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not yet capable of truth. Such forgetting leads to not knowing, whereas truth is
about unveiling what is and knowing it. Not knowing is agnosis (αγνοσις), the
attitude of those who are not yet or no longer capable of facing truth. Quite clearly
Heidegger feels deeply scornful about such people and sees philosophers as far
superior to this state of agnostic being.
In Part 2 of the book, Heidegger addresses Plato’s Theaetetus and the essence
of untruth, since the latter has been shown in need of better understanding. This
leads to the question ‘what is knowledge, episteme (έπιστημη)?’. As genuine
auditors, that is, as co-questioners, we allow ourselves to be drawn into this
question. What you know does not matter much: ‚what is essential is that you are
ready and willing to pose questions‛ (p.111). To know, Heidegger says, means
only to direct ourselves towards something, placing ourselves towards it, in order
to find out, for that is what the Greek verb ‘γιγνώσκω, to know’ literally means in
Plato’s time. By the time Aristotle was writing, the word had taken on a different
meaning: something much more akin to science. Of course in Plato’s Theaetetus the
question of knowledge turns into the question of how man is to understand
himself. To gain any knowledge, we have to put ourselves in question. It is only if
we are willing to face the untruth we usually inhabit that we can begin our
journey towards truth. The beginning of truth is therefore self-knowledge.
‚Knowledge is the having present of what is present as such, having disposal over
it in its presence, even when indeed precisely when, it is absent, when it is not at
one’ s disposal‛ (p.116–17).
It is my own impression after studying Heidegger’s text carefully and over
many weeks, that Heidegger, as so often, lacks in self-modesty. He tries to use
Plato’s work to obtain a stamp of Greek philosopher’s approval for his view that
some of us are rather more holy than others, and have a hold on the truth that
puts us in a superior and privileged position. I often find myself tempted to follow
Heidegger’s direction, for it is flattering to believe oneself part of an elite, capable
of such authenticity and truth. But, at the end of the day, Heidegger’s striving
seems petty, wasted and rather conceited. Then I return to my understanding of
Socrates’ wisdom, that is, that I only know that I do not know very much at all.
John R. Searle
http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk 141
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142 http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk
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Raymond Geuss
http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk 143