Disad

China-Taiwan-US war outweighs and turns case –

a) Magnitude – China and US are the two most dominant East Asian powers – war
between them would draw in all other major nuclear states and ensure global
nuclear war
b) Timeframe and probability – China’s already acting in Taiwan and tensions
there have only been rising – the area’s on hair trigger alert and could escalate at
any moment
c) Turns case – rape and dehumanization is inevitable in a world of nuclear war
because there are no rules – everybody would be looking out for themselves and
would do anything to survive
d) Evaluate magnitude first – no matter how low the probability is we must act to
prevent Sino-Taiwan war – and even if they win probability outweighs, we still win
that probability is high – this is the only scenario for war with China – star this
card
O’Hanlon adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, 07 [Michael, “A war like no
other: the truth about China's challenge to America”, p. google books]

War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the
United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus
leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states. It seems
inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their
mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the
dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about
is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to
come to blows. There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap- ter three, most of the reasons whv China and
the United States could theoretically fight do not in the end hold water. But the Taiwan problem
is different. Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control. Not only
does it involve a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nation and that the
United States sees as a long-standing, stalwart, and democratic friend. In addition, the way that a
China-Taiwan crisis could begin and escalate would hold the inherent potential for
escalation to direct superpower war. This chapter explains whv. The- next chapters get into the dynamics of what could
happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely serious—but also why it could be tough to control. The overall message is
sobering. Even if the chances of war between the United States and China are less than 25 percent—
indeed, even if they are less than 10 percent—they are far from zero. And given the
enormous consequences of any such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as lasting effects on the interna- tional system,
every effort must be made to prevent it. World War I did not seem very likely to most world
leaders in 1912 or 1913 either; certainly a horrible four-year struggle, followed two decades later by an even
worse world war, was not predicted. We must avoid dire mistakes of that era and take seriously the
possibility of a war that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war
could occur, are as follows: First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has
arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has
explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second, Chinas military capabilities are
growing last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an
opportunity—if it can keep the United States out of the light Third, Taiwan could push the
sovereignty' issue in away that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While
China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions could
matter more than reality in such a situation. Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan is
long- standing, it is also somewhat ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United
States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.

He says China threat –

1. The status quo disproves – 1NC Payne proves that our threats aren’t
constructed – objective analysis proves that China is modernizing its military
arsenal for war

2. China’s modernizing and expanding now – this ain’t no threat construction,

this is real –other claims are merely hippy rhetoric and their authors failed history
– their criticism is trying to deny the simple facts and avoid facing the music
Nyquist 5 (Jeffrey R, brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy and the Chinese military, “Recent China
Revelations,” http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0701.html, dml)

China’s war preparations are deliberate, and the implications should not be passed over
lightly. China is a highly secretive country, like all communist countries. The objective of communism is world revolution, the overthrow of global capitalism, the
destruction of the free market, the elimination of the international bourgeoisie and the disarming of the United

States. We should be puzzled, indeed, if Chinese policy did not follow the communist line (however deviously). Given all this, it is difficult to account for the dismissive attitude of U.S. intelligence experts when
regarding Chinese intentions. The China problem is a serious one. “The people … of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite,” said Chairman Mao in
1964. “The people of all continents should unite … and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace.” In terms of today’s peace movement,

Mao’s sentiments are up-to-date. They are, I think, a founding inspiration. The supposed “death of communism” may have eliminated a few soiled terms, but not the main idea.
The label on old hatreds may be changed, but the content remains the same. And because America is asleep, and the market is buzzing with

Chinese goods, the U.S. government has turned a blind eye. The truth about China is worse than
inconvenient. It is painful. So a special context has been devised for dismissing inconvenient facts.
This context is inculcated at graduate schools, think tanks and in government. The context
for understanding international affairs must not admit the existence of a coordinated,
secretive and dangerous combination of countries motivated to overthrow the United States.
In other words, the existence of a “communist bloc” cannot be admitted. And China’s role within this bloc – above all – must be rated as a “crackpot notion.” And yet, the existence of something identical to the old communist
bloc – whatever we choose to call it – is indicated by actions across the board by Russia, the East European satellite countries, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and China. Some ideas fall from fashion. But truth is always true,

fashion or not . U.S. experts failed to connect the dots regarding China’s development of a long-range
cruise missile, a new attack submarine, new ground-to-air missiles, a new anti-ship missile
(for sinking U.S. aircraft carriers) and more. China is preparing for war against the United States,
specifically. As absurd as it sounds to the economic optimists who think trade with China guarantees peace, the U.S. and China are bound to collide. Anyone who thinks otherwise

doesn’t have a sense of history, doesn’t understand communist thinking or the overall policy Beijing has consistently followed since 1949. Communist countries periodically
experiment with capitalism, they always seek trade with the West, and they always sink the money and technology they gain thereby into a military buildup. Ultimately, they don’t care about

the prosperity of their people, the state of the national infrastructure, personal or press
freedom. Some believe that we mustn’t say that China is a threat. Such a statement would be akin to self-fulfilling prophecy. But an honest appreciation of Chinese
actions should not be disallowed by an appeasing diplomacy or wishful thinking. The job of the analyst is not to
guarantee good relations with countries that are preparing for destructive war. The job of the analyst is to see war preparations, diplomatic maneuvers and economic policies and draw a common sense conclusion about them. If
world peace depends on hiding China’s military buildup, then world peace is like your fat uncle dressed in a Santa Claus suit. Saying it’s your fat uncle may ruin Christmas for your little sister, but Santa Claus isn’t a real
person – and never will be.

3. The alternative triggers a war through Chinese misperception and

miscalculation.
Christensen, prof. of politics and international affairs at Princeton U, 2006 (Thomas J., INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, Summer 2006, p. 81)

In the Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer takes a similarly dark view of China's rise from the perspective of great power competition. He
this "misguided" policy is based
blasts the U.S. policy of constructive engagement, espoused by most American elites. He believes that

on the false hope that international engagement of China will do more than just make China
strong; it will also make it more cooperative. Mearsheimer writes, "China is still very far away
from the point where it has enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony. So it is not
too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China. In
fact, the structural imperatives of the international system, which are powerful, will probably
force the United States to abandon its policy of constructive engagement in the near future." n63
In his 2000 book, Dale Copeland similarly concludes that if high rates of Chinese growth
continue through the first decade of this century, Washington's China policy "can be predicted
to gravitate toward the hard-line end of the spectrum," meaning, for Copeland, a Cold War-style containment strategy
aimed at limiting trade and investment relations with China.
4. Realism is good in the context of China – the PRC is a legitimate threat to
security and realism is empirically proven in this context; their alternative
uniquely leads to war.
Mearsheimer, prof. of poliscie at the U of Chicago, 5 (John, November 18, The Australian, “The Rise of China
Will Not Be Peaceful at All”, lexis)

will China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive
THE question at hand is simple and profound:

economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense
security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbours, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South
Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the US to contain China's power. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act and how
other states will react to them. My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival
The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximise its share of world
great power dominates another region.

power and eventually dominate the system. The international system has several defining
characteristics. The main actors are states that operate in anarchy which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. All great powers
have some offensive military capability, which means that they can hurt each other. Finally, no
state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in
such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is
that another state will attack it. The great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon,
the only great power in the system. But it is almost impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony in the modern world, because it is too hard to project and sustain power
around the globe. Even the US is a regional but not a global hegemon. The best that a state can hope for is to dominate its own back yard. States that gain regional hegemony have a
further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want
to keep other regions divided among several great powers so that these states will compete with each other. In 1991, shortly after the Cold War ended, the first Bush administration
That same message appeared in the famous
boldly stated that the US was now the most powerful state in the world and planned to remain so.

National Security Strategy issued by the second Bush administration in September 2002. This
document's stance on pre-emptive war generated harsh criticism, but hardly a word of protest
greeted the assertion that the US should check rising powers and maintain its commanding
position in the global balance of power. China -- whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic -- is likely to try
to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically,
China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours,
especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is
unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it
will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries, much the way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss.
Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will
get Taiwan back. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the US
out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the
Western hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of
the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s. These policy goals make good strategic
sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its
borders. What state in its right mind would want other powerful states located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the 20th century when Japan was
powerful and China was weak. In the anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military
forces operating in its back yard? American policy-makers, after all, go ballistic when other great powers send military forces into the Western hemisphere. Those foreign forces are
invariably seen as a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with US
forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine,
would not China's security be better served by pushing the American military out
of Asia? Why should we expect the Chinese to act any differently than the US did? Are they more principled than the Americans are? More ethical? Less nationalistic? Less
concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to imitate the US and attempt to become a regional hegemon. It is

clear from the historical record how American policy-makers will react if China
attempts to dominate Asia. The US does not tolerate peer competitors. As it
demonstrated in the 20th century, it is determined to remain the world's only
regional hegemon. Therefore, the US can be expected to go to great lengths to
contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of
ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the US is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
China's neighbours are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is

already substantial evidence that countries such as India, Japan, and Russia, as
well as smaller powers such as Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, are worried
about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they
will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France,
 given Taiwan's strategic
Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the US to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Finally,

importance for controlling the sea lanes in East Asia, it is hard to imagine the US,
as well as Japan, allowing China to control that large island. In fact, Taiwan is
likely to be an important player in the anti-China balancing coalition, which is sure
to infuriate China and fuel the security competition between Beijing and
Washington.

He says no war –
1. The only warrant to this evidence is that the US doesn’t want to fight – this is
irrelevant – we would be forced to because we have promised Taiwan that we’d
back them up

2. The evidence says that Bush (who isn’t president anymore btw) wants to
uphold relations – but those aren’t a check against war
Hunkovic, American Military university, 09 [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict
Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of
America”, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf]

The situation between China, the United States and Taiwan is stable for the time being.
However, the stability of the status quo is delicate. If any change in the current dynamic
between the three countries occurs and the balance is upset, war may be the end result.
If a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, China is clearly the most likely of the three countries
to fire the first shot. This is due to the fact that the absorbing of Taiwan is not only the
highest national priority from the standpoint of patriotism and national morale, but also
critical to Chinese national security. Taiwan would be little short of suicidal to provoke a war with China
and the United States does not wish to be involved in any additional war at this point, as it simply cannot afford
one, with its dire economic crisis. While the United States will quite possibly be more concerned with the
preservation of its own national interests in the near future, rather than maintaining its military security obligations
and wish to steer clear of the Chinese-Taiwanese conflict, by finding a graceful way to shy away from
its military commitment to defend Taiwan; however, the danger of this policy, as the pairwise comparisons
showed, is that doing so, at least openly, could have the complete opposite effect, by emboldening
China to take Taiwan by force. To make matters worse, this would not only severely undermine the
strategic security of other American allies in East Asia, such as Japan, but also serve to
worsen the economic crisis that threatens to severely curtail the funding to the U.S.
military. Therefore, the United States has a vested interest in using aggressive diplomatic pressure to maintain
the status quo and workable relations between China and Taiwan, by using incentives to keep both countries at the
negotiating table, as the Chinese typically do not respond well to intimidation and attempting such will only
increase their proclivity towards military aggression. While the Taiwanese people without a doubt deserve their
freedom and human rights, neither of which the People’s Republic of China places any value on whatsoever,
allowing the situation to deteriorate to the point where Taiwan is at war with China would be doing them an
incredible disservice, due to the fact that at this point, America is in a very precarious position militarily and
economically and not militarily supporting Taiwan in such a conflict would be leaving them to almost certainly be
eventually crushed. Since the United States does nonetheless have a moral and ethical
responsibility to do everything in their power to keep this from happening, the best way to
accomplish this goal is to do everything possible to keep both China and Taiwan from determining that their
negotiations are not being productive and that war is their best option. Attempting to follow any other course of
action at the present time, from attempting to militarily coerce China or openly renouncing the United
States’ security obligation to Taiwan would be a dangerous course of action and a recipe
for disaster.

3. And, war over Taiwan is the only scenario for extinction – US gets involved.
Prefer our evidence – it’s comparative
Tucker, professor at Georgetown University, 05 [Nancy, “Dangerous strait: the U.S.--
Taiwan--China crisis”, p. google books]

At the beginning of this new century,

nowhere is the danger for Americans as great as in the
Taiwan Strait where the potential for a war with China, a nuclear armed great power, could
erupt out of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. Skeptics might argue that other
threats are more volatile or more certain—conflict in the Middle East, terrorism at home and
abroad, clashes with angry and chaotic rogue or failed states. But although the United States
risks losing lives and repu- tation in these encounters none but a collision with China would
be as massive and devastating. War with China over Taiwan may or may not be inevitable. The pros-
pect, nevertheless, shapes the course of U.S.-Taiwan relations and signifi-cantly influences the texture of Taiwan's
domestic affairs. Similarly, though the level of tension between Washington and Beijing fluctuates, depending on
security, proliferation, trade, and human rights concerns, the dilemma of Taiwan's future remains a
constant and can become incendiary with little warning. Optimists believe that, with time, ground for
reconciliation be- tween China and Taiwan can be found and the two sides will be able to ar- rive at a mutually
acceptable solution despite an impasse that has produced repeated military skirmishes and political upheaval for
more than fifty years. Pessimists argue that the road to war has been laid, and nothing that anyone does, short of
realizing the immediate unification demanded by Beijing, will deter combat. Indeed some feel that progress toward
such a calamity has speeded up, making Washington's struggle to keep the rivals at peace, and the United States
out of war, much more difficult. It is not surprising, therefore, that those who write on the interactions among the
United States, Taiwan, and the PRC inevitably are drawn to, and quickly become preoccupied with, the situation in
the Taiwan Strait. The tendency to focus on the clash of interests surrounding Taiwan's status and future follows
naturally from the hazards inherent in the existing situation. For decades the contending parties have struggled
toward largely incom- patible objectives. China insists upon recovery of the island of Taiwan which it
asserts is a part of China's sovereign territory, severed from the mainland first by imperialists and then by the
losing side in a civil war. Tai- wan's rulers initially believed as adamantly as those of the PRC in the uni- ty of China,
but declared that Taipei not Beijing was the legitimate capital. More recently, Taiwan has sought increasing
autonomy and international space despite Beijing's objections, with the majority of the population fa-
voring a status quo that shuns both independence and Chinese control. For the United States also, the status quo is
desirable since Washington has acknowledged, without accepting, the one-China principle asserted by Bei- jing. At
the same time, the United States has legally obligated itself, in a way some sec as a contradiction,
to help provide for Taiwan's defense and has asserted its preference for a solution to the
problem that will meet with the assent of the people of Taiwan.

They say no escalation – but cross-apply our two pieces of Hunkovic evidence –
war over Taiwan is fundamentally different – also the evidence just says that
China wouldn’t use weapons against Taiwan but our disad is predicated off of
using them against the US

The US would be forced to get involved – that’s above

They say forces don’t do anything:

1. This evidence just says that the forces don’t protect Japan – doesn’t assume
the disad’s scenario for war

2. The forces stationed in Okinawa are key to deter China – they’re perfectly
positioned to respond to and resist any signs of Chinese expansion into Taiwan –
the forces make up the core pillar of our East Asian deterrence strategy – that’s
1NC Chaffin

3. The forces are perceived and are key to maintaining deterrence in the region –
even if contributions aren’t tangible we still shouldn’t risk withdrawal
Chaffin 10/5 (Greg, intern with Foreign Policy in Focus, “Okinawa and the Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance,”
http://www.fpif.org/articles/okinawa_and_the_changing_us-japan_alliance, dml)

The III Marine Expeditionary Force does contribute to deterring Chinese expansion and
aggression in the East China Sea and toward Taiwan. This appears to be the most powerful
argument for the continued operation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force out of Okinawa. The
positioning of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, which reinforces U.S. commitment to
Japanese security, is a costly signal to regional challengers of the U.S. commitment to
extended deterrence. Moreover, the perception that extended U.S. deterrence is credible is of
vital importance to the Japanese military. According to Vice Admiral Kaneda (MSDF Ret.) “Once the
U.S. defense is no longer perceived as credible, we will be in a global multi-polar
military age which will make the region much less predictable.” However, here too, other forces in the region
contribute to providing extended deterrence, including the U.S. 7th fleet and the 5th Air Force. Furthermore, an increase in the economic ties among all the
major actors – the United States, Japan, China, and Taiwan – help to lower tensions and make conflict much more unlikely.
the tangible contributions of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to the strategy of
In the end,
deterring China, and to a lesser extent, North Korea, are debatable, and to many, not worth the cost.
However, there are no real metrics by which to measure the effectiveness of a strategy of
deterrence other than that conflict has or has not broken out. But both the United States
and Japan are loath to simply abandon a strategy that has contributed to regional stability.

1206

Baudrillard and Rescher are answered all over the place – also Hunkovic from the
overview is better on this question, magnitude comes first in the context of
China-Taiwan-US war
 Kritik
The affirmative’s demands against the state pose the potential for ultimate
destruction – their idea that once we embrace an ethic of vulnerability and
compassion everyone will drop their weapons, get in friendship circles and sing
Kum Ba Ya is childish and dangerous – the Soviet Union never died and the KGB
still controls Russia – were we to end our attempts at dominance they would see it
as the perfect opportunity for a nuclear attack. The alternative is to reject their
rhetoric – merely speaking against the nation can bring it down; we must insist on
patriotism and solidarity with our nation.

K outweighs and turns –

a) Extinction – Bostrom indicates that a large-scale nuclear exchange between
the US and Russia would destroy humanity – they can’t access major nuclear war
so they can never outweigh
b) Value to life – 1NC Nyquist indicates that quality of life depends on the quality
of a nation – if we allow for Communists to subvert the red, white, and blue we
will be subjected to the nightmares of Stalin’s Russia once again
Kimball 3 (Roger, served on the Board of Advisors of the Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History, “Malcolm
Muggeridge’s journey,” http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/Malcolm-Muggeridge-s-journey-1713)

Muggeridge’s great gift as a political commentator was a nose for spurious idealism. Like nearly every right-thinking
(which meant left-leaning) person, the young Muggeridge regarded the Soviet Union as the first chapter of the new
utopia. When he went there as Moscow correspondent for The Manchester Guardian in the early 1930s,
disabusement was almost immediate. As a leader writer, Muggeridge had tapped out “Many an uplifting sentence
… expressing the hope that moderate men of all shades of opinion would draw together, and that wiser counsels
might yet prevail.” In Moscow, he discovered that “moderate men of all shades of opinion had a
way of disappearing into Lubinka Prison, never to be seen again.” Muggeridge saw the
future, and—unlike Lincoln Steffens a decade earlier—he saw that it was hell on earth. Russia, he
understood, was in the process of becoming “a huge and centrally organised slave
state.” It wasn’t long before he was writing to his aunt-by-marriage Beatrice about his overwhelming conviction
that the [Soviet] Government and all it stands for, its crude philosophy (religion if you like) is
evil and a denial of everything I care for in life… .
Why should uncle Sidney say … “I indignantly repudiate the slander that there is forced labour in the Soviet Union”
when every single person in Russia knows there is forced labour … ?
A glimpse of Stalin’s Russia spurred Muggeridge’s political awakening. It is to his everlasting credit that he had the
wit to see through his Fabian “ideals” and the courage to broadcast the horrors going on around him. In the
beginning, at least, he was almost alone. Western intellectuals flocked to the workers’ paradise that Stalin had
created and “they were one and all utterly delighted and excited by what they saw there.”
Clergymen walked serenely and happily through the anti-god museums, politicians claimed that no system of
society could possibly be more equitable and just, lawyers admired Soviet justice, and economists praised the
Soviet economy.
As for the Webbs and their starry-eyed ideal of universal brotherhood, Muggeridge summed it up in a
dismissive BBC broadcast after their deaths. Comparing Beatrice to Don Quixote, he wrote that “she finished up
enmeshed in her own self-deception, adulating a regime [the USSR] which bore as little relation to the Fabian Good
Life as Dulcinea del Toboso to the Mistress of Don Quixote’s dreams.”[2]
Muggeridge was one of the first—perhaps he was the first—Western journalist to expose the
awful brutality of Soviet totalitarianism. He was equally prescient about Hitler, early on warning
against the British policy of appeasement. In addition, Muggeridge had the rare perspicacity to understand that
left-wing tyranny is no less murderous than the right-wing variety. Reporting from Berlin
in 1933, he wrote that “It’s silly to say that the Brown terror is worse than the Red
Terror. They’re both horrible.”
-272

They say focus on great power war bad – but a focus on anything else is simply
just reshuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic – dealing with Russia must come
first to avoid inevitable extinction
Nyquist 9 (J.R., brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy, 6/19, “Why Most Things Do Not Matter,”
http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2009/0619.html)

Imagine you are on the Titanic, and the ship is sinking after sideswiping an iceberg. Does it matter if you need a haircut? Should you be worrying about your investments? Under life-
true philosophy is
and-death circumstances, only life seems to matter. The trivia that clogs our existence is swept away by the sudden realization of what is actually at stake. In this sense,

found on the deck of the Titanic. It leads us to discover what really matters; that is to say, why most things actually do not matter. Using the Titanic as an analogy, we all find
ourselves on a ship of state. And for Europeans, Russians and Americans – at the least – a figurative iceberg has torn

through the underside of our ship. In other words, something cold and dangerous has damaged us from underneath. Of course, this is something
we strenuously deny. We say to ourselves, “The ship of state is not fatally damaged.” We therefore continue our vain activities, imagining that the latest rearrangement of the deck chairs
constitutes a move in the right direction. People do not consider their actual position, where they are headed or what vessel they have embarked upon. The passengers and crew of many countries have deluded
themselves with rhetoric and ideas that are utterly at variance with reality. Cold bureaucratic words seem harmless enough, like the ocean rolling endlessly along. But sometimes whole icebergs are hidden in

The recent meeting of the BRIC countries is a good example. BRIC stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China.
such words.

Combining these four countries into a new economic powerhouse was the brainchild of a KGB
general. In such waters, cold and forbidding, one finds ice in abundance. “We the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of
China,” etc. What does it mean? The joint statement says: “The emerging and developing economies must have a greater voice and representation in international financial institutions….” Note the sharp edge of
the iceberg itself: “We also believe that there is a strong need for a stable, predictable and more diversified international system.” (Dominated by Russia and China.) “The poorest countries have been hit hardest
by the financial crisis. The international community needs to step up efforts to provide liquid financial resources for these countries.” (Read “bailout.”) The BRIC statement also proposes to deal with “climate
change based on the principle of common differentiated responsibility….” (Read “the Americans pay” to lower global temperatures.) “We underscore our support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world
order … and collective decision-making for all states.” (Read, “We support socialism and an international redistribution of wealth, and taking America down a peg or two.”) In the name of stabilizing the world,

Russian President Medvedev encapsulated the destabilizing principle of BRIC when he said, “The idea of
fairness is probably one of the key terms that we should use today.” The reader may ask, in this context, what is fairness?
It is a codeword for the redistribution of global power from rich to poor countries. It is “communism” writ large, yet

disguised behind innocuous language. To make a revolution that will ultimately kill billions of people through

starvation, famine and war, you must emphasize “fairness.” There is no better slogan for
promoting global catastrophe. Here is a thinly disguised assault on the U.S. dollar, capitalism and the protecting hand of America. If the United States was the all-power
malignant cancer that so many prefer to denounce, then why hasn’t this malignancy devoted its vast treasury to the construction of a successful pro-American mythology? Why are the people of Brazil and India
allowing themselves to be used by Moscow and Beijing? To answer simply: The United States does not defend itself rhetorically, and does not have a coherent strategy – failing to recognize its enemy. The
Americans believe in freedom, and they believe that the “truth will prevail in the market place of ideas.” They believe that their benevolent intentions will persuade others to adopt the American way. In a speech
given to senior Party cadres in 2005, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian once noted, “In Chinese history … the ruthless have always won and the benevolent have always failed.” What is true for Chinese

Only those who appreciate this fact will understand what the
history, however, has not been true in American history.

elimination of the United States would signify. No country is perfect, of course; but the intentions of the United States are not those of China or Russia.
The strategic misdirection of these two countries will ultimately produce the most devastating
war that the human race has yet experienced. BRIC is part of that strategic misdirection. Much of the poison that circulates on the internet, entering our
political discourse, belongs to that same mode of information warfare once referred to as “active measures.” Consider, in this context, the words of yet another Chinese general, Li Jijin: “Unconsciously accepting
an opponent’s strategic misdirection causes a nation to be defeated or collapse, and not know why.” Is this really possible? Decades of information warfare – through active disinformation – has already had an
effect. The process touches on topics as unrelated as religion and art, diplomacy and child-rearing. The subtle poison of certain ideas, the mischief of new disciplines, has sometimes arisen through a generalized
nihilistic tendency. But also, there is a positive design at work. For nobody has yet explained civilization’s sudden unwillingness or inability to crush pathological growths that have
sabotaged our collective sanity. The serious strategist, looking at society’s gradual surrender to one suicidal idea after another, says to himself: “An enemy could not have devised a better engine
for our ultimate destruction.” I am reminded that society does not automatically promote its own health, or its defense against enemies (foreign and domestic). Somebody has to know what is needed and do
something. The problem we face today is best described in the words of Cato the Younger, when he characterized the Roman Senate in the midst of a plot to destroy the state as “each waiting for someone else
to act.” That seems to be our position, today. We do not see the danger as it approaches, or maybe we don’t want to see the danger. The evil of our time is not easy to cope with. One might say it is
“inconvenient.” As General Chi explained to his Party comrades four years ago, “Death is the engine that moves history forward.” This totalitarian admonition is not put forward as a principle of American foreign
policy, but as a hint regarding Chinese and Russian intentions. That others are promoting conditions leading to your demise should be understood; that language itself is a tool in the promotion of life or death,
should also be understood. But we understand next to nothing. We are too busy with things that do not matter. Meanwhile, we ignore something of great importance. We ignore something that is a matter of life
and death.

They say no war – but their authors have been blackmailed by the Russians –
reject their evidence because it’s biased – 1NC Nyquist indicates that the Soviets
are perfectly ready to wage war at any moment
Nyquist 9 – (J.R., brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy, 7/24, “Acknowledging the Deception,”
http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2009/0724.html, dml)

The totalitarian system has now become more sophisticated

If it sounds like Soviet times, you are not mistaken.
and more streamlined. The West should not deceive itself. The Cold War never ended. The KGB
remains in place. According to Kalashnikov, “It is not necessary to control the entire former Soviet area. We can project our influence. Even when we allow the Americans and NATO to have a presence there, we have the upper hand.
I even suspect that what happened has produced a modernized strategic model.”

Gone are the imperial burdens. Russia can use its secret agent networks to blackmail executives,
politicians and intellectuals. Journalists can be bought inexpensively, as it turns out. The disinformation
campaigns of the 60s, 70s and 80s have laid the groundwork for a great deception. The West thinks they are dealing with a
new entity in Russia. Yet they are still dealing with the house that Stalin built. “My feeling is that the old
personnel management system has been reinstalled from Soviet times,” said Kalashnikov, explaining how the secret police can deprive uncooperative citizens of a livelihood. “In the
Soviet Union your personnel file followed you whenever you changed from one job to another. Your employer sees any black marks set down by previous employers, and my former
employer [the KGB] was eager to make life as difficult as possible. They wanted to press us to the degree that we would admit our defeat and failure, reconsidering our behavior.” In
the West we were told that the Soviet system was finished. We were told that the Communist Party lost power, the KGB was reformed and democracy won the day. Kalashnikov said:
“There was not any moment, I can state with certainty, that the old system of KGB and nomenklatura admitted their failure or lost control. They just changed their form and appearance.

It was a sort of generational change. Instead of generals in charge, we have lieutenant

colonels. They behaved differently, but they are doing the same thing. There has never been any
moment when they admitted historical defeat. There never was any serious step toward de-
communization – never, never. The Yakovlev Commission was conceived to imitate de-communization procedures in Central Europe.”
So it was a sham? “Yes, it was a fake, an imitation,” Kalashnikov insisted. “From the very beginning the idea was, we’ll get back, we’ll modernize. And
that’s how it happened. Of course, many Western observers were hxappy about the new faces and new styles and openness. But step by step, you
 many American institutions here in Russia have been pushed out or brought
yourself may remember that
under Russian control. So, formally, we have several Western bodies here allegedly doing
democracy and consulting work, but in fact they have become an instrument of Kremlin policy
to imitate and exploit for their own purposes.”

And, all indicators flow neg – top Russian generals confirm that the Kremlin is on
the offensive – only US primacy can contain them and prevent nuclear war
Nyquist 09 – (J.R., brilliant analyst of Russian foreign policy, 7/17, “Marina Kalashnikova’s Warning to the
West,” accessed at http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2009/0724.html on 9/21/10,
dml)

Our leaders do not realize

In other words, the West has already been outmaneuvered. The KGB and the Russian General Staff have taken our measure, and they are laughing at us.

the sophistication of their enemy. They cannot see or understand what is happening. They blink, they turn away,
continuing to use concepts gifted to them long ago by Soviet agents of influence. As a nation we are confused and disoriented, believing that the world is
beholden to the West’s money power – and therefore, peace can be purchased.

“The Kremlin has activated a network of extremists in the Third World,” wrote Kalashnikova. “[At the same time] Russia has
managed to shake off nearly all international conventions restricting the expansion of its
military power.” In this situation, the only counter to Russian power is American power. Yet the American president is preparing to
surrender that power in a series of arms control agreements that will leave the United States
vulnerable to a first strike. Placing this in context, nuclear weapons are ultimate weapons, so that the West’s superiority in conventional weapons is
therefore meaningless. Whoever gains strategic nuclear supremacy will rule the world; and the Russian strategic rocket

forces are in place, ready to launch, while America’s nuclear forces are rotting from neglect.
The Russian historian sees that the West relies on the greed of Russia’s elite to keep the Kremlin in line. But this is a foolish conceit. Mao Zedong said that political power “flows
Therefore, the Kremlin’s logic is ironclad: Let the West keep its worthless
from the barrel of a gun.”

currency. Moscow will have weapons, and in the end Moscow and its allies will control
everything. The liberal may believe that protests and appeals to humanity are the ultimate trump cards. The financiers may believe that money makes the world go
‘round. Let them try to stop a salvo of ICBMs with liberal sentiment and cash. As far as the laws of physics are
concerned, their favored instruments cannot stop a single missile.
the [Kremlin] regime has no restraint and will commit any crime, break any rule, surpass any
According to Kalashnikova, “It is clear that

benchmark in order to consolidate its already illegitimate power….” Even the old KGB chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, was appalled:

“Putin and others have to answer for what they are doing today to the country,” he said. But the West sleeps. The West doesn’t want to hear about

the danger that rises in the East – from the Kremlin and its Chinese allies. As Kalashnikova points out, the warnings of Russian observers like Viktor Suvorov and Vladimir
Bukovsky have been almost totally ignored. Western chauvinism is deep-rooted, and the Westerner takes his military and economic superiority for granted. He laughs at the idea that “the Russians are coming.”
But the joke is on America. The Kremlin’s psychological advantage is vital and immediate, and extends into the political domain. This is significant because the outcome of every war is pre-determined by the
political process leading up to the war.
Kalashnikova laments that Suvorov and Bukovsky remain largely unknown, “and are even hated by the Western establishment … [which] avoids uncomfortable truths about the world and themselves, especially

The Russian
when the truth comes from Russian critics.” Do the Americans have sense? Are they serious people? No, said Suvorov more than two decades ago. No, says Kalashnikova today.

generals are getting ready. They are consolidating their influence because the coming war
requires it.
“The NATO idea of deterrence means absolutely nothing to the Russian generals,” wrote Kalashnikova.
“Unlike their Western counterparts, they are not afraid of big military and civilian losses. This was true in the time of Stalin. Losses do not affect the popularity of Kremlin
rulers….” The philosopher Nietzsche once wrote that sacrificing people for a state or an idea makes that state or idea all the more precious to those who have made the sacrifice.
Such is human psychology, yesterday, today and tomorrow.
Standing outside the logic of nuclear deterrence,
“The strategic balance,” warned Kalashnikova, “has by and large never worked.”

Kremlin leaders have modernized their nuclear bunkers. They are prepared to survive. “The
current Russian military is not weaker than the USSR,” she says, “and in some areas it surpasses the Soviet military.” – This
from a writer who has personally interviewed Russian generals, spy chiefs and statesmen. She goes on
to say that after 9/11 Russia’s terrorist allies can be realistically assumed to play a key role in the strategic equation. And then she fatefully quotes a NATO functionary who spoke
about the role of al Qaeda and Bin Laden as follows: “This [9/11 attack] is beyond their intellectual capabilities.” Insights of this kind have been known to trigger “polonium
reactions,” as in the case of former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko – who publicly declared that Vladimir Putin was the master terrorist
behind al Qaeda.

They say case outweighs –

a) I answered the structural violence debate in the 2NC
b) Cross-apply from the overview that K outweighs

They say nuclear deterrent causes mass genocide –

a) This card is massively powertagged – literally all it says is that nuclear
weapons are used for deterrence – don’t let him actually utilize this
b) They can’t explain the internal link – we just say that Russians are evil, not
that we should kill everyone

They say baudrillard/Rescher – this was answered in the 2NC – also this is absurd;
Rescher doesn’t say we can only accept a risk if the probability is 100% - he just
says that low probabilities should be rejected – but here’s evidence indicating
Russia war is probable
Andreas Umland, DAAD Lecturer, Shevchenko University, “The Unpopular Prospect of World War III…The 20th
Century is Not Over Yet,” HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, January 17, 2009, http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/60004.html.

the darkness of a future scenario that one comes to regard as possible should be no
That is because

hindrance for its full assessment and public outline. Arguably, one of the reasons that societies afford themselves the
employment of social scientists at universities and research institutes is the provision of information and interpretation that goes beyond what journalists,
publicists or politicians – often, more dependent on current mainstream opinion and reigning political correctness than academics – may be able to say or
A plain extrapolation of recent political developments in Russia into the future should lead
write.

one to regard outright war with NATO as a still improbable, yet again possible scenario. It is not unlikely
that Russian public discourse will, during the coming years, continue to move in the same direction in,
and with the same speed with, which it has been evolving since 2000. What is, in this case, in store
for the world is not only a new “cold,” but also the possibility of a “hot” and, perhaps even,
nuclear war. This assessment sounds not only apocalyptic, but also “unmodern,” if not anachronistic. Aren’t the real challenges of the 21st century global warming,
financial regulation, the North-South divide, international migration etc.? Isn’t that enough to worry about, and should we distract ourselves from solving these real problems?
A
Hasn’t the age of the East-West confrontation been over for several years now? Do we really want to go back to the nightmarish visions of the horrible 20th century?

sober look on Russia advises that we better do: Carefulness may decrease the probability that a
worst-case scenario ever materializes.

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