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In this note, we will derive the inverse elasticity rule for a monopoly and
work on some numerical examples to see how the optimal quantity and price
are determined. The rule is given as formula 14.1 in Nicholson & Snyder,
10th edition. You may find some discussion on firm’s profit maximization
problem and the elasticity of demand in Chapter 11 helpful. The anwers to
numerical exercise are be found online as the solution to the practice prob-
lems.
dp
F.O.C : q + p − C 0 (q) = 0
dq
1
Please send me an email at ziyanhuang@ucla.edu if you find any typos or mistakes.
2
It does not matter whether the monopoly is choosing quantity or price. However, it
matters for other market structures, as you will see in the incomplete competition models
later this quarter.
1
or
dp
q + p = C 0 (q) (2)
dq
The righthand side of (2) is the marginal cost (usually denoted by M C) of
producing q. The lefthand side is the marginal revenue (M R). Notice that
for a monopoly, the extra revenue it gets from selling one more unit of good
is not simply the current price p. Consumers’ downward-sloping demand
curve means that the monopoly has to lower price a little bit to make con-
sumers willing to consume this extra unit, and this decrease in price reduces
its revenue for all units that have already been demanded. The term p0 (q)q
captures this effect.
dq/q dq p
eq,p = = (3)
dp/p dp q
dp dp q 1
MR = q+p=p ( + 1) = p ( + 1)
dq dq p eq,p
2
Rearranging above equation, we have
p − MC 1 1
=− = (4)
p eq,p | eq,p |