Balkan Refugee Special Report

Report
To
Senator Christopher J. Dodd (CT)
On
Kosovo
Refugee Issues
With
Recommendations
By
William B. Seebeck
April 9, 1999
2
Confidential
Report to
Senator Christopher J. Dodd
On
Kosovo Refugee Issues
With Recommendations
TABLE OF CONTENTS
© 1999 Seebeck International, L.L.C. All rights reserved. This document is

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Introduction
The purpose of this report is to briefly review the Balkan Refugee issues in light
of the author’s experience in the housing and resettlement of Indochinese
refugees in 1975 and 1976. Further, I have been asked to make
recommendations to Senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut based upon my
observations
In both the Balkans and Indochina, refugees “appeared” almost instantaneously

and action was required immediately. In the Indochinese situation, some
150,000 refugees were evacuated from land or were rescued from the South
China Sea. Operating within a military theatre, every transport available was
utilized to accomplish this task, although many were left behind. We know now
that those left behind were imprisoned or terminated by hostile forces.
In the Balkans, the Serbian leadership has used the people of Kosovo as human
bargaining chips played as if on a geographic game board. More than 250,000
of them have been pushed in our direction, deflecting NATO’s ability to wage a
ground war by effectively clogging roadways and severely impairing the
infrastructure of its surrounding nation states. Whatever the purpose, we now
have to meet every need of a community of people twice the size of the city of
Trenton, the capital of New Jersey.
It should be pointed out that this report is not an effort of days, but of hours and
therefore is not complete, and its recommendations and observations are drawn
only from data I have been able to assemble myself.
A Look at the Refugee

(Excerpts of Dr. C.V. Teodoru’s 1975 Review of the Needs of the Indochinese
Refugee As Compared to the Post-World-War II European Refugee)
(The late Dr. C.V. Teodoru, a physician, was actively involved in the
resettlement of European refugees at the end of World War II. Upon completion
of that effort, he was named the director of the Romanian Red Cross. Dr.
Teodoru was able with members of his family to seek political asylum in the
1950’s, while attending an International Red Cross conference in Paris. In 1975,
we asked Dr. Teodoru if he would visit the Indian Town Gap Refugee Center in
Pennsylvania and give us his opinion of the situation. His comments were
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audiotaped and excerpts of that transcript follow below. Many of Dr. Teodoru’s
views were implemented in 1975 to the benefit of the Indochinese Refugee. You
will find that his comments provide an interesting organizational, medical and
human perspective that has pertinence to the current situation in the Balkans.
His son, Dr. Daniel Teodoru, dedicated a substantial part of his life in 1975-76,
at his own expense, to the resettlement of the Indochinese refugees and today
practices medicine in New York City).
Initial Psyche of the Refugee
“...According to my observation, the very first factors that may determine the
success or failure of such an enterprise are of a psychological nature. I assume
that the same thing will happen to the Vietnamese, as I know happened in
Europe, the first year the refugees developed a kind of complex -- everyone was
scared at the beginning. They came into other countries with established
excellence in many fields [of work, e.g., teachers, pharmacists, scientists, etc.].
They were afraid of not corresponding to the standards of another country or
locale. They had all types of complexes, particularly guilt for the people left
behind and of inadequacy and confusion. The result is that they tried to
overcompensate. They tried to reassure themselves almost unconsciously, but
they avoided taking a job or responsibility, always finding a reason that the job
was too small, that they are too educated or prepared for the job. But, in fact it
was simple fear that they would not be able to correspond or to adapt.
Inability to Communicate
If there is a lack of communication in addition to the psychological background,

this will complicate the situation even more. Many refugees were able to
understand English because English literature was widely read in Europe, but
unable to talk or to make themselves understood because of the accent or
difficulty in finding the proper expression.
Keeping the Refugees Together
So, it is my feeling that the first thing you have to do is to give reassurance to
those people and to keep them together for a period of time. In this way, they
can find, at least for certain psychological needs, somebody nearby of the same
culture and habits that can better understand their needs and feelings Even if that
someone cannot satisfy those feelings, at least they have a shoulder to cry on or
someone who can understand their feelings of despair or disappointment.
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Questioner: What you are saying Dr. Teodoru is that being together they lend a
support system to one another.
Yes, at least until they succeed to orient themselves and understand a little, the
new environment and especially to start to get means of communication and to
learn the language and to understand the other people.
Recreating Community and Economy
In addition to it, I think that they should be kept as near as possible to their
professional or trade habits. For instance, I think that in a community like this if
anyone repairs shoes, they should find a shoemaker within the group. The
shoemaker if he needs a tailor, he should find a tailor within the group, so
whatever money is within the group circulates within the group and it will reach
much further than if it is dispersed in the community around. Now, this may
seem a small matter to the community-at-large [the host country] but it maybe
very important for a small group. In addition to the fact that they have the
feeling that they have not quit completely their professional trade and are still
able to foresee the possibility of continuing to make a living in their given trade.
Many people, as you know define themselves by their professions. This was one
of my first observations of the refugees.
Leadership – Positive and Negative/From Within and Without
I think, however, now among them as you very well have pointed out here, there
are many infiltrations whose aim is the failure of the program. Those involved
will favor failure in anyway possible. First of all, they will point out how the
refugees have many differences from themselves and others within the group
will point to the many differences of those in the host country. This will create
discontent within the group and it will demoralize them.
Both those inside and outside who harbor such negative attitudes will also try to
attack the natural leaders that first grow up among the group as a whole. What
we found in Europe was that each person would have an older man or someone
who they consider wise man to go to and ask advice. If these people are
6
deprived of such morale support, represented by their own leaders, the people
will become to very confused and irritated and very susceptible to being pushed
in a certain way. So, that it is important that the supervision be with local
American military types able to understand and communicate with them [the
refugees], then subversive actions will not take place and certain failure may be
averted.
Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity
My experience also shows that various groups have a very serious need for some
specific cultural activity – religious, artistic or any other kind of such activity.
This must be supported within the group. Now some artistic manifestations,
whether art, music, dance, folklore of any kind are useful for the refugees and
their group. It is a way to make a fusion with the community at large [outside
the refugee centers]. Once they organize a little, some cultural activity is critical
so that they feel that they are also perpetuating their traditions from which they
have been torn.
Once they have an opportunity to express their cultural activity, then I would
suggest that there be an exchange between this group and the population at
large. In this way, the local population can view for themselves the “unusual”
habits of this “strange” group of people now living amongst them and with the
new culture. This knowledge and shared understanding will make it easier to
disperse these people within the community-at large. It will also help alleviate
pent up fears and concerns.
Education
Naturally, these people should be given the opportunity to learn English or

anything else that will help them become assimilated into this population as
quickly as possible. Children can go to the public schools, once they have an
understanding of the language. From this point, if possible, it would be useful to
give them an opportunity to work, first within the group as I described earlier.
The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions

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My observation in Austria and Germany, wherever there were camps for

refugees, one of the most dangerous decisions that was made was not to let the
refugees work. The International Refugee Organization was aware of the fact
that if the refugee were to work in the camp or in the city, it would take some of
the jobs of the local population and would create a great deal of adverse
reaction.
The result of this was that some people who were extremely productive
individuals and many who had been professionals in their fields were obliged to
spend 12 hours a day laying down on a hard bed and looking at the ceiling
living. They lived on a very low caloric intake – around 1200 to 1500 calories
per day, an existence that didn’t let them die or live.
My observations was that those who have a very active mind need to conceive,
to build, to construct, to work. As they were not allowed to work in any way,
these camps created all types of subversive activities and the people became
dissatisfied.
Questioner: It creates a type of depression that leads to destructive subversion
The Danger of Destructive Subversion
Exactly, but a destructive subversion that is sometimes is directed toward

themselves. They become apathetic, not fighting anymore and not looking for
anything, and that’s how you create material for welfare. And some others,
more aggressive and dynamic are directing this destructive subversion at the
society at large, which they blame for their depression. This is again a very
dangerous situation. History has shown us that whenever we deal with a group
that can be recognized for their differences by physical features or by culture or
whatever, it will only take one individual of this group to do wrong, and it will
reflect upon the whole group. This is one thing that should be avoided.
Discontent and depression should be detected before it takes a form that can be
aggressive or dangerous to the society as a whole.
Questioner: Or irreversible.
Yes, or irreversible as you say. Now I hope that irreversibility does not exist in
people that have strengthened by so many years of adversity and suffering and

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so on. For usually people that survive and revive every time with the slightest
hope that anyone pains them. This is what comes first in my mind.
Simple Solutions Can Cause Despair
You must recognize that the refugees and I was concerned mainly with the
refugees from Romania. I had to recognize that although we are democratic in
nature and do not believe in qualitative differences between human beings, we
have to recognize however, that the necessities especially cultural and
sometimes physical differ from one group to another. They depend on the habits
they had before and how they used them. For instance, I found out that giving
beds without the mattress was a cause for extreme depression I would even say
despair for a man who had all his life a very soft mattress. However, this
condition may be perfectly satisfactory for one who had lived that way before
[without a soft mattress]. Now this doesn’t mean that one of the two men was
better, what it means is that on so little may depend the happiness and the
disposition of progress for one individual over another. This is why I believe
you have to take into consideration of various groups and must meet their
particular needs. For instance, those that came from an academic rank, they
need very much material for reading. Material that was advanced in their own
fields of activities, therefore, they should be given access to libraries. Other
types, farmers, for example, would be very disoriented in an city environment
really need to go to the farm. They would be the easiest to place, because they
have necessity and they want to learn the new techniques. Other workers would
be highly interested in the skills of the host country and in one way or another
should be exposed to these skill sets and processes. They then should be given
an opportunity to test “hands on” with what they have been shown. This might
be called the training and preparation period.
Food as an Expression of Identity
Somebody should tell the U.S. government that food in every country is also an
expression of the culture of their native country or region. It is also a need
induced by the environment. I experienced this myself as a refugee. One of the
secrets for good integration and adaptation in a new culture is to start with the
idea that the new people are bringing certain things different than what you are
doing within your own country. The ability to present food is a simple but
dramatic way to offer something to the host country that represents their identity.
Summary
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So, what follows are key issues that Dr. Teodoru indicated pertain to all
refugees. These should be considered when making any type of decision in
relation to their disposition, either temporary or permanent. We found these
points rang true with the Indochinese and I believe they pertain today to the
Kosovo refugee.
The Initial Psyche of the Refugee – Fear

Loss of Identity
Inability to Communicate
The Importance of Keeping the Refugees together

Create An Environment Free From Fear and Hostility
Recreate Community and Economy Among the Refugees
Make Room for the Growth of Leadership
The Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity

Education
The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions
Provide Sustenance that is more than Survival Subsistence
Support the Development of a self-sustaining Environment
The Danger of Destructive subversion

Simple Solutions can Cause Despair
Food as an Expression of Identity
Provide emotional strength by understanding their culture and heritage and using
it to achieve some level of acculturation.
Indochinese Refugee Resettlement of 1975-76
The Indochinese Refugee effort was very difficult, not only because it was so
immediate, involved some 150,000 people, but also because it occurred at a time
when the American people no longer wanted to hear the word “Indochina” or
“Vietnam”. Raising funds for the effort were difficult because President Ford
did not want to go to Congress for additional funding and possibly suffer a
defeat that would demoralize the refugees and further agitate the country.

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We were also unable to ask Congress that the Indochinese refugee be covered
under the Cuban Refugee Act of 1961, which would have solved many “red
tape” issues. These “red tape” issues included the refugees being designated
simultaneously as both parolees and refugees by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). This meant that as a parolee, they were not
permitted certain aid support including qualifying for a “green card” and
therefore were unable to work. Further, if they did “something wrong”,
technically they could be sent back to their country of origin. However, they
could not be sent back to their country of origin because they were also political
refugees with asylum in the United States.
When we began the effort with the Indochinese Refugees, we encountered many
issues such as the parolee/refugee issue. To follow Dr. Teodoru’s view, we had
put the refugee in a no-man’s zone that caused only pain and despair.
Another example of this “red tape” factor involved South Vietnamese military
personnel. Under the Vietnamization program, we had trained the ARVN
recruits in the very same way we did American troops, using American
personnel. As some 50+% of the refugees were South Vietnamese soldiers, we
asked the Department of Defense to draw up a plan that would allow the
American military to accept such refugees into a special force that over time
would be fully assimilated into our military. If we had succeeded in this effort,
we would have supported our claim that Vietnamization worked, housed, fed
and otherwise provided jobs for thousands of refugees virtually overnight. DOD
thought this was a great idea, but a few days later came back to tell us that they
couldn’t take the Vietnamese military types because they were officially
parolees and not eligible for a green card. To enter the U.S. military, you need at
a minimum, a green card.
Fortunately, the American people responded to the call by the President to help
the refugees. Thousands of citizens provided funds, housing, and support of all
kinds. We followed many of Dr. Teodoru’s ideas and kept families and natural
communities together, resettling them in same or adjoining housing units, etc.
Vietnamese who were rice farmers, we moved to Louisiana and other areas
where rice farming was possible. Former Vietnamese vice president and air
marshal Ky went along with that group. The area between San Francisco and
Santa Cruz is known today as “little Vietnam or Saigon”, where Vietnamese own
thousands of businesses, hotels, restaurants, etc. I have visited these areas and
found that many of the decisions that we made did prove helpful to these people
now nearly 25 years later.
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There are so very many issues that are faced with refugees, particularly those
who are stripped of all identification. It is so very important to give them
“back” their identity. It is also important to feed them, house them, clothe them
and to free them from a hostile environment, so that they can breathe free and
without fear. Yet, as Dr. Teodoru said, “...you can’t provide them with an
existence that doesn’t let them die or live...” That is now the challenge in the
Balkans.
My E-Mail on the Kosovo Refugee Situation
(The following e-mail’s represent contact with Janice O’Connell of Senator

Dodd’s staff and Bob McPhearson of CARE. Bob was seriously injured on
Wednesday, April 7, 1999, when a vehicle he and four other CARE workers
were in went off a cliff in Macedonia. All were seriously injured and U.S.
military personnel later evacuated him to Germany).
Subject: Kosovo
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:09:38 -0500
From: "William B. Seebeck" <seebeck@snet.net>
Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C.
To: janice_oconnell@dodd.senate.gov
Dear Janice,
This is a follow-up to the voice mail I left you a few minutes ago about the
Kosovo Refugee Issue.
I have become very concerned over the movement of people from Kosovo to
Albania and Macedonia, particularly since both of these nations are so ill-
equipped to deal with such a crush of humanity, so in need
of every aspect of care.
Today, I called Secretary of State Albright to see how I might be helpful. Her
assistant connected me with the Kosovo Task Force.

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Why I thought I might be helpful is because in 1975, I was appointed to the

business/labor committee of the President's Commission on Indochinese
Refugees (I had also been on the U.S.-Nicaraguan Earthquake
Relief Committee in 1973, following the earthquake that demolished Managua).
It was our task in the Indochinese effort to see to the organization, care and
resettlement of some 150,000 refugees. Fortunately, DOD had successfully
housed these refugees into I believe three sites (memory fails me a bit). The
largest was Indian Town Gap (Pennsylvania). This was a two year intensive
inter-agency and public effort with little budget (as President Ford did not want
to go back to Congress for yet more funds for Vietnam related issues).
I believe that what we had accomplished for the Indochinese refugees given a
similar size group may also be a method for the Kosovo refugees. I am not of
course suggesting they come to the U.S., but I know that in
the archives, DOD must have a report that would deal with the methods and
resources they used back in 1975-1976 to house, feed, clothe and otherwise
maintain 150,000 refugees over a two year period. I thought that if the cost of
that might be adjusted for current pricing that a refugee aid bill using such a
model might be put before the Congress by Senator Dodd and an appropriate
House member.
I realize that DOD has addressed refugee issues since 1976, particularly with
Somalia. However, I believe that in the case of Kosovo, it may be different, as
we may need to support and maintain them in an adjoining country for an
extended period of time, with the end objective being returning them to their
homeland once it is safe to do so and with an infrastructure that will support
them.
From your experience in the Peace Corps Janice, I don't need to tell you how
quickly this situation can become horrific. Further, I want you to know that
when I spoke today with the Kosovo Task Force at the State Department, they
seemed confused and unorganized (net, net, I did not get a feeling of anyone
being "in-control"). They told me that right now they were trying to figure out
how to get food to the people at the borders. I asked for the DOD liaison and
they said they didn't have one. They instead referred me to the Balkan Task
Force and I am currently awaiting a call from that task force's humanitarian
officer Tony Banberry. I also spoke with Bob McPhearson from CARE early
this morning (just before he left for the region) and told him about what I was
doing (trying to help get an organized refugee aid program) and he told me he

13
had Iridium uplinks and asked that I stay in touch. By the way, in addition to
being a business consultant, I am also an
ordained Episcopal deacon.
Back in 1975, when the Indochinese refugee mission began, I was managing the
day-to-day operations of the Grace Foundation for W.R.Grace & Co. My
involvement in Vietnam was not in uniform, but as a member of a public policy
group during that time...”
Subject: Kosovo Refugee II

Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:28:43 -0500
To: janice_oconnell@dodd.senate.gov
Dear Janice,
A few minutes after sending you my first e-mail, I received a briefing from the
Balkan Task Force Humanitarian officer. He told me how the UNHCR will be
handling this effort and described how aid is on the way and how profound that
aid will be in support of these refugees. I was most heartened to hear of this
program.
Consequently, I gather that my note may be moot. I guess what I am still left
with is the feeling that as a citizen, I am very disconnected with participating our
nation's effort in this war. In the Persian Gulf War, I felt as a citizen fully
engaged (writing letters to servicemen, visiting families, sending packages, etc,
etc.). Now, we learn about so many things thirdly (first NATO, then State or
NSC, the press secretary, occasionally our military [haven't seen Gen. Clark
yet], occasionally our elected officials -- the president, never the vice president,
then the press). I have heard more on CNN from the Serbian Deputy Prime
Minister and U.S. Ambassador than from our own leaders.
I realize that this is a result of the structure of NATO, but it is also NATO's first
offensive engagement and we did not anticipate the same public
communications needs when we were in a defensive mode (i.e., we would
already been attacked in the original NATO plan).

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Is there more we can do as citizens in addition to sending a financial donation to

CARE or other such organizations?
Subject: Update
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 10:46:50 -0500
To: TOHIDV@yahoo.com
Dear Bob,
Paul told me today that you had problems in transit. Trust they are clearing up
and you are on your way.
I promised that I would give you updates from my vantage point. Please realize
that no one understands the power and delivery capability of CARE more than I
do, but many in the general public do not. Communication with the general
public about what is going on with the refugees is very limited. Finally, I am
trying to be helpful in this difficult human situation. If I get in the way at all,
please tell me.
Now the Update:
When I spoke with Tony Banberry, the Humanitarian Officer of the Balkan Task
Force on the 31st, he told me that UNHCR would be coordinating aid to the
area, but that soon after the president signed Presidential
Determination No. 99-20 that day at 1:00 pm, that DOD had relief planes ready
to roll. The President did sign the Order, but as of right now, no one has been
able to confirm that these relief planes ever rolled. This morning, I spoke with
Will King, CNN's VP & Head of International Newsgathering. He told me that
their conversations this morning with Christiane Amanpour indicated a further
deteriorating situation. I asked him to have someone at CNN ask DOD at their
daily (hopefully to be held today) briefing to ask about the refugees -- Food,
Housing,
Infrastructure, etc. (in yesterday's briefing, the press did not ask a single
question about the refugees, their current situation, let alone what happened to
the men).

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As you may recall, on the 31st, I sent a series of e-memo's to Sen. Dodd’s
foreign policy advisor (Janice O'Connell), whom you may come across in your
current travel. I gave her my views and concerns, shared my own experiences
and described the results of all of my calls and the U.S. government responses to
my questions.
This morning, the President is meeting (as I type) with State and DOD (further
described as an inter-agency meeting) and reportedly a number of private
organizations (Red Cross and others not named), because "...he is very
concerned about what the U.S. is doing on an interagency basis..."
Net, net, other than the terrible pictures on television, the refugee situation has
still not hit page one of government focus. It in fact may have, but that is
unknown to the general public. I mentioned this to CNN's King, but he said that
as far as they knew, nothing had changed in terms of aid on the ground.
Finally, I also spoke this morning with Wallace Coggins who is the legislative
fellow (on loan from DOD) to my congressman Jim Maloney who sits on the
National Security Committee (the subcommittee charged with funding military
procurement and personnel) of the House Armed Services Committee. I know
Jim and Wallace are making appropriate inquiries.
That's it for now. God be with you Bob, be safe.
Bill Seebeck (bill@seebeck.com)
(As I finish this, the White House reports via CNN that the refugee number is
now close to 250,000 [AID estimate]).
Subject: Update 4:45 PM EST

Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 16:51:05 -0500
Bob,
Here is the update:

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Congressman Maloney's (CT) national security committee liaison Wallace

Coggins, reported to me around noon, that DOD's Task force gave him an update
of the situation. According to that update, food from UNHCR and
NGO stores are moving into the region. However, they have been delayed by
lack of infrastructure. However, the word was that the food is in transit to the
refugee site (see below). Further, it is reported that estimates of pre-positioned
food from UNHCR/NGO's in the region will last through mid-April. Wallace
also reported that the Pentagon will be moving HDR's (Human Daily Ration)
into the area from U.K. by air (200,000 units) and from U.S. by ship (500,000
units) to the region.
Shelter is reported as the worst situation. According the update, only 700 tents
are available in the region (each able to house 7 to 8 adults). An effort is
underway to secure plastic sheeting. Coggins on behalf of the Congressman
offered DOD assistance on any procurement requirements.
Its 4:00 PM EST, Lt. Gen. John McDuffie, Logistics Director of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is just now completing his press conference (viewed on CNN) on these
matters. His direct dial is 703-697-4121, his Exec. Officer, who I just spoke
with, is Col. Gary L. Border 703-697-1408. In his press conference, McDuffie
confirmed the Task Force report to Coggins. The General indcated that there
current estimates as of 2:00 EST today were that there are 138,500 refugees in
Albania, 17,400 in Montenegro and 86,000 in Macedonia. He said that the
Macedonia number could double by the end of the weekend. He indicated that
there were USAID Disaster Recovery Teams in the area and a DOD team would
be arriving within 24 hours. Further, General McDuffie indicated that the whole
operation "in country" will be coordinated by Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., who is
in Naples, Italy (Direct Dial from U.S. 011390817212302). Admiral Ellis is the
former deputy Chief of Naval Operations. He was also former director of plans,
policies and operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Further, I spoke at the end of the press conference with Colonel Border who also
confirmed the Coggins report. He agreed that there is very little infrastructure in
the area, hindering smooth operations. Col. Border also confirmed that the food
is getting to the site only because of the assistance of the Albania army and
people, who have pitched in to help. I asked Border why DOD isn't sending a
combat construction unit into the area to build temp housing and he said that
State hadn't requested it. I felt that he wished they had.

17
The process for aid, as described by McDuffie, was that requests would go from
State Department or NATO to UNHCR then back to State and then to NATO
and then back to DOD. Not a smooth operation. I just spoke (4:16 PM EST)
with Congressman Maloney directly and he said he would contact either the
Secretary of Defense or the President about streamlining this process.
I trust you are doing well and that's it from here. Very best Bob.
--- Bill Seebeck
Subject: Update
Date: Sun, 04 Apr 1999 09:24:53 -0400
Bob,
I am just going to assume that you are getting this e-mail. My update is as
follows:
There is a growing public concern now over the refugees here at home and the
government and media are speaking much more to the issue. That's good. Poll
numbers are going up on public concern and want for action, etc.
What still isn't good is that we are talking about small units of what is needed
right now. I spoke yesterday afternoon NYC time with Captain Burnett, USN in
Naples Italy, who is on the staff of Admiral Ellis. As
I indicated in my earlier message Ellis now has NATO/U.S. military
responsibility for relief and Captain Burnett is the staff coordinator for that
effort reporting to Admiral Ellis. Burnett's direct dial from U.S. is
011390817212263 and his e-mail is SBurnett@AFSouth.Nato.int. In the
conversation, Burnett indicated that the food while on site or arriving on site,
still wasn't getting where it needed to go (he didn't seem happy with the
UNHCR effort) and I could tell he was frustrated. By the way, he seems like a
great guy who like most of the DOD people I have spoken with wants to get it
done ASAP.

18
He said the big problem was housing and they are bringing tentage from all over
the world (primarily from U.S. bases), but he said it still won't be enough. I told
him that I had a conversation with Congressman Maloney about pushing to get
combat construction teams to the site for temp billeting. He wouldn't comment
on it other to say, it is needed. He also indicated that they have turned much of
the NATO force already in these countries to the relief effort. It was also
announced last night that 20,000 Italian troops have been assigned to the effort.
Not surprisingly, the continuing problem is lack of infrastructure and also I

think, the enormous pressure that is being put on these small countries to
shoulder so much of this burden, while trying to protect themselves against
Milosevic.
I will be monitoring today and expect to follow-up with Congressman Maloney

in the morning.
Recommendations
I have divided my recommendations into three categories – policy, infrastructure

and the refugees. I have included policy as I have found that there are too many
“hands in the pot”. The result has been inaction or slowed reaction. In part this
is because requirements are being set by agencies and groups not able (because
it is not in their charter to do so) to follow through on the ground or to “make
things happen”. This has delayed vital and timely aid to the refugees that can
have horrific results.
Policy
Diplomacy has not succeeded in this effort. The response was military action.
As a result, the Department of State should no longer act as an intermediary in
this action determining military or other requirements in a theatre of war.
Rather, DOD should immediately assume these functions. The same action
should be taken with all NATO allies.
Clearly, the command structure of NATO as it pertains to civilian, diplomatic

and military authority has failed. I would recommend that the structure used in
World War II be put in place. That is, the heads of state acting in direct concert
determine overall goals and objectives. Then the military chiefs present their
plans for meeting those goals and objectives to this group (not their
19
representatives). Then they should be left to carry out those plans, in the pursuit
of an end victory.
As this is the first action of NATO, we should not apologize. NATO was created
as a defensive mechanism and only in the last eight years has it pursued the
possibility of an offensive posture. We should expect things to break and not
work. However, when it is clear that something doesn’t work, dump it
especially when you are already engaged in combat.
The United States of America should never forget that it started NATO and it has
been a hallmark of U.S. foreign and military policy for 50 years. Therefore, we
must lead NATO forward, just as we planned and promised to do, albeit
defensively at the beginning. Now that the chips are down, we should not say,
well it’s a European problem. This must also provide better communications
with the people of the U.S., who have supported NATO for half a century and
will not and have not been surprised by the objectives of NATO.
Some may find fault with the recommendations outlined above, but understand
that the Department of State is not structured to physically ACT overtly on
behalf of the nation. We are now engaged in war, with the lives of many at
stake. It is now time, as President Bush described it in the Persian Gulf War, to
pass the ball from the diplomats to the military, so that our objectives might be
met. At that time, it became the responsibility of the president to act as
commander-in-chief and the then secretary of state spent his time, running
between allies to make sure they were doing what they said they would and we
were doing what we said we would. The SOS was not being consulted on daily
targeting, nor should he have been. This also applies to the National Security
Council, whose job is not to run the war, but to report on the impact of the action
on allies, the enemy and potential enemies. This is the lesson of Vietnam. The
president and military in consultation with the Congress run wars. When you do
that, it works. Let’s do it.
Infrastructure in Support of the Kosovo Refugees
Infrastructure does not exist in the countries where the refugees are now
positioned.
Diplomats cannot create infrastructure.

20
Infrastructure requires action in the field, especially in a military theatre and that
means military intervention. If the U.S. has to go it alone on this it should.
The President should order combat construction teams immediately into these
areas to build roads, airports and shelter.
Ranger forces should also be ordered into these countries to protect these aid
teams.
The refugees must not be put in a position where they are in a no-man zone
separating aggressive forces.
The United States and other NATO nations should provide immediate hard
currency aid to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro to assist them in the efforts
that they have already voluntarily begun, but also to strengthen them in
whatever means necessary to protect themselves against Serbian aggression.
The food and material available for these refugees will exhaust in a few months.
Plans must be initiated to deal with this situation. Failure to do so, will result in
possible worldwide shortages for other yet to be experienced disasters.
The Refugees
Refugees must stay in the region (at the very least Europe).
Refugees must not be sent to Cuba.
It should also be remembered that Cuba is not the United States.
If they are to be sent anywhere in the U.S., it should be to a like climate area
such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire or Maine, where DOD sites are
available and Albanian communities that can support them are within reach.
The Department of Defense should run the refugee camps.
If refugees are brought to the United States, a commission similar to that created
by President Ford in 1975 should be initiated. Those appointed to the
commission should be U.S. leaders in business, health, social services, housing,
religion, etc. Ideally, these leaders should be of non-Serbian Balkan background
21
(there are plenty of such people). This will better support the needs of the
refugees, especially since it is the intent to send them back to their homelands.
If refugees are sent to the U.S. with the idea of assimilation, they should not be
designated simultaneously by the INS as both parolees and refugees.
The President must ask the American people for their involvement in this effort.
We have not been asked to do anything more than contribute to NGO’s
providing aid in the region.
About William B. Seebeck
William B. Seebeck is an ordained deacon canonically resident in the Diocese of

New York.
Bill began his studies for priestly formation in 1986. At the end of those studies,
he completed a full-term clinical pastoral education program at Bellevue
Hospital in New York City (1989-1990) were he served on the hospital's
emergency room/trauma team. The Rt. Rev. Richard F. Grein, Bishop of New
York, ordained him in 1990, in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Bill has
served the parishes of Christ Church, (Bronxville, NY), Trinity-St. Paul's (New
Rochelle, NY), St. Peter's (Port Chester, NY), St. Paul’s (Norwalk, CT) and
Christ Church (Rye, NY). He also served as a member of the Council of the
Diocese of New York.
In his secular life, Bill is the managing director of Seebeck International, L.L.C.,
an online commerce & communications consulting company. Previous to this,
he served as an executive for a variety of companies including the Chase
Manhattan Bank, W.R. Grace & Co., LEXIS/NEXIS, Inc., Global Scan, Ltd.
(UK) and Ziff Communications Company. Mr. Seebeck, who has traveled
extensively in Europe and the Middle East, is a member of the Institute of
Electrical & Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the International Security Systems
Association (ISSA), and the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.
He was an author of a report on the Progress of Vietnamization presented to

President Nixon in 1971; served as a member of the U.S./Nicaraguan
Earthquake Relief Committee (1973); and was appointed by President Ford to
the business/labor advisory committee of the President’s Commission on
Indochinese Refugees in 1975. He served as chairman of the corporate urban

22
affairs advisory committee (CUAAC) and a member of the executive committee

and board of directors of the National Urban Coalition (1974-1980).
In 1979, Bill was the recipient of the New York City Junior Chamber of
Commerce Big Apple Award as an Outstanding Young New Yorker. In 1968,
Bill was named the Outstanding Catholic Youth of the United States by the U.S.
Catholic Conference. He is also the author of the song Roll Up Your Sleeves
America. He resides in Wilton, Connecticut.

Balkan Refugee Special Report

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© 1999 Seebeck International, L.L.C. All rights reserved. This document is

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

In both the Balkans and Indochina, refugees “appeared” almost instantaneously

A Look at the Refugee

Initial Psyche of the Refugee

If there is a lack of communication in addition to the psychological background,

Keeping the Refugees Together

Recreating Community and Economy

Leadership – Positive and Negative/From Within and Without

Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity

Naturally, these people should be given the opportunity to learn English or

The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions

My observation in Austria and Germany, wherever there were camps for

Questioner: It creates a type of depression that leads to destructive subversion

The Danger of Destructive Subversion

Exactly, but a destructive subversion that is sometimes is directed toward

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Simple Solutions Can Cause Despair

Food as an Expression of Identity

The Initial Psyche of the Refugee – Fear

The Importance of Keeping the Refugees together

The Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity

The Danger of Destructive subversion

Indochinese Refugee Resettlement of 1975-76

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

My E-Mail on the Kosovo Refugee Situation

(The following e-mail’s represent contact with Janice O’Connell of Senator

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Why I thought I might be helpful is because in 1975, I was appointed to the

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Subject: Kosovo Refugee II

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Is there more we can do as citizens in addition to sending a financial donation to

Now the Update:

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

That's it for now. God be with you Bob, be safe.

Bill Seebeck (bill@seebeck.com)

Subject: Update 4:45 PM EST

Here is the update:

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Congressman Maloney's (CT) national security committee liaison Wallace

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

--- Bill Seebeck

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Not surprisingly, the continuing problem is lack of infrastructure and also I

I will be monitoring today and expect to follow-up with Congressman Maloney

I have divided my recommendations into three categories – policy, infrastructure

Clearly, the command structure of NATO as it pertains to civilian, diplomatic

Infrastructure in Support of the Kosovo Refugees

Diplomats cannot create infrastructure.

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

Refugees must not be sent to Cuba.

It should also be remembered that Cuba is not the United States.

The Department of Defense should run the refugee camps.

About William B. Seebeck

William B. Seebeck is an ordained deacon canonically resident in the Diocese of

He was an author of a report on the Progress of Vietnamization presented to

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

affairs advisory committee (CUAAC) and a member of the executive committee

91 Wolfpit Road • Wilton, CT 06897-3412 • v 203.834.9957 • f 203.834.9987 • http://www.seebeck.com

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