Roy Cardenas

Phil. 228: Existentialism

Paper No. 2
4/4/2011

“Caring” About Heidegger

Inspired, at least initially, by the ‘father of phenomenology’ Edmund Husserl, Martin

Heidegger aimed to obtain a rigorous analysis of the nature of ‘being.’ His project was and is a

difficult one; even referring to ‘the idea of being’ instead of ‘being’ violates the spirit of his

thinking because being or ‘is-ness’ is fundamental and cannot be reduced to an idea which is

only an instance of being. Heidegger’s method of inquiry relies upon phenomenology – he

descriptively studies the being of ‘Da-sein’ (human beings – a type of being to which being itself

is readily disclosed) in order to attain an understanding of Being in general (Notes). In deploying

his phenomenological analysis of Da-sein, Heidegger introduces the concept of ‘care’ as the

underlying structure of human existence. My goal is to elaborate on and explicate this idea of

care, as well as the transcendental horizon for such a structure – time.

In Being & Time, Heidegger introduces care as “the totality of the structural whole of

Da-sein” (Marino, 299). He augments this statement by writing, “the primary factor of care,

‘being ahead of itself,’ however, means that Da-sein always exists for the sake of itself” (300). In

other words, care is characterized by a forwardness or directedness towards the future. In fact,

Heidegger later refers to a “constant unfinished quality” or something that is “outstanding” in

Da-sein (300). What he means here is that when Da-sein is ‘ahead-of-itself,’ this aspect of its

being ensures that there is something unfinished or undecided about Da-sein; there is still a

potential for something more in its being. Acknowledging this care creates certain problems for

Heidegger; he wishes to grasp and define Da-sein “as a whole” (299). However, in order to do

so, he must attempt to traverse a seeming contradiction – it appears paradoxical to grasp, as a

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whole, what is always, by definition, ‘unfinished.’ Additionally, death is introduced as another

potential obstacle for understanding Da-sein. One interpretation of death is that it results in the

wholeness of Da-sein (which is the end of its potentiality, its ‘unfinished-ness’) (302). However,

in this wholeness, Da-sein cannot reflect upon its death and its finished being because it has lost

its potential to do so. On the other hand, Da-sein, after its death, can be analyzed by those with

whom it existed in the world with; but this third-person analysis does not offer an intimate

enough look at Da-sein’s existence.

Death must then be understood not as a discrete event in one’s life. On the contrary, death

is itself something that is always present in Da-sein; just as the “not-yet” or the potentiality of

Da-sein is an intrinsic quality of its being, so is death (308). “The ending that we have in view

when we speak of death, does not signify a being-at-an-end of Da-sein, but rather a being toward

the end of this being,” claims Heidegger (310). For him, death must not be a singular, ending

event, but rather Da-sein’s continual struggle to relate to its own mortality. The choice of the

word ‘own’ is very deliberate; Heidegger contends that individuality is made possible by the fact

that death is something inescapable. This sentiment is encapsulated by the words “no one can

take the other’s dying away from him” (304). Heidegger argues that even though one Da-sein

can, in a sense, “represent” another (that is to say, one person can fulfill the same societal tasks

of another, and replace them in that manner), every Da-sein must deal with the fact that it will

end; it must deal with death (304). Death then “reveals itself as the ownmost nonrelational

possibility not to be bypassed” (317). This death is a transcendental horizon for individuality;

because each person is forced to relate to his or her own death uniquely, and because the act of

dying makes Da-sein ‘whole,’ a Da-sein may say that he or she can exist as distinct from other

Da-sein. This discussion not only uncovers Heidegger’s views on death, but also his views on

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care itself. He writes, “with regard to its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care” (318).

Heidegger establishes earlier on that care is based upon “being-ahead-of-itself” and now we can

revise this provisional interpretation of care by adding on “death” or “being towards the

end”/”being-towards-death.” Similarly, Heidegger acknowledges that “being-with-others” allows

for Da-sein to “represent” one another, and so this coexistence is also a part of care. With this

fuller definition of care in hand, it would be useful to analyze what makes care possible and

intelligible – time itself.

Implicit in Heidegger’s philosophy is the notion that time, or at least the experience of

time, must be continuous and not discrete. In a deterministic account of the world, ‘cause and

effect’ seems to prevail. Suppose some event ‘A’ precedes an event ‘B.’ More generally, one

may even suppose that ‘A’ and ‘B’ represent points in time, each containing the totality of all

events to occur within those points in time. ‘A’ may be said to cause ‘B’ in the sense that the

events of ‘A’ resolve and become causes for the effects present in ‘B’ (and these effects become

causes for the events of some time ‘C’). However, the underlying assumption in this model of

causality is that time is discrete and can be represented accurately by an infinite series of points

(‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘C’…). Deploying an analogical illustration using basic mathematical concepts

produces an opposing but coherent outlook on time.

Suppose that time is not analogous to a collection of points, but rather a geometric line

upon which all of these points lie. The line, as a continuous body, implies that between any two

of our arbitrary points ‘A’ and ‘B’, there exist an infinite number of points that can be selected

(one need only travel ‘halfway’ between ‘A’ and ‘B’ to find such a point). In fact, between any

of these infinite points exist an infinitude of infinities. The idea here is this – if time is discrete,

there is no such thing as a ‘next point in time’; we showed that this ‘next-ness’ is eradicated

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since we can always pick out a point between any two points. However, as we are aware from

experience, we are always ending up at the ‘next point in time.’ Therefore, a more cohesive

conception of time would be something less like a discrete collection of ordered events or

instances, and something more continuous and connected in nature, akin to a mathematical line

or curve. Before continuing I wish to note that the word ‘line’ here does not necessitate a ‘linear’

model of time (i.e. this is not a distinction between linear and circular time, but between

continuous and discrete time). Additionally, this does not abolish the idea that events in time can

cause one another – it merely shows that the true nature of causality is ambiguous, and this

allows a position advocating free will and action to emerge.

“‘As soon as a human being is born, he is old enough to die right away,’” says Heidegger

(311). In this way, Heidegger claims that death is always with Da-sein and is not just an event

but a quality to be had. The previously analyzed temporal continuity is a justification for this

view; death is not a discrete, far-away point, but part of the Da-sein’s continuous experience of

time. Continuous time is not only part of this “being-towards-death” but also of Da-sein’s

“being-ahead-of-itself.” Just as a line continuously unravels itself towards some direction, Da-

sein always exists in direct relation to its future possibilities and potential. Obviously, Da-sein’s

existence is not as monotonous as the constant incline or decline of the line may suggest, but

what must be understood is that neither idea is pinned down by being a singular point, moment

or event.

From this analysis, we see that time (and I argue for the use of the expression ‘continuous

time’) is a necessary condition for care. Also involved in care is the notion that there are other

instances of Da-sein in the world. When Heidegger writes, “the fact that one Da-sein can be

represented by another belongs to the possibilities-of-being of being-with-one-another in the

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world,” he rejects idealism and points out that there is not just an’ I’ but a ‘we’ – a ‘they’ (304).

This is important in care because the presence of other Da-sein creates a misinterpretation of

death. In the setting that Heidegger calls the “everyday,” Da-sein can attempt to flee from or

“evade” relating to its own death (324). It is important to note why Heidegger embraces his view

of death while rejecting what the ‘they-Da-sein’ construes (at least on the surface level) as death.

“Death is postponed to ‘sometime later,’ by relying on the so-called ‘general opinion.’ Thus the

they covers over what is peculiar to the certainty of death, that it is possible in every moment,”

states Heidegger (326). Here, when the they ‘postpones’ death, they relegate death to a discrete

possibility; they detach death from the continuity of human experience. However, death in

Heidegger’s eyes is never detached because it is an intrinsic part of care (as ‘being-towards-

death’) and care as Heidegger establishes very early on is “the structural whole of Da-sein

(299).” In fact, not only is death inevitable, it is also indefinite – since the end may arrive at any

time, “angst” and “anticipation” can ensue. Thus, it follows that if Da-sein is always in care (and,

in a sense, Da-sein is care), then death, as a permanent constituent of care, is pervasive and is

also always with Da-sein.

We have explained care in terms of a number of different ways in which Da-sein exists;

care, at least based on what has just been discussed, is Da-sein’s ‘being-ahead-of-itself,’ ‘being-

towards-death,’ and ‘being-with-others.’ Time has also been displayed as an absolutely

necessary component of care in that it organizes all of the ways of Da-sein’s being. I believe our

traditional conception of ‘care’ is not precise, but it allows us to have a very intuitive

understanding of what Heidegger is trying to show. When Heidegger discusses care, he doesn’t

refer to it in its everyday sense; for example when one says to another, “I care about you,” there

is some ethical commentary that is present. However, Heideggerian usage of the term seems to

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defy the moral connotations associated with the word and instead refers to the fact that Da-sein

must be actively concerned with its impending future possibilities and also with those who exist

around it. Thus, care, in its simplest sense, is the fact that Da-sein is by definition, an active

participant in the world, and not a being that simply observes; Da-sein is tasked with coping with

its existence and existing for “the sake of itself.” (300). What is missing in these passages of

Heidegger’s writing is an explicit remark which prescribes certain goals and ideals that Da-sein

should involve itself in. He conjectures extensively on death, and the attempts of the they to

misrepresent it – this seems to hint towards the motif of ‘authenticity’ which, at least in the

context of the passage, is a genuine relation of Da-sein to its death. This authenticity appears to

be a potential ethical basis. Perhaps further reading and reflection on care, authenticity, and death

will allow one to identify Heidegger’s moral prescriptions, assuming they even exist.

Works Cited

Marino, Gordon D., ed. Basic Writings of Existentialism. United States of America: Modern
Library, 2004. 299-326. Print.

Phil. 228: Existentialism, Lecture notes.