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Review Article
Andre Gorz, ed. The Division of Labour: The Labour Process and Class
Struggle in ModernCapitalism, AtlanticHighlands, N.J., HumanitiesPress,
1976, xiv, 189pp.
226
Richard Ashcraft
227
ComparativePolitics January 1979
228
RichardAshcraft
raise the point, it would appearto follow from the generalpropositionto which
they subscribe,thatif the social scientist's conceptualizationof class structure
representsa symbolic expressionof the social inequalitiescharacteristicof his
day-to-daymilieus, then whethersocial scientistsadopta consensus-hierarchy
or a conflict-dichotomousmodel of social structureis itself an issue rooted in
theirperceptionof the particularaspectsof class conflict or social stratification
thatshapetheirdaily lives. Theoriesof class structure,in short,are, at the same
time, ways of organizing the empirical data and also expressions of it. In
turningto a considerationof postwardevelopmentsin the United States and in
Europeancapitalist countries, I shall try to indicate the ways in which the
problemsthus far describedas conceptualor theoreticalreemergeas "part of
the data."
II
229
ComparativePolitics January 1979
It was largely on the basis of what he regardedas "fairly high rates of social
mobility" in Westerncapitalistsocieties thatDahrendorfpostulatedthatsocial
conflict would increasinglymove away from a traditionalclass conflict model
towardsa social structuremore easily describedas "a fragmentationof inter-
ests." 23
It is interestingto contrastDahrendorf'spositionon this issue, which focuses
almost exclusively upon the statistical movementof individuals, with that of
Poulantzas,who maintainsthatwhatthe individualmembersof a class do does
not matterso long as the several social classes, as objectivestructuralconfig-
urations, retaintheir place within the social system (p. 284). Giddens, how-
ever, rightly reminds us that, although class structurationdoes representa
"closure" of life-chancesfor the individualandfor intergenerationalmobility,
if this closure were complete, we would not be speakingof classes at all, but of
somethingmore like castes. On the otherhand, if life-chances were randomly
distributedamongst individuals, "class" would indeed become a concept of
dubiousvalue for analyzingthe social structure.In otherwords, because class
stratificationpresupposes limited social mobility, the real issue is not the
theoreticalchallenge to the formerposed by the latter,but rather,what are the
specific featuresof social mobility in a particularsocial context which permit
one to speakof the empiricaltendenciesrelativeto class structurein thatsociety
(pp. 107, 110).
230
Richard Ashcraft
One of the difficulties in dealing with the data on social mobility in this
manner is attributableto the "strong ideological interest in the process of
upwardmobility" in the sociological literature,which has distortedthe rela-
tionshipbetweenthe persistenceof social classes andthe movementof individ-
uals.24In fact, as Parkinobserves, some capitalistsocieties have a higherrateof
downward mobility-nonmanual workers falling into the manual working
class-than of upwardmobility."5In anyevent, whatneeds to be madeclearare
the social circumstanceswhich providea contextualmeaningfor the statistical
data.26 For example, of those who move from manualto nonmanualoccupa-
tions, the overwhelmingmajorityareindividualswho move frombeing skilled
workersto positions with white-collarstatus. Thus, even when, for statistical
purposes, it constitutes an instance of upward mobility for the son of a
machinistto become an office clerk or a departmentstore salesman, whether,
fromthe standpointof social class, this reallyreflectsan upwardmovementout
of the working class is, to say the least, a highly problematicalissue. In his
studyof class in the United States, RichardHamiltonmaintainedthatthe social
and cultural milieus of the lower middle class, as well as their income and
workingconditions, were not appreciablydifferentfrom those experiencedby
the workingclass.27 Since almost all of the social mobility in capitalistsociety
is concentratedin whatParkincalls "the bufferzone" betweenthe middleclass
and the working class, the significance of social mobility with respect to
overcoming the obstacles of class barrierswould appearto be severely lim-
ited.28
Aside from income redistributionand occupational mobility, theories of
class realignmenthave relied heavily uponthe efficacy of educationas a factor
which levels class differences. "Mobility through education," Dahrendorf
argues, necessarily "includes mobility between the classes; from manual to
clerical and professionaloccupations..." 29 In fact, the expansion of higher
educationin industrializedsocieties has hadvery little effect uponclass stratifi-
cation. Essentially, growth in educationalopportunitiesduring the last half
century has meant an increase in the numbersof sons and daughtersof the
middle and upper classes attending college, and this expansion may have
actually workedto the relative disadvantageof membersof the working class
with respectto upwardsocial mobility.30 The son of an upper-classfatherstill
has morethanfifty times the chanceof the son of an unskilledworkerto become
a memberof the upperclass, despite the social importanceand availabilityof
educationalopportunities.In otherwords, "it is not the inequalitiesof class that
have been reduced" throughthe benefits conferredby the educationalsystem,
but rather,their "transparency."31 The ideological belief in social mobility
gained through education is far more importantas a "social fact" within
contemporarycapitalistsociety thanany empiricalevidence pointingto actual
shifts within the social structurecould possibly warrant.32
When argumentspremisedupon the rise of the middle class and, relatively
231
ComparativePolitics January 1979
speaking, upon the decline of the working class were first formulated,they
were interpretedas pointingto a basic transformationtakingplace within late
capitalism.Here again, however, a closer examinationof the evidence has led
to a reevaluationof this thesis andof the overallrelationshipbetweenthe middle
class and the working class. In the first place, it makes a crucial difference
whether"class" is simply a statisticalaggregateof individualunits or whether
it is a social unity, with referenceto families, life-styles, neighborhoods,job
conditions, etc. The failureto recognizethe family ratherthanthe individualas
the appropriatesocial unitof the class system, Parkinargues, is responsiblefor
much of the confusion as to the significance of the data.33For, the "middle
class majority"is a statisticalconsequenceof the fact thatthe employed wives
and daughtersof blue-collar manualworkers are counted as members of the
middle class.34The suddeninflux of women into the laborforce duringWorld
War II had more to do with the rise of a "white collar" sector of the economy
than any other single factor. Yet, forty percentof all female marriedclerical
workersin the UnitedStateshave blue-collarhusbands." In otherwords, when
the statistics are translatedinto the empirical conditions under which social
classes exist and relateto each other, the workingclass remainsthe largestand
most importantclass within the capitalistsystem of production.36 All contem-
porarycapitalistcountries, Giddens observes, are "working class societies,"
in which manufacturingremains the key sector of the economy (p. 198).
Moreover,if the projectedgrowthratesof blue-collarandwhite-collarworkers
are seen in termsof class membership,ratherthanas statisticalcategories, this
situationwill continue until well into the twenty-firstcentury.
Secondly, it is far fromclear as to the extentto which the tremendousgrowth
of the service sectorof the economy is a consequenceof the dramaticdecrease
in the number of agriculturalworkers during the period of rapid capitalist
expansion or of the displacementof jobs previously held by manufacturing
workers.3"The former, as a nonrepeatablehistorical development-like the
sudden massive entrance of women into the work force-would obviously
provide a shaky foundation upon which to base the projected trends of
capitalism, with respectto the comparativerelationshipbetween the manufac-
turing and the service sectors of the economy.
In short, a "postindustrialsociety" readingof the datapresentsa numberof
problems,rangingfrominsupportableassertionsaboutincome redistributionor
the achievements of upward social mobility gained through education, to
questionableinterpretationsof class mobility based upon occupationalcatego-
ries or the relativestatusof white-collarto blue-collarworkers,definedin terms
of statisticaldataratherthanin termsof social relationshipsor specific histori-
cal circumstances.Althoughthe point cannotbe given the attentionit deserves
here, I do want to suggest the presence in the stratificationliteratureof a
persistenttendency amongst those who adopt the neo-Weberianapproachto
social conflict to formulatea theory of the social structurewhich gives prece-
232
Richard Ashcraft
Virtuallyeveryadvancedcapitalistcountryhasa lowerstratum,distinguished
by
orotherspecialcharacteristics,
race,nationality, whichcarriesouttheworstjobs
andhas the leastdesirablesocialconditions.45
233
ComparativePolitics January 1979
234
Richard Ashcraft
235
ComparativePolitics January 1979
HI
The rise of the new middleclass, it was at firstbelieved, would "stabilize class
tensions." In Aristotelianfashion, this class would act as a force of moderation,
standingbetweenthe extremistviews of the Right andthe Left, and "press the
political system towardconsensus.""' Since socialism, but especially Marx-
ism, was identifiedwith the extremistLeft in Europe,the political implications
of postcapitalist society seemed to point to "the demise of socialism.""
Lipset, however, recognized that the mass base of leftist parties and voting
patternsin Western Europe had not, in fact, declined during the period of
emergence of the new middle class. As a corollaryto the general moderation
thesis, therefore, it was arguedthat even if traditionalleft-wing parties con-
tinuedto grow in postcapitalistsociety, they would do so as a consequenceof
becoming "deradicalized" or more moderate;in short, parties of the Left
would move closer to a centrist political outlook.58
This political prognosiswas based largely upon inferences which translated
certain sociological characteristicsof the new middle class into projected
patternsof political behavior. The significant fact of postcapitalistsociety,
Dahrendorfargued, is that there has been "a withdrawal from politics in
modernsociety." The resultis that "the intensityof political commitmenthas
decreased.""59 The reason for this, Dahrendorfsuggested, is thatthe members
of the new middle class were more preoccupied with individual-centered
concerns than with the kinds of issues which would promote class solidarity.
Politics in a postindustrialsociety had assumed an increasingly "privatized"
and apatheticform, because this best reflectedthe sociopoliticalfeaturesof the
new middle class.
Lockwood's study of working-class imagery appeared to provide some
empiricalsupportfor this view. In additionto the "proletarian"and "deferen-
236
Richard Ashcraft
237
Comparative Politics January 1979
238
Richard Ashcraft
life," in orderto "provide an escape from class society," the more it estab-
lishes "the entrenchmentof bureaucraticpower" (p. 282). In this sense,
althoughhe recognizesthat"in capitalistsociety, the class system continuesto
constitutethe fundamentalaxis of the social structure,and remains the main
channelof relationshipsof exploitativedomination"(p. 294), Giddens, in the
last analysis, agrees with Dahrendorfand Weber that revolutionaryclass
conflict has become extremelyproblematicas a lever of social change, giving
way to the dynamicsof bureaucratization as the dominantpolitical characteris-
tic of advancedindustrialsocieties.65
For Poulantzas,"the contemporaryspreadof bureaucratization is essentially
due to theprocessof concentrationandcentralizationof capital" (p. 275). And,
althoughhe means by bureaucratizationsomething which is only tangentially
relatedto the Weberiannotion, the point to be emphasizedhere is that from a
Marxistperspectivethis phenomenongrowsout of andmustbe definedin terms
of the class strugglebetween workersand capitalists. In one respect, bureauc-
ratizationwithinthe sphereof industrialorganizationis tied to the processof the
"proletarianization"of nonmanualworkers, previously discussed.66Viewed
in termsof the growthof the state apparatus,however, it has been arguedthat
the bureaucratizationof sociopolitical life in capitalist countries rests upon
deeply rooted divisions within the economy.
In the last two decades, the percentageof GNP representedby government
spending has increasedin these countries, largely as the consequence of the
expansionof social welfare services providedby the state.67 At the same time,
capitalismhas sufferedan "acute crisis of profitability"in the privatesectorof
the economy. Capitalaccumulationandeconomic growthhave slowed consid-
erably in the United States and Western Europe since the 1960s. During the
same period, tradeunion militancy, especially within the industrialsphereof
the economy, has increased. Government attempts to stimulate economic
growth, maintainfull employment, hold down inflation, and meet the wage
demandsof public sector employees, while also enlargingthe scope of social
services for the citizenry, has produced"the fiscal crisis of the state."68 The
costs of providing services and wage increases-which are not tied to rising
levels of productivity-lead to tax increases which, on the whole, serve to
maintain, and even in some cases widen, the existing social inequalities
between classes.
These economic difficulties which have plagued postwarcapitalismdo not
mean that a radical political movement will emerge in the United States or
WesternEurope.Rather,the point of the argumentis to suggest thatthe spread
of bureaucratizationmust be viewed as a contributorycause and not as a
solutionto the problembroughtaboutby class divisions. It is in this respect, as
Giddens remarks, that we are returnedonce more to the original competing
conceptualparadigmsof "class" and "bureaucracy,"accordingto which the
recent empirical researchis interpreted(p. 125).
239
ComparativePolitics January 1979
240
Richard Ashcraft
NOTES
241
Comparative Politics January 1979
242
Richard Ashcraft
243
Comparative Politics January 1979
43. Erik Olin Wright has written an extensive critiqueof Poulantzas'position on this issue,
pointing out the theoreticaland political implicationsof the size of the working class when the
criteria employed by Poulantzas are used to define class boundaries. "Class Boundaries in
Advanced CapitalistSocieties," New Left Review, XCVIII (July-August 1976), 3-41.
44. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, 1, p. 392 ff.
45. Castles and Kosack,ImmigrantWorkers,p. 2; Goldthorpe,"Class, Status, and Party," p.
358.
46. Castles and Kosack, p. 480; Goldthorpe,p. 357.
47. Poulantzas,p. 152; Gorz, p. 124;Castlesand Kosack, p. 473; Westergaardand Resler, pp.
75, 292; Szymanski, p. 109.
48. The essay by StephenMarglin, "Whatdo Bosses do?" in Gorz, pp. 13-54, places this issue
in the historicalcontext of the developmentof capitalism.
49. Stanley Aronowitz, "Does the United States Have a New Working Class?", in George
Fischer, ed. The Revival of AmericanSocialism (New York, 1971), pp. 188-216, esp. p. 208.
Goldthorpewarnsthat"the thesisof white-collarproletarianizationis likely to prove as empirically
questionableas thatof workingclass embourgeoisement;""Class, Status, andParty," p. 355. For
Giddens' skeptical remarks,see pp. 188-96.
50. Goldthorpepointsout thatwhite collar tradeunionmilitancyis quiteoften fueled by a strong
resentment against blue collar manual workers, from whom the former wish to distinguish
themselves; "Class, Status, and Party," p. 357. See also Giddens, pp. 188-92.
51. Hamilton, "The Marginal Middle Class: A Reconsideration," American Sociological
Review (April 1966), 192-99.
52. Hamilton argues that the defection of non-manualvoters to the left is likely to be more
importantthan the conversion of manualvoters to political conservatism;Class and Politics, p.
193. "The strikingfact of Europeanworking-classpolitics," accordingto Parkin,"is the long term
stabilityin electoralsupportfor left-wing parties;"Class Inequality,p. 129. See also Lipset, "The
ChangingClass Structure," p. 278-79.
53. FrederickEngels, Introduction,The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850 (New York,
1964), p. 27.
54. Poulantzas,pp. 207, 241-42, 287. See also Wright's critique of Poulantzas.
55. Wright, p. 40.
56. Lipset, p. 286.
57. Dahrendorf,Conflictafter Class, p. 22; Bell, CulturalContradictions,p. 245. As Samuel
Huntingtonobserves, it is somewhatdifficult to be precise about the political implicationsof the
theory of postindustrialsociety, since its supportershave devoted little attentionto this specific
issue; "PostindustrialPolitics: How Benign Will It Be?", ComparativePolitics., VI (January
1974), 163-91.
58. Parkin,Class Inequality, pp. 113 ff.
59. Dahrendorf,Conflict after Class, p. 21; Lipset, op.cit., p. 271.
60. The relationshipbetween these two themesis discussedin Westergaardand Resler, op.cit.,
pp. 398-400.
61. Dahrendorf,"Recent Changes", pp. 246-7.
62. Huntington,p. 177; Dahrendorf,pp. 250-1, 262.
63. Dahrendorf,p. 264.
64. Giddens,p. 111-12. The empiricalbasi'sof this propositionis exploredby the authorsof the
essays in Working-ClassImages of Society.
65. Because Giddens distinguishes between Weber's two meanings of "rationalization," he
does not acceptWeber'sview thatthe rationalizationof socio-economic life throughbureaucratiza-
tion is inevitable, andcertainlynot thatthisprocessmakesthe aims of socialism "utopian." On the
other hand, since he does not agree with Marx that revolutionaryclass conflict will establish
socialism, his analysis and descriptionof "neo-capitalism" presupposesthe ability of the stateto
"regulate" class conflict, the outcome of which is, in fact, the proliferationof the state bureau-
cracy. Giddens, in effect, is in practicalbut not theoreticalagreementwith Weber's projectionof
the bureaucratizationof social life. Giddens, pp. 278-94.
66. This, however, is not Poulantzas'meaning.
67. Ian Gough, "State Expenditurein AdvancedCapitalism,"New Left Review (July-August
244
Richard Ashcraft
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