Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


UTICA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff. Corporate file number: 8:11-CR-00038(DNH)
vs.

VICTOR JACOBS LAZORE,


alleged Defendant. Memorandum Of Law
vs. applied as Principle Of Law
in support of Notice and Demand
Victor-Jacob:, to Strike.
Secured Party Claimant
___________________________________/

APPEARANCE: OF COUNSEL:

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Esquire RICHARD S HARTUNIAN


ALBANY OFFICE
Attorneys for the United States of America Esquire ELIZABETH A. HORSMAN
James T. Foley US Courthouse
445 Broadway, Room 231
Albany NY 12201

____________________________________________________________________________

Special presence under duress: Without counsel:


Suæ potestis esse.
Claimant

Victor-Jacob:
Suæ potestis esse
c/o box 55 Saint Regis Road Victor-Jacob:, Secured Party Claimant
Hogansburg Post Office
[near New York 13655]

DAVID N. HURD
United States District Court Judge

1
Table of contents and cites

Principle of Law Count Page


Cause of Action
Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, rule 12 (f) Count three Page one
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(e) Count four Page one
Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, rule 12(c) Count five Page one
Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b) Count six Page one
110 Stat 3850 codified at 28 USC § 2284 Count seven Page two
110 Stat. 3850 and 119 Stat. 9 codified at 28 USC § 1332 Count eight Page two
94 Stat. 2369 codified at 28 USC § 1331 Count nine Page three
64 Stat. 845 codified 25 USC § 233 Count ten Page three
62 Stat. 1224 codified at 25 USC § 232 Count eleven Page three
121 Stat. 2557 codified at 18 USC § 1341 Count twelve Page three
123 Stat. 3481 codified at 18 USC § 1091 Count thirteen Page four
110 Stat. 3511, 3507 codified at 18 USC § 242 Count fourteen Page four
110 Stat. 3511, 3507 codified at 18 USC § 241 Count fifteen Page five
Deprivation of Rights
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 47 (1905) Count sixteen Page five
UNITED STATES v OTHERSON, 480 F. Supp. 1369 (1979); Count seventeen Page five
1871 Ku Klux Klan Act; 42 U.S.C. §1983
Trezevant v City of Tampa, 741 F.2d 336, 337 Count eighteen Page six
35 Stat. 1114 codified at 18 USC § 4 Count nineteen Page six
61 Stat. 642 codified at 4 USC § 2 Count twenty Page seven
61 Stat. 642 codified at 4 USC § 1 Count twenty-one Page seven
90 Stat 2891 codified at 28 USC § 1330 Count twenty-two Page seven
Article VI of the Constitution for the United States of Count twenty- Page seven
three
America; Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union
between the North American Colonies, Article XI; German
Flatts Treaty, 1775
Kidnapping
Laws of New York, Indian Law, Article 8, § 114 Count twenty-four Page eight

2
United States of America v. Wilson, Case 8:10-cr-00068-DNH
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2010)
CONNALLY V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO.,
269 U. S. 385 (1926)
18 USC § 4100 Count twenty-five Page nine
Failure to state claim for which relief can be granted.

42 Stat. 227; 42 Stat. 23; Pub. Law. No. 13, Act of June 10, Count twenty-six Page nine
1921, Ch. 18, § 301, § 305, § 236 of revised statutes; 5
U.S.C. § 5512 and notes; 26 U.S.C. § 7401

5 U.S.C. § 5512; Act of June 10, 1921, ch. 18, title III, 42 Count twenty- Page ten
seven
Stat. 23; section 16 of the Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 212, 47
Stat. 1517; section 5 of E.O. 6166, June 10, 1933; section 1
of 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 2, 64 Stat. 1261; 31 U.S.C. § 3702

E.O. # 10289; T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. Count twenty- Page eleven
eight
#150-01 (1986)
T.D.O. 150-29, in 1953; Article IV § 3.2 Constitution for the Count twenty-nine Page eleven
United States of America; 4 U.S.C. § 72
36 F.R. 849-890 [C.B. 1971-1,698]; 36 F.R. 11946 [C.B. 1971 Count thirty Page eleven
– 2,577]; presidential letter following Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1952, published following 26 U.S.C. § 7804
Notes for Amendments to Pub. L. 94-455 codified at 26 USC Count thirty-one Page twelve
§ 7804; Pub. L. 105–206
31 USC § 3711; Notes to 31 USC § 3711 Count thirty-two Page twelve
Article I § 8.9, Article III § 1 & Article I § 8.18 Constitution Count thirty-three Page thirteen
for United States of America
Article XIII in Amendment to the Constitution for the United Count thirty-four Page thirteen
States of America
Reading Comprehension

18 USC § 921(a)(2); Article IV § 3.2 Constitution for United Count thirty-five Page thirteen
States of America; United States v. Lopez (93-1260), 514 U.S.
549 (1995), quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-

3
195 (1824) .

18 USC §§ 924 (a)(2) & 922 (g)(1); United States v. Count thirty-six Page fourteen
Lopez, infra;

CONNALLY V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO.,


infra at page 391

Church of Scientology v. U. S. Dept. of Justice (1979) 612 F. Count thirty-seven Page fourteen
2d 417, 425.)
1 USC § 1 Count thirty-eight Page fourteen
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, Count thirty-nine Page fifteen
239 (1874); United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175,
186 (1936); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn.,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 161, n. 21
(1983)
18 USC § 921(a)(1) Count forty Page fifteen
27 CFR 178.11 Count forty-one Page fifteen
8 USC § 1101 Count forty-two Page fifteen

18 USC § 921(a)(2) Count forty-three Page fourteen

27 CFR 178.11 Count forty-four Page sixteen

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 1 (b)(9) Count forty-five Page sixteen

Second Article in Amendment to Constitution for Count forty-six Page sixteen


United States of America

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition Count forty-seven Page sixteen

26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) Count forty-nine Page seventeen


Notes to Rule 1 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Count fifty-one Page seventeen
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) Count fifty-two Page eighteen
4 U.S.C. §§ 71 & 72 Count fifty-three Page eighteen

Article I § 8.17 to Constitution for United States of America Count fifty-four Page eighteen

Boswell v. Otis, 9 Howards 336. Count fifty-five Page nineteen


1871 Ku Klux Klan Act; 28 USC §§ 2284, 2283 Count fifty-six Page nineteen
Legislative Construction
25 USC §§ 233, 232; Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co. 160 Count fifty-seven Page nineteen
at page twenty
4
F.2d. 788; Royer's, Inc. Appellant, v. United States of
America, 265 F.2d 615.
Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register, 580 F.2d Count fifty-eight Page twenty
1166, 1170, 1171 (1978); 1 CFR § 8
5 U.S.C. §§ 302 and 301 Count fifty-nine Page twenty
United States, Appellant v. Mersky et al., 361 U.S. Count sixty Page twenty
438; 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)
People v. Edwards, 104 Misc. 2D 305, 428 N.Y.S. 2D Count sixty-one Page twenty-one
406 quoting Bardes v. First National Bank, 178 US
524
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, Agoncillo et Count sixty-two Page twenty-one
al., 277 U.S. 189.
Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425 Count sixty-three Page twenty-one
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, Agoncillo et Count sixty-four Page twenty-one
al., 277 U.S. 189, 205.
Boyd v. U.S. 116 U. S. 616 Count sixty-five Page twenty-two
Article I § 8, Article III § 3 Constitution for United States of Count sixty-six Page twenty-two
America
Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat (US) 264 (1821). Count sixty-seven Page twenty-two
Lack of Subject Matter
120 Stat. 617 codified at 18 USC § 1153; Count sixty-eight Page twenty-two
Article III Courts
Article III § 1 Constitution for United States of America; Count sixty-nine Page twenty-
three
Mookini v. United States (1938) 58 S.Ct. 543, 303 U.S. 201,
82 L.Ed. 748, at p. 205; Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922) 42 S.Ct.
343, 258 U.S. 298, 66 L.Ed. 627, at 258 U.S. 312; 26 USC §§
7402(a), (b), (c); 7429 (b)(2)(A), 7407; 7402 (e): and 7422(f)
(2).
4 CFR § 91.2; Count seventy Page twenty-four

28 U.S.C. § 1869(f) County seventy- Page twenty-four


one
18 U.S.C. § 3231 Count seventy-two Page twenty-four
Supreme Court order of December 27, 1948 Count seventy- Page twenty-four

5
three
28 USC § 610 Count seventy- Page twenty- five
four
28 USC § 451, 28 USC § 132 Count seventy-five Page twenty-five
Abstention
Colorado River Water Conservation District v United States, Count seventy-six Page twenty-six
424 US 800 (1976)
Unites States v Tweel, 550 F2d 297.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
Burford v. Sun Oil Co Sun Oil Co 319 US 315 (1943)
Caudill v Eubanks Farms, Inc, 301 F3d 658 (CA 6, 2002)
Quackenbush v Allstate Ins Co, 517 US 706, 727 (1996)
United States v. Ambrose 108 US 336
Belligerent
United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538, 540 (District Court, Count seventy- Page twenty-
M.D. PA. 1947) seven seven

6
1. Claimant files this 'Memorandum Of Law' applied as 'Principle Of Law' in support of 'Notice
and Demand to Strike'.
2. Claimant, Suæ potestis esse, de jure Secured Party Claimant, herein after Claimant, National
Kanienkehaka, Onkwehonwe, original being from the Ancient One, man of creation, brought
forth from earth, being real flesh and blood, living soul, mind and spirit, maintains Explicit
Reservation of Rights, waiving none, admitting not Jurisdiction of the State of New York or any
of the three United States upon filing of this 'Memorandum Of Law applied as Principle Of
Law' or any other declaration, documents, in form of MOTIONS, except to dismiss.
3. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, rule 12 (f):
“MOTION TO STRIKE.
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after
the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court’s own initiative at any time,
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
4. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(e):
“MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT.
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that
a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may
move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.”
5. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, rule 12(c):
“Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
After the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.”
6. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b):
“How to Present Defenses.
Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive
pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:
(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

7
(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;
(3) improper venue;
(4) insufficient process;
(5) insufficient service of process;
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and
(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.
A motion asserting any of these defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive
pleading is allowed. If a pleading sets out a claim for relief that does not require a
responsive pleading, an opposing party may assert at trial any defense to that claim. No
defense or objection is waived by joining it with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or in a motion.”
7. As to US Attorney's assumption of venue and location of New York State, Claimant cites as
Principle of Law 110 Stat 3850 codified at 28 USC § 2284:
“Three-judge court; when required; composition; procedure
(a) A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of
Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the
apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide
legislative body.
(b) In any action required to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges
under subsection (a) of this section, the composition and procedure of the court shall be
as follows:
(1) Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is
presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required, immediately
notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one of
whom shall be a circuit judge. The judges so designated, and the judge to whom the
request was presented, shall serve as members of the court to hear and determine the
action or proceeding.
(2) If the action is against a State, or officer or agency thereof, at least five days’
notice of hearing of the action shall be given by registered or certified mail to the
Governor and attorney general of the State.
(3) A single judge may conduct all proceedings except the trial, and enter all orders
permitted by the rules of civil procedure except as provided in this subsection. He may
grant a temporary restraining order on a specific finding, based on evidence submitted,
that specified irreparable damage will result if the order is not granted, which order,
unless previously revoked by the district judge, shall remain in force only until the
hearing and determination by the district court of three judges of an application for a
preliminary injunction. A single judge shall not appoint a master, or order a reference, or
hear and determine any application for a preliminary or permanent injunction or motion
to vacate such an injunction, or enter judgment on the merits. Any action of a single
judge may be reviewed by the full court at any time before final judgment.”
8. Claimant cites as Principle of Law in pertinent part 110 Stat. 3850 and 119 Stat. 9 codified at 28

8
USC § 1332:
“Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a
State or of different States.”
9. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 94 Stat. 2369 codified at 28 USC § 1331:
“Federal question
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
10. As to conflict of law and violation of Claimant's Right under color of law, Claimant cites in
pertinent part as Principle of Law 64 Stat. 845 codified 25 USC § 233:
“Jurisdiction of New York State courts in civil actions
“...That nothing in this section shall be construed to require any such tribe or the
members thereof to obtain fish and game licenses from the State of New York for the exercise
of any hunting and fishing rights provided for such Indians under any agreement, treaty, or
custom...” See German Flatts Treaty, 1775, supra.
11. As to conflict of law and violation of Claimant's Right under color of law, Claimant cites as
Principle of Law 62 Stat. 1224 codified at 25 USC § 232
“Jurisdiction of New York State over offenses committed on reservations within State
The State of New York shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians on Indian reservations within the State of New York to the same extent as the
courts of the State have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State
as defined by the laws of the State: Provided, That nothing contained in this section
shall be construed to deprive any Indian tribe, band, or community, or members thereof,
hunting and fishing rights as guaranteed them by agreement, treaty, or custom, nor
require them to obtain State fish and game licenses for the exercise of such rights.” See
German Flatts Treaty, 1775, supra.
12. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 121 Stat. 2557 codified at 18 USC § 1341:
“Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or
procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article,

9
or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article,
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or
involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in
connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are
defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”
13. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 123 Stat. 3481 codified at 18 USC § 1091 here in part:
“Genocide
(a) Basic Offense.— Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war and with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as
such—
(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through
drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of
the group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Punishment for Basic Offense.— The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is—
(1) in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1), where death results, by death or
imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or both; and
(2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both,
in any other case.
14. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 110 Stat. 3511, 3507 codified at 18 USC § 242
“Deprivation of rights under color of law
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race,
than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts
10
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to
kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or
an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or
for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”
15. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 110 Stat. 3511, 3507 codified at 18 USC § 241
“Conspiracy against rights
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in
any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so
secured—
They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if
death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”
16. Claimant although not citizen of State of New York, nor the United States, cite as Principle of
Law the following U.S. Supreme Court Case:
"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to
carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He
owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of
his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land [Common law]
long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due
process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal
to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or
seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he
does not trespass upon their rights." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 47 (1905).
[Emphasis added]
17. Furthermore, in UNITED STATES v OTHERSON, 480 F. Supp. 1369 (1979), the Federal
Court made clear that the protection of Rights did not only extend to citizens and resident
aliens, but that the protection of rights extended to illegal aliens, tourist and all inhabitants of
the Territory, irregardless of the time said inhabitants has been within said Territory. However,
Claimant maintains all times that Claimant dwelt, inhabited and is domiciled without the
Territory of the United States and State of New York, and Claimant's inhabitance only applies to
this illegal attempt by Plaintiff, to injure Claimant, without law, into this Administrative
Proceedings. The underlying cause of ruling in OTHERSON was the abuse of Power and

11
unnecessary use of Force by agents or employees, such as in this case with the Saint Regis
Mohawk Police, Bombay Town Justice, Franklin County District Attorney, US Marshall
Service, US Attorneys and US Administrative Magistrate.
"The word 'inhabitant' should be construed so as to protect newly arrived aliens." id. Page 1372
"Shellabarger, chairman of the House Select Committee which drafted the 1871 Ku Klux Klan
Act, emphasized:
"The model for [what is now 42 U.S.C. {§} 1983] will be found in the second section
the act of April 9, 1866, known as the 'civil rights act'. That section provides a criminal
proceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy..."

"18 U.S.C. §242 and 42 U.S.C. §1983 have been judicially declared the analogues of
each other, with 'linguistic differences' not 'thought to be substantive'." "Congress
almost certainly did not contemplate any distinction between 'inhabitant' and 'person'. In
1870, no restrictions on immigration into the United States were in force; in fact, no
immigration laws at all existed in this country." Id. Page 1374.
18. Claimant has been unconstitutionally deprived of his right to liberty although certified copy
'Notice of Surety Act and Bond' has been filed for the Record by way of Seal of United States
Post Office with 2¢ stamp and confirmed service on 2/10/11 to United States District Court for
Northern District of New York, Plattsburgh, case # 8:11-CR-00038 (DNH), with assistance of
United States Postal Service certified mail # 7009 3410 0000 8370 4974 and Bondsman served
for the record certified copy 'Notice of Surety Act and Bond' on Administrative Magistrate
Larry A Kudrle in simulated legal proceeding on eighth day, second month called February, two
thousand eleven A.D.
For deprivation of Right, Claimant cites as Principle of Law, Trezevant v City of Tampa, 741
F.2d 336, 337 wherein;
“...with what they considered to be governmental policy, was sufficient to support
finding that motorist's unconstitutional incarceration during booking process, even
though motorist at all times had sufficient cash on hand to post bond, was result of an
official policy, thus rendering both municipality and county board of criminal justice
liable to motorist for unconstitutional deprivation of right to liberty.”
and
“Official policy or custom of a municipality must be moving force of constitutional
violation before civil liability will attach to municipality under civil rights statute.”
19. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 35 Stat. 1114 codified at 18 USC § 4
“Misprision of felony

12
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court
of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to
some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”
20. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 61 Stat. 642 codified at 4 USC § 2
“Same; additional stars
On the admission of a new State into the Union one star shall be added to the union of
the flag; and such addition shall take effect on the fourth day of July then next
succeeding such admission.”
21. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 61 Stat. 642 codified at 4 USC § 1
“The fly shall be 1.9 to 1.0 of the hoist. The field shall be forty percent of the fly. The
flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and
the union of the flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field.”
22. Claimant cites as Principle of Law 90 Stat 2891 codified at 28 USC § 1330
“Actions against foreign states
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any non jury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605–1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over
which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been
made under section 1608 of this title.
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign state does not confer
personal jurisdiction with respect to any claim for relief not arising out of any
transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections 1605–1607 of this title.”

23. Claimant cites as Principle of Law Article VI of the Constitution for the United States of
America;
“All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under
the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
13
or public Trust under the United States.”
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the North American Colonies,
signed at Philadelphia, 20 May 1775, Article XI declares:
“A perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, is to be entered into, as soon as may be,
with the Six Nations; their limits ascertained, and to be secured to them; their lands not
to be encroached on, nor any private or colony purchase to be made of them hereafter to
be held good, nor any contract for lands to be made, but between the great council of
the Indians at Onondaga and the general Congress. The boundaries and lands of all the
other Indians shall also be ascertained and secured to them in same manner; and persons
appointed to reside among them in proper districts, who shall take care to prevent
injustice in the trade with them; and be enabled at our general expence, by occasional
small supplies, to relieve their personal wants and distresses; and all purchases from
them shall be by Congress, for the general advantage and benefit of the united
colonies.” See Proceedings of the commissioners appointed to negotiate a Treaty with
the Six Nations of Indians, 1775 known as German Flatts Treaty, 1775, as transcriped
from; National Archives Microfilm Publications: Papers of the Continental Congress,
1774-89, M247;r 144; item 134.
24. As to criminal charge of kidnapping committed by certain employees of Saint Regis Mohawk
Police going in disguise upon the highway as St Regis Mohawk Police acting as New York
State Police against Claimant implementing foreign law within International boundaries of
Kanienke. Claimant cites as evidence of corporate law, Laws of New York, Indian Law, Article
8, § 114
“A person appointed a police officer under this section shall only be permitted to
exercise the duties or functions of a police officer within the county of Franklin, and
within that county, only within the boundary of the St. Regis reservation; except that
such officer may follow a person for whom he or she has the authority to arrest on
the reservation in continuous close pursuit, commencing on the reservation, in and
through any county of the state, and may arrest such person in any county in which the
officer apprehends him or her.”
Wherein count 1 of indictment states “...in or near Hogansburg, New York...”
Hogansburg has been held by this court not to be St. Regis reservation. United States
of America v. Wilson, Case 8:10-cr-00068-DNH (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2010). No
statement to be in St. Regis reservation, therefore Sergent Belson Herne and Saint
Regis Mohawk Police are without jurisdiction. Hogansburg is hamlet, St. Regis is the
Reservation.
“Certainly, the expression "near the place" leaves much to be desired in the way of a
delimitation of boundaries, for it at once provokes the inquiry, "how near?" And this
element of uncertainty cannot here be put aside as of no consequence...” CONNALLY
V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., 269 U. S. 385 (1926).

14
Certainly criminal affidavit should be more precise.
On sixth day, second month February, two thousand eleven at least two Saint Regis
Mohawk Police kidnapped Claimant from Clinton County Jail and transported
Claimant against his will, under color of law pursuant to custom, policy and usage, to
United States District Court in Plattsburgh. Clinton County and Plattsburgh to
Claimant's knowledge has not yet been ruled by any court to be Saint Regis reservation,
therefore Saint Regis Mohawk Police are without jurisdiction and have unclean hands,
Public Officers involved including but not limited to US Attorney, US Marshall Service
and Administrative Magistrate Larry A Kudrle have unclean hands and are acting
criminals.
25. As to the criminal charge of kidnapping committed by certain agents or employees of Saint
Regis Mohawk Police, United States Marshall Service, US Attorney and Administrative
Magistrate, Claimant cites as Principle of Law 18 USC § 4100;
“Scope and limitation of chapter
(a) The provisions of this chapter relating to the transfer of offenders shall be applicable only
when a treaty providing for such a transfer is in force, and shall only be applicable to transfers
of offenders to and from a foreign country pursuant to such a treaty. A sentence imposed by a
foreign country upon an offender who is subsequently transferred to the United States pursuant
to a treaty shall be subject to being fully executed in the United States even though the treaty
under which the offender was transferred is no longer in force.
(b) An offender may be transferred from the United States pursuant to this chapter only to a
country of which the offender is a citizen or national. Only an offender who is a citizen or
national of the United States may be transferred to the United States. An offender may be
transferred to or from the United States only with the offender’s consent, and only if the offense
for which the offender was sentenced satisfies the requirement of double criminality as defined
in this chapter. Once an offender’s consent to transfer has been verified by a verifying officer,
that consent shall be irrevocable. If at the time of transfer the offender is under eighteen years
of age, or is deemed by the verifying officer to be mentally incompetent or otherwise incapable
of knowingly and voluntarily consenting to the transfer, the transfer shall not be accomplished
unless consent to the transfer be given by a parent or guardian, guardian ad litem, or by an
appropriate court of the sentencing country. The appointment of a guardian ad litem shall be
independent of the appointment of counsel under section 4109 of this title.
(c) An offender shall not be transferred to or from the United States if a proceeding by way of
appeal or of collateral attack upon the conviction or sentence be pending.
(d) The United States upon receiving notice from the country which imposed the sentence that
the offender has been granted a pardon, commutation, or amnesty, or that there has been an
ameliorating modification or a revocation of the sentence shall give the offender the benefit of
the action taken by the sentencing country.”
26. As to failure to state Claim for which relief may be granted, whereas, the Director of the Office
15
of Management and Budget re-delegated from the General Accounting Office, herein GAO, as
general agent for the Treasury of the United States, is responsible for initiation of judicial
proceedings. GAO is an independent agency or department, and serves as general agent of the
Treasury of the United States, in charge of determining legitimacy of all claims of or against the
United States. A claim against the United States cannot be adjudicated in courts of the United
States unless it has first been submitted to, and rejected by GAO for claims submitted through
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
Congress effectively hid the Treasury of the United States in June 1921 by creating the General
Accounting Office and moving former Treasury personnel to the office under supervision of the
Comptroller General, then via the act of Nov. 23, 1921, repealed virtually all taxes authorized
by Article I and the Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, with the various taxes,
when reenacted, applicable exclusively within territory of the United States. The revenue act of
Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, is at 42 Stat. 227; creation of the General Accounting Office and
transfer of Treasury employees is at 42 Stat. 23.
Pub. Law. No. 13, Act of June 10, 1921, Ch. 18, § 301 et seq. See particularly § 305: "Sec. 305.
Section 236 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 236. All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or
against it, and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the United States is
concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General
Accounting Office.'"
Refer to notes following 5 U.S.C. § 5512 to see that the "Solicitor of the Treasury" was merged
with functions of the Attorney General via Executive Orders, etc. The necessity for initiating
civil action, as well as criminal, is tacitly stated in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. §
7401.
27. For purposes here, Historical and Revision Notes following 5 U.S.C. § 5512 follow:
In subsection (b) [of 5 U.S.C. § 5512], reference to the "General Accounting Office" is
substituted for "accounting officers of the Treasury" on authority of the Act of June 10, 1921,
ch. 18, title III, 42 Stat. 23. The words "on request of" are substituted for "if required to do so
by" as more accurately reflecting the intent. Reference to the "Attorney General" is substituted
for "Solicitor of the Treasury" and "Solicitor" on authority of section 16 of the Act of March 3,
1933, ch. 212, 47 Stat. 1517; section 5 of E.O. 6166, June 10, 1933; and section 1 of 1950
Reorg. Plan No. 2, 64 Stat. 1261.
Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title
as outlined in the preface to the report.

16
Responsibility of the Comptroller General, as head of the General Accounting Office, is
redelegated to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the current United
States Code at 31 U.S.C. § 3702, Title 31 relating to Money and Finance:
“Sec. 3702. Authority to settle claims

“(a) Except as provided in this chapter or another law, all claims of or against the
United States Government shall be settled as follows:
“(4) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall settle claims not
otherwise provided for by this subsection or another provision of law.”
Unless or until a claim is submitted to the Comptroller General, through the delegated agent
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, courts of the United States may not
adjudicate it -- suit for a claim which has not been denied by the General Accounting Office
presents a claim for which relief may not be granted.
28. The Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are agencies of
the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, both in the lineage of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Puerto Rico, created by the provisional government of Puerto Rico in approximately
1900. These agencies are delegates of the Secretary in insular possessions of the United States,
Guam and American Samoa evidently included. They operate in the framework of authority
delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury via E.O. # 10289, and redelegated to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue via T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. #150-01
(1986). They have absolutely no constitutional or statutory authority in the Union of several
States party to the Constitution, nor sovereign lands of Kanienke.
29. The Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are successors
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, the BIR to IRS name change being effected by
T.D.O. 150-29, in 1953; BATF was split from IRS in 1972 by administrative order, not by
Congress' statutory authority. No new governmental entity was created. These agencies, which
are not part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States or the Treasury of the United
States, have legitimate authority only in insular possessions and territorial waters belonging to
the United States, all of which are subject to Congress' plenary power under Article IV § 3.2 of
the Constitution. Neither has statutory authority beyond borders of the District of Columbia
save in insular possessions of the United States, per 4 U.S.C. § 72.
30. In the official historical report on the nation's revenue laws, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue admitted that Congress never created the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of
17
IRS & BATF. See 36 F.R. 849-890 [C.B. 1971-1,698], 36 F.R. 11946 [C.B. 1971 -- 2,577], and
section 1111.2 of the Internal Revenue Manual 1100. The best the Commissioner could do is
allude to Congressional intent in 1862 even though there is no independent evidence of
Congressional intent to create a new and separate tax collection agency. Revenue officers were
independently appointed in their respective districts until implementation of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. This is confirmed in the presidential letter following Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1952, published following 26 U.S.C. § 7804.
31. Notes for Amendments to Pub. L. 94-455 codified at 26 USC § 7804 states:
1998—Pub. L. 105–206 amended section catchline and text generally, substituting
present provisions for provisions which had declared: in subsec. (a), that provisions of
Reorganization Plans No. 26 of 1950 and No. 1 of 1952 should apply to all functions
vested by this title, or by any act amending this title in any officer, employee, or agency
of the Department; and in subsec. (b), that nothing in such Reorganization Plans should
be considered to impair existing rights and remedies, that for the purpose of any action
to recover tax all statutes, rules, and regulations referring to collector of internal
revenue, principal officer for internal revenue district, or Secretary, should be deemed to
refer to officer whose acts gave rise to such action, and that venue of any such action
should be the same as under existing law.
Whereas, as not to “impair existing rights”, venue “under existing law” would fall on
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall settle claims not otherwise
provided for by this subsection or another provision of law. .
32. Procedures and claims of the United States Government are outlined at 31 USC § 3711
“Collection and compromise
(a) The head of an executive, judicial, or legislative agency--
(1) shall try to collect a claim of the United States Government for money or property
arising out of the activities of, or referred to, the agency;
(2) may compromise a claim of the Government of not more than $100,000 (excluding
interest) or such higher amount as the Attorney General may from time to time
prescribe that has not been referred to another executive or legislative agency for
further collection action, except that only the Comptroller General may
compromise a claim arising out of an exception the Comptroller General makes in
the account of an accountable official; and
(3) may suspend or end collection action on a claim referred to in clause (2) of this
subsection when it appears that no person liable on the claim has the present or
prospective ability to pay a significant amount of the claim or the cost of collecting
the claim is likely to be more than the amount recovered.
(b)(1) The head of an executive, judicial, or legislative agency may not act under
subsection (a)(2) or (3) of this section on a claim that appears to be fraudulent,
false, or misrepresented by a party with an interest in the claim, or that is based on
conduct in violation of the antitrust laws.”
18
Notes to 31 USC § 3711 clarify which agency is responsible for making claim:
“In the section, the words “executive or legislative agency” are substituted for “agency”
because of the restatement. The words “or his designee” are omitted as unnecessary.
“In subsection (a), the word “Government” is added for consistency. In clause (2), the
words “including the General Accounting Office” are omitted as surplus. In clause (3),
the word “financial” is omitted as surplus.
“In subsections (b) and (d), the word “official” is substituted for “officer” for
consistency.
“In subsection (b), the words “Comptroller General” are substituted for “General
Accounting Office” for consistency. The words “has the same authority that the head of
the agency has” are substituted for “have the foregoing authority” for clarity.”

US Attorney has failed to state claim for which relief may be granted. Neither Comptroller
General for GAO or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall settle claims
not otherwise provided for by this subsection or another provision of law. US Attorney has
failed to produce bona fide claim for which United States has Security Interest. Claimant has
perfected and paramount Security Interest in alleged Surety.
33. Congressional authority to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court is found in two clauses in
the Constitution: Article I § 8.9 & Article III § 1; Congress' general authority to promulgate
legislation for carrying out all powers enumerated in the Constitution is at Article I § 8.18. The
Supreme Court has several times addressed the necessity of Congress creating departments and
agencies of the United States, and has repeatedly declared that unless a department or agency is
created by Congress, it has no legitimate authority.
34. The UNITED STATES of America can not claim injury for act committed by foreigners while
exercising their Rights in foreign Nation. To Claim relief the UNITED STATES would need to
prove on record that it owns or has claim of right to land belonging to Kanienke and the
Kanienkehaka, thereof. Such claim would violate Article XIII in Amendment to the
Constitution for the United States of America. Failure to state claim for which relief may be
granted.
35. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, definitions at 18 USC § 921(a)(2), which are applicable for
Chapter 44 -- Firearms, in the current edition of the United States Code (18 USC §§ 921-930):
§ 921. Definitions
(a) As used in this chapter --
(2) The term "interstate or foreign commerce" includes commerce between any place in
a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States

19
(not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not
include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside
of that State. The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone).”
Application of the term "State" above is exclusive of the Union of several States party to the
Constitution -- all examples of the class are territories and possessions of the United States
subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction.
Count one of indictment fails to make claim of any other place other than in a State.
“...limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the
Commerce Clause.”
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.
Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
"Comprehensive as the word `among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . The enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject
of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State." United States v.
Lopez (93-1260), 514 U.S. 549 (1995), quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-
195 (1824) .
36. 18 USC §§ 924 (a)(2) & 922 (g)(1) is unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to
legislate control over Claimant or other Onkwehonwe Right, Custom and Spiritual Ceremony to
hunt and support his mate and progeny, having not engaged in interstate commerce as alleged.
citing from United States v. Lopez, infra.
Furthermore 18 USC §§ 924 (a)(2) & 922 (g)(1) is vague, arbitrary and capricious
"A criminal statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application lacks the first essential of due process of law." CONNALLY V. GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION CO., infra at page 391.
37. Secured Party is not a "person" as the term is used in Statutes, Codes, Rules, Regulations and
Ordinances of STATE OF NEW YORK, and any of its political subdivisions, corporate or
otherwise, when such definition includes artificial entities. As Principle of Law, Claimant cites
following:
"The word 'person' in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes
in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings." 1 USC § 1. Church of Scientology v.
U. S. Dept. of Justice (1979) 612 F. 2d 417, 425.)
38. As to lack of personal jurisdiction Claimant cites as Principle of Law 1 USC § 1;

20
“Words denoting number, gender, and so forth
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates
otherwise— … the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals; “
39. The idea that the word "person" ordinarily excludes the Sovereign (who usually are corporation
soles, not corporations) can also be traced to:
"familiar principle that the King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be
named therein by special and particular words." Dollar Savings Bank v. United States,
19 Wall. 227, 239 (1874). As this passage suggests, however, this interpretive principle
applies only to "the enacting Sovereign." United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175,
186 (1936). See also Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 161, n. 21 (1983).
40. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, definitions at 18 USC § 921(a)(1), which are applicable for
Chapter 44 -- Firearms, in the current edition of the United States Code (18 USC §§ 921-930):
(a) As used in this chapter—
(1) The term “person” and the term “whoever” include any individual, corporation,
company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company.
41. Regulations associated with alleged charge of 18 USC §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(1) at 27 CFR
178.11 also defines person:
"Person. Any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint
stock company.”
42. As referencing “individual”, Title 8 USC § 1101, definitions includes “United States citizen or
resident alien.” Claimant is neither, being foreign to the United States or state of the forum.
43. Claimant cites as Principle of Law, definitions at 18 USC § 921(a)(2), which are applicable for
Chapter 44 -- Firearms, in the current edition of the United States Code (18 USC §§ 921-930):
§ 921. Definitions
(a) As used in this chapter --
(2) The term "interstate or foreign commerce" includes commerce between any place in
a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States
(not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not
include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside
of that State. The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone).
Application of the term "State" above is exclusive of the Union of several States party to the
Constitution -- all examples of the class are territories and possessions of the United States

21
subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction.
Count one of indictment fails to make claim of any other place other than in one State.
44. Regulations associated with alleged charge of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(1) at
27 CFR 178.11 also defines state:
State. A State of the United States. The term shall include the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including
the Canal Zone).
45. Definition for 'State' is further affirmed in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 1
(b)(9);
“State” includes the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States.

Akwesasne, Kanienke is none of the above.

46. This conclusion is supported by the Constitution: The Second Article in Amendment set bar
against government, guaranteeing protection of unalienable right to keep and bear arms for free
people of the several states, party to the Constitution. The Fifth Article in Amendment also
secures absolute right of the people to Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness, except when
taken in lawful courts by due process of law in the course of common law. An absolute right
includes the right to defend that which falls within the right -- life, liberty and property. And
since there is no constitutional amendment, which alters or limits the Second and Fifth Articles
in Amendment, or lists firearms and related commodities as commodities Congress may
regulate, it follows that the bevy of firearms laws in Chapter 44 of title 18 and related laws in
title 26 of the United States Code were promulgated under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary
power in territories belonging to the United States. The cumulative evidence is sufficient to
leave even the worst cynic with nothing more than shifting sand beneath his feet. Congress may
tax something, but has no regulatory power unless the power is specifically enumerated.
47. Definitions above are also governed by long-standing principles of law thoroughly treated in
The Federal Zone by Mitch Modeleski. The two principles, articulated long ago in Latin, are,
"Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,", and "Noscitur a sociis." Both are found in Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th edition, as follows:
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The
certain designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others ... This doctrine
decrees that where law expressly describes [a] particular situation to which it shall
apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was

22
intended to be omitted or excluded.
Noscitur a sociis. It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word is or may be
known from the accompanying words. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis", the
meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.
48. The principles are clearly enough stated that they shouldn't need elaboration. Definitions
reproduced in this discourse include only territories and insular possessions of the United
States, Akwesasne, Kanienke is neither, there are no examples of the several States or other
verbiage suggesting than any or all of the several States party to the Constitution are included.
Therefore, "The certain designation of one [territory] is an absolute exclusion of all others..,"
and "... the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be
ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it." Where
only the District of Columbia or insular possessions of the United States are listed in
definitions, application may extend only to possessions of the United States, whether territories
incorporated in the constitutional scheme, or insular possessions not incorporated in the
constitutional scheme.
49. The definition of "includes" and "including" at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) is clumsy, but basically
restates the two Latin principles:
(c) Includes and including.
The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title
[Internal Revenue Code] shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the
meaning of the term defined.
50. Generally words in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. When a statute
does not specifically define words, such words should be construed in their common or
ordinary sense to the effect that the rules used in construing statutes are also applicable in the
construction of the Constitution. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that words of
common usage when used in a statute should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense.
51. Notes to Rule 1 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state in pertinent part;
“Rule 1 is entirely revised and expanded to incorporate Rule 54, which deals with the
application of the rules. Consistent with the title of the existing rule, the Committee believed
that a statement of the scope of the rules should be placed at the beginning to show readers
which proceedings are governed by these rules. The Committee also revised the rule to
incorporate the definitions found in Rule 54(c) as a new Rule 1(b).”
and

23
“Rule 1(b) is composed of material currently located in rule 54(c), with several exceptions.
First, the reference to an 'Act of Congress' has been deleted from the restyled rules; instead the
rules use the self-explanatory term 'federal statute.'"
As the definition for 'Act of Congress' has not been transferred with other definitions from rule
54(c) to rule 1 or other rule, we see in former definition at former rule 54(c) for “Act of
Congress” and state lack of venue as to alleged charges;

"'Act of Congress' includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the
District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.”
"'State' includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.”
Applications above use territorial possessions of the United States as examples. None of
the examples represent the Union of several States.

52. Further The acid test is to examine application. To do that, consider corresponding authority for
the Attorney General to imprison people, set out at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a):
§ 4001. Limitation on detention; control of prisons
(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress.
Since the Supreme Court has stipulated that an Act of Congress is locally applicable in the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or in a territory or an insular possession, the term "Act of
Congress" used in 18 U.S.C. § 4001 must comply with the application.

53. One of the more important statutory restrictions which secures and reinforces Congress'
authority is at 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 & 72. The first of these sections establishes territory within the
current borders of the District of Columbia as the seat of government for the United States; the
second prohibits any government department from operating outside the District of Columbia
save as Congress authorizes by statute:

Ҥ 71. Permanent seat of Government


All that part of the territory of the United States included within the present limits of the
District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United States.”

Ҥ 72. Public offices; at seat of Government


All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia,
and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.”

54. The District of Columbia, ceded as the seat of government of the United States by Virginia and
Maryland, is a unique case as the Constitution of the United States was extended to the territory
as the law of the land prior to cession under authority of Article I § 8.17. The Supreme Court
24
has wrestled the matter of how the Constitution applies to the District of Columbia almost since
United States acquisition, but has generally followed the rule that once the Constitution has
been extended to territory, Congress does not have authority to withdraw it. Where the territory
now designated as the District of Columbia was in Virginia and Maryland when they
respectively joined the Union under the Constitution, the Constitution theoretically remains in
full force and effect. However, when the District municipal corporation was revised following
the Civil War, Congress adopted the "Constitution of the United States of America" for the
District municipal corporation. This distortion aside, the District of Columbia is actually a class
of one as it does not have standing as a State of the Union and it isn't an unincorporated insular
possession of the United States, so is usually named in definitions when statutory application is
intended to apply within the District.
55. Claimant nor private property VICTOR JACOB LAZORE can not be forced into
Administrative Proceedings against Claimant's Will and consent; and object and take exception
to presumptions and all assumptions of jurisdiction over Claimant's proper being or private
property. Although, Claimant, Secured Party, is not a person, Claimant reference following cite
as to principle of law:
"Courts enforcing mere statutes do not act judicially but ministerially, and do
not acquire jurisdiction over the person by arrest or compelled appearance but
by waiver of objections and consent of the accused." Boswell v. Otis, 9
Howards 336.
56. US Attorney and Administrative Magistrate are on Inquiry Notice of 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,
today codified and applied by 28 U.S.C. 2284, 2283, since action of Saint Regis Mohawk
Police, United States Marshall Service, US Attorneys RICHARD S HARTUNIAN and
ELIZABETH HORSMAN, Administrative Magistrate Larry A Kudrle in simulated legal
proceedings appear to promote genocide of Claimant's Nation, mate and progeny.
57. Claimant maintains residency inside Kanienke, and the Land upon which Claimant is domicile
portrayed in Artist rendition as map to be North Latitude Forty-five degrees one and six tenth
seconds and West Longitude Seventy-four degrees thirty-nine minutes forty-six seconds, and all
surrounding land including, but not limited to, One-hundred (100) miles square, is under
Jurisdiction of Kanienkehaka, and known from time immemorial to present. This Land is not,
nor has never been part of New York state or State of New York, United States or territory or
possession thereof, United States of America or reservation land; nor has Claimant claimed

25
such, and neither can State of New York make, lawful or legal, claim to Land at which Claimant
maintains residency. 25 USC §§ 233 & 232 do not apply to, Akwesasne, nor State Statute
making similar claim.
"The United States Code was not enacted as a statute, nor can it be construed as such.
It is only a prima facie statement of the statute law. The statutes collected in it did not
change their meaning nor acquire any new force by their inclusion. If construction is
necessary, recourse must be had to the original statutes themselves." Murrell v.
Western Union Tel. Co. 160 F.2d. 788.
also...
"The official source to find United States law is the Statutes at Large and the United
States Code is only prima facie evidence of such laws. 1 U.S.C.A. § 204(a)." Royer's,
Inc. Appellant, v. United States of America, 265 F.2d 615.
58. Neither can 25 U.S.C. § § 233 & 232 be found within Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules as
required. In Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register, 580 F.2d 1166 (1978), a Third Circuit
case where John Cervase, an attorney, filed a Writ of Mandamus against the Office of the
Federal Register to construct and publish finding aids required by the Federal Register Act (44
U.S.C. §1510). In the Decision after Appeal of Dismissal, the Court noted the purpose of the
Federal Register Act (p.p. 1170-71):
“...but such a construction would fly in the face of the fundamental purpose of the
Federal Register Act – to eliminate the problem of secret law.”

Regulations governing construction of Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules are at 1 CFR §8

59. The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules lists sections and titles of United States Code in
numerical order, with sections that have published Regulations listed having general application
or application limited to the Regulation listed, and those not listed having limited application to
(1) government of United States, see 5 U.S.C. § § 302 and 301, (2) Territories and insular
Possessions of the United States, or (3) admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction of United States.
60. In fact State of New York, New York State Police or Saint Regis Mohawk Tribal Police can not
claim, assume or presume Jurisdiction pursuant to said secret law codified at 25 U.S.C. § 233 or
§ 232, as neither has force and effect of law:
“The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other,
and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one
necessarily involves the construction of the other.” United States, Appellant v. Mersky
et al., 361 U.S. 438.
Any given statute that prescribes a departmental function, creates an obligation, or prescribes a
26
penalty, must be implemented by regulations published in the Federal Register. The
requirement is in the Federal Register Act, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a).
61. In lieu of this enlightenment 25 U.S.C. §§ 233 and 232 go against established rules for statutory
construction:
"Federal statutes are to be construed in view of the established rules for statutory
construction." People v. Edwards, 104 Misc. 2D 305, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 406,
quoting Bardes v. First National Bank, 178 U.S. 524. Also see 73 Am. Jur. 2D,
Statutes, Section 144.
62. In all reality 25 U.S.C. §§ 233 and 232 are unconstitutional, as they violate not only Treaty (see
German Flatts Treaty, 1775) but separation of Powers, eg. Congress Powers under Commerce
Clause:
"Power definitely assigned by Constitution to one department cannot be surrendered nor
delegated by that department nor vested by statute in another department or agency."
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, Agoncillo et al., 277 U.S. 189.
This shall give, now, opportunity in proper Forum to overturn erroneous Decisions of State of
New York as in Cases such as People v. Cook, 81 Misc. 2D 235, 365 N.Y.S. 2D 611.

63. As declared 25 U.S.C. §§ 233 and 232 are unconstitutional as is this Action:
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it
had never been passed." Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425.
64. Although this Action is fraudulent, it now provides an opportunity in proper Forum upon
continuation, for the unconstitutionality of 25 U.S.C. §§ 233 and 232 to be heard, which has
never been presented as outlined in this 'Memorandum Of Law, Applied As Principle Of
Law':
"'In the use of congressional legislation to support or change a particular
construction of the Constitution by acquiescence, its weight for the purpose must depend
not only upon the nature of the question, but also upon the attitude of the executive and
judicial branches of the government, as well as upon the number of instances in the
execution of the law in which opportunity for objection in the courts or elsewhere is
afforded. When instances which actually involve the question are rare, or have not in fact
occurred, the weight of the mere presence of acts on the statute book for a considerable
time, as showing general acquiescence in the legislative assertion of a questioned power,
is minimized.'" Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, Agoncillo et al., 277
U.S. 189, 205.
This Code assumes jurisdiction, which assumption is false, over Onkwehonwe, who are falsely
called “Indians”. Kanienkehaka have never, NEVER, received just compensation for land
27
claimed and seize by State of New York, United States, British Crown, or Vatican. The so-
called Macomb Purchase, also, being fraud on its inception.
65. “...It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of citizens, and against
any stealthy encroachment thereon." Boyd v. U.S. 116 U. S. 616. Under U.S. V Otherson, 480
F. Supp. 1369 this right of protection was extended to everyone, even illegal aliens, who fall
prey to the courts' tax collectors, law enforcers.
66. There are only four (4) crimes listed in Constitution for united States of America. These are;
(1) Counterfeiting of securities and current coins, (Article I § 8)
(2) Piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, (Article I § 8)
(3) Treason against the United States (Article III § 3)
(4) Offenses against the law of nations (Article I § 8)
67. In 1821, Chief Justice John Marshall, of the United States Supreme Court stated in Opinion;
“Congress has a right to punish murder in a fort, or other place within its exclusive jurisdiction;
but no general right to punish murder committed within any of the States.”
Further he added,
“It is clear, that Congress cannot punish felonies generally;” Cohen v. Virginia, 6
Wheat (US) 264 (1821).
68. As to venue and subject matter Claimant cites as Principle of Law 120 Stat. 617 codified at 18
USC § 1153;
Offenses committed within Indian country:
“(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person
any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony
under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or
neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by
Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are
in force at the time of such offense.”
Alleged charges under 18 USC § 922 (g)(1) is not defined and can not be punished by Federal
law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States for offenses inside said
“Indian Country” as stated at 18 USC § 1153.
69. No Article III or Article I jurisdiction of the United States is vested in United States District
28
Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. They are not courts
created by Congress -- they are private courts created by a judicial consortium. These black
robed Devils were for the most part appointed under authority of Article III § 1 of the
Constitution to preside in lawful courts of the United States, but without constitutional or
statutory authority, elected to set up a system of private courts which operates under the
territorial illusion. Only district courts of the United States, as defined at 28 U.S.C. § 451 and
three remaining territorial courts, are courts of the United States. United States District Courts
situated in the Union of several States are private courts; they do not exercise Article III or
Article I (legislative-territorial) judicial authority of the United States.
The Article III district court was defined in a 1938 Supreme Court decision as follows:

“The term 'District Courts of the United States', as used in the rules, without an addition
expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the
constitutional courts created under article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories
are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United
States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that
vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a 'District Court of the
United States." Mookini v. United States (1938) 58 S.Ct. 543, 303 U.S. 201, 82 L.Ed.
748, at p. 205.
The legitimate territorial court, designated as a United States District Court, was defined by the
Supreme Court in 1922:
“The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under
article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial powers of the United States
therein conveyed. It is created in virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted
under article 4, § 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its
jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its
character as a mere territorial court.” Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922) 42 S.Ct. 343, 258
Clearly there is difference between United States District Court and District Courts of the
United States. See also, 26 USC §§ 7402(a), (b), (c); 7429 (b)(2)(A), 7407; 7402 (e): and
7422(f)(2).
70. Validity of this definition of courts of the United States is reinforced by regulations generated
for the General Accounting Office in the definition of "agency" at 4 CFR § 91.2;

Ҥ 91.2 Definitions.
(a) Agency means --

29
(1) An executive agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, including the General Accounting
Office,
(2) The Government Printing Office,
(3) The Library of Congress,
(4) The Office of the Architect of the Capitol,
(5) The Botanic Garden, and
(6) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Federal Judicial Center,
and any of the courts set forth in section 610 of title 28, U.S. Code. Section 610 defines
"courts" to include the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of
Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Claims Court and the
Court of International Trade.”
71. There is somewhat different but maybe clearer approach used in definition at 28 U.S.C. §
1869(f). This subsection "defines" what courts of the United States are authorized by statute to
convene grand and petit (trial) juries, and effectively bridges civil and criminal so far as lawful
courts of the United States are concerned;
(f) "district court of the United States", "district court", and "court" shall mean any district court
established by chapter 5 of this title, and any court which is created by Act of Congress in a
territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court established by chapter 5 of this
title...
72. Criminal jurisdiction of the United States, found at 18 U.S.C. § 3231, is vested in "district
courts of the United States", not "United States District Courts", and the same is true in civil
forums in title 28 of the United States Code. The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3231 is as
follows:
"The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States."
73. Where Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are concerned, the Supreme Court order of
December 27, 1948 amended the rules to apply to the United States District Courts rather than
district courts of the United States: "1. That the title of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
be, and it hereby is, amended to read as follows: Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts." The order of December 26, 1944 reads as follows: "It is ordered that
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States..." Where the rules of
civil procedure are concerned, the following is found in the order of December 29, 1948: "1.
That the title 'Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States' be amended
to read 'Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts'." These orders are

30
reproduced ahead of rules of procedure in West Publishing desktop editions of titles 18 & 28 of
the United States Code, and the 1994 edition of the United States Code.
74. 28 USC § 610. Courts defined
As used in this chapter the word “courts” includes the courts of appeals and district
courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United
States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade.
Venue does not appear to rest with United States District Court for Plattsburgh or Utica. Court
of International Trade is the authority in case of “diesel therapy” and Prison Bond issued on
New York Stock Exchange against Claimant's body in rem.
75. At 28 USC § 451 “Definitions” we come upon term Act of Congress that was conveniently
deleted from Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As used in this title:
The term “court of the United States” includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts
of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of
International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to
hold office during good behavior.
The terms “district court” and “district court of the United States” mean the courts constituted
by chapter 5 of this title.
Chapter 5 of this title is said to list district courts constituted including but on closer
examination we find at 28 USC § 132 Creation and composition of district courts, states in
pertinent part;
(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record
known as the United States District Court for the district.
As we know from Supreme Court decision cited at count 67, District Court of the United States
is Article III courts and United States District Court is territorial. District courts for New York
are listed in chapter 5 and are known as United States District Court.
28 U.S.C. § 132 allegedly establishes a "United States District Court" in each judicial district of
the United States. However, by reading historical notes, it is found that this section merges
sections from titles 28 & 48 of the United States Code, 1940 edition, with the latter pertaining
to territory and insular possessions of the United States. Along with 18 U.S.C. § 7, which
merely defines special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States but does not
prescribe jurisdiction for any given section of the criminal code, 28 U.S.C. § 132 is among the
more sinister decoys in the United States Code. Article III district courts of the United States,

31
defined at 28 U.S.C. § 451, and legitimate territorial courts listed at 18 U.S.C. § 23, are defined
as courts of the United States (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 610, 753, 1869(f), and elsewhere).
76. In certified and verified statement of Sue Ellen Tupia, court clerk, Bombay Town Court in
regards to action against fiction Victor J. Lazore she declares, “This case remains pending in
this court.” See exhibit N to Notice and Demand to Strike.
Federal litigation is duplicative, if not identical, it is substantially similar to parallel pending
court action. See Colorado River Water Conservation District v United States, 424 US 800
(1976).
Whereas state prosecutor has yet to respond to or refute Bill of Particulars that would either
construct the law in a way that eliminates the constitutional problem or to rule it void under the
state's own constitution. Although State law is unclear, it is hopeful issue, if exists, was
dispositive.
“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or
where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.” Unites States v
Tweel, 550 F2d 297.
Claimant believes that search and seizure was illegal, and in violation of IV article of
Amendment to Constitution for United States of America and Treaty Law, that Claimant has
cause of action and Claim against State of New York, a Delaware Corporation, for illegal search
of Claimant resulting from unlawful traffic stop. Prosecution was in bad faith, prosecution was
part of some pattern of harassment against Claimant; and State law being enforced was an utter
and irredeemable unconstitutional act. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Furthermore case before state court and territorial United States District Court presents difficult
questions of state public policy, involves particularly complex areas of state law and may
disrupt state efforts to establish coherent public policies although policies are presently
incoherent. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co, 319 US 315 (1943) and Caudill v Eubanks Farms, Inc,
301 F3d 658 (CA 6, 2002).
As Claimant does not understand the nature and cause of the charges and court refuses to make
known whether nature and cause of charges is in equity, law or some other jurisdiction foreign
to Claimant, Burford Abstention would apply. See Quackenbush v Allstate Ins Co, 517 US 706,
727 (1996).
Claimant gives Inquiry Notice to US Attorney, US Magistrate and US Judge DAVID N HURD
this Principle of Law:

32
“In Pleading the declaration at common law, answers to the 'libel' in ecclesiastical and
admiralty law, the 'bill' in equity, the 'petition' in civil law, the 'complaint' in code
pleading, and the 'count' in real actions.”
For further clarification see United States v. Ambrose 108 US 336. See A TRUE BILL
at exhibit A and B.
77. As declared by Administrative Magistrate Larry A Kudrle in “Star Chamber” proceeding held
on Sunday, the sixth day of second month, called February, two-thousand eleven, whereas,
Claimant was declared belligerent.
“The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the
man who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its
benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It can not be retained by attorney or solicitor.
It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in the flesh.”
“The one who is persuaded by honeyed words or moral suasion to testify or produce documents
rather than make a last ditch stand, simply loses the protection. Once he testifies to part, he has
waived his right and must on cross examination or otherwise, testify as to the whole transaction.
He must refuse to answer or produce, and test the matter in contempt proceedings, or by habeas
corpus.” – United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538, 540 (District Court, M.D. PA. 1947)
I, Victor-Jacob:, certify under the penalty of perjury pursuant to the Laws of the United States
of America that above Memorandum Of Law in support of Notice and Demand to Strike to be true and
correct, as per 28 USC 1746(1), except that which is stated on information and belief, and which is
believed to be true, acknowledged and executed this Twenty-fourth Day of February, A.D. Two-
Thousand Eleven.

33