PROMOTING JIHAD AGAINST CHINA

The Turkistani Islamic Party in Arabic Jihadist Media

Kirk H. Sowell
An Independent Report Commissioned by Sky News

August 1, 2010

www.kirksowell.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 3

Background 4

Sources, Methods & Scope 7

TIP Enters the Global Jihadist Media 8

Analysis 18

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Turkistani Islamic Party (TIP) is a jihadist organization which claims to represent
China‟s Muslim Uighur population. It is the most militant of Uighur groups in the
northwestern province of Xinjiang. While experts dispute TIP‟s origins, it claims to be a
renamed continuation of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which
appeared defunct in 2003 following the death of its leader.

Since 2008, TIP has used the global jihadist media to present itself as the successor of
the classical Islamic caliphate, operating parallel to Osama bin Ladin‟s al-Qaeda (AQ),
with its avowed ambition the Islamization of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
While marginal to Uighur society and never demonstrating significant capabilities, Uighur
jihadists garnered increased international attention following al-Qaeda‟s 2001 attacks on
the United States and TIP‟s own 2008 threat against the Beijing Olympics.

This report, Promoting Jihad Against China, attempts to address two issues: (1) TIP‟s
origins, including its relationship to ETIM; and (2) TIP‟s relationship to the global jihadist
movement, including al-Qaeda. The evidence is derived from TIP publications in Arabic
jihadist media supplemented by secondary sources in English and Arabic.

While this report was commissioned by Sky News, it is an independent study and Sky
News is not responsible for its contents. The key judgments are as follows:

 TIP is a successor organization to ETIM, which likely ceased to exist in

2003. While TIP claims total continuity between the two groups, its emergence in
2008 is more likely a refounding of a defunct organization.

 TIP has deep ties to the Taliban, but appears to have only tangential links to
al-Qaeda. TIP supports AQ‟s war against the United States, but has criticized it
for ignoring Asian Muslims. Media which habitually describe TIP as “al-Qaeda-
linked” would be on firmer ground linking it to the Taliban.

 The primary purpose of TIP’s Arabic publications appears to be fundraising,

with little relationship to operations. TIP‟s publications feature highly-
theoretical discussions of Islamic history and doctrine targeted to Gulf Arabs
sympathetic to jihadism. While fundraising is typically a goal of jihadist
publications, this seems more true of TIP than for jihadists in the Arab world.

 TIP has failed to break into the mainstream Arabic information environment.
While TIP‟s publications have sufficient presence on jihadist forums to give it
exposure to its core audience, it has failed to have impact on mainstream Arabic
media similar to that of other militant Islamist groups.

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BACKGROUND
China‟s northwestern province of Xinjiang, referred by many Muslims as “East
Turkistan,” was conquered by a China in the mid-18th century and incorporated into
modern China in 1949. Its primary ethnic group, the Uighur, speak a Turkic language
with many Arabic loanwords and have strong cultural commonalities with the Muslim
world. Between 1949 and 1990, Xinjiang experienced sporadic violence, with Uighur
grievances driven by a range of factors, including a desire for greater autonomy or
outright seccession, cultural identity, demographic change caused by the migration to
Xinjiang of Han Chinese, and religious conflict. Uighurs number around eight million and
are now an ethnic minority in the province.1

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was the most Islamist of several Uighur
separatist groups which arose in the early 1990s as violence escalated. Fleeing the iron
grip of the Chinese security apparatus, ETIM took refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban
around 1997. ETIM fought alongside the Taliban against U.S.-led forces following 9/11,
and then fled with them to Pakistan. ETIM‟s leader, Hassan Mahsum, was killed by
Pakistani forces in October 2003.2 ETIM is generally believed to also have been close to
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).3 The Uzbeks and Uighurs are both Turkic
peoples with mutually intelligible languages fighting secular authoritarian states.

Information about ETIM prior to 2003 has been limited. In his 2004 study of Xinjiang
violence, James Millward concluded that there had been no verifiable activity by ETIM
prior to the 2002 U.S. designation of it as terrorist.4 Furthermore, a widely-cited 2002
official report, “‟East Turkistan‟ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” gives
the PRC‟s point of view on Xinjiang violence in the 1990s.5 But tying ETIM/TIP to specific
attacks continues to be difficult. This is made more difficult by the odd media synergy TIP
and the PRC have developed; it serves the PRC‟s interests to link all Uighur violence
with the most jihadist Uighur group, and taking credit for the same attacks allows TIP to
support its claim to lead Uighur opposition to Chinese rule.

It now appears that Mahsum arrived in Afghanistan in 1997, and may have received
support from both the Taliban and its original patron, Pakistan‟s Interservice Intelligence

1
For general background on Xinjiang and the Uighur-China conflict, see Gaye Christoffersen in Elizabeth Van Wie
Davis and Rouben Azizian, Islam, Oil and Geopolitics: Central Asia After September 11, (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2007) 45-59; “Islamic Extremism as a Political Force: A Comparative Study of Central Asian Islamic
Extremist Movements,” Michael Fredholm, Research Report No. 12, Asian Cultures and Modernity, 2006; “Radical
Islamists in Central Asia,” Zeyno Baran, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2, September 12, 2005.
2
Mahsum is consistently referred to in TIP’s Arabic publications as “Hassan Makhdum” (‫)حسن مخدوم‬. The reason for
this is not clear, but as “Mahsum” is universally used in English, I will follow that convention here.
3
See Christoffersen and Baran as in footnote 1 above.
4
“Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment,” James Millward, Policy Studies 6, 29, East-West Center,
Washington, 2004 (http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf).
5
For a translation of the 2002 Chinese report, see:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml.

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(ISI), prior to that time.6 The fact that ETIM was under Taliban refuge and fought with
them thereafter is sufficient to establish close ties between the two groups, and that
some Uighurs had trained with al-Qaeda suggests some relationship there.7 Mahsum
himself, in a widely-quoted 2002 statement to a journalist, disclaimed ties to both.8 The
2002 U.S. designation of ETIM as terrorist followed the arrest of two Uighurs for an
alleged plot to attack the U.S. embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.9

The state of Uighur jihadism 2003-2007 is murkier still. While many continue to refer to
ETIM as existent, or to TIP and ETIM as synonymous, the lack of activity 2003-2007
suggests it ceased to exist. The Council on Foreign Relations‟ online file, last updated
July 2008 after TIP‟s emergence, still referred to it as ETIM and could say only that
“some counterterrorism experts” claimed that TIP was ETIM renamed.10 One regional
expert testified before Congress in June 2009 that many experts had never even heard
of ETIM before the U.S. recognized it as terrorist in 2002, and speculated that TIP might
not even be a Uighur group at all, but a propaganda front for China or al-Qaeda.11

In 2008, a group claiming to be the remnants of ETIM reemerged as this new

organization, the Turkistani Islamic Party (also spelled Turkistan Islamic Party), or TIP.
Most prominent among them was Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani,12 who claimed a close
relationship with Mahsum. Between mid-2008 and early 2010, TIP produced a series of
Arabic-language journals and statements portraying itself as fighting a jihad deserving of
global Muslim support. Abd al-Haq was killed in a February 2010 U.S. airstrike in

6
Christoffersen, 46-48; 52-56. Christoffersen also says that al-Qaeda supported Uighur jihadists, but doesn’t give
any specific examples. TIP’s biography of Mahsum gives 1997 as the year, and this is consistent with other sources.
7
“Evaluating the Uighur Threat,” The Long War Journal, October 9, 2008
(http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/10/evaluating_the_uighu.php). According to testimony from
Uighurs captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, it appears that some trained in Taliban-protected ETIM camps and
others with al-Qaeda. Christoffersen, citing a report in Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, states that al-Qaeda was
funding the IMU, and thus ETIM, and that Uighurs were found in several camps.
8
“Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, January 2008. “We don’t have any organizational contact or relations with al Qaeda or the Taliban… Maybe
some individuals fought alongside them on their own.” Nonetheless, elements of the Taliban have also distanced
themselves from AQ in recent years, so even if Mahsum was having second thoughts in 2002 this doesn’t
necessarily mean there were not close ties previous. And the abundant evidence of ETIM’s reliance on the Taliban
makes this statement not credible. The quote is attributed to an August 31, 2002 article from the Washington Post
which is not presently on its website.
9
Millward, 24.
10
“The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, July 31, 2008
(http://www.cfr.org/publication/9179/east_turkestan_islamic_movement_etim.html).
11
Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight, Sean R. Roberts, PhD, George Washington University, June 16, 2009
(http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/rob061609.pdf).
12
“Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani” is of course a nomme de guerre. In Uighur he is known as Memtimin Memet; see “Will
Xinjiang’s Turkistan Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its Leader,” TerrorismMonitor, Volume VIII,
Issue 10, March 11, 2010. The U.S. Treasury release designating him as a terrorist has a variety of other spellings for
his name: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg92.htm.

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Pakistan,13 and it is not clear whether TIP‟s military commander, Sayfullah al-
Turkistani, may have taken over leadership.

While other jihadists operated on the ground for years before building an online network,
TIP emerged when jihadist media had matured. Arabic is the primary language of this
world, although there are jihadist websites in other languages. While Uighur is the native
language of TIP members, they use Islam‟s lingua franca to amplify their message.

Jihadists do not have a static websites like political parties, but rely on a network of
discussion forums. Groups publish their material in forums through two main distributors,
al-Fajr Media Center and the Global Islamic Media Front. Distribution by either gives a
publication credibility it would not otherwise have. Al-Fajr distributes TIP publications,
which are produced under the brand Islam Awazi (“Voice of Islam”).14

Jihadist media may be used to build support, or in operations – to recruit members or

teach techniques such as bomb making – and also for fundraising. The latter function is
worth emphasizing for TIP, which is short on operational success and long on
propaganda. As reported in the Jamestown Foundation‟s TerrorismMonitor, Iraqi
jihadists use the web prolifically, and while some jihadists are broke, some forum
members report making $1,000 a month in salary. 15 While open sources do not make it
possible to estimate TIP‟s financial return on its Arabic publications, there is no reason to
think that TIP might not get a portion of jihadist money sent to south Asia.

TIP‟s contribution to jihadist media includes a mixture of Uighur videos (mostly

untranslated) and Arabic print publications in PDF format and postings to discussion
forums. Online media is not, of course, the only or even the primary form of
communication; jihadists also spread their message through mosque networks, word-of-
mouth, print publications, CDs, and so on.

13
“Al-Qaeda-linked Chinese Terrorist Leader Reported Killed in US Airstrike in Pakistan,” The Long War Journal,
March 1, 2010 (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/al_qaedalinked_chine.php).
14
For a visual illustration of this system, see Evan Kohlmann’s NEFA Foundation presentation, “Al-Qaida’s Online
Couriers,” The NEFA Foundation, May 2009 (http://nefafoundation.org/fajrchart.html).
15
“Jihadis Debate Methods of Financing the Mujahideen Network in Iraq,” Abdul Hameed Bakier, TerrorismMonitor,
Vol. VII, Issue 32, October 30, 2009.

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SOURCES, METHODS & SCOPE
This report‟s primary sources are TIP‟s Arabic publications on Arabic jihadist online
forums. The bulk of these are contained within its flagship periodical, Islamic Turkistan
(IT). There have been six issues, each about 50 pages, with the first appearing in July
2008 and the most recent in July 2010. While there are hundreds of webpages on
jihadist websites with TIP statements, these consist of a small number of statements
copied over and over into various posts. Even where statements are issued outside of IT,
most are later republished in it. This report supplements this material with comments by
others about TIP on jihadist forums as well as secondary sources in English and Arabic.

This report does not cite specific webpages where copies of Islamic Turkistan can be
found because the URLs change over time. To obtain copies, perform an internet search
for the name of the publication (‫ )تركستان االسالمية‬and this will bring up jihadist forums from
which it can be downloaded. You will likely need to try multiple file-sharing links before
finding one which still works, although occasionally the PDF is linked directly on the
page. For citations to jihadist websites other than IT, we have cited the URL.

Regarding dating, where the statement itself does not have a date, we have dated it by
the earliest still-existing forum posting. However, because jihadists forums do not usually
have a stable URL – forums often move around on the internet from one URL to another
– statements could have been published previously to those cited here and gone down.

The methodology combines a reading of TIP‟s publications, which are distributed in PDF
format, and Google searches of specific jihadist forums using TIP-related names and
keywords. While Google‟s Arabic search technology is better than any alternative, there
is no guarantee that even repeated searches will find every online publication.

As noted above, the scope of this study is limited to TIP‟s historical relationship to ETIM
and its contemporary relationship to global jihadists. As this study is limited to sources in
English and Arabic, it does not attempt an assessment of TIP‟s following or military
operations in China, or how it relates to other Uighur groups. Information about TIP
operations outside China from secondary sources is taken into account in evaluating
claims made in TIP publications.

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TIP ENTERS THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MEDIA
This section outlines TIP‟s Arabic media campaign from its reemergence in 2008. TIP‟s
first Arabic publication was in July 2008, and the last in July 2010. The bulk of TIP‟s
Arabic media is within the six issues of Islamic Turkistan (IT), totaling 341 pages. While
there are hundreds of pages on jihadist forums with individual TIP statements, many are
the same statement copied over and over, and much is material also published in IT.16

For the first issue, we provide a summary of each article to give a sense of the material.
For issues two through six, we have translated the table of contents and then only cite
details which bear direct relevance to the core questions posed here; the ETIM-TIP
relationship, and TIP‟s relationship to global jihad.

Islamic Turkistan No. 1, July 2008

This is the introductory issue of TIP‟s flagship periodical, Islamic Turkistan. The main
purpose was to introduce the organization to the global jihadist community and make the
case for their fight against China as a legitimate jihad. Key points on the front cover:
“In this issue:
*An Introduction to East Turkistan
*Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime
*Why do we fight China?
*Statement from the Turkistani Islamic Party
*The Turkistani Islamic Party in the International Press”

The following is printed on the second page, next to the table of contents:
“The Program of the Turkistani Islamic Party: We are a group working for Islam and
warriors (mujahiddin) in the cause of God in order to liberate Turkistan.
Our doctrine: It is that of the Sunna [Sunni Islam], among those who follow the
understanding of the companions of Muhammad, the followers of righteousness.” At the
bottom of the page there is an email at which they can be reached:
tipawazionline@yahoo.com. This is a summary of each article from volume one:

 The “editorial” is “Why We Publish Islamic Turkistan.” The article cites a series of
passages from the Quran and hadith about Islam and jihad, and argues that the
monopolization of media by “occupying” powers requires a publication like this.

 The first article reprints their famous March 1, 2008 statement threatening to
attack the Beijing Olympics.

16
Some of TIP’s earlier Arabic publications have been reviewed by other secondary sources. See “Mounting Efforts
on Jihadi Forums to Target China for Terrorist Attacks,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, April 2010
(reviews the first three issues of IT); “Journal of Turkistan Islamic Party Urges Jihad in China,” TerrorismMonitor,
Volume 7, Issue 9, April 10, 2009; and “Will Xinjiang’s Turkistani Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its
Leader,” TerrorismMonitor, Volume 8, Issue 10, March 11, 2010. TIP’s threat to attack the Olympics was widely
circulated in translation, see “The Turkistan Islamic Party Warns China One More Time,” Jihad Watch, July 27, 2008.

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  The third article contains claims for several terrorist attacks in China in 2008. The
first, for example, has a picture of two burned out buses with the caption
“Explosion of Two Buses in the city of Shanghai on May 5, 2008.” This statement
is dated July 23, 2008.

 The fourth article is entitled “Why We Fight China?” and is written by “Shaikh
Bashir.” The four-page article gives five reasons. One, because “China is a
despotic enemy to Islamic countries occupying their territory, Islamic Turkistan…”
Two, “We fight China until it declares „that there is no god but God and
Muhammad is the messenger of God‟ and enter into the religion of Islam.” TIP is
not fighting for Uighur rights or autonomy; it has much grander ambitions. Three,
“we fight China to awaken those oppressed among Muslims to liberate
themselves from injustice.” Four, TIP fights China so as to free Muslim prisoners
imprisoned for being Muslim. Five, “we fight China because they have violated
and raped our land and exploited our wealth, starved our people and enforced
sanctions upon us.”

Bashir then goes on to rebut the claim, which presumably TIP members face
when trying to raise money in the Arab world, that fighting China is a distraction
from fighting the United States. The author gives several responses to this,
including that China is the near enemy and a greater threat in that sense than the
U.S. The author feels the need to rebut the claim that China is too strong, pointing
to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and their power differential with the U.S. This
is one of the few references to OBL in IT.

 “The Turkistani Islamic Party in the International Media” contains reprints from
mainstream Arab media such as the pan-Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-
Jazeera. The stories mainly focus on TIP‟s own threats to attack the Olympics.

 “What Do You Know About East Turkistan?” is an introduction to the region. It

assumes no prior knowledge and begins with the region‟s geography and the
etymology of the name, and then traces the history of the region and its
interaction with China since 1616. Over three pages it comes up through 1949
when China “occupied” Turkistan and the December 1955 “revolution” under the
leadership of two individuals – Abd al-Hamid Damallah and Fatah al-Din
Makhdum – in which it claims thousands of “mujahiddin” died fighting China. It
states that in April 1990, hundreds of mujahiddin were killed in jihad against China
under the leadership of Diya‟ al-Din Yusuf, leader of the “East Turkistan Islamic
Party.” The article ends: “And the Muslim people of Turkistan are still to this day
fighting the Communist regime and seeking their Islamic identity.”

 The next article is about how the earthquakes which had taken place recently
were punishment by God to China.

 The next two chapters are about the concept of hijra, or migration, which dates to
the time of Muhammad, and derives from his departure from Mecca, then a pagan

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 city, to Medina, in order to found the first Islamic state. The first article, by one
Abu Amru Abd al-Hakim Hasan, is theoretical and focused on expositing the
doctrine of hijra in language which could be found in many Islamist texts in the
Arab world. The second article is by one Um Abdullah al-Turkistaniya, meaning a
woman who is the mother of a man named Abdullah al-Turkistani, and is a
personal story. The article appears to have been dictated orally, as it begins “The
mother of Abdullah says this, speaking of the story of her hijra, the reason for my
hijra was the martyrdom of my brother in jihad…” This was also posted to the
jihadist forum al-Faloja, where the title was changed to correct an apparent
mistake in the original Islamic Turkistan article.17 The remainder of the article is in
the first person, and describes how the woman traveled to Pakistan – “land of
majesty and jihad” – by way of Shanghai and then Thailand.

 “The History of the Islamic Conquest of East Turkistan” summarizes Turkistan‟s

Islamic history is one page, beginning with Qutaiba bin Muslim al-Bahli, who
conquered Turkistan for Islam, and ending with the emergence of the Turkistani
Islamic Party which “raised the standard of jihad” in modern times.

 The next chapter is entitled “The Turkic Peoples and their Geographical
Divisions.” This article divides Central Asian Turks into east, west, north and
south, and provides some basic information about each.

 Next is an article by TIP‟s spokesman, Abdullah Mansur, “The Life of Abu

Muhammad,” or Ahmad Mahsum (Makhdum), the leader of ETIM. Notably, it
states that in 1997 Mahsum moved to “the land of jihad,” Afghanistan, and makes
clear Mahsum‟s dependence on the Taliban. It also states that Abd al-Haq al-
Turkistani had become the military commander by Mahsum‟s death in 2003.

 “On Salafist Doctrine” is a six-page exposition on what it means to be a Salafist

Muslim. The article has nothing to do with the Uighurs and is intended only to
show the likely intended readership – i.e. Gulf Arabs – that TIP is made up of true
believers. The topics include such basic Islamic concepts as “The meaning of
testifying that there is no god but God.”

 “The Responsibility of the Ulema and Preachers to Defend East Turkistan,” calls
upon religious authorities (“ulema”) to play the same role in promoting jihad
against China as they had against other non-Muslim powers. It gives precedents
such as how a scholar from Egypt opposed Napoleon and how the Deobandis of
Pakistan promoted jihad against Britain. It ends with nine specific steps the ulema
should take, ranging from the education of exiled Uighur Muslims to promoting
violence against Chinese embassies, businesses and social gatherings abroad.

17
“The Story of the Hijra of the Um Abdallah al-Turkistaniya,” al-Faloja.net
(http://alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=45877). In the original, the title referred to “Um Abd al-Rahman” but
then “Um Abdallah” in the text. They are consistent in the Faloja version; this was probably a correction.

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  “The Conditions of Mosques and Islamic Schools in East Turkistan” discusses
how China‟s limits on mosques and religious studies shows its hatred for Islam.

 The journal concludes with an appeal – “Save Turkistan Before it is Too Late!” –
by Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. This urgent message essentially summarizes the
remainder of the contents, warning of the threat to Islam in Xinjiang and chastising
Muslims elsewhere for turning a blind eye to the region‟s Muslims.

Islamic Turkistan, No. 2, November 2008

The second issue of Islamic Turkistan appeared in November 2008. Unlike the first
issue, it lists the editorial staff: Abu Jaafar al-Mansur, General Director; Abdullah Mansur,
Editor; and Abd al-Hakim Arif, Technical Production. It continues the key themes of the
first publication, has 57 pages, and, unlike the first issue, is paginated. The articles are
similar in content to those in the first issue.

Islamic Turkistan, Table of Contents, No. 2

Editorial: Fatwa of Dr. Abdullah al-Faqih – East Turkistan and How a

Muslim Helps His Brother
Interview with Amir of the Turkistani Islamic Party, Brother Abd al-Haq
The Mujahiddin Bring Down Spy Plane in Waziristan
Lessons from the Life of the Prophet (Invasion and Parties)
China‟s Ethnic Cleansing Policy Against the Turkistan People
Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime
The Enemy Becomes Terrified of Our Operations
The Turkistani Islamic Party in the Global Media
America Leads the Capitalist World into Recession and Collapse
The Slogans of Democracy
Sayings of the Leader Hassan Mahsum
This is Our Religion We Owe to God, So Examine Yourselves
On Salafist Doctrine
Pioneers of Philosophical Thinking in Islamic Civilization

 The editorial reprints a fatwa, or religious opinion, from the Islamic scholar
Abdullah al-Faqih. The fatwa calls upon Muslims to aid TIP‟s cause with both
human and financial resources. Faqih is the director the “Islamic Network,” an
organization which publishes its fatwas on the well-known “Islam Web” website.18

 The second article begins a three-part interview with TIP‟s recently deceased
leader, Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. This article begins with Abd al-Haq‟s early life
and describes his travel to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan up through 1998.
The content of the interview is detailed, with numerous names, dates and
personal impressions. While remembrances by any political leader must be read
with some caution, the document seems credible.

18
This is the homepage of al-Faqih’s website: http://www.islamweb.net/mainpage/index.php. The original text of
the fatwa is here: http://islamweb.net/ver2/fatwa/ShowFatwa.php?Option=FatwaId&lang=A&Id=75447. A search
for the title of the fatwa did not return significant results, however, so it does not appear to have been widely read.

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TIP Introduction Statement to al-Fajr February 2009
“The Turkistani Islamic Party Introduces Itself to Our Brothers in al-Fajr Media” was
posted to two different forums, Muslm.net19 and Forsanelhaq20 (“Knights of Truth”), on
February 26, 2009. Its purpose may have been to avoid problems TIP had with getting IT
No. 2 published promptly. Apparently, al-Fajr doubted its authenticity and while it was
waiting to publish there emerged an online fight about who would publish it. 21

This statement is from your brothers in the Turkistani Islamic Party so that you
may know and learn more about the conditions of your Muslim brothers in East
Turkistan and what they are subjected to through various forms of oppression
and abuse at the hands of the Chinese Communist usurpers. For it is known that
the region of East Turkistan borders Pakistan and Afghanistan from the west,
and entered into Islam in this region during the reign of the Umayyad Caliph
Walid Abd al-Malik in 96 H., at the hands of the mujahid Qutayba bin Muslim, and
from that time Islam became the official religion in the region, and this Islamic
state remained until the last Islamic state died out in 1355 H….

The statement goes on to discuss the various means China is using to undermine the
Islamic nature of the region, such as prohibiting prayers, burning Islamic books, sending
women outside the region to work in factories, and the migration of Han Chinese.

Islamic Turkistan No. 3, March 2009

The third issue continues the themes begun in the previous issues, with a mixture of
polemics, theology, classical history, and contemporary historical narrative.
Islamic Turkistan, Table of Contents, No. 3

Editorial: The Chinese Government Mocks the Prophet Muhammad

From the Guidance of the Quran: How Often the Small Group Overcame the
Larger Group by God‟s Will
Interview with Amir of the Turkistani Islamic Party, Brother Mujahid Abd al-Haq
Lessons from the Life of the Prophet: Perspectives and Reflections on the
Battle of Uhud
Letter to the Ulema
The Jurisprudence of Jihad: Rule of the Spy
On Salafist Doctrine
Our Martyrs: The Martyr Diya‟ al-Din bin Yusef
Notes of a Prisoner in the North
Lost Pages from Islamic History: The Sultan Mahmud al-Ghaznawi
The International Press
China and the Islamic Caliphate
When the Era of Caliphal Leadership Came
The Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime
Women Immigrants: A Real Story in Hijra
Slogans of Democracy Raised by the West
The Truth of Chinese Enmity Toward Muslims
Save Turkistan While There is Still Time

19
http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=333945
20
http://www.forsanelhaq.com/showthread.php?t=103767
21
See the Jihadica blog post, http://www.jihadica.com/infighting-over-distribution-of-new-uighur-magazine/.

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  The editorial is “The Chinese Government Mocks the Prophet Muhammad.” It
cites a Chinese television channel, CCTV, and a program called “The Tang
Dynasty.” The article states that this production claimed that Muhammad sent gifts
to Chinese rulers – a sign of submission – and that Muslims brought a picture of
Muhammad.

 The second installment of Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani‟s personal account shows

ETIM as essentially a ward of the Taliban. It picks up shortly after Abd al-Haq‟s
coming to Afghanistan and goes through the destruction of the Buddha statues in
March 2001. In this segment Abd al-Haq describes himself and his Uighur
comrades as essentially being under the command of the Taliban‟s Mullah Omar;
on page 10 he talks of how “the Commander of the Faithful” had appointed a new
military commander for them and opened up the Jalalabad camp for them. Then
he traveled to Kabul and Kandahar and met with IMU leader Juma Namangani,
whom Omar had placed in command over the immigrants (like Abd al-Haq).

 “Letter to the Ulema” – this article, written under the byline of Abd al-Haq himself,
is another appeal for support. It is five pages, filled with quotes from hadith and
statements like “…your Turkistani brothers are now in the greatest need of your
support and assistance, especially after your Turkistani sons in the Turkistani
Islamic Party declared jihad in 2008. Some of these mujahiddin, based on this,
executed a series of successful military operations against the Chinese.”

 “On Salafist Doctrine” in this issue cites the founder of Saudi Arabia‟s Wahhabi
establishment, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, and it is the only TIP article to do so.

Preserverence and Preparation in Jihad, April 2009

TIP has posted a series of videos on Arab jihadist forums over the past two years, mostly
in Uighur without Arabic translation, not even subtitles. It is not clear why they do this,
although it may be that TIP does not want to set up its own Uighur online network, so
they just use the Arabic network for Uighur videos.

One of the few which would be intelligible to Arabs is “Preserverence and Preparation in
Jihad,” 22 placed on YouTube in April 2009. It is a ten-minute jihadist training video, with
camouflaged jihadists training in small-arms and hand-to-hand combat. There are some
Arabic subtitles, and most of it is set to jihadist songs, some in Arabic, some in Uighur.

Islamic Turkistan No. 4, June 2009

A major theme of the fourth issue is the interconnectedness of TIP‟s fight with China and
the war between South Asian jihadists and the Pakistani government and the U.S. This
partly grows out of TIP‟s strong relationship with the Taliban, and Pakistan‟s historical
relationship with China. But it also seems intended to pressure mainstream Pakistani
Islamists to ensure that the Pakistani government doesn‟t target TIP.

22
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TYol9sYsfU.

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 Islamic Turkistan, Table of Contents, No. 4

Editorial: The Sino-American Agreement to Fight the Mujahiddin

in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Statement: Deception of the Chinese and Pakistani Media and
Their Reliance on Lies and Falsehood
Statement of the Military Leader: On the Occasion of the Chinese
Massacre in Urumqi
Interview with Brother Abd al-Haq, Amir of the Turkistani Islamic
Party
The Crimes of the Chinese Communist Party (The Secret
Revealed)
The Muslim Turkistani People Deprived of Passports for Travel
Our Martyrs, Shahid Bilal
The International Press
From the Guidance of the Quran: The Story of Talut and Jalut
War is Deception
Security in the Quran
The Islamic Nation is a Body without Spirit and Writing without
Clarity
The Beautiful Masks Fall and the Ugly Faces are Revealed
The Political Means the Chinese Have Used to Corrupt Turks and
Bring Them into Submission Through Several Agreements

 The editorial deals with the April 2009 meeting between American and Chinese
leaders and agreements reached which TIP frames as hostile to the mujahiddin.

 The second article, on Chinese and Pakistani media, was prepublished on forums
in May 2009.23

 The third article completes the three-part biographical sketch of TIP leader Abd al-
Haq al-Turkistani. It starts with Abd al-Haq in Kabul in 2001 in the months before
9/11, and finishes with the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan later that year and
the retreat into Pakistan. The text states that they ended up in “Shin Warsak,” part
of “Wana,” in Wazirstan, Pakistan.24

 An article “Our Martyrs, Martyr Bilal” provides a biographical sketch of an religious

authority, Yusuf Qadir Khan, nomme de guerre Bilal. It states that he died in
Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan, at the time of the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

 An article with the interesting title “The Beautiful Masks Fall and the Ugly Faces
are Revealed” by spokesman Abdullah Mansur attacks Pakistani Islamists for
negotiating with the Chinese government. The criticism is focused on the Jamaat-
i-Islami and several of its leaders are mentioned by name.

23
http://alshahada.maktoobblog.com/663/%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A/
24
The text puts these place names in quotes; it appears that they are spelled with Farsi characters.

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The Suffering of East Turkistan, July 2009
An online essay was published on several websites in mid-2009 recounting the suffering
of the Turkistani people, identified as the “archive” of the Turkistani Islamic Party. 25 The
origin of the article is not clear, but it reflects the standard claims made by TIP.

On the Occasion of the Chinese Massacre in Urumqi, July 2009

This statement, issued by Sayfullah, is identical to the article with the same title in the
fourth issue of IT.26 What makes it notable is that it is easily the most widely copied TIP
statement on the forums. The riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang on July 5, 2009 resulted in
approximately 200 deaths and got widespread attention internationally.27

The Believer’s Obligation and Assistance, August 2009

This is a presentation given through video, part in Arabic, and part in Uighur translated,
published on jihadist forums, as well as on Youtube. 28 It is approximately 40 minutes
long, and is the most comprehensive video presentation of TIP‟s views.

Revive Turkistan, al-Qaeda in Iraq, August 2009

This 38-minute video from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) includes material about a range of
topics, mostly Iraq, but begins with Turkistan and returns to it later in the video around
minute thirty-six. It mentions ETIM and TIP the second time around.29

The Forgotten Wound, Abu Yahya al-Libi, October 2009

TIP‟s cause received a boost when the famous al-Qaeda propagandist Abu Yahya al-Libi
produced a 20-minute video presentation about Turkistan entitled “The Forgotten
Wound.” 30 The content of the presentation is identical to TIP‟s own propaganda and
some of the same references as the AQI Turkistan video, but notably, he never mentions

25
http://www.bdr130.net/vb/t594111.html (second link: http://alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=72721)
26
This is the Sayfallah video presentation, which is in Uighur: http://www.archive.org/details/Sayf-Allah. This is an
Arabic text published into the jihadist forum Omaniyat: http://www.omaniyat.com/vb/showthread.php?t=13476.
27
The Wikipedia entry seems to have the fullest account:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_%C3%9Cr%C3%BCmqi_riots. The incident got attention from Islamists who
don’t normally focus on China, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; see “The Muslims of East Turkistan… Massacres
Ignored,” IkhwanOnline, July 11, 2009 (http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=51381&SecID=344).
28
“The Believer’s Obligation and Assistance.” On Youtube: Part one,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTxVyc0b8yE. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XO-
iUIOfupA&feature=related; part two, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0H6fhR7m44M&feature=related; part
three, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTxVyc0b8yE; part four, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-
fbrj7hoqw&feature=related. The Youtube counter indicates that these are not highly-watched videos, although
some will watch them over jihadist forums or CDs.
29
The video is hard to find on jihadist forums in easily downloadable format, but is conveniently broken into four
parts on Youtube: Part I (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbNaAJzunR4), Part II
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03mXHedDzzI&feature=related), Part III
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kSJI_3iFdE&feature=related), Part IV
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvzgCKJdEGQ).
30
“The Forgotten Wound,” Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-Roshd Forum (http://www.al-
roshd.com/vb/showthread.php?t=601). If that URL does not work, search on Youtube for (‫)الجرح المنسي‬. For
background on Abu Yahya, whose real name is Muhammad Hasan Qaid, see “The Next Osama,” Foreign Policy,
September 10, 2009 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/10/the_next_osama).

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TIP. The significance of this video is Abu Yahya‟s own prominence. Note also that Abu
Yahya‟s video was produced by al-Sahab, al-Qaeda‟s own media production
organization. It also got coverage on Al-Jazeera.31

Islamic Turkistan No. 5, January 2010

The fifth issue of Islamic Islamic Turkistan,Table of Contents, No. 5
Turkistan was published in
January 2010. The second-page Editorial: The Duty of Muslims Toward Their Brothers in Turkistan
mast-head noted a change in the The Massacres and Attacks of the Chinese Will Not Continue without
Response
journal‟s management; the
Review of Military Operations in 2009 (Military Commander Sayfullah)
General Manager is now listed as Our Martyrs (Shaykh Shahid Ibn Amr)
Shihab al-Din Fatih. The picture East Turkistan… the Forgotten Wound (Abu Yahya al-Libi)
at the top of the page The Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime in East Turkistan
dramatically shows two Chinese The Present War Between Chinese and Turkistanis is a War of Religion
and Doctrine
police holding a man down –
The International Press
presumably a Uighur man – while Lion of the Islamic Call: Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani
a third kicks him. The Conquest of Beijing
Participants in the Journal
The Obedient Descendant Revives the History of the Righteous
Ancestor
Security in the Quran
The False Representation of Abidallah Khan and China‟s Aggression
Against East Turkistan
Turkic Lands Occupied by Russia
Peace to the Brothers in East Turkistan
How the Story of East Turkistan Resembles that of Palestine
Save Turkistan Before it is Too Late

 The second article, “The Massacres and Attacks of the Chinese Will Not Continue
without Response,” was prepublished in late 2009 as a separate statement.

 The article on “Turkic Lands Occupied by Russia” is notable because it is the only
TIP publication focused on Russia. Russia is identified as an enemy elsewhere,
but is only rarely mentioned. There are significant Uighur populations in the
Central Asian states where Islamists view Russia as a key enemy.

Islamic Turkistan No. 6, July 2010

The sixth issue of Islamic Turkistan appeared on several jihadist websites on July 13,
roughly four months after the death of Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. It contained no
references to either Abd al-Haq or the group‟s military commander, Sayfullah, and no
comment regarding a new leadership. While some of the material reprinted statements
published prior to February 2010, it contained references to events as late as March
2010, so its publication was finalized after Abd al-Haq‟s death.

31
“Al-Qaeda Calls for Uighurs to Fight China,” al-Jazeera, October 7, 2009
(http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/653EF122-29DB-427B-952C-B08290584B9B.htm).

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 Islamic Turkistan Table of Contents, Vol. 6

Editorial: Here the Crazy Duo Enters Vicious War Against

Mujahiddin in Afghanistan
Statement: The Turkistani Islamic Party Clarifies its Position on
Democratic and Secular Turkistani Parties
Statement: Response to Website Published in the Name of the
Turkistani Islamic Party
Our Martyrs: The Martyr Shaykh Qurban Ata
Crimes of the Communist Chinese Regime in East Turkistan
The International Press
The Conquest of Beijing
Participants in the Journal
The Secret Which the Ottoman Caliphate Sent to Kashghar
Security in the Quran
Learn About Muslims in China
The Jihadist Experience of the Mujahiddin of the Islamic Party of
East Turkistan
Uighur Muslims… Preserverence in Islam Despite Chinese
Persecutions
Save Turkistan Before it is Too Late

 The editorial focuses on Chinese-Afghan cooperation against jihadists, and a

reference to Afghan President Hamid Karzai‟s March 24 visit to Beijing
establishes that this was published after Abd al-Haq‟s death. The editorial also
criticizes China‟s CCTV for opening a new Arabic-language TV channel to
promote what it calls anti-Muslim policies. There is also a reference to testimony
before the U.S. Congress crediting them with attacks in Xinjiang.32

 The second and third articles are both reprints from statements issued previously
in jihadist forums. The second is a February 2010 statement attacking secular
Uighur parties. The third is a statement first published in 2009 disclaiming that a
website, www.tipislam.net, speaks for the group.

 “Statement from the Turkistani Islamic Party Clarifying its Position on Democratic
and Secular Turkistani Parties,” is TIP‟s most explicit statement on other Uighur
groups.33 It is published under the name Muhammad Yasin and the “Shura
Council of the Turkistani Islamic Party.” It gives a list of nine Uighur organizations
it condemns as unislamic. The list includes: The Uighur Union of America, the
Uighur Union of Australia, the International Uighur Conference, the Swedish
Uighur Association, the Canadian Uighur Association, the Uighur Educational
Union, the Organization for Education and Social Cooperation of East Turkistan,
the Association of East Turkistan Culture and Cooperation in Turkey, and the
Association for the Defense of Uighur Human Rights.

32
Reprinted in “China Stalls on the AfPak Road,” Asia Times, May 20, 2009
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KG17Ad02.html).
33
Published previously on several forums, including Hanein: http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?164706.

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ANALYSIS
The Relationship Between ETIM and TIP
TIP appears to be a successor organization to ETIM.

(1) TIP claims complete continuity with ETIM, with its contemporary leadership working
closely under and succeeding directly from ETIM‟s known leadership in the pre-2003
period. While TIP‟s claims of ties to ETIM pre-2003 are presented credibly, it presents
no evidence of activities during the 2003-2007 period.

(2) The global jihadist community is convinced of TIP‟s claims. This study finds only a
couple of random forum comments even referring to ETIM over the past three years,
and none casting doubt on TIP‟s claims about its origins. The willingness of al-Fajr
Media Center to distribute TIP publications reinforces this point.

(3) There are no statements from jihadist media claiming to be from ETIM, even going
back several years. Any forum member could post a statement from another Uighur
group were there another one active in jihadist circles.

This suggests that there is no need for media to say that TIP is “also known as” ETIM or
even refer to ETIM as an existing group. It would be correct, if necessary for context, to
refer to TIP as a successor organization to ETIM, or as the group once known as ETIM.

The degree of continuity which TIP claims is less convincing, however, and undermined
by two facts. First, there is the simple lack of affirmative evidence of ETIM/TIP activity
during the 2003-2007 period. While it adds to the credibility of Abd al-Haq‟s self-narrative
that he ends in 2002, he provides no evidence of activity after that point. Sources which
report ETIM/TIP activity during this period, such as an August 2008 report from
Stratfor,34 appear to rely entirely on PRC claims that the group it is attacking is ETIM.

There is evidence from a 2008 arrest in the United Arab Emirates linked to TIP, based on
information from the trial published in July 2010. The alleged plot involves two Uighur
residents of the UAE who were plotting to create a home-made bomb to destroy a statue
of a dragon wrapped around a globe outside of a shopping mall selling Chinese-made
goods.35 Published sources from the trial indicate that they had money wired to them

34
“China and the Enduring Uighurs,” Stratfor, August 6, 2008
(http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china_and_enduring_uighurs). In part, the Stratfor report relies on Chinese
reports of their own raids against a group they associate with ETIM, but as the PRC has an interest in labeling any
Uighur militant activity with ETIM/TIP, this does not establish that TIP was active. The article also refers to videos
from 2005 and 2006 which are described in a way that sounds a lot like the material in IT, but without either
indicating what language these videos were in, or citing any specific sources.
35
“Revealed: The Plot to Blow Up Dragonmart,” The National, July 9, 2010
(http://thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100709/NATIONAL/707089840/0/FRONTPAGE); “Two Chinese
Uighurs Held for UAE Bomb Plot,” Reuters, July 1, 2010 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE66004X); “Uighurs
Convicted in East Turkestan Islamic Movement Plot in Dubai,” TerrorismMonitor, Vol. VIII, Issue 29, July 22, 2010.
The National article states that the plotter was recruited in December 2007. The TerrorismMonitor article, which
claims to be relying on court documents, claims he was recruited sometime in 2006.

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from a member in Turkey. The main plotter was recruited by the deputy leader of ETIM
while on the Hajj in Saudi Arabia, perhaps as late as December 2007, but sources do not
give the leader‟s name. The plotter traveled at a later unspecified date to Waziristan to a
Uighur jihadist camp. But this overlaps with TIP‟s emergence in 2008.

Second, TIP‟s claim that ETIM changed its name in 2000 to TIP suggests revisionism.
The “Background” section above reviews the available secondary sources on ETIM/TIP,
and it is notable that not one source refers to it as TIP until 2008. Had the group changed
its name in 2000, it is unlikely that no observers could have taken notice.

One possible explanation for ETIM remnants during those years is that they might have
simply melted in with Uzbek jihadists from the IMU also based in Waziristan, the west
Pakistan province where various militant groups have sanctuary. As noted, Uighur and
Uzbek are mutually intelligible. The IMU changed its name to something similar to TIP‟s
current name in 2001,36 broadening its focus and perhaps confusing observers. Abd al-
Haq even indicated that he had fought under the command of the IMU‟s military
commander for a period in the late 1990s.37

The Relationship Between TIP, AQ and the Global Jihadist Network

TIP‟s relationship to al-Qaeda needs to be addressed because it is very often mentioned
in media reports as linked to al-Qaeda, as if the most important fact about TIP were its
relationship to AQ. It is worth asking, though, whether it makes sense to describe TIP in
these terms. TIP‟s ideology is jihadist, and so it would be a threat regardless if its
relationship to AQ if it had greater capabilities. Moreover, as al-Qaeda portrays itself as
the global umbrella group for jihad, to consistently identify Islamist groups according to
their relationship to AQ feeds the organization‟s narrative.

That said, we conclude that TIP has a strong relationship to the Taliban, but appears to
view al-Qaeda more as “brothers-in-arms” than a close ally.

(1) TIP‟s references to al-Qaeda distinguish it from affiliates known to be loyal to Osama
bin Laden. TIP‟s publications rarely mention either AQ or OBL, and never mention
other AQ leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. At one point they even criticize al-
Qaeda for neglecting Asian Muslims, although they are generally respectful of
“Shaikh Osama.”38 Nor does TIP‟s leadership ever mention any relationship with AQ

36
See Christoffersen, 54.
37
“Interview with Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani,” Islamic Turkistan, November 2008, No. 3, p. 10.
38
The six issues of IT show just three references to Osama bin Laden, and while all are respectful, none express any
loyalty to him. There are no references to Ayman al-Zawahiri, or any other al-Qaeda leader outside of quoting Abu
Yahya al-Libi’s video on Turkistan. There are about a dozen total references to al-Qaeda as an organization, not
counting quotes in news articles. But several of these references are to state that China claims a TIP-AQ link without
having any evidence (for example, see No. 5, 27). One of the references actually criticizes al-Qaeda for neglecting
the jihad in Asia (No. 3, 45): “… for although al-Qaeda is the one Islamic jihadist organization which has raised its
voice for the Islamic nation, nonetheless the cause of Muslims in Central Asia generally and in China in particular lies
outside their concerns and published strategic plans, except for a brief mention by Abu Musab al-Suri…”, that being
a reference to the noted Syrian AQ thinker captured by the U.S. in 2005.

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 leaders. This contrasts strongly with, for example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). AQAP statements often praise both OBL and Zawahiri as a way of validating
themselves, and AQAP‟s leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, worked under Bin Laden for an
extended period, a fact which he advertises.

(2) TIP strongly presents itself as an independent vanguard of the new caliphate, not
subservient to any group, although its historical narratives and some independent
evidence suggest that it has been a virtual ward of the Taliban.

(3) The word choice, topical emphasis and writing style of Islamic Turkistan is mostly
ambiguous on the issue, although the lack of anti-Saudi rhetoric does distinguishe it
from AQ. The quality of the language indicates that its writers are native Arabs, with
at least some likely educated in Saudi Arabia.39 The ideological and doctrinal content
of Saudi-Wahhabi and al-Qaeda writings overlap significantly, so the use of al-
Qaeda-like language means only that TIP is targeting the same core audience and
that its writers have the same educational background.40

(4) The claim by the U.S. Treasury Department that Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani is a
member of al-Qaeda‟s Shura Council is not confirmed by evidence from open jihadist
sources. AQ has not issued a statement even commenting on Abd al-Haq‟s death.

(5) Abu Yahya al-Libi‟s video on Turkistan which pointedly did not refer to TIP may have
been an attempt by AQ to fend off TIP‟s claim that it ignores Asian Muslims.
Furthermore, Zawahiri‟s most recent video, on July 27, 2010, mentions a list of AQ
martyrs over the years and does not mention Abd al-Haq.41 AQI‟s video mentions
them, but it is an AQ affiliate, whereas Libi and Zawahiri are AQ core leadership.

These factors suggest that if media outlets feel the need to relate TIP to an outside
organization, it would be better to describe TIP as a “Talban-affiliated” rather than an “al-
Qaeda-affiliated” group.

The impression from TIP‟s historical accounts that it was under Taliban control is
reinforced by a story circulating on jihadist forums about how Hassan Mahsum came to
give the baya, or Islamic loyalty oath, to Mullah Omar. The story has apparently been
around for a while, and when posted in 2009 to the al-Hanien forum readers responded

39
The “On Salafist Doctrine” from Islamic Turkistan No. 3, 30, cites Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and reads like
something produced by a Saudi cleric. That said, this is the only reference to him, and while much of the language in
a range of articles sounds very “Wahhabi-like,” this kind of material can be read outside Saudi Arabia.
40
For example, TIP believes in the doctrine of “disavowal” – hostility toward and non-association with non-Muslims
(al-wila wa al-bira). But both AQ and the Wahhabis share this view. See, for example, Islamic Turkistan No. 5, 5.
41
This link has all five videos:
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%D8%B1%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A1+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%
D8%AC%D9%84+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB+%2F%2F+%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%8
8%D8%B1+%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%
8A&aq=f.

20 | P a g e
that the story was well known.42 We found no evidence that TIP has denied this story.
Although there have been reports that China reached an agreement with the Taliban in
the 1990s to limit ETIM activities, there is no evidence in TIP‟s publications that the
Taliban carried out its side of the bargain if it existed at all.

As noted in the Background section, the fact that some Uighurs captured by U.S. forces
were training with al-Qaeda suggests a relationship during that time. More relevant to the
movement‟s current form, the U.S. Treasury Department claims that Abd al-Haq was a
member of al-Qaeda‟s Shura Council “as of 2005.” 43 If true, this would establish a strong
link between the two groups, although the wording suggests the classified assessment
may rely on information which has not been confirmed recently.

A search of jihadist websites returned no references to Abd al-Haq being on the Shura
Council, although a search for individuals who are members of al-Qaeda‟s Shura Council
does return some results. This does not prove that he was not a member, as there is no
complete list of Shura Council members on the web. Yet it is worth noting since Treasury
does not disclose the basis of its assessment.

A more recent potential Uighur-AQ link came as the New York Times reported in July
2010 a Uighur resident of Norway being involved in a bomb plot. Details released so far
suggest that the Uighur, a member of ETIM, had been in Norway since 1999, and had
traveled to Waziristan to meet with al-Qaeda over the past two years. The same plot
involved two other men – an Iraqi Kurd and an Uzbek.44 Norwegian officials have not
stated whether these men met with TIP‟s new leadership or whether TIP had any direct
role. A comment from a Uighur writer in Norway who claims to have known the individual
states that he hung around Arabs and studied Arabic, which, if true, suggests he may
have come into contact with AQ directly instead of through TIP.45 But if TIP arranged for
their travel to Pakistan, this would suggest a stronger TIP-AQ relationship.

The safest conclusion is that TIP‟s relationship with AQ since 2008 is unclear. At the very
least, it seems highly unlikely that theories about TIP being a Chinese or AQ front are
true. Aside from some common ideological underpinnings, TIP‟s publications share none
of the typical characteristics of AQ-affiliated publications.

The Purpose and Impact of TIP’s Arabic Publications

The weight of the evidence suggests that TIP‟s Arabic publications serve as a
fundraising tool, with little or no relationship to operations.
42
http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?136529-!!.
43
The Treasury press release: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg92.htm. This is the UN designation:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9636.doc.htm.
44
“Norway Announces Three Arrests in Terrorist Plot,” New York Times, July 8, 2010
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/europe/09norway.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1279443617-
HilVROkN1hUL0nzqScDz4g); “Chinese Separatists Tied to Norway Bomb Plot,” New York Times, July 9, 2010
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/10uighur.html?_r=1).
45
“Diaspora Uyghurs in America, Norway on Norway Terror Plot,” The New Dominion, July 10, 2010
(http://www.thenewdominion.net/1799/diaspora-on-terror-plot/).

21 | P a g e
1) TIP‟s use of jihadist media contrasts with jihadist groups which are known to be close
to al-Qaeda such as AQAP and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Both AQAP and AQI
coordinate public statements with operations. The time iming and content are related to
operations in that they will take credit for something or deny something, and where
there are mainstream media reports of important jihadists being killed, they will either
eulogize the individual or assert that he is still alive. Some AQ-related publications also
provide instructions about how to carry out attacks. TIP‟s publications, by contrast, are
dominated by theoretical and polemical materials and if they claim attacks, they do not
do so in ways that make the claims verifiable. They also don‟t publish articles about
how to carry out attacks, or comment on the killing of their leaders.

2) TIP‟s message has made no substantial impact on mainstream Arabic media, not only
in comparison to Arab groups such as AQI and AQAP but also in comparison to the
Somali group al-Shabab. This can be demonstrated by a search of Al-Jazeera‟s
website. A search for the Somali group returned 956 unique pages, while a search for
stories on TIP returned just one.46 Even a broader search for just “Turkistan” returned
only 88 stories, and the bulk of these were about Uighurs but not TIP.

3) There is no evidence of Arabs taking up TIP‟s cause and joining the jihad against
China. If there were any Arab jihadists showing up in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities
would have a strong incentive to advertise their presence to the world.

If TIP has benefited from its Arabic publications, it is probably through fundraising. It is
possible that some contributions to Pakistan have been diverted to TIP. The fact that the
sixth issue of Islamic Turkistan continued to be published after Abd al-Haq‟s death, but
without even commenting on it, strengthens this impression. Their income is probably not
great, but they are likely bringing in enough money to pay their Arab writing staff to be
able to produce another 52-page publication.

Why has TIP generally failed to gain greater traction? Four factors may explain this.

First, TIP lacks a verifiable track record of success in launching attacks. While all jihadist
groups work in the shadows to a degree, AQI, AQAP and the Shabab are able to
convince journalists that they are responsible for the attacks they claim, with video
statements by the suicide bomber, for example, as AQI did with the video which
mentioned the Turkistani cause without mentioning TIP.

Second, TIP faces a hostile media environment as most influential Arabic media is
funded by states which need to maintain good relations with China. This is true of Qatar,
which funds al-Jazeera, and even more so of the other key sovereign media moguls,
Saudi Arabia – which owns al-Arabiya satellite TV, and the pan-Arab newspapers al-
Sharq al-Awsat, and al-Hayat – and Iran, which owns the third and fourth most prominent
satellite TV channels, Hizbullah‟s al-Manar and its own al-Alam.
46
“China Continues to Benefit from War on Terror,” al-Jazeera, April 22, 2009
(http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/EB8CA696-C306-44F6-B415-A4398CF92EBC.htm).

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Third, Turkistan faces significant competition as a front for jihad in the eyes of even the
most sympathetic Arab reader. There are a certain number of Arabs willing to abroad for
jihad. But anyone from the Arab world who could travel to Xinjiang could travel to
Afghanistan or Pakistan, or even more easily, to Iraq, Yemen, the African sahel or
Somalia. And whatever one might be willing to suffer for the cause, TIP‟s readers could
have no illusions about the fate awaiting them were they captured by Chinese security.

Fourth, the importance of forum publications to jihadist recruiting could be overrated. An

analysis published by Clinton Watts in Small Wars Journal of jihadists accounts of their
recruitment suggests that jihadists going to Iraq are overwhelmingly recruited by former
foreign fighters from Iraq who return to their home towns, not from the internet. 47 Watts‟
concludes that there are clusters of recruitment in a limited number of cities, creating a
cycle of recruitment. With no such pattern existing for Xinjiang, TIP struggles to create a
network over the internet. Even the sole example of recruitment they have in the Arab
world, the UAE case, was by word-of-mouth through the Uighur diaspora.

The Future of the Turkistani Islamic Party

Until the publication of issue six of Islamic Turkistan in July there had been no TIP
communications after Abd al-Haq‟s death in February. There were a few postings to
forums, but all of the material had previously been posted. TIP‟s renewed publication
with the sixth issue of IT maintains their visibility, but that the 52-page document made
no reference at all to the death of their leader raised more questions than answers.

The renewed publication does suggest that TIP must be getting enough money to at
least justify the effort. Even if on the ground TIP has blended back in with the much
larger Uzbek jihadist movement, it might nevertheless make sense for TIP‟s remaining
members to continue publishing as an independent group to raise money.

ETIM/TIP has never had sufficient capacity to operate independently. From the time it
left China in the 1990s, ETIM/TIP has been highly dependent on the Taliban. Assuming
Uighur jihadists maintain a separate organization from the IMU at all, the fortunes of both
will depend upon the success of the Taliban‟s war in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as
regional stability. And the recent instability in Kyrgyzstan, which like other Central Asian
states has a notable Uighur population, could be to their benefit. Further studies of
Uighur jihadism will likely need to exploit sources in Uighur and Uzbek to provide a better
picture of TIP‟s true standing. But as far as Arab jihadists are concerned, it remains to be
seen if TIP can start to act more like a jihadist movement with a media wing, and less
like a media outlet with just a jihadist cache.

47
“Foreign Fighters: How are they Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models,” Clinton Watts, Small Wars
Journal, 2008 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/69-watts.pdf). Given the recent concern in the
U.S. over online radicalization, it is worth noting that Watts says that online forums may have relatively greater
impact in the West among second and third-generation Muslims who are unlikely to be able to meet a returned
jihadist in the city where they live. In the Arab world, however, the influence of jihadist forums is fairly limited
compared to other sources of radicalization.

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