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FOUNDATIONSOF INFORMATION SCIENCE

REVIEWAND PERSPECTIVES

RafaelCapurro

Contents

Introduction
I. Some critical commentsonthree leading paradigmsof information
science
II. From thecognitive turn to the pragmaticturn
III. Informationscience ashermeneutic-rhetoricaldiscipline

Notes
References

Abstract

Threemain epistemological paradigms of information science, namely

therepresentationparadigm, the source-channel-receiver paradigm, and the
Platonisticparadigm,are criticized. Taking into consideration some basic
insights fromhermeneutics(Heidegger, Gadamer) and analytic philosophy
(Wittgenstein) a pragmaticfoundation of information science is suggested.
Information means thepossibilityof sharing thematically a common world
within specific forms of life.Itthus becomes a rhetorical category. Information
science is conceived asa hermeneutic-rhetorical discipline that includes
aformal-methodologicalas well as a cultural-historical perspective.

Introduction

Somethirteenyears ago I made an investigation of the etymological roots of

the term information [Capurro 1978]. I (re-)discovered that keytheoriesof
Greek ontology and epistemology based on the concepts of typos,idéaand
morphé were at the origin of the Latin term informatio.These connotations
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were maintained throughout the Middle Ages butdisappearedas scholastic
ontology was superseded by modern science. Sinceapproximatelythe 16th
century we find the term information in ordinaryFrench,English, Spanish and
Italian in the sense we use it today: 'toinstruct,to furnish with knowledge',
whereas the ontological meaning of 'givingform to something' became more
and more obsolete. Paradoxically, theepistemologicalmeaning was the
basis of the formalization by Shannon and Weaver,
whoexplicitlydisregarded the semantic and pragmatic connotations.
Informationseemed to lose its connection to the human world, and came to
beapplied,as a more or less adequate metaphor, to every kind of process
throughwhichsomething is being changed or in-formed. Through the
mediationofcybernetics and computer science an inflationary infiltration of
thisterminto many sciences (e.g. physics, biology, psychology, sociology)
tookplace. The result has been a chaotic discussion between
twoextremes:anthropomorphism and reductionism (1).

Therise of information science led to a further explosion of this

chaos.Schrader[1986, p. 179] counted some 134 notions of information in
our field! Atthe same time he observed that, on the one hand, the content of
ourdomainwas taken to be defined by the specification of the term
information,butthat, on the other, there was almost no reference to the
negative form misinformationand its derivatives: "lies,
propaganda,misrepresentation,gossip, delusion, hallucination, illusion,
mistake, concealment,distortion,embellishment, innuendo, deception." This
leads to a "naïve modelof 'information man', which sometimes takes the
form of decision-makingman or uncertainty man." (ibid.) Nevertheless, one
thing seems to beclear:the notion of information in our field is explicitly
referred andrestrictedto the human sphere. This means a(n) (implicit)
rejection ofinformationscience in the sense of a super-science whose
object is information atall levels of reality. Such a science, without a
material ofitsown, would be similar to a general techné, a
scienceofsciences, as attributed to the Sophists by Plato in his
Charmides[Capurro, 1991].

Whenwe are looking for the foundations of a science, we cannot

avoidreflectingon its main concepts. In the case of information science the
mainconceptis not information but - man (= man and woman). If we take a
look intosome leading paradigms in our field, we observe certain
ontologicalpresuppositionshaving their roots in Greek as well as in Modern
Philosophy. With theriseof philosophical Hermeneutics and Analytical
Philosophy we have gainednew paths of thinking which are, I believe,
relevant to the foundationsof information science.

Inthis paper I will first briefly describe three main

epistemologicalparadigms,which are based on a substantialist view of
something called informationas well as on the modern distinction between
subject and object[Capurro,1986]. From these I will pass to what I call the
cognitiveturn.This view abandons the idea of information as a kind of
substanceoutsideof the mind und looks for the phenomenon of human
cognition as anecessarycondition for the determination of what can be
called information,but fails to consider the pragmatic dimension of human
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existence. Iwillargue in favor of a complementary pragmatic turn by
claimingthatinformation is a fundamental dimension of human existence.
The question'what is information?' asks for the substantial characteristics
ofsomething.But information, taken as a dimension of human existence, is
nothingsubstantial.Instead of asking 'what is information?' we should ask
'what isinformation(science) for?' The change over to the second question
means a changeofperspective which takes as a starting point the cognitive
turnbutgoes beyond it in search of a pragmatic and rhetoricalperspective.

I.Some critical comments on three leading paradigms

of information science

Followingthe positivist or, as Winograd and Flores call it [1986] (2),

rationalistictradition, not onlyinformatics but alsoinformationscience looks
for its subject by considering information to besomething objective in the
external reality. Thisviewpoint remainsbasic with regard to three main
paradigms in our field, namely:

-therepresentation paradigm
-the source-channel-receiver paradigm
-the Platonistic paradigm.

Allthree paradigms consider the knowing subject in interaction

withsomethingcalled information. This typification leaves aside many
nuancesand combinations. It is not my intention now to criticize any
specificauthors, but just to delineate some paths of thought when looking
forthegroundings of our field (3).

Accordingto the representation paradigm human beings are knowers

orobserversof an outside reality. The process of knowledge consists of
anassimilationof things through their representations in the mind/brain of
theknowingsubject. These representations, once processed or codified in
ourbrain,can then be communicated to other minds and/or stored and
processed inmachines (computers). Human beings are biological
informationprocessors.Information is the codified double of reality. Humans
can useinformationfor specific rational purposes, but nothing speaks
against thehypothesisthat also machines can achieve this level of
information processing anduse.

Onthis basis information science is concerned with the study

ofrepresentation,codification and rational use of information.

The source-channel-receiverparadigm takes thephenomenon ofhuman

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communicationas a metaphor to be applied to different levels of reality.
When theycommunicate,human beings, or other kinds of sources and
receivers, are said toexchangeinformation. In order for the receiver to
understand the meaning of themessage sent by the source, a common
stock of signs hast to exist. Butthe exchange of information can be
considered only in relationship tothestructure of the message. In this case
we speak of syntacticinformation.Cybernetics couples source and receiver
dynamically. Constructivismdescribesthe autogeneration of organisms
coupled with their own world in asimilarway. There is no world outside to be
represented, only theworldas the organism sees or forms it for its own
purposes ofsurvival.

Underthese premisses information science is primarily concerned with

theimpactof information on the receiver. At the same time, receivers are
seekersor users of information in order to solve their problems.

Finally,the Platonistic paradigm takes an opposite view to

theforegoing.Instead of starting with a knowing subject, it looks for
something tobeconsidered as information in itself. This is the sphere
ofhumanknowledge not as a biological, psychological or sociological
processbutas objectivized in non-human carriers. We can call it,
paradoxically, materialisticPlatonism . The idealistic version of this
paradigm considersknowledgeas something objective in itself,
independently of any materialcarrier.

Informationscience is supposed to study primarily the world of informationin

itself, i.e., to contribute to the analysis and construction ofit. Information has
the same ontological status as the laws of logicwithregard to the
psychological or biological description of the process ofthinking. There
remains the problem of the relationship between this worldand the world of
the knowing subject. This is a problem similar to theone posed by the
representation paradigm. In its materialisticversion,information science
studies information as far as it is materialized incarriers outside the brain, in
the form of documents or of theirelectronicsurrogates. The idealistic version
considers information as anobjectivebut non-material entity.

Allthree paradigms have a long tradition in the history of ideas, but theywere
the object of further developments in modern philosophyparticularlywith
regard to the difference between the knowing subject as a kind ofsubstance
or thing separated from the objects of knowledge(Descartes' res cogitans
vs. res extensa), which,accordingto Boss [1975,Fig. 1], led to the
subjectivist-objectivist representation of humancommunication,i.e., to the
idea, that objects of the outside world arerepresentedin the mind or brain of
a subject. Communication means, on this basis,the exchange of information
between subjects concerning theirrepresentationsof the outside world
objects. The main characteristics of thisphilosophicalparadigm are to be
found, in one way or another, in the three leadingparadigmsof our field.
Maturana and Varela's constructivism [1980],philosophicalhermeneutics
and Wittgenstein's later philosophy criticize this kind ofdichotomic thinking.
In the case of constructivist theories the outsideworld becomes formally

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determined by the structure of the living.Withininformation science similar
attempts were made, for instance, with thedevelopment of the cognitive
viewpoint. From a hermeneuticpointof view cognitivism dislocates
knowledge from social praxis.

Fig1: Subjectivist-objectivist representation of human communication

(Boss1975)

1a/1b:body of a and b
2a/2b:brain of a and b
3a/3b:psyche (or mind or self) of a and b
4a/4brepresentation of an object (information) of the outside world
5:outside world
6:impression of (or 'in-formation' process from) the object
7:object of the outside world
8a/8b:information exchange between a and b concerning their
representationsofthe outside objects

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II.From the cognitive turn to the pragmatic turn

Theshiftfrom the "physical or mechanical" paradigm of the Cranfield

tests[Ellis1991] to the cognitive turn took place at the beginning of
theseventies[Kunz/Rittel, 1972] and particularly with the ASK-Theory
developped byBelkin et al. [1982] as well as with Ingwersen's "cognitive
viewpoint"[1984]. Belkin's theory refers to an "anomalous state of
knowledge" asthe basis of the information retrieval process. The knower
isoriginallya non-knower. This is a Socratic insight as well as a hermeneutic
one.The non-knower is a partial-knower i.e., an inquirer, whose
questionsarebased on a "conceptual state of knowledge" that is part of the
"user'simage of the world". The affinity of these terms to some basic ideas
ofhermeneutics, for example pre-understanding, is evident, and itwas very
soon identified as such [Hollnagel, 1980]. Instead of startingfrom an
objectivist consideration of something called informationand its interaction
with a sender or receiver, common to all kinds oflivingand non-living
systems, the cognitive turn asks for the intrinsicrelationshipbetween the
human knower and her/his potential knowledge. Thecognitiveturn led also
to a specification of the traditional paradigms in ourfield.But this turn too
rests upon the modern subject/object dichotomy, i.e.,it overemphasizes an
epistemological view of the relationship betweenmanand world. Knowledge
becomes, even more emphatically, a worldinitself.

Thisemphasis becomes manifest for instance in Brookes' foundation

ofinformationscience. On the basis of Popper's ontology Brookes proposed
his"fundamentalequation of information science", where a knowledge
structure ismodifiedby information. Information is to be found objectively
as"extra-physicalentities which exist only in cognitive [mental or information]
spaces."[Brookes, 1980, 1981]. This is, on the hand, an idealistic version
ofthePlatonistic paradigm. On the other side, Brookes considers
theinteractionbetween subjective and objective knowledge as being
reflected in thechangesto be observed in the knowledge structure caused
by new information.FollowingRudd [1983] we can ask: "Do we really need
World III?" i.e., do wereallyneed a trichotomic Popperian ontology?
Hermeneutics and Wittgenstein'slate philosophy criticize some
presuppositions underlying ontologicaldichotomiesand trichotomies, without
taking the path of monism, i.e., remainingskeptical.By questioning the
presuppositions of a "capsule-like psyche" [Boss,1975]and of a re-
presented outside world, hermeneutics offers a newinsightinto the question
of how knowledge is being pragmatically constitutedandsocially shared by
human beings, whose being is basically abeing-in-the-world-with-others.The
empirical study of this phenomenon is at the core of informationscience.

Thesefew references to the "cognitive viewpoint in information science"

[Belkin,1990] show a tendency in recent discussion of the foundations of
ourdiscipline:information is intrinsically connected to the knowledge
structure ofhumanbeings. The cognitive viewpoint brings out a founding
dimension of ourfield but it remains unsatisfactory as far as the user is
consideredprimarilyas a knower. I would like to introduce some
hermeneutic concepts inorderto look for a possible solution of the

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difficulties which arise whenthesubject/object dichotomy of modern
epistemology is taken for granted inthe cognitive turn.

Oneof the key insights of hermeneutics is the holistic (not

monistic)approachto the relationship betwenn man and world. This
approach is a socialanda pragmatic one. We are not isolated monads,
having first a private orsubjective cognitive sphere, separated from the
objective one. Languageis not something occurring in the inner sphere of a
subject, whoseinteractionswith an outside object lead to inner
representations, to becommunicatedthrough signs to other receiver-minds.
Wittgenstein's private languageargument has clearly refuted this thesis
[Wittgenstein 1984].

Insteadof the modern presupposition of subjectivity as a "psyche-

capsule"whichwas established in order to describe a theoretical or
objective view onthings belonging to a real world, hermeneutics refers to the
foundingdimensionof our being-in-the-world-with-others, in the sense of
ahistoricaldimension of disclosure of meaning, which conditions (but does
notfullydetermine) our understanding of the world including our theories of
it.Being prior to our theoretical and/other practical projects, thisdimensionis
called pre-understanding. It is the open context ofpossibilitieswithin which
our inter-personal life as well as our dealing with thingsand with nature
reveals a possible horizon of meaning. Ourbeing-in-the-worldis such that we
are not first within our subjectivity and lookafterwardsfor ways of getting out
of it, but we are basically open i.e., able tobe addressed, within specific
situations, by the meaningfulness ormeaninglessnessof things. At the same
time we grasp this openness as a finite one,givenour posterior knowledge
of birth as well as our prior knowledge ofdeath.Fig. 2 shows the dimension
of shared and limited openness, whichcharacterizesour being-in-the-world.

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Fig.2: Sketch of our being-in-the-world-with-others (Boss 1975)

1:World-openness: open and finite context of possibilities (past, presentand

future ones) in their partial and socially mediated 'dis-closure'
2:'closure' or undiscovered and never completely discoverable
dimensionofall our foundational efforts
3:'being-outside' sharing thematically with others the meaning of
(forinstance:past) things in changing contexts (=circles and crosses)
4,5,6:'being-outside' sharing present things (for instance: a tram)

Ourway of being is, according to hermeneutics, different from the one

ofotherbeings we know of (e.g. animals, machines). The term existenceisan
indicator of this difference, by stressing the sense of beingoutside(ek-). This
being outside is originally abeing-outside-with-others.Communication in the
sense of sharing together a common world is aspecifictrait of our being-in-
the-world. Here lies the existential foundationofinformation science.
Information, in an existential-hermeneuticsense,means to thematically
and situationally share a common world. If weask for the conditions of
possibility of communicating to each otherthepossible meaning of things
within specific horizons of understanding,thenthe hermeneutic answer is that
we can do this because we already sharea world. Thus, information is not
the end product of a representationprocess,or something being transported
from one mind to the other, or, finally,something separated from a capsule-
like subjectivity, but anexistentialdimension of our being-in-the-world-with-
others.

Informationis, more precisely, the articulation of a prior

pragmatical understandingof a common shared world. This prior
understanding, or pre-understanding,remains to a great extent tacit even
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when we articulate it in spoken orwritten form just because, given our finite
being, we can never make itfully explicit. One important consequence of this
is that, in the caseof scientific thematization of the world, we can never
render a fullfoundationof knowledge. Human knowledge is, as theory of
science stresses, alwaystentative. This tentative character means, as I
argue in [1986], thatknowledge,being basically shared knowledge
necessarily refers to limited horizonsof pre-understanding as well as to a
community which shares thispre-understanding.Hermeneutics stresses the
pragmatic dimension of human existence in thesense that we primarily live
within a tacit context before we get theundisturbedfreedom to look at things
as if (!) we were not existentiallyconcerned.But, indeed, "primum esse, tum
philosophari" (Seneca). We were notaskedbeforehand whether we like to
be or not. To be means primarilyhavingto do with things, which is the
original meaning of Greek prágmata.We can use this term to denotate a
fundamental characteristic of ourbeing-in-the-world,i.e., a characteristic
prior to the theoretic subject/object dichotomy.This is also the meaning of
Wittgenstein's "forms of life", which arethebasis for our "language games"
[1984, p. 23].

Thecognitive turn in information science presupposes this

pragmaticdimensionof our being-in-the-world, but it does not make it
explicit. Thispragmaticdimension is not a practical as opposed to a
theoretical one, becausealsoin our actions we are not void of all pre-
understanding but already informedi.e., sharing a common background of
un-discovered potentialities forbeing.

Thus,information is neither a mentalistic nor just a mind-related

conceptbutexpresses a characteristic of our pragmatic way of being. It
points tothe dimension of sharing with others thematically different
practicaland/ortheoretical possibilities of world disclosure. When we say:
'we store,retrieve, exchange etc. information' we act as if (!) information
weresomething out there'. But it is, on the contrary, we who are
there,sharing a common world and therefore able to share explicitly
withothers,in a process of partial disclosure, the conditions and limits of
ourunderstanding.I take the term information in this existential meaning as a
basicconceptof information science.

Scientificknowledge is the classical field where the creation of a

commonpre-understandingis an essential aim in itself. It is not by chance
that informationscience,since its very beginning, considered the processes
of technologicalmanipulationof scientific or, more generally speaking,
professional-orientedknowledge,as its paradigmatic model of shared
knowledge, i.e., ofinformation.

Thepragmatic turn´ was proposed by Roberts [1982] and Wersig et al.

[1982 and 1985] in the eighties. Roberts looks for a behaviouristapproachto
"information man". Wersig considers the "actors" within
"problematicsituations". The "rational-cognitive treatment of problems"
constitutesfor Wersig only one aspect of the problem of rationalization. In
otherwords, "information man" cannot be separated from the
specificsituationsin which she/he is pragmatically and socially imbedded.
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More radically,"information man" cannot be separated in her/his cognitive
functionsfrom,for instance, aesthetic or ethical ones. I believe that these
ideasleadto a hermeneutic and rhetorical foundation of information
science.

Thequestion 'what is information?' asks for substantial characteristics

ofsomething. But information, taken as a dimension of human existence,
isnothing substantial. Instead of asking: 'what is information?' we
canask:'what is information (science) for?' The turn to the second
questionmeansa change of perspective. The pragmatic fields of open
possibilities areshared contexts, also in the linguistic sense of the word
(con-texts),i.e., of thematically shared pre-understanding. The aim of
informationscience is to thematize this con-textual dimension taking
intoconsiderationprimarily all technical forms of communication as parts of
other formsof life. This scientific thematization can take place in aformal-
methodologicalas well as in a cultural-historical or pragmatic perspective. I
callthefirst an information heuristics or ars quaerendi ' and
thesecondinformation hermeneutics. All methods of information retrieval
belongtothe first one and are an essential part of our science. But a
mereformalistor substantialist view leaves aside the existential groundings
i.e.,thenecessary thematization of the historical, cultural, economic
etc.dimensionswhich are the pre-conditions for understanding what we
mean when wesay:'we store, retrieve, exchange etc. information'. An
information economythat seeks to reduce information to an exchange value
without takingintoaccount the different forms of life in which it is grounded is
no lessdangerous than a blind exploitation of nature. In designing tools
wearedesigning, as Winograd and Flores remark [1986, p. xi], "ways
ofbeing".This, I think, is a key insight with far-reaching implications
forinformationscience studies, which do not forget the pragmatic dimension
of theirsubjectmatter.

Takinginto consideration the unity of boths aspects, the methodological

andthepragmatic, information heuristics and information
hermeneutics,informationscience can be considered a sub-discipline of
rhetoric.

III.Information science as a hermeneutic-rhetorical discipline

Inhis Rhetoric [Rhet. 1358 b] Aristotledistinguishes threekinds of speech:

-deliberativespeech (genos symbouleutikon): concerns arguments for or

againstsomeone or something, and is related to future actions.
-juridical speech (genos dikanikon): concerns charge or defence,and is
related to past events.
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-laudatory speech (genos epideiktikon): concerns praise and blameand is
mainly related to present situations.

Aristotleconnects rhetoric not only to other linguistic-

methodologicaldisciplinessuch as logic, dialectic and topic, but also with
ethics andpolitics.

Thisclassical division of rhetoric embraces, in other words [Schlüter,1978,

pp. 22-26], three objectives including their corresponding
humancapabilities:

- toteach/to inform (docere, informare): concerns reason

-to influence/to move (movere): concerns the will (and thefeelings)
-to please (delectare): concerns (sensory and sensual)perception

Thecharacteristics of good speech (arete tes lexeos) are:

-unambiguity(saphe/claritas): the use of clear expressions

-commonness (to hellenizein/latinitas): the use of commonexpressions
-adequation (to prepon/proprietas): the use of adequateexpressions

Inthe case of informative (and deliberative) speech these characteristicscan

be achieved with different kinds of figures: argumentative figures(such as:
examples, comparisons, detailed explanations, prima facie-
judgements,definitions), composition figures (such as anticipations and
lookingback),and lexical figures (such as: paradoxes, irony, puns, litotes).

Itis easy to see that the negative forms of the informative speech,
towhichSchrader refers, cannot be considered as an essential part
ofinformationscience as long as such a science is not seen as a sub-
discipline ofrhetoric.The crucial point underlying the hermeneutic-rhetorical
paradigm ofinformationscience is neither the analogy of information as
something physical northe representation of reality within an inner sphere,
but therecognitionof the interwovenness of information and misinformation
as anexistentialdimension, i.e., as a specific human way of sharing with
others theworldopenness. Information and misinformation are, in some way,
pseudonyms,i.e. ,they are abbreviations for experiences such as "lies,
propaganda,misrepresentation, gossip, delusion, hallucination, illusion,
mistake,concealment, distortion, embellishment, innuendo, deception"
(Schrader)on the one hand, and of telling the truth, communicating publicly
ourconvictionsand ideas, looking for adaequate approaches to all kinds of
phenomena,hearing to what others have to say, letting our phantasy create
newpossibilitiesof being, developing our sense of reality, cultivating
criticalthinking,as well as other capacities such as righteousness,
openness, frankness,clarity, helpfulness, and truthfulness, on the other.

Bygrasping information and misinformation as a dimension of

humanexistence,I am suggesting a distinction with regard to other uses of
these terms.This anthropologic (or ontologic) distinction does not imply
ananthropocentricview. It criticizes a worldless subjectivity representing the

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things ofthe outside world in an encapsulated mind. To exist means, for
humanbeings,to be thrown into a field of possibilities with the capacity
ofconceiving and misconceiving not only our own (technological)
projects,but also the nature of things that bring themselves forth.

Onefundamental reason for the interwovenness of information

andmisinformationis precisely the finite structure of human existence, our
facticityor thrownness (Heidegger's "Geworfenheit"). Scienceremains
fallible and all the information we are supposed to store,retrieveetc. is to be
understood within a possible breakdown situation(Winogradand Flores
1986). According to the classical physical paradigmthesesituations should
be avoided in order to get relevant results. Forthe hermeneutic-rhetorical
approach they are a basis for usersconstructions.

Therhetorical distinctions do not intend to separate informative

(anddeliberative)speech from the other forms of speech nor to isolate all of
them fromethicsand politics. In order to see these connections, for instance
betweeninformative,persuasive and pleasant speech in our field, we have
but to recallquestionsof data security and copyright, or the persuasive
efforts of a hostmarketingdivision or, finally, the efforts to create user-
friendly systems. Theideology of a pure informative speech rests upon the
disregarding ofitsrhetorical roots. Many of our so-called information
systems areremnantsof a pre-pragmatic, utopic view of an ideal language,
although or, moreprecisely, because our field has been considering itself as
a practicalone, i.e., as one which does not need a theory.

Withregard to the formal-methodological questions to be studied against

arhetoricalbackground, we are particularly committed in our field
toconsideringthe technological or artificial possibilities of the
informativespeech.Aristotle distinguishes between non-artificial (atechnoi )
andartificial(entechnoi ) means of persuading (pisteis), thefirstones being
the given ones ("such as witnesses, tortures, documents"),whereasthe
second are the ones to be produced by the speaker and to
beanalyzedtheoretically by rhetoric (Rhet. 1355 b). Information science, as
asub-disciplineof rhetoric, studies the different forms of handling artificially
i.e.,technologically, shared knowledge. But such handling is, as in the
caseof other forms of rhetoric, not just a formal-methodological
question,completely independent from ethical and political dimensions.
Rhetoricand topic play a basic role in the construction of hypertext
databases.For, as Wallmannsberger remarks [1990], non-linearity and
associativityimply a conception of human knowledge, where analogy and
probabilityarethe key aspects. Contrary to the idea of information as
adecontextualizedor situation-independent sphere, a hermeneutic and
rhetorical viewstressesthe contextuality (including cultural, aesthetic, ethical,
andpoliticaldimensions) of meaning. The pragmatic turn in philosophy, as
carriedoutby hermeneutics and Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations,has decisive implications for our field. Hypertext and
hypermedia aswellas other kinds of intelligent databases and systems, can
becalled intelligent as far as they take into considerationdialectical,topical
and rhetorical figures. On the background of rhetoric it isalsopossible to

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thematize the connections of these technological mediationsto ethics and
politics.

Thequestion: What is information science for? is a rhetorical question inthe

sense that information science, conceived as a sub-discipline
ofrhetoric,implies a double-bind methodology. It must accomplish a self-
reflectionin a formal-interpretative as well as in a cultural-historical way.
Ithas to resist the temptation to become just a technical heuristics or
ametadiscipline embracing ethics and politics. As a sub-discipline
ofrhetoricit belongs to other deliberative techniques. As one part of them it
isdifferent from juridical and literary forms of speech, but it certainlyimplies
aspects of persuasion and pleasure. This relationship betweenrhetoricand
aesthetics within information science needs to be more
stronglyemphasizedthan I am doing it here. It does not only imply the user-
friendlinessorthe ergonomic design of information systems, i.e., the alliance
betweeninformation science and information design, as Orna and Stevens
remark[1991], but also takes into consideration, much more basically,
thebodilyor aesthetic (Greek: aisthesis = perception) dimension of
humanexistence. We should study how information technologies influence
thebodilypossibilities of the users. We need, in other words, an
informationscienceaesthetics closely related to an information science
ethics i.e., to acritical analysis of the ways in which power structures are
imposed onthe (bodies of the) users or, viceversa, to become aware of
thesituationsand conditions in which information technology becomes,
individuallyandsocially, an open field of self creation. One way of doing this
is, asFrohmann proposed [1991], through discourse analysis.
Informationscienceis a hermeneutic science just because there is no
definite separationbetweeninformation and misinformation. Information
science is the science ofinformationand misinformation.

Weare concerned, as Popper suggested [1973], with problems and not

withsubjectfields precisely because problems always arise within
changing(culturaland historical) horizons or fields (!) of expectations. These
termsbelong,by the way, to the same geographical metaphor (pro-blem =
tothrowbefore).

Thelinear model of human knowledge and action from "facts" to

"decisions",suggested by Hayes [1991], is an idealized description of
humanunderstanding,which must take decisions in order to establish facts,
thus beinginvolvedin a hermeneutic, i.e., not only intellectual, but also
pragmaticalcircle.

Thequestion 'what is information for?' leads to the question 'what

isinformationscience for?' since information science, conceived as
ahermeneutic-rhetoricaldiscipline, studies the con-textual pragmatical
dimensionswithinwhich knwoledge is shared positively as information and
negativelyas misinformation particularly through technical forms
ofcommunication.These are not just an instrument but a "way of being"
[Winograd andFlores1986]. This conception of information science is
important if we wantinformationsystems to become part of the background
of various forms ofliving.
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Notes

(1)For a detailed exposition see my [1986].

(2)For criticisms on Winograd and Flores see my [1991a]
(3)For more details see my [1986, pp. 74-98]

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Lastupdate: May 25, 2010

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