Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Best evidence – evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in
question
Secondary evidence – evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best
evidence and shows on its fact that better evidence exists
Factum probans – the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be
established; material evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the
consideration of the tribunal
Factum probandum – the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to
be established, hypothetical, and that which one party affirms and the other
denies
Factum probandum Factum Probans
Proposition to be established Material evidencing the proposition
Conceived of as hypothetical; Conceived of for practical purposes as
that which one party affirms and existent, and is offered as such for the
the other denies consideration of the court
Collateral facts – matters other than facts in issue and which are offered as a
basis merely for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in
issue
Real evidence – evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or
inspection as distinguished from a description by them of a witness; that which is
addressed directly to the senses of the court without the intervention of a witness
Rebuttal evidence – evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or
disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party
Positive evidence – when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence – when a witness states that he did not see or know the
occurrence of a fact
2. Distinguish
Admissibility of evidence Weight of evidence
Pertains to the ability of the evidence Pertains to the effect of evidence
to be allowed and accepted subject to admitted
its relevancy and competence
Substantive essence or characteristic The probative value of evidence
feature of evidence as would make it which the court may give to admit
worthy of consideration by the court after complying with the rules of
before its admission relevancy and competency
Proof Evidence
Effect and result of evidence Medium of proof
End Result Means to the end
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3. Scope
a. Rule 128 §2
Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts
and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or
these rules. (2a)
b. Cases
Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992) The Rules of Court, and its rules on Evidence,
are not even suppletorily applicable to agrarian cases. Special law allows
affidavits to be admitted in evidence in agrarian courts, even without the witness
testifying nor subject to cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was presented were affidavits. Ordinarily,
affidavits are not admissible before the regular courts because there is no
opportunity for the other party to cross-examine. Depositions are admissible
because there was an opportunity for the adverse party to cross-examine.
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 237 (1993) The unverified position
paper is a mere procedural infirmity which does not affect the merits of the case.
Procedural technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before the LA.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
.1 probation board
.2 CTA
.3 SEC
.4 Immigration cases
.5 LA/NLRC
.6 CAR
B. Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Requisites for admissibility
.1 relevant
.2 competent
1. Relevancy
a. Rule 128 §4
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. – Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
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2. Competence
a. Rule 128 §3
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Competence – not excluded by the law or the RoC
b. Constitutional rules of exclusion
1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3
Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
2) Art. III, Sec. 12
Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
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4) RA 4200: Wire-tapping
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Unlawful acts
.1 any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:
.2 any person to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured in the manner prohibited by this law; or
.3 any person to replay the same for any other person or persons
.4 any person to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing,
or
.5 any person to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person:
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The use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in
the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following
section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes
such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it
unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a
written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of
treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and
other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written
order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has
been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed:
Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such
authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts
of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for,
or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3)
that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
.1 any peace officer
.2 authorized by a written order of the Court
.3 in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping, espionage and other offenses
against national security:
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
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Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) As a general rule courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an
exception is when in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to
all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when,
with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
then pending.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)
2. Judicial admissions
a. Rule 129 §4
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.2 is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
.3 consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
.4 the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office
2. Cases
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990) The best evidence rule does not apply to
the marked money in a buy bust operation because the inquiry is not on the
contents of the marked bill, but merely its existence.
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948) – BER only applies if the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document; such an inquiry need not be the main issue
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504 (1986) – US BER “or their equivalents” vs.
Philippine BER “other modes of written expression;” is a disputed work in an
infringement case object or documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910)
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F. Secondary Evidence
1. Rule 130 §5-8
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. – If the document is in the custody or under the control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 §25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any public record, an official copy of which is
admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon
order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case. (27 a)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. - An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from all the people who possibly has a copy of
the original, e.g. Notarized Deed of Sale
.1 Vendor
.2 vendee
.3 notary public
.4 clerk of the court which gave the notary public commission
.5 Bureau of Archives
Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds
.1 the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
.a prove execution or existence
.b prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror
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Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the original has been lost or destroyed, the
offeror may prove its contents by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document or by testimony of witnesses. The Certificate is one such authentic
document.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 (1983) In case of loss of the original of a
document, the order of proof is as follows; 1) existence of the original, 2) its due
execution, 3) loss, and 4) its contents. Failure to prove loss of all the originals
without fault of the offeror renders secondary evidence inadmissible.
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963)– when the existence of a
document is proven, the court should allow the lost document to be proven by
parole; testimony of a witness need not be verbatim
Compañia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) – voluminous
character of accounts must be established, and it must be made available to the
adverse party before parole; audit made by or testimony of private auditor is
inadmissible as proof of original record or books of accounts; auditor’s opinion not
admissible; best evidence on cost of equipment are sales invoices not testimony
of an auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968) – it is not necessary for a
party seeking to introduce copy to prove that original is in actual possession of
adverse party as long as it is under his control; adverse party need not admit that
it is in his possession before a copy may be introduced
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 (1915) – To prove a lost document,
must prove due execution, delivery (if required), and the fact of lost or
destruction; it is important to have qualified witnesses
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not, bound to offer it. - A party
who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not
obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
G.Parol Evidence Rule
1. Rule 130 §9
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an,
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
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4. Cases
Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990) PER does not apply to receipts because it is not
an agreement. It is proof only of delivery of money. Furthermore, the parole
evidence bars only evidence as to the terms, it does not bar evidence as to
statement of facts. The receipt of money is merely a statement of fact. Lastly,
failure of the adverse party to object renders parole evidence admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA 740 (1993)
Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car in favor of Michael Santos. Pioneer claims
that the car was merely a security for the time deposit placements of Santos’
relatives. Since Santos’ relatives have recovered their placements, Pioneer sued
for recovery of the car.
Held: Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While
parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake. Pioneer failed to produce any instrument or
written document which would prove that the deed of sale in question was only a
security for the time deposit placements of Santos' relatives in Pioneer. The 2
main witnesses for Pioneer, were not mere employees of the bank. They were
bank officers; one being a lawyer and supposed to be steeped in legal and
banking knowledge and practices. They were expected to know the consequences
of their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred ownership over the
subject vehicle in favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed of
sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the parties) a stipulation that
transfer of ownership and registration of the vehicle in Santos' name were
conditioned on the failure of his relatives to recover their time deposit placements
in petitioner bank. No such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale which
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Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) – PER does not specify that the agreement be
a public document; need not be in any particular form or signed by the parties;
fraud must be corroborated
Ortañez v. CA – contemporaneous conditions not referred to in the contract can
not be proven by parol; merely alleging that the contract is subject to conditions
does not “put” the exception “in issue in the pleadings”
H.Interpretation of Documents
1. Rule 130 §10-19
Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. –
The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal
meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties
intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. –
In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions
or particulars. such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular
provisions. – In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. – For the proper
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was
made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to
it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those whose language he is to interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. – The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation,
but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the
particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed
accordingly.(12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. – When an instrument consists
partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are
inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain
writings. – When the characters in which an instrument is written are
difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the
court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or
who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or
the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred. – When the terms of
an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different
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Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that
are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be
understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object
of the contract.
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in
the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the
omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the
rules established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to
incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission
of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt
shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such
a way that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will
of the parties, the contract shall be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of
contracts.
Statutory rules of interpretation
.1 If the terms are clear, the literal meaning shall control.
.2 If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the
intention shall prevail
.3 In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
.4 terms of a contract shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree
.5 If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it
effectual.
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.2 political belief
.3 interest in the outcome of the case, or
.4 conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, e.g.
.a A state witness must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17 (e)]
.b A person who has been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony is disqualified from being a witness to a will (Art. 821 NCC)
1. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
a. Rule 130 §21
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.
– The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production
for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at
the time of production, even if he was not so at the time of perception. A child
must be mentally mature both at the time of perception and at the time of
production.
With regards to the subject matter of the testimony, we must make a distinction
between absolute disqualifications and relative disqualifications. Objections based
on absolute disqualifications may be raised upon the calling of the disqualified
witness. Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised when it
becomes apparent that the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible
matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses
.1 can’t perceive
.2 not perceiving
.3 can’t make known their perception to others
.4 whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, render
them incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others
.5 whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully
.6 marital disqualification
.7 parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications
.1 dead man’s statute
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2. Marriage
a. Rule 130 §22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
(20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification rule
.1 marriage subsists
.2 a spouse is a litigant
.3 no consent from the spouse-litigant
.4 not a civil case by one against the other, or a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants.
GR: During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse
Exceptions:
.1 in a civil case by one against the other, or
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Note that the exceptions under the marital disqualification and marital
communications rule are the same.
b. Cases
Ordoño v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270 (1975) The wife can therefore testify against
her husband in such a case for rape against her daughter because it is considered
a crime against the wife. When an offense directly attacks, or directly impairs the
conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the marital disqualification rule.
de Leon: Note that when this case was decided, a crime by a spouse against the
other’s descendant was not yet an express exception to the marital
disqualification rule.
People v. Castañeda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979) The wife can testify against the
husband in a case for falsification of the wife’s signature in public documents to
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Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) This in effect ruled that the Dead
Man’s statute can not be invoked against a plaintiff-corporation. Interest no longer
disqualifies a witness. Officers/stockholder of corporation may testify in a case
filed against the estate of a deceased by the corporation
Escolin: In an action where the administrator is the plaintiff, the defendant may
testify on facts occurring prior to the death of the decedent.
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 (1927) – action must be brought against the
estate, not by the estate, to be covered under the dead man’s statute
Escolin: The dead man’s rule does not apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument evidencing the claim, it would be difficult to
prove the claim in the estate proceeding because of the dead man’s statute.
However, if there is such an instrument, it is not barred by the dead man’s statute
(Neibert v. Neibert)
Goñi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986) – heirs of a deceased are “representatives”
within the ambit of the dead man’s statute; waived by defendant if he files
counterclaim against plaintiff; adverse party may testify to transactions or
communications with deceased which were made with an agent of such person if
the agents is still alive and can testify as long as it is confined to the transactions
J. Privileged Communications
Privileged Communications
.1 marital
.2 attorney-client
.3 physician-patient
.4 priest-penitent
.5 state secrets
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification. Each of those enumerated is disqualified
to testify as to specific matters only. It does not disqualify them from testifying on
matters not privileged. Hence, it is improper to object to their testimony upon
mere subpoena. One must wait until it becomes apparent that their testimony
covers matters that are privileged (e.g. upon asking of a question that covers
privileged matters; when the purpose of their testimony as admitted by the
offeror covers privileged matters) before one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is nevertheless a testimonial disqualification,
as opposed to the testimonial privilege of ascendants and descendants (Rule 130
§25). [careful not to be confused in the multiple meanings of the word “privilege”]
Hence, the witness has no say whether the objection is to be raised or not. When
the holder of the privilege (not necessarily the opposing party) consents to the
testimony, the witness must testify.
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Note that the wording of the law is to the effect that “(someone) may not be
examined without the consent of (another).” The law does not say that one can
not testify or be examined over the objection of another. The wording of the law is
to the effect that an objection of the other party in the privileged communication
is not necessary for the privilege to hold. Consent of the other party in the
privileged communication is an act that needs to be proved for the testimony to
be admitted. This is not to say that failure of a such a party to object will never
render such testimony admissible. This is to say that where the other party to the
privileged communication is not a litigant in the case, and privileged
communication is offered in evidence without the consent of such party, the
litigant against whom the testimony is offered may object to its admission on the
ground of privileged communication. Where the other party in the privileged
communication is a litigant, then his failure to object will be taken as a consent to
the testimony or a waiver of a privilege.
The communication that is privileged need not be in any form. It can be oral or
written.
The communication ceases to be privileged if knowingly communicated in the
presence of 3rd persons. In such a case, the privilege may not be invoked at all.
However, if the privileged communication was within the surreptitious observation
of a 3rd person, then the communication can be invoked if either the
communicator or communicatee called to testify. However, the privilege can not
be invoked if the 3rd person is called to testify.
1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 §24 (a)
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants;
Requisites for Marital Communications Rule
.1 communication received
.a from the spouse
.b in confidence
.c during the marriage
.2 without the consent of the spouse
Note that the marital communication rule applies even after the marriage. It
applies only to matters communicated by one spouse to another in confidence. It
does not cover knowledge of matters that a spouse obtains from a source other
than other spouse. It can be invoked even if neither spouse is a party to the
action. It is a relative disqualification and can be invoked only when it is apparent
that the testimony would cover privileged matters.
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2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 §24 (b)
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Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) – Privilege extends to information
given by employees to corporate not to facts.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447 (1983) – The general rule is the
identity of a client is not protected; legal advice exception may be defeated
through prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in
furtherance of present or intended continuing illegality, as where the
representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy; it is the link between the client
and the communication, not the link between client and possibility of potential
criminal prosecution which is protected; last link exception is abandoned;
disclosure might possibly implicate client in criminal activity not an exception
US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) – statement made by co-defendant
to an investigator acting for defendant’s counsel protected; communication by
client to attorney remain privileged when attorney shares them with co-defendant
for a common defense
US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) – protection does not extend to
the communication regarding an intended crime; communication divulged to
strangers not protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975) – WPD waived when client presents investigator
as witness
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
3. Physician-Patient Privilege
a. Rule 130 §24 (c)
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as
to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he
may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity,
and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cf Rule 28, Sec. 3 and 4
Sec. 3. Report of findings. — If requested by the party examined, the party causing the
examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions. After such request and delivery,
the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled upon request to receive from
the party examined a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the
same mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the
court on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just,
and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his testimony if
offered at the trial. (3a)
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so
ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege
he may have in that action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the
testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect
of the same mental or physical examination. (4)
Requisites for physician-client privilege
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.1 civil case
.2 witness is a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
.3 as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may
have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity
.4 the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity
.5 the information would blacken the reputation of the patient
Escolin: The old rule used the word “character” (what the person actually is). The
new rules use the word “reputation” (what people think of the person).
Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.
Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are covered
by the privilege. Hence, nurses, midwives and other people who attend to the ill
can be called to testify as to any matter.
The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the witness does not testify
to matters specifically referring to the patient.
There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.
de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal cases?
1) Cases
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) The physician-patient privilege is not violated by
permitting physician to give expert testimony regarding hypothetical facts.
Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) Non-physician testimony on a medical
psychologist’s report is not covered by the physician patient privilege. This is
hearsay but there was no objection.
4. Rule 130 §24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person
making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any
advice given by him in his professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
Requisites for Priest-Penitent Privilege
.1 witness is a minister or priest
.2 as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional
character
.3 in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or
priest belongs
5. State Secrets
a. Rule 130 §24(e)
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence,
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when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. (21a)
Requisites for the State Secrets rule
.1 witness is a public officer
.2 as to communications made to him in official confidence
.3 the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
b. Cases
US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) – absent a claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, executive privilege can not
prevail over due process
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) – confidential information
is not necessarily privileged; no public interest is prejudiced by disclosure, thus
not protected; is there a need for a law to declare it confidential?
6. Newsman’s Privilege
a. RA 53 as amended by RA 1477
Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal
laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the
State.
Requisites of newsman’s privilege
.1 publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter
.2 of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
.3 cannot be compelled to reveal
.4 as to the source of any news report or information appearing in said
publication
.5 related in confidence
Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State.
b. Cases
Matter of Farber (A.B.), 394 A. 2d 330 (1978) – Constitution prevails over shield
law, but entitled to hearing to prove relevance.
7. Bank Deposits (RA 1405)
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by
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2. Compromises
a. Rule 130, §27
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer
of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
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reason; in this case, the law allowed compromise, thus the offer to compromise is
not admitted
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) – offer to compromise made by a person
other than the accused is inadmissible if the accused repudiated the actions of
such person by raising the trial court’s admission of evidence of such offer as an
error.
People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (1996) – the offer to compromise made by a
person other than the accused was admitted in evidence because the accused
failed to repudiate such acts by raising the trial court’s admission of evidence on
such offer as an error.
People v. Yparriguirre, 268 SCRA 35 (1997) – whether a complaint has been filed
or not is irrelevant as to the admissibility of an offer to compromise.
People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (1914)
3. Res Inter Alios Acta
a. Rule 130, §28
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided. (25a)
The general rule is extra-judicial acts of a person other than a party are
inadmissible against such party. However, the rules also provide for exceptions
.1 Partner’s admissions
.2 agent’s admissions
.3 admissions by a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with
the party.
.4 Co-conspirator’s statements
.5 Admission by privies
Is personal knowledge required for these exceptions to apply?
b. Cases
People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)
Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extra-
judicial confession of another admitting his participation in the offense.
Held: This is not a co-conspirator’s statement because there was no evidence of
conspiracy independent of the extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the
confession was executed long after the supposed conspiracy had ended.
Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his co-
accused, the testimony would have been admissible. In this case, what was
presented was a merely his affidavit.
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2) Co-conspirator’s statements
a) Rule 130, §30
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. – The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (27)
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People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (1976) Where the extra-judicial confessions of the
accused are consistent in many material details and manifest amazing
consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of facts which could not
have been known to the police investigators if the same were not voluntarily
given by the accused, such statements are admissible against the accused on the
doctrine of interlocking confessions.
de Leon: The value of the doctrine of interlocking confessions is when a
confession is inadmissible against one accused (e.g. obtained without counsel),
but it is nevertheless admissible against the other co-accused. The confession of
one may be used against another to produce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
People v. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Bruton v. US,
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)
People v. Encipido, G.R. No. 7009l, Dec. 29, 1986
N.Previous Conduct as Evidence
1. Rule 130, §34-35
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. (48 a)
GR: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time
Exceptions: It may be received to prove a specific
.1 intent
.2 knowledge
.3 identity
.4 plan
.5 system
.6 scheme
.7 habit
.8 custom or
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.9 usage, and
.10 the like.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. – An offer in writing to pay a particular sum
of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property
is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production
and tender of the money instrument, or property. (49 a)
2. Cases
US v. Evangelista, 24 Phil 453 (1913) In a trial for arson, the prosecution may
prove that the accused had attempted to set fire to the house on the day previous
to the burning alleged in the information, for the purpose of showing the intent of
the accused in subsequently setting fire to the house. Where a person is charged
wit the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of the other
similar acts committed about the same time, only for the purpose of establishing
the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)
Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium chlorate,
a poison, causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the packages, two
chemists went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate,
which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate
defendant's motive and negligence. It is permissible to ascertain defendant's
knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than
one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. There is
no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. Evidence is
admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to
prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)
Facts:
After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her
money and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face
and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified
by Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial,
Maximiana’s neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on the night in question, her
house was assaulted by malefactors. de la Cruz noticed that one of them had
pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximiniana’s
testimony that the man of the same description was the one who went to her
house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of
another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant
as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the
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scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of
a circumstance connected with the crime.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
O.Hearsay Rule
1. Testimonial Knowledge
a. Rule 130, §36
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30 a)
b. Cases
People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992) Hearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, cannot be given credence. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
has no probative value.
People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 (1971)
People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (1965)
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
U.S. v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
2. Exceptions
Exceptions to the hearsay rule
.1 waiver
.2 independently relevant evidence
.3 dying declaration
.4 Declaration against interest
.5 Act or declaration about pedigree
.6 Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
.7 Common reputation
.8 Part of the res gestae
.9 Verbal acts
.10 Entries in the course of business
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hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was charged and convicted of Murder. Laquinon
argues that the statement is not a dying declaration because it was not made
under the consciousness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a dying
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, at
the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis
for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may
be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient
time to concoct a charge against the accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was inferred from the
extent of the injuries. In Laquinon, the declarant expressly said that he was not
sure that we was going to die. The moral of the story is, in taking a dying
declaration, don’t ask if the declarant thinks he will die.
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (1981)
Facts: Catralino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and
wounded. Espina asked for the police. When police officers arrived, they asked
Espina “who slashed and robbed” him. Espina answered that it was Sabio. His
declaration was taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and
convicted of robbery with homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the
declaration on the ground that it was not made under the consciousness of an
impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to his
grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's
forehead which had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's
inability to speak unless his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the
victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent
demise from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the
conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That
death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately
thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death, that renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told
his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of
hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so
little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of
robbery is at best circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused had carried away personality belonging to the offended party.
There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged
missing objects recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred
nor presumed from the circumstance that the accused was seen running "with his
hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash
amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the things
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and merchandise inside the house were in disarray. Nor can the dying declaration
of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The admission of dying
declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide
or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof of Sabio’s guilt of
robbery as a part of the res gestae?
People v. de Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin Valencia, came
home and found her wounded. He asked his grandmother "Apo, Apo, what
happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words,
she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya.
De Joya was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that
constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement
of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not
be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death
is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or
intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption cuts short a statement which thus
remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there,
and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if
the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that
he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. Since the
declarant was prevented from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say
might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from
making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption
of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.
The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. The
phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin:
"Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to
you?" The deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or
sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering
the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer. But Eulalia
herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to
regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the
doer of the bloody deed.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision. Under the
context, what else could have “Si Paqui” meant other than that he was
responsible for the crime?
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2) Cases
Viacrusis v. CA, 44 SCRA 176 (1972) Previous recognition of ownership in another
by a party in possession of property in dispute is admission against interest which
may be received even against 3rd persons.
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2) Cases
People v. Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1976) A declaration made by a person
immediately after being wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be
considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence. A statement
was given sometime after the stabbing while the declarant was undergoing
treatment at a medical clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood or to
fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive has been shown
as to why he would frame-up the accused would render the statement admissible
as a part of the res gestae.
People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994)
Facts: Atanacia Ramos had a daughter Rosita. Rosita married Domiciano Peralta.
They had a daughter Siony. On morning, Siony came to Atanacia at her house
frantically told her that Domiciano was strangling Rosita. They went to the Peralta
home and found Rosita dead. Domiciano was not there. They immediately
reported the matter to the police, who eventually arrested the Domiciano. At the
preliminary investigation, Siony executed a sworn statement implicating her
father. Domiciano was charged with Parricide. At the trial Atanacia testified as to
Siony’s declaration. However, Siony testified for her father and said that though
she saw someone strangling her mother, she did not see who it was. After the
defense rested, the prosecution presented the investigating judge who testified as
to the regularity of the conduct of the preliminary investigation. TC convicts.
Held: The statement Siony made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform
her of her father's attack on her mother was part of the res gestae. Res gestae
means the "thing done." It refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. Siony rushed to
Atanacia immediately upon seeing her father strangling her mother to death. Her
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spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part of the res gestae and is assumed to
preclude the probability of premeditation of fabrication. Since the utterance was
made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses rather than
reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-
interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as
expressing Siony's real belief as to the facts just observed by her.
Besides, where a witness executes a statement for the prosecution and retracts
his testimony and subsequently testified for the defense, the test to decide which
testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked
upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. Siony testified during the
preliminary examination conducted by Judge Paano that the appellant choked her
mother to death. Her subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no
probative value at all.
Furthermore, there are certain circumstances that may have persuaded the
daughter to change her former declaration and testify in favor of her father. First,
the accused was her father after all, and she probably felt that she should not be
responsible for his incarceration for the rest of his life. Second, her testimony was
given 7 years after the incident and therefore could not be expected to be as
accurate as the statement she made in the preliminary investigation only hours
after the killing. Third, during all this time, her father had been under detention
and she must have believed that this was punishment enough for him. Lastly, she
was, at the time she testified in court, living with her father's sister, who may
have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her to recant her earlier
statement.
g. Verbal acts
1) Rule 130, §42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. – xxx So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (36 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to verbal acts
.1 statements accompanying an equivocal act
.2 material to the issue
.3 giving it a legal significance
2) Case
Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919)
Facts: Tan Po Pik died in the Philippines intestate. After he died, Marta Torres,
claiming to be his widow, took possession of his estate and partitioned it between
herself and her children by the deceased. Plaintiffs claim to be the legal wife and
children of the deceased from China. They now sue to recover their supposed
share of the estate. The SC found numerous inconsistencies as to the testimonial
and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs as to lead to the conclusion that the
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plaintiffs are not who they claim to be. However, the plaintiff offered in evidence a
sworn declaration of the deceased that the plaintiffs were his children. Defendants
offered letters between the deceased and his brother showing that deceased’s
sworn declaration was to deceive the customs authorities to allow plaintiffs to
enter the country. Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of such letters.
Held: The declaration was made in proceedings before customs authorities upon
arrival of the plaintiffs from China. The arrival and admission of these plaintiffs
and the declaration of Tan Po Pik are isolated parts of an event which is the
voyage from China to the Philippines of these supposed children of the deceased.
Their preparations for the voyage and the plans conceived by them to obtain their
sure entrance into this country are also part of the voyage. In order to consider
the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs authorities, the other acts,
declarations, and events occurring before the said entrance into the country,
which may have an essential bearing or which have led to the realization of their
entrance into the country are admissible in evidence in this case on the ground
that they constitute parts of the same transaction, or of the res gestae. A word, an
expression, or an act of a person, considered apart from the circumstances
surrounding them, does not signify anything, and in many cases it signifies the
opposite of the true sense of the said word, expression, or act. It is imprudent and
illegal to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs
authorities separately from the circumstances which prompted him to make such
a declaration. We must therefore inquire into circumstances which surrounded the
entrance of the plaintiffs and the declaration made by Tan Po Pik on that occasion.
In this case, letters between Tan Po Pik and his brother in China contained an
agreement that for plaintiffs to enter the Philippines, Tan Po Pik was to declare
before the customs authorities that plaintiffs were his children. The names of the
children whom Tan were supposed to declare as his children were the same as
the names of the plaintiffs, except that they now bear the surname Tan. The
letters even refer to one of the plaintiffs as the deceased’s nephew. If these
plaintiffs were really children of Tan Po Pik, there would have been no necessity
for the above letters. Thus, Tan Po Pik’s declaration before the customs
authorities is for the sole purpose of allowing the children to enter the Philippines,
and such a declaration is entirely false. All these letters formed an essential part
of the fact of the coming of these plaintiffs to Manila, because if these letters had
not been transmitted and received the plaintiffs could not have succeeded in
entering the Philippines. Therefore, all the statements and declarations-of Tan Po
Ho in these documents relative to the prosecution of the object of the conspiracy
are admissible in evidence.
People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)
h. Entries in the Course of Business
1) Rule 130, §43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near
the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
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Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She had only one child,
Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta predeceased her mother. Crisanta was married to Fermin
Fortus. They had an only son, the Victorino Fortus. Ciriaca died intestate. The
property therefore passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino never caused
the OCT to be cancelled and to have another issued in his name. Ciriaca’s estate
was therefore not yet closed.
Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were childless. Upon
Victorino's death, Julia executed an affidavit of extra-judicial summary settlement
of Ciriaca’s estate and had it registered. Rosario Novero, claiming to be an
illegitimate child of Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings for
summary settlement of Ciriaca’s estate. Julia opposed, along with the Fortuses,
who claim to be Victorino’s half-brother and sisters. They claim to be the
legitimate children of Fermin Fortus with Jacoba Aguil.
The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate of their alleged
parents, but sought to present secondary evidence. The SC found the testimonial
evidence the Fortuses presented to lay the basis for introduction of secondary
evidence were inconsistent, incredible and insufficient to establish than an
original marriage contract was indeed executed. However, the Fortuses presented
baptismal certificates of some of them to prove the marriage of their parents.
Note that they must prove marriage because otherwise, they would be illegitimate
relatives of Victorino which would disqualify them from inheriting from him.
Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the administration of the
sacrament on the date stated therein, but not the truth of the statements therein
made as to the parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the baptismal
certificates public documents or public writings, because the parochial records of
baptisms are not public or official records, as they are not kept by public officers,
and are not proof of relationship or filiation of the child baptized.
Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past 30 years their
parents had deported themselves in public as husband and wife and had been
living under the same roof, the legal presumption is that they had entered into a
lawful marriage. This presumption, however, is only applicable where there is no
clear and concrete evidence showing otherwise. In this case, however, there is a
certificate from the Division of Archives to the effect that 'no copy of the marriage
record of spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil supposed to have been
solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas
had been received by said office for file', and this certification is further
strengthened by the affirmation of Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in the office of the
municipal treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of such
marriage supposedly contracted between the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil from 1902 and 1922 of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. At most, the
baptismal certificates were only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia Fortus
had overcome by satisfactory evidence to the effect that Fermin Fortus and
Jacoba Aguil were never married and hence all of their children are not legitimate
brothers or half brothers and therefore have no right to inherit from Victorino
Fortus.
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j. Commercial Lists
1) Rule 130, §45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. – Evidence of statements of
matters of interest, to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Commercial lists
.1 statements of matters of interest
.2 to persons engaged in an occupation
.3 contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
.4 as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated
.5 the compilation is
.a published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
.b generally used and relied upon by them therein.
e.g. NEDA reports, part of the newspaper which reports the prices of shares
2) Cases
State v. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)
Estrada vs. Noble, [C.A,] 49 O.G. 139
k. Learned Treatises
1) Rule 130, §46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. – A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science or art is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer
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.a attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and
.b if the record is not kept in the Philippines
)1 accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody made
by
)a a secretary of the embassy or legation
)b consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
)c by any Philippine officer in the foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
)2 and, authenticated by the seal of his office.
l. Prior Testimony
1) Rule 130, §47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41 a)
cf with the rules on admissions (Rule 130 Secs. 26-33, RoC) and interrogatories
(Rule 24, RoC)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to prior testimony
.1 testimony or deposition
.2 of a witness deceased or unable to testify
.3 given in a former case or proceeding
.4 involving the same parties and subject matter
.5 as evidence against the adverse party
.6 adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him
2) Cases
Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 54 (1967) Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside
the Philippines, or unable to testify, their prior testimony is inadmissible. Mere
refusal to testify is does not amount to inability to testify. The party could have
urged to court to have these witnesses summoned, arrested, and punished for
contempt in case of refusal to obey the summons.
People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976)
Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented
during the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as part of the
evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to
the condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the
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accused. At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the
preliminary investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by
counsel for the appellant.
Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-
parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer
during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his
counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination.
The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to
further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be
reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand
during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the
facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet
the witnesses face to face.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
P. Opinion Rule
1. Rule 130, §48-50
Sec. 48. General rule. – The opinion of a witness is not admissible,
except as indicated in the following sections. (42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. (43 a)
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding -
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person. (44 a)
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible.
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
.1 a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
.2 the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
.3 a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
.4 the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
.5 his impressions of the
.a emotion
.b behavior
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.c condition or
.d appearance of a person
2. Cases
Dilag & Co. v. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
U.S. v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
State v. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (1993)
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Exceptions
.1 In Criminal Cases:
.a accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
.b In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the
accused which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
.c moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
.2 In Civil Cases – only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the
case.
.3 good character of an impeached witness
R. Rule 131, §1: Burden of Proof
Sec. 1. Burden of proof. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1 a, 2 a)
Burden of proof – the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law
1. Civil Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 1
Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining whether a contract is a sale or equitable mortgage, the evidence
presented must be clear and convincing, not merely a preponderance of
evidence.
b. Cases
Pornellosa v. LTA, L-14040, 31 January 1986
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b. Cases
People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970) The prosecution has the burden of
proving even the negative elements of a crime (e.g. lack of license to possess a
firearm).
Escolin: The remedy is to present the certification of the officer, who is in charge
of issuing the licenses, that the accused was not issued a license.
People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977) The elements of self-defense must be
proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
U.S. v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 19 (1977)
3. Administrative Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 5
Rule 133, Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. (n)
substantial evidence – that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
b. Cases
S. Presumptions
1. Conclusive presumptions
a. Rule 131, §2
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out
of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. (3 a)
Instances of conclusive presumptions
.1 a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such
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c. Cases
Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)
Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of Basilisa Manjon, informed her that some
guerilla soldiers would arrest her for investigation, because one Conchita Cuba
complained to them against her for having illegally encroached on her property.
Afraid to be taken to the guerilla camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best for
her to do. He suggested that she execute a fictitious deed of sale in his favor for
the portion in question which was the one claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order that
he could defend her rights in his name against the claim of Conchita Cuba. Manjon
accepted the suggestion and asked Molina to have the corresponding deed of sale
prepared which Manjon signed. However, Manjon made the Molina sign a
statement in, which he expressly admitted that the transaction was only a
simulated sale. The Molina denied the whole story and asserted that the
statement was a forgery. Manjon sues Molina for recovery of possession of land.
TC ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have disposed the land
because it was part of the public domain, sales patent having been issued to
plaintiff by the government only on 1948. CA affirms.
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Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, when a person who is not the owner
of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it and later the seller or grantor acquires
title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. Case
remanded to determine whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994) The juridical relation between petitioners and
private respondents is that of lessee and lessor. Considering this jural
relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased the questioned lot from
somebody else. A tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession of the
leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. Nor can a tenant set up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his
landlord, without first delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by
virtue of the agreement between themselves.
2. Disputable presumptions
a. Rule 131, §4
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for
the later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment
of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or
delivered the thing accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or
elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
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(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid
before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all
matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration
were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient
consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before
the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is
dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular
course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after
the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient
in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed
hostilities, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years,
the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of
disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any
case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for
a declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
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(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced
in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of
copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted
another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of
the former marriage, these rides shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual
with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or
published by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of
cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published,
contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real
property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when
such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his
successor in interest;
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(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish
in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is
not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according
to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to
have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have
survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is
deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the
male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those
ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are
called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same
time. (5 a)
b. Cases
People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 (1976) Mere non-presentation of a written
statement of a witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, does not
give rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the
prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does
not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the
prosecution through use of compulsory processes, e.g. subpoena duces tecum.
People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 (1992) The presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of
the witness is merely corroborative. Neither does it apply in cases where the
witness, as in this case, is available to the accused because then, the evidence
would have the same weight against one party as against the other. Mere failure
to present the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation is not suppression of
evidence.
Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)
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Rights of a witness
.1 To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from
harsh or insulting demeanor;
.2 Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
.3 Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
.4 Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an
offense, unless otherwise provided by law; or
.5 Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to
the fact
.a at issue or
.b from which the fact in issue would be presumed
.c of his previous final conviction for an offense.
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. – The order
in which an individual witness may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5. Direct examination. – Direct examination is the examination-in-
chief of a witness by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to
the issue. (3 a)
Direct examination – the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting
him on the facts relevant to the issue.
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196
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197
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198
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)e consular agent or
)f any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
)2 authenticated by the seal of his office.
Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts
.1 get a copy from the legal custodian
.2 have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct
.3 have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is the legal custodian of
a copy of official act
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court. (26 a)
Attestation of copy must
.1 state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be
.2 be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. – Any public record, an official
copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the
office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must
not be removed from the office in which it is kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to
the just determination of a pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. – An authorized public
record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by
a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
.1 the original record, or
.2 a copy thereof
.a attested by the legal custodian of the record
.b with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
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Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991) Lack of signatures on the first pages of
a document alone is not a blemish that would disqualify a document from being
an ancient document. Allegations that the pages had been substituted should be
proven in order to disqualify the document from being an ancient document, more
so if the documents were shown to be exact copies of the original on file with the
Register of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer
required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record because it had been
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the court did not have to
determine whether the document was in fact an ancient document because it was
in the first place a public document whose authenticity and due execution need
not be proven. The problem with this case is it is now authority to say that private
documents whose first pages are not signed by the parties can qualify as ancient
documents. Keep in mind that crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact that the
document presented matches the one on file in the Registry of Deeds. Had there
been no matching copy in the Registry of Deeds, I submit that the document can
not qualify as an ancient document.
c. Proof of foreign judgments
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) To be enforceable, the
foreign judgment must be proven as a public document of a written official act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. The offeror
must submit an attestation issued by the proper foreign official having legal
custody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the
original, which attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer
having jurisdiction in that country.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.
The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere testimony of a witness is
not sufficient to prove foreign law.
d. Documents in unofficial language
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) A document written in an
unofficial language should be translated into either English or Filipino. The
translator should be identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or as a
competent translator of both languages. The translation should be either sworn to
as an accurate translation of the original, or agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976) Affidavits written in an unofficial language
and not accompanied with a translation are inadmissible in evidence.
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Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which don’t have the
required documentary stamp tax will not be admitted in evidence.
Salison v. People, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999
V. Offer and Objection
1. Rule 132 §34-40
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. – As regards the testimony of a witness,
the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done
orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
.1 testimony – the time the witness is called to testify
.2 documentary and object – after the presentation of a party's testimonial
evidence
Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in
writing.
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de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no continuing objection
because continuing objections are applicable when there is a single objection to a
class of evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the new rules on
evidence is now clear that continuing objections are applicable only to testimonial
evidence.
de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when inadmissible
evidence is being identified and marked, and then object when it is formally
offered? Interpacific Transit was explicit when it said “What really matters is the
objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.”
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked, and its contents
recited, the offeror decides not to formally offer it into evidence. Is the court
authorized to consider such exhibit on the strength of the ruling in Tabuena? I
would say “yes” because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of
the testimony of the witness which has been formally offered.
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bereaved family and relatives or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake
or the funeral, and that he had a serious misunderstanding and strained
relationship with the owner of the burned premises.
Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)
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