'Stress or Scarcity of Environmental

Resources Can Stimulate Cooperation

as Well as Conflict'
In View of this Statement, Examine the
Factors that Increase the Risk of Violent
Conflict in Response to Environmental
Stresses or Scarcities in Relation to
Access to Freshwater.
What Needs to be done to Prospects that
Such Stresses Stimulate Cooperation?

Module: Perspectives on Security and Development

UB-Number: 10010074
Due Date: 20/01/2011
Words: 3041
Turnitin-ID: 9155829
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Introduction
Water is the basis for all human life on earth. We need it to drink, to wash and to grow

our food. Being of such elemental importance for societies and individuals to prosper,

scarcity of water (or freshwater) is often cited as a possible cause of conflict. But there

is also evidence that such scarcities can lead to cooperation. In the course of the

following pages, both scenarios will be analysed.

This essay will first provide an introduction to the most important terms and concepts

used in the discussion. The most important one of these may be “freshwater scarcity”

itself. The first research question of the essay will therefore be:

Under which circumstances can freshwater be considered scarce and which

processes lead to that state? (R1)

The essay will then proceed to outline possible factors that may increase the risk of

violent conflict in connection with freshwater scarcity and describe how their numerous

causal links operate. The second research question will therefore be:

Which factors increase the risk of violent conflict in relation to freshwater

scarcity and how do they operate? (R2)

The essay will then discuss why and how freshwater scarcity may lead to cooperation

instead of violent conflict, answering research question three:

How does freshwater scarcity and its effects have to be managed to

stimulate cooperation instead of conflict? (R3)

The conclusion will sum up key findings and answer the research questions.

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Definitions and Concepts

Environmental Stress and Scarcity

This essay will follow Homer-Dixon and use the terms environmental stress and

environmental scarcity interchangeably.1 Homer-Dixon defines both terms as

“Scarcity of renewable resources, such as cropland, forests, river water, and

fish stocks. This scarcity can arise […] from depletion or degradation of the
resource, increased demand for it, and from unequal distribution.”2

Further, this essay will refer to environmental or freshwater scarcity simply as scarcity

where readability commands it.

While the concrete causal connections between scarcity and violent conflict will be

explored in detail in the following chapters, it is important to underline that there is a

wide consensus in the scientific community that such a connection exists 3, though

environmental or freshwater scarcity on its own is neither a necessary nor a sufficient

cause of conflict.4 This essay also does not make any claims on its relevance in

comparison with other causes of conflict.5 This essay will also focus solely on scarcity

of freshwater (see below) though many processes will apply to other types of

environmental scarcity as well.

Violent Conflict and Cooperation

Different authors identify different types of violent conflict which according to them

might or might not be influenced by scarcity. Homer-Dixon describes five types of

1 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 4.

2 Ibid., 8.
3 Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” 660.
4 Schwartz, Deligiannis, and Homer-Dixon, “Commentary: Debating Environment, Population, and
Conflict,” 87.
5 As advised by Ibid., 85.

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violent conflict, largely differentiated by their spatial scale and the type of political

organisation of their actors.6 This differentiation can be useful when analysing how

different effects of freshwater scarcity interact. The only overarching consensus is that

scarcity is extremely unlikely to cause interstate armed conflict.7 This essay will

therefore limit itself to the inspection of intrastate violent conflict. Violence is defined

as the use of deadly force by one conflict actor against another. “Violent conflict” and

“conflict” will be used interchangeably.

The opposite of conflict is cooperation. In the context of this essay cooperation will be

defined as the act of different groups working together to mitigate freshwater scarcity,

either by mitigating the scarcity itself or by mitigating its negative effects.

Freshwater Scarcity

The following section will focus on answering the first research question to set the

necessary background for the following discussion.

Freshwater is generally defined as

“Naturally occurring water having a low concentration of salts, or

generally accepted as suitable for abstraction and treatment to produce
potable water.”8

This covers potable water as well as water suitable for agriculture. Agriculture is also

the dominant human use of freshwater with a share of 70% of global water extraction.

20% of global extraction is due to industrial uses and 10% is used for human

6 These types are 1. Disputes over local environmental degradation; 2. Clashes with an ethnic
dimension arising from scarcity-induced deepened social cleavages and migration; 3. "Civil strife",
which arises from lowered economic productivity due to scarcity; 4. Interstate wars (e.g. water wars);
5. Global North - Sourth conflicts, waged over the mitigation of, compensation for and adaption to
gloabl environmental scarcities; Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 5.
7 Gizelis and Wooden, “Water Resources, Institutions, & Intrastate Conflict,” 445.
8 International Glossary of Hydrology, “Freshwater.”

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consumption.9 Due to this discrepancy, Wallace and Sullivan declare that a solution to

freshwater scarcity will not impact direct freshwater consumption 10, but this can be

doubted as local freshwater scarcity may well be induced by human consumption.

There are many reasons why freshwater can become scarce. Global climate change for

example will lead to a change in rain patterns, which will leave some regions of better,

but especially the developing world will receive less precipitation as a result.11

Another factor is population growth. This can be an issue globally12 as well as locally.

Adding to this is an increasing water consumption per capita 13, and an increasing

industrialisation of the economy.14 A final aspect of freshwater scarcity is unequal

access to freshwater, with globally 1.1 billion people without access.15

A generally accepted measurement for freshwater scarcity is water availability in cubic

meters. Homer-Dixon argues that

“[…] as average water availability drops below 1,000 cubic meters [per
capita] in a developing region, a significant fraction of the society's
population will confront serious scarcity problems.”16

It has to be noted though that not all parts of a society will be affected. Next to a supply-

dimension of scarcity (the physical availability of water), the dimensions of demand and

equality have to be taken into account as well.

9 OECD, Water and Violent Conflict, 2.

10 Wallace, Acreman, and Sullivan, “The Sharing of Water Between Society and Ecosystems: From
Conflict to Catchment-Based Co-Management,” 2023.
11 Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 177,184,186.
12 The world population is expected to rise to over 9 billion by 2050, from less than 3.5 billion in 1965.
This rise not only impacts direct consumption, but also agricultural use of water and water pollution;
United Nations Population Division, “Total Population, Both Sexes Combined (thousands): Medium
Variant.”
13 This is largely induced by global wealth creation, which leads to a greater direct consumption of
freshwater per capita, but also to the consumption of more water intensive agricultural products like
meat; The World Bank, “GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (current US$).”
14 Lonergan, “Water and Conflict: Rhetoric and Reality,” 110, 114.
15 Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” 660.
16 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 67.

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Freshwater Scarcity and Violent Conflict

This section will concentrate on analysing the factors that increase the risk of violent

conflict in relation to freshwater scarcity and will thus answer the second research

question.

Homer-Dixon was one of the first scholars to introduce a comprehensive model on the

causal links between (freshwater) scarcity and violent conflict.17 He postulates that

certain “ideational”18 factors produce three sources of scarcity: supply-induced,

demand-induced and structural scarcity.19 These are subject to certain types of social

interactions, notably “resource capture” and “ecological marginalization”. 20 The

resulting scarcity has a number of social effects (like migration and social segmentation)

which in turn lead to different types of violent intrastate conflict. 21 Violent conflict feeds

back into the social effects and both feed back into the ideational factors.

Kahl extended this model to better accommodate the effects of regime type on the

relationship between scarcity and conflict.22 He integrates the ideational factors, sources

of scarcity and social interactions of Homer-Dixon into a variable labelled

“Demographic and Environmental Stress” (DES). This variable puts pressure on both

society and the state which may lead to civil strife either through state exploitation or

state failure. Kahl further introduces two intervening variables called “Groupness” and

“Institutional Inclusivity”, the first measuring the “degree and nature of social

cleavages”23, the other referring to “the degree to which key social groups are
17 For a more detailed discussion on this model, see Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence,
47-104 and 133-169; and Schwartz, Deligiannis, and Homer-Dixon, “Commentary: Debating
Environment, Population, and Conflict.”
18 For a defenition see Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 49.
19 Ibid., 48.
20 Ibid., 73.
21 Ibid., 134.
22 For a detailed presentation of this model see Kahl, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing
World, 28-64.
23 Ibid., 52.

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institutionally empowered to participate in, and potentially influence, decision making

by state elites, especially the the executive”.24

Kahl is certainly right to point out the importance of regime type and institutional

inclusivity, factors that receive not enough attention in Homer-Dixon's model. On the

other hand, the integration of the societal context and processes of social interaction in

one variable (DES) is limiting the analytical depth of his model unnecessarily. Further,

Kahl gives up the differentiation between types of conflict, opting instead for the all-

encompassing “civil strife”. The model thus looses some level of detail and usefulness

in predicting possible outcomes of scarcity.

This essay proposes an extended model based on Homer-Dixon instead, which

integrates the most important theoretical additions by Kahl. Its core components are the

Societal Context, which encompasses variables like physical water availability,

groupness, dependence on local resources, and institutional inclusivity. This context

produces supply-induced, demand-induced and structural scarcities which are in

constant interaction. Depending on this interaction, scarcity has certain Social Effects

(migration, constrained economic productivity, state exploitation, state failure). These

social effects feed back into the societal context and are in turn influenced by it.

Depending on the types of social effects created and their interaction, different types of

violent conflict may ensue. The conflict will in turn have social effects and influence the

social context.

Applied to freshwater scarcity, the following factors increase the risk of violent conflict

to happen. The different factors will of course impact each other.

24 Ibid., 54.

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Societal Context

The following factors influence the likelihood of freshwater becoming scarce for a

society or a group within it:

• Dependence: If a group is highly dependent on a limited number of freshwater

sources (for example a single stream), it puts outside groups in a position of

strength to limit access to these sources.25 Also, the probability of a disruptive

event increases.

• Buffer capabilities: As Reuveny rightly points out, it is not relevant how strong

a disruptive event is, but how strong it is in relation to the capability of the

population to withstand it.26

• Groupness: There is a wide consensus that scarcity can impact different groups

in different ways.27 A possible way to measure the probability of such a situation

is the variable of groupness introduced by Kahl (see above). A higher niveau of

groupness will increase the risk of scarcity for a part of society.

• Institutional Inclusivity: Another variable introduced by Kahl and integrated

into Homer-Dixon's model. It describes the possibility of different groups taking

part in deciding who gets access to freshwater. Less institutional Inclusivity

results in a higher risk of scarcity for one of the groups.

• Relative Power Relationships: If all concerned groups are in a balance of

power (to inflict violence upon the other), it is unlikely that one will exclude the

other from freshwater access.28

25 Lonergan, “Water and Conflict: Rhetoric and Reality,” 118.

26 Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” 661.
27 See for example OECD, Water and Violent Conflict, 3.
28 Ashton, “Avoiding Conflicts Over Africa's Water Resources,” 240.

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• Water Sharing: Conflict over water resources are more likely, if these resources

are shared by a larger group of actors.29

Social Interactions

The following social interaction further determine which group will be impacted by

freshwater scarcity and how:

• Resource capture: Powerful groups within a society may decide to manipulate

the states institutions to give them access to scarce resources. This may be done

out of fear or greed and can be accomplished by violent or non-violent means.

The effect is always a marginalization of the less powerful groups.30

• Ecological Marginalization: If access to freshwater is unequally distributed in

a society and demand for it rises, the already marginalized groups are forced to

migrate to areas with less optimal water supply.31

Social Effects

• Decreasing Economical Productivity: If due to freshwater scarcity economic

(this includes agricultural) productivity declines, the wealth gap between groups

in a society will widen.32

• Migration: Freshwater scarcity itself as well as a decreasing economic

productivity can lead to a wave of migration, either into rural areas with

29 This is true for a larger total number of actors as well as for the existence of different types of actors;
OECD, Water and Violent Conflict, 3; Ashton, “Avoiding Conflicts Over Africa's Water Resources,”
240.
30 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 74.
31 Ibid., 77.
32 Ibid., 88.

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perceived more available freshwater or into urban areas.33

• Social Segmentation: Scarcity also sharpens the distinction between those that

have access to freshwater and those that lack it. This can lead to an increased

segmentation of society, which in turn may give rise to state exploitation and

failure.34

• State Exploitation: Due to the increases societal demands because of

freshwater scarcity, incumbent regimes may opt to use the state apparatus to

encourage the own support base to suppress these demands by other groups.35

• State Failure: Increased societal demands for freshwater access may also make

the regime concentrate solely on the demands of its support base. If this leads to

a serious threat for the survival of other groups, this poses an incentive for these

groups to violently oppose the state.36

Violent Conflict

• Group-Identity Conflicts: Migration and state failure or exploitation can be an

incentive for distinct groups of a society (e.g. ethnic or religious groups), to

enter into violent conflict against other groups.37

• Coups: Institutional failure, like it is associated with state exploitation and state

failure can lead to a coup by state elites who feel threatened by this failure.38

• Insurgencies: Motivated by grievances because of a declining economic

33 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 12; Benjaminsen, “Does Supply-Induced Scarcity
Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel?,” 832.
34 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 96.
35 Kahl, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World, 50.
36 Ibid., 45.
37 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 141.
38 Ibid., 147.

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productivity and by processes of state exploitation or failure, societal groups can

decide to challenge the state violently.39

An example on how this causality works is the case of Gaza. In 1996, the societal

context of Gaza was dominated by a high dependence on a single aquifer, with limited

capabilities to buffer shortages. There was a stark difference in power between Israeli

authorities, Palestinian authorities (PA) and normal citizens. The aquifer was heavily

used by Israel and seen as essential by all parties. Both resource capture and ecological

marginalization could be witnessed, with Israel and Palestinian elites shifting access in

their favour. This led to a scarcity of freshwater and as a result to economic decline in

Gaza, which relied heavily on agriculture and discredited both the PA and Israel. The

resulting grievances contributed to both the renewed insurgency against Israel and the

strengthening of Hamas which eventually took over power from the PA in a coup in

Gaza.40 Other cases will show different dynamics and combinations of conflict-risk

increasing factors, but the fundamental model will be the same.

Freshwater Scarcity and Cooperation

The following section will focus on explaining the causal connection between

freshwater scarcity and cooperation. It will also be explored how a conflict-prone

freshwater scarcity can be managed to become cooperation-prone, thus answering

research question three.

The possibility of freshwater scarcity generating conflict has received far more attention

by scholars than the possibility of it generating cooperation, even though it seems to be

at least equally realistic that a group should try to alleviate scarcity by means of trade,

39 Ibid., 142.
40 Kelly and Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Gaza.”

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treaties or forming the necessary institutions.41 In fact, at least one type of potential

water conflict (interstate war) seems to default to cooperation instead of violence.42

Cooperation allows societies and their individuals to generate ideas to solve freshwater

scarcity and implementing them by turning them into social institutions. Cooperation is

thus a prerequisite and part of what Homer-Dixon describes as “Ingenuity”. 43 In many

cases, if enough cooperation allows for enough ingenuity to be “produced”, societies

can manage scarcities so well that they emerge from them stronger than they were

before.44 Ingenuity can mitigate conflict at three points45:

1. First-stage interventions: Ingenuity can influence the social context of

freshwater scarcity directly. Technical innovations can reduce dependence and

the introduction of new social institutions can change the relationship between

societal groups. This may keep freshwater scarcity from emerging in the first

place.

2. Second-stage interventions: Even when negative social effects ensue due to

scarcity, ingenuity can help address these effects. Migration can be mitigated or

constructively directed, social segmentation can be averted and economic

decline countered.

3. Third-stage interventions: If negative social effects could not be mitigated, an

adequate supply of ingenuity can still keep them from causing violent conflict. If

a critical mass of the society cooperates, or they can rely on a strong cooperation

41 Diehl and Gleditsch, “Controversies and Questions,” 4.

42 Since 1948, more than 290 international water agreements have been signed; OECD, Water and
Violent Conflict, 6.
43 "Ideas applied to solve practical technical and social problems"; Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity,
and Violence, 108.
44 Ibid., 26, 85.
45 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 134; Ruckstuhl, Renewable Natural Resources:
Practical Lessons for Conflict-Sensitive Development, 20.

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with outside actors, security can be enforced and the necessary institutions to

control the social effects can be build up.

In fact, all societies pass through the process of developing freshwater scarcities and

mitigating them through cooperation at all times. In most societies, first-stage

interventions are sufficient to alleviate scarcity. But also societies normally not

associated with scarcity induced conflict may be forced to employ second-stage or even

third-stage interventions at times of disruptive events.46 Those societies actually profit

from a constant need to adapt to a low threat of scarcity, as it forces them to reinvent

institutions and norms, which reinforces peace.47

Only societies plagued by both high levels of physical freshwater scarcity and the

failure of those institutions necessary to produce an adequate supply of cooperation /

ingenuity succumb to violent conflict as a result.48 Next to effective market institutions,

which give incentives to share and distribute freshwater access, the most important

institutions with regard to mediating freshwater scarcity seem to be those responsible

for governing and administering water access.49 As Gizelis and Wooden point out:

“Effective governance can address problems of water supply, for example

improving storage, preservation and water Quality. Governance can also
help ensure a fair and equitable distribution of water resource, as well as
limiting total demand through efforts to promote better conservation and
more efficient use.”50

While autocratic regimes can show the institutional capacity needed to guarantee an

effective governance of freshwater resources51, recent studies show a clear correlation

46 For example the droughts of the 1930s forced the US to introduce migration-mitigating measures;
Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” 668.
47 Ruckstuhl, Renewable Natural Resources: Practical Lessons for Conflict-Sensitive Development, 10.
48 Schwartz, Deligiannis, and Homer-Dixon, “Commentary: Debating Environment, Population, and
Conflict,” 80.
49 OECD, Water and Violent Conflict, 4.
50 Gizelis and Wooden, “Water Resources, Institutions, & Intrastate Conflict,” 444.
51 Ibid., 446.

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between democratic state institutions and the ability to peacefully manage freshwater

scarcity.52 Also, managing freshwater scarcity and its effects produces higher

cooperation and ingenuity “costs” the higher the stage of intervention is. To sustainably

provide enough cooperation to avert conflict, a society must thus employ democratic

methods of water governance and try to intervene early. It is also advisable to focus on

societal factors influencing demand-induced and structural freshwater scarcities, as here

will be the greatest leverage.53

Conclusion
This essay has explored the connection between freshwater scarcity, violent conflict and

cooperation. It has started by lining out three research questions.

Answer to R1:

Discussing the concept of freshwater scarcity, it was shown that this state is produced in

many parts of the world through a physical decrease in water availability, an increase in

water demand and an increase in inequality to access freshwater resources.

Answer to R2:

To answer that question, a model by Homer-Dixon was extended with elements of

Kahls work. This extended model showed that a specific societal context can lead to

supply-induced, demand-induced and structural scarcities, which interact with each

other. The resulting freshwater scarcity can have a number of social effects which are in

turn influenced by the societal context. The interaction of the social effects with the

societal context and with each other can produce different forms of violent conflict

which in turn has social effects and influence the societal context. Having explored this

52 Ibid., 451.
53 OECD, Water and Violent Conflict, 5.

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relationship, the essay turned to research question three.

Answer to R3:

The essay first established a connection between the process of cooperation and the

concept of ingenuity. It was then shown that adequate inputs of ingenuity are able to

mitigate freshwater scarcity and its effects on three levels. The failure of some societies

to provide enough cooperation / ingenuity was shown to be due to institutional failure,

especially the institutional capacity to effectively and equitable govern freshwater

resources. It was finally recommended to employ democratic institutions to increase

cooperation, to intervene early to keep scarcities from developing and to focus on the

demand and equality dimensions of scarcity for effective prevention of freshwater

scarcity induced conflicts.

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