Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 25


The main objective is to explain the reasons of the

formation of Economic Unions at regional and
international level. Developing the theory of Custom
Unions based on the notion of comparative
advantages and explaining the static and dynamic
effects of economic integration and the consequences
on growth and development are important issues to
be analysed. The historical, institutional economic and
social development of the European Integration and
the main European Common Policies are subjects of
the course too


Part I: The theory of economic integration and stages

of regional economic associations. Free trade versus
protection, advantages and disadvantages. The
traditional theory of Custom Unions and Free Trade
Areas. Empirical studies of measuring the static and
dynamic effects of international trade and the
progress of economic integration. Economic structure
and Institutions of European Union.
Part II: European community common policies. The
Common Agricultural Policy, its mechanisms and
efficiency. The Industrial Policy and main objectives.
Monetary Integration, Optimum Currency Areas and
single currency. Nominal and real convergence.
Regional Policy of the EU and theories of regional
growth and development. Regional convergence or
divergence processes(sigma and beta convergence).
Real convergence among the EU countries.


PAST AND FUTURE, Alfred Tovias


This paper tries to explain how the thinking of political

economists has been evolving on this fascinating
subject over the last 40 years. In fact, until the mid-
1970s theoreticians had a quite sceptical opinion
about the economic value of customs unions
formation. It was considered to be a second best
policy among others. With the development of the
theory of intra-industry trade in the mid-1970s, new
light was shed on the usefulness of regional trade
liberalization. Economies of scale and the size of the
market were entered into the new models in one way
or another. Even more optimism about the role of
economic integration was brought in when
theoreticians tried to investigate the effects of
eliminating non-tariff barriers (NTBs) instead of
customs duties. Economists recognize now, maybe
with a delay of several decades over their colleagues
of political science, that discriminatory trading
arrangements tend to be welfare-increasing for their
members provided they are regionally-based and
fairly open to new membership and if members acting
together can influence the terms of trade with the rest
of the world (see Oye 1992). It is still an open
question whether integration agreements are good or
bad news for the non-members. The general
presumption is that in any case they are not welfare-
increasing for the latter, but Smith and Venables 1991
have questioned even this clear-cut result. Supply
side improvements in the integrating area benefit non-
members' consumers (whether final or intermediary)
as well as exporters since fixed costs to penetrate the
unified market tend to decrease.


Until Viner 1950 published its pioneering work in

1950, economic integration did not become a
separate subject in economic theory. Then, and until
1965, the theory of economic integration passed
through two different periods (Krauss 1972). In the
first period were investigated the impact of customs
union formation on production (Viner 1950),
consumption (Meade 1955, Lipsey 1957) and trade
flows. In a second stage, from 1960 onwards,
scholars began to ask themselves what the real
objectives are of those entering an integration
scheme; since some times earlier, with the
development of the second best theory, economists
had reached the conclusion that a priori any
agreement for the regional liberalization of trade must
not be necessarily positive from a normative
viewpoint, even for the partners themselves. Work by
Johnson 1965, Cooper and Massell 1965 and later
Berglas 1979 were the most significant in this respect.


The concepts suggested more than 40 years ago by

Viner (trade creation and diversion) have been
accepted by every scholar of international trade
theory, and as a matter of fact by most political
economists, although they have had a lesser impact
on the way practical policy-makers think. That a
Customs Union can lead to a substitution of domestic
high-cost sources by low-cost imports from
associated countries does not seem to surprise
What is already less obvious is that in many other
cases the regional liberalization of trade can lead to a
substitution of low-cost imports (which originated
traditionally in non-member countries) by imports
originating in one preferred member country. Viner
thus stressed the discriminatory aspects of regional
trade liberalization, showing by the same token that
preferential concessions made on customs duties
would impose real costs on the donors. This point is
stressed here because it has been admitted earlier
and rather frequently that such an agreement could
affect negatively those excluded from it. What Viner
said is that the welfare cost derived from trade
diversion is borne by the consumers of the member
countries, not by the exporters of third countries.
Viner's analysis was clear-cut. However, his
assumptions were very simplistic, something which
did not detract from the general validity of his
conclusions. In spite of it, it is convenient to mention
at least two key assumptions :

1. Production costs of future partner countries were

supposed to be constant, whatever the amount
produced. Therefore, the "rent" or "excess profit"
element on the producer's side did not appear in the
analysis. Moreover, if costs are variable, a much more
likely occurrence, any discriminatory trade
liberalization contains simultaneously elements of
trade creation and diversion, since the promotion of
production in the preferred country is obtained at the
expense both of the preference-giving country and of
the non-member country. This result contrasts clearly
with Viner's who had said very clearly that in any
given situation there would be either trade creation or
diversion, but not both at the same time.

2. Viner's analysis focused on resource allocation

changes and on production efficiency. However, it did
not say anything on the reaction of the consumer's
demand when domestic prices decrease as a result of
customs union formation. Basic economics tells us
that any price reduction has a positive impact on
welfare, known as the "consumer's surplus". Focusing
on this secondary positive effect, Lipsey 1957 and
others asserted that some trade-diverting customs
union would be beneficial for its members, something
contradicting openly Viner's conclusions. It is obvious
that the consumer surplus effect can compensate in
excess the negative trade diversion effect on the
production side, provided the decrease in local prices
is sufficiently large.


In the mid-1960s appeared two professional articles

(Johnson 1965, Cooper/Massell 1965) which had
tremendous influence afterwards and which approach
the integration issues from a totally new viewpoint.
Both state that Viner's theory is a sheer extension of
free trade theory, since the trade creation effect is not
more than what the integrative process contributes in
terms of dismantling of protection in future partner
countries and therefore, can only be considered a
step in the right direction.

On the other hand, the trade diversion effect is

damaging because it results in the introduction of new
obstacles to the entry in the Union of goods which
were the cheapest in the world. Of course, the
corollary of all this was quite logically that prospective
partners could obtain the positive static welfare
effects deriving from Customs Union formation by
dismantling tariffs unilaterally without discriminating
among foreign suppliers. Thus, in order to justify the
creation of preferential trading arrangements one had
to assume that there were economic or political
constraints preventing the use of better instruments of
economic policy set at the right level (such as an
optimal subsidy or an optimal tariff, which in the case
of a small country were equal to zero).
For instance if prospective members have a collective
preference for industrialization, customs union is not
the first best instrument to address it. Even if the
public good ("the collective preference") in country A
is for "more autonomy or self-sufficiency", a non-
discriminatory restriction to trade is the "first best"
instrument. Only if there is such an objective as "the
need to trade with a given country (B) rather than with
another (C) for political motives" or the "need to be
independent from C" (e.g. the US), the first best policy
is a customs union agreement between A and B (El
Agraa and Jones 1981).
But when one does these assumptions the danger is
that any objective that a government may have to be
called a collective preference, even if blurred or badly
defined, and can lead to tremendous abuse. Even if it
the public good is really socially representative, it
could be that it is irrational or that it collides head-on
with the basic assumption in economics whereby
"more is better than less", since then there is no
sense whatsoever to engage in economic calculus.
The merit of all this research was nonetheless that it
tried to explain why customs unions were established
at all. Neoclassical trade theory had considered
customs union a second best from an economic
viewpoint. The discovery that creating customs unions
for economic reasons was rational, was important in
itself, since before it, most economists believed that
the real reasons for establishing unions were political,
sentimental or cultural. Note that what neoclassical
economists were saying until Johnson contradicted
head-on the philosophy of those creating the
European Community (like J. Monnet), the only really
successful integration scheme. The latter believed
that the net economic benefits of regional cooperation
would be so large that political and cultural obstacles
would melt down with time, not the other way round !
To make justice to new contributions further
demolishing the more classical theories mentioned
above, one must mention here that since more than a
decade the Wonnacott brothers (see Wonnacott &
Wonnacott 1981, 1984 and 1992) have attacked the
view according to which customs unions were
"second best" creatures when compared to unilateral
tariff reductions. The Wonnacotts are right in saying
that all hinges on the restricting and particularly
unrealistic assumptions imposed in neoclassical
models from Viner 1950 on until Berglas 1983. The
latter ignored that future partner countries and/or non-
members have also tariffs, ignoring by the same
token that countries are interested in customs union
because they want to improve market access and not
only efficiency or welfare. In other words, countries
want to get rid of other countries' tariffs, a fact long
recognized by GATT. In fact, Viner paid little attention
to the partner country receiving the tariff preference,
probably because the former could not improve
benefits by expanding exports, since constant costs
were assumed. Curiously it was A. Smith who
emphasized the gain that preferences procure to the
preference recipient country, a point largely forgotten
until the end of the 1970s.

Since 1965, research has been shifting in four

different directions :

•. research on the impact of integration

agreements on the terms of trade;
•. theoretical analysis of how scale economies
and imperfect competition affect the basic model;
•. extension of Customs Union theory to other
forms of integration;
•. extension of the theory in the presence of



In the last two decades theory has been looking at the

experience of the European Community and tried to
understand why it was created at all. Very soon that
the error made by theoreticians through the 1960s
and early 1970s had been to assume prices in foreign
markets as given, ignoring terms of trade effects and
ultimately making of unilateral dismantling the optimal
policy. But the tendency to conclude integration
agreements cannot be explained if one does not take
into account the benefits of discrimination for the
discriminators. Terms of trade effects had been
particularly examined early on by Mundell 1964,
Vanek 1965 but much more thoroughly by Kemp
1969, Negishi 1969 and Caves 1974. Pearce 1970
summed up all this new research trend by stating
bluntly that the aim of a customs union is to
redistribute world income in favour of the member
countries, through an improvement of the terms of
trade with the rest of the world. In contrast, the
neoclassical alternative of unilaterally dismantling
tariffs on a non-discriminatory basis does not improve
the terms of trade (if the country is small) or may lead
even to a deterioration of the terms of trade (if the
country is large), not an improvement. In reality, says
Pearce, creating a customs union for this purpose is
akin to introducing an optimal trade restriction at the
national level. Customs union formation can be
particularly advisable for small countries which cannot
individually affect the terms of trade. When joining a
customs union, the country can do what it cannot do
The contribution of the general models of Vanek,
Kemp, Negishi, Caves was in focusing in the
distribution of gains among member countries, and
among them and the non-members. The main
conclusion was that the country which traded before
the union mainly with its future partner was likely to
gain from the integration, whereas partners with large
trade stakes in the rest of the world would lose. All
this unless the latter were able to improve their terms
of trade with the rest of the world through trade
diversion in such a way as to compensate for the
deadweight loss derived from being led to switch
supply sources. But the improvement of the terms of
trade depends on the relative size of the union in
relation to third countries. Kemp in a very influential
article written by Wan (see Kemp/Wan 1976)
extended his previous analysis by stating very simply
that customs union formation was a positive
contribution to world welfare (contradicting therefore
Viner) in as much as it was also possible for the
partner which gains to compensate fully the loser
inside and the non-members outside and still be
better off.

This could always be done first by a series of intra-

union lump-sum transfers and second by picking the
right Common External Tariff (CET) instead of
assuming that the latter was equal either to the tariff
prevailing before in the importing country or to an
arithmetic average of the members' tariffs before the
union was formed. Manipulating the CET allows to
eliminate any trade diversion cost (and by the same
token any terms of trade effect). Therefore, after the
mid)1970s theoretical optimism came back through
the back door : customs unions were not irrational
creatures after all, in that potentially at least they
could increase the members' welfare, improving the
status quo. All the attempts of the late 1970s and
early 1980s to obtain more clear-cut conclusions by
trying to add more goods and more countries to the
basic neoclassical model failed (Riezman 1979,
Collier 1979, McMillan and McCann 1981, Lloyd
1982). On the contrary all these "3x3" models only
blurred further an already confusing analysis looking
for reasons why countries engage in discriminatory
trading arrangements. To cap it all, a rather sour note
has been added more recently to the debate on the
terms of trade. Krugman 1990 has pointed to the
rather obvious fact that the optimal CET should be
expected to be higher than the pre-union tariff rates of
the member nations, given their increased market
power derived from acting jointly. With Kemp and
Wan 1976 the proof that customs unions were
potentially good for the world relied on the fact that
the latter could always prevent trade diversion. But
Krugman expects customs union always to provoke
trade diversion as part and parcel of their raison
d'être, leading in all likelihood to a reduction of non-
members' welfare and in some cases of the world's
welfare as a whole.



The argument for creating economic unions to better

exploit scale economies which cannot be reaped in
small national markets relies on the basic idea that
mass production reduces average costs per unit.
However, this is a general argument for trade
liberalization or for world-wide free trade. And all
depends obviously on the type of product under focus
and the relative size of the national market when
compared to the union's market. Corden 1972
analyzed what the argument implies in practice and
showed that apart from the usual trade creation and
trade diversion effects, there are two supplementary
effects to count on : one positive, one negative. The
good one is the cost reduction effect. The customs
union leads to cost reductions also on the quantity
locally supplied previously (under prohibitive
protection) by the most efficient producer in the union.
On top of it, he supplies the other members of the
union, for which there is a trade creation effect. But
Corden says that there could also be a trade
suppression effect whenever all the partner countries
were importing before the union all consumption from
non-members (because there was no tariff or the
latter was not high enough to be prohibitive). After the
customs union is created, the least inefficient partner
country may be able to begin producing simply
because now it has all the union's markets at his
disposal and this may be sufficient to have average
unit costs in the area to be smaller than the price-
cum-common external tariff set by the union. Other
member countries suffer from trade diversion in
favour of the exporting country.

The scale economies argument has been combined

in the 1970s with the fast-growing theory of intra-
industry trade, developed initially by Grubel and Lloyd
1975, which oppose it to Hecksher-Ohlin type of
theories in inter-industry trade. Observed intra-EC
two-way trade in differentiated products and the
related intra-industry specialization, they say, is
probably due to a concentration of local EC producers
in particular production lines and models once they
are assured that they will enjoy a quasi-monopoly in
the whole EC market fro the particular brand they
produce. Economists speak of monopolistic
competition. Not surprisingly, in the 1980s the scale
economies argument has been progressively linked to
new models of international trade under imperfect
competition, drawing abundantly from industrial
economics (Krugman 1979, Ethier and Horn 1984,
Helpman and Krugman 1985, Smith and Venables
1988, Krugman 1991). The interesting question is to
know if customs union creation is a substitute or a
complement to competition policy. It used to be
thought that trade liberalization could replace
competition policy insofar as local monopolies would
be kept in check by international competition. The
argument is back in fashion in connection to the
expected benefits of completing the EC's internal
market (Smith and Venables 1988). But if the starting
assumption is that there were unexploited economies
of scale before (regional) trade liberalization, the latter
will increase concentration and firm scale, and
ultimately justify mass production which is
incompatible with perfect competition. After a quasi-
monopoly in differentiated products is established in
every partner country, the latter may be tempted to
jack up the prices to whatever the traffic can bear.
Clearly implicit or explicit collusion can be sufficiently
rewarding to take place in certain circumstances
(Fung 1992). However, Smith and Venables 1988
seem to think that products exchanged across
borders are sufficiently similar for this not to happen.
Interestingly, they show that the gains of removing
intra-union trade barriers in such a setting are
generally modest. What in their view makes a big
difference is the fact that nationally-based
monopolistic firms prevailing before the union is
created cannot apply anymore a price-discriminating
strategy; market segmentation is not feasible.
Domestic markets are no more captive. On the other
hand, local firms cannot dump goods anymore across
borders at prices below costs, something feasible
whenever they can cover losses by selling
domestically at monopolistic prices. The forced
reduction of domestic prices and the increase in intra-
union export prices leads to less rather than more
intra-union trade (Venables 1990, Krugman 1979).
Nonetheless, there is still a need for competition
policies to follow in case the final or intermediary
consumer perceives the products exchanged as
rather different. Competition policies must
complement economic integration to prevent
monopoly power to resurface at the union's level
(Hine 1985, Jacquemin and Sapir 1991, Fung 1992).
The advantage of competition policy over trade policy
is that it is rule-based, not based on discretion. But
Jacquemin and Sapir go one step further when they
say that in the future domestic competition policy
might not be enough in order to reap the benefits of
integration. Only the establishment of worldwide
competition rules would.

On the other hand, the new theoretical developments

point in a different direction as far as trade policy is
concerned. In the world of decreasing returns, "first
mover advantages" are critical. The temptation for the
government is then to intervene to promote
production in the desired direction and pre-empt the
entry of competing countries to the fray. This is what
economists call "strategic trade policy" (Krugman, ed.
1986). However, when sovereign countries decide to
integrate they are in fact stating that they foreclose
autonomous intervention, i.e. that they renounce to
implement an individual trade policy. They prefer (or
accept) that intervention be done at the level of the
union. Is there a reason to believe that "strategic trade
policy" is better conducted at the union's level than at
the national level ? The answer is an unqualified yes,
since the internal market is larger. However, it is also
much more difficult to reach a consensus among
member countries on what product to promote since
such a decision will favour one member over the
other. Therefore, compared to the world of constant
returns to scale, in the presence of economies of
scale, economic integration may lead not only to more
conflictive relations between members and non-
members (which could end in trade wars), but also to
more friction between member countries, unless the
latter play a cooperative game among themselves or
with other strategic actors.

Until the late 1960s, it was fashionable, following

Viner, to analyze the special case of customs unions
but add a few sentences stating that conclusions
could be extended tel quel to free trade areas, partial
preferential agreements or common markets. Sine
then a series of studies have appeared which show
the originality of each of these other integration forms
(Shibata 1967, Curzon 1974, Tovias 1977, Robson
1984, Wonnacott and Lutz 1989, Wooton 1988,
Richardson 1993). In the case of free trade areas
Shibata showed that there is a shifting effect, i.e. an
indirect form of trade deflection which origin rules
cannot pre-empt. Without the latter, a FTA would
become a customs union which adopts a CET equal
to that of the country with the lowest pre-union tariff.
On top of it, the country with high tariffs would lose all
revenue and the national Tariff would become
obsolete. However, even with rules of origin the Tariff
is partially obsolete. The low-tariff country can satisfy
all local demand after the FTA is formed with imports
from non-members and direct import-competing
production to the high-tariff country market. Another
original feature of FTAs is that generally speaking
there is not a single price in the area (as in customs
unions). Of course shifting effects are more likely, the
closer are member countries geographically. This
may explain why there are not many FTAs among
neighbours : high tariff countries are naturally hostile
to trade deflection and shifting effects. Theoreticians
tend to think that FTAs are a more liberal form of
integration than tariff-averaging customs unions and
probably more welfare-increasing. The low-tariff
country is not compelled to raise its tariff in the FTA
case and can pre-empt thus trade destruction, while
domestic prices in the high-tariff country may go down
(provided the low-tariff country can entirely replace
non-members' imports) as in the case of a tariff-
averaging customs union. Not only that. Richardson
1993 shows that the high-tariff country will tend to
reduce its tariff on non-members once the political
influence of import-competing industries decreases as
a result of forming the FTA. This will tend to minimize
trade diversion.
Economists agree as well that customs unions are not
superior to partial preferential trade arrangements, in
spite of the doctrine of GATT. Moreover, in the latter
case, customs revenue does not decrease in the
same proportions as in customs unions or FTAs; it
may even increase. This may be important for
members unable to find alternative fiscal sources to
fund the budget.
The theory of common markets is less developed. In
fact factor market integration has hardly been
addressed, an exception being Wooton 1988,
Jovanovic 1992, Ulff-Moller Nielsen et al. 1992 and
Michael 1992. Wooton examines whether member
countries of a customs union would gain from moving
to a common market and proves that all depends on
the level chosen for the CET. If the latter is adjusted
at appropriate levels, building a common market is
welfare-increasing. Michael, however, proves that this
is not sufficient. Only if tax rates on factors' rates of
return (e.g. income taxes) are equal among members
Wooton result obtains. In other words, harmonization
of tax rates in common markets is a must. After all,
differences in domestic direct and/or indirect taxes
can distort trade as much as external barriers such as
tariffs (Jovanovic 1992).



Turning now to NTBs, the distinction between trade

creation and diversion remains critical for evaluating
integration schemes (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989),
even though the case against trade diversion
associations has been muddled by the shift to this
kind of barriers as a method of protection. For
instance, a selective relaxation of QRs in favour of
member countries without a simultaneous tightening
of Qrs applied on non-members does provoke trade
diversion but does not impose costs on importing
countries and does not come neither at the expense
of the outside world (Molle 1990). The idea that trade
diversion is undesirable for member countries is
generally valid only when tariffs are the means of
protection. Pelkmans and Winters 1988 show that
when barriers which are removed among members
are not revenue-generating (as tariffs are) but cost-
increasing (such as differing testing and certification
requirements or cumbersome customs procedures),
the diversion of trade in favour of union members is
not welfare-reducing. However, in practice what
happens is that union members first create a customs
union and only then decide to eliminate cost-
increasing NTBs among them. When they engage in
this second step, trade diversion is welfare-reducing
after all because revenue previously generated by the
CET imposed on non-members' imports is lost (Sapir
1988). In the case of the EC, the latter eradicated
intra-EC quotas right from the start. Public purchase
and sale monopolies in member states were also
outlawed by the Treaty of Rome. But other NTBs,
such as technical barriers, have not been removed
until recently, so that Sapir's argument applies to the
EC as well.
The elimination of different NTBs in the integration
area has been explicitly treated by different authors in
the wake of the EC's decision in the mid-1980s to
complete its Internal Market.

Winters 1988 for example shows that replacing QRs

on the transhipment of third country goods among
members of a union (which had been imposed in the
first place to prevent deflection) is welfare-increasing.
However in practice it is likely that individual member
states will then request from the centre to impose a
common quota equal to less than the sum of member
states' quotas so as to leave the situation as it was in
the most restrictive countries. Another NTB, whose
abolition on a regional basis, this author has analyzed
is discriminatory government procurement (Tovias
1990). I show that its replacement by preferential
government procurement at the union's level can lead
to proportionately larger trade diversion or
suppression than in the case of customs union
formation. First of all, discriminatory procurement as a
disguised subsidy to the local champion is not a cost-
increasing distortion to trade, but rather a quasi-fiscal
measure. Second, there is a negative consumption
component to trade diversion which is absent in the
case of customs unions. This is due to the fact that
national governments or public agencies are free
before a preference for union's goods is declared to
buy equipment in world markets beyond a limited
protected amount which has to be bought at home.
After integration of public purchasing policies it is
most likely that all imports will have to be bought from
area suppliers at higher prices, therefore diminishing
quantities bought.
I will not refer to the analysis of the effects of
eliminating in the area of integration NTBs on trade in
services, because of lack of substantial work on the
subject and of space limitations.


A new consensus seems to prevail since a decade
whereby discriminatory trading arrangements are fully
justified if they are regionally based and if members
acting together can influence the terms of trade with
the rest of the world, while not otherwise. Wonnacott,
Wonnacott 1981 show for instance that whenever
prospective partners have difficulties of access to
third countries due to the existence of artificial barriers
imposed by non-members or natural barriers
separating members from non-members (something
ignore in previous analysis), unilateral tariff reduction
by the country wishing to gain access to the
prospective partner's market is not better than
creating a customs union which reorients trade in
favour of intra-regional trade. This trade diversion is
not welfare-reducing but rather the contrary, because
re-orientation saves on transport costs. Krugman
1990 has proven explicitly that the likelihood of a
preferential trading agreement being welfare-
increasing raises with the inherent regionalism of the
members wishing to join. Countries of the same
region were probably doing before a union a large
part of their trade with neighbours anyway; therefore,
trade diversion will be small. Balassa and Bauwens
1988 show that the existence of common borders and
small distance is positively related to intra-industry
trade. The former not only minimize transportation
costs, but even more important, information costs, two
key factors entering production functions of
differentiated products. Moreover, similar preference
structures and similar per capita incomes are
prevalent among neighbours (Greenaway 1989).
In short, common borders, "psychic proximity" and
short distance favour in turn intra-industry
specialization and a better exploitation of national and
international scale economies (Lorenz 1992, Krugman
Economists have today also a clearer idea of why all
this confusion about the worthiness of customs union
creation developed. Most models of the 1960s and
1970s assumed implicitly that the integration scheme
was being formed between a small country and a
large country (or a group of countries) which were not
neighbours, while the rest of the world was huge and
would not notice what was going on. In that context, it
can clearly be shown (Tovias 1978) that the small
partner invariably gains, the large country invariably
loses and non-members are indifferent. This model
fits, to mention just three examples, what happened
when the United Kingdom signed the EFTA
agreement with six highly-dispersed small European
countries; when Portugal entered the EC or when
Israel signed a Free Trade Agreement with the US.
Curiously nobody but for some exceptions (e.g.
Pomfret and Toren 1980, Wonnacott and Wonnacott
1981) seemed to be interested by the small country
partner. Most theoreticians were questioning the
economic rationale for entering such agreements of
countries like the UK, the EC or the US in the
examples just mentioned. Economists thought,
probably tightly so, that the three has "only" political
reasons in mind ("counter the creation of the EC",
"create spheres of influence", "reinforcing
democracy"), and knew that there was a cost they
would have to bear in terms of trade diversion, with no
improvement of the terms of trade with non-members
to compensate for.
But clearly not all customs unions are signed on a
non-regional basis by members of radically different
economic sizes and not all unions being created are
"small" in world terms. If sizes of potential members
are similar, reciprocity embodied in integration
agreements insure that every member gains as an
exporter. As an importer it may sometimes be lose,
but sometimes gain. This may have happened with
the initial association of the four equally-sized
customs territories that were France, Italy, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Benelux to form the
EEC. On top of it they constituted a "natural trading
block" in Western Europe, from a geographical
viewpoint, à la Krugman. Enlarging the EC from Six to
None and then to Twelve always on a regional basis
added a supplementary attraction for the members in
that they could begin to count more and more on
improving their terms of trade with the rest of the
world, sine the EC evolved from a small "union" to a
larger one. Not only that. Since the club was
constituted by technologically advanced developed
countries, many of their production functions
displayed increasing, nor constant returns to scale. In
such a setting, adding more members and enlarging
the market increases the probability of having a firm in
the club which is able to produce a good not
previously available in the union (e.g. a super-
computer) at unit costs which are only marginally
higher than those of the good previously imported
from non-members. This minimizes Corden's trade
suppression effect (which in EC parlance would come
to the "cost of Fortress Europe" for the members).
Moreover as trade with the rest of the world shrinks it
is likely that the cost of goods previously imported
from non-members will rise since production is
curtailed there (Krugman 1988, Venables 1987).
This paper has been dealing with some of the
achievements of the theory of economic integration
(the real side) until now. There are still many
omissions and much remains to be done. The reader
wishing to look ahead should consult Pelmans 1990
which maps for us the future agenda.