Self reflective memo: Week 5: Job Offer Negotiation

The structure of the job offer negotiation was characterized by a bargaining mix:
salary/title, assignment, signing bonus, relocation allowance, stock options and start date.
There were two parties, Leigh (opponent) and Joe (me), both not monolithic. The nature
of the negotiation involved managing tangible and intangible issues, like preserving the
long-term relationship, conveying appreciation and sincerity. Despite strong alternatives,
both parties were interdependent to achieve preferred outcomes- to work for Robust
Routers/ employ Joe (Lewicki et al, 2006). Given the multiple issues structure,
interdependence and relationship-based nature of the negotiation, we felt that a mixed-
motive strategy would optimize performance and best serve mutual interests. Overall,
performance was fair, since I achieved my preferred title, salary, signing bonuses, but had
to make concessions on percentage of bonus and moving allowance. The multiple issues
structure assisted our performance, as we created value and mutually benefited from
different start date preferences, but the solutions were not particularly creative. Whilst we
attempted to manage the intangibles, my performance could be improved through a
cooperative, rather than competitive approach, especially given the long-term
relationship-based nature of the negotiations.

According to the Thomas-Kilman survey, I tend to use compromising, forcing,

avoiding modes over accommodating and collaborating modes. From the results, which
was confirmed by self-observations in this negotiation, I learnt that I am moderately
assertive, but not cooperative enough. Despite my attempts to concentrate on interests
and commonalities, for example, engaging in a small talk, reinforcing our shared goal of
working together, and clarifying my interests, I learnt that I tend to replicate my
opponent’s negotiation style and “respond in kind” (Lewicki et al, 2006, pp.61). In this
negotiation, my opponent indicated a competitive stance through firm opening offers and
meager concessions, which led me back to positional bargaining (Lewicki et al, 2006).

Two aspects of my usual negotiation style- forcing and compromising, combined

with efforts to collaborate, played out moderately well in this negotiation. Compromising
style allowed me to effectively claim value through logrolling disagreeable issues
(Lewicki et al, 2006). For example, I agreed to forgo my position in the business
development group in return for the product manager title and $88,000 salary. However,
my forcing style through hardball tactics hindered my performance (Lewicki et al, 2006).
I tried unsuccessfully to anchor my opponent by asking for a 20% performance bonus. In
hindsight, if I asked for a reasonable figure, my opponent might have been more
cooperative. My initial attempts at a collaborative style was helpful in assisting
performance, since we were able to separate the problem definition from generating
solutions.

After reflecting, I identified strengths that contributed to my moderately

successful performance. Firstly, I am keen to “unfreeze” and “change” my existing
distributive negotiation style and “refreeze” by experimenting with an integrative style
(Susskind, 2005). Consequently, I was able to tradeoff issues that are of low value to me,
but high value to the opponent; for example, I traded off an early start date for a $14,000
signing bonus. Another strength from adopting a more integrative style was that I learnt
to focus on our commonalities, rather than different position, by leaving all disagreeable
issues until last, since I did not want to destroy the collaborative atmosphere (Fisher et al,
1997).

One of the major weaknesses in my performance is that, despite my attempts to

“expand the pie”, I felt that I was too focused on claiming value at times, and therefore,
did not reach a Pareto efficient solution (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Moreover, I was not
absolutely clear about my priority issues, and consequently, I missed the opportunity to
obtain a better relocation allowance, by trading-off my high, but less important signing
bonus. Finally, claimed value, I forgot about my need to preserve the relationship with
my employer and creating an ideal reputation (Thompson, 2005). I used intimidation
tactics to enhance the legitimacy of getting higher signing bonuses by overstating the
attractiveness of my alternatives, which could have potentially destroyed the trust and
reputation I created (Lewicki et al, 2006). Paradoxically, my attempts to claim value
actually “impede[d] its creation” (Lax & Sebenius, 1986, pp.34).
 The reflection on weaknesses in this negotiation serves as a good starting point
for plans for improvement in the future. One of the changes for the future is to stop
engaging in positional bargaining. Instead, I should try to create more value by observing
the opponent’s interests and find a bridging solution and arrive at mutually satisfying
positions (Lewicki et al, 2006, pp.86). In order to discover a bridging solution, I should
know exactly where each issue ranks in terms of its importance. Finally, I should focus
on building swift trust (Thompson, 2005) in the future, through “information sharing and
honest communication”, so that both parties can eliminate the inefficiencies in the
negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1986, pp.31).

Word Count (excluding references): 800

Appendix
 Reference:
 Fisher, R., Ury, W. & Patton, B. (1997) Chapters 1-5, Getting to yes: negotiating
an agreement without giving in.

 Lax, D. A & Sebenius, J. K. (1986) Chapter 2. The Negotiator’s Dilemma:

Creating and Claiming Value. IN Lax, D. A. & Sebenius, J. K. (Eds.) The
manager as negotiator: bargaining for cooperation and competitive gain.

 Lewicki, R. J., Saunders, D. M., & Barry, B. (2006) Chapter 2. Strategy and
tactics of distributive bargaining, Negotiation, 5th ed.

 Lewicki, R. J., Saunders, D. M., & Barry, B. (2006) Chapter 3. Strategy and
tactics of integrative bargaining, Negotiation, 5th ed.

 Susskind, L. (2005) Full Engagement: Learning the Most from Negotiation

Simulations. Negotiation, 3-5.

 Thomas- Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument, Blackboard.

 Thompson, L. L. (2005) Chapter 6. Establishing trust and building a relationship.

IN Thompson, L. L. (Ed.) The mind and heart of the negotiator. 3rd ed.