CCP 2.

2 (2010) 311–312 Comparative and Continental Philosophy (print) ISSN 1757-0638

doi:10.1558/ccp.v2i2.311 Comparative and Continental Philosophy (online) ISSN 1757-0646

The Domestication of Derrida: Rorty, Pragmatism and Deconstruction,

by Fabbri, Lorenzo, translated by Daniele Manni, Continuum, 2008.
150pp., Hb. $130.00, ISBN-13: 9780826497789.
Reviewed by Shannon M. Mussett, Department of Philosophy and Humani-
ties, Utah Valley University, shannon.mussett@uvu.edu

Keywords
Derrida, Rorty, deconstruction, pragmatism

Perhaps it is indicative of my own education in philosophy, but the idea that

anyone could realistically critique deconstruction as apolitical is surprising.
I have always found Rorty’s relegation of deconstruction to little more than a
quaint parlor trick (and certainly not philosophy) not very persuasive. Derri-
dean writing, from its very beginnings, has challenged, engaged, provoked and
proposed politics, even when not explicitly stated. Because of this, I was imme-
diately sympathetic to Lorenzo Fabbri’s book, which charts his own seduction
by and subsequent disillusionment with Richard Rorty’s approach to Derrida.
Fabbri takes issue primarily with Rorty’s privatization of the Derridean project
in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Fabbri challenges the “double privacy”
Rorty attributes to Derrida. Problematically, Rorty’s two-fold conception pro-
motes “the reduction of deconstructive writing to a sort of autobiographical
drift…[and] the belief that Derrida dismisses the endeavor to engage philoso-
phy with political struggle” (3). Fabbri investigates both claims on Rorty’s terms
and then proceeds to dismantle them through careful analysis.
The book is divided into three thematically interrelated chapters. In the
first chapter, Fabbri undertakes an explication of Rorty’s philosophical posi-
tion. Fabbri notes that Rorty (like Bloom before him) assails the tradition of
the supposed “ironists” beginning with Hegel, who take seriously the debt of
the past and the historical nature of truth. Unlike thinkers such as Heidegger,
Foucault and Hegel, Derrida’s virtue for Rorty resides in the fact that, pragmati-
cally speaking, his “narrative about philosophy helps stop paying attention to it”
(44). The second section addresses Rorty’s accolades of Derridean philosophi-
cal privatization and counters that the private for Derrida is thoroughly “con-
taminated” by the public. In the last section of the book Fabbri rejects Rorty’s
stark division between theory and politics in Derrida and in the humanities in
general. Peppered with discussions of Foucault (a particularly frightening bo-
geyman to Rorty) Fabbri gets to the heart of the matter towards the end of his
book by asking “Why is Richard Rorty so afraid of deconstruction?” (115). The

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011, 1 Chelsea Manor Studios, Flood Street, London SW3 5SR
312 Book Reviews
answer, it seems, is that deconstruction let loose from the walls of the academy
will wreak havoc on our best public institutions and our future-oriented opti-
mism. With such a clear project, divided so nicely into a tripartite presentation,
it is a wonder why Fabbri provides no conclusion. As it is, the whole book ends
abruptly—referencing unpredictability, multiplicity and other lovely decon-
structive catchphrases—but ultimately leaving us a little bewildered.
Overall, Fabbri’s text accomplishes a number of things. First, he manages to
write a scholarly analysis of an intriguing debate in the history of philosophy.
Although it may be difficult to see the debate between Rorty and Derrida as
already a thing of the past, Fabbri shows us that it captures the general feeling
of the second half of the twentieth century and the tensions between the conti-
nental and analytic traditions. In so doing, he joins a host of other scholars now
working to bring these two camps together in a more fruitful dialogue. Addi-
tionally, to write clearly on Rorty is one thing, but it is a rare accomplishment to
write so lucidly on Derrida. Fabbri’s language is coherent and accessible and yet
scholarly. He displays a broad knowledge of the history of philosophy and the
nuances of the debates surrounding the emergence and effects of deconstruc-
tion. Finally, Fabbri manages to do justice to Rorty’s reading of Derrida (with-
out simply claiming that he misread or misunderstood him) while ultimately
rejecting his oversimplification of Derridean thought.
Fabbri’s treatment of Rorty is so fair that he makes us pause at Rorty’s alle-
gations of Derridean philosophical privatization and its generation of apoliti-
cal fantasies. Yet, given his final conclusion that Rorty’s pragmatism is fiercely
conservative and outright dangerous with its techniques of policing and ter-
rorization, Fabbri could have spared us a few of his apologies for the tone of
his critique. Although Rorty’s reading of Derrida was not without profound
respect or critical rigor, Fabbri is absolutely right to unveil its political agenda
of making the status quo bearable, rather than undermining or questioning its
claims to dominance. When Rorty praises Derrida as apolitical and untheo-
retical, Fabbri counters, “To believe in an unserious Derrida, a Derrida lacking
theories, is to avoid the effort to read him” (52). Going one step further, Fabbri
shows us how even someone like Rorty, who clearly went through the effort of
reading Derrida, can take his thought and denude it of its radical potential by
walling it up in the academy, far from the body politic where it might legiti-
mately challenge the norm.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2011