991), 199–232; M.N.McConnell, A country between: the Upper Ohio valley and
its peoples, 1724– 1774 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1992), 61–120; C.J.Balesi, The time
of the French in the heart of North America, 1673–1818 (Chicago, 1991).
29. T.R.Clayton, “The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and the American
or igins of the Seven Years’ War”, Historical Journal 24 (1981), 571–603;
A.Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outre-mer. Koloniale Fragen in der
französischen Aussenpolitik, 1700–1763 (Stuttgart, 1988), 249–89.
30. Mirepoix, French envoy in London, to Rouillé, French foreign minister, 16
Jan., 10 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f 21–2, 116, 120; Perron, Sardinian envoy
in London, to Charles Emmanuel III, 23 Jan. 1755, AST, LM, Ing. 59.
31. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 2 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 15.
32. J.Aman, Une campagne navale meconnu à la veille de la Guerre de Sept Ans: l’escadre
de Brest en 1755 (Vincennes, 1986).
33. They are briefly mentioned in P.Vaucher (ed.), Recueil des instructions données
aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France…Angleterre (Paris, 1965), III, 366–7,
though there is more extensive archival mater ial, for example the
correspondence between Rouillé and Bonnac, the envoy in The Hague, in AN,
KK, 1401; AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 385–6, 391; anon, memorandum, AE, MD, Ang.
41, f. 28–43; Newcastle to William, 4th Duke of Devonshire, 2 Jan., Yorke to
Viscount Royston, 6 Jan., Fox to Rouillé, 13 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 7;
35364, f. 65–6; 34728, f. 40; Rouillé to Fox, 21 Dec., Yorke to Fox, 26 Dec.
1755. Fox to Devonshre, 7, 8 Jan., 9 Mar. 1756, council memorandum, 14 Jan.
1756, HP, Chatsworth transcripts; Pol. Corr., XI, 346–7, 356.
34. Yorke to Newcastle, 3 June, Yorke to Royston, 14 Nov. 1755, BL, Add. 35364,
f. 55, 32855, f. 312–13; A.C.Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven
Years War (1971), 31–44.
35. Holdernesse to Newcastle, 28 May, Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11, 18 July,
Keith to Holdernesse, 27 Aug. 1755, BL, Add. 32855, f. 236, 32857, f. 1, 162–
4, 35480, f 56.
36. Instructions for Hanbury-Williams, 11 Apr. 1755, PRO, SP 91/60.
37. C.Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool, A collection of all the treaties of peace, alliance and
commerce between Great Britain and other powers [3 volumes] (1785), iii, 30–6.
38. Holdernesse to Yorke, 22 June 1755, BL, Eg. 3446, f. 164.
39. As the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel is usually referred to from mid—
century.
40. Holdernesse to Newcastle, 1, 7 June 1755, BL, Eg. 3428, f 208–9; BL, Add.
32855, f. 375; Pol. Corr., XI, 286–7; Münchhausen to Newcastle, 24 Feb. 1756,
NSTA, Hanover 91v.
41. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11 July, Aug., Instructions for Holdernesse, 9 Aug.,
Holdernesse to Newcastle, 21 Nov. 1755, BL, Add. 32857, f. 5, 506, 32858, f.
150, 32861, f. 59.
42. J.C.Batzel, Austria and the first three Treaties of Versailles, 1755–1758, PhD thesis
(Brown University, 1974), 72; Aubeterre to Rouillé, 13 Aug., 30 Nov. 1755,
Rouillé to Aubeterre, 14 Sept., 17 Nov. 1755, AE, CP, Autriche 254, f. 254–7,
319, 279–81, 330.
43. L.Perey, Un petit neveu de Mazarin, 3rd edn (Paris, 1890), 36; Pol. Corr., xii, 73;
Bonnac to Rouillé, 6 Feb. 1756, AN, KK 1402, p. 174.
44. Batzel, Austria, 116–25; A.Schaefer, Geschichte des Siebenjährigen kriegs (Berlin,
187
NOTES
1874), i, 584–5; Due de Broglie, L’alliance Autrichienne (Paris, 1895), 338–43,

368–74.
45. Keith to Holdernesse, 16 May, Holdernesse to Keith, 23 Mar. 1756, PRO, SP
80/197, f. 42–3, 104–5.
46. H.Kaplan, Russia and the outbreak of the Seven Years War (Berkeley, 1968), 47–56.
47. Keith to Holdernesse, 7 June 1756, BL, Add. 35480, f. 181; Mitchell to
Holdernesse, 7 June 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June
1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 154–67; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 27 May, 9 July
1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Mitchell to Hanbury-Williams, 3 June, 6 July 1756, BL,
Add. 6804, f. 24, Newport, Hanbury-Williams papers.
48. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 22, 23, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to
Mitchell, 13 July, 6, 10, 20 Aug. 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to
Mitchell, 13, 27 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65, BL, Add. 6832, f. 80.
49. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.
50. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13 July, 6, 10, 20 Aug. 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.
51. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13, 27 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65, BL, Add. 6832,
f. 80.
53. Comte de Garden, Histoire generate des traités de Paix (Paris, 1903), III, 349–75.
54. 9 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 38334, f. 33–4.
55. Count Colloredo, Austrian envoy in London, to Stahremberg, 20 Apr. 1757,
AE, CP, Br. Han. 52, f. 97–106; Marshal Estrées to Lieutenant-General
Sporcken, 7 May 1757, BL, Add. 35481, f. 200; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 8
May 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.
56. Cumberland to Richelieu, 29 Aug. 1757, BVC, FR 58; W.Mediger,
“Hastenbeck und Zeven. Der Eintritt Hannovers in den Siebenjahrigen
Krieg”, Niedersachsisches Jahrbuch fur Landesgeschichte 56 (1984), 137–66.
57. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 7 Aug. 1757, BL, Add. 35417, f. 15.
58. P.F.Doran, Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian relations during the Seven Years War
(New York, 1986); K.W.Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War
(Lewiston, 1989).
59. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 9 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.
60. A.Bourguet, Le Due de Choiseul et l’alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906).
61. Choiseul to Ossun, envoy in Madrid, 12 May 1762, AE, CP, Espagne 532, f.
236.
62. AE, CP, Espagne 533, f. 270–85, 290–4.
63. Ossun to Choiseul, 3, 17 Sept. 1761, AE, CP, Espagne 533, f. 362, 436–7.
64. J.Black, “The British Expeditionary Force to Portugal in 1762: international
conflict and military problems”, British Historical Society of Portugal, Annual
Report and Review 16 (1989).
65. Z.E.Rashed, The peace of Paris 1763 (Liverpool, 1961).
66. J.Black, “Naval power and British foreign policy in the age of Pitt the Elder”,
in The British Navy and the use of naval power in the eighteenth century, J.Black &
P.Woodfine (eds) (Leicester, 1988), 100–3.
67. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 29 June 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.
68. August Wilhelm to Valory, 29 June 1757, AE, CP, Prusse 186, f. 65.
69. Pol Corr., xv, 218; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 2 July 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.
70. Richard to John Tucker, 4 July 1757, Bod, MS. Don. c.112.
188
NOTES

72. K.W.Schweizer, “Lord Bute, Newcastle, Prussia and the Hague overtures: a re-
examination”, Albion 9 (1977), 72–97; “The non-renewal of the AngloPrussian
subsidy treaty, 1761–1762: an historical revision”, Canadian Journal of History
13 (19), 382–98; “Br itain, Pr ussia, Russia and the Galitzin letter: a
reassessment”, Historical Journal 26 (1983), 531–56; and “Britain, Prussia and
the Prussian Territories on the Rhine 1762–1763”, Studies in History and
Politics 4 (1985), 103–14.
73. The best study of the situation from 1763 is H.M.Scott, British foreign policy in
the age of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1990).
Chapter Three
1. There is a valuable account of the domestic debate in R.Harris, A patriot press:

national politics and the London press in the 1740s (Oxford, 1993).
2. Lodge used material in the Public Record Office, the British Library and the
family archive of the Earls of Sandwich, now deposited in the National
Maritime Museum.
3. C.Haase, W.Deeters, E.Pitz, Ubersicht über die Bestade des Niedersächsischen
Staatsarchivs in Hannover [2 volumes] (Göttingen, 1965, 1968).
4. G.C.Gibbs, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Stanhope and
Walpole”, EHR 77 (1962), 18–37; and “Newspapers, Parliament and foreign
policy in the age of Stanhope and Walpole’, Melanges offerts à G.Jacquemyns
(Brussels, 1968), 293–315; J.R.Jones, Britain and the world, 1649–1815 (1982),
203.
5. R.Pares, War and trade in the West Indies (Oxford, 1936); J.O.McLachlan, Trade
and peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750 (Cambridge, 1940).
6. J.Black, “When ‘Natural Allies’ fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations 1725–1740”,
Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983), 120–49.
7. R.Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1923).
8. U.Dann, Hannover und England 1740–1760 (Hildesheim, 1986); translated and
slightly revised as Hanover and Great Britain 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991).
9. J.Black, “Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole”, in Britain in the age of Walpole
J.Black (ed.) (1984), 145–69; J.Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole
(Edinburgh, 1985); S.Baxter, “The myth of the grand alliance in the
eighteenth century”, in Anglo-Dutch cross currents, S.Baxter & P.Sellin (Los
Angeles, 1976); M.Roberts, Splendid isolation, 1763–80 (Reading, 1970).
10. B.Williams, Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943) is the best introduction.
11. Lowther to John Spedding, 20 Apr. (os) 1742, Carlisle, CRO, Lonsdale papers,
D/Lons/W; Newcastle to Hardwicke [c.ll Aug. (os) 1739], BL, Add. 35406, f.
136; Dickens to Harrington, 5 Sept. 1739, PRO, SP 90/46; Waldegrave to
Horatio Walpole, 7 Sept. 1739, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 Feb. (os) 1740,
Chewton.
12. Cobbett, xi, 29, 15 Nov. (os); Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP
78/223, f. 267.
189
NOTES
13. W.Hoist, Carl Gustaf Tessin (Lund, 1931), 417; Hervey to Stephen Fox, 9 Sept.
(os) 1740, BL, Add. 51345; Cobbett XI, 677.
14. Destouches, French envoy in London, to Dubois, French foreign minister, 15
Dec. 1718, AE, CP, Ang. 311; James Craggs, Secretary of State for the Southern
Department, to Stair, 25 Jan. (os) 1720, SRO, GD. 135/141/24.
15. Weekly Miscellany (Dublin), 9 May (os) 1734; Destouches to Dubois, 9 Apr.,
Dubois to Destouches, 21 Apr. 1722, Chammorel, French envoy in London, to
Morville, French foreign minister, 17 Feb. 1724, AE, CP, Ang. 341, sup. 7, 347;
Ossorio, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel, 2 Apr. 1743, AST,
LM, Ing. 48.
16. Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 27 Aug. 1742, AST, LM, Ing. 48; Report by Le
Ville, French envoy at The Hague, 16 Oct. 1742, Vincennes, Archives de la
Guerre, Al 2970 No. 265; Stair to Trevor, 2 Nov. 1742, Aylesbury, Trevor, 32.
17. The Oracle: or, Bristol Weekly Miscellany, 24 Apr. (os) 1742.
18. Chavigny to Morville, 5 Sept., 21, 17 Nov., Morville to Chavigny, 18 Oct.
1723, Broglie to Morville, 20 July 1724, AE, CP, Ang. 346, 348; Carteret to
Pentenriedter, 3 Apr. (os) 1721, HHStA, Frankreich Varia, 11.
19. AE, MD, Ang. 6, f. 108.
20. Parliamentary collections of Philip Yorke, BL, Add. 35875, f. 436; Haslang to
Charles Albert, 12 May 1741, Munich, KS 17211; Carteret to Dr Wetstein,
travelling tutor of his son Robert, 30 Jan. (os) 1741, BL, Add. 32416.
21. Jones, Britain and the world, 203–4; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Apr.
1744, AST, LM, Ing. 50.
22. W.Mediger, “Great Britain, Hanover and the rise of Prussia”, in Studies in
diplomatic history: essays in memory of D.B.Horn, R.M.Hatton & M.S. Anderson
(eds) (London, 1970), 199–213.
23. Henry to Stephen Fox, 17 Aug. (os), Henry Pelham to Henry Fox, 27 Sept.
(os) 1743, BL, Add. 51417, 51379; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Jan.
1744, 15 Jan. 1745, AST, LM, Ing. 50; Carteret to Newcastle, 15 Oct. 1743,
PRO, SP 43/32.
24. Jacobites Journal, 6 Feb. (os), 5 Oct. (os) 1748; Westminster Journal, 13 Feb. (os)
1748.
25. For the Jacobites and France, E.Cruickshanks, Political untouchables (1979);
F.McLynn, France and the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981).
26. Robinson to Carteret, 4, 27 (quote) Aug. 1743, 6 May 1744, Carteret to
Robinson, 19 Aug. 1743, 8 May (os) 1744, PRO, SP 80/160, 163.
27. York Courant, 13 Oct. (os) 1741.
28. Trevor to Carteret, 14 Feb. 1744, Harrington to Newcastle, 26 July 1745,
Villiers to Harrington, 22 Feb., 1 Mar., 21 June, 2 July 1746, PRO, SP 84/
402, 43/46, 88/68; J.Black, “The theory of the balance of power in the first
half of the eighteenth century: a note on sources”, Review of International
Studies 9 (1983), 55–61.
29. Haslang, 21 Mar. 1741, Munich, KS 17211.
30. Henry to Stephen Fox, 21 Nov. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 51417.
31. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 July (os) 1740, BL, Add. 35406; Harrington to
Newcastle, 29 July 1745, PRO, SP 43/31; Pelham to Philip Yorke, 15 Oct. (os)
1747, BL, Add. 35424; Lady Hertford to Lord Beauchamp, 31 Jan. (os) 1743,
Alnwick Castle, Alnwick papers 113, p. 166; Walpole to Trevor, 17 Sept. (os)
190
NOTES
1743, Aylesbury, Trevor 36; Robinson to his secretary Draper, 2 Sept. 1745, BL,
Add. 23821, f. 7.
32. Cobbett, xi, 675–76; Thompson to Couraud, 8 Mar. 1741, Carteret to
Newcastle, 19 May 1743, PRO, SP 78/225, 43/36; Egremont to Bute, 11 Oct.
1762, Mount Stuart 7/170; Lord Raymond to Hardwicke, 24 Dec. (os) 1744,
Newcastle to Pelham, 25 Oct. 1750, BL, Add. 35587, f. 327, 35411, f. 189.
33. Villiers to Harrington, 5 Mar. 1746, PRO 88/68; Amelot, French foreign
minister, to Fénelon, French envoy at The Hague, 20 May 1743, AE, CP,
Hollande 446, f. 328; E.von Wiese, Die Englische parlamentarische Opposition und
ihre Stellung zur auswärtigen Politik des britischen Cabinets, 1740–1744, PhD
thesis (Göttingen, 1883).
34. N.Rogers, “Resistance to oligarchy: the City opposition to Walpole and his
successors, 1725–1747”, in London in the age of reform, J.Stevenson (ed.)
(Oxford, 1977), 1–29; and “The urban opposition to Whig oligarchy”, in The
origins of Anglo-American radicalism, M. & J.Jacob (eds) (1984), 132–48.
35. Justus Alt, Hesse-Cassel envoy in London, to Frederick I of Sweden, 19 Nov.
1743, Marburg 241.
36. Cobbett, xiii, 272, 562, 564–65.
37. Cobbett, xiii, 617; Kalm’s account of his visit to England (1892), 300; A
congratulatory ode, most humbly inscribed to a certain very Great Man, on his becoming
Greater (1744), 7; Matthew Decker to Morton 16 Dec. (os) 1742, NLS, GD
150/3485, Lowther to Spedding, 11, 14, 16, 18 Dec. (os) 1742, 19 Jan. (os)
1743, Carlisle, CRO, D/Lons/W.
38. Cobbett, xiii, 618–19; Newcastle to Harrington, 14 June (os), 19 July (os)
1745, PRO, SP 43/37.
39. T.C.W.Blanning,” ‘That Horrid Electorate’ or ‘Ma Patrie Germanique’?
George III, Hanover, and the Fürstenbund of 1785”, Historical Journal 20 (1977),
311–44; J.C.D.Clark, The dynamics of change: the crisis of the 1750s and English
party systems (Cambridge, 1982); E.Gregg, Queen Anne (1980); R.M.Hatton,
George I (1978); P.Mackesy, War without victory: the downfall of Pitt, 1799–1802
(Oxford, 1984); J.Black, “George II reconsidered: a consideration of George’s
influence in the conduct of foreign policy, in the first years of his reign”,
Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 35 (1982), 35–56; J.B.Owen,
“George II reconsidered”, in Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants, A.Whiteman,
J.S.Bromley, P.G.M.Dickson (eds) (Oxford, 1973), 113–34.
40. Walpole to Trevor, 12 July (os) 1741, Trevor, 27; Trevor to Harrington, 6 Jan.
1741, PRO, SP 84/391.
41. Utterodt to Augustus III, 10 Jan. 1741, Dresden, 2677 III; Frederick II to
Andrie, Prussian envoy in Hanover, 29 June 1745, Flemming, Saxon envoy in
London, to Brühl, Saxon minister, 11 May 1745, PRO, SP 43/36, 107/61;
E.O.Borkowsky, Die Englische Friedensvermittlung im Jahre 1745 (Berlin, 1884),
pp. 81, 92.
42. Hardwicke to Sophia Bentinck, 11 Aug. (os), Philip Yorke, later second Earl of
Hardwicke, to wife, Marchioness Grey, 18 Aug. (os) 1744, Bedford, CRO,
Lucas papers 30/4/3/1, 30/9/113/10; Cope, envoy in Hamburg, to Carteret,
20 Oct. 1744, Newcastle to Harrington 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 82/67,
43/ 37; Pelham to Stair, 18 Mar. (os) 1743, Pelham to Hardwicke, 8 Aug. (os)
1747, BL, Add. 35423, f. 9, 38–9.
191
NOTES
43. Flemming to Brühl, 11 May 1745, Newcastle to Harrington, 12, 26 July (os),
18 Aug. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 107/61, 43/114, 115; Lady Car penter to
Marchioness Grey, 26 Sept. (os) 1745, Bedford CRO, Lucas, 30/9/24/26.
44. Robinson to Carteret, 1 Aug., Robinson to Hyndford, 1 Aug. 1744, PRO, SP
80/164.
45. Newcastle to Harrington, 21 May (os), 14, 28 June (os), 12, 26 July (os) 1745,
PRO, SP 43/37, 114; Alt to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 1 Aug. 1747,
Marburg 245.
46. Newcastle to Harrington, 9 Aug. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 23821, f. 457, Trevor to
Robinson, 31 Dec. 1745, PRO, SP 43/115; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10
Oct. 1747, AST, LM, Ing. 53; Pelham to Hardwicke, 12 June (os), 21 Aug. (os),
undated, 7 Nov. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 35423, f. 42, 55, 75, 78.
Chapter Four
1. Chesterfield to Earl Gower, Lord Privy Seal, 6 Aug. (os) 1747, PRO 30/29/ 1/
11, f. 307.
2. Newcastle to Cumberland, 15 Nov. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 41/143.
3. R.Middleton, The bells of victory: the Pitt-Newcastle ministry and the conduct of the
Seven Years’ War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge, 1985); J.C.Riley, The Seven Years’ War
and the old regime in France: the economic and financial toll (Princeton, 1986);
J.Brewer, The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688–1783
(1989).
4. P.F.Doran, Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian diplomatic relations during the Seven
Years’ War (New York, 1986); K.W.Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven
Years’ War (Lewiston, 1989).
5. P.Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury (Paris, 1924); J.Black, Natural
and necessary enemies: Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth century (London,
1986), 21–35.
6. J.Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions, 1783–1793 (Cambridge,
1994).
7. M.Schlenke, England und das friderizianische Preussen 1740–1763 (Freiburg,
1963).
8. S.Baxter, “The myth of the Grand Alliance”, in Anglo-Dutch cross currents in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, S.Baxter & P.R.Sellin (eds) (Los Angeles,
1976), 43–59; H.M.Scott, “The ‘True Principles of the Revolution’: the Duke
of Newcastle and the idea of the Old System”, in Black, Knights Errant, 55–91.
9. G.Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der Britischen Weltpolitik 1738–1763 (Munich,
1979); M.Mimler, Der Einfluss kolonialer Interessen in Nordamerika auf die
Strategic und Diplomatic Grossbritanniens während des 18. Jahrhunderts
(Hildesheim, 1983).
10. R.M.Hatton, The Anglo-Hanoverian connection 1714–1760 (1982); A.M.Birke
and K.Kluxen (eds), England und Hanover (Munich, 1986), 17–51, 127–44;
J.Black, “The British state and foreign policy in the Eighteenth Century”,
Trivium 23 (1988) 127–48; J.Black, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age
of Walpole: the case of the Hessians”, in Black, Knights Errant, 41–54.
192
NOTES
11. G.C.Gibbs, “The revolution in foreign policy”, in Britain after the Glorious
Revolution, G.S.Holmes (ed.), 59–79 (1969); J.Black, “The Revolution and the
Development of English Foreign Policy”, in E.Cruickshanks (ed.), By force or
by default? The revolution of 1688 (Edinburgh, 1989), 135–58.
12. M.Roberts, “Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution, 1771/2”, Historical
Journal 8 (1964), 146.
13. P.L.Woodfine, “The Anglo-Spanish War of 1739”, in The origins of war in early
modern Europe, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1987), 185–209.
14. Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 78/223, f. 266–9; Walpole to
Trevor, 29 Sept. (os) 1738, Aylesbury, Trevor 14; Newcastle to Harrington, 12
Aug. (os) 1739, BL, Add. 35406, f. 138.
15. Harrington to Thompson, 15 Oct. 1740, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 236–9.
16. H.Schilling, Der Zwist Preussens und Hannovers 1729–30 (Halle, 1912); J.Black,
“Foreign inspiration of eighteenth–century British political material: an
example from 1730”, Trivium 21 (1986), 137–42; J.Black, The collapse of the
Anglo-French alliance, 1727–1731 (Gloucester, 1987), 141–2.
17. Mediger, “Hastenbeck und Zeven”.
18. On Anglo-Hanoverian relations in general, U.Dann, Hannover und England,
1740–1760 (Hildesheim, 1986).
19. Bussy to Amelot, 17 May 1741, AE CP, Ang. 412, f. 63.
20. J.Black, “British neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession, 1733–1735”,
International History Review 8 (1986), 345–66; J.Black, “French foreign policy
in the age of Fleury reassessed”, EHR 103 (1988), 359–84.
21. Cobbett, xii, 176–8.
22. Bussy to Amelot, 17 May 1741, AE, CP, Ang. 412, f. 52–61.
23. Harrington to Thompson, 3 Sept. 1741, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 123.
24. Bussy to Amelot, 1 Jan. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f. 18, 26.
25. Chammorel to Dubois, 5, 26, Apr. 1723, AE, CP, Ang. 344, f. 181–1, 234.
26. Thompson to Onslow Burrish, 22 Mar. (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6.
27. Bussy to Amelot, 19 Feb. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f. 141; Bussy memorandum,
1745, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 107.
28. Givry, agent at Dunkirk, to Maurepas, naval minister, 28 Feb. 1742, Paris, AN,
Archives de la Marine B3 406, f. 21; Bussy to Amelot, 1 Mar. 1742, AE, CP,
Ang. 414, f 163. This despatch, like many of the period, was intercepted by the
British, PRO, SP 107/53.
29. Amelot to Bishop of Rennes, 27 Mar. 1742, AE, CP, Espagne 470, f. 183.
30. Thomas to George Anson, 30 Nov. (os) 1743, BL, Add. 15955, f. 29; Carteret
to Stair, 4 May (os) 1742, PRO, SP 87/8, f. 107.
31. Stair to Earl of Nottingham, 27 June 1741, Leicester, CRO, Finch MSS DG/
7/4952; Stair to Robinson, 30 May 1742, BL, Add. 23810, f. 492; Holdernesse
to Burrish, 18 Mar. 1757, PRO, SP 81/106.
32. J.Black, “Jacobitism and Br itish Foreign Policy, 1731–5”, in The Jacobite
challenge, J.Black & E.Cruikshanks (eds) (Edinburgh, 1989), 142–40.
33. J.Black, “Parliament and the political and diplomatic crisis of 1717–18”,
Parliamentary History 3 (1984), 77–101.
34. J.Black, “When natural allies fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations 1725–1740”,
Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983), 120–49; J.Black,
“AngloAustrian relations, 1725–1740: a study in failure”, British Journal for
Eighteenth-Century Studies 12 (1989), 29–45.
193
NOTES
35. Bussy, memorandum, AE, MD, Ang. 8, f. 272–6, 40, f. 107–14; Thompson to
Newcastle, 14 July 1742, PRO, SP 78/227, f. 276–82.
36. Thompson to Harrington, 26 Sept. 1741, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 169–71; Stair to
Robinson, 30 May 1742, BL, Add. 23810, f. 492; Bussy to Amelot, 14 June
1742, AE, CP, Ang. 415, f. 24.
37. Amelot to Fénelon, 25 June, Fénelon to Louis XV, 28 June 1742, AE, CP,
Hollande 443, f. 69, 102.
38. Drummond to Burrish, 21 June (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6; George Harbin to
Thomas Carew MP, 28 Aug. (os) 1742, Taunton, Somerset CRO, Trollop-
Bellew Papers DD/TB FT 18.
39. Walpole to Trevor, 22 Oct. (os) 1742, Aylesbury, Trevor 36; Finkenstein,
Prussian envoy in Hanover, to Frederick II, 30 Oct. 1743, PRO, SP 43/32;
Cobbett, xiii, 123, 125.
40. Material on Austro-French negotiations can be found in R.Butler, Choiseul
(Oxford 1980), i, 327–683 passim.
41. J.Colin, Louis XV et les Jacobites: le projet de débarquement en Angleterre 1743–44
(Paris, 1901); F.McLynn, France and the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981);
J.Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud, 1990), 56–9.
42. Anon, memorandum, May 1745, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 122; for Hanoverian fears,
Grote to Hyndford, 16 Apr. 1745, NSTA, Calenberg Brief Archiv 24 Nr. 6617,
f. 44.
43. Chesterfield to Trevor, 6 July (os) 1745, Aylesbury, Trevor 49; Newcastle to
Harrington, 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/414.
44. Harrington to Newcastle, 4, 29 July 1745, BL, Add. 32704, 419, 510; Papiers
Raisonne to Har rington, 6, 8 July 1745, PRO, SP 43/36; Newcastle to
Harrington, 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/114.
45. Newcastle to Harrington, 19 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/114.
46. R.Lodge, Studies in eighteenth-century diplomacy 1740–1748 (1930).
47. Stone to Weston, 2 Aug. (os) 1745, Farmington, Weston Papers, vol. 16.
48. Philip to Joseph Yorke, 1 Aug. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 35363, f. 91; John Sharpe,
“Proposals for reducing Cape Breton and Canada”, received 7 Nov. (os) 1740,
BL, Add. 33028, f. 374–5.
49. Old England, 3 Aug. (os) 1745.
50. Newcastle to Harrington, 9 Aug. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/115.
51. Stair to Earl of Loudoun, 10 Aug. (os) 1745, HL, Loudoun papers 7609.
52. G.S.Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: the maritime struggle for North America
(Toronto, 1950), 132–5; President of Council of Marine to Roland-Michel
Barrin de La Galissonière, Governor of Canada, 21 July 1747, AN, Colonies B 85.
53. A.H.Buffington, “The Canada expedition of 1746: its relation to British
politics”, American Historical Review 45, 1940; The Monosyllable IF, (1748)
Oxford, Bod. Firth c8 (61).
54. J.Black, “The British navy and British foreign policy in the first half of the
eighteenth century”, in Studies in European history in honour of Ragnhild Hatton,
J.Black & K.W.Schweizer (eds), (Lennoxville, 1985), 137–55; “Naval power and
British foreign policy in the age of Pitt the Elder”, in J.Black and P.L.Woodfme
(eds), British Navy, 91–107; “British naval power and international commitments:
political and strategic problems, 1688–1770”, in Parameters of British naval power
1650–1850, M.Duffy (ed.), (Exeter, 1992) 39–59.
194
NOTES
55. K.Wilson, “Empire, trade and popular politics in mid—Hanoverian Britain:

the case of Admiral Vernon”, Past and Present 121 (1988), 74–109; M.Peters,
Pitt and popularity: the patriot minister and London opinion during the Seven Years’
War (Oxford, 1980).
56. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 9 Dec. 1751, AST, LM, Ing. 56; Mirepoix to
Puysieulx, 18 Aug. 1751, AE, CP, Ang. 432, f. 128.
57. Joseph Yorke to Hardwicke, 8, 22 Mar., 5 Apr. 1749, BL, Add. 35355, f. 22, 27,
34; Yorke to Bedford, 29 Mar., Yorke to Keith, 31 Mar., Joseph to brother
Philip Yorke, 16 Mar. 1749, BL, Add. 32816, f. 261, 35465, f. 154–5, 35363, f.
232.
58. J.R.Danielson, Die Nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746–1751 (Helsinki, 1888);
Puysieulx to Durand, envoy in London, 14 Mar. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 425, f.
406.
59. R.N.Middleton, “French policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix-la-
Chapelle, 1749–1753”; R.Lodge, “The mission of Henry Legge to Berlin”,
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 14 (1931), 1–38.
60. Richelieu to Puysieulx, 8 July 1748, AN, KK 1372; a highly intelligent
account is offered by K.W.Schweizer, “The Seven Years’ War: a system
perspective”, in Black, Origins of War, 242–60.
61. R.Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Imperial Election Plan, 1749–
1754”, Journal of British Studies 1 (1967), 28–47.
62. Newcastle to Cumberland, 22 Oct. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 40/166.
63. Pelham to Cumberland, 12 July (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 37/157.
64. Newcastle to Earl of Sandwich, Plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle, 10, 11 July,
Sandwich to Newcastle, 14 July 1748, PRO, SP 43/48, f. 155, 209, 84/434, f.
321.
65. Pelham to Gower, 9 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 311; Sandwich to
Newcastle, 11 Aug. 1748, PRO, SP 84/435, f. 229.
66. Newcastle to Cumberland, 23 July 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 37/162.
67. Sandwich to Keith, 26 Sept. 1748, BL, Add. 35464, f. 55; Jacobite’s Journal, 6
Feb. (os) 1748.
68. Newcastle to Cumberland, 29 Oct. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 40/149; Newcastle to
Hardwicke, 14 July 1752, BL, Add. 35410, f. 253; Münchhausen to Austrian
minister, Count Kevenhüller, 23 Mar. 1749, NSTA, Cal. Br. 24 Nr. 1740, f. 96.
69. Puysieulx to Marquis de Valory, envoy in Hanover, 2 July 1750, AE, CP,
Brunswick-Hanover 50, f. 223.
70. J.R.Dull, A diplomatic history of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985), 28.
71. Valory to Puysieulx, 5 June 1750, AE, CP., Brunswick-Hanovre 50, f. 209.
72. Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istorischkago obshchestvo [148 volumes] (St
Petersburg, 1867–1916), CXLVIII, 223.
73. This period is not really considered in R.M.Hatton’s interesting “Frederick
the Great and the House of Hanover”, in Friederich der Grosse in seiner Zeit,
O.Hauser (ed.) (Cologne, 1987), 151–64.
74. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 July 1752, PRO 36/119, f. 138–9, 143.
75. Puysieulx to Valory, 13 July, 10 Aug., 12 Sept., Valory to Puysieulx, 19 Sept.
1750, AE, CP, Brunswick-Hanovre 50, f. 240–1, 256, 290–1, 299; AE, CP, Ang.
430 passim.
76. Newcastle to Sandwich, 29 Mar. (os) 1748, John, 4th Duke of Bedford,
195
NOTES
Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Joseph Yorke, 23 Mar. (os),
4 Apr. (os) 1749, BL, Add. 32811, f. 434, 32816, f. 276–8, 325–6; Durand,
envoy in London, to Puysieulx, 13 July 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 15; Joseph to
Philip Yorke, 25 July 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 275; Per ron to Charles
Emmanuel, 28 Oct. 1751, AST. LM. Ing. 56.
77. Newcastle to Gower, 15 July 1750, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 320.
78. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 19 Aug. 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 277.
79. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 51–2.
80. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 26 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 279.
81. Puysieulx to Durand, 29 Sept. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 192.
82. Puysieulx to Mirepoix, 12 Dec. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 310–11, 315; Bussy,
Réflexions, 19 Mar. 1751, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f.145.
83. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 17 Dec. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 324–5, 334, 336–41.
84. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 26 June 1753, PRO, SP 84/463; T.C.Pease (ed.),
Anglo-French boundary disputes in the west, 1749–1763 (Springfield, Illinois, 1936);
K.P.Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the westward movement, 1748–1792
(Glendale, California, 1939); M.Savelle, The diplomatic history of the Canadian
boundary, 1749–1763 (New Haven, 1940); D.S.Graham, British intervention in
defence of the American colonies, 1748–56, PhD thesis (London, 1969); J.E.Stagg,
Protection and survival; Anglo-Indian relations, 1748–63, PhD thesis (Cambridge,
1984); Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outremer, 249–73.
85. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 4 Sept. 1752, BL, Add. 35363, f. 308.
86. Newcastle to William, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Ambassador in Paris, 18, 29 Oct.,
Albemarle to Newcastle, 25 Oct. 1752, PRO, SP 78/245, f. 160, 170, 175;
Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 12 Jan., 6 Mar. 1753, PRO, SP 84/ 462; Saint—
Contest, French foreign minister, to La Touche, envoy in Berlin, 23 Mar., 19
Apr. 1753, AE, CP, Prusse 171, f. 188, 225.
87. Newcastle to Yorke, 13 Feb. 1753, PRO, SP 84/462.
88. Newcastle to Yorke, 6 Mar., Yorke to Newcastle, 10, 13, 17 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP
84/462; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 10 Apr. 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 326.
89. Newcastle to Keith, 30 Mar. 1753, PRO, SP 80/191.
90. Yorke to Newcastle, 11, 22 May, 3, 22 June, Newcastle to Yorke, 1 June 1753,
PRO, SP 84/463; Whitehall Evening Post, 14 June 1753; Joseph to Philip Yorke,
3 July 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 332; Protester, 14 July 1753; Mirepoix to St
Contest, 1 Feb. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 49.
91. Newcastle to Yorke, 17 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/463.
92. D.B.Horn, “The cabinet controversy on subsidy treaties in time of peace,
1749–50”, EHR 45 (1930), 463–6; R.Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (New
Haven, 1975), 159–80; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Aug. 1753, AST, LM,
Ing. 57.
93. Mirepoix to St Contest, 10 Jan. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 17–18.
94. Mirepoix to St Contest, 25 Jan., St Contest to Mirepoix, 25 Jan. 1754, AE, CP,
Ang. 437, f 32–3, 35.
95. Mirepoix to St Contest, 7, 14, 25 Mar. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 76, 85, 109.
96. Mirepoix to St Contest, 25 Apr. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 97, 109.
97. Mirepoix to St Contest, 23 Apr. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 181.
98. Mirepoix to St Contest, 6, 11 June, St Contest to Mirepoix, 14 June 1754, AE,
CP, Ang. 437, f. 220–1, 226, 228–9.
196
NOTES
99. Walpole to Dinwiddie, 15 July 1754, HL, HM 9406.

100. St Contest to Boutel, French agent in charge in Mirepoix’s absence, 9 Sept.,
1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 296–7.
101. Clayton, “Duke of Newcastle”, 592–403; Halifax to Newcastle, 6 Mar. (os)
1751, BL, Add. 32724, f. 165–8.
102. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Oct. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58; Haslang,
Bavarian envoy, to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 11 Oct. 1754, Munich,
Bayr. London 229; Boutel to Rouillé, 24 Oct. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f.
355–6.
103. Clark, The dynamics of change, 104; Elliot to his father, the Earl of Minto, 16
Nov. 1754, NLS, MS 11001, f. 10.
104. Clayton, “Duke of Newcastle”, 593; D.S.Graham, “The planning of the
Beauséjour operation and the approaches to war in 1755”, New England
Quarterly 41 (1968), 551–66.
105. Old England, 6 Oct (os), 3 Nov. (os) 1750.
106. Old England, 6 Oct (os), 3 Nov. (os) 1750; Newcastle Courant, 13 Oct. (os)
1750; R.Rolt, The conduct of the several powers of Europe [4 volumes] (1749–
50), IV, 635.
107. AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 203.
108. Aubeterre to St Contest, 2 Mar. 1754, AE, CP, Autriche 253, f. 48–9.
109. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 26 Nov. 1754, BL, Add. 35364, f. 17; Haslang to
Preysing, 11 Oct. 1754, Bayr. London 229.
110. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 5 Dec. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58; Rouillé to
Boutel, 6 Dec., Boutel to Rouillé, 19 Dec. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 399,
416–17.
111. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 15–21; Old England,
24 Feb. (os) 1750.
112. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 21–2; Perron to
Charles Emmanuel, 23 Jan. 1755, AST, LM, Ing. 59.
113. Rouillé to Bonnac, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 19; Mirepoix to
Rouillé, 16, 23, 30 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 27–8, 42, 54; Robinson to
Keene, 27 Jan. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11834.
114. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 3 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 76–80.
115. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 10 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 116, 120.
116. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 19 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 152–3, 163–87.
117. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 28 Feb., Rouillé to Mirepoix, 5 Mar. 1755, AE, CP,
Ang. 438, f. 238, 247–50.
118. Rouillé to Duras, 25 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Espagne 517, f. 153–5; Bonnac to
Rouillé, 25 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 122–3; Yorke to Holdernesse,
25 Feb. 1755, PRO, SP 84/468.
119. President of the Council of Marine to Marquis de Duquesne, governor of
Canada, 17 Feb. 1755, AN, Colonies B 101; Mirepoix to Rouillé, 10, 13 Mar.
1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 273, 279.
120. Robinson to Keene, 11 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11835.
121. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 17 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 280–2.
122. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 20 Mar. 1755, AST, LM, Ang. 59; Bonnac to
Rouillé, 21, 27 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 147, 158.
123. Memoranda of conferences on 22, 23 Mar., Rouillé to Mirepoix, 27 Mar.,
197
NOTES
British note to Mirepoix, 5 Apr. Leeds, Vyner 5725, 5727, 5728, Mirepoix to
Rouillé, 28 Mar., 1, 5, 6, 10, 16, 25 Apr., 6, 10, 15 May, Rouillé to Mirepoix,
3, 13, 24 Apr., 9, 24 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 339–40, 342, 344, 357,
359, 362–6, 385–6, 406–7, 440–48; 439, f. 6–11, 66–71, 76–9; 438, f. 351,
357, 359, 362–6, 385–6, 406–7, 440–48; 439, f. 6–11, 66–71, 76–9; 438, f.
351, 396, 401, 426–7; 439, f. 47–51, 96–7.
124. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 2 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 15.
125. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 5, 10 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 25, 71–2;
Boscawen to John Cleveland, Secretary to the Admiralty, 21 Apr. 1755, PRO,
ADM 1/481; Rouillé to Bonnac, 18 May 1755, AE, CP 488, f. 263.
126. Newcastle to Lord Hartington, later 4th Duke of Devonshire, 17 May 1755,
HP, Chatsworth Transcripts; Robinson to Keene, 16 June 1755, Leeds, Vyner,
11840.
127. Holdernesse to Keith, 20, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 3–5, 39.
128. Robinson to Keene, 16 June 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11840.
129. Rouillé to Bonnac, 29 June 1755, Paris, AN, KK 1401, p. 534.
130. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 July 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 252; Robinson to
Holdernesse, 18 July 1755, BL, Add. 35480, f. 78–9; Rouillé to Bonnac, 20
July 1755, Paris, AN, KK 1401, pp. 572–3; Holdernesse to Sir Charles
Hanbury-Williams, envoy in Russia, 24 July 1755, Newport, South Wales,
Public Library, Hanbury-Williams Papers; Holdernesse to Keith, 26 July
1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 137–9; Bussy to Rouillé, 29 July 1755, AE, CP,
Brunswick-Hanovre 52, f. 18–25.
131. On the likelihood of peace before spring, Lord Cathcart to the Earl of
Loudoun, 13 Sept. 1755, HL, Loudoun Papers 7087.
132. Scott, “True Principles”, 72–4; but see J.Black, Eighteenth century Europe,
1700–89 (1990), 292–3.
133. Rouillé to Aubeterre, 17 July 1755, AE, CP, Autriche 254, f. 226; Anon., The
Crisis (1756), 44. In 1756 Holdernesse tried to argue that it was not in
Russia’s interest to acquire more land or people as she already had sufficient,
Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June 1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 179.
Chapter Five
1. Thomas Villiers, envoy in Dresden, to Trevor, 20 Dec. 1739, Aylesbury, Trevor

20; Guy Dickens, envoy in Berlin, to Harrington, 6 Dec. 1740, PRO, SP 90/
48; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 9 Jan., 6 Feb., 3 Apr. 1741, AST, LM,
Ing. 47; State of army, Apr. 1742, AE, CP, Br-Han. 49, f. 283.
2. Carteret to Wych, 18 Sept. (os) 1742, PRO, SP, 91/32; Fawkener to
Robinson, 7 Nov. 1747, Hanbury-Williams to Robinson, 17 Nov. 1747, BL,
Add. 23816.
3. Hatton, Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 3; I.B.Campbell, The international legal
relations between Great Br itain and Hanover, 1714–1837, PhD thesis
(Cambridge, 1966). On George II, see, recently, A.Newman, The world turned
inside out: new views on George II (Leicester, 1988).
4. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 5 Jan. (os) 1750, PRO, SP 84/454.
198
NOTES
5. Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions, 89–93. For marital diplomacy
see, for example, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept. 1758, BL, Add. 35418, f.
24; Walter Titley, envoy in Copenhagen, to Bute, 10 Apr. 1762, PRO, SP 75/
114, f. 122.
6. Newcastle to Hanbur y-Williams, 5 Feb. (os) 1751, PRO, SP 88/71;
Holdernesse to Mitchell, 10 Oct. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70.
7. Amelot to Bussy, 5 Jan., Valory to Bussy, 13 Jan. 1742, PRO, SP 107/52;
Fénélon to Amelot, 26 Apr. 1743, AE, CP, Hollande 446; Pol. Corr., IV, 324.
8. G.C.Gibbs, “Britain and the Alliance of Hanover, April 1725–February 1726”,
EHR 73 (1968), 428; R.M.Hatton, “New light on George I”, in England’s rise
to greatness 1660–1763, S.Baxter (ed.) (Berkeley, 1983), 239; R.M.Hatton,
Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 12.
9. Harrington to Newcastle, 2 Aug. 1741, PRO, SP 43/101.
10. J.Ralph, Critical history of the administration of Sir Robert Walpole (1743).
11. Haslang to Charles Albert of Bavaria, 12 May 1741, Munich KS 17211.
12. Harrington to Trevor, 26 Dec. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 84/388, f. 180; Cobbett, xii,
157.
13. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 15 Jan. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56. For George’s
interest in foreign news, Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 28 Mar. 1750, AE, CP, Ang.
428, f. 243.
14. D.B.Horn underestimates the role of Hanoverian diplomats in The British
Diplomatic Service 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), 11; Robinson to Trevor, 20 May
1739, Farmington, Weston 12; Robinson to Edward Weston, 18 Jan. 1741,
PRO, SP 80/144; Hyndford to Harrington, 4 Oct. 1741, PRO, SP 90/52, f.
156; Törring, Bavarian envoy to Frederick, to his father Count Törring,
Bavarian minister, 13 Sept. 1741, Munich, Bayr. Ges. Berlin 9.
15. Hardenberg to George II, 17 Apr., 7 May 1742, NSTA, Cal. BR. 24 NR.
2006, f. 51, 58; Bussy to Amelot, 13 Aug. 1742, PRO, SP 107/54.
16. Haslang to Charles Albert, 7 Apr. 1741, Munich, KS 17211.
17. Walpole to Trevor, 19 Dec. (os) 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor 24; Mediger, Moskaus
Weg nach Europa, (Brunswick, 1952) 386–8; Blondel, French envoy at the
Imperial election, to Bussy, 3 Jan.; Wasenberg, Swedish envoy in London, to
Gyllenborg, Swedish Chancery President, 2 Feb. 1742, PRO, SP 107/52.
18. R.Przezdziecki, Diplomatic ventures and adventures: some experiences of British
envoys at the court of Poland (1953), 184.
19. Steinberg to Newcastle, 17 Dec. 1748, BL, Add. 32815, f. 279.
20. Hanbury-Williams to Robinson, 20 Oct., 17 Nov. 1747, BL, Add. 23826, f.
113, 188.
21. Sandwich to Newcastle, 22 Dec. 1747, BL, Add. 32810, f. 324.
22. Chesterfield to Sandwich, 17 Feb. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 32807, f. 127;
Farmington, Horace Walpole’s Commonplace Book.
23. Newcastle to Sandwich, 5 Apr. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32812, f. 19.
24. Legge to Newcastle, 24 Apr., Newcastle to Sandwich, 13 July (os) 1748, BL,
Add. 32812, f. 41, 32813, f. 5–7; Pelham to Gower, 18 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO.
30/29/1/11, f. 313.
25. Walpole to Mann, 23 Mar. (os) 1749, Walpole-Mann, IV, 39.
26. Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Lord Hervey and his friends (1950), 207.
27. Newcastle to Villettes, 3 Dec. (os) 1741, PRO, SP 92/44.
199
NOTES
28. PRO, SP, series 32, 44.

29. Manuscript newsletter, 17 Apr. 1741, AST, LM, Ing. 47.
30. S.Baxter, “The conduct of the Seven Years War”, in Baxter, England’s rise to
greatness 323–4.
31. P.Kennedy, “A.J.P.Taylor and ‘profound forces’ in history”, in Warfare, diplomacy
and politics, C.Wrigley (ed.) (1986), 25.
32. Wych to Carteret, 14 June, Carteret to Wych, 16 July (os) 1742, PRO, SP 917
31.
33. Pol. Corr., II, 445 n.l; Andrew Stone, Under Secretary, to Harrington, 22 Aug.
(os) 1740, PRO, SP 43/98; Keene to Bedford, 30 June 1749, PRO, SP 947
135, f. 303.
34. Fagel, Dutch foreign minister, to Hop, envoy in London, 7 May 1743, PRO,
SP 107/58.
35. Haslang to Charles VII, 26 Mar. 1743, Munich, Bayr. London 208.
36. Amelot to Bussy, 23 Feb. 1743, PRO, SP 107/55.
37. Pol. Corr., ix, 251.
38. Townshend to Samuel Buckley, 16 Sept. (os) [1730–38], Bod. MS. Eng. Lett, c.
144, f 267; George Quarme to Marquess of Rockingham, 18 Oct. 1757, WW
RI-III.
39. Newcastle to Sandwich, 22 Jan. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32811, f. 102.
40. Memorials of…James Oswald (Edinburgh, 1825), xi.
41. W.S.Lewis (ed.), The Yale edition of Horace Walpole’s correspondence [48 volumes]
(New Haven, 1937–83), xx, 239; W.Macdonald (ed.), Select works of John
Douglas (Salisbury, 1820), 56; Henry to Stephen Fox, 27 Dec. (os) 1744, BL,
Add. 51417, f. 132.
42. Cobbett, xiii, 265.
43. Horatio Walpole to Trevor, 7 July (os) 1738, Aylesbury, Trevor 13; Hanoverian
government to von Lenthe, envoy in Vienna, 16, 26 Apr., 10 May, George II to
Hanoverian government, 2, 9 June, Hanoverian government to Lenthe, 4 June,
George II to Hanoverian government, 14 July (os) 1739, NSTA, Cal. Br. 11 El
No.410a, f. 80–81, 87–8, 94–100, 107, 117–19, 145–6.
44. Harrington to Trevor, 5 Jan. (os), Trevor to Harrington, 3 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP
84/378, f. 40, 117; Remarques prealables sur 1’affaire de Steinhorst, no date,
AE, CP, Br. Han. 49, f. 30–40.
45. Edward Finch, envoy in Stockholm, to Titley, 23 Feb. 1739, BL, Eg. 2685, f.
244.
46. Frederick William I to Karl of Brunswick—Wölfenbuttel, 13 Jan. 1739,
Wölfenbuttel, Staatsarchiv, 1 At 22 Nr. 610, f. 200; Robinson to Harrington,
25 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 80/133.
47. NSTA, Cal. Br. 24 Nr. 1475, 1477.
48. York Courant 6 Feb. (os) 1739.
49. Stolberg to Christian VI, 9 Jan. 1740, HMC, Weston-Underwood, 436.
50. Newcastle to Har r ington, 24 June (os) 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 411;
Harrington to Newcastle, 22 July 1740, PRO, SP 43/91.
51. Newcastle to Dickens, 3 June (os) 1740, PRO, SP 36/51, f. 10; Newcastle to
Harrington, 24 June (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 29 June 1740, PRO, SP
43/90; Pelham to Newcastle, 27 June (os) 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 417;
F.Frensdorff (ed.), “G.A. von Münchhausen’s Berichte über seine Mission
200
NOTES
nach Berlin im Juni 1740”, Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der

Wissenschaften zu Göttingen new series 8 (1904), 3–87.
52. Harrington to Newcastle, 13 July 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 436; Finch to
Harrington, 12 Nov. 1740, PRO, SP 91/26; Newcastle Journal 4 Oct. (os) 1740.
53. Dann, Hannover und England, 26.
54. Owen, “George II reconsidered”, 123.
55. Harrington to Newcastle, 27 July, Newcastle to Harrington, 29 July (os), 12
Aug. (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 21 Aug., 11 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 437 91,
92, 93; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 July (os) 1740, Hardwicke, 1, 243.
56. Dickens to Harrington, 17 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 90/48.
57. Newcastle to Harrington, 12, 29 Aug. (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 14 Aug.,
4 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 43/92–3.
58 Harrington to Newcastle, 18 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 43/93.
59. Finch to Harrington, 6, 16 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 91/24.
60. Harrington to Finch, 25 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 91/24.
61. Newcastle to Harrington, 11 Sept. (os),—Sept. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 43/94, 36/
52, f. 145.
62. Dann, Hannover und England, 27.
63. Harrington to Dickens, 31 Oct. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 90/48.
64. Walpole to Pelham, 25 July (os), 3, 12 Aug. (os), Walpole to Cumberland, 26
Aug. (os) 1747, NeC 485–8; Walpole to Cumberland, 18 Dec. (os) 1747, RA,
Cumb. P. 30/146; Walpole to Newcastle, 28 Dec. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 9147, f.
13–17.
65. R.R.Sedgwick (ed.), Letters from George III to Lord Bute 1756–1766 (1939),
28–9, 78–9.
66. Marquess of Rockingham to Sir George Saville, 30 Oct. 1760, Bod. MS. Eng.
Lett. c. 144, f. 284.
67. J.Black, “The crown, Hanover and the shift in British foreign policy in the
1760s”, in Black Knights Errant, 113–34.
68. Haslang to Baron Wachtendonck, Palatine foreign minister, 10, 31 Mar., 28
July 1761, Munich, Bayr. Ges. London 238; draft to Yorke, 9 Apr. 1761,
Farmington, Weston, 23; Bussy to Choiseul, 11 June 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 443, f.
176; George Grenville, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, to
Mitchell, 31 Aug. 1762, HL, STG Box 16(7).
69. Viry to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Oct. 1761, AST, LM, Ing. 66; Newcastle to
Rockingham, 19 Nov. 1761, WW Rl–22.
70. Pol Corr., x, 149–50, ix, 235; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 14 Dec. 1753, BL, Add.
35363, f. 341.
Chapter Six
1. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 10 Dec. 1754, BL, Add. 35364, f. 23; Holdernesse to
Newcastle, 8 July 1749, PRO, SP 84/449, f. 68; Holdernesse to Burrish, 1 Oct.
1754, PRO, SP 81/104; Newcastle to Cumberland, 15 Mar. (os) 1748, RA,
Cumb. P. 32/303; Newcastle Courant, 23 Jan. (os) 1748; Worcester Journal, 31 Aug.
201
NOTES
(os) 1749; Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 22 Sept. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 86;
London Evening Post, 23 Oct. (os) 1750; Old England, 8 Feb. (os) 1752; Perron
to Charles Emmanuel, 21 Nov. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58.
2. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 Apr. 1758, BL, Add. 32879, f. 27–8; D’Artagnan
report on visit to Britain, 7 Aug. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 72.
3. Drummond to Burrish, 19 Feb. (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6.
4. Trevor to Burrish, 1 June (os) 1746, PRO, SP 110/6. Reporting conversation
with Steinberg on need to win public support for foreign subsidies, Lascaris,
Sardinian envoy in Hanover, to Sardinian Foreign Minister, 15 June 1752, AST,
LM, Ing. 57.
5. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 24 Nov., Holdernesse to Burrish, 2 Dec. 1757, PRO,
SP 90/67, 110/6; Fox to Shelburne, 4 Oct. 1762, BL Bowood, 15 f. 107;
Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Nov. 1761, BL, Add. 32931, f. 47.
6. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 12 June 1751, BL, Add. 35363, f. 283; Bute, speech, 5
Feb. 1762, PRO 30/8/75; Newcastle to William Bentinck, 21 Mar. (os) 1749,
BL, Add. 32816, f. 272.
7. Waldegrave to Keene, 22 June 1739, BL, Add. 32801, f. 59.
8. Jacobite MP.
9. John Campbell MP to Pryse Campbell, 15 Nov. (os) 1739, Carmarthen, Dyfed
Archive Service, Cawdor Muniments, Box 138 (hereafter Cawdor); Cobbett,
xi, 12.
10. John to Pryse Campbell, 17 Nov. (os) 1739, Cawdor; Charles Coles to Pleydell
Courteen, 23 Nov. (os) 1739, Swansea, University Library, Mackworth Papers,
548.
11. Herbert Mackworth to Courteen, 7 Jan. (os) 1740, Swansea, Mackworth,
1301; John Couraud, Under Secretary in the Souther n Department, to
Waldegrave, 14 Jan. (os) 1740, Chewton; Bishop of Chester to his son, 19 Jan.
(os) 1740, HMC, Hare MSS., 254.
12. Walpole to Trevor, 29 Jan. (os) 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor vol. 20.
13. Champion, London newspaper, 19 Feb. (os) 1740.
14. Pulteney, Walpole, 21 Feb. (os) 1740, Cobbett, xi, 494, 497–9, 501, 503; John
to Pryse Campbell, 21 Feb. (os) 1740, Cawdor.
15. Cobbett, xii, 177, 175–6, 181, 178–9.
16. M.Peter s, “Pitt as a foil to Bute: the public debate over minister ial
responsibility and the powers of the Crown”, in K.W.Schweizer (ed.), Lord
Bute: essays in re-interpretation (Leicester, 1988), 111.
17. John to Richard Tucker, 18 Nov. (os) 1742, Bod. MS. Don. c. 105, f. 154–5;
John to Pryse Campbell, 18 Nov. (os) 1742, Cawdor. For a similar argument in
1757, Con-Test, 6 Aug.
18. John to Pryse Campbell, 9 Dec. (os) 1742, Cawdor.
19. Walpole to Trevor, 28 Feb. (os) 1744, Aylesbury, Trevor 37.
20. J.B.Owen, The rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957).
21. Haslang to Seinsheim, 4 Feb. 1744, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 211.
22. L.J.Colley, In defiance of oligarchy: the Tory Party 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 1982),
244; Chesterfield to Gower, 13 Apr. (os) 1745, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 290–1.
23. A.W.Massie, Great Britain and the defence of the Low Countries, 1744–748, DPhil.
thesis (Oxford, 1988), 178; John to Richard Tucker, 6 Dec. (os) 1746, Bod. MS.
Don. C. 109, f. 43.
202
NOTES
24. D.Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory politics, 1710–14 (Edinburgh, 1984); E.Gregg, The
Protestant succession in international politics (New York, 1986).
25. Newcastle to Cumberland, 17 Mar. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P. 20/415.
26. Newcastle to Cumberland, 25 Nov. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 41/328; Cobbett, xiv,
333; Potter to Robinson, 24 Oct. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 23830, f. 98.
27. Pelham to Gower, 18 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 313.
28. Pelham to Gower, 9 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 311.
29. Thomas Harris to James Harris, 3 Dec. 1748, Winchester, Hampshire CRO.
9M73 G 310/24; Cobbett, xiv, 338.
30. Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 6 Jan. 1749, AST, LM, Ing. 55.
31. Giovanni Zamboni, Hesse—Darmstadt agent in London, to Ludwig VIII of
Hesse-Darmstadt, 6 Dec. 1748, 4 Mar. 1749, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv, El M10/
6; Alt to William VIII, 7 Jan. 1749, Marburg 250; Abbé de La Ville, mémoire,
1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 411.
32. Zamboni to Ludwig VIII, 21 Jan. 1749, Darmstadt, El M10/6.
33. Puysieulx to Durand, 11 Apr. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 426, f. 32–4. This instruction
is of some consequence because it contrasts with the stress on diplomatic
issues in the instruction to Durand pr inted by Vaucher in his Recueil des
instructions, iii, 324–30.
34. Cumberland to Joseph Yorke, 10 Ap. (os) 1749, RA, Cumb. P. 43/191.
35. Durand to Puysieulx, 15 May 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 426, f. 125.
36. Haslang to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 25 Feb. 1750, Munich, Bayr.
Ges., London 224; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 12 Mar. 1750, AST, LM, Ing.
56.
37. Dodington to Francis Dashwood, no date, Bod. D.D.Dashwood (Bucks) B/
11/1/12. On weakness of the opposition, Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 10 Jan. 1751,
AE, CP, Ang. 431, f. 32.
38. Cobbett, xiv, 694.
39. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 13 Mar. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 202.
40. Granville to Marquis of Tweeddale, 11 Jan. (os) 1750, NLS, MS. 14420, f. 128.
41. J.Black, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the
Hessians”, in Black, Knights Errant, 41–54.
42. Horace Walpole, Memoirs of King George II, ed. Brooke [3 volumes] (New
Haven, 1985) 1, 33–4; Cobbett, xiv, 930–70; BL, Add, 32724, f. 129–34;
Haslang to Preysing, 8 Mar. 1751, Munich, KS 225.
43. Walpole, Memoirs of George II, i, 166–7; Newcastle to Hanbury Williams, envoy
to Augustus III of Saxony-Poland, 24 Jan. (os) 1752, Newport, Hanbury
Williams Papers; W.Coxe, Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole (1802), 398–405;
Cobbett, xiv, 1152.
44. Yonge to Hanbury Williams, 24 Jan. (os) 1752, Farmington, Hanbury Williams
Papers 54, f. 252–3, a fuller account than that sent the same day by Edward
Digby, f. 244–7.
45. Alt’s reports, 18 Jan., 1 Feb. 1752, Marburg 253.
46. John Dobson to John Mordaunt, 30 Jan. (os) 1752, undated notes, Warwick
CRO, CR 136 8/5/6, CR 136 B 3012/44; Walpole, Memoirs of George II, i,
167–73; Newcastle to Yorke, 31 Jan. (os) 1752, PRO, SP 84/458.
47. J.N.Rosenau, “Private preference and political responsibilities: the relative
potency of individual and role variables in the behaviour of U.S. senators”, in
203
NOTES
Quantitative international politics: insights and evidence, J.D.Singer (ed.) (New

York, 1968), 49.
48. Cobbett, xiii, 305.
49. Ibid., xiii, 379.
50. Ibid., xiii, 344.
51. Fox to 4th Duke of Devonshire, 11 Dec. 1755, Chatsworth, HP; Campbell to
Mr White, 18 Dec. 1755, Cawdor.
52. Monitor 13 May 1758.
53. Hardwicke to Earl of Findlater, 16 Nov. 1762, Edinburgh, Scottish Record
Office, GD 248/572/8/17; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 28 Nov. 1762, 1 July
1763, BL, Add. 32945, f. 176, 32949, f. 252.
54. Lord Sandys to Lord Northwick, 11 Dec. 1762, Worcester CRO 705–66, BA
4221/26; Duke of Nivernais, French envoy, to Praslin, French foreign minister,
13 Dec. 1762, AE, CP, Ang. 448, f. 305–9; J.Nicholas, The ministry of Lord Bute,
1762–3, PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988), 220–50.
55. Walpole to Pelham, 12 Aug. (os) 1747, NeC 487.
56. Henry to Stephen Fox, 13 Feb. (os) 1746, BL, Add. 51417, f. 213–14;
Newcastle, memorandum, 18 Apr. 1759, BL, Add. 32890, f. 133; Con-Test, 2
Apr. 1757; Anon., Letters to the estimator of the manners and principles of the times
(1758), 41; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 14 Dec. 1759, PRO, SP 90/74; Newcastle
to Yorke, 11 Dec., Yorke to Weston, 15 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 32932, f 123,
58213, f. 58; P.Mathias and P.O’Brien, “Taxation in England and France,
1715–1810: a comparison of the social and economic incidence of taxes col-
lected for the central government”, Journal of European Economic History 5
(1976), 601–50.
57. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 17 July, Mitchell to Holdernesse, 31 Aug. 1757, PRO,
SP 90/69; Newcastle to Rockingham, 27 Sept. 1757, WW Rl–103;
C.W.Eldon, England’s subsidy policy towards the Continent during the Seven Years’
War (Philadelphia, 1938); G.Brauer, Die hannoversch-englischen Subsidienvertrage
1702–1748 (Aalen, 1962); P.G.M.Dickson, Finance and government under Maria
Theresia 1740–1780 [2 volumes] (Oxford, 1987), II, 158–69, 172–3, 391–3,
395.
58. Newcastle to Mitchell, 8 Dec. 1757, BL, Add. 6832, f. 31; Haslang to Preysing
and Wachtendonck, 9 Dec. 1757, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 233;
Münchhausen to Prussian minister Podewils, 25 Dec. 1757, NSTA, Hannover
Des 91 Nr. 38, f. 13–14; Anon., An appeal to the sense of the people (1756), 21–
2; Monitor, 20 Aug. 1757; North Briton, 20 Nov. 1762.
59. Michael Becher to Edward Southwell MP, 31 Mar. (os) 1744, Bristol, Public
Library, Southwell Papers, vol. 8; Bristol, Society of Merchant Venturers,
Minutes of the Steadfast Society, pp. 56–7; Northampton Mercury, 4 June (os)
1739; Anon., An Appeal, 21–2; Monitor, 20 Aug. 1757.
60. Bedford to Goldsworthy, 28 Nov. (os) 1748, PRO, SP 98/55, f. 96; Mann to
Bedford, 16 July 1748, BL, Add. 32813, f. 41–2; Bedford to Keene, 19 Jan. (os),
Keene to Bedford, 24 Mar., 5 May 1749, PRO, SP 94/135, f. 8, 123, 222–3;
R.Lodge (ed.), The private correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene (Cambridge,
1933), 176, 243, 257–8, 271, 320; McLachlan, Trade and peace with Old Spain,
133–45; Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestvo [148 volumes]
(St Petersburg, 1867–1916), CXLVIII, 399; Newcastle to Yorke, 4 Feb. (os)
204
NOTES
1752, Newcastle to Keith, 20 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/458, 80/191;

Holdernesse to Robert Orme, 14 Oct. 1755, BL, Eg. 3488, f. 96.
61. Meeting in Cornhill, 23 Jan. (os), Hardwicke to Bedford, 2 Feb. (os) 1749,
London, Bedford Estate Office, papers of the 4th Duke; Newcastle to Dayrolle,
13 Sept. 1751, PRO, SP 84/452, f. 136; Grenville to Bothmar, Danish minister,
28 June, Grenville to Titley, 23 July 1762, PRO, SP 75/114, f. 236, 263–5;
P.Clendenning, “The Anglo-Russian trade treaty of 1766–an example of
eighteenth-century power group interest”, Journal of European Economic History
19 (1990), 475–520.
62. Henry to Stephen Fox, 18 Mar. (os) 1746, BL, Add. 51417, f 228.
63. Finch to Harrington, 27 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 95/84. See, more generally,
H.S.K.Kent, War and trade in northern seas: Anglo-Scandinavian economic relations
in the mid-eighteenth century (Cambridge, 1873).
64. Wasenberg to Ekeblad, 2 July 1742, PRO, SP 107/54.
65. Keene to Robinson, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11850.
66. Newcastle to Keith, 20 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 80/191; G.Shelton, Dean Tucker:
eighteenth-century economic and political thought (1981), 46–7; North Briton, 20
Nov. 1762; J.Campbell, The present state of Europe (1750), 24. On Campbell, see
G.Abbattista, Commercio, colonie e impero alla vigilia della Rivoluzione Americana:
John Campbell pubblicista e storico nell’Inghilterra del sec. XVIII (Florence, 1990).
For the argument, see also Anon., The conduct of the ministry impartially examined
(1760), 38; Monitor, 26 Dec. 1761, 2 Oct. 1762; Newcastle, memorandum, 4
Sept. 1762, BL, Add. 32942, f. 151.
67. Legge to Pelham, 24 May 1748, NeC 573. For praise from Newcastle,
Newcastle to Pelham, 18 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 125.
Chapter Seven
1. D.B.Horn, The British diplomatic service 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), is the best
introduction, although it is somewhat dated.
2. W.Robertson, The history of the reign of the Emperor Charles V (1769; 1782 edn.),
i, 134–5.
3. E.Gibbon, The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, J.B.Bury (ed.)
(1896–1900), IV, 163–6.
4. Horn, Diplomatic Service, 112–14; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 1, 8, 22 Nov.,
Mitchell to Holdernesse, 25 Dec. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70.
5. G.W.Rice, The diplomatic career of the fourth Earl of Rochford at Turin, Madrid and
Paris, 1749–1769, PhD thesis (University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 1973);
“British consuls and diplomats in the mid-eighteenth century: an Italian
example”, EHR 92, 834–46, 1977; and “Lord Rochford at Turin, 1749–55: a
pivotal phase in Anglo-Italian relations in the eighteenth century”, in Black,
Knights Errant, 92–112.
6. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 25 Feb., Joseph Yorke to Holdernesse, 11 Apr. 1758,
PRO, SP 90/71; Earl of Ilchester and Mrs Langford-Brooke, The life of Sir
Charles Hanbury-Williams (1929), 311–417.
205
NOTES
7. Hyndford to Burrish, 27 Feb. 1752, PRO, SP 110/6.

8. Hugh Valence Jones, Under Secretary in the Northern Department, to Burrish,
20 Aug. (os) 1752, Villettes to Burrish, 6 Sept. 1752, PRO, SP 110/6.
9. Schweizer, “Scotsmen and the British diplomatic service, 1714–1789”, Scottish
Tradition 7–8 (1977–8), 115–36.
10. Pelham to Newcastle, 28 Sept. (os) 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 171; M.A.
Thomson, The Secretaries of State 1681–1782 (Oxford, 1932); Newcastle to
Devonshire, 2 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 7; Holdernesse to Yorke, 30 July
1755, BL, Eg. 3446, f. 182; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Sept. (os) 1751, Horatio
Walpole to Hardwicke, 16 June (os) 1740, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Mar.
(os) 1749, Newcastle to Pelham, 13, 26 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35412, f. 19,
35586, f. 241, 35410, f. 116, 35411, f. 95, 100, 133; Pelham to Devonshire, 20
June (os) 1749, HP, Chatsworth.
11. J.C.D.Clark (ed.), The memoirs and speeches of James, 2nd Earl Waldegrave 1742–
1763 (Cambridge, 1988), 160–1.
12. Anon., A letter to the King of XXX (1756), 11–12.
13. Pol. Corr., vi, 168. There is no systematic study of Newcastle’s views on foreign
policy. He can be approached via Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, and his
correspondence in P.C.Yorke (ed.), Life and correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of
Hardwicke [3 volumes] (Cambr idge, 1913) and T.J.McCann (ed.), The
correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle 1724–1750 (Lewes, 1984).
14. D.B.Horn, “The Duke of Newcastle and the origins of the diplomatic
revolution”, in The diversity of history, J.H.Elliott & H.G.Koenigsberger (eds)
(1970), 247–68.
15. Newcastle to Pelham, 10 July 1748, NeC 638.
16. Pol. Corr., vi, 174, cf. 175–6.
17. Pol. Corr., VI, 176, 179.
18. Pelham, note on letter from Newcastle, 13 July 1753, Council memorandum,
21 Aug. 1753, BL, Add. 33201, f. 162, 32995, f. 27; Newcastle to Dickens, 2
Oct. 1753, Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago, CXLVIII, 493–4.
19. Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions 1783–1793 (Cambridge,
1994), 544–5.
20. P.Lawson, George Grenville: a political life (Oxford, 1984), 118–32; K.W.
Schweizer and J.Bullion, “The vote of credit controversy, 1762”, British Journal
for Eighteenth-Century Studies 15 (1992), 175–88.
21. Anon., An answer to a Pamphlet called a second letter to the people (1755), p. 14.
22. Holdernesse to Burrish, 20 Feb. 1756, PRO, SP 81/105.
23. Anon., A letter to his grace the D-of N-E, on the duty he owes himself…(1757), 2.
24. Marquis d’Havrincourt, 25 Apr. 1749, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f. 117.
Chapter Eight
1. Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 49.

2. Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 37.
3. Keith to Holdernesse, 22 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 32; Zamboni to.
Kaunitz, 7 Aug., 11 Sept. 1752, HHStA. England, Varia 10, f. 124, 140.
206
NOTES
4. J.Black, “The problems of the small state: Bavaria and Britain in the second
quarter of the eighteenth century”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 5–36.
5. Cobbett, xiv, 694; Thomas Harris to James Harris, 14 Dec. 1759, Winchester,
Hampshire CRO. 9M73/G311/7. For a similar warning by a pro-government
pamphleteer against unrealistic expectations, Anon., An appeal to the sense of the
people (1756), 52–3.
6. Cobbett, xiv, 801; Keene to Robinson, 30 July, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner
11843, 11850.
7. Walpole, Memoirs of…George II, i, 5–6, 34; Cobbett, xiii, 159, xiv, 963–70;
Egmont, BL, Add. 47012B, f. 177.
8. W.S.Taylor and J.H.Pringle (eds), The correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of
Chatham (4 vols, 1838–40).
9. “Mr. Pitt’s points”, memorandum, 21 Sept. 1753, BL, Add. 32995, f. 29–30;
J.Black, Pitt the Elder (Cambridge, 1992), 88–9.
10. Ibid., 109; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 14 Oct. 1755, BL, Add. 35364, f. 53.
11. Schlenke, England und das friderizianische Preussen, 230–49.
12. P.Langford, “William Pitt and Public Opinion, 1757”, EHR 88 (1973), 54–80;
N.Rogers, Whigs and cities: popular politics in the age of Walpole and Pitt (Oxford,
1989), 106.
13. Charles to Lady Townshend, 13 July 1757, BL, Add. 63079, f. 46.
14. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sept. 1757, BL, Add. 35417, f. 54; Bernis to
Aubeterre, envoy in Spain, 3 Jan. 1758, AE, CP, Espagne 523, f. 6.
15. Pitt to Keene, 23 Aug. 1757, New Haven, Beinecke Library, Osborn Files, Pitt;
Holdernesse to Mitchell, 23 Sept. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70; Monitor, 24 Sept.
1757. For differing views on Gibraltar, Anon., National prejudice opposed to the
national interest, candidly considered in the detention or yielding up Gibraltar and
Cape-Breton by the ensuing treaty of peace: with some observations on the natural
jealousy of the Spanish nation, and how far it may operate to the prejudice of the
British commerce if not removed at this crisis. In a letter to Sir John Barnard (1748),
Westminster Journal, 1 Apr. (os) 1749; Mirepoix to St Contest, 24 Dec. 1751,
AE, CP, Ang. 432, f. 354–6.
16. Rigby to Sir Robert Wilmot, 20 Nov. 1759, Derby, Public Library, Catton
Collection WH 3457; see also Monitor, 23 June 1759, 2 Jan. 1762.
17. Cabinet minute, PRO SP 90/70, 30/8/89, f. 52.
18. Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War, 64.
19. Haslang to Preysing, 13 Oct., 29 Oct., 29 Dec. 1758, 2, 16, 30 Jan., 2 Feb.
1759, Preysing to Haslang, 18 Nov. 1758, 18 Jan. [late Jan.] 1759, Munich,
Bayr. Ges., London 234–5; A. Schmid, Max III Joseph und die europäischen
Mächte: Die Aussenpolitik des Kurfürstentums Bayern 1745–1765 (Munich, 1987),
415–20, 440–2.
20. W.J.Eccles, “The role of the American colonies in eighteenth-century French
foreign policy”, in Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Storia Americana (Genoa,
1978), 165, 171; Newcastle to Fox, undated, Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Letters to
Henry Fox, 86; George Ross to Br igadier John Forbes, 11 Mar. 1758,
Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office, GD 45/2/20/10.
21. Bussy to Choiseul, 26 June, 9, 26 July, Choiseul to Bussy, 27 June 1761, AE,
CP, Ang. 443, f. 277, 339, 444, f. 67–8, 445, f. 17; Choiseul to Ossun, envoy in
Madrid, 19 Feb. 1760, 30 July 1761, AE, CP, Espagne 527, f. 235, 533, f. 173;
207
NOTES
Viry, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel, 30 June 1761, AST,

LM, Ing. 66. On the negotiations, Rashed, The Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool,
1951).
22. W.L.Grant, “Pitt’s theory of empire”, Queen’s Quarterly (July-Sept. 1908), 32–
43 and “Canada vs. Guadaloupe: an episode in the Seven Years’ War”, American
Historical Review 17 (1912), 734–66; R.Hyam, “Imperial interests and the
Peace of Paris”, in Reappraisals in British imperial history, R.Hyam & G.Martin
(eds) (Toronto, 1975), 21–43. Marie Peters’s important works on Pitt include
“The myth of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Great Imperialist. Part I: Pitt and
imperial expansion 1738–1763”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
20, 1993, and Pitt the Elder (Harlow, 1997).
23. Bussy to Choiseul, 26 July 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 444, f. 62–70; J.K.Hiller, “The
Newfoundland fisheries issue in Anglo-French treaties, 1713–1904”, Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History 24 (1996), 5–8; North Briton, 11 Dec. 1762.
24. P.D.Brown and K.W.Schweizer (eds), The Devonshire diary (1982), 116.
25. A.Soulange-Bodin, La diplomatic de Louis XV et le pacte defamille (Paris, 1894);
A.Bourguet, Le due de Choiseul et l’ alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906).
26. Choiseul to Bussy, 29 July, Ossun to Choiseul, 10, 13 Aug. 1761, AE, CP, Ang,
444, f 84, Espagne 533, f. 235, 259; Henry Fox to Shelburne, 29 Dec. 1761,
BL.Bowood, 15, f. 65; Elizabeth to Edward Montagu, 11 Sept. 1760, HL,
Montagu Papers 2394.
27. Yorke, Hardwicke, in, 318–21; Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 111.
28. Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 127–31, 135; W.J.Smith (ed.), The
Grenville Papers [4 volumes] (London, 1852–3), i, 386–7; Yorke to Sir John
Goodricke, 17 Oct. 1761, Bod. MS. Eng. Hist. C 62, f. 12.
29. Minute of St James’s meeting, 2 Oct. 1761, BL, Add. 32929, f. 18; Yorke,
Hardwicke, III, 279–80; Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 139.
30. Lyttelton to Elizabeth Montagu, 8 Oct. 1761, HL, Montagu Papers 1296.
31. D.Syrett, The siege and capture of Havana (1970); N.Tracy, Manila ransomed: the
British assault on Manila in the Seven Years’ War (Exeter, 1995); Portuguese
Secretary of State to Charles, 2nd Earl of Egremont, Secretary of State for the
Souther n Depar tment, 27 Sept. 1762, PRO 30/47/2; Hardwicke to
Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1762, BL, Add. 32943, f. 258–9.
32. J.L.Bullion, A great and necessary measure: George Grenville and the genesis of the
Stamp Act, 1163–1165 (Columbia, 1982).
33. J.L.Bullion, “Securing the peace: Lord Bute, the plan for the army, and the
origins of the American Revolution”, in K.W.Schweizer, Lord Bute, 17–39;
J.W.Shy, Toward Lexington: the role of the British army in the coming of the American
Revolution (Princeton, 1965), pp. 68–72.
34. N.Tracy, Navies, deterrence, and American independence: Britain and seapower in the
1760s and 1770s (Vancouver, 1988).
35. Melcombe, memo., 10 July 1762, Mount Stuart 2/93; memorandum by
Newcastle on discussion with Lyttelton, 24 Aug. 1762, BL, Add. 35422, f. 26;
I.Hont, “The rhapsody of public debt: David Hume and voluntary state bank-
ruptcy”, in Political discourse in early modern Britain, N.Phillipson & Q.Skinner
(eds) (Cambridge, 1993), 321–48.
36. Monitor, 28 Apr. 1762.
208
NOTES
Chapter Nine
1. Sir James Kinloch to Lord Braco, 5 Jan. (os) 1749, Aberdeen, University
Library, 2727/1/2/4.
2. Keene to Bedford, 21 May 1749, PRO, SP 94/135, f. 265–8; Anon., “Mémoire
sur les moyens de conserver par mer la paix retablie par le Traité d’Aix la
Chapelle ou projet d’union maritime entre la France, l’Espagne, la Suéde et le
Danemark”, July 1749, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 164–7; Rouillé to Bonnac, 27 Mar.
1755, AN, K 1351 no. 88; Earl of Bristol, envoy in Turin, to Holdernesse, 30
Aug. 1755, PRO, SP 92/63, f. 152.
3. S.Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (1991).
4. Rolt, The conduct of the several powers of Europe, iii, 1; Sandwich and Robinson
to Keith, 26 Sept. 1748, BL, Add. 35464, f 58.
5. Dickson, “English commercial negotiations with Austria, 1737–1752”, in A.
Whiteman, J.S.Bromley and P.G.M.Dickson (eds), Statesmen, scholars and
merchants, 80–9.
6. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 8 Feb. (os) 1751, PRO, SP 84/457.
7. P.W.Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763–1848 (Oxford,
1994), 485–91.
8. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 15 Oct. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70.
9. J.Black, “The Tory view of eighteenth-century Br itish foreign policy”,
Historical Journal 31 (1988), 475–6.
10. Anon., A letter to the King of XXX, 5; Tyrconnel to Sir John Cust, 30 Apr. (os)
1748; L.Cust, Records of the Cust family, series 3 (1927), 129. For Bedford,
C.Baudi di Vesme, La politica Mediterranea inglese nelle relazioni degli inviati
italiani a Londra durante la cosidetta Guerra di successione d’Austria (Turin, 1952),
117–18.
11. Cumberland to Fox, 23 Sept. 1757, Ilchester, Letters to Henry Fox, 120.
12. Pares, “American versus continental warfare, 1739–63”, EHR 51 (1936), 429–
65; K.W.Schweizer, “The draft of a pamphlet by John Stuart, 3rd Earl of
Bute”, Notes and Queries, (1981), 343–4; D.Baugh, “Great Britain’s ‘BlueWater’
policy, 1689–1815”, International History Review 10 (1988) 33–58.
13. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Apr. 1762, BL, Add 32937, f. 14.
14. Réflexions de M.de Bussy, 19 Mar. 1751, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f. 141.
15. Bedford to Keene, 6 July (os) 1749, PRO, SP 94/136, f. 1; Mirepoix to
Puysieulx, 23 Oct. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 176; Old England, 3 Feb. (os)
1750.
16. Newcastle to Yorke, 9 Mar., Newcastle to Keith, 22 Oct. 1753, PRO, SP 84/
462, 80/192; Pol. Corr., ix, 437–8, 457. For concern in 1755, Richard Blacow
to Thomas Bray, no date, Exeter College Oxford, Bray Papers.
17. Newcastle to Devonshire, 2 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 6; J.Glete, Navies and
nations: warships, navies and state building in Europe and Ameria, 1500–1860
(Stockholm, 1993), 266.
18. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 3 Jan. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 9–11; Pol. Corr., vii,
276, viii, 243.
19. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 July 1752, PRO, SP 36/119, f. 143; Joseph to
Philip Yorke, 5 Sept. 1752, BL, Add. 35363, f. 308.
209
NOTES
Chapter Ten
1. For Bute’s foreign policy, Schweizer’s work is crucial. It can be approached

through his contributions in K.W.Schweizer (ed.), Lord Bute: essays in re-
interpretation (Leicester, 1988). J.D.Nicholas, The ministry of Lord Bute, 1762–3,
PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988) is also very important. He
emphasizes the government’s continued desire for European allies.
2. Memorandum by James Harris MP, 9 Dec. 1761, HP, transcript of material in
the Malmesbury Papers.
3. Ibid., 12 May 1762.
4. Bute to Mitchell, 9 Apr. 1762, Mount Stuart, Cardiff Papers 6/143; Bedford’s
speech, 5 Feb. 1762, PRO 30/8/70/5; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 14 Apr. 1762,
BL, Add. 32937, f. 103; K.W.Schweizer and J.L.Bullion, “The vote of credit
controversy, 1762”, British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Studies 15 (1992), 175–
88; and “The use of the private papers of politicians in the study of policy
formulation during the eighteenth century: the Bute papers as a case study”,
Archives 22 (1995), 39–43; Schweizer, “Foreign policy and the eighteenth-
century English press: The case of Israel Mauduit’s ‘Considerations on the
present German war’”, Publishing History 39 (1996), 45–53.
5. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 1 Jan. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56.
6. J.L.Bullion, “Securing the peace: Lord Bute, the plan for the army, and the
origins of the American Revolution”, in Schweizer Lord Bute, 30. Despite the
title, Bullion’s essay includes much of importance on foreign policy; Trevor to
Robinson, 26 Mar. 1746, BL, Add. 23822, f. 245; Irby to Humfrey Morice, 18
Mar. 1761, Gosforth, Northumberland CRO, ZSW 554/11. For an emphasis
on cost, Nathaniel Cole to James Brockman, 9 Apr. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 42591,
f. 56; London Chronicle, 5 Jan. 1762; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 1 Apr. 1762, BL,
Add. 33030, f. 260.
7. Briton, 26 June, 10, 24 July, 22 Oct., 4 Dec. 1762.
8. K.W.Schweizer, “Lord Bute, Newcastle, Prussia and the Hague overtures: a re-
examination”, Albion 9 (1977), 72–97; Scott, British foreign policy, 46–7.
9. Haslang to Wachtendonck and Preysing, 7 Sept. 1762, Munich, Bayr. Ges.,
London 239.
10. K.W.Schweizer, “The Bedford motion and the House of Lords debate, 5 Feb.
1762”, Parliamentary History 5 (1986), 107–23.
11. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 8 Jan. 1762, BL, Add. 32933, f. 113–14; Newcastle
to Hardwicke, 8 Oct. 1761, 18 Jan. 1762, Newcastle to Devonshire, 31 Oct.,
26 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 32929, f. 115–16, 32933, f. 364, 32930, f. 221, 32932,
f. 363; Nicholas, Bute, 390.
12. Memorandum by Newcastle on discussion with Lyttelton, 24 Aug. 1762
Hardwicke account of conference with Bute, 28 July 1762, Newcastle to
Count William Bentinck, 24 Feb. 1763, BL, Add. 35422, f. 26, 32941, f. 87,
32947, f. 81–2; Buckinghamshire to George, 2nd Earl of Halifax, Secretary of
State, 20 Sept., Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 23 Sept., 20 Dec. 1763, PRO,
SP 91/ 72, 138, 109, 237–8; H.M.Scott, “Great Britain, Poland and the
Russian Alliance, 1763–1767”, Historical Journal 19 (1976), 62–9; I.de
Madariaga, Russia in the age of Catherine the Great (1981), 189–90; J.Black,
210
NOTES
“Anglo—Russian relations after the Seven Years War”, Scottish Slavonic Review
9 (1987), 27–37; Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, Holdernesse to Mitchell,
9 July 1756, PRO, SP 807 196, f. 37, 90/65; [Samuel Martyn], Deliberate
thoughts on the system of our late treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia, in regard to
Hanover (1756), 49; [John Shebbeare], A sixth letter to the people of England
(1757), 4; Anon., Royal Magazine, Jan. 1761, IV, 12; London Evening Post, 1 May
1762; St James’s Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1762.
13. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 25 Feb. 1762, BL, Add. 32935, f. 76–7; Nivernais,
French envoy in London, to Choiseul, 24 Sept. 1762, Chatelet, French envoy
in Vienna, to Praslin, 16 July, 17 Aug. 1763, AE, CP, Ang. 447, f. 146–8,
Autriche 295, f. 67–71, 201–2; Viry to Charles Emmanuel, 26 July 1763, AST,
LM, Ing. 68.
14. Chatelet to Praslin, 16 July, 17 Aug., 21 Sept., Praslin to Chatelet, 28 Aug.
1763, Count Guerchy, French envoy in London, to Praslin, 23, 28 Oct., 4
Nov. 1763, AE, CP, Autriche 295, f. 67–71, 201–2, 326, Ang. 451, f. 456–8,
473–7, 452, f 41; Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 28 Oct., Sandwich to
Stormont, 27 Dec. 1763, PRO, SP 91/72, f. 155–6, 80/119; Smith, The
Grenville papers, II, 240; Marmora to Charles Emmanuel, 11, 15 Nov., 13 Dec.
1763, 6, 24 Jan., 7 Feb., 20 Apr., 18 June 1764, AST, LM, Ing. 69; Annual
Register (1763), 213.
15. Clark, The dynamics of change.
16. D.W.Jones, War and political economy in the age of William III and Marlborough
(Oxford, 1988).
17. Bedford to Bute, 13 June 1761, Mount Stuart, 1761 Papers, no. 458.
18. Paterson to Bute, 9 Oct. 1762, Mount Stuart, Cardiff Papers 5/4.
19. Newcastle to Cumberland, 5 Ap. (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 33/272; J.Black,
“Territorial gain on the continent: an overlooked aspect of mid-eighteenth
century British foreign policy”, Durham University Journal 86 (1994), 43–50;
Vincent to Puysieulx, 5 Mar. 1747, AE, CP, Ang. 423, f. 86–7; Newcastle
Courant, 20 Feb. (os), 5 Mar. (os), Old England, 7 May (os), London Evening Post,
15 Sept. (os) 1748. For earlier lobbying on the importance of Cape Breton and
Newfoundland, BL, Add. 13972, f. 2–7. For talk of Britain purchasing Leghorn
(Livor no), Mann to Horace Walpole, 16 Jan. 1742, Lewis, Walpole’s
Correspondence, p. 267.
20. Horatio Walpole to Pelham, 3 Sept. 1747, NeC 489; Newcastle Courant, 22, 29
Sept. (os) 1749; Old England, 17 Feb. (os) 1750.
21. Richard Dobbs to Bute, 29 Jan., Arthur Dobbs to Bute, 2 June 1762, Mount
Stuart, 2/73–4. For a proposal for seizing leading Spanish bases in the New
World, J.Molesworth to Bute, 8 Oct. 1761, Mount Stuart, 4/121.
22. Wilson, “Empire, trade and popular politics”; The sense of the people: urban
political culture in Urban England, 1715–1785 (Cambridge, 1994); and “Empire
of Virtue. The imperial project and Hanoverian culture c. 1720–1785”, in
L.Stone (ed.), An imperial state at war: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (1994), 128–
64; Baugh, “Maritime strength and Atlantic Commerce”, in last, 210–11;
G.Jordan and Rogers, “Admirals as heroes: patr iotism and liber ty in
Hanoverian England”, Journal of British Studies 28 (1989), 201–24; B.Harris,”
‘American idols’: empire, war and the middling ranks in mid-eighteenth-
century”, Past and Present 150, 1996, 111–41.
211
NOTES
23. J.Brewer, “Commercialization and Politics”, in The birth of a consumer society: the
commercialization of eighteenth-century England, N.McKendrick, Brewer, J.H.
Plumb (1982), 209, 229. On the coal trade, Herbert Mackworth MP to
Pleydell Courteen, 25 July (os) 1739, Swansea, University Library, Mackworth
Papers 1236, A recent summary is offered in H.V.Bowen, War and British
Society, 1688–1815 (Cambridge, 1977) and another effective account is that by
P.K. O’Brien, Power with profit: the State and the economy, 1688–1815, 1991.
24. J.Andrews, Geographical aspects of the maritime trade of Kent and Sussex, 1650–
1750, PhD thesis (London, 1954), 170.
25. Sandwich to Chesterfield, 12 Jan. 1748, PRO, SP 84/433, f. 49.
26. Mildmay Journal, 1 Nov., 9 Dec. 1748, 1 Jan. 1749, Chelmsford, Essex Record
Office, D/DM 01/19.
27. R.V.Jackson, “Government expenditure and British economic growth in the
eighteenth century: some problems of measurement”, Economic History Review
second series, 43, 1990, 217–35; Richard to John Tucker, 11 Feb. (os) 1744,
Bod. MS. Don. C 106, f. 186.
28. Rev. Henry Gilbert to Cust, -Jan. (os) 1744, Cust, Cust Family, ii, 202.
29. W.J.Eccles, “The fur trade and eighteenth-century imperialism”, William and
Mary Quarterly 40 (1983), 341–62.
30. J.Walvin, Fruits of empire. Exotic produce and Br itish taste, 1660–1800
(Basingstoke, 1997). For a recent study of the role of economic interest in
expansionism, J.L.A.Webb, “The mid-eighteenth century gum arabic trade
and the British conquest of Saint-Louis du Sénégal, 1758”, Journal of Imperial
and Commonwealth History 25 (1997), 37–58.
212
Index
Africa, West 25, 68, 70, 127, 154, 168, Bahamas 168
174 Baker, William 129
Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 1748 1, 16, balance of power 20, 133–4, 147, 152,
60, 62, 64, 69, 91, 114, 116, 118, 166–7, 171–2, 177
125, 148 Baltic 5, 17, 27, 62, 64–5, 79–80, 84,
Albemarle, William, 2nd Earl of 71, 75 128, 156
Alsace 15 Baltimore 168
Alt, Justus 117 Barnard, Sir John 110
Amelot de Chaillou, Jean-Jacques 38, Barrier 18, 61, 75, 129, 169–70
50, 54, 85 Bath, William, Earl of 50, 88, 96, 107–
Anna (of Russia) 13 9, 112, 114, 165
Anne, Queen 85, 105, 176 Bath Chronicle 183
Anson, George, Admiral Lord 61 Bavaria 49, 105, 112, 117–21, 142,
Anson, Thomas 52 147–8, 153
Antin, Antoine-François, Marquis de Bedford, John, 4th Duke of 70,
47 114, 122, 127, 139–40, 143, 172,
Appalachians 75, 79, 168 181
army, British 40 Behr, Burchard Christian von 178
Army of Observation 24, 150–3, 156 Belle Ile 25–6
Atterbury Plot, 1722 53 Bergen-op-Zoom 16, 45
Aubeterre, Joseph-Henri, Marquis d’ Berlin 27
22 Bermuda 168
Augustus III of Saxony-Poland 11, 14, Bestuzhev-Riumin, Alexis 17, 21, 23
21, 23, 83, 121 Blanning, T.C.W. 41
Austria 9–11, 17–23, 65–6, 79, 83, 87, Blue Water Strategy 9, 61, 112, 124,
140, 144–5, 153, 170, 177, 179 149, 151, 172, 176
Austrian Netherlands 11, 15, 18, 20, Bohemia 27, 42
43, 45–6, 49–51, 55–6, 59, 61, 68, Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount
75, 113, 128, 170 8
Austrian Succession, War of, 1740–8 Bonnac, François-Armand d’Usson,
see War Marquis de 76
213
INDEX
Boscawen, Admiral Edward 20, 77–9, Charles VI (of Austria) 11–13, 97, 107,
155, 183 181
Bremen 97 Charles XII (of Sweden) 10
Breslau, Peace of, 1742 15 Charles Albert (of Bavaria), Charles VII
Breslau, Treaty of, 1741 13 11, 13, 18, 33, 95, 146
Brest 20 Charles Edward Stuart 17, 57, 112
Bristol 127, 161 Charles Emmanuel III (of Sardinia) 11,
Briton 177 15, 17
Broad Bottom ministry 59, 64 Chatham, Earl of, see Pitt, William, the
Bruges 16, 170 Elder
Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 26, 85 Chavigny, Anne-Théodore Chevignard
Brussels 16, 170 de 49–50
Buckinghamshire, John, 2nd Earl of Cherbourg 25
177, 179–80 Chesterfield, Philip, 4th Earl of 40, 45,
Burrish, Onslow 105–6, 137 51, 56, 108, 114, 139–40
Bussche, Johann 91 Choiseul, Etienne-François, Duke of
Bussy, François de 20, 49–50, 57, 78–9, 25, 156, 158
138, 156, 172 Citizen 33, 167
Bute, John, 3rd Earl of 5, 26, 100–2, Clark, Jonathan 41, 181
107, 175–6, 178–9, 181–2 Clement-Auguste, Archbishop of
Byng, John, Admiral 24 Cologne 177
Cleves 12, 23
Cabinet 106, 159 Clive, Robert 154
Cambis, Louis-Dominique, Count 49 Clutterbuck, Thomas 88
Campbell, John, MP 111, 113 Cologne 105
Campbell, John, writer 129 colonial issues 25, 68, 72–4, 76–8, 129,
Campbell, Pryse 124 133, 149, 155–8, 166–8, 173, 181–3
Canada 20, 26, 58–60, 68–70, 72, 77, Corsica 180
149, 157, 160, 162, 166, 168, 175, Cotton, Sir John Hynde 107
182 Courland 21
Cape Breton 16, 58–60, 74, 77, 126, Craftsman 53–4
156–7, 173, 182 Culloden, battle of, 1746 15, 62, 173
Caribbean 47, 51, 58, 79, 98, 166, 168, Cumberland, William, Duke of 16, 24,
173 48, 62–3, 67, 73–4, 83, 93, 96, 115,
Carlos, Don, see Charles III (of Spain) 117, 150–1, 153, 155, 172
Cartagena 161, 183
Carteret, John, Lord, later Earl Daily Post 166
Granville 5–6, 15, 17, 31–2, 34–6, Dann, Uriel 30, 41
38–41, 51–5, 57, 61, 65, 67, 74, 83, Denmark 17, 31, 35, 82–4, 98, 120,
93–5, 102, 107–8, 110, 112, 118, 128
122, 139–40, 150, 152, 158 Dettingen, battle of, 1743 15, 45, 55,
Catherine II (of Russia) 136 60, 113, 155
Centinel 131 Devonshire, William, 4th Duke of 149
Champion 1–2 Dickens, Guy 13, 32
Charleroi 16 Dinwiddie, Robert 20, 72
Charles III (of Spain) 11–12, 17, 25, Diplomatic Revolution, 1756 4–5, 9,
158, 166 19, 63, 79–80, 171
214
INDEX
diplomats 131–2, 135–8 Francis, Duke (of Lorraine and then

Dobbs, Arthur 182–3 Tuscany), later Emperor Francis I
Dodington, George Bubb 39, 96–7, 11, 17, 154
117, 162 Frederick, Duke of York 178
Dominica 26, 74 Frederick, Prince of Wales 70, 85, 93,
Douglas, John 96 117, 125
Dresden, Treaty of, 1745 15 Frederick II, the Great (of Prussia) 1
Drummond, John 51, 54, 105 2–15, 18–28, 31, 37, 41–2, 47, 49,
Dunkirk 36, 54, 58, 69, 71, 118, 146, 55–6, 63, 66–7, 71, 79, 83, 85–92,
148 95, 97–101, 122, 136, 140, 144–5,
Durand, François-Marie 117 151, 160, 173–5
Duras, Emmanuel-Félicité, Duke de 76 Frederick William I (of Prussia) 12,
Durham 183 31–2, 86, 92, 97–8
Fuentes, Count 158
East Friesland 89, 91, 97–100 Fürstenbund, 1785 48
East India Company, British 16, 70, Füssen, Treaty of, 1746 15
128–9, 131, 156, 167
East Prussia 21, 27 General Advertiser 183
Egmont, John, 2nd Earl of 118, 120, Geneva 66
148 Genoa 15, 180
elections 105, 115 George I 48, 81, 85, 92–3, 132
Elisabeth Farnese 11 George II 5–6, 12, 18–19, 21, 25, 31,
Elizabeth I of England 165 34–5, 41–3, 45, 48–9, 53, 63–4,
Elizabeth, Tsarina of Russia 19–20, 23, 66–7, 70, 72, 75–7, 81, 83, 85–103,
156, 171 110, 117, 122, 125, 132, 135, 137,
Elliot, Sir Gilbert 73 139–41, 148–51, 155, 174, 184
Emden 153 George III 26, 70, 81, 88, 92–3, 100–2,
Emden Company 92, 100 159, 162, 175–9, 184
Georgia 168
Falkland Islands 77, 165–7 Ghent 16, 170
Family Compact, Third, 1761 25, 157, Gibbon, Edward 134
159 Gibbs, Graham 30
Fawkener, Sir Everard 83 Gibraltar 26, 116, 152
Ferdinand VI (of Spain) 9, 17 Glorious Revolution 124, 133, 165,
Ferdinand of Brunswick 153–6, 175 171
Fielding, Henry 64 Goree 25–6, 157
finance 26, 164–5, 176–7 Gower, John, 1st Earl 114
Finch, Edward 12, 99 Grafton, Augustus, 3rd Duke of 178
Finckenstein, Karl, Count 95 grain exports 183
Finland 15 Granby, John, Marquis of 155
Flanders 16, 31, 56, 59 Great Northern War, 1700–21 10, 12,
Flemming, Karl, Count 42 87, 97
Fleury, André Hercule de 12, 32, 38, Gregg, Edward 41
47–8, 85, 111 Grenada 26
Florida 26, 168, 175 Grenville, George 172
Fontenoy, battle of, 1745 16 Guadeloupe 25–6, 156–7, 178
Fox, Henry 73, 106, 124, 149 Gustavus III (of Sweden) 92
215
INDEX
Halifax, George, 2nd Earl of 73, 139 ‘James III’ 1, 17, 53, 59
Halifax, Nova Scotia 68 Jemappes, battle of, 1792 170
Hamburg 128 Jenkins’ Ear, War of see War of
Hanbury-Williams, Sir Charles 21–2, Jenkins’ Ear
90, 135–6 Johnson, Samuel 165
Hanover 19–26, 29–30, 33, 39–41, 48, Joseph I (of Austria) 11
55–6, 58, 63, 65–8, 70–1, 74, 77, Joseph II (of Austria) 18, 92
80–102, 144–6, 150–3, 156, 162, Jülich-Berg 8, 49, 97–9
175–8, 184
Hardenberg, Count 85 Kaunitz, Count Wenzel 19–22, 180
Hardwicke, Philip, 1st Earl 6, 24, 31–2, Keene, Benjamin 75, 95–6, 127–9,
37–8, 42, 70, 94, 105, 123, 128, 148, 135–6, 147, 152
158 Keith, Robert 22, 64, 135, 137–8,
Harrington, William, Lord 6, 32, 36, 145
38, 41, 48, 89, 93–4, 97–8, 139 Keith, Sir William 33
Haslang, Joseph, Count 37, 102, 114, Kleinschnellendorf, Convention of 15
117, 154 Klosterseven, Convention of, 1757
Hastenbeck, battle of, 1757 24, 151, 24–5, 48, 151–2, 156
155 Kolin, battle of, 1757 27
Hatton, Ragnhild 41, 93
Havana 2, 26, 106, 161, 183 La Salle, René-Robert, Sieur de 77
Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward 74, 155, Laffeldt, battle of, 1747 16
183 Lagos, battle of, 1759 25, 45, 154–5
Hervey, John, Lord 32, 85, 92, 94 Lee, Dr George 116
Hesse-Cassel 26, 83, 85, 118, 124 Legge, Henry 120, 130–1, 137, 141
Hildesheim, Prince-Bishopric of 82, Leghorn 127
102, 177 Leuthen, battle of, 1757 27
Holdernesse, Robert, 4th Earl of 6, 52, Levant Company 127
67, 75, 77–9, 93–4, 105–6, 128, 135, Lichfield, George, 3rd Earl of 123
138–9 Linz 13
Hudson’s Bay Company 129, 168 Lithuania 180
Hungary 10–11 Liverpool 161
Hyndford, John, 3rd Earl of 90, 137 Livonia 12, 21
Locke, John 122
Imperial Election Scheme 5, 18, 35, Lodge, Sir Richard 1, 29
49, 67–8, 90, 92, 118, 140–1, 147 logwood 25, 158
India 25, 68, 70, 72, 128, 149, 154, London 154, 161, 165, 183
156, 160, 168, 174, 181 London Chronicle 129, 157
invasion 25, 56–7 London Evening Post 157, 161, 173,
Irby, Sir William 177 184
Ireland 26, 182 Lords, House of 105, 114, 122
Italy 145, 158, 177 Lorraine 15
Ivan VI (of Russia) 13 Lorraine, Charles of 15, 18, 43
Louis XIV of France 47, 49, 52–3, 57,
Jacobites 2, 15, 36, 50, 53, 55–6, 79, 169, 178
111–13, 171, 173, 178–9 Louis XV of France 11–12, 14, 17,
Jacobite’s Journal 183 19, 21, 23, 25, 56, 75, 77, 93, 99,
Jamaica 26 169, 171
216
INDEX
Louisbourg 2, 16, 24–5, 58, 146, Namur 16, 170

154–5 Naples 12, 15, 26
Louisiana 20, 26, 157, 162, 166, 168 Napoleon 168, 171
Lowther, Sir James 31 National Debt 61, 126, 164
Lyttleton, George 113, 119, 159, 179 navy 2, 24, 37, 148, 155, 160, 162, 167,
173–4, 184
Maastricht 16, 170 Nevis 173
Mackesy, Piers 41 Newcastle, Thomas, 1st Duke of 6, 8,
Madras 16 17–18, 24, 31–2, 35, 37, 40–3, 45,
Maillebois, Yves-Marie, Count de 33 52–3, 56–7, 59, 61–2, 64–6, 68–9,
Manila 2, 26, 161 71–5, 84, 91, 93–4, 96, 98, 101–2,
Maria Theresa (ruler of Austria) 9, 11, 105–7, 111, 115, 120–1, 125–9,
13, 17–20, 22, 27, 33, 50–1, 54, 59, 137–43, 146, 151–2, 154, 158–9,
88, 107, 109, 111 173, 176–9, 184
Marlborough, Charles, 3rd Duke of 40 Newfoundland 26, 157–9, 168, 173,
Marlborough, John, 1st Duke of 16, 182
54, 158 newspapers 165, 175
Marmora, Count 180 Nivernais, Louis-Jules, Duke of 22
Marseille 184 Nootka Sound 77, 166
Martin, Samuel 119 North America 17, 19–20, 68, 70,
Martinique 25–6, 160, 163, 178 78–80, 129, 149, 153–4, 168, 174,
Mauduit, Israel 175 181
Maximilian Joseph (of Bavaria) 14 Nova Scotia 61, 68, 70, 72–3, 79,
Mecklenburg 99 148, 168
Mediterranean 79
Mexico 161 Ochakov Crisis, 1791 179, 181
Michell, Abrahm Louis 137 Ohio valley 19, 69, 72, 75–6
Milanese 11, 15 ‘Old Corps’ 4, 111, 113, 151
Mildmay, William 184 Old England 58–9, 74, 122, 143,
Minden, battle of, 1759 25, 155, 179 172–3
Minorca 2, 22, 24, 26, 46, 56, 149, ‘Old System’ 17–19, 64, 100, 141,
154, 157 145, 170
Mirepoix, Gaston, Duke de 20, 61, Osnabrück 64, 91, 177–8
69–70, 72, 75–8, 118, 174 Ossorio, Giuseppe 34, 43, 116
Mitchell, Andrew 14, 23, 27, 135–6, Ostend 16, 57, 112, 151, 170, 182
138, 171, 176 Owen, John 41, 114
Money, William 137 Owen’s Weekly Chronicle 143
Monitor 104, 126, 151–3, 156–8, 163,
177 Pacific Ocean 161, 167–8
Mons 16 Panama, Isthmus of 2
Montagu, Elizabeth 158 Panin, Count Nikita 179
Montréal 25, 154 Pardo, Convention of the, 1738 108–9
Morton, James, 13th Earl of 40 Pares, Richard 30
Mosquito Coast 25 Paris, Peace of, 1763 11, 26, 28, 125,
Münchhausen, Gerlach Adolph von 48, 168, 175
64–5, 67, 90–1, 198 Parliament 6, 30, 37, 39, 48, 61,
Munich 13 104–30, 132, 172, 175–6
Murray, William 115–16, 119–20 Parma 11, 15, 17
217
INDEX
Partition of Poland, First, 1772 47 Pulteney, William, see Bath, William,

Paterson, John 182 Earl of
Patriots 3, 5, 153, 175 Puysieulx, Louis-Philogène Brulart,
Pelham, Henry 38, 50, 61–2, 72–4, 94, Marquis de 43, 47, 62–4, 66,
100, 109, 115–16, 118–19, 121, 69–70, 117
124, 126, 130, 138–9, 141, 148
Penny London Post 183 Québec 17, 25, 154
Perron, Count 72, 75, 77 Quiberon Bay, battle of, 1759 25, 45,
Peru 161 154–5, 173
Peter I, the Great (of Russia) 10, 12
Peter III (of Russia) 80, 136, 179 Ralph, James 87
Philip II (of Spain) 165 Regensburg 89
Philip V (of Spain) 5, 47, 166 Reval 10
Philip, Don 12, 15, 17 Richelieu, Louis-François-Armand,
Philippines 161 Duke de 24, 63
Piacenza 11, 15–17 Riga 10
Piacenza, battle of, 1746 15 Rigby, Richard 153
Pitt, William, the Elder 23–6, 88, 100, Roberts, Michael 31
106, 112–14, 118, 123, 125, 130, Robertson, William 134
136, 140, 146–60, 172, 175, 177–8, Robinson, Sir Thomas 36, 43, 75,
184 77–8, 89, 120, 136, 138–9, 149,
Pitt, William the Younger 180 170
Plassey, battle of, 1757 154 Rochford, William, 4th Earl of 135–6
Podewils, Count Heinrich von 37–9 Rockingham, Charles, 2nd Marquis of
Poland 18, 27, 50, 66, 71, 179–80 102
Polish Succession, War of the see War Rolt, Richard 170
of the Polish Succession, 1733–5 Rossbach, battle of, 1757 27, 179
Pomerania 12, 27 Roucoux, battle of, 1746 16
Pompadour, Jeanne-Antoinette, Rouillé, Antoine-Louis 20, 73, 75,
Marquise de 22, 27 77–8
Pondicherry 25–6 Royal Magazine 180
Poole 184 Russia 9–10, 12–23, 63, 66, 68, 79,
Porto Bello 2, 155, 183 83–4, 97, 99, 102, 124, 136, 141,
Portugal 3, 26, 31, 70, 129, 160–1, 145, 148, 177, 179
176
postal interception 6, 42, 85, 95–6, Saint-Contest, François-Dominique
158 Barberie de 71–3
Potter, John 115 Salisbury 161
Pragmatic Sanction 11–12, 99–100 Salisbury Journal 161
Prague 13, 27 Salm 66
Protestant alliance 43 Sandwich, John, 4th Earl of 18, 40,
Protester 71 43, 64–5, 91, 96, 114, 137, 170,
Provence 15 180
Prussia 12, 56, 61, 63–5, 67, 87, 137, Saratoga, battle of, 1777 27
140, 142, 146, 148, 153, 160, 162, Sardini?, kingdom of 11, 52
175–7, 180 Saxe, Maurice, Marshal 16, 59
public opinion 39, 47, 72, 115–16, Saxony 23, 27, 71, 85, 148
125–6, 150, 153, 177 Scarborough, Richard, 2nd Earl of 108
218
INDEX
Scotland 173 Townshend, Charles 151

Second Silesian War 14, 27, 138–40 Townshend, Charles, 2nd Viscount 35,
Secretaries of State 30, 35, 138–40 41, 93, 96, 139
Senegal 26 trade 26, 111, 127–30, 152, 166–7, 170
Septennial Act, 1716 105 Trevor, Robert 30, 34, 36, 41, 55, 87,
Settlement, Act of, 1701 58, 88 97, 106, 136, 177
Seven Years War, 1756–63 2, 10–11, Triennial Act, 1694 105
62, 88, 106, 115, 155, 166, 168, Tucker, John 110, 114
171, 177, 184 Tucker, Josiah 129
Seville, Treaty of, 1729 58 Tucker, Richard 27
Shirley, William 68 Turkey 9–10, 18, 66, 68, 179
Silesia 11, 13, 19, 22, 26–7, 33, 42, 47, Tuscany 11, 26
86, 90, 100, 144–5 Tyrconnel, John, Viscount 172
Silesian debts 92, 100
Slade, Sir Thomas 155 Union Journal; or, Halifax Advertiser 156
sources 6, 95–6 United Provinces, Dutch 16–17, 19,
Spain 9, 14, 31–3, 36, 46–7, 58, 60, 62, 31, 39, 41, 57, 74, 87, 106, 166,
66, 91, 107, 111, 147, 152, 156–61, 179, 181
165–9 Utrecht, Peace of, 1713 47, 108–9,
St. Helena 168 114–15, 118, 158, 168–9
St. Lawrence, river 2
St. Lucia 26, 58, 74 Valory, Louis-Guy-Henri, Marquis de
St. Saphorin, François, Seigneur de 66
136 Vaucher, Paul 29
St. Severin, Alphonse, Count de 91 Vergennes, Charles, Count of 10–11
St. Vincent 26, 74 Vernon, Admiral Edward 155, 183
Stair, John, 2nd Earl of 34, 51–3, 59 Versailles, First Treaty of, 1756 19, 22,
Stanhope, James, Viscount 36, 152 63
Stanley, Hans 158 Versailles, Second Treaty of, 1757 23
Starhemberg, George, Count 21–2 Vienna, battle of, 1683 10
Steadfast Society 127 Vienna, First Treaty of, 1725 58, 111
Steinberg, Ernst, Freiherr von 90–1, Vienna, Second Treaty of, 1731 64, 74
177 Vienna, Third Treaty of, 1738 12
Steinhorst 97 Villettes, Arthur 13–14, 137
Stone, Andrew 57, 118–20 Villiers, Thomas 37, 39
Stormont, David, Viscount 177 Virginia 20, 72
subsidy treaties 41, 105, 118, 126, 160, Viry, Count 102
176
Sumatra 168 Wager, Sir Charles 13
Sweden 9–10, 13–14, 17, 63, 65–6, 68, Waldegrave, James, 1st Earl 32, 38, 47,
83–4, 98, 128, 166 107
Waldegrave, James, 2nd Earl 139
taxation 61, 126, 164, 176 Wall, Richard 158
Temple, Richard, 2nd Earl 159 Walpole, Horace, 4th Earl of Orford
Thompson, Anthony 38, 48, 135 91–2, 94, 120, 147–8
Titley, Walter 136 Walpole, Horatio 31, 37, 41, 53, 72,
Tobago 26, 68, 74 90, 93, 99–100, 113, 120, 125, 137,
Tories 5, 107, 112–14, 122, 149, 171–2 139, 146
219
INDEX
Walpole, Sir Robert 4–5, 30–1, 34, 40, Weston, Edward 8

47–50, 54, 61, 95–6, 101, 108–11, Westphalia 27, 48, 88
116, 118, 120, 147 Whig Split 117
War of American Independence 88, Whigs 4
161 Whigs, Opposition 107–9, 112–14
War of the Austrian Succession, Wilhelmstah, battle of, 1762 25
1740–8 2, 5, 11, 29–30, 43–4, 62, William III of Orange 16, 46–7, 52,
83, 90–2, 107, 114–15, 136, 144, 54, 81, 84–5, 87, 133, 176
153, 158, 179 William IV of Orange 16, 19
War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1739–48 2, 11, Wilmington, Spencer, 1st Earl of 95
14 Wilson, Arthur 29
War of the Polish Succession, 1733–5 Wolfe, General James 155
11–12, 15, 31, 47, 53, 97, 111 Worms, Treaty of, 1743 15–16
War of the Quadruple Alliance, Württemberg 66
1718–20 53 Wych, Sir Cyril 95
War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–
13 1–2, 16, 114–15, 125, 153, xenophobia 4
155, 179, 181
Warren, Vice-Admiral, Sir Peter 74, Yonge, Sir William 120–1
155 Yorke, Joseph 58, 62, 68–71, 75–6,
Washington, George 20 103, 105, 107, 135
Watson, Charles Yorke, Philip, 2nd Earl of Hardwicke 58
West Indies 25, 68, 99, 128, 147–8, Yorktown, battle of, 1781 162
182
Westminster, Convention of, 1756 19, Zamboni, Giovanni Giacomo 116
21–2 Zorndorf, battle of, 1758 27–8
220

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America or Europe?

Also by Jeremy Black and published by UCL Press

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.

First published in 1998 by UCL Press

UCL Press Limited

1900 Frost Road, Suite 101

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

The name of University College London (UCL) is a registered

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ISBN 0-203-49947-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-80771-5 (Adobe eReader Format)

I began working on a sequel to my British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole

her secretarial support. I have benefited from the opportunity to advance

Add. Additional Manuscripts

patriotic exhortation. Foreigners kicked into the filthy gutters of London

Succession, an attempt to recast the territorial situation in central Europe

Politics must change with the situation of things…

A brief account of international relations and the course of British foreign

that greatly concerned contemporaries, for example, in 1736–40 the Jülich-

more clearly a number of confrontations and conflicts, with different causes,

the conduct of diplomacy between battles is a phantasmagoric frenzy of

illegitimate progeny, Marshal Saxe, scored a number of successes and were

The diplomatic alignments of the postwar world had already been

Earl of Sandwich, one of the British Plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle,

Governor of Virginia, was ordered to use force to defend British claims.28 In

willingness to grasp the opportunity led to the conclusion of an agreement on

any Anglo-French conflict. 42 Kaunitz also approached Louis through his

Bestuzhev-Riumin and his anglophile policies. 47 Frederick stressed the

commitment to Germany. Under a subsidy treaty signed on 11 April 1758,

Although Frederick survived, the Anglo-Prussian alliance did not. Tensions

Having provided an overview, it is necessary to turn back from the relatively

consequences of French intervention, “if France joined with Spain we [the

…notwithstanding the great age of the present prime minister of that

The search for an alliance system represented a rejection of pressure for a

An emphasis on self-sufficiency was linked to a sense of the transience of

such an universal change in the face of public affairs throughout all

An anti-French alliance intended to intimidate France was not the same as an

by the opposition on the Hanoverian neutrality, and ministerial denials had

Carteret’s vigorous espousal of the anti-French cause was marked by a

In 1745 Harrington, a minister not noted for expressing concern about

They have a good opinion of the stability of our affairs in England,

Carteret returned to the theme of the impact of domestic support on the

On the 2d inst. Count Podewils told me, that he was informed by a

It may be hoped that these sentiments will be adopted, and these

In the same debate, the Duke of Marlborough declared:

It is not possible to mention Hanover, or its inhabitants, in any public

Abroad our gallant Army fights

The Pelhams were probably encouraged in their opposition to Carteret’s

George II was less prepared to tolerate Prussian aggrandizement. His

However, the London ministers urged the subordination of opposition to Prussia

how little…was to be expected from France, if the King of Prussia was

arguments are out of the Question…the Question appears to us, not to

The ambiguity in British aims, which essentially put George II in opposition

the behavior of the Queen of Hungary, in totally abandoning the

Frederick II and in order to protect Hanover, British troops did campaign in

octogenarian Fleury appeared an inappropriate first minister for a period of

what may be expected from an emperor whose elevation was procured

Thus Br itish interests were to be identified with a particular state of

In office the following May, Stair wrote to Robinson,

I have never been nor understood to be a partisan of the House of

dureé of attitudes that constituted an important factor in the structure of British

thinking on foreign policy. It was glanced at in the pseudonymous name of the