WFI Schmitt K

Schmitt
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007

Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon -1-
Schmitt Table of Contents

Liberalism Bad Shell.........................................................................................................................................................3
Enemies Good Shell........................................................................................................................................................12
Link –Generic Links........................................................................................................................................................20
Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War........................................................................................................................22
Link – Civil Society.........................................................................................................................................................24
Link – Debate..................................................................................................................................................................25
Link – Democracy...........................................................................................................................................................28
Link – Education.............................................................................................................................................................31
Link – Hegemony............................................................................................................................................................32
Link – Humanity..............................................................................................................................................................33
Link – Humanitarianism..................................................................................................................................................34
Link - International Relations..........................................................................................................................................38
Link – Justice...................................................................................................................................................................40
Link – Liberalism............................................................................................................................................................41
Link – Modernity (Generic)............................................................................................................................................43
Link – Peace....................................................................................................................................................................44
Link – Rights to Africans................................................................................................................................................45
Link – Pluralism..............................................................................................................................................................46
Link – Rule of Law..........................................................................................................................................................47
Link – Technology..........................................................................................................................................................48
Link – War on Terror......................................................................................................................................................49
Link – We Demand.........................................................................................................................................................50
Impact – Civil War..........................................................................................................................................................51
Impact – Dictatorship......................................................................................................................................................52
Impact – Extinction.........................................................................................................................................................53
Impact – Governance Fails..............................................................................................................................................58
Impact – Internal Conflict...............................................................................................................................................60
Impact – Solvency Takeout.............................................................................................................................................62
Impact – War...................................................................................................................................................................63
Alternative – Agonism....................................................................................................................................................64
Alternative – Friends/Enemies........................................................................................................................................67
Alternative – Rejection....................................................................................................................................................70
Alternative – Sovereignty................................................................................................................................................71
Alternative Solvency – Compromise...............................................................................................................................73
Alternative Solvency – Extinction...................................................................................................................................74
Alternative Solvency – Economy....................................................................................................................................78
Alternative Solvency – Empowerment............................................................................................................................79
Alternative Solvency – Freedom.....................................................................................................................................81
Alternative Solvency – Individual Effort........................................................................................................................82
Alternative Solvency – Internal Conflict.........................................................................................................................83
Alternative Solvency – Protection...................................................................................................................................84
Alternative Solvency – Respect for the Other.................................................................................................................85
Alternative Solvency – State Collapse............................................................................................................................87
A2 Agamben....................................................................................................................................................................88
A2 Bad States..................................................................................................................................................................89
A2 Dictatorship Bad........................................................................................................................................................90
A2 Exceptions Bad..........................................................................................................................................................91
Schmitt
A2 Friends Bad................................................................................................................................................................92
A2 Impacts Improbable...................................................................................................................................................94
A2 Liberalism Good........................................................................................................................................................95
A2 Nazi............................................................................................................................................................................96
A2 No Obligation to State...............................................................................................................................................98
A2 Perm...........................................................................................................................................................................99
A2 State Deconstruction Good......................................................................................................................................100
A2 Schmitt  War.......................................................................................................................................................102
A2 Totalitarian...............................................................................................................................................................104
Aff – Destroys Debate...................................................................................................................................................105
Aff – Friendship Bad.....................................................................................................................................................106
Aff - Nazi Turn..............................................................................................................................................................107
Aff - Nihilism Turn.......................................................................................................................................................108
Aff – Perm.....................................................................................................................................................................109
Aff – Schmitt Dumb......................................................................................................................................................113
War Turn.......................................................................................................................................................................114
FYI: Difference between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship..............................................................................116
Schmitt
Liberalism Bad Shell

The neo-liberal agenda embodied by the United States erodes state
sovereignty through imposing international requirements on foreign
states – leads towards a single new world order
Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Louiza. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law
and Social Sciences. University of London]. September 11. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger
on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror.” http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/.
P. 15-16. BH
The second strand of cosmopolitanism is neo-liberal in its ideological location. As Peter Gowan notes, it 'run[s] parallel to the
discourse of globalisation and rhetorically complement[s] it.' 34 It is a cosmopolitanism that instantiates a rewriting of the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which were regarded as constitutive of the Westphalian order. Seen as
conditional, they 'can be withdrawn should any states fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the
requirements of liberal governance. ,35 In the words of William Rasch, state sovereignty becomes restricted by 'the simple but
uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself'. 36 This neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, which Gowan associates with US and its allies
and their academic apologists, often betrays an 'arbitrary attitude towards enforcing of universalist liberal norms of individual
rights' despite its resting on the argument of a humanity that is 'finally on the verge of being unified in a single, just world order,.7
This arbitrariness often results in the imposition of incoherent domestic and international requirements on states in the form of
legal domestic arrangements that promote individualism and liberal (i.e. good) governance, but also frequently in the form of
social population control and consumerisation. Chantal Mouffe suggests that such policies might lead
to an increasing detachment of citizens from their demos as a result of the imposition of externally acceptable arrangements.
This would leave liberal cosmopolitans in the precarious position of losing
their democratic rights of lawmaking. They would be left, at best, with their liberal right of appealing to transnational courts to
defend their individual rights when those have been violated. In all probability, such a cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to
be realised, would not be more than an empty name disguising the actual disappearance of democratic forms of government
and indicating the triumph of the liberal form of govemmental rationality that Foucault called "governmentality"38
Schmitt
The West is reintroducing colonialism into the international sphere which

is reinstating liberal globalism – this internalizes conflict and identifies
those who are seen as the enemies of humanity
Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of
Aarhus Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.
http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. 320-321. BH
Schmitt
The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose,

and when this happens total extermination is possible
P. 19-21. BH
Thirdly, 'humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept
of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it. ,56
Outside of this historical location, where does it fmd concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an
abstract politics of neutrality, usually in the name of an international community which acts, we are assured, in the interest of
humanity. James Brown Scott, a jurist and prominent political fIgure in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century, wrote in the interwar years of
the right of this international community to impose its neutral will:
The "international community," Scott writes, "is coextensive with humanity-no longer merely with Christianity;" it has become "the representative of the common
humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States." Therefore, the international community "possesses the inherent right to impose its will. . and to
punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need" (283). If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian
Church that determined the content of this international need, in the twentieth centmy and beyond it must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that
performs this all¬important service. 57
Finally, and most importantly, there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other, and to war and violence. In its
historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives, but its utilisation by liberal
discourses in the individualist tradition, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. Rasch
explains:
The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract
normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace
all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars?
58
'Humanity as such' Schmitt noted 'cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet'. 59 As Ellen Kennedy
notes, humanity 'is a polemical word that negates hs opposite. ,60 In T71e Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity
'excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being,.6! In the Nomos, however, it
becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of Justus hostis, of a 'just
enemy', who is recognised as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. Schmitt noted how only when
'man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new
enemy: the inhuman' (NE 104). It is worth quoting Rasch's account at length:
We can understand Schmitt's concems in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become
believers, they must be of the same category of being. To be human, then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is
made. That is, humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the
horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the
distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to
horizon and positive pole alike-can only, in other words, be inhuman62
Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non¬discriminatory war, the enemy had no value and could
be exterminated. The concept of humanity, furthermore, reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal
concept of Justus hostis, now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. In Schmitt's accomlt of the League of
Nations in the Nomos, he
highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the
interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated; they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in
comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186).
Enemies of humanity cannot be considered 'just and equal' enemies. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or
against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the jus
publicum Europeaum. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror, this denial of the self-defence and resistance 'can presage a
dreadfhl nihilistic destruction of all law'
(NE 187).
When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality, the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt
detailed through his study of the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in rescinding the concept of
neutrality only succeeded in the 'dissolution of "peace'" (NE 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation
and destruction become possible, where the other cannot be assimilated, or accommodated, let alone tolerated: the
friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil, human and inhuman,
where 'the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. ,63 With this in mind, 1 turn in
the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of
humanity and cosmopolitanism
Schmitt
A strong state is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the regulated

wars that arise with concretely identifiable enemies are preferable to total
extermination
P. 7-9 BH
According to Schmitt there are four major achievements that can be attributed to this order. The first concerns that ability of the
order to bracket and regulate war: the lines or distinctions drawn between European soil mId 'free space' available for
appropriation (the so-called 'amity lines') facilitated the conduct of limited war on Europeml soil. The amity lines set aside two
distinct areas considered 'open spaces' (NE 94-95). On the one hand, the landmass of the New World, whose belonging to the
native populations was not recognised, and on the other, the newly mapped and navigable seas. In both types of space, force
could be used freely and ruthlessely as these were areas 'designated for agonal tests of strength' amongst Europeml powers
(NE 99).
The interstate order which existed in Europe until 1914 had sought, through its international law, 'to prevent wars of anniliilation,
i.e. to the extent that war was inevitable, to bracket it' (NE 246). It did not, on the contrary, seek to end war as such, to abolish or
banish it from its international relations since it implicitly recognised that 'any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted
only in new, perhaps even worse types of war, such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246).
It, rather, sought to find ways in which to gauge the
opponent's strength, usually by striving for appropriation of lands in the new world or by fighting linlited wars on European soil,
and by recognising the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds - as a justus hostis. This is the given foundation for a
bracketing of war' (NE 187): '[t]he essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed
space. Such wars are the opposite of disorder' (NE 187).
This brings us to the second achievement of this order, which was the development of the notion of justus hostis. The concept of
an 'equal and just enemy' evolved alongside the consolidation ofthe modem state. With the predominance of this type of political
entity and the weakening of the moral authority of the Church, war became divorced from substantive causes of justice. Since
war was the means by which land could change ownership stahls, 'war came to be judged in terms of its outcome' and became
a foml of military relation amongst states (NE 100). Any enemy that had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be
waged against it. This avoided wars of conviction, creed and religion (i.e. based on substantive issues of justice - justa causa)
which had historically led to wars of annihiliation and destruction. For Schmitt, whose belief was that war was an inevitable part
of political life, this regulation of war without substantive cause meant a 'rationalization, humanization and legalization' of war;
regarding an enemy as both just and as an equal partner meant that peace could be made with that enemy - his ultimate
destruction was not sought, but conflict with him was possible and regulated. The notion of the just enemy also meant that such
a system of war allowed for both resistance and self-defence.
And this is the third achievement of this order: given that the enemy was apriori just, its right to self-defense and to resistance
was recognised, precisely because the issue of just cause was eliminated. No state could claim to have the issue of
'righteousness' on its side. Therefore, wars did not need to eliminate that enemy given the recognition of the right to defend
oneself or to resist submission. Finally, the jus publicum Europeaum allowed for the construction and maintenance of a balance
(NE 161). This relates to the avoidance of wars of destruction, because if balance was the political and military objective, then
wars can be limited to achieving it, unlike wars of substance which required the submission of the opponent or their re-
socialisation. All of these achievements together enabled the emergence of limited and regulated wars
that sought balance and the avoidance of preponderance, rather than the extermination of the enemy.
Schmitt
Liberalism lacks any political foundation – a lack of political theology

dooms it to leadership failure – turns case
http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. 63. BH
Schmitt
The kritik must come first, only through the sovereign state is the political
will is further expressed. The sovereign is one who is given “the
monopoly to decide,” in matters of the exception and to exercise these
powers. The sovereign must come first before any political decisions can
be made
Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander, Rockefeller College Review, Volume1., Issue 2, Carl Schmitt on
Friends and Political Will, Spring). AN.
(Continuted on Next
Page)
Schmitt
Schmitt
Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon - 10 -
War is inevitable, but we must approach it from a political framework,

because if we introduce moral, aesthetic or economic categories into
warfighting considerations we will have a war to end all war that
culminates in total extermination of enemies and ourselves – this political
framework must rely on categories of friends and enemies so we can
approach war with a solidarity that binds the warring factions, with an
emphasis on strengthening sovereignty
Norris 1998 [Andrew, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University, received his
Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends, enemies and the
political.” Telos; Summer98 Issue 112, p68. BH
This helps to understand the significance of Schmitt's almost cryptic note on Hegel in The Concept of the Political. "Hegel
remains everywhere political in the decisive sense." He "also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois. The
bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere." Finally: "Hegel has... advanced a
definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers. The enemy is negated otherness."(n41) The
first two of these claims become clear in light of an explication of the third. Hegel argues that war is a fundamental possibility of
political life, one that is actually beneficial. It is a fundamental possibility, because the state is, vis-a-vis other states, an
individual, "and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this
group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy."(n42) It is a beneficial one because, by providing the
necessary context for martial courage, war allows the individual to transcend the limited perspective of his place in society: "the
important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal."(n43) As Hegel acknowledges, even "robbers
and murderers bent on crime" sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their lives. Such bravery has a merely negative worth
because "it is the negation of externalities, and their alienation, the culmination of courage, is not intrinsically of a spiritual
character."(n44) That is to say, courage even in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or "alienates" the
inessential baggage of life (e.g... the obsession with property). This worth, however, is only negative because it is found in
removing or negating the inessential, without affirming something of real spiritual worth. Quite different is patriotically motivated
self-sacrifice: "The intrinsic [or positive] worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the
sovereignty of the state."(n45)
The affinities between this position and Schmitt's are obvious.(n46) But where Hegel's commitment to the view that reason must
be actual leads him to celebrate the actual virtuous conduct of war, Schmitt never praises war as such and remains silent on the
value of courage. For Hegel, the modern state is the highest form of ethical life, and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life.
Thus war "is not to be regarded as an absolute evil," as it itself contains an "ethical moment": courage.(n47) For Schmitt, war is
essentially a political matter; as such, it is as little ethical as it is evil. "If there really are enemies in the existential sense meant
here, then it is justified, but only politically, to repel them and, fight them physically. ...Justice does not belong to the concept of
war."(n48) No doubt, the conduct of war is often also sublime, economically wasteful and immoral. But Schmitt cautions against
concluding from this that moral, aesthetic, or economic categories should trump political ones. In particular, the attempt to end
war because of its immorality may backfire horribly by producing a war to end all wars. Schmitt argues that this could well
produce a form of warfare that is "unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework,
it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only
be defeated but also utterly destroyed."(n49) As a political theorist, Schmitt neither celebrates nor bemoans war. Instead, he
recognizes that it appears inevitable, and he argues that it is a distinctively political possibility, in that it can be the expression of
the solidarity that binds together the various warring factions. No doubt, he would also recognize that war is not always the
function of such political systems some wars are little more than private squabbles between princes, dictators and business
interests, whose servants remain as alienated and isolated in conflict as they were in peace.
If this interpretation is correct, it is not merely because people are "evil" in the sense of dangerous that the political is their
destiny. It is not the threatening presence of the enemy alone that leads into the political; the enemy must threaten relations and
forms of life that are sufficiently cherished by those who partake of them. It is such commitments and such solidarity that are the
destiny of human beings.(n50) This seems to be what Schmitt has in mind when he writes: "In the concrete reality of the political,
no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings rule over other human groupings and associations."(n51)
     
Schmitt
To describe these "real human groupings" or "ways of life" as relations of friendship may be misleading. As one of the
criteria of the political, "friend," like "enemy," has a formal, almost technical meaning. Just as Schmitt argues that the public
enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy, whom one hates, so is his public friend distinct from the private friend,
whom one loves. This, however, does not mean that Schmitt's political friendship is the same phenomenon described by
Aristotle in books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle's philia emphasizes objective qualities of character and
lacks the connotations of intimacy carried by "friendship." In contrast, Schmitt's political friendship implies as little about the
character of the "friend" as it does about one's feelings for him. Indeed, in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular
concepts of friendship, it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another.
What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life. As Schmitt makes clear, that form of life might be
defined in any number of ways: "All concepts, including the concept of mind, are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms
of concrete political existence. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and finds the constitutive characteristics of
nationality within itself, so every culture and every cultural epoch has its own concept of culture. All essential concepts are not
normative but existential."(n52)
Schmitt
Enemies Good Shell
The politics created by the affirmative is a deviation form the preparation

from war which dangerously threatens state power – we must prepare for
our moment of clarity where battle is immanent
Schmitt
Case Take Out: Political action can only be achieved through

distinguishing friends from enemies
Schmitt
Identifying enemies is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the

regulated wars that arise with concretely identifiable enemies are
preferable to total extermination
P. 7-9 BH
According to Schmitt there are four major achievements that can be attributed to this order. The first concerns that ability of the
order to bracket and regulate war: the lines or distinctions drawn between European soil mId 'free space' available for
appropriation (the so-called 'amity lines') facilitated the conduct of limited war on Europeml soil. The amity lines set aside two
distinct areas considered 'open spaces' (NE 94-95). On the one hand, the landmass of the New World, whose belonging to the
native populations was not recognised, and on the other, the newly mapped and navigable seas. In both types of space, force
could be used freely and ruthlessely as these were areas 'designated for agonal tests of strength' amongst Europeml powers
(NE 99).
The interstate order which existed in Europe until 1914 had sought, through its international law, 'to prevent wars of anniliilation,
i.e. to the extent that war was inevitable, to bracket it' (NE 246). It did not, on the contrary, seek to end war as such, to abolish or
banish it from its international relations since it implicitly recognised that 'any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted
only in new, perhaps even worse types of war, such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246).
It, rather, sought to find ways in which to gauge the
opponent's strength, usually by striving for appropriation of lands in the new world or by fighting linlited wars on European soil,
and by recognising the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds - as a justus hostis. This is the given foundation for a
bracketing of war' (NE 187): '[t]he essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed
space. Such wars are the opposite of disorder' (NE 187).
This brings us to the second achievement of this order, which was the development of the notion of justus hostis. The concept of
an 'equal and just enemy' evolved alongside the consolidation ofthe modem state. With the predominance of this type of political
entity and the weakening of the moral authority of the Church, war became divorced from substantive causes of justice. Since
war was the means by which land could change ownership stahls, 'war came to be judged in terms of its outcome' and became
a foml of military relation amongst states (NE 100). Any enemy that had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be
waged against it. This avoided wars of conviction, creed and religion (i.e. based on substantive issues of justice - justa causa)
which had historically led to wars of annihiliation and destruction. For Schmitt, whose belief was that war was an inevitable part
of political life, this regulation of war without substantive cause meant a 'rationalization, humanization and legalization' of war;
regarding an enemy as both just and as an equal partner meant that peace could be made with that enemy - his ultimate
destruction was not sought, but conflict with him was possible and regulated. The notion of the just enemy also meant that such
a system of war allowed for both resistance and self-defence.
And this is the third achievement of this order: given that the enemy was apriori just, its right to self-defense and to resistance
was recognised, precisely because the issue of just cause was eliminated. No state could claim to have the issue of
'righteousness' on its side. Therefore, wars did not need to eliminate that enemy given the recognition of the right to defend
oneself or to resist submission. Finally, the jus publicum Europeaum allowed for the construction and maintenance of a balance
(NE 161). This relates to the avoidance of wars of destruction, because if balance was the political and military objective, then
wars can be limited to achieving it, unlike wars of substance which required the submission of the opponent or their re-
socialisation. All of these achievements together enabled the emergence of limited and regulated wars
that sought balance and the avoidance of preponderance, rather than the extermination of the enemy.
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency: Agonism crushes the drive towards destruction and

instead replaces it with the production of excellence. Only agonism can
solve liberalism's drive for destruction.
Hateb, 2002 (Lawrence J., Ph.D. from Fordham University, "Prospects for a Democratic
Argon; why we can still be Nietzcheans")
Appel gives particular attention to a Nietzschean sense of agonistics that has been taken up by postmodern thinkers as
applicable to democracy. He grants that an agonistic element can be very valuable for life and for democratic politics (NCD,
p.162ff.), but he correctly notices a problem rarely faced in postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche: an agon, for Nietzsche, is a
selective activity restricted to an elite and not extended to the public as a whole (NCD, p.140), which surely clashes with
democratic provisions.
We can begin to address the complex question of agonistics by attending to an early text of Nietzsche's that is often cited in
scholarly discussions, Homer's Contest (KSA 1, pp.783-92). In this text, Nietzsche maintains that civilization is not something
separate from nature but a modulation of more vicious natural drives into less destructive forms. In the light of Hesiod's
distinction between a good and bad Eris, Nietzsche distinguishes between a brutal drive to annihilate and a modified drive to
defeat in a competition, what the Greeks called an agon. The proliferation of contests in ancient Greece represented both a
sublimation of cruel instincts and a setting for the production of excellence, since talent unfolds in a struggle with a competitor
(KSA 1, p.787). Nietzsche praises the Greeks for not succumbing to an Orphic life-denial or an ideal of harmony in the face of
life's conflicts. Moreover, their sublimation of violence into cultural contests prevented the Greeks from regressing into "the abyss
of a horrible savagery of hatred and lust for destruction" (KSA 1, p.791). And an agonistic spirit insured a proliferation of
excellence by undermining the stagnation that stems from unchecked control and the "domination by one" (KSA 1, p.789). 8
Schmitt
Alternative: The alternative is to reject the affirmative by embracing a

politics of enmity. This enables a more robust conception of tolerance and
political rights informed by resistance. A true democracy must
paradoxically embrace anti-democratic outcomes. Any other mode of
democracy only paces the way for tyranny
Hateb, 2002 (Lawrence J., Ph.D. from Fordham University, "Prospects for a Democratic
Argon; why we can still be Nietzcheans")
If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others, an agonistic model of politics
can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something like "equal regard." I have
already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. Since the self is formed in and through
tensional relations with others, then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then,
discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of
the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom.
Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I
need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent.
As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the
presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to
succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a
host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able
participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a
dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal
dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work.
Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid
sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to
simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public
discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement,
and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this
way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness
to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is
a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing,
refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with
opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression,
pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern
model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. 26
An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something
"natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain
viable political practice. Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can
avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing
reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. We can even defend
so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse.
Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for
some provision that might be denied by others. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus, as a partial
recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others—which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112).
And, as is well known, the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights, and political life must engage in the
ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions, a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities
inviolably possessed by an originating self.
    
Schmitt
Beyond political rights, a broader conception of rights, often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice, can
also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational, negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the
self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits, rather than some metaphysical essence, stable substance, or eternal
entity. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. So much
of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to "natures" having to do with
race, gender, class, role, character, and so on. [End Page 143] Nonfoundational challenges to "identity" may seem unsettling,
but if we consider how identities figure in injustices, a good deal of work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in
resistance. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some
other conditions. But a look at human history and experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out
of the irrepressible tendency of human beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they
"are." It may be sufficient to defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say No.
Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. Although he does little to develop
how and why this may be so, the charge raises important questions facing postmodern, and particularly Nietzschean,
approaches to democratic politics. In my work I have tried to face this question, admit the difficulty, and suggest a "tragic" model
of democratic openness, to borrow from Nietzsche's interest in tragedy. 27 Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be
grounded in secure principles, which themselves are incontestable, so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their
day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. A radically agonistic, open conception of democracy that simply
invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist, with no justification beyond its contingent enactment.
But from a historical perspective, despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters, democratic foundings have in fact emerged
out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. 28 And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our
system, it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy, even anti-democratic
outcomes (not likely, but surely possible). The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own hands. Foundationalists would
call such an outcome contradictory, but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic
practice.
Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as, for Nietzsche, the tragic
allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence, thus enhancing life, a tragic politics could wean
us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. And even if
one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles, would the force of such principles by themselves
necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not, the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted
to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. The nonexistence of
foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. What is to be said of
someone who, in the absence of a guarantee, would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less
than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of will to power,
agonistics, and eternal recurrence, in my view, can be put in the following way. For Nietzsche, to act in the world is always to act
in the midst of otherness, of resistances or obstacles. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. To affirm
one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal
recurrence), but also to affirm action as action, that is to say, a real move in life amidst real resistances, as opposed to the
fantasy of self-sufficient, fully free, uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of divine perfection and continued in
various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. The irony of a tragically open, agonistic
politics is that it need not "infect" political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. And as
radically open, an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice, something especially important when
even purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to
being impartial enough, rational enough, secular enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so on),
thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name.
Schmitt
War is inevitable, but we must approach it from a political framework,

because if we introduce moral, aesthetic or economic categories into
warfighting considerations we will have a war to end all war that
culminates in total extermination of enemies and ourselves – this political
framework must rely on categories of friends and enemies so we can
approach war with a solidarity that binds the warring factions
This helps to understand the significance of Schmitt's almost cryptic note on Hegel in The Concept of the Political. "Hegel
remains everywhere political in the decisive sense." He "also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois. The
bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere." Finally: "Hegel has... advanced a
definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers. The enemy is negated otherness."(n41) The
first two of these claims become clear in light of an explication of the third. Hegel argues that war is a fundamental possibility of
political life, one that is actually beneficial. It is a fundamental possibility, because the state is, vis-a-vis other states, an
individual, "and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this
group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy."(n42) It is a beneficial one because, by providing the
necessary context for martial courage, war allows the individual to transcend the limited perspective of his place in society: "the
important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal."(n43) As Hegel acknowledges, even "robbers
and murderers bent on crime" sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their lives. Such bravery has a merely negative worth
because "it is the negation of externalities, and their alienation, the culmination of courage, is not intrinsically of a spiritual
character."(n44) That is to say, courage even in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or "alienates" the
inessential baggage of life (e.g... the obsession with property). This worth, however, is only negative because it is found in
removing or negating the inessential, without affirming something of real spiritual worth. Quite different is patriotically motivated
self-sacrifice: "The intrinsic [or positive] worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the
sovereignty of the state."(n45)
The affinities between this position and Schmitt's are obvious.(n46) But where Hegel's commitment to the view that reason must
be actual leads him to celebrate the actual virtuous conduct of war, Schmitt never praises war as such and remains silent on the
value of courage. For Hegel, the modern state is the highest form of ethical life, and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life.
Thus war "is not to be regarded as an absolute evil," as it itself contains an "ethical moment": courage.(n47) For Schmitt, war is
essentially a political matter; as such, it is as little ethical as it is evil. "If there really are enemies in the existential sense meant
here, then it is justified, but only politically, to repel them and, fight them physically. ...Justice does not belong to the concept of
war."(n48) No doubt, the conduct of war is often also sublime, economically wasteful and immoral. But Schmitt cautions against
concluding from this that moral, aesthetic, or economic categories should trump political ones. In particular, the attempt to end
war because of its immorality may backfire horribly by producing a war to end all wars. Schmitt argues that this could well
produce a form of warfare that is "unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework,
it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only
be defeated but also utterly destroyed."(n49) As a political theorist, Schmitt neither celebrates nor bemoans war. Instead, he
recognizes that it appears inevitable, and he argues that it is a distinctively political possibility, in that it can be the expression of
the solidarity that binds together the various warring factions. No doubt, he would also recognize that war is not always the
function of such political systems some wars are little more than private squabbles between princes, dictators and business
interests, whose servants remain as alienated and isolated in conflict as they were in peace.
If this interpretation is correct, it is not merely because people are "evil" in the sense of dangerous that the political is their
destiny. It is not the threatening presence of the enemy alone that leads into the political; the enemy must threaten relations and
forms of life that are sufficiently cherished by those who partake of them. It is such commitments and such solidarity that are the
destiny of human beings.(n50) This seems to be what Schmitt has in mind when he writes: "In the concrete reality of the political,
no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings rule over other human groupings and associations."(n51)
     
Schmitt
To describe these "real human groupings" or "ways of life" as relations of friendship may be misleading. As one of the
criteria of the political, "friend," like "enemy," has a formal, almost technical meaning. Just as Schmitt argues that the public
enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy, whom one hates, so is his public friend distinct from the private friend,
whom one loves. This, however, does not mean that Schmitt's political friendship is the same phenomenon described by
Aristotle in books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle's philia emphasizes objective qualities of character and
lacks the connotations of intimacy carried by "friendship." In contrast, Schmitt's political friendship implies as little about the
character of the "friend" as it does about one's feelings for him. Indeed, in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular
concepts of friendship, it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another.
What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life. As Schmitt makes clear, that form of life might be
defined in any number of ways: "All concepts, including the concept of mind, are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms
of concrete political existence. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and finds the constitutive characteristics of
nationality within itself, so every culture and every cultural epoch has its own concept of culture. All essential concepts are not
normative but existential."(n52)
Schmitt
Link –Generic Links

The imminent danger embodied by the affirmative advantage scenarios is
an act of the state alienating the indvidual – it is a sign of the retreat of the
state
Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus
Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.
Schmitt
The affirmative plan is a representation of civil society that is the site of

the dissolution of state power because of its implicit liberalism
Cristi 1998. [Renato, Professor in department of Philosophy, Wilfred Laurier University] Carl
Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. 74-75. BH
The plea for a strong state was the one theme that stood out inSchmitt's early Weimar production. The theme linked this
earlyproduction with his work later in Weimar and the Nazi period,and marked the conceptual ground that confirmed the
continuityof his theoretical and practical interests. If the state was to main-tain its strength and survive, one ought to affirm its
sovereignty,authority and unity. The state could not yield to the factitioustemperament of civil society. This was the site of
pluralism andthe dissolution of state unity.20 In R6mische Katholizismus andPolitische Form (Roman Catholicism and Political
Form),published in 1923, three facets articulated Schmitt's plea for astrong state. First, Schmitt attributed the modern state's
difficulty
and ideas espoused by contemporary liberalism, and also assumedby democrats and socialists, which he designated as 'the
economicpoint of view'. In essence, the economic point of view sought tominimize the role of the state and dissolve its
separation from civilsociety. By eliminating the state's autonomy and diluting itsauthority, civil society was given a free rein
spontaneously to putits own affairs in order. Second, in opposition to the economicpoint of view Schmitt affirmed the viewpoint of
the political. Theaffirmation of the political secured the ultimate foundation onwhich rests the state's claim to authority. Third,
Schmitt observedthat the Catholic Church had preserved intact an awareness of thepolitical and had kept faith in the true
meaning of authority. Onlythe Church was in the position and had the will to affirm thepolitical and frustrate the prevalence of
pure economic thought.The Church did so by endorsing a form of rationalism opposed tothe rationality of economics and
technology. The Church was notthe seat of irrationalism but it embodied a form of rationality,akin to juridical thinking, that was
foreign to the culture thatissued from the Enlightenment.
The state’s current method of politicization (esp economics) contributes o

the state’s dissolution through internally warring political factions
In the mean time, another misguided view, representing a totally opposed standpoint, had become equally pervasive.
Schmitt described this view by means of a tantalizing formula, the 'total state'. That notion represented a centralized
state that had expanded in every direction and politicized every domain of human existence . There was no sphere
that could remain free from its interventions, so that 'not even a bowling club [could] continue to exist without
maintaining a good relation with the state' (App. p. 218). Politicization was most visible in the sphere of economics.
'After years of attempting to reduce the state to economics, it now [appeared] that economics [had] become entirely
politicized' (App.: p. 216). According to Schmitt, the bearers of the total state were the total parties.
If we take a closer look, we see that we do not have a total state but a plurality of total parties. Each party realizes in
itself the totality, totally absorbing their members , guiding individuals from the cradle to the grave, from kindergarten to
burial and cremation, situating itself totally in the most diverse social groups and passing on to its membership the
correct views, the correct ideology, the correct form of state, the correct economic s ystem, and the correct sociability
on account of the party. (App.: p. 219)
Schmitt
Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War
Interference by the state into modern society weakens the apparatus as a

whole – historically proven to be true
The first time Schmitt mentioned the notion of total state during the Weimar period was in his Der Hiiter der Verfassung (The
Protector of the Constitution), whose preface was dated March 1931. He used that notion to highlight what he considered to bethe latest phase in the 'dialectical
development' of the modernstate. This development had its point of departure in the 'absolutestate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', and then, medi-
ated by the 'neutral state of the nineteenth century', it reached itsfinal destination with the twentieth-century 'total state whichidentifies state and society' (1931:
79). As his argumentproceeded, it became clear that the identity that characterized thetotal state meant a weakening, and not a strengthening of stateauthority.
In this respect, the total state was diametricallyopposed to its earlier configurations. It demanded the interpenetration of state and civil society, and
thus denied the completeindependence and autonomy on which rested the authority ofboth the absolute and the neutral states. '
in his Legalitit undLegitimit,4t (1932a), the notion of total state was again mentionedand explicitly contrasted with that of the authoritarian state. Inthis case,
Schmitt acknowledged the work of Heinz Otto Ziegler.The notion of authoritarian state in contrast to the total statewas the theme of Ziegler's book entitled
precisely Autoritdreroder totaler Staat (1932). The next time Schmitt made publicreference to this notion was in his keynote address entitled'Strong State and
Sound Economy', presented at a meeting of the Langnamverein.2 This time he reversed his position and extendec*the use of the term 'total state' to include the
authoritarian statehe sponsored. This was to be understood as a qualitative totalstate, as opposed to the purely quantitative total state which heequated with
twentieth-century democracy.
On each one of these occasions, Schmitt brought up the topicin the context of a broader discussion, namely the development ofGermany's constitutional design
after the revolution of 1918-19,and more pointedly after the inauguration of a presidentialgovernment on 28 March 1930. On that day,
ReichsprisidentHindenburg appointed Heinrich Briining as Chancellor withoutprior consultation with the political parties. The new governmentcould function as a
non-parliamentary regime that rested onHindenburg's own authority. The legal basis for his decision wasarticle 48 of the Weimar constitution. This event marked
thecollapse of what Schmitt called the 'legislative state' in Germanyand the beginning of a presidential regime that departed from theparliamentary system as it
had come to be known and practisedin the Weimar republic.
In a 1929 article entitled 'Der Hiiter der Verfassung' (1929b),
which he expanded in 1931 into the book of that same title(19 31),3 Schmitt sought to justify Hindenburg's presidentialregime not merely as a legal configuration
sanctioned by theconstitution but also as the republic's only politically viableoption. Up to that point, much of Schmitt's work as a jurist hadbeen devoted to
demonstrating the need for an enhanced politicalrole for the Reichsprisident. A consistent use and application ofarticle 48 of the constitution was the procedure
he suggested.This, he thought, would break the hegemony of a parliamentary system gone astray and restore the fine balance between legisla-tive and
executive functions procured by the parliamentarytradition before 'it was corrupted by the advancement of demo-cracy. The entrenchment of a presidial system
could becharacterized as more than a provisional step aimed at solving theconj'unctural difficulties of Weimar parliamentarism. What was atissue here
compromised the very existence of the modern state.Like a dying star, the state had experienced a voluminous expan-sion in
size, matched by a commensurate loss of prestige, powerand authority.4 By overstepping its limits and becoming involvedin
what were the exclusive concerns of civil society, the state hadlost its autonomy and independence and advanced with acceler-
ated pace towards its own extinction. Hindenburg's presidialregime intended to save the state by reinforcing its executive func-
tions at the expense of the legislative power. According toSchmitt, this action could only be interpreted as the restoration ofa
balance disrupted by the influx of democratic party politiCS.5The total state was Schmitt's description of this predicament,which
resulted in the modern state's slanted evolution. Schmittcharted the course of this evolution and for that purpose hedistinguished
four distinct state configurations: the Judicial, exec-utive, legislative and administrative forms of the state. These werefunctional
descriptions which corresponded to four historical embodiments- the feudal state, the seventeenth- and eighteenth century
absolutist state, the nineteenth-century parliamentarvstate and the twentieth-century democratic state which he alsocalled the
'administrative' or 'total' state.
The aim Schmitt had in mind in drawing this manifold distinction was a description of the political regime that had evolved under
the aegis of the Weimar constitution.
With the distinction between the legislative state, the judicial state.the executive state and the administrative state, the theory of
thestate and the constitution acquires the specific indicators that help better and more clearly to understand the concrete
peculiarity o-the legal system and its present situation. (Schmitt, 1932a:'19)
These configurations did not constitute four specific instantia-tions of a common generic nature. The administrative or tota.state
was not properly a state but served as the portrayal of 'itsdissolution. What was common to the first three configurationswas the
dualist structure constituted by the separation of the statefrom civil society. The dissolution of the state occurred, according to
Schmitt, when the dualism maintained by the separatior.between civil society and the state dissipated.
Schmitt
Any deviation of the state from a protective function is bad – the

affirmation of positive outcomes weakens the state and fails to respect the
autonomy of civil society
Hayek defended the view that democracy and liberalism wereunrelated answers to completely unrelated questions. This
sameview was espoused by Schmitt and used by him as a way ofaccommodating political options akin to decisionism within
theliberal discourse. The strong state advocated by Schmitt in the1930s was supposed to respect the autonomy of civil
society.Hayek appeared to be saying the same thing when he wrote:
Liberalism and democracy, although compatible, are not the same.The difference is best seen if we consider their opposites:
theopposite of liberalism is totalitarianism, while the opposite ofdemocracy is authoritarianism. In consequence, it is at least
possi-ble in principle that a democratic government may be totalitarianand that an authoritarian government may act on liberal
princi-ples. (1967: 161; compare with Hayek, 1960: 103)ls
That a liberal polity, one limited by abstract general rules, couldbe open to authoritarian rule did not appear contradictory
toHayek. Like Schmitt, he too distinguished sharply between civilsociety and the state. Like Schmitt, again, he
distinguishedbetween authoritarianism and totalitarianism in strict adherenceto the views expressed by Heinz Otto Ziegler in his
Autoritarer und Totalitarer Staat, a work heavily influenced by Schmitt. Theautonomy and independence reserved to the state
grounded itsauthoritarian potential. Again like Schmitt, Hayek opposedcentral planning and any form of state intervention in
economicmatters. The role of the state ought to be negative, never affirma-tive of any positive outcomes or ideal patterns of
production or distribution. It ought to be limited to a merely protective func-tion. Hayek's idea of a spontaneous order
presupposed civilsociety's capacity for self-regulation and autonomous administra-tion. This should confirm the complete
dethronement of politicswithin that sphere (compare with Hayek, 1976: 102-3; 1979:149-50). Still, the negative tasks ascribed to
the state were to bedetermined and sustained by the action of the state itself. It wasthus positively and actively that the state
ought to restrict andlimit its action to a merely negative one, so that the depoliticiza-tion of civil society could turn dialectically into
the state's activepreservation of its monopoly over the political as such. Wheneverthe normal working of civil society became in
any way imperilled,so that its spontaneous order was converted into an organization,the knowledge of such a situation and the
decision to alter thespontaneous order of civil society lay beyond its powers in so faras they were recognized as being of a
political nature. Hayekadmitted that the power to declare a state of emergency belongedto the state. And it did not escape his
attention that there wassome plausibility in Schmitt's contention that 'whoever has thepower to proclaim an emergency and on
this ground suspend anypart of the constitution is the true sovereign' (Hayek, 1979: 125).It appears as if Hayek was unable to
exorcise the notion of sover-eignty. Hayek offered a series of precautionary measures aimed atavoiding a relapse into an
unbalanced decisionist posture. I willnot discuss here whether these measures were effective or not. Iwill only say that
decisionist elements were potentially incorpor-ated into his system in so far as the separation between state andcivil society was
essential to it.
Hayek reiterated his support for a politically conservativeliberalism and expressed a preference for strong but
limitedgovernment. This concurred with the necessary limitation andrelativization of state power demanded by
individuals whoclaimed sovereignty and the spontaneous order that arose fromtheir free and sovereign activity. In
accordance with liberalism,Hayek first postulated unbounded individual freedom and therecognition of rights that were
prior to the state. Individualspossessed a domain of action over which they alone could claimabsolute sovereignty, and
which demanded limitations onconstructivist state interference. Second, while Hayek emphasizedthe typical liberal
limitations on the state, he did not object to the formation of a strong state. He thought that strong
authoritariangovernments could ensure the necessary depoliticization of civilsociety.16 His liberalism was thus politically
conservative for itpresupposed the possibility of postulating both a strong state anda liberal society. Possibly no one
better expressed this conceptualdichotomy than Benjamin Constant when he wrote: 'le gouverne-ment en dehors de sa
sph6re ne dolt avoir aucun pouvoir; dans sasph~re il ne sauralt en avoir trop' (compare with R6pke, 1948:28; Friedrich,
1955: 531). It should come as no surprise thatHegel, together with Hayek and Schmitt, expressed a close affin-ity with
Constant's political philosophy. And just as Schmitt wasan attentive reader of Hegel, so Hayek was an attentive reader
ofSchmitt.
Schmitt
Link – Civil Society

When Civil Society is increased, the State is diminished until it is just
another association among many, where it is further reduced to the
technology of the administration.
Rasch 2000 [William, Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory,
Culture, and Society. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.”
http://tcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. AN
Schmitt
Link – Debate
Open debate only serves to undermine the political and state authority
Schmitt himself demonstrates an easy confidence in his own ability to make the required distinctions: "To demand seriously of
human beings that they kill others and be prepared to die themselves so that trade and industry may flourish for the survivors or
that the purchasing power of the grandchildren may grow is sinister and crazy."(n59) Such a remark might well be made in a
debate over "Operation Desert Storm." Here the claim might be that Americans are committed to and united in a democratic
freedom that has only contingently been aligned with capitalism's interests, and that Middle-East oil is not one of this polity's vital
interests. Put this way, the reply is easy enough to imagine. On the face of it, such a debate about the nature of shared identity
and the focus of mutual commitment would not seem to be in conflict with Schmitt's strictures. Nonetheless, he does not permit
for political decisions to involve public debate and deliberation, even of the minimal sort his theory will allow. In his constitutional
theory, the populace is accorded the right to evaluate the performance of the state only in the form of acts of acclamation.
This limitation is a result of Schmitt's decisionism. Schmitt understands the political decision as an alternative to the law -- one
necessitated by the law's own limitations. The rationality that characterizes the normal situation is, in his eyes, that of a norm or
law governing that situation. In its absence, there is no indication, in Schmitt's texts of the 1920s, of any rational guidance
whatsoever.(n60) This is why Schmitt has no faith in public debate. If the only rational guidance that can be found is that of a
norm, and if that will not apply in the case of an exception, it is plain that open debate will serve no purpose but that of
undermining authority. Schmitt is quite frank about this: "The decision becomes instantly independent of argumentative
substantiation and receives an autonomous value."(n61) In the end "The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle
in theology."(n62)
The relevant point here is that this characterization of the irrationality or arationality of the political decision is not necessarily
connected with Schmitt's characterization of the nature of political community. Schmitt' s version of identity politics is largely
derived from his reading of Rousseau. As he emphasizes again and again, according to this model, democracy is not a matter of
popular participation, revocable consent, or liberal/ parliamentary institutions; instead, it is a question of the identity of the ruler
and the ruled.(n63) Such identity is not at all irreconcilable with a form of dictatorship that denies to the populace the right to
debate political issues.(n64) This much is clear in Rousseau's own infamous references to the possibility of forcing the citizenry
to be free when they misunderstand their own (general) will. But it does not necessitate dictatorship. As The Social Contract
again makes clear, a Rousseauian polity that rests on the homogeneity of the commitments of its members is compatible with a
variety of political structures and institutions.(n65)
Schmitt
Political decisions are left only to the state, when individuals make
political decisions it leads to social contracts that will break down the
system of sovereignty
   
Schmitt
Schmitt
Link – Democracy
Democracy is self defeating and it contributes to a weakened state

Schmitt's reform proposal assumed that contemporary parlmentarism was facing a crisis due to a betrayal of its originalideals.
The institution devised by classical liberals had beendefiled by the prevalence of democratic ideals. The segregationand
inflection of parliament's liberal essence was mandatory. Asa genuinely liberal institution, parliament ought to limit andcontrol
democracy's overwhelming leverage. By opening the doorto democracy, the Weimar constitution had introduced an ambiguity
which now eroded parliamentary practices and weakenedthe state. First, the Reichstag, like other contemporary parliaments,
had ceased to be a place of rational discussion. Accordingto Schmitt, individual deputies no longer complied with theliberal
requirements of the Weimar constitution as stipulated byarticle 21. They could not be said to be 'bound only to theirconscience'
and to be free from the instructions of the particularelectoral group they represented. Instead of being the 'representatives of the
whole people' and 'bound by no instructions',deputies were acting as popular agents and commissaries, inaccordance with well-
established democratic demands. Second,the Reichstag had ceased to be, if it ever was, open to publicinvestigation and
scrutiny. Article 29 of the constitution requiredthat its deliberations be public, but its discussions weresurrounded by secrecy and only the results yielded by
voting werepublicly announced. Furthermore, the parliamentary commissionhad become a place for secret party deals whose content thepublic ignored. The
arcana imperli of absolutist times were fullyrevived (compare with Schmitt, 1928: 318-19).
Schmitt's aim was to separate the parliamentary institutionfrom its democratic ties. Parliaments, if allowed to function in agenuinely
representative manner, should not have to yield todemocratic pressures. On the contrary, much like the CatholicChurch, parliamentarism could not be said to
constitute a specificpolitical form or a specific form of state (compare with Schmitt, .923a: 10). Indifference to the political as such allowed
parliamentarism to remain open to different political forms (comparewith Schmitt, 1928: 305). The historical development of parliamentarism
had successfully incorporated monarchical,aristocratic and democratic elements, without identifying itselfwith any of them. Precisely
because parliaments could not be saidto constitute specific political forms, they functioned as open
to constitutesystems that used and mixed diverse political forms. According toSchmitt, parliamentarism owed its current problems to the
ascendancy of democracy. By displacing the competing monarchicala-id aristocratic elements, democracy acquired a
disproportionateinfluence, disrupting the delicate balance presupposed by theparliamentary system. In his earlier works, Schmitt
thoroughlyidentified liberal parliamentarism and democratic legitimacy.Since 1848, democratic legitimacy had supplanted the monarch-:cal principle, which until
then had secured the unity of the state.The nineteenth-century liberal-democratic rapprochement wasinterpreted by Schmitt as an irreversible pluralist trend
whichinevitably led to the demise of the state. The identification ofliberalism and democracy precluded any possibility of securing arole for the state as guarantor
of political unity. It was thereforenatural that Schmitt would rely, in Die Diktatur and PolitischeTheologie, on a counter-revolutionary
dictatorship as the onlymeans to guard the political unity of a nation and sustain the dualonslaught arising from humanitarian
liberalism and atheistdemocracy.
Democracy is self defeating – the will of the people is unorganized and

fails to succeed
Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. 122-123 BH
After considering the issue of the subject of constituent powerSchmitt analysed its activity. Constituent power, like sovereignpower, preceded and rose,
legibus solutus, above all positiveconstitutional normativity. Its activity escaped constitutionalbounds, just as any measure transcends what
is measured by it. Inthe case of sovereign monarchs, their activity could include theunilateral granting of constitutional charters. At times, prudencedictated
that monarchs reach agreements with the representativesof special interests. But this did not imply a renunciation of theirsovereignty. In democratic
polities, the people exercises itsconstituent power by means of any manifestation which conveysits express will. According to
Schmitt, the people as such was nota firm and organized entity, and not endowed prima facie withpermanent authority. Even if
its power and plastic energy couldnot be extinguished and could embody an infinite variety offorms, the people was not to be
taken as an organized subject of decision. This was the reason for its weakness and explained why.ts actual will could be
falsified.
Constituent activity, according to Schmitt, persistedautonomously and independently of any positive constitutionallegislation. This was an indication of
sovereignty. Constituentpower could not be destroyed, changed or altered in any way; itpersevered as the extra-constitutional ground of constitutions
andconstitutional laws. It was not exhausted by its exercise and.retains the ability to persevere in its existence' (Schmitt, 1928:92). The positive
constitution, as an accident supported byconstituent power, could be born, suffer alterations and eventually die, but alongside
and above it the pouvoir constituant wouldContinue to exist.
Schmitt
Democracy skews the separation between state and civil society and puts
the power of the state in jeopardy
Two phases characterized the departure from the tradition ofthe strong executive state: one was determined by a liberaldemand,
the other by a democratic demand. First, the nineteenth-century legislative state sought to encircle the authority of theexecutive
state by way of a normativist system. Liberalism sawin the strong state of absolutist monarchs a threat to the indi-vidualist values
of liberty and private property. As a guaranteethat those values would be respected it demanded state neutral-ity and the
replacement of the rule of men by the rule of law. Butwhat it got was a division of powers, which meant thatmonarchs, dislodged
from legislative functions, could still retainthe control of the executive (compare with Kelsen, 1929: 81).Second, the liberal
demand was superseded by a democratic de-mand that led to the formation of the twentieth-century state of total administration.
8 By emphasizing the democratic principle c--identity, the distinction between state and civil society "-ascompromised. The state
was put in charge of the supervision ancdirection of the spontaneous order of the market, untouched b-.the nineteenth-century
legislative state. This meant a loss o-autonomy and independence for the state, which naturally led tothe weakening of its
authority. In Schmitt's view, the curren:crisis of the Weimar republic was ultimately a crisis of authoritv.Schmitt defined the
legislative state as the state 'ruled by imper-sonal, general and predetermined norms, by lasting norms ofdeterminable and
measurable content, where law is detached fromits application to the concrete case, where the legislator is detachedfrom the
officials that execute it' (1 932a: 8). Typical of the legisla-tive state was the distinction between laws and measures ordecrees,
between law and its execution. It was also on this concep-tion of law that Schmitt based his distinction between normativismand
decisionism. The legislative state, and its parliamentaryembodiment, realized the ideal of the Recbtsstaat. The oldAristotelian
dictum that laws and not men ought to rule impliedthat sovereignty and power were extinguished. Whoever claimedexercise of
sovereignty and power could do so only 'according tothe law or in the name of the law' (ibid.). Schmitt envisaged thelegal system
imposed by the legislative state as hermetically closed.Its claim to validity excluded and made it refractory to any exter-nal
appeal to legitimacy, and thus to any recourse to a right ofresistance. Legality meant 'making superfluous and rejecting notonly
legitimacy (both monarchical and the plebiscitary will of thepeople) but also any sovereign or higher authority' (ibid.: 14). Thisalso
implied a perfect congruence between justice and legality,which made the possibility of abusive legislation inconceivable.
Schmitt would thus conclude that legality was conceptuallyDpposed to legitimacy.
Democracy kills the unity of the state, it must be neutralized

Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. 17. BH
Before drawing the distinction between liberalism and democracy in his Parlamentarismus, Schmitt had attack liberalism
because it seemed inextricably bound to democracy. He charged liberalist for its inability to withstand the democratic avalanche.
But as a universe of ideas distinct from democracy, and interpreted as an apolitical, neutral posture, attentive only to the
protection of individuals, liberalism appeared to Schmitt in 1923 as the best way to neutralize democracy. Liberalism was
objectionable only when it assumed a political stance. If the pluralism that was congruent with liberalism were allowed political
expression, the unity of the state would be put in jeopardy. Schmitt’s paramount concern was the attainment and safeguard of
the unity of the state. Once he came to the view that liberalism was, at its core, not a political form, his reservations subsided.
Nineteenth-century liberalism tried to fashion a state in its image and likeness, and aimed at exporting pluralism onto the political
sphere. But if kept at a clear distance from any political form, liberalism ceased to be a threat. Schmitt was now able to aim his
attack at the democractic populace, which he would attempt to disarm by means of a democratically elected sheriff.
The distinction between liberalism and democracy, which Schmitt introduced in 1923, marked the beginning of his
rapprochement with liberalism. This accommadation allowed him to identify what he feared most: the increased pace of the
democratic revolution. Schmittian scholarship has for the most part assumed a strict unity and continuity in his Weimar writings.
Thus, what he wrote in Parlamentarismus is read in line with his earlier Die Diktatur and his Political Theology. The anti-liberal
stance of this early work is then projected onto his later Weimar writings. In Parlamentarismus, however, he was bale to extricate
liberalism from popular democracy, and could henceforth aim all his efforts at taming democratic absolutism.
Schmitt
Democracy forces the state to intervene in civil society weakening its

neutrality and strength
This coexistence and balance between state configurations did notpreclude the possibility of describing concrete states on the basisof the 'central sphere' of
state activity (ibid.). It was fair to say,for example, that the nineteenth-century constitutional stateought to be described as a legislative state, for in it the notes
thatdefined both the judicial and the executive states were subordi-nate to the legislative function. But Schmitt's primary interest wasto point out the
common features that typified the historicalembodiment of those state functions, namely the dualism'of stateand civil society.
Observance of that dualism meant that the nine-teenth-century state resulted from 'a balance between two kindsof state: it was at the same time an executive
state and alegislative state' (ibid.: 75). First, the separation of the state fromcivil society ensured the formation and endurance of a
strongstate, strong enough to keep at bay the many religious, culturaland economic differences that divided a state-free
society.According to Schmitt, the realization of a 'common opposition tothe state relativized those differences and did not impede
socialintegration' (ibid.: 73). Second, a strong state could also be aneutral state, neutral with respect to religion and the economy
and 'respectful of the autonomy of these vital and objective domains' (ibid.). In this respect, the nineteenth-century state was'neither absolute nor
strong enough to render any non-state busi-ness meaningless' (ibid.). The balance between state and non-statecompetences allowed the persistence of
dualism. The state, as astato neutrale e agnostico and bereft of any metaphysical commit-ment, was able 'to build a state-free economy and aneconomic-free
state' (ibid.). The neutrality of the state was aresult of its strength. Only a strong state could hand over to civilsociety, without fear or jealousy, the management
of its ownaffairs. Schmitt recognized that
the tendency of the liberal nineteenth century was, when possible,to limit the state to a minimum, to prevent it from intervening andinterfering with the economy,
to neutralize in relation to societyand its conflicts of interests, so that society and the economy couldadopt in their respective spheres the necessary decisions
accordingto their immanent principles. (ibid.: 78)
Accordingly, he saw no oblection in allowing the market tooperate according to its own 'automatic mechanism', thus assur-ing the highest economic prosperity
(ibid.: 78; compare withFil'alkowski, 1958: 27). But this liberal order could only survive ifplaced under the aegis of a strong state.10 A
fundamental alter-ation occurred when the dualist structure of state and civil societylost its antithetical tension. By yielding to
democracy and inter-vening in society's spontaneous order the state became a 'welfarestate' and in the process lost its
autonomy and independence, itsneutrality and strength.
Democracy destroys state strength

It is plain to see that Schmitt's interest in a description of state-forms and the difficulties he found in combining them prefacedhis
concern for the preservation of the state as such. In his esti-mation, the state's very existence was compromised by the rise
ofdemocratic party politics and the state-form that democracydemanded and advanced, namely the administrative or total
state.Democracy, furthermore, was responsible for weakening theunitary and decisive will of parliament. Parliament had
becomethe 'scenario of a pluralist system' (1932a: 90), so that partypolitics meant that the will of the majority shifted according
tounstable compromises between a plurality of heterogeneousorganizations. This situation seriously compromised the legis-
lative state's capacity to survive. For it to survive as a state it wasessential that state sovereignty be enhanced and a sharp
separa-tion from civil society be maintained. The total state obliteratedthat separation and imperilled the autonomy and
independencenecessary for the state to function. This development need nothave occurred if the parliamentary regime had been
truly success-ful in preserving a status mixtus, i.e. an inner balance among itsconstituent elements, particularly between its
executive andlegislative functions, and not allowed the exorbitant developmentof the latter. Because the Weimar regime failed to
do this, Schmittproposed the retrieval of an executive state as a solution to thecrisis currently faced by the Weimar republic. The
crisis resulted from the extinction of the authoritarian ethos and the decisionisttemper that could sustain a strong state.
Schmitt
Link – Education
Education projects in South Africa can lead to force to implement our

values in the area
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt:
Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 91. SD
It is irrelevant that Bloom and other "traditionalist" intellectuals prefernot to speak of "values" but proclaim the "principles" of
democraticequality. What they want is recognition of their own highest value, not areturn to older patterns of life; and it is not
extraneous to our discussionthat their stated Hchstwert is one the political and intellectual Leftembraces no less readily than
they. Both the American Right and theAmerican Left consider a secular, majoritarian democracy with a mixedeconomy to be the
highest universal good, which they hope to see implemented everywhere, including the Soviet Union and South Africa. Schmitt
would find understandable this convergence of views, for theasserting and imposing of values, he notes, entails
Denkschaltungen, conceptual manipulations in which values are readily reordered inaccordance with the changing wills of
individuals or groups. It is alsoconceivable that intellectuals competing for political control will accept thesame highest value, but
disagree on who is to carry it through. Force isof course an acceptable tool to achieve compliance. Like other valueassertors,
Bloom and his admirers demand that their values be validatedthrough acts of imposition. Thus they justify war not as a means
toprotect national territory, but as an "educational project."
Schmitt
Link – Hegemony
U.S. hegemony contributes to a spaceless universalism that destroys the
ability of lines to be drawn – leads to exclusion and annihilation
Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Louiza. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and
Social Sciences. University of London]. September 11. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on
the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror.” http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/. P.
10-11. BH
It is today often assumed that end of the Cold War meant the victory of the US, and that an American Empire is now being
constmcted. At this stage, however, this is far from the first altemative that Schmitt had outlined in that 'world unity' has not
emerged under a sole sovereign or even through the impending retreat and demise of the modem state that processes of
globalisation herald. Neither has a new global balance been constmcted in an explicit system akin to the European system of the
balance of power under US hegemony. And, indeed, despite the attraction of regional blocs that the 'success' of the European
Union has created, politically it is difficult to speak of the regional spatial order with the assumption of intemal unity within each
bloc that Schmitt had presumed. While the emergence of US hegemony since 1945, but especially since 1989, is often
discussed through various perspectives, in this paper, I would like to remain with Schmitt's argument and concem of a
'spaceless universalism', which I think still best captures the lack of explicit spatiality to global politics that is prevalent today. 15 I
would like to explore this spaceless universalism under the heading of today's cosmopolitanism and discuss some of the
repercussions of cosmopolitanism's claim to 'erase' the lines or distinctions set by the intemational state order and promote the
idea(l) of a universal humanity.
Schmitt had argued vehemently against the 'spaceless universalism' that followed the jus publicum Europeaum. That this post-
1914 order was spaceless was exemplified in the inability and unwillingness of major public actors to draw lines and spatial
distinctions16 Schmitt's concem was that the ideal of universality and of a common or
universal humanity that was first promoted by the League of Nations, and subsequently by the United Nations (despite the UN
Charter's tense comprom.ise between human rights and the affIrmation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention);
would not rid the political world of exclusions. The unwillingness or inability to concretely draw lines and distinctions would
definitely not entail their permanent erasure but rather m.ight signal the return of substantive conceptual distinctions that could
lead to even more horrendous 'otherings' and exclusions. Schmitt's historical survey and analysis led him to argue that a certain
'''dialectic'' of inclusion and exclusion' operated in each historical era and could not be ignored or easily rescinded in the post-
19l4 era as was believed by the League of Nations. 17
Schmitt
Link – Humanity
The discourse of humanity represents a battle against political that serves

to ensure cosmopolitanism
17-18. BH
In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increasing usage of the terminology of 'humanity' by both
theorists and public actors, such as the League of Nations. There are in fact four main criticisms arising from political
considerations, which Schmitt puts forward against the discourse of humanity. The first is an allencompassing objection that
arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of values: by using the discourse of humanity the new
cosmopolitanism reverberates with the 'ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle' which go back to the nineteenth
century.45 As David Dyzenhaus notes 'liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting rid of
politics. ,46 For Schmitt, liberal modernity 'is the battle against the political - as Schmitt defines the
political,47 in terms of the friend / enemy distinction. The politics of humanity focuses on moral questions and hopes to ignore or
surpass questions of conflict altogether.48
Schmitt
Link – Humanitarianism
Humanitarianism is a war for liberalism – the goal is not to help the

victims of the world but instead to extend liberalism
   
Schmitt
Schmitt
Humanitarian efforts are a form of liberalist impositions on the state

Schmitt explained this uneasy accommodation as the confluence of two distinct elements. On the one hand, a liberal,apolitical
element stressed the protection of individuals.Individuals were assured a sanctuary for their immunities andprivileges. From this
perspective the state ought to be seen as anintruder whose actions required close supervision. On the other hand, a political
form, resting on the pouvoir constituent of the people, allowed for an interventionist political state. A democratic volonte
generale, Schmitt recognized, could override and render superfluous the inalienable human rights (1921: 140), hence the need
to distinguish between liberalism and the political. The existence of the state, particularly if it responded to those unlimited
political demands, contradicted the spirit of liberalism, which saw in those demands a permanent threat to the freedom of
individuals. The tensions and contradictions within the Weimar constitution were powerful arguments aimed by Schmitt against
humanitarian liberalism. The mere existence of a state proved that the attempt to dispense with notions such as sovereignty,
dictatorship and politics was futile.
Humanitarianism attempts to create universal friendship, but this

produces new internal enemies that results in efforts at extermination
26-27. BH
A new type of war also requires a new type of enemy: 'it is an apparent fact', Rasch argues, 'that the liberal and humanitarian
attempt to construct a world of universal friendship produces, as if by internal necessity, ever new enemies'. 85 As we discussed
above, the discourse of humanity enables the creation of 'a category of political non¬persons, since those who fall outside of
these delineations become ... subject to a demonization which permits not simply their defeat, but their elimination'. 86 In the
case of the war on terror, the 'freedom-hating' recalcitrant others, those subjects of other ‘modernities’ entangled with the liberal
one,87 become those to be excised from the global liberal order. The notion of enemy used by the war on terror is problematic
because it denies any rationality or justice to its opponents. As Schmitt argued in the Nomos, the notion of just us hostis which
the interstate order had developed, alongside the notion of non-discriminatory war, was what allowed war to be limited in nature
but also peace to be made with enemies. When enemies are denied this procedural kind of 'justness', then peace cannot be
made with them, nor are they allowed a right
of resistance and self-defence. The notion of an unjust enemy in the war on terror relies on the reintroduction of the notion of just
cause for one's own side and points to an 'other' who has to be fought until there is no more resistance
Schmitt
Humanitarianism is an effort to achieve a universal order in which

opposition to this order is seen as the enemy of humanity
Schmitt
Link - International Relations

International Relations force alliances and groups to make friends and
enemies thereby erasing the grey area of indistinction, where life can be
eradicated; clearly defining friends and enemies during war and peace
   
Schmitt
Schmitt
Link – Justice
State intervention in the arena of social justice destroys individual

freedom and is a deviation from the state’s true purpose – a strong state
and sound economy is the necessary alternative – it protects civil
society’s independence
In this affirmation of a substantive conception of law, Hayekstood very much in agreement with Schmitt. In theVerfassungslebre,
Schmitt distinguished between the rule of lawas a generic notion and the liberal rule of law. The latter presup-posed a state
whose function was limited to 'the preservation ofthe legal order'; and by legal order he meant 'a liberal legal order,viz. one
based on private property and personal freedom, onewhich considers the state to be the armed warranty of liberalpeace, order
and security' (Schmitt, 1928: 130; my emphasis).This corresponded to the substantive core embraced by earlyliberalism. In
addition, Schmitt postulated that the conception oflaw required by the liberal rule of law demanded conformity withfour specific
criteria: generality; predictability and measurabilityof all political and juridical decisions; an administration subjectto judicial review
(ibid.: 130-2); and equality before the law(ibid.: 154-5). In his The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek adoptedthese same four criteria
(1960: 207-12), and acknowledged hisdebt to Schmitt (p. 207 n. 9). He explicitly referred to the memor-andum written by Schmitt
in 1926, where he proposed that thedistinction between law and measure, together with equalitybefore the law, constituted the
'proper foundation of theRecbtsstaat and the most effective warranty against all despotism'(1926: 23). Schmitt defined laws as
general and abstract, andmeasures as concrete, particular and open to the needs and inter-ests of particular individuals or
groups. The generality andpersistence of law was meant equally to protect all individualsfrom prerogative and arbitrary authority
(Schmitt, 1928:139-41). Schmitt and Hayek agreed in assuming that the legalfoundations of liberalism consisted in this objective
encirclementof authority. In other words, coercive orders were in principleincompatible with the liberal idea, but they could be
permitted oncondition that the authorities in charge of implementing themallowed all individuals equally to foresee and calculate
the courseof legal actions.
Both Schmitt and Hayek acknowledged that the rule of lawremained a purely procedural condition. The requirement ofequality
before the law and the rejection of the particular opportunities, privileges and dispensations conveyed by particu-lar measures
implied that the rule of law was indifferent to theconsequences of its application (Schmitt, 1928: 154; comparewith Hayek, 1960:
231-3). The emergence of substantive differ-ences among individuals was of no concern here. The value ofindividual freedom
would be jeopardized only by attempts tomodify and correct such outcomes under the guidance of prin-ciples defined by social
justice and by state intervention (Hayek,1960: 93). In this respect, Schmitt's attacks on democratic liber-alism matched Hayek's
assault on the welfare state. As WilliamScheuerman has noted, Schmitt sought to dispose of the Weimarwelfare state and thus
eliminate the burdensome obligationsimposed by the principle of social justice (1995: 122). Thealternative to this state of affairs
was summarily captured bySchmitt's formula 'a strong state and a sound economy', whichsought to give capitalist managers
freedom from state welfareregulation. At the same time, a decrease in state regulation couldnot amount to a decline in
discretionary state authority. On thecontrary, only a very strong state, one that strongly asserted itsmonopoly over the political,
would be able to protect the inde-pendence required by civil society.
Schmitt
Link – Liberalism
Neither liberalism nor democracy favor politics of restraint and democracy

sacrifices private life and heads to totalitarian politics
Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. PG 80-81. SD
Neither liberalism nor democracy, in Schmitt's opinion, favored apolitics of restraint: liberalism because it paid insufficient
attention to man as a "dangerous, dynamic being”; and democracy because it politicizedlife entirely to the detriment of other
human activity. Though Schmittapparently preferred democracy to liberalism, or at least found it moreconsistent with the
maintenance of sovereignty in Weimar Germany, his prodemocratic statements were mostly tactical. He made them in order
todefend an authoritarian presidential government against a liberal parliamentary one. Plebiscitary democracy, he thought, was
the means bywhich a conservative president could hold the German state together. Inno other respect was Schmitt a political
majoritarian. He finessed hisdefinition of "democracy" to avoid making it refer to government thatdepended on changing popular
opinion. The association of democracywith national homogeneity would allow an ideal sovereign to benefit fromdemocratic
legitimation without being stymied by majoritarian whims. What Schmitt really thought of democracy comes through in Legality
and Legitimacy when he expresses the opinion that "the cause of the totalstate, more accurately of the total politicization of
man's entire existence,must be sought in democracy." It is that mode of organizing human groupings that totally sacrifices
private to public life and that carries political antagonisms into ideological crusades. F. R. Cristi is right whenobserves that,
contrary to the view of Schmitt as primarily antiliberal, “his attacks were directed against the democratic component in nine-
teenth-century liberalism, particularly against the principle of popular sovereignty." Schmitt regarded liberals as too muddled to
save
European states from democracy, which he believed would engender totalitarian policies.
Liberalism has increased the gap between representation and reality – we

must break this cycle
http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p.132. BH
Schmitt
Liberalism makes liberal regimes vulnerable to emergencies and must

prefer the alternative.
McCormick ‘97 (John P. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago, Ph. D,
Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism; Against Politics as Technology) PG 151-152. AN
Liberalism's denial of the exception and avoidance of' the discretionary activity that was traditionally sanctioned to deal with it,
not only makesliberal regimes susceptible to emergencies but also leaves them vulnerableto alternatives like the one eventually
put forth by Schmitt. As Bernard Manin describes it, “once the notion of prerogative power was abandoned no possibility of
legitimately acting beside or against the law was left.” The only apparent recourse available in this milieu to political actors
confronted with a political exception is to act illegitimately and hope to pass off such actions as legitimate. Lack of
constitutionally facilitated emergency prerogative may then provide the opportunity to those like Schmitt who would use this
particular liberal deficiency as a ruse to scrap the whole legal order. In this sense, Schmitt’s deciding sovereign can be seen as
a violent return of the prerogative represented by scientific liberalism.
Schmitt
Link – Modernity (Generic)

Modernity is penetrating the political (weakening the state) – if we fail to
act to end this imposition on political dictatorship it will become
irreversible
Schmitt
Link – Peace
The end goal of peace is a form of depoliticization that denies the

existence of enemies and refuses to make a distinction between friend
and enemy
Schmitt
Link – Rights to Africans
The extension of liberal rights to aliens distorts the unity of the state
The liberal element proper demanded, first and foremost, 'theprotection of citizens from the abuse of state power' (p. 126).The
state had to be seen as 'a strictly controlled steward ofsociety' (p. 125). This determined the two principles that found their way
into every modern constitution: a recognition of funda-mental individual rights (principle of distribution) and a divisionof public
powers (principle of political organization). As a liberalelement, the rule of law, the Kantian Herrschaft des Gesetzes(p. 127), did
not entail any specific principle of political organi-zation. All that liberalism required in this respect was thelimitation and control of
the state on behalf of individualfreedom. This relativization of the power and authority of thestate should count as the most
essential ingredient in any attemptto define liberalism. Individuals were best served by closelydemarcating a domain of action
free of political interference.
The political element of the constitution was meant to securethe unity of the state. This quest;on, as Schmitt understood it,
wasnot to be taken as a normative one, but factually and existentially.The unity of the state could not be rendered by the liberal
elementbecause the tendency of liberalism was to confront the state andstand apart from it. This was what the distinction
between civiland political rights presupposed. Civil rights, liberal rights parexcellence, belonged to individuals living in a state of
nature, anextra-state situation of personal freedom. Their scope was unlim-ited in principle. Political rights, on the contrary, were
privilegesthat could be held only within the state. They were limited in thesense that they could not 'be claimed by aliens.
Otherwise thepolitical unity and community would cease, and the fundamentalpresupposition of political existence, the possibility
of distin-guishing between friends and enemies, would disappear’ (p. 169). This concept of the political, as the possibility of
distinguishing friends from enemies, placed Schmitt explicitly in the Hobbesian camp.
Schmitt
Link – Pluralism
When pluralism enters the state, party politics begin to deteriorate state
power
The argument presented in this book has chronicled the devel-opment of Schmitt's pre-1933 theory of the state and
theconstitution, the front line of a broader campaign aimed againstthe German democratic revolution of 1918-19 and the
Weimarconstitution. According to Schmitt, classical liberalism was ableto maintain a clear line of separation between civil society
and thestate, which had the effect of preserving the latter's independenceand autonomy. But the German democratic revolution
meant anirreparable weakening of the state. By giving free rein to thepluralist tendencies buried in civil society it allowed the
occupa-tion of the state by party politics and the consequent dissolutionof its unity. The Nazi destruction of the constitution in
1933 washailed by Schmitt as a reversal of that historical process. To thinkthat a piece of paper could personify the sovereignty
formerlyheld by the representative figure of the monarch was, accordingto Schmitt, a dangerous illusion. Ascribing sovereignty to
theconstitution and the ideal of the rule of law was the illusionpeddled by humanitarian liberals in their campaign to discreditthe
state and the political. But it was simply a mistake to thinkthat a constitution could of itself warrant the realization of thejuridical
(Recht). The realization of the juridical was first andforemost the achievement of the pouvoir constituant whose activ-ity,
according to Schmitt, could not be contained within strictconstitutional bounds. The original pouvoir constituant wouldalways
transcend the constitution, which ought to be regarded asa merely derivative pouvoir constitug.
Schmitt
Link – Rule of Law
The liberal rule of law seeks to limit sate power

Hayek also shared Schmitt's definition of the liberal rule of law as advancing the two general legal conditions required by a
liberalpolity. On the one hand, Schmitt assumed that civil societyneeded to be regarded as a protected sphere where
individualswere accorded the freedom to develop and launch forth in everndirection. As such, civil society was granted
precedence over thestate, and the latter was taken as instrumental to the ends indi-viduals set for themselves.6 The liberal rule
of law, then.presupposed a clear separation between civil society and the state.and, as a separate sphere, civil society was
legitimated in itsdemands for the least possible interference in its internal affairs.On the other hand, Schmitt maintained that the
liberal rule of lawpostulated that a state, limited in principle, should maintain aseparation of its powers and competencies as a
guarantee that itwould remain within its own bounds. These two principles made-:p the heart of liberal constitutionalism.
Accordingly, the struc-:ure of liberal constitutions reflected this dual condition. First,constitutions recognized the priority of
individual rights. Theywere to be protected, but not established or generated, by thelimited legislative powers of the state. This
corresponded to whatSchmitt called a 'principle of distribution' (1928: 126). Second, inorder to make sure that the state did not
overstep its limitations,its powers and competencies were to be strictly defined and sep-arated. It was only in this latter function,
as a 'principle oforganization' (ibid.), that the liberal rule of law had its propertask. The classical liberal formulation of the rule of
law, we arereminded by Hayek, was given by William Paley: 'the first maximof a free state is that the laws be made by one set of
men, andadministered by another; in other words, that the legislative andthe ludicial character be kept separate' (Hayek, 1960:
173).
Schmitt
Link – Technology
Technology links to liberalism

McCormick ‘97 (John P. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago, Ph. D,
Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism; Against Politics as Technology) Pg. 24-25. AN
It is my argument that Schmitt's derogatory references to what is "tactical" or is a reflection of some kind of narrow
"functionalism," as well as hisdisdain for what he describes as an instrument or tool, are not merelyrhetorical. They are
indications of a deep-seated connection withinSchmitt's political theory between liberalism and modern technology. Perhaps
more productive avenues for understanding each of these important entities. The problem of technocracy has become a
persistent issue inthe practical reality and public discourse of liberal democracies. A carefulstudy of Schmitt's work - where
liberalism and technology inexorablyintersect - might provide some provisional insight into this problem.
Schmitt
Link – War on Terror
The War on Terror is a modernist version of the end of war that produces
civil wars of annihilation
25-26. BH
The first relationship arises from their joint location in a long line of thought and policy aiming to articulate an outlook and a
political programme of the modern world in which violence and war dissipate, in which war is gradually replaced by mles and
principled behaviour. 80 This, Hans Joas has eloquently called, 'the dream of a modernity without violence,.81 That
cosmopolitanism seeks 'perpetual' peace, is often acknowledged through the debts that cosmopolitan thinking owes to
Immanuel Kant's understanding of cosmopolitan law. 82 That the war on terror is located in this understanding of modernity is
less apparent, but nevertheless becomes obvious in the apocalyptic-sounding framing of the Bush Administration's
understanding of the fight on terrorism as a fight that will not be abandoned until terrorism is rooted out. The occurrence of
September 11 th in the seat of this dream, the United States of America, was an unforgivable affront to this liberal modernist
vision of perpetual peace.
Therefore, both the war on terror and liberal cosmopolitanism are located within a modernist vision of the end of war. At the
same time, however, the war on terror is
central to the very paradox of liberal modernity and war which that has preoccupied realist, Marxist and poststructuralist thought.
A recent articulation of this paradox is offered by Julian Reid who notes this disturbing paradox:
[a] political project based concretely upon an ideal of 'peace' has continually produced its nemesis, war. Not only does the
recurrence of war throughout modernity serve to underline its paradoxical character. But the very forms of war that recur are of
such increasing violence and intensity as to threaten the very sustainability of the proj ect of modemity understood in terms of
the pursuit of perpetual peace.83
Schmitt's own assessment of prior liberal attempts to abolish war, as those undertaken by the League of Nations, is similar: 'any
abolition of war without true bracketing [has historically] resulted only in new, perhaps even worse types of war, such as
reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246). And, how else can we understand the war on terror if not
in a sequence of changing types of war, yet another evolution after the one noted by Mary Kaldor in the late 1990s?84
The War on Terror promotes the spread of subjectivity and liberal political
institutions and skews the concept of who is with and who is against us
28-29. BH
Outside of the liberal polity, the war on terror seeks to rid us of the scourge of terrorism, and the singular way of achieving this is
to spread modern subjectivity and its attendant liberal political institutions (or vice versa). Recall the numerous speeches by
George W. Bush on the desirability of a newly democratic Iraq, whose liberated citizens can participate in promoting a safer and
more peaceful Middle East.94 Outside,
the threat entailed in dichotomous determinations of 'with us or against us' is intended to shape peoples, only partly subjectivised
through other means, into subjects. The second relationship of the war of terror to cosmopolitanism, then, pertains to the rise of
modem subjectivity and the institutions that it makes possible, and their global exportation. When threatened, the apparatus of
liberal cosmopolitanism responds by radicalising its normal mode of operation (which is the spread of modem subjectivity
through commerce and cultural 'exchange ') and attempts to impose a liberal order by spreading modem subjectivity through
logistical, biopolitical and military means. Dispensing with intemational law and norms of state action cannot be understood as
serious obstacles to this kind of war, because, as Habermas notes regretfully, in the age of the war on terror the US sees 'wars
that make the world better. .. need no further justification' 95
Schmitt
Link – We Demand
Impositions by the civil society on the state crumble its strength

The intellectual task attempted by Schmitt immediately after thepublication of Political Romanticism and prior to 1923, was a
bidto reassert the juridical validity of notions such as sovereignty,authority and dictatorship. These non-romantic notions
wereneeded to strengthen the state and keep it from drowning in thevortex of civil society. The rise of liberalism had
depoliticizedpublic discourse to such an extent that the real nature of the statehad been obfuscated. Schmitt took the view that it
was futilesimply to repress political life and attempt to cover it up with thelanguage of abstract legality. Hence, to read the
Weimar consti-tution as a purely formal juridical document missed its truemeaning. Schmitt treated the constitution as a
distinguishedpatient invited to lie on his couch and confess to its repressedpolitical intentions. Then its impeccable liberal facade
wouldcrumble and the real proportions of its article 48 would come tolight (compare with Schwab, 1970: 37-43). This is what
heachieved in the last pages of his Die Diktatur (Schmitt, 1921:201-3).
Schmitt
Impact – Civil War
A distinction of enemies and friends is needed to avert impending civil

war – key to a strong state
Schmitt's emphatic affirmation of the sovereignty of the statewas due to what he saw as the weak state that had resulted fromthe
revolutionary abrogation of the monarchical legitimacy inGermany. A convinced etatist and anti-monarchomachist,Schmitt
followed Hobbes in judging that only the strongly decisive state could avert the possibility of a civil war. Its strengthcould be
measured by the capacity to identify friends and enemiesand draw between them clear adversarial lines. Once order wasre-
established and normality returned, the exercise of state sovereignty could again be juridically determined. The normativity ofa
legislative state could replace the stark raison d'itat, the political reason of an absolute prince. Only contempt for the reality ofthe
political would allow one to pretend that a system of legalitycould sustain itself and maintain no reference to a substantiveorder
of things. If liberalism were to be identified with thisapolitical view, Schmitt was a unswerving critic; if liberalism wereto restrict its
apoliticism to the sphere of civil society, andacknowledge the necessity of a sovereign state that retained themonopoly of the
political, Schmitt would not object to conservative or authoritarian liberalism.8
Schmitt's conservative thought found in the critique of liberal-ism a continuous line of argument.
Schmitt
Impact – Dictatorship
Dictatorship is inevitable through the affirmative’s engagement in politics

McCormick ‘97 (John P. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago,
Ph. D, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism; Against Politics as Technology) Pg. 132-133. AN
All of politics becomes technical and dictatorial politics; correspondingly, both elements themselves change through the
transformation: In a traditional framework, the technical was a means to a prior-sanctioned good, butin modernity it becomes an
end in itself-, dictatorship changes from a "commissarial" phenomenon to a "sovereign" one. Civil war and foreign war
traditionally considered exceptional circumstances that might occasionally call for a dictator, become something else in the
writings of such statetheorists as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin. In line with these historicaltransformations, Hobbes, who will
become Schmitt's intellectual hero, further inverts the relationship of a normal political situation and an exceptional one with his
concept of the "natural condition" or the "state ofnature. For Hobbes, the present manifestation of 'War" is an exceptional
circumstance that in the past, or more accurately beneath the veneerof the present, is actually a normal state of affairs, the
"natural condition" or"state of nature." Thus, the exceptional circumstance is viewed actually as areturn to normalcy and the
regular order as a kind of exceptional situation -the distinction becomes deliberately blurred. Hobbes's "sovereign" andstate are
hence a kind of dictatorship that has as its sole task guarding overthe ever-present exception and, as such, is no longer
commissarial butappropriate to its own name, sovereign. In this way is "the technical conception of the origin of the modern state
directly related to the problem of dictatorship" (D, 10).13
According to Schmitt, this process is radicalized as sovereignty becomesincreasingly defined as popular sovereignty, as
authority derives not from aspecific and definite individual person, like an absolute monarch, butr-ather from an amorphous and
differentiated populace. As a result, emergency action becomes more extreme, because it is soon carried out by anelite whose
actions are supposedly sanctioned by such "popular" sovereignty. Concomitantly, there is a historical justification for the
violentdestruction of an old order and the creation of a new one out of nothing.Sovereign dictatorship becomes the power to
perpetually suspend andchange political order in the name of an inaccessible "people" and aneschatological notion of history.
Schmitt's chief examples of this development are the writings of the French revolutionary theorists, such as Mably(D, 115-16)
and especially Siey6s (D, 143-5) and more immediately theBolsheviks.
Schmitt
Impact – Extinction
Without regular conflict in which our enemies are identified, the state of
war goes beyond defeat - extinction
Schmitt
Universality fails – leads to exclusions and annihilation

10-11. BH
Schmitt had argued vehemently against the 'spaceless universalism' that followed the jus publicum Europeaum. That this post-
1914 order was spaceless was exemplified in the inability and unwillingness of major public actors to draw lines and spatial
distinctions16 Schmitt's concem was that the ideal of universality and of a common or
universal humanity that was first promoted by the League of Nations, and subsequently by the United Nations (despite the UN
Charter's tense comprom.ise between human rights and the affIrmation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention);
would not rid the political world of exclusions. The unwillingness or inability to concretely draw lines and distinctions would
definitely not entail their permanent erasure but rather m.ight signal the return of substantive conceptual distinctions that could
lead to even more horrendous 'otherings' and exclusions. Schmitt's historical survey and analysis led him to argue that a certain
'''dialectic'' of inclusion and exclusion' operated in each historical era and could not be ignored or easily rescinded in the post-
19l4 era as was believed by the League of Nations. 17
Schmitt
The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose,

and when this happens total extermination is possible
19-21. BH
Thirdly, 'humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept
of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it. ,56
Outside of this historical location, where does it fmd concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an
abstract politics of neutrality, usually in the name of an international community which acts, we are assured, in the interest of
humanity. James Brown Scott, a jurist and prominent political fIgure in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century, wrote in the interwar years of
the right of this international community to impose its neutral will:
The "international community," Scott writes, "is coextensive with humanity-no longer merely with Christianity;" it has become "the representative of the common
humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States." Therefore, the international community "possesses the inherent right to impose its will. . and to
punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need" (283). If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian
Church that determined the content of this international need, in the twentieth centmy and beyond it must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that
performs this all¬important service. 57
Finally, and most importantly , there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other, and to war and violence. In its historical
location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives, but its utilisation by liberal discourses in
the individualist tradition, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. Rasch explains:
The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract
normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace
all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars?
58
'Humanity as such' Schmitt noted 'cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet'. 59 As Ellen Kennedy
notes, humanity 'is a polemical word that negates hs opposite. ,60 In T71e Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity
'excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being,.6! In the Nomos, however, it
becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of Justus hostis, of a 'just
enemy', who is recognised as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. Schmitt noted how only when
'man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new
enemy: the inhuman' (NE 104). It is worth quoting Rasch's account at length:
We can understand Schmitt's concems in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become
believers, they must be of the same category of being. To be human, then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is
made. That is, humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the
horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the
distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to
horizon and positive pole alike-can only, in other words, be inhuman62
Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non¬discriminatory war, the enemy had no value and could
be exterminated. The concept of humanity, furthermore, reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal
concept of Justus hostis, now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. In Schmitt's accomlt of the League of
Nations in the Nomos, he
highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the
interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated; they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in
comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186).
Enemies of humanity cannot be considered 'just and equal' enemies. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or
against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the jus
publicum Europeaum. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror, this denial of the self-defence and resistance 'can presage a
dreadfhl nihilistic destruction of all law'
(NE 187).
When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality, the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt
detailed through his study of the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in rescinding the concept of
neutrality only succeeded in the 'dissolution of "peace'" (NE 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation
and destruction become possible, where the other cannot be assimilated, or accommodated, let alone tolerated: the
friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil, human and inhuman,
where 'the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. ,63 With this in mind, 1 turn in
the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of
humanity and cosmopolitanism.
Schmitt
Having enemies is necessary to ensure the containment of war – The

alternative is extinction
Schmitt
With the implementation of values leads to naming enemy as

worthlessness and lets extermination become a reality
Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 89-90. SD
It would not be stretching a point to recognize in Schmitt's modernpartisan an intellectual seeking desperately to carry through
his "highest value [Hochstwert]." In the contemporary world partisans are losing theirattachment to homeland soil. Their
dependence on great power and theiridentification with revolutionary ideals have turned them from nationalliberators into armed
ideologues. Schmitt presents Lenin as a key figurein this process of change "who gave a new twist to the distinctionbetween
friend and enemy." The Prussian military theorist Karl vonClausewitz had advocated total war during Prussia's struggle
againstNapoleon. Clausewitz did so as an extraordinary, temporary measure in aEurope of established states. Lenin, by
contrast, advocated total war asan instrument of raising the party above the state. He set out to turn thestate into a weapon of
"world civil war" directed by the party, and his acthad irreversible significance: "Once the party became absolute, thepartisan too
became absolute and was raised to being a bearer of absolutehostility. Today the absolutization of the enemy has become all
the moredifficult to discredit, for it seems to be inherent in the reality of a nuclear age. Such statements are clearly related to the
escalating war of valuesin which intellectuals damn the bearers of competing values, togetherwith the values being rejected. In
The Tyranny of Valties Schmitt stressesthat the competition being discussed is not a mere academic exercise but adeadly
confrontation: "For the highest value no price is too high to bepaid." Politics now centers on values and no longer on the
definableinterests of established communities. Such politics demands just wars,"for any consideration of the enemy must vanish,
must become anonvalue, when the struggle against this enemy is concerned with the highest value.” In this situation there are
only two types of human beings, "the one who annihilates and the one who is to be annihilated." Inconclusion: "All categories of
the classical military law of the jitspitblictim Europaelitium -- just enemy, just grounds for war, proportionality between the means
and the intended purpose, reparation – must fall victim to this [judgment of] worthlessness. The drive toward theimplementation
of values becomes here a compulsion toward their immediate realization.
Without the friend-enemy distinction any opposing view in the world will
lead to war of all against all with new weapons of annihilation and
extermination
The pure subjective freedom of positing values leads to the eternal struggle of
values and worldviews, to a war of all against all, to an eternal bellum
omniurn contra ornnes, in comparison to which the murderous state of nature
in the political thought of Thomas Hobbes is a true pastoral scene. The oldgods arise from their graves and continue to wage
their old struggle, butdisenchanted ... with new weapons of annihilation and procedures ofextermination.
Liberalism emasculates politics allowing a war of all against all which can
lead to extinction
The views that remain standing on the problematic character of liberal politics in Schmitt's work are the first two: (1) Schmitt
criticized liberalism for emasculating politics; and (2) he feared that liberalism, by taking human aggressiveness too lightly, would
produce the war of all against all. Though these interpretations clearly diverge, it is possible to cite supporting passages for
either from The Concept of the Political.
Schmitt
Impact – Governance Fails
Liberalism fails as a organizing politic – creating enemies is a necessary

framework for politics to function – only through the exception can the
sovereign maintain order and power
Schmitt
Liberalism fails at governance because of the way it is limited from

declaring emergencies – comparatively a politics based on friends and
enemies is better
Schmitt
Impact – Internal Conflict
Failure to adhere to a strict friend/enemy dichotomy produces internal

conflict – preemptive war is justified, civil liberties are destroyed, and the
public is disciplined
27-28. BH
The second relationship is that the war on terror is connected to cosmopolitanism in that it is a set of practices, which intends to
produce and spread modem liberal subjectivity. Given the commitment to the individual - which sets into place norms and
practices that prohibit the torturing of the subject's body, making physical violence in principle illegitimate (if sometimes
inevitable) - war in the present stage of liberal modernity becomes an activity that spreads modern subjectivity and subjectivist
socio-political practices. The type of violence that becomes possible in a liberal cosmopolitan age is that which promulgates
modern subjectivity, which makes incrementally real the ideal of universal humanity; which abstracts human political diversity
from its local constructions and retains only its cultural and aesthetic spectre88 The war on terror should be seen as the latest
form of a longer project of subjectivising peoples who have only partially been subjectivised through colonialism, through the
extensions of global capitalism, through the international biopolitical operations of the UN system in the last half of the 20th
century and through other kinds of wars prominent since the end of the Cold War. 89
As to the means of this war to spread the modern liberal subject, the war on terror contains what were traditionally recognisable
as 'war practices', but also newly inserts 'peace practices' into its set of operations. Peace and War 'must be understood in
accordance with a substitutive value that makes the two tenns absolutely contemporary with one another, starting with the
inversion both of their functions and of their "classical" relations'. 90
In one way, then, David Held is correct to claim that the war on terror (and the US's unilateralist foreign policy) is a return to the
Hobbesian state of nature. If we
understand the 'state of nature' to be an educational tool employed by Thomas Hobbes in order to discipline the unruly
participants in the English civil war, then we can see its function as a disciplining device helping to convince
imperfectly domesticated subjects that they, in their present state, should consent to remain there and should commit
themselves more fully to the habits and principles that ensure the stability of their condition, even though that condition does and
must
carry many ‘inconveniences’.
Just as the device of the state of nature is able to achieve results for classical liberalism by exulting the need and desire for the
sovereign, the war on terror can be understood to serve a similar purpose and to entail, therefore, a similar relationship with
liberal cosmopolitanism. The war of terror is, in part, an environment which (re )creates fearful subjects inside liberal polities. It
reminds citizens, as the state of nature did, that the sovereign is needed and ought to be made stronger92 Inside the polity, let
us take the US as an example, the practices of the war of terror such as its constant raising of colour-coded terror alerts, its
lessons of how citizens ought to cultivate readiness to deal with disaster, its general logistical manipulation of citizens,93
disciplines and controls the subjects of liberal societies by suggesting that the distinction between inside and outside no longer
holds; that the danger, which the Hobbesian solution had banished to the outside, has retumed. Moreover, the internal
disciplining of liberal publics is necessary in order to justify the undertakings of the war on terror on the world outside of liberal
polities. As soon as liberal citizens stop being afraid, they may begin to seek justifications for pre-emptive wars, as they may
start to question, more incessantly, the weakening of their civil liberties.
Schmitt
Modernity has created the depoliticized enemy – this is the enemy that
results from having no external enemies in which case hatred turns
inward into uncontrollable violence and hate
Without a sovereignty to name foe’s conflict turns in on the state and

forges religious, economic, or cultural.
Moreover, Schmitt's insistence on the polemical and thereforepolitical potential of holding opinions strongly appears to lend
credibilityto Sartori's question, whether an intellectual or parliamentary debatepresupposes the same degree of antagonism as
that manifested in ashooting war. Sartori contends that Schmitt is making too much of theGreek word polemos (war) by
extending it to essentially civil encountersamong oratorical or scholarly opponents. But Schmitt does not equatesuch encounters
with shooting war. He is only calling attention to thecc ever present possibility of conflict" that can erupt in the internal politicsof
weak states, in the form of civil war, as well as among organizednations.15 Where the state dissolves itself or renounces
sovereignty,armed combat does not cease among organized units, even if the state nolonger directs it. Nonpolitical groupings
can suddenly transformthemselves into violently antagonistic ones, a point forcefully made in anoften misunderstood passage
from The Concept of the Political: "The realfriend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that thenonpolitical
antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomespolitical, pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely
religious,purely economic, purely cultural criteria and motives.... Thatgrouping is always political which orients itself toward this
most extremepossibility.
Schmitt
Impact – Solvency Takeout

Plan fails – policy implementation/advocacy by the individuals fail to
create any changes in the state
The emergence of the modern sovereign state was thus the result of the triumph of the these royaliste, the assertion of absolute
monarchical sovereignty over feudal seigneurial claims. The transition from monarchical absolutism to liberal constitutionalism
and the rule of law presupposed that the challenge to the sovereign unity of the state posed by the aristocratic Frondes (these
nobiliaire) had been met. If henceforth an individual or a group of individuals conspired to alter the public order, this was to be
seen as a perfectly normal event, calculated and regulated in advance.13 The unity of the state could not thereby be placed in
jeopardy. Classical liberalism acknowledged that the juridical value of absolutism lay in having definitely secured the unity of the
state that had been menaced by the Frondes. Once that unity was attained, it became necessary to limit what liberals then inter -
preted as royalist excesses and arbitrary rule. The notion of sovereignty could be safely dissolved or, even better, transferred
from the monarch to each individual citizen. Liberalism presup posed the elimination of all social groupings, all intermediate
associations, and the isolation of individuals. Condorcet was able to justify, according to Schmitt, switching his allegiance from
monarchy to republicanism, in the following terms:
“the time is past when there existed within the state powerful groups and classes. The associations puissantes have vanished.
While they existed, un despotisme arme was required to contain them. Now individuals confront a unified totality. Thus, il faut
bien peu de force pour forcer les individus a l'obeissance. (1921: 204)14”
Schmitt
Impact – War
Without a sovereign power the state can fall into “legal war of all against
all”
Gray depicts the "new Hobbesian dilemma" that is developing out ofbad liberal doctrines and social democratic zeal for state-
initiatedredistribution of services and income. In England, which is his test case,the "state has become the most powerful
weapon in an incessantcompetition for resources" and entitlements. "Its power is sought byevery interest and enterprise partly
because of the huge assets it alreadyowns and controls but also because no private or corporate asset is freefrom invasion or
confiscating taxation." In contrast to the sovereign state,Gray describes an "anti-Hobbesian" one that is occupied by mutually
antagonistic interests. Working through legislation and litigation andoften through human rights rhetoric, these interests create a
"legal war ofall against all, with the ... state of nature being reproduced in thecontext of an over-extended government and a
weak civil society.' Gray does not confuse this "over-extended government" with a trulysovereign state, which does not allow
itself to fall victim to the "legal warof all against all." Only through the restoration of its political sovereignty,in the Hobbesian
sense of maintaining public order against internal andexternal threats, can the state control its own destiny and protect itscitizens
against each other as well as foreign enemies. Inherent in Gray'sanalysis are the three points of reference that define Schmitt's
critique ofliberalism: sovereignty, the challenge of the exception, and humancontentiousness. The challenge of the exception is
the assault on the state's sovereignty that has created Gray's "new Hobbesian dilemma," an occupied state that is also an "over-
extended government." His wordsrecall Schmitt's critical remark made in The Concept of the Political thatliberals "transform the
enemy from the viewpoint of economics into acompetitor and from the intellectual viewpoint into a debating partner.' Through
such redefinitions of identities, Gray and Schmitt both maintain,the participants in this process work to hide, while actually
spreading, dangerous political antagonisms.
Schmitt
Alternative – Agonism
Agonism is essential to self development and politics. In a political
system, decisions are made based on wins and losses and the loser is
forced to become subordinate to the winner.
Hateb, 2002 (Lawrence J., Ph.D. from Fordham University, "Prospects for a Democratic Argon;
why we can still be Nietzcheans")
How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation
and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us
articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to
power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply
an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an
overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page 134]
Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to
external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the
self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this
sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and
therefore as an intrinsically social activity. 10
In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and
sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by
annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the
"spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as
implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion
to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or
harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to
political relations.
How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work.
Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins
and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the
government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can
always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow
for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic
contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more
than just talk or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the
policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic
politics. 12
Schmitt
The creation of antagonisms is necessary for the sovereign’s ability to

create exceptions – this is necessary to reaffirm state power
Europe in 1848, Russia in 1917 and Germany in 1918 provedCondorcet to be wrong. Within the state there arose new powerful
associations whose 'antagonist force' created exceptionalsituations. These required the development of totally new frameworks
of reference. In particular, the Marxist notion of adictatorship of the proletariat went beyond the notion of commissarial dictatorship, which could still be placed
within traditionalparameters. It represented an absolute dictatorship grounded ona revolutionary pouvoir constituant, very much the same powerthat was claimed
by the National Convention in 1793, and whichSchmitt presented as an example of absolute dictatorship. Schmittconcluded his Die Diktatur with the thought that
the Weimarrepublic, like the situation of Marx and Engels as described intheir address to the Communist League in 1850, had retrogressed, to the state of affairs
of France in 1793 and was thus compelledto employ the same measures (1921: 205). Schmitt's self-imposed task was to bring to light what lay
beneathWeimar's liberal facade. It was one thing to recognize the sovereignrights of individuals and quite another to attribute
broad unlimitedpowers to the executive authority, powers that could even configurean absolute dictatorship. If conceived as an
outlet for the pouvoirconstituant, the Reichsprisident would be empowered to go beyondthe limits set by the constitution itself.
Schmitt sought to bring outthis repressed aspect of the constitution, its revolutionary stance, inorder to graft onto it his own counter-revolutionary programme,
aprogramme he thought he shared with de Maistre, Bonald andDonoso Cort6s.16 Novalis's observation that Burke wrote arevolutionary book against the
revolution could be extended to thework of these thinkers. It seems to me that it should be also extendedto Schmitt's Die Diktatur. Indeed it was by revolutionary
means thatSchmitt intended to contest the revolutionary claims of theproletariat. The dictatorship envisaged by Marx was an extension ofthe enlightened
rationalist dictatorship. The conservative reactioncontested the expulsion of the will from the constitutional empire ofreason. For the Enlightenment there could
only be an administrationof things which left no room for ultimate decisions. The enlighteneddespot was a rational edifying dictator, who centralized control
andadministered the state according to plan. To Burke, de Maistre andBonald this appeared repugnant. Schmitt notes their aversion to apriori constitutions, 'to
"artifice" in political affairs, artificial consti-tutions based on the calculations of a clever individual, and thefabricators of constitutions and
political geometricians' (1 925b: 95).Only a decisionist, non-constructivist way of thinking such astheirs could fully restore and
bring to life the political eminence ofthe Reichsprisident. He alone would then decide on the livingexception.
The notion of sovereign dictatorship developed by Schmitt in his Die Diktatur manifested his desire to keep alive what he sawas the foundation of the now
disintegrated German monarchy,namely the monarchical principle. The French Charte of 4 June1814 constituted its paradigm. The monarchical principleallowed
the monarch, in virtue of his pouvoir constituant, tostand above the constitution, so that from the monarch's point ofview the constitution appeared as something
precarious and provisional. According to Schmitt, article 14 of the Charte meantan express manifestation of sovereignty, and not just a commissarial
empowerment to deal with emergencies. The monarch was
ictator, commissarial or sovereign. Like the sovereign dictator Schmitt modelled after him, the French monarch 'did notconsider it anticonstitutional to issue
decrees that violated existing laws and even the constitution itself, when he alone judged itnecessary for the security of the existing order' (1921: 193). While
the function of a commissarial dictator was the preservation of the constitutional order, the aim of a sovereign dictatorwas the
elimination of 'the whole existing order' and the generation of a new constitution, the only true constitution. Accordingto Schmitt,
in such circumstances an appeal was made to theconstitution that would be enacted, not to the one that actuallyexisted (ibid.:
137). This abrogation of the existing order was totranslate into the adoption of a revolutionary stance whereby asovereign dictator could place himself above the
constitution.This could be seen prima facie as a purely political move, as some-thing completely 'devoid of juridical value' (ibid.). But whatabided above and
beyond a constitutional system was not purelya Machtfrage. A sovereign dictator appealed to a power that,though not constituted, was definitely the 'foundation'
of aconstitution. Here resided, according to Schmitt, 'the meaning ofthe pouvoir constituant' (ibid.). It allowed one to transcend thelimits of a legal system without
trespassing the limits of the juridical (Recht). Schmitt's sovereign dictator fell within the bounds oflegitimacy and could thus borrow the juridical status that
wasbestowed on traditional commissarial dictators.17 In sum, Schmitt formulated the notion of sovereign dictatorshipand adopted the related doctrine of the
pouvoir constituant tohighlight the perceived disharmonies within the make-up of theWeimar constitution. The framers of the constitution hadattempted to
accommodate a 'combination of a sovereign and acommissarial dictatorship' (ibid.: 203). By enhancing the role ofthe Reichsprisident as a bearer
of pouvoir constituant and poten-tial sovereign dictator, Schmitt looked to exploit those perceiveddisharmonies in favour of a
strong state. In view of the uncertainties of the new democratic course chartered by the Weimarconstitution, Schmitt's ultimate
aim was to strengthen the state byreinforcing its unity. Later, in his Verfassungslebre, when circum-stances proved more
auspicious for the state, the role of theReicbsprdsident would be de-emphasized. Even though Schmittstill recognized analogies
between Reichsprilsident and Kaiser, theformer could not be presented as the Kaiser's heir 'because thejuridical foundation was
not the same' (1928: 292). TheReichsprdsident was a plebiscitary figure, resting on the sovereignty of the people; the legitimacy
of the Kaiser was based on themonarchical principle. If the monarchs of the Restoration periodhad recognized the Estates 'as
representatives of the wholepolitically unified people' (1928: 52), this would constitute acontradiction. They would have
surrendered the key element oftheir legitimacy - the monarchical principle. Equally contradictory would now be the attribution of
constituent power to theReicbsprdsident as heir to the Kaiser. The juridical foundation ofthe Weimar republic was not a
monarchical but a democraticlegitimacy.
Schmitt
Agonism can be healthy for establishing hierarchies.

Appel concedes that a political agon can be healthy and prevent the establishment of entrenched, permanent hierarchies (NCD,
p.162). But he poses an important question, which is in the spirit of French neo-liberal critics of Nietzschean politics: Might not a
radical agon all the way down in political life "debunk" important democratic "verities" such as universal suffrage, equal respect,
and human rights? This is indeed a pressing question that many postmodern writers have not addressed adequately. Yet Appel,
like many critics of postmodernism, simply assumes the truth and necessity of these traditional democratic notions, without much
articulation of how agonistics threatens these notions, and without any defense of the viability of these notions in the wake of
Nietzschean genealogical criticisms. Such criticisms have been effectively advanced by Foucauldian appropriations of Nietzsche
that reveal how modern "reason" cannot help being caught up in what it presumes to overcome—namely regimes of power—and
consequently cannot help producing exclusionary effects and constraints that belie the modern rhetoric of emancipation. 18
Nietzsche's genealogical critique of liberal democratic ideals, I think, is important and still relevant for political philosophy. The
question at hand turns on two possibilities: Does the critique presume a refutation of these ideals or does it open up the
possibility of redescribing these ideals in quasi-Nietzschean terms? Appel presumes the former possibility, I take up the latter,
while agreeing that most postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche have not done much to address either possibility. We cannot
assume the truth of universal suffrage, equality, and human rights by ignoring Nietzsche's trenchant attacks. My strategy has
been to redescribe democratic ideals in the light of Nietzschean suspicions of their traditional warrants. Universal suffrage,
equality, respect, and political rights can be defended by way of a postmodern via negativa that simply rules out grounds for
exclusion rather than postulates conditions that warrant inclusion. Nietzschean perspectivism, [End Page 138] metaphysical
suspicion, and agonistics simply destabilize politics and prevent even ostensibly democratic propensities from instigating
exclusions or closed conceptions of political practice. In what follows I will briefly address two questions: How can a Nietzschean
agonistics be extended to the body politic so as to be viably democratic? How can agonistics redescribe respect and political
rights without the baggage of traditional egalitarianism so forcefully assailed by Nietzsche?
Schmitt
Alternative – Friends/Enemies
Policy Alternative: Use political will in order to recognize the enemy

The sovereign is needed to name the states enemies

Though in The Concept of the Political Schmitt purports to bediscussing political life in general, he defines "political antagonism"
bylooking specifically at the sovereign national state. His paradigmaticfriend-enemy grouping is the one institutionalized by the
sovereign statethat mobilizes citizens against collective rather than personal enemies. It is the state and its sovereign who take
charge of this antagonistic relationship; private citizens and civil society, by contrast, participate in politicalconfrontation only
under the state's aegis. While Schmitt is willing toconsider the "political" defined as a "friend-enemy antithesis" in variousother
situations, proper normative political antagonism is linked for himwith the operation of sovereign states. George Schwab notes
that "thereturn of the foe," a situation based on absolute rather than legal enemies,is at least implicit in Schmitt's picture of the
end of the sovereign state.War would no longer be viewed as limited combat, but as a total struggle, as in medieval crusades,
against a criminalized and thus dehumanized enemy.
Schmitt
Decisions to make enemies are of utmost importance.

Schmitt
Distinguishing between friend and enemy is a cornerstone of the political

– it is up to us as individuals to make these representations
In order to provide philosophical underpinnings for thisretrieval of the notion of a status mixtus, Schmitt related thecommunity
and diversity of state-forms to two polarly oppositepolitical principles, concretely embodied in every state: the prin-ciple of
identity and the principle of representation. Schmitt wrote(p. 2 14):
The state rests, as a political unity, on the combination of two opposed principles: the principle of identity (namely the presenceof
the people as a political unity ... when capable of distinguish-ing between friend and enemy) and the principle of
representation,by virtue of which the political unity is constituted by the govern-ment.
On the one hand, the people was capable of unified politicalaction. This could happen when the people attained a full real-ization
of its identity and homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit). Theability to distinguish between friends and enemies became thecriterion for
the existence of political consciousness. The Weimarconstitution acknowledged that the people was the true subject ofpouvoir
constituant and the principle of identity determined thepeople's political unity. In truth, there could be no state withouta people
and a people would always be present and make its pres-ence felt in the constitution of the state. On the other hand, theprinciple
of representation was based on the fact that the politicalunity of a people could never attain full and permanent presence,it could
never be present as a actual identity. It needed always tobe represented personally by individuals.
The status mixtus was not an ideal notion. It could not claimthe conceptual rank of the principles of identity and representa-tion.
Only stark acceptance and recognition of the reality of thepolitical was able to validate it. For the truth was that no actualstate
could entirely give up the principle of identity, just as nonecould wholly renounce representation. The principles of identityand
representation were but theoretically opposed points of refer-ence, which excluded each other only when considered in
theabstract. In reality they jointly configured the diversity of existingpolitical unities. There could be no state without some kind
ofrepresentation. The need for it would seem superfluous in caseswhen direct democracy was rigorously exercised, when,
forinstance, active New England citizens met in the proverbial town-hall. But in truth, even in such cases, only adult members
werepresent and their democratic encounter lasted only while theywere present together in session. At the same time, no state
coulddispense with the structural principle of identity. Representationcould never be implemented absolutely and in a pure
fashion. Thepeople could not simply be ignored because, as a matter of fact, itwould always retain a presence. In sum, Schmitt
formulated the contrasted principles of identity and representation, not with aview to hinder the status mixtus, but better to
explain its poten-tial.
Schmitt
Alternative – Rejection
Reject aff - Interventions by the state must be limited – key to a strong

state
In the 1932 edition, he maintained basically the same view, but dropped and added crucial terms which confirmed his
rapprochement to the neoliberal standpoint. The same text now read:
For the liberals, by contrast, the goodness of humankind signifiesnothing more than an argument by means of which the state
ismade to serve society; it only means that society has its own orderin itself and that the state is only its distrustingly controlled
subor-dinate, bound to precise limits (1932b: 60)
A comparison of these two texts shows, in the first place, a substi-tution of the phrase 'society has its own order in itself' for the
phrase 'society is good'. This change coincided with what Schmitthad advanced in his Der Hiiter der Verfassung. There he
haddeveloped a conception of a strong state, strong enough to main-tain its independence with respect to the free development
of theforces that constituted civil society. Only a strong state couldrestrict its social interventions to a minimum and allow
'thatsociety and the economy could adopt in their respective spheresthe necessary decisions according to their immanent
principles'(Schmitt, 1931: 78). This view of the state coincided with require-ments demanded by German neoliberals and Schmitt
had noreservations in complying with them. Second, he added the phraseland bound by precise limits', defining in this way a
conditionthat the state ought to respect. This again conformed with hisconception of a strong state, a state that would stay within
itsown limits and would not invade, in quantitative totalitarianfashion, the domain of society.
Schmitt
Alternative – Sovereignty
The sovereign’s capacity to make political decisions is the essence of the

unity of the state
In his Political Theology, which was published shortly after Die Diktatur, Schmitt explored the notion of sovereignty, so maligned
by liberal thinkers and rescued from oblivion by the Catholicconservatives.
“De Maistre spoke with particular fondness of sovereignty, whichessentially meant decision. To him the relevance of the state
restedon the fact that it provided a decision, the relevance of the Churchon its rendering of the last decision that could not be
appealed.Infallibility was for him the essence of the decision that cannot beappealed. (1922b: 55)”
For Schmitt this meant that the foundations of a legal orderrested on a transcendent source: a subject who had the will todecide
politically. The capacity and willingness to make politi-cal decisions defined sovereignty. Sovereignty in turn secured theunity of
the state, and the state was henceforth in the positionto generate a system of law. Liberal constitutional theories, likethe one
developed by Kelsen, reversed this order of generation..A, supreme underived basic norm, Kelsen's Grundnorm,grounded a
legal order whose central point was the sovereignstate. There was no transcendent subject of pouvoir constituant,no natura
naturans, no eminent legislator to which the state'shighest authority could be traced. 'The basis for the validity ofa norm is only a
norm' (ibid.: 19). According to Schmitt, 'Kelsensolved the problem of sovereignty by negating it ... This [was]in fact the old liberal
negation of the state vis-a-vis law (Recht)and the disregard of the independent problem of the realizationof law (Recht)' (1922b:
21; compare with Schmitt 1921: 194).Kelsen drew no distinction between state and law (Recbt) andidentified the state with the
legal order (Recbtsordnung)(Schmitt, 1922c: 27).18 He thereby eliminated authority merelyat the level of definitions. It was easy
for Schmitt to prove that this was simply a cover-up. The living authority of the state, putto sleep by liberal enchantments, would
of necessity wake up atthe slightest invocation.
Schmitt
Strong sovereignty is needed to combat bad stuff in the world

Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Compromise

Schmitt’s alternative provides compromises for international cooperation
The sovereign and (still in Europe to some extent) national state maybe the only sound alternative to those largely empty hopes
that have beenraised against it. The sovereign state defended by Schmitt does not rejectinternational cooperation but remains
wary of encroachment on itsinternal governing power. Above all, it avoids the irreversible surrenderof the right of war. In view of
the foreign balance of power that has controlled Europe since 1945 and the current international problems of terrorism and drug-
related crimes, it may no longer be possible for all western governments to be as sovereign as the states that reconstructedthe
European map after the Napoleonic Wars. Still, it may be warrantedto distinguish between military cooperation and the turning of
military dependence into the subversion of another state's sovereignty. At the end of the Second World War, the United States
imposed on Germany and Japan a reeducation plan and a preferred regime, by right of conquest. Such a project by now has
become paradigmatic for many architects ofAmerican foreign policy who approach military alliances looking foropportunities for
further conversions. Those who promote such politicsresemble the Persian Emperor as depicted by Isocrates, who treatedGreek
allies as slaves by another name.
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Extinction
Eliminating conceptions of enmity results in them reemerging in worse

ways – a return to recognizing a concrete, external enemy is needed to
preclude the rise of an exterminationist ethic that seeks annihilation
   
Schmitt
   
Schmitt
   
Schmitt
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Economy
A strong state is key to a successful economy

The fact that he was Schleicher's legal adviser and member o-his clique influenced some contingent aspects of
Schmitt'sLangnamverein speech. But its overall argument marched inunison with what he had first developed in Der
Hiiter.atVerfassung, published the year before. There he sought to reiforce the authoritarian tendencies he discerned in the
Weimarconstitution by clearly demarcating the realms of the state a-Zof civil society. He blamed party politics for weakening
state authority and espoused a strong state to provide the necessary protection for the development of a free economy. In
hisLangnamverein speech, he used the formula 'qualitative total40m m opposed to the 'quantitative total state' of totalitarianism,
which he saw as a weak state) to refer to this strong state. Despite the anti-liberal resonances conjured by the notion of a state
described as both strong and total, it was well-received in liberal circles, where his views were interpreted favourably. A noted
neoliberal economist, Alexander Riistow,40 did not hesitate to confirm the liberal ancestry of Schmitt's conception of the total
state (1932: 69).
In this conference, Schmitt deployed many of the principles andessential elements of his theory of the state and the constitution.
Hesummed it up by adopting the conference's striking motto - only a strong state6 can preserve and enhance a free-market
economy.Schmitt’s address began by reviewing three epochal events inrecent history: first, the establishment, on 28 March, of a
presidential regime, instigated by Schleicher andsupported Juridically and ideologically by Schmitt's interpretation of article 48 of
the Weimar constitution; second, the Prussian coup
June 1932; and third, the enigmatic decision handed down byme supreme court at Leipzig on 25 October of that same year
which appeared to confirm the legality of the government's decision that led to the Prussian coup. Schmitt did not hide, first of all,
disappointment with the results shown by the presidentialSince its inauguration in 1930. One could not avoid 'the general
impression that the state has grown weaker and the circumstances have worsened and become more chaotic' (Appendix: p.
214. But he was still prepared to defend 'the practical usefulness
And energy of article 48' in the face of a campaign to discredit and
Defame it. Second, he was also willing to credit that failed regime, in his view, crucial achievement: the Prussian coup of 20That
decision went to the core of 'the Weimar constitution'sworst design defect - the dualism between the Reich and Prussia'p. 214).
Third, that sole achievement had been, in turn, compromised by another decision, the one handed down thepreceding month by
the supreme court at Leipzig. Schmitt noticedthat when a strong state asserted itself, it sparked an immediatereaction that
brought together a vast coalition of the most unlikelyconfederates. Despite his disappointment with that decision,Schmitt was still
hopeful that a strong state would prevail in theface of a number of opposing forces.
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Empowerment
The delineation between friends and enemies empowers individuals within

a political community
Schmitt
The task of the political is to provide experience and nourishment. The

decisions regarding friends and enemies are placed at the center of the
political which provides life with increased meaning.
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Freedom
The alternative protects freedom through spontaneous market

mechanisms and monopolization of protection
The first text was a conservative plea that decried party factionalism and appealed for a further strengthening of state authority.
could be read as an anticipated agenda for Schleicher's stint asChancellor. Schmitt's strong state was not meant to interfere
inany way with the affairs that properly belonged to civil society.His conservatism was combined with a liberal view that sought to
leave civil society to a large extent free of state regulation and ruled mainly by spontaneous market mechanisms. The strength
ofthis state was dependent on its ability to remain neutrall6 anddepoliticize society. This it could do by monopolizing the political
and assuming the full scope of its protective function. Schmittreferred to this authoritarian state as 'qualitative total state'
andcompared it to the stato totalitario of Italian fascism. The twotexts that he published shortly after Hitler rose to power
showedSchmitt's enthusiastic support for a new revolutionary statewhose strength was bolstered by the absence of an
essentialliberal ingredient, the separation of the executive and legislativepowers. Schmitt was personally responsible for
advancing aninterpretation of the enabling act of 24 March, the Instrument ofGovernment of Hitler's regime, as the revolutionary
abrogationof the Weimar constitution. Implicit in his argument was anappeal to the notion of constituent power, an appeal that
had theeffect of destroying the Weimar constitution and placing in itsstead the enabling act as a provisional constitution.
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Individual Effort

culture has been exhausted, it is up to individuals to affirm national integrity
Cristi 1998. [Renato, Professor in department of Philosophy, Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian
Liberalism. p. 73-74. BH
If Schmitt's critique of liberalism put him within the conservative camp, the existentialist tone of this hard decisionism wasmore
akin to a conservative revolutionary outlook. Other conser-vative revolutionaries, like Spengler, also gave up any claim
tolegitimacy, monarchical or democratic. They saw that the preser-vation of traditional ways of life and past institutions
wasillusory. Their pessimism led them to think that their present wasbeyond redemption, that history had passed its verdict:
Westernculture was exhausted, its soul had perished. Traditional con-servatives thought that the past retained its vivifying
force;revolutionary conservatives, on the contrary, stoically gave upany efforts to revitalize tradition. When the cultural soul of
anation died nothing could revive it. National integrity, in theabsence of spiritual forces to sustain it, ought to be affirmed bythe
decisive will of one single individual.
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Internal Conflict
A strong state is needed to crush factions that oppose it and ensure

individual freedom
Much of what appears bewildering and contradictory inSchmitt rested on the metaphysical symbiosis of dynamicity andstaticity,
pluralism and unity. This was the complexio opposito-rum that separated and brought together the state and civilsociety. Around
the distinction between the juridical and the real-ization of the Juridical, and that between the substance of powerand its
exercise, likely to be dismissed as 'scholastic subtleties' (Schmitt, 1921: 194), Schmitt built his last line of defence. Onthese
rested a string of other axiomatic distinctions which shapedthe architecture of his theory of the constitution (pouvoir consti-tuant
and pouvoir constitu6, law and measure, absolute andpositive constitution) and his theory of the state (the polarltvstate/civil
society, the separation of executive and legislativepowers). This metaphysical appurtenance of dynamicity andstaticity, pluralism
and unity was meant as the conceptual struc-ture that would ease the inevitable transition to a substantivelyliberal society.
According to Schmitt, a well-ordered liberalsociety was one founded on substantive values like private prop-erty and individual
freedom (Schmitt, 1928: 8 and 130).3 In thecourse of history, other national communities had been able toentrench and
institutionalize a substantive liberal order that didnot dissolve into factions. To attain such an order Germanyrequired a strong
state, one that could crush the powerful factionsthat menaced it from within. Only a strong state could be trustedto minimize the
power to be exercised over individuals. AsCondorcet acknowledges, once those associations puissantes aredismantled, 'll faut
blen peu de force pour forcer les individus
l'obeissance' (Schmitt, 1921: 204).
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Protection
Politics are dependant on “friends,” who make decisions on who

“enemies,” are. “Friends” are willing to risk their lives to defend
communities against “enemies”
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – Respect for the Other

The sovereign is the only way to preserve differences in an international
system
   
Schmitt
Schmitt
Alternative Solvency – State Collapse
Individuals must unite to view enemies collectively, preventing the state

collapsing in on itself
Schmitt
A2 Agamben
The rule only exists as a result to the exception. Without the exception,
rules could never derive.
Ph. D, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism; Against Politics as Technology) PG 226-227. AN
Exactly how does this natural-scientifically tainted constitutionalism hamper the ability to deal with the exception? As we know
from Chapter 3, according to Schmitt, any attempt to define the exception or to describewhat circumstances might constitute an
exceptional case is a hindrance onthe ability to manage it when it in fact arises to threaten a regime. ForSchmitt, it is ridiculous
to make plans or provisions for what one could notpossibly foresee (PT, 6-7). This could easily be taken as a call for a
perpetualstate of "emergency," in which an authoritarian regime is required to standguard at every moment for the possibility of
the sudden appearance of theexception.37 Any limit, legal or otherwise, to this government's functioning
would jeopardize its vigil and would necessarily require suspension. Schmitt seemingly attempts to allay such fears. Just as the
exceptional case by definition cannot be predicted, by definition neither can it exist at all times. Because of this, the exception
can be good for the legal order, for it confirmsits existence. There can be no "exceptional" situation without a normal one."'The
exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal descriptions can be valid must first be brought about.
Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its
regulations" (PT, 6-7). Schmitt asserts that the rule, in effect, defines the exception and that the exception, in turn, draws
attention to the rule, hence, ostensibly restoring confidence in the importance and primacy of the norm-bound situation. Schmitt
goes on, however, to suggest that the normal situation actually owes its legitimate existence, on the contrary, to the exception:
The exception can be more important ... than the rule, not because of aromantic irony for the paradox, but because the
seriousness of an insight goesdeeper than the clear generalizations inferred from what ordinarily repeatsitself. The exception is
more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but its
existence,which derives only from the exception. (PT, 15, emphasis added)
Schmitt
A2 Bad States
The internal standards that make up a group are irrelevant so long as

there is some form of homogeneity of the group so that war will only be
waged in self defense
Here it may be objected that Hegel's distinction between a legitimate state and a gang of courageous "robbers or murderers bent
on crime" is valid. If so, does Schmitt's political theory allow him to recognize it? It does in so far as it distinguishes between a
loosely organized group and one in which the sovereign authority is acknowledged by the citizenry to possess "the right to
demand from its members the readiness to die." Whether a group of the latter sort is made up of thieves and murderers is
beside the point. No doubt, some states have been largely concerned with the pursuit of murder and thievery. Such states are
deplorable. But they are states nonetheless. Schmitt is attempting to provide "a definition [of the political] in the sense of a
criterion,' one independent of the criteria that define the moral, aesthetic and economic spheres of human thought and action. It
follows that he will acknowledge as political some forms of association that may be good or evil, beautiful or ugly, profitable or
unprofitable.(n54)
However, it is one thing to say that the internal standards of a group defy evaluation by universal rationalist standards, and quite
another that the members of the group are incapable of guiding their own decisions by shared values or shared ideas of what
constitutes a good reason. Schmitt commits himself to the latter as well as the former position. The first step toward this
unwelcome conclusion is taken when he insists on the political irrelevance of the content of the "motives" that define any given
political group. Schmitt argues that the political "is independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can
neither be based on any one antithesis [such as good and evil, beautiful and ugly] or any combination of other antitheses, not
can it be traced to these." Further, "it would be senseless to wage war for purely religious, purely moral, purely juristic, or purely
economic motives."(n55) On what, then, will the solidarity of the group be based? What do they have in common if it is neither
economic, aesthetic, religious, or moral? The answer is a shared identity, the homogeneity of the group. Hence the only
"sensible" justification for waging war is the self-defense of the group.(n56) The homogeneity that defines the group may well
have its origins in a shared religion or a shared set of moral values. But politically this content is irrelevant. This would seem to
squash most public debate and deliberation. Moral, economic and even religious matters are things about which one can argue.
But shared identity, if there is one, appears to be nothing more than a fact. Indeed, it is not even that because this identity is so
formalized, so thoroughly drained of content, that is nothing more than a shared commitment. Like the sovereign decision, it is
neither a fact nor a norm.(n57)
Schmitt
A2 Dictatorship Bad
Dictatorship is always going to be superior to liberalism. Without a

dictator or sovereign, liberals are incapable of handing emergencies and
are vulnerable to these very emergencies.
Ph. D, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism; Against Politics as Technology) Pg. 124-127. AN
It is important to note that this purely technical aspect of dictatorship isat the very heart of the concept and the institution for
Schmitt and that ithad much to do in his mind with the contemporary use, disuse, and abuse ofthe concept in the early twentieth
century. According to Schmitt, the "bourgeois political literature" either ignores the concept altogether or treats it asa kind of
slogan to be used against its opponents (D, xi-xii). Schmitt isalarmed that the concept seems to be taken seriously only by the
Communists with their doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (D, xiii). TheCommunists have the concept partially right,
according to Schmitt, for theyrecognize its purely technical and temporary characteristics: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is
the technical means for the implementation of thetransition to the Communists' final goal" (D, xiv). The "centralizing machine"
and "domination-apparatus" of the state seized by the proletariat is not, according to their ideology, "definitive" for the
Communists, but rather.transitional" (D, xiv).
Schmitt notes that one might then see the communist theory of dictatorship as simply a modern incarnation of the classical
institution: a negationof parliamentary democracy without formal democratic justification (because the Communists are often a
minority) and a replacement of thepersonal dictator with a collective one (the party) (D, xiii). But this obscuresthe truly
fundamental transformation of the essence of the classical concept: The communist institution employs technical means to
create a newsituation; the classical institution employed them to restore a previous inexisting one. This difference has important
ramifications for the question ofjust how limited a dictatorship can be if it is legitimated and bound by afuture situation as
opposed to being legitimated by a previously existingone.5 This difference also lays the groundwork for the theoretical-
historicaldistinction that governs the whole of Die Diktatur.- the one between thetraditional concept of "commissarial
dictatorship," which is bound by allotted time, specified task, and the fact that it must restore a previously standing order; and
"sovereign dictatorship," which is unlimited in any way and may proceed to establish a completely new order.6 I will return to
theseissues in greater detail in subsequent sections.
So, if the Communists partially understand the essence of dictatorship.liberals, to the extent that they pay any attention to the
concept at all, completely misapprehend it, according, to Schmitt.7 Liberals have completely forgotten its classical meaning and
associate the idea and institution solely with the kind described by Schmitt as "sovereign" dictatorship: A distinction is no longer
maintained between dictatorship and Caesanmmand the essential determination of the concept is marginalized ...
thecommissarial char-acter of dictatorship" (D, xiii). Liberals deem a dictator tobe any single, individual ruling through a
centralized administration withlittle political constraint, often democratically acclaimed, and they equate aunreflectively with
authoritarianism, Caesarism, Bonapartism, military government, and even the papacy (D, xiii).8
But by corrupting the notion of this important technique for dealing withemergencies and subsequently banishing it from
constitutional concerns..liberal constitutionalism leaves itself especially susceptible to emergencies. Its blind faith in the technical
apparatus of its standing constitutions andthe scientistic view of the regularity of nature encourages liberalism tobelieve that it
needs no technique for the extraordinary occurrence, be cause the regular constitutional techniques are assumed to be
appropriateto a nature free of the extraordinary. Classical dictatorship is a wholly technical phenomenon that restores what is not
wholly technical, the normallegally legitimated order. Liberal constitutionalism is an order become increasingly technical through
its formulation of a conception of normalcythat excludes the extraordinary. Unlike the separation of powers that, according to
Schmitt, despite its fixation on equilibrium, ironically, cannotensure stability, or despite legal positivism that, due to its
mechanical nature, cannot distinguish between right and wrong and hence legality andlegitimacy, dictatorship has an end that is
not simply the perpetual means toanother end. The classical dictatorship emphasizes the importance of theregular order -
something that eludes the liberal positivism of Hans Kelsen,"for whom the problem of dictatorship has as much to do with a
legalproblem, as a brain operation has to do with a logical problem. This is aresult of a relativistic formalism that misunderstands
that dictatorship dealswith something else entirely, namely, that the authority of the state cannotbe separated from its value" (D,
xix). Dictatorship emphasizes the importance of the regular order through the imperative to bring it to restoration.For Schmitt, the
separation of powers and legal positivism defile it throughthe emphasis on uninterrupted processes and not what is substantively
important about a regime.
Schmitt
A2 Exceptions Bad
Sovereignty is inevitable, but certain exceptions are necessary to

momentarily confirm constitutional validity and protection
The recognition of the democratic political form and itsconstituent power had a price which Schmitt was eager to exact:the
reintroducion of sovereignty as a legitimate theme for constitutional discussion. He now felt he could point withoutmisgivings to
what he called 'apocryphal acts of sovereignty'.These sovereign actions set in motion the activity of constituentpower in the daily
ordeal of constitutional business. They tookplace, for instance, when particular constitutional norms wereviolated. Of
themselves, such violations did not imply the destruction or suppression of the constitution as a whole. On thecontrary, such
cases confirmed constitutional validity. Accordingto Schmitt, particular constitutional norms were violated in orderto safeguard
the substance of a constitution. Those violationswere only 'measures' (1928: 107) and not constitutional norms.They were
justified by particular exceptional and abnormal transitory situations. What these situations demonstrated was the,superiority of
the existential over mere normativity' (ibid.). Theyforced the recognition of sovereignty. Sovereignty manifesteditself when the
legal order was violated. According to Schmitt,whoever had the faculty to violate, and thus relativize, the legalorder as a whole
was sovereign. An absolute form of government,monarchical or democratic, implied a sovereign prince or a sovereign people
who stood legibus solutus, above the law. Bycontrast, the purpose of the liberal ideal was, according to Schmitt, to subject the
power of the state to the rule of law andexpel sovereignty from its domain. For Schmitt, this ideal ofabsolute normativity
constituted a tenuous fiction. The politicaland the state could be erased by legal fabrications and methods ofavoidance. Acts of
sovereignty would always occur. But 'theseacts of inevitable sovereignty' (Schmitt, 1928: 108) were betterjustified when they
could be seen as grounded in the constituentpower of the people.
Schmitt
A2 Friends Bad
Friends are classified in as part of Aristotle’s “the good.” Friendship

develops as a result of goodness
  
Schmitt
Schmitt
A2 Impacts Improbable
Even if war is only a tiny possibility, it reaffirms the need of a strong

sovereign
Schmitt
A2 Liberalism Good
Liberalism is self defeating – it intensifies wars, disciplines political

choices, and fails to promote peace
24-25. BH
Of course, this latter endeavour is hardly new and it is important to acknowledge that such questions about the relationship
between war and liberalism/liberal cosmopolitanism have been historically posed either from a traditional power-political (political
realist) perspective or, alternatively, from a historical materialist perspective.76 The former disregards the liberal nature of these
wars, suggesting that liberal values are often used to obscure a power political reality, thus paying scant attention to the ways in
which liberalism, in seeking to disavow war, promotes it and intensifies the ways in which it is fought. The latter has customarily
sought to interrogate both the ways in which the use of force is promoted within liberal zones of peace but also the ways in
which liberalism involves a modernist disciplining of those political endeavours which contradict its key tenets or even seek to
provide
alternatives to its worldview.71 More recently, moreover, poststructuralist accounts have suggested understanding liberalism
as a strategy for the gradual dissemination of principles that derive from war within the power relations that pervade the societies
it governs. Comprehending liberalism first and foremost as a strategy of power is, I argue, to deepen and broaden our
understanding of the relations between war and modernity in ways that can help us make sense of the profoundly logistical
orientation of liberal societies today. 78
This section examines the claim that the war on terror does not indicate a crisis in
cosmopolitanism but rather is the quintessential liberal cosmopolitan war; but it pursues this claim in a different way than the
critiques noted above. 79 It suggests that, despite the prominent sense in which the war on terror is portrayed as the antithesis
of cosmopolitan orientations and achievements, there are strong relationships between cosmopolitanism and the pursuit of the
war on terror. This section examines these in turn.
Schmitt
A2 Nazi
Nazism and Stalinism definitely had needs that had to be met, but until we
understand these needs from the clear awareness that the alternative
allows these types of movements will resurface without Democracy and
Morality having a chance of stopping them
The appeal and the danger of Schmitt's political thinking largely derive from his twofold insistence on the primacy of the whole.
Only if politics and experience can be imagined in a new way -- one that does not revolve around the attempt to regain unity and
totality -- will it be possible to move beyond Schmitt's concept of the political. Liberalism, of needs it promises to fulfill. For it is
simply not true that every Nazi or Stalinist was an evil, stupid, or morally retarded human being. As disturbing as it sounds, it
follows course, tries to do this. But the mere assertion of liberal principles to those who seek something else from politics is
clearly futile.(n68) Whether one finds Schmitt acceptable or not, it is undeniable that his concept of the political continues to
apply today. If it is to be set aside, it should be done with a clear awareness of the from this that there were what appeared to be
good reasons to believe that legitimate needs could be met by such movements. Until those needs are understood, it is difficult
to meet them in other ways and to resist those movements that promise to meet them. As Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe Lacoue-
Labarthe(n69) note: "It is not possible to push [Nazism] aside as an aberration, still less as a past aberration. A comfortable
security in the certitudes of morality and of democracy not only guarantees nothing, but exposes one to the risk of not seeing the
arrival, or the return, of that whose possibility is not due to any simple accident of history."(*)
Using Schmitt’s Nazi affiliation to overshadow his important political

contributions is problematic – we still must recognize the utility of his
political theories
In order to rescue Schmitt's Weimar writings and politicalphilosophy, his apologists have explained his later behaviour asdue to a
flawed moral character. According to Bendersky, forinstance, 'Schmitt's Nazi career definitely revealed a personalweakness so
far as moral principles are concerned'; at the sametime, this collaboration with the Nazis ought not 'to overshadowall other
aspects of his life and work' (1983: 282). If boundlessambition and lack of moral character alone could explain hissudden
conversion in March 1933, which then led to an obsequious intellectual capitulation to the most perverse aspects ofNazism, this
admission should be able to save the core ofSchmitt's conservative thought from Nazi contamination. Butwhile it is true that
opportunism was an ingredient in Schmitt'sintellectual adventure, and his apologists have been right in pointing this out
(Gottfried, 1990: 3), this does not necessarily absolvehis entire Weimar output. It is still possible to discern aspects ofhis
conservative thought in his Weimar writings that may be saidto configure and predetermine his intellectual abdication toHitler's
authoritarian figure.
Schmitt
Schmitt can’t be classified as a Nazi; Bendersky proves

Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. Pg. 3. TJ
Bendersky not only provides a serious treatment of Schmitt's relationship to the Weimar Republic, but also undertakes to put into
perspective his real and alleged involvement with Hitler's Third Reich. He conclusively demonstrates that Schmitt's support of
the early Nazi regime was at most an opportunistic tactic. Though charged by his critics with being "Hitler's Crown Jurist,"
Schmitt expounded a modified traditionalist view of the state that had little in common with Nazi theory or Nazi practice.
Bendersky's judgment, that Schmitt could be "neither nazified nor denazified," was an attempt to counter the accusation seen as
having led to his intellectual ostracism in the United States.
Schmitt
A2 No Obligation to State
People must be willing to risk their lives for the sake of the state – these
political communities transcend all other associations, the enemy wants
to destroy us all and sacrifices must be made
Schmitt relies on the threat to the individual's own physical life to draw out the "existential" quality of the political. But this threat
is hardly identical with the threat to the collectivity's "way of life" or "form of existence." In order to bridge the gap between the
two, Schmitt must present the Lebensform as in some way prior to the individual. This is why Schmitt never acknowledges as his
own the problem that bedevils Hobbes: if individuals merely enter into a polity to protect their lives, how can that polity ever
demand that they risk or sacrifice their lives? As Schmitt explicitly states, "the right to demand from its members the readiness to
die" implies that the state has a priority over the individual.(n19) Indeed, this is one of the most important features of the
Schmittian state. It is "by virtue of [its] power over the physical life of men [that] the political community transcends all other
associations or societies."(n20) Since the enemy is defined as a threat to those relations of "friendship" internal to the state, it
follows that the latter are not entirely a function of the external relation to the enemy.(n21) If Schmitt is at all coherent, then Wolin
must be wrong in claiming that Schmitt's "existential definition of politics in terms of the primacy of the friend-enemy grouping
necessitates the relinquishing of all claims to the 'good life' and instead to rest content with 'mere life' -- namely, existential self-
preservation."(n22) If an often intemperate writer is also capable of subtlety, one might see Schmitt's dedication to The Concept
of the Political as a clue to this. It reads "In memory of my friend, August Schaetz of Munich, who fell on August 28, 1917, in the
assault on Moncelul."
At this point, however, this may seem to be making extremely heavy weather out of a few turns of phrase. But Schmitt explicitly
states that: "The political... does not describe its own substance, but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human
beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can effect at
different times different coalitions and separations."(n23) The plainest reading of this is as follows: groups define themselves in a
variety of ways. The conflicts that emerge between these various groups are not political until they reach a certain level of
intensity -- until they pose a threat to the group's existence. The sovereign decision is then made whether or not to go to war in
order to resolve the conflict, at which point the conflict becomes political. What is distinctively political, then, is entirely a matter
of the conflict with the enemy; the relation with the friend is only a pretext: for this conflict. If the final step of this interpretation
were correctly taken, in view of Schmitt's claim that the political has an existential priority over all other forms of association,
Wolin would be quite right to conclude that Schmitt is committed to the view that "all the energies of modern life stand in the
service of war."(n24) How then can Schmitt assure his readers that "War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very
content of politics"?(n25)
"In case of need," Schmitt writes, "the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by
the individualism of liberal thought."(n26) What does justify, such a demand? In the longer of the two passages just quoted,
Schmitt is wholly unconcerned with the substance or motives of the association that enters into the political conflict. Yet
something connected to these motives, which are said to have no specifically political substance, is strong enough to lead men
and women to offer their lives for the group. More, it is strong enough that men and women ought to recognize as legitimate the
"right" of the state to "demand" their lives. Given the political indifference of the content of the group's motives and beliefs, it can
only be this recognition itself that makes the group political. When one, for whatever reason, prize the integrity of one's way of
life over one's own lives, then he has become political. The threat to human life does not make one political, but serves only as a
reminder of one's commitment, of the fact that one's way of life is valued above one's life. Compare, in this regard, the quotation
at the beginning of this paragraph with Schmitt's previously cited claim: "If physical destruction of human life is not motivated by
an existential threat to one's own way of life, then it cannot be justified." The decisive conflict is between political solidarity and
apolitical, liberal individualism: "The negation of the political... is inherent in every consistent individualism."(n27)
Schmitt
A2 Perm
Combining the state with the legal order does not allow the state to be the
highest force and will ultimately lead to the destruction of the state
Schmitt
A2 State Deconstruction Good

The idea of deconstructing the state is an “astonishing
misunderstanding” and must be reject. Turning to the state leads to
unrestricted participation in all social systems
    
Schmitt
Schmitt
A2 Schmitt  War
War is not the aim or the purpose of the identity politics that Schmitt
prescribes – it is democracy that seeks the eradication of the other
No doubt, this interpretation shifts the grounds of the debate on Schmitt in an important way. Too many of Schmitt's critics take
him to task for war-mongering. If this were true, it would make him an easy target. It is far more uncomfortable to recognize his
close relation to the currently fashionable identity politics. The assertion of identity need not follow from nor lead to a violent
conflict. Schmitt is quite right when he insists that "[w]ar is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the content of politics." But it
would be naive or disingenuous to maintain that a politics that defines itself in terms of a shared identity did not raise this and
other dangers. As Schmitt rather chillingly puts it "[D]emocracy requires ...first homogeneity and second -- if need arises --
elimination or eradication of heterogeneity."(n67)
Constant conflict is not necessary, but we must always be willing to

recognize the enemy and realize that conflict is a real possibility – without
the will to this political beyond physical existence life has no meaning – a
loss of life contributes to something bigger
Compare this interpretation with Leo Strauss's reading of Schmitt: Strauss concludes that, in the absence of an independent
moral affirmation of the political, "the affirmation of the political is the affirmation of fighting as such, wholly irrespective of what is
being fought for."(n32) This still places too much emphasis on actual combat. As Schmitt put it: "The political does not reside in
the battle itself... but in the mode of behavior which is determined by this possibility."(n33) That mode of behavior is a solidarity
that makes possible both self-sacrifice and political authority. In a passage often quoted by his detractors, Schmitt insists that
"The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the
enemy."(n34) "Simultaneously," because such high points of politics are not identical with the recognition of the enemy. It is not
that groups need to be constantly at war with one another to be political,(n35) but that the people belonging to them see war and
what it demands as a real possibility, i.e., that they are reminded of their commitments, of their willingness to give their lives
when the sovereign demands they do so. The relation of friend is not defined by the emergence of the enemy, but it is brought
into view in its true significance. This should make it plain why Schmitt suggests that a loss of meaning and significance attends
the eclipse of the political.(n36) Life will lack meaning unless it contains commitments cherished above mere physical existence.
(n37)
Much of the drama and the danger of Schmitt's work is a function of this attempt to use politics to counter nihilism. Though
Schmitt's polemical political theory sets itself against the presuppositions of what he finds to be today's "individualistically
disintegrated society,"(n38) he is hardly a latter-day Tocqueville or a communitarian a la Michael Sandel. Where Tocqueville
contrasts individualism with a public life of the sort that jury duty might encourage, Schmitt contrasts it with solidarity in the face
of the potential enemy.(n39) If Tocqueville seeks to broaden personal interests and to temper "the habits of the heart," Schmitt
seeks to change the concept of who one are.(n40) Politics paves the way for this in such a way that. it makes sense to sacrifice
one's life, because of the awareness that there will be some other form of survival. Where Schmitt adds decisively to the analysis
of Tocqueville et. al. is in his emphasis on authority (and hence commitment) and mortality. Schmitt aligns himself with the
Greeks in his insistence that politics be a response to the fragility and futility of human life. He is hostile to individualism., not
simply because of his authoritarian tendencies, but also because the form individualism has taken in contemporary society,
manifest in the consumption of images, pleasures, and commodities, is simply incapable of addressing this issue.
Schmitt
The sovereign’s insistence on belligerence is justified given the external

threats of the enemy
That all said, interpretations of Schmitt that center on his alleged "occasional" belligerence remain plausible, because of the
stress he places on the threat of physical death implicit in the encounter with the enemy. It is this, he argues, that establishes the
existential independence of the political: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is
that between friend and enemy"; and, "The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because
they refer to the real possibility of physical killing."(n12) Because of this structural configuration, he has far more to say about the
enemy than the friend. Since The Concept of the Political understands the state in terms of the political, it characterizes the state
primarily in terms of external conflict rather than in terms of specific internal social structures.(n13) Nonetheless, it would be a
mistake to think that what Schmitt means by an enemy can be grasped without understanding what he means by a friend,
however difficult this latter task may be. This is not merely true because, as the old saw has it, a valley cannot be imagined
without a hill. It is also because some meaning must be given to the notion of the friend in order to make any sense of Schmitt's
distinction between the private and the public.(n14)
Schmitt
A2 Totalitarian
Schmitt’s alternative does not embody totalitarian regimes, it emphasizes

freedom and autonomy
The argument expounded in this book seeks to define the scopeand assumptions of Schmitt's theory of the state and the
constitution and the pivotal task it addressed - securing the state'sautonomy and independence. Only this would shore up
andstrengthen the power and authority of the state. A strong state,however, did not imply canceling civil society's own
independence. If totalitarianism means that the state ultimately assimilatesand metabolizes civil society, at no point of his
intellectual development did Schmitt espouse such a totalitarian view. On thecontrary, he thought that an autonomous state
would prove itsstrength by affirming the freedom and autonomy of civil society.This is a keystone of Schmitt's theory of the state
and the constitution. At one point during the Weimar republic, Schmitt publiclystated his dual affirmation of a strong state and a
free economy,which neatly encapsulates the aim and scope that defined histheory of the state and the constitution.7 My choice
of the motto’strong state and free economy' as the subtitle of this book is intended to highlight this. In order to adjudicate
between theopposing claims of a sovereign state and a free civil society andharmonize their interests, Schmitt appealed to the
distinction. between the substance and the exercise of sovereignty, developedby medieval philosophers like D'Ailly and Gerson
(Schmitt, 1921:44, 193). This distinction, mentioned only in his early Weimarproduction, provided him with the definitive model
for the operation of a strong state. Normally, the exercise of state sovereignty was juridically ordained and was thus limited. But
thesubstance of its omnipotence was unlimited and remained in a stateof latency, waiting to be roused in exceptional
circumstances.
Schmitt is not totalitarian – the friend enemy distinction does not always
lead to war and is actually a response to nihilism
This reading of The Concept of the Political is unwarranted. While some might not be surprised that Schmitt put his intellectual
powers in the service of the Nazi Party when it came to power, although most of his colleagues and students were shocked, it
does not follow that Schmitt's concept of the political is itself necessarily totalitarian.(n6) Schmitt's attempt to characterize politics
in terms of friendship and enmity is both more complicated and more interesting than his critics suggest. In particular, his
provocative formulations of the friend/enemy distinction should not lead to the conclusion that he reduces politics to a function of
war. Schmitt's theoretical position requires a prior substantive commitment to relations of "friendship" and social solidarity. His
account of political authority, in particular, rests on an almost Hegelian understanding of the individual's relation to the
community and one's own mortality. The friend/enemy criterion defines a particular form of life, one in which group identity is
valued above physical existence.(n7) To properly understand Schmitt's work it must be considered not as a rejection of an
established moral order but as a response to a culture of nihilism in which meaning -- rather than value -- is ebbing away.
Schmitt
Aff – Destroys Debate
Schmitt’s emphasis on depoliticization is a de-democratization that

destroys debate because it precludes movements from bringing people to
the streets
Schmitt
Aff – Friendship Bad

The reason to engage in friendship is purely selfish in that engagement in
friendship is only for one’s own personal benefit, or to benefit the state
Schmitt
Aff - Nazi Turn
Schmitt’s arguments contributed to the rise of the Nazi party

When the Nazis rose to power at the end of January 1933,

Schmitt's initial reaction was of dismay at realizing Schleicher'spolitical failure. After cautiously observing the turn of events
hemade his move immediately after 24 March, the day the enablingact was promulgated by the Reichstag. The next day he
completeda commentary on that piece of legislation which he then sent tobe published in the Deutscbe juristen-Zeitung. There
he interpreted the enabling act as having somehow activated the notionof constituent power or pouvoir constituant,9 which
meant that the Weimar constitution had been formally superseded. This Revolutionary action had cancelled the effects of the
German revolution of 1918. The Nazis had attained in a few days what Schmitt had strived to defend during Weimar: a strong
state. TheNazi regime acknowledged the great service Schmitt had rendered immediately invited his collaboration. This began
on 1 April,scarcely two months after Hitler's rise to power. Installed asregime's Kronjurist, he soon climbed to prominent
positions
Within the government and his profession. In November 1933, forexample, he was appointed Director of the Association
ofCierman National Socialist jurists, and in June 1934, he became The editor of the Deutsche juristen-Zeitung. Unforgivably, he
alsobegan to adopt the most despicable aspect of Nazi doctrine, their
Anti-Semitism, of which one cannot find traces in any of hisearlier writings. The Nazis, however, who showed more interest.n
strengthening the party than in strengthening the state, soonfound their Kronjurist was dispensable. In 1936 Schmitt lost-much of
what he had gained politically and his ideas were no longer seriously considered by the Nazi authorities.
Schmitt
Aff - Nihilism Turn
Schmitt’s politics is nihilistic – it glorifies violence and reduces friendship

to a common will to destroy the enemy
The main complaint: against this formulation is familiar enough: Schmitt allegedly emphasizes the limitations of law only to glorify
the decision that exceeds the regulation of any law. Insofar as rights are defined and guaranteed by law, Schmitt's existential
concept of the political makes these rights vulnerable to unregulated political decision. This is found to be all the more
distressing, since Schmitt stresses the decision's role in the most extreme case, i.e., war, in the political identification of the
existential enemy. As he puts it: "Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete
situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to
negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence."(n2)
The bellicose nihilism this suggests is often seen as a causal factor in Schmitt's own active participation in the Nazi movement in
the 1930s. His political theory, it is alleged, is opportunistic, with only one consistent commitment --to the irrational. Thus Richard
Wolin claims that the central roles played in Schmitt's political theory by the political decision and the threat of war are both
motivated by a "vitalism" and a "politics of authenticity," with the aim of overturning the vapid bourgeois order.(n3) The result is a
glorification of violence.(n4) In the end, politics for Schmitt is a matter of conflict and war, and the true criterion of the political is
the enemy. Who one's political "friends" are is determined only in the encounter with the enemy, and they are valued only insofar
as they allow for success in the resulting war. As Martin Jay puts it, "the hated other [is] needed to create the solidarity of the
homogeneous self."(n5)
Schmitt
Aff – Perm
Perm: do both, pass plan in order to recognize the enemy
Schmitt
Perm – A combination of liberalism and non-liberalist regimes is best to

maintain the power of the sovereign – the impacts of the kritik are
inevitable, so we should use the combination of the two alternatives
because there are limits to both – get the best of both worlds
   
Schmitt
Schmitt
Perm - a combination of democracy and the politics of Schmitt is net

beneficial, neither system works on it’s own – the perm is net beneficial
because it ensures the legitimacy as a result of the people
Perm: agonism and democratic politics can overlap to allow for more
creativeity.
Perhaps one could argue for a coexistence of a Nietzschean cultural elite and a democratic egalitarian politics. Some of
Nietzsche's own remarks suggest as much (see HAH I,438 and KSA 10, p.244). One passage seems to imply that a fortified
democratic egalitarianism would spur even higher forms of creativity ( BGE 242), which would be consistent with Nietzsche's
overall agonistics, in the sense that part of creativity is a resistance to, and dissatisfaction with, the established norm.
Nietzschean cultural creators could simply coexist with a democratic polity, even be given some honor, yet not be given
unchecked political power. A restricted agon might be appropriate for the arts, let's say, but context is everything. The context of
political practices and milieus is such that artistic genius seems out of place.
Such an interpretive outcome might be satisfying, but I would not want to establish it by separating the cultural and
political spheres, as some would be happy to do in order to either preserve democratic ideals from Nietzsche's critique
or rescue Nietzsche from reprobation by sidestepping his frightful political remarks or decoding them as simply
metaphors for self-creation. I think that Nietzsche's attack on democracy ought to be challenged, but not by reasserting
democratic traditions, but by showing that much of Nietzsche's cultural and philosophical outlook is compatible with,
even constitutive of, much of democratic politics. So the distinction between cultural and political spheres allows us to
challenge some of Nietzsche's political vision; but overlaps between the spheres show that Nietzsche's authoritarianism
is weakened by his own philosophical orientation, and that democratic political life [End Page 141] can exhibit certain
creative, nonegalitarian, and agonistic elements to a degree that may warrant calling it Nietzschean enough to support a
democratic appropriation of Nietzsche (thus answering Appel's challenge).
Schmitt
Aff – Schmitt Dumb
Schmitt never concedes that conflict and the friend/enemy relationship is

inevitable. He only talks about the possibility conflict and the formation of
friend/enemy groups
Schmitt
War Turn
Politics is centered around the idea of friends and enemies, making it the
most extreme source of friction that will eventually lead to war.
Wolfe 2004. [Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life and
professor of political science at Boston College.] April 2. Chronicle of Higher Education: The
Chronicle Review. “A Fascist Philosopher Helps Us Understand Contemporary Politics” Volume
50, Issue 30, Page B16. http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i30/30b01601.htm. AN
In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt wrote that every realm of human endeavor is structured by an irreducible duality. Morality
is concerned with good and evil, aesthetics with the beautiful and ugly, and economics with the profitable and unprofitable. In
politics, the core distinction is between friend and enemy. That is what makes politics different from everything else. Jesus's call
to love your enemy is perfectly appropriate for religion, but it is incompatible with the life-or-death stakes politics always involves.
Moral philosophers are preoccupied with justice, but politics has nothing to do with making the world fairer. Economic exchange
requires only competition; it does not demand annihilation. Not so politics.
"The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism," Schmitt wrote. War is the most violent form that politics takes, but,
even short of war, politics still requires that you treat your opposition as antagonistic to everything in which you believe. It's not
personal; you don't have to hate your enemy. But you do have to be prepared to vanquish him if necessary.
Schmitt
Although war is not the purpose of politics, it is the most extreme result of
friction between friends and enemies
Schmitt
FYI: Difference between commissarial and

sovereign dictatorship

WFI Schmitt K

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WFI Schmitt K

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Schmitt

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007

Schmitt Table of Contents

Liberalism Bad Shell

The West is reintroducing colonialism into the international sphere which

The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose,

A strong state is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the regulated

Liberalism lacks any political foundation – a lack of political theology

War is inevitable, but we must approach it from a political framework,

Enemies Good Shell

The politics created by the affirmative is a deviation form the preparation

Case Take Out: Political action can only be achieved through

Identifying enemies is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the

Alternative Solvency: Agonism crushes the drive towards destruction and

Alternative: The alternative is to reject the affirmative by embracing a

War is inevitable, but we must approach it from a political framework,

Link –Generic Links

The affirmative plan is a representation of civil society that is the site of

The state’s current method of politicization (esp economics) contributes o

Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War

Interference by the state into modern society weakens the apparatus as a

Any deviation of the state from a protective function is bad – the

Link – Civil Society

Democracy is self defeating and it contributes to a weakened state

Democracy is self defeating – the will of the people is unorganized and

Democracy kills the unity of the state, it must be neutralized

Democracy forces the state to intervene in civil society weakening its

Democracy destroys state strength

Education projects in South Africa can lead to force to implement our

The discourse of humanity represents a battle against political that serves

Humanitarianism is a war for liberalism – the goal is not to help the

Humanitarian efforts are a form of liberalist impositions on the state

Humanitarianism attempts to create universal friendship, but this

Humanitarianism is an effort to achieve a universal order in which

Link - International Relations

State intervention in the arena of social justice destroys individual

Neither liberalism nor democracy favor politics of restraint and democracy

Liberalism has increased the gap between representation and reality – we

Liberalism makes liberal regimes vulnerable to emergencies and must

Link – Modernity (Generic)

The end goal of peace is a form of depoliticization that denies the

Link – Rights to Africans

Link – Rule of Law

The liberal rule of law seeks to limit sate power

Technology links to liberalism

Link – War on Terror

Impositions by the civil society on the state crumble its strength

Impact – Civil War

A distinction of enemies and friends is needed to avert impending civil

Dictatorship is inevitable through the affirmative’s engagement in politics

Universality fails – leads to exclusions and annihilation

The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose,

Having enemies is necessary to ensure the containment of war – The

With the implementation of values leads to naming enemy as

Impact – Governance Fails

Liberalism fails as a organizing politic – creating enemies is a necessary

Liberalism fails at governance because of the way it is limited from

Impact – Internal Conflict

Failure to adhere to a strict friend/enemy dichotomy produces internal

Without a sovereignty to name foe’s conflict turns in on the state and

Impact – Solvency Takeout

The creation of antagonisms is necessary for the sovereign’s ability to

Agonism can be healthy for establishing hierarchies.