Christology - PDF Philosophical

Philosophical Theology: Christology
Dr. Garry DeWeese

Talbot School of Theology, Spring 2001
1. The incoherence
1.1 The central Christian affirmation is that Jesus is God.
1.1.1 This is an identity statement, not a predication. Somehow Jesus is
numerically identical to God.
1.1.2 How do we understand this identity statement?
1.2 The second issue is the cosmological one.
1.2.1 If God is the creator, what would it mean for God Himself to become part
of that universe?
1.2.2 Isn’t it demeaning for the Creator to become part of the creation?
1.2.3 If there’s a good reason, a reason in consonance with the Creator and
creation, then it can be explained.
1.2.4 How is it an ontological possibility for the Creator to enter the creation? If
all of creation is ontologically dependent on the Creator to sustain it, then how
could God leave His supernatural perspective and enter what He is sustaining
and still keep it in existence? Can He do this as a creature?
1.2.5 The attributes of the Creator is such that they must be greater than His
creation. So if the Creator assumes the nature of what is made, doesn’t that
necessitate the Creator give up some of His attributes and no longer be the being
He was?
1.3 The epistemological issue
1.3.1 If “Jesus is fully man” is true, then on what basis can we know the doctrine
of incarnation is true? On what basis can we predicate deity of Him? It may be
true, but how do we know it’s true because what we encounter is a man.
1.3.2 There’s a major role for natural theology to play in this.
1.4 The Trinitarian question--If the Trinity is true, how do we understand that if the
second person of the Trinity becomes man?
2. The nature of identity statements

2.1 The “is” of predication (x is y): x is a particular or a class, and y is a property or
a metaphor (qualities, properties, attributes).
2.1.1 That necktie is stylish. “Necktie” is a particular. “Stylish” is a property.
2.1.2 Neckties are torture. “Torture” is a metaphor.
2.1.3 Analogical predication. That book is good. The book isn’t good in the way
that God is good.
2.1.4 Logic shorthand “Fx” – F is the property, x is the particular.
2.2 The “is” of identity: x is numerically identical to y. x is a particular or class, and
y is a particular or class.
2.2.1 That animal is a dog.
2.2.2 The statement should be made so that if x is a particular y is a particular, or
if x is a class then y is a class, too.
2.2.3 Jesus is God could mean that God is a class and Jesus instantiates all of the
qualities of God. But that’s not what orthodoxy holds. This would imply that
the qualities of God could be multiply instantiated. Jesus is the only instance of
God that we can point to.
2.2.4 It’s better to say that both Jesus and God are particulars.
2.2.5 The green necktie is Ed’s. They are numerically identical.
2.3 Identity statements have certain properties.
2.3.1 Reflexivity: a=a. Something is identical to itself.
1 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

2.3.2 Symmetry: (a=b) then (b=a)
2.3.3 Transitivity: [(a=b) and (b=c) then (a=c)]
2.3.4 Liebniz’ Law of the indiscernability of identicals: Necessarily, for any
objects a and b, if a is identical to b, then for any property P, a exemplifies P iff b
exemplifies P. (a)(b)[(a=b) iff (Pa iff Pb)]
2.3.4.1 This creates a problem for the Trinity. If Jesus bears the property of
dying for our sins, then the property of dying for our sins is necessarily true
of anything Jesus is identical to, i.e., God.
2.3.4.2 This also creates a problem for the hypostatic union. If Jesus as man is
identical to Jesus as God, then the attributes of man would be shared by God
and visa versa. How can limited knowledge be compatible with
omniscience? How can limited location be compatible with omnipresence?
2.3.5 Not Liebniz’ Law of the identity of indiscernibles: Necessarily, for any
objects a and b if for any property P, a exemplifies P iff b exemplifies P, then a is
identical to b.
2.3.5.1 This is hotly debated whether it’s true or not.
2.3.5.2 If it’s true, it’s true for pure property is anything that doesn’t depend
on another for its identity. Relations are impure properties because there is
another involved.
3. Christology
3.1 Christological distinctions
3.1.1 Christology from above and Christology from below
3.1.1.1 From above is Alexandrian Christology
3.1.1.1.1 Alexandria was a center for Platonism and philosophical study,
so it tends to be more philosophical.
3.1.1.1.2 Starts from Jesus’ divinity and works to His humanity. It takes
for granted Jesus’ divinity and tries to work out His humanity. How can
God Himself (taken as a presupposition) can take on full humanity?
3.1.1.1.3 John’s Gospel is Christology from above.
3.1.1.2 From below is Antiochene
3.1.1.2.1 Antioch was a center for theology in the Greek world early on.
3.1.1.2.2 The epistemology is from Jesus’ humanity to His deity. How
can a human being be God incarnate?
3.1.1.2.3 This is the Christology of the synoptics.
3.1.1.3 You have to choose one of these starting points. Either starting point
can yield a fully orthodox Christology. This class is Christology from above,
which tends to be the approach of philosophical theology.
3.1.2 High vs. Low Christology
3.1.2.1 High Christology puts the emphasis on the divinity of Christ, but
doesn’t necessarily result in the exclusion of His humanity.
3.1.2.2 The danger is the docetic heresy, He appears to be a man but is not.
3.1.2.2.1 Jesus didn’t experience real temptation. If He couldn’t sin then
He couldn’t be tempted.
3.1.2.2.2 It seems undignified for God to live as a man.
3.1.2.3 Low Christology puts the emphasis on Jesus’ humanity to the virtual
exclusion of Jesus’ divinity.
3.1.2.3.1 Because of antisupernatural presuppositions, this has been the
recent trend in theology.
3.1.2.3.2 The danger is the Ebionite heresy, the beginning of the
adoptionistic idea. There is no ontological distinction between Jesus and
every other human being.

3.1.2.3.3 This is a watershed whether one works within an orthodox or
liberal tradition.
3.1.2.4 Functional vs. ontological Christology
3.1.2.4.1 Functional focuses on the saving work of Christ.
3.1.2.4.2 The danger tends to ignore or downplay the uniqueness of
Christ.
3.1.2.4.3 Bypasses the high/low debate by focusing on what He did
3.1.2.4 Ontological focuses on the divine and human natures of Christ.
4. Functional Christology
4.1 Functional Christology defines Jesus in terms of function rather than ontology,
seeks to understand the person of Christ in terms of what He did, not in terms of
what He is.
4.1.1 The difficulty comes when a rigid form of Christology is worked out from
this starting point. Tends to declare certain aspects of orthodoxy to be without
merit or relevance.
4.1.2 “To know Christ means to know His benefits, and not to reflect upon His
natures and the modes of His incarnation.” (Philip Melancthon, Loci communes
theologici) This is a functional view of Jesus, but Melancthon meant it in a
different way. In order to benefit from the atonement, we don’t need to parse
out the philosophical and theological details of Christology. But that is not to say
that it’s not important to reflect on those issues.
4.2 Four claims
4.2.1 The Bible reveals the work of Christ and not His nature.
4.2.2 The Hebrew worldview of the biblical writers was relational, not
metaphysical. The Hebrews didn’t think in metaphysical terms; they had no
worked out philosophy.
4.2.3 Ontological Christology is a product of importing Greek philosophical
categories in the post-biblical period.
4.2.4 A Christology that is relevant today must be functional, not ontological.
4.3 The Biblical worldview
4.3.1 It’s alleged that form/redaction criticism when applied to the New
Testament help us disentangle the creedal affirmations about Jesus, which are
reflective of a developed Christian community of the 2nd c., from the historical
Jesus. This approach reinforces the idea that the world view didn’t include
philosophical speculations. John was incapable of thinking in platonic terms
when describing the “logos.”
4.3.2 This view also places the synoptics over John because of their temporal
priority.
4.3.3 Jesus made no clear claim to be divine. The “I Am” are Johannine, not
synoptic. In the synoptics, Jesus used the title “Son of Man” as a reference to His
humanity, not a Messianic claim.
4.3.4 Jewish messiahship doesn’t yield a Christology of status in metaphysical
terms of “human” or “divine” origin at all. The Old Testament gives us a human
picture of the Messiah. Messianic terms were applied to some prophets, so to be
called Messiah doesn’t entail divinity.
4.3.5 Response
4.3.5.1 Function, not nature
4.3.5.1.1 Texts with clear ontological statements: Jn. 1:1, 18; Ph. 2:6-11;
Co. 1:15-20. The early dating of these texts is on solid scholarship.
4.3.5.1.2 Titles: “Son of Man,” “Son of God,” “Lord,” “Savior,” “God” are
all titles that have ontological implications.

4.3.5.1.3 “New Testament Christology was primarily functional,
indicating what role Jesus played in effecting God’s salvation of human
being, but in so doing, it reflects much about what Jesus was in Himself.”
(Raymond Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament) Though the focus
is on function, it doesn’t rule out ontology.
4.3.5.2 Hebrew thought
4.3.5.2.1 There are no implications from the Hebrew world view that
would exclude ontology. This says nothing about whether there was
speculative thought.
4.3.5.2.2 The Hebrew language uses very concrete terms to extend
analogously to other things. E.g., “heavy” is applied to God for His
“glory.”
4.3.5.2.3 We cannot read metaphysics off the lexical stock of any
language, and it’s dangerous to do so.
4.3.5.2.4 The reductionist fallacy: The emphasis becomes exclusive.
Vocabulary doesn’t limit what the culture or individuals might know or
use in other contexts. The fact that they didn’t do it doesn’t mean they
weren’t capable of it.
4.3.5.2.5 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language—This approach is
seriously flawed.
4.3.5.3 Post-biblical developments
4.3.5.3.1 It’s assumed that by historical accident Christianity developed in
the cradle of Greek philosophy. But if we believe in God’s providence, it
wasn’t an accident. And why can’t philosophical categories be borrowed
and developed?
4.3.5.3.2 There are very few arguments for this view, just assertions.
4.3.5.3.3 The claim is that Hebrew “mythology” was replaced by Greek
“ontology” because it was found to be inaccurate. We need to do the
same thing because we’ve moved beyond Greek thought.
4.3.5.3.4 The functional point of view was replaced by static (ontic) point
of view and ontological definitions (e.g., ousia, prosopon, hypostasis.)
4.3.5.4 Jesus made no clear claim to be divine.
4.3.5.4.1 Ontological notions are present in the Old Testament and New
Testament.
4.3.5.4.2 You really cannot separate the “what” from the “who.” Jesus’
saving work depends upon His divine and human natures. Given Jesus’
job description, what must be true about His natures?
4.3.5.4.3 Post-biblical development is necessary for the articulation and
defense of the Gospel. To articulate what was meant by simple
statements in the Bible, and to defend against the developing heresies,
philosophical development was necessary.
4.3.5.5 In order to be relevant we need a new Christology that abandons
ontological categories and is defined in functional terms
4.3.5.5.1 The Greek metaphysical background to Chalcedon is out of date.
We now have a richer understanding of natural causation and a better
understanding of cosmology. Things don’t have essences and natures.
But it’s not clear how scientific understanding has to change our
metaphysics.
4.3.5.5.2 The empirical scientific point of view is dynamic, pragmatic, and
relational, not static, speculative, ontological. This isn’t an argument, but
an assertion. Unless you assume this claim, it doesn’t rule out the
traditional view.

4.3.5.5.3 Contemporary (postmodern) preaching cannot be “logocentric.”
If we preach the story of what Christ did, that entails who He was and
claimed to be. We don’t preach a philosophical Christology, we preach
the Gospel.
4.3.5.5.4 Inadequacies of logical positivism (self-refuting), existentialism
(metaphysically bankrupt), and pragmatism are well known, and
therefore their attempt to reject the traditional metaphysics is a failure.
4.3.5.5.5 This primarily stems from an antisupernatural bias. There is no
solid objection to an ontological Christology.
4.3.5.6 Jesus couldn’t have accomplished a function of a certain sort if He
weren’t a being of a certain sort.
5. Process Christology
5.1 Process philosophy and theology
5.1.1 God: principle of concretion
5.1.1.1 Everything in the world is part of interconnected events. There are no
individuals, just events. Every localized process can take different directions
with different potentials.
5.1.1.2 The principle of concretion (of becoming a real process) is what
determines which direction an event goes. Concrete vs. abstract: concrete if
it is a possible termination of a causal relation. Something is abstract because
it cannot be the termination of a causal relation (e.g., the number 8).
5.1.2 God is the principle effect in the world. This is not a personal conception of
God. God actualizes some eternal, ideal forms. The process contained in
something is its teleological form. God can actualize that telos, but not through
coercion, but persuasion. God lures (loves) the world towards the perfect
realization of its nature. God is the final cause, not the efficient cause.
5.1.3 God is not actualized yet. God and the world are mutually independent.
Things in the world are free and can choose which way they evolve, and in turn
will affect which way God changes. If God is the final goal and the world is free,
then as things in the world take different paths, God will change.
5.1.4 Panentheism: God is in all things, but not identical to them (not
pantheism).
5.1.5 God is developing with the world. Genuine freedom gives more value to
the things that are brought about by those choices. Aggregates can be coerced,
but things that are considered individuals have complete freedom and cannot be
coerced. The higher things evolve, the greater freedom they must have if their
actions are to have value. God therefore loves the world to the final effect.
5.1.6 God is the sum of two natures: primordial (what he has been; fixed) and
consequent (what he will be; open). No fixed and immutable nature.
5.1.7 Major names: Whitehead, Bergson, Hartshorne, Pittenger, Ogden, Cobb,
Griffin. Southern Methodist University was a major center of process theology
for a while.
5.2 Process Christology
5.2.1 It is said that process theology takes seriously the humanity of Christ. That
is questionable.
5.2.1.1 Person is an event—a complex aggregate of past history, present
relationships, and future influences and potentials. Persons are bundles.
They cannot take Jesus’ humanity seriously when they redefine what it is to
be a person.
5.2.1.2 The divinity of Christ is modified.
5.2.1.2.1 E.g., Cobb speaks of the Logos as God’s creative, transformative
power in culture.

5.2.1.2.2 The Logos tends to be incarnate in all things because it’s God’s
transformative power. It’s just incarnate in a salient way in Jesus.
5.2.1.2.3 The uniqueness of Jesus is one of degree, not kind. Jesus is a
natural process in tune in a special way with God’s transformative
process.
5.2.1.3 Process theology lacks both genuine humanity and deity.
5.3 Evaluation
5.3.1 Positive
5.3.1.1 Philosophically and scientifically informed
5.3.1.2 Motivation is to take the humanity of Jesus seriously
5.3.1.3 Emphasis on God’s love
5.4 Negative
5.4.1 Role of Scriptural authority is minimal
5.4.2 Dependent on process philosophy. To the degree process philosophy is
flawed, so is process theology.
5.4.3 Neglect of sin, atonement, resurrection
5.4.4 Divinity of Jesus: same problems as the God of process theology
6. Epistemological Approach
6.1 Methodist approach: first define the method to arrive at justification or
knowledge. How do we know what constitutes knowledge unless we develop a
criterion first?
6.2 Particularist approach: Identify cases of knowledge first, or at least justified
belief that counts as knowledge. Analyze these cases and synthesize what criteria
that gives us for identifying knowledge.
6.3 Two ways of identifying knowledge
6.3.1 Coherentism: Each item of knowledge receives its justification from other
beliefs; a web of beliefs support and lend justification to a belief.
6.3.1.1 No belief is justified apart from its relation to other beliefs; each belief
has doxastic justification from other beliefs.
6.3.1.2 This doesn’t guarantee truth because many systems of belief may be
justified but not fit the world.
6.3.2 Foundationalism: Trace beliefs back to the foundations of belief, which
have a certainty to them given the best theory of reality.
6.3.2.1 Kinds of beliefs that fit in the foundation: perceptions, synthetic a
priori intuitions, introspective awareness, memory beliefs, testimonial beliefs
6.3.2.2 These are non-doxastic evidence that meet certain conditions
(properly basic evidence): e is a basic source of evidence iff the beliefs
formed on the basic of that evidence are mostly true in a cognitively ideal
setting.
6.3.2.3 Certainly these could be false. Defeasible foundationalism allows for
problems in the causal chain that may produce false beliefs.
6.3.2.4 There are beliefs that support beliefs that are mostly true. What are
the kinds of evidence that count as basic sorts of evidence? They are the
kinds of evidence that mediate to our mind evidence of universals in the
world.
6.4 How do we incorporate Scripture into our epistemology?
6.4.1 Expert testimony has a higher standard to meet than ordinary testimony:
competence and sincerity. These are the kinds of criteria that critics tend to test.
6.4.1.1 Coady Testimony examines the epistemology of testimony.
6.4.1.2 The Bible, and any work of history, is expert testimony. Conclusion:
Expert testimony is a basic sort of belief iff any belief formed under ideal
circumstances formed on the basis of expert testimony is mostly true.

6.4.1.3 If expert testimony asks for an unusual level of commitment of belief
or volition, it requires a higher epistemic status. The Bible as normal
testimony doesn’t get us there.
6.4.1.4 This is where inerrancy is essential. Inerrancy is that property of
Scripture that makes it sufficient for the formation of belief. Within a
comprehensive scheme that includes who God is and how He might
communicate with us, because of the nature of Scripture, beliefs responsibly
formed are justified.
6.4.2 The Bible has evidential status as expert testimony; it has authoritative
status from its inerrancy. When it places a demand on our volition, it must have
a higher authoritative status.
7. Christology of the Gospels (lecture by Dr. Mike Wilkens)

7.1 We must look for a vigorously content for the Jesus in the Gospels.
7.2 In Jesus’ earthly ministry what did He do and could do only because He was
God?
7.2.1 An absolute authority to forgive sins, as opposed to delegated authority
7.2.2 Atonement for the world’s sins
7.2.3 Almost everything Jesus did in His earthly life before His resurrection can
be found as acts of prophets or Apostles.
7.3 What are the implications of Jesus’ self-consciousness? What is the source of His
self-consciousness?
7.3.1 He’s limited by His humanity.
7.3.2 Kenotic theory: Jesus didn’t empty Himself of His deity or His attributes.
(Mt. 24)
7.3.3 If Jesus didn’t give up His attributes, was He omnipresent during His
earthly ministry? Yes. The menotholite controversies wrestled with these.
There was a localization of Jesus’ consciousness that inhered in His humanity.
7.3.4 He emptied Himself of His independent exercise of His attributes as deity.
He limited Himself to His human nature.
7.4 Three theses are advanced by the synoptic Gospels:
7.4.1 An implicit Christology that grows from Jesus’ own self-consciousness
7.4.2 Jesus acted out of an awareness of His deity and Messiahship throughout
His ministry.
7.4.3 Jesus manifested awareness of His deity specifically by three things:
Exercising the functions, assuming the prerogatives, and accepting the honors
that belong only to God.
7.4.4 Implicit divine claims:
7.4.4.1 He claimed thee divine rights: judge mankind, forgive sins, grant
eternal life.
7.4.4.2 His presence was God’s presence.
7.4.4.3 The attitude people took toward Him would determine their eternal
destiny.
7.4.4.4 He identified His actions with God’s actions. His actions were God’s
actions.
7.4.4.5 He taught the truth on His own authority.
7.4.4.6 He performed miracles on His own authority.
7.4.4.7 He appeared to receive worship.
7.4.4.8 He assumed that His life was a pattern for others, a divinely
authoritative form of life.
7.4.4.9 He applied Old Testament texts that described God to Himself.
In the Parables, He identified Himself with a father or king that represent
God.

7.5 The synoptics are much less explicit about Jesus’ claims to deity than the Gospel
of John. But much of this has to do with the purposes of the synoptics and John.
7.5.1 Up to 30 years transpired between the writing of the synoptics and John.
7.5.2 The synoptics are a historical recounting of Jesus’ ministry. They allow us
to enter into the experience of the disciples as they experienced recognizing Jesus
as God.
7.5.3 We are too familiar with Jesus, and the impact of the incarnation of God
doesn’t impress us. It was inconceivable and terrifying for the Jews to adjust
their concept of God as triune. This was a huge paradigm shift. That’s what the
Gospels were written to do. Their focus was on persuading others of Jesus’
deity. That was the difficult idea to absorb then.
7.5.4 Acts and the Epistles: The Acts provide an account of the paradigm shift
and the Epistles the explanation of it. Paul is the leading Pharisee who makes the
shift philosophically and theologically.
7.5.5 John writes 30 years later to give a philosophical supplement to the
synoptics. But the battleground has now shifted from struggling to accept Jesus’
deity. He writes freely of the Logos incarnation. By now gnosticism has
challenged the humanity of Jesus. (1 John 4; 2 John 7)
7.5.6 Both the deity of Christ and the incarnation must be maintained to
understand the Gospels.
7.6 Jesus couldn’t fully accomplish His mission without being fully human. Denial
will lead to heresy and practical blasphemy.
7.6.1 The purpose of the divine man: Matthew 1:18—Function of His deity: save
man from sin. Emmanuel—ontological deity. Jesus’ purpose was to intertwine
those.
7.6.2 His job was to be what the first Adam failed to be and restore the image of
God in man as God created man.
7.6.3 Restoration of humans to do what the first Adam failed to do—subdue and
rule the Earth. (Gen. 1; Psalm 8) Jesus was a fully human person in whom God
was peculiarly active in fulfilling the hopes of the prophet, priest, and king.
Don’t be lulled into a distinction between an ontological and functional deity.
Jesus couldn’t fulfill His function without His unique being.
7.6.4 The restoration of humans to live in a way the first Adam failed to live.
7.7 The real difference in what Jesus did in His earthly ministry is the authority He
claimed for Himself.
7.7.1 Jesus performed miracles on His own authority by the power of the Holy
Spirit. The real difference in Jesus was that it was His will that accomplished the
miracles. (Mt. 8)
7.7.2 It is the demonstration of the Spirit that Jesus is now the Messianic
authority. (Acts 10) Jesus was the anointed one that would rule for God.
7.7.3 Jesus limits Himself in the kenosis to live as a man and operates through
the power of the Holy Spirit. That becomes the example of a spirit-filled life of
the church today. He is an example of what we are, how we are to live, and what
we are to do. (2 Cor. 3; Rom. 8:29)
8. Christology of Colossians 1:15-20 (lecture by Dr. Clint Arnold)

8.1 Poetic structure—apparent in the Greek. Not only poetic, but some scholars
consider it to be a hymn that was used by churches in Western Asia Minor, where
Colossi is.
8.2 Affirms a high Christology
8.2.1 Jesus is creator of Heaven and Earth.
8.2.2 Preexistence. Agrees with John 1 and Hebrews 1 that affirm this high
Christology.

8.2.3 Jesus is also characterized as the goal of creation, it was for Him.
8.2.4 He also maintains all of creation.
8.2.5 Jesus is celebrated as Lord over the cosmic powers.
8.3 Authorship
8.3.1 Continental scholarship believes that Paul was not the author.
8.3.1.1 Instead it was a gnostic author who was writing against a strain of
gnosticism he disagreed with.
8.3.1.2 Bultmann believed that the hymn was used by gnostic groups. It
reflects the spirit world as superior to the material world. The thought forms
indicate that the author has been influenced by gnostic ideas.
8.3.1.3 This view also assumes an evolutionary Christology.
8.3.2 Recent scholarship recognizes that Christology developed early in the
church.
8.4 Historical background
8.4.1 Colossi was a small country city 100 miles inland from Ephesus. It was an
insignificant city overshadowed by the nearby cities of Laodicea and Hierapolis.
It was known only for a technique of wool dying.
8.4.2 There were probably a few house churches in the city.
8.4.3 The church was probably composed of Jews (many from Persia), Romans,
local indigenous peoples.
8.4.4 Paul didn’t plant the church, but he felt responsible for it because it was
evangelized as a result of Paul’s preaching in Ephesus.
8.5 The Colossian heresy
8.5.1 The problem Paul addressed was empty philosophy (2:8). The philosophy
is inspired by the elemental spirits.
8.5.2 They worshipped angelic spirits.
8.5.3 They practiced mutilation, but it’s not clear whether this is circumcision or
self-mutilation.
8.5.4 Taboos
8.5.5 There are extensive references to principalities and powers.
8.5.6 Celebrating the new moons and Sabbath is mentioned.
8.5.7 Gnosticism and Jewish mysticism seem to be the problems addressed.
There was a faction the encouraged mystical, experience-based worship that
included visionary ascent to Heaven and worshipped with the angels around the
throne. Jewish animistic mysticism was quite common.
8.5.8 A philosophical system of thought and practice of the local area. Paul uses
a definite article before philosophy, so he is referring to a specific teaching in the
church.
8.5.8.1 A number of suggestions have been made: neopythagoreanism,
middle Platonism, cynicism. Most likely it was local Phrygian-Lydian folk
belief.
8.5.8.2 The indigenous religious practices best account for what the religious
influences might be.
8.5.8.3 Gnosticism didn’t surface as a religion until the mid-second century.
8.6 Colossians 2:18
8.6.1 “insisting on…”
8.6.2 “humility”—ascetic practices
8.6.3 “worship of angels”—The angels are the objects of worship, not co-
participants in the worship. They were invoking and calling on angels.
8.6.4 “entering what He has seen”—spiritual insight from initiation into a
mystery cult. This odd word usage and has been difficult to translate and
interpret, but it is found in an Apollo temple regarding a mystery initiation into a
mystical cult.

8.7 Paul’s solution to the problems at Colossi is a correct understanding of
Christology.
8.7.1 He is the head over all rulers, powers, authorities, and dominions. This is
vocabulary his audience would be familiar with in the context of their mystical
practices.
8.7.2 He shows them how out of sync their practices are with Christianity. Why
fear these powers if your worship Christ. He is preeminent, He created all
things, and creation is for Him. He is exalted over all creation.
8.7.3 He emphasizes Jesus’ supremacy to prevent them from viewing Jesus as
another powerful being in their mystical beliefs.
8.7.4. He emphasizes Jesus preexistence.
8.7.5 Jesus is the firstborn of all creation. This is a reference to Psalm 89:27 that
the Jewish audience would have understood. Firstborn is a status with rights.
Jesus is the fulfillment of the Davidic promise in Psalm 89; He is the most exalted
of the kings of the earth. It underscores the power and authority of Christ.
8.7.6 Jesus’ deity can be inferred from the fact that He is said to be the creator.
He is not an intermediary figure.
8.8 Jesus’ function to answer fears and needs is based on who He is.
9. Christology of the First Four Ecumenical Councils (lecture by Dr. Fred Sanders)
9.1 How does God relate to the world? The Christian answer is Jesus Christ.
9.1.1 Incarnation: “Among the heretics, you always search in vain for this one
sentence: The Word of God has become flesh.” Iranaeus of Lyons (ca. 180)
9.1.2 Who is Jesus Christ? has implications for everything you do theologically.
Systematic connections:
9.1.2.1 Who is God?
9.1.2.2 How is God revealed?
9.1.2.3 What is the image of God?
9.1.2.4 What is sin?
9.1.2.5 What does it mean to be human?
9.1.2.6 How are we saved?
9.1.2.7 What is the goal of my life?
9.1.2.8 What is the church?
9.2 Ecumenical Councils: gathering of bishops from the entire Christian church
across the inhabited world (oikomene).
9.2.1 Seven church councils. Jerusalem Council in Acts isn’t considered one of
these because it is unique to itself because of the Apostolic authority inherent in
the participants.
9.2.2 Tradition and its claims on us: The claim of the ecumenical council is that
not only can’t you be faithful to who Jesus Christ is without the New Testament,
you also can’t be faithful without the normative interpretation as determined by
the ecumenical councils.
9.2.2.1 Nicea and Chalcedon are widely agreed upon. How many councils
do we have to confirm in order to be orthodox?
9.2.2.2 Protestantism sets the ecumenical councils at seven; the Roman
Catholic church continues to have ecumenical councils.
9.2.3 The seven ecumenical councils and their key teachings on Christ:
9.2.3.1 Nicaea I (325) )—truly God
9.3.2.2 Constantinople I (381)—truly human
9.3.2.3 Ephesus (431)—one person
9.3.2.4 Chalcedon (451)—two natures
9.3.2.5 Constantinople II (553)—Christ’s God-centered humanity
9.3.2.6 Constantinople III (681)—two wills

9.3.2.7 Nicaea II (787)—images
9.4 History before Nicaea
9.4.1 persecution, martyrdom, etc.
9.4.2 Constantine makes the empire Christian.
9.4.2.1 A.D. 312: Battle of Milvian Bridge—Constantine prevails and is on his
way to be the sole emperor.
9.4.2.2 A.D. 313: Edict of Milan—Christianity is made a legal religion.
9.4.2.3 A.D. 325: Council of Nicaea
9.4.2.4 Constantine is held as a saint by the Eastern church. His mother
Helen was converted, became very pious, and was intent on finding the
historical sites of Jesus’ life in Palestine.
9.4.2.5 Constantine used Christianity as a unifying force for his unified
emperor.
9.4.3 Pre-Nicene heresies
9.4.3.1 Docetism: God only appeared (dokeo) to become human. Related
heresies are modalism, gnosticism, Sabellianism.
9.4.3.2 Adoptionism: the opposite heresy. Jesus was only a man, exalted to
Godhood by grace. Related heresies: ebionitism.
9.4.3.3 Arianism: named for Arius, an Alexandrian priest ca. 318.
9.4.3.3.1 If Jesus is the Son, he must have been begotten. If he was
begotten, there was a time before he was begotten. Jesus is the greatest
creature of God’s.
9.4.3.3.2 Christ is the mediator between God and man, but part of the
creation.
9.4.3.3.3 Christ was begotten, but before time. Then God created time
through Jesus. This is how Arius thought he could get out of the idea that
Jesus is a creature.
9.4.3.3.4 Jesus was high enough to redeem us, but low enough to suffer
and be an example.
9.5 Nicaea
9.5.1 Athanasius concluded that this view of Jesus would not achieve salvation.
Jesus mediates between God and man by partaking of both natures.
9.5.2 Soteriological axiom: Only God can save us. Jesus is not created. Christ is
fully God; homoousius with the Father.
9.5.3 The Arians kept affirming the orthodox statements without meaning the
same thing. Finally, they used a non-biblical term (homoousius) to make the
difference clear.
9.5.4 Athanasius is a young man in 325 but lived nearly to the next council
fighting the controversies. He was exiled five times, was in mortal danger,
slandered.
9.5.5 After Nicaea the political trends changed in favor of Arius. The Creed was
rediscovered at Constantinople.
9.6 Constantinople (381)
9.6.1 Headed by the Cappadocians: Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa,
Gregory of Nazianatus.
9.6.2 The first Council of Constantinople
9.6.2.1 Confirmed the defeat of Arainism
9.6.2.2 Affirmed the Creed of Nicaea
9.6.2.3 Confirmed the deity of the Spirit
9.6.3 Apollinarianism
9.6.3.1 Jesus is a human body, but has a divine soul.

9.6.3.2 Soteriological axiom: What is not assumed is not healed. Jesus
cannot save what He is not. Christ saves by assuming, taking on humanity.
Jesus cannot save human souls if He didn’t have a human soul.
9.7 Summary
9.7.1 True Word: adoptionism, Arianism
9.7.2 True Flesh: docetism, Arianism, Apollinarianism
9.7.3 Only God can save us; what is not assumed is not healed.
9.7.4 Jesus is homoousios with the Father and homoousios with humanity.
9.8 Ephesus
9.8.1 The major doctrine from Ephesus is that Jesus is one person.
9.8.2 Refutes Nestorianism.
9.8.3 Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, objects to theotokos, Mary is the God-
bearer.
9.8.3.1 It’s impossible to do something to just one of the two natures.
Therefore, Mary gave birth to God. The hypostatic union is affirmed: one
person, two natures.
9.8.3.2 Jesus gives life, yet is born. He is everywhere, yet grows. He knows
all, yet learns. He rules in glory, yet suffers. He is eternal, yet dies. They sort
through these and assign them to one of His two natures.
9.8.3.3 It’s important to be able to distinguish between the two natures, but
also affirm that what happens to one nature happens to the other. So God
suffers and dies. This is the communicato idiomatum. Therefore, Mary is the
mother of God. If this isn’t affirmed, you are a Nestorian.
9.8.4 Nestorianism divided the natures in the one person as wholly independent.
The nature is equivocated with person and the terms aren’t well-defined.
9.8.5 Ephesus affirms that Jesus is the mother of God, which is a statement about
Jesus not Mary. It’s an affirmation of the unity of Jesus’ person and natures. It’s
possible to affirm the doctrine, yet not use the terminology because it’s been
invested with Maryology of Catholicism in the intervening time.
9.8.6 There is still a small Nestorian church in Syria.
9.9 Chalcedon (451)
9.9.1 Heresy in question: monophysitism--one nature
9.9.1.1 Jesus is from two natures, but only one nature after the incarnation.
Hybrid nature. It affirms that the human nature is still in tact, but is
overpowered by the divine nature.
9.9.1.2 Orthodoxy is that Jesus is from one nature and took on a second
nature.
9.9.2 How are the two natures unified?
9.9.2.1 Monophysite: They become one the human absorbed in the divine.
One person/one nature. Opposite of nestorianism.
9.9.2.2 Nestorianism: They are distinct. Two person/two natures.
9.9.2.3 Christ is one person with two natures, unconfused, unchanged,
undivided, and unseparated. Note that Chalcdeon defines the two natures in
the negative (i.e., error), not by giving a positive description of how it is true.
9.9.2.4 The Chalcedon box sets the boundaries, the conceptual field, for
orthodoxy. Boundaries: two natures, one person, fully God, fully man.
9.9.2.5 Within orthodoxy, there is a range of understanding the balance
between Jesus’ natures. Lutherans tend closer to monophysism, and
Reformed tend closer to nestorianism. The Coptic Orthodox Church is
monophysite today.
10. Christology of the Last Three Ecumenical Councils (lecture by Dr. Fred Sanders)
10.1 Constantinople II

10.1.1 A.D. 553. Heresy refuted: nestorianism. There are no living heretics they
oppose, but they respond to written teachings.
10.1.2 Key teaching: Christ’s God-centered humanity. Who is Jesus Christ?
Requires a Trinitarian answer. Key phrase: “One of the Trinity suffered in the
flesh.”
10.1.3 The Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God; the Father is not the
Son or the Spirit, etc.
10.1.4 Who suffered in the flesh? The Trinitarian and Christological debates
come together at this council.
10.1.5 The one person is God the Son. The natures come from God and from
man.
10.1.6 Hypostatic union
10.1.6.1 anhypostatic Christology: Christ’s human nature is not personal if
considered by itself. If it were personal by itself, then there would be two
persons or a human person adopted by the Logos.
10.1.6.2 enhypostatic Christology: Christ’s human nature is personal when
considered with the second person of the Trinity.
10.1.6.3 How are the two natures unified?
10.1.6.3.1 They become one new nature: monophysitism
10.1.6.3.2 They choose to remain together: Nestorianism
10.1.6.3.3 They are joined in one person without confusion, change,
division, or separation: orthodox
10.1.6.3.3.1 Human nature is sort of annexed to the second person of
the Trinity.
10.1.6.3.3.2 Christ’s human nature is personalized by the eternal Son
of God.
10.1.6.3.3.3 Our human nature is personalized by created
personhood.
10.2 Constantinople III
10.2.1 A.D. 681 Heresy refuted: monothelytism
10.2.2 Key teaching: Christ has two wills.
10.2.3 Hero: Maximus the Confessor maintained the faith against the Emperor
and was martyred.
10.2.4 Key phrase: Keep the economy free of fantasy. Maintain the maximum
integrity of the natures.
10.2.4.1 “Economy” is the dispensation of salvation in which God becomes
incarnate; the incarnate life of Jesus Christ.
10.2.4.2 If it appears that Jesus is doing something then it’s real; He’s not
pretending. He was tempted; He didn’t know where Lazarus was.
10.2.4.3 Affirms the full integrity of the human and divine natures.
10.2.5 The crux of the council is Jesus’ prayer in Gethsemene: Not my will, but
Yours.
10.2.5.1 If He’s God, why is His will different?
10.2.5.2 Does Jesus have two wills?
10.2.6 If the human nature includes a human will, and the divine nature includes
a divine will, then Jesus had to have two wills.
10.2.6.1 Natures have wills, natural wills. Wills don’t belong to persons.
10.2.6.2 God has one will.
10.2.6.3 What is a will?
10.2.6.3.1 Choosing—gnomic will: deliberative, person-centered will.
Maximus thought this was from the Fall. He explicitly denies that Jesus
had this kind of will.

10.2.6.3.2 Desiring—This is the definition Maximus uses for will.
Desiring is of the nature. The natural will is the desires and energies that
are part of your nature. If the will is in the nature, Jesus had two wills.
10.2.7 “Not my will, but Yours.” —Not the desires of my human nature, but the
desires of our common divine nature—that’s what I choose with my deliberative
will.
10.3 Necaea II
10.3.1 This is the capstone of the councils; they all come together under this one.
10.3.2 Heresy refuted: iconoclasm
10.3.3 Key teaching: Christ is the image of the invisible God.
10.3.4 It’s debatable whether this council is Christological in the same was as the
others.
10.3.5 Iconoclasm occurs over a long period of time. Iconoclasts vs. iconodoules:
10.3.5.1 Iconoclasts held that you cannot make a picture of Jesus’ divine
nature. It’s invalid to make an image of Christ.
10.3.5.2 The reply was that it wasn’t the nature being portrayed in the
picture, it is the person who combines the two natures.
10.2.6 Dulia vs. Latria
10.2.6.1 Dulia is proper reverence to holy things. The reverence is to the
type, not to the object.
10.2.6.2 Latria is worship, proper only to God.
11. Why study the seven councils?

11.1 Keeps you from re-inventing the wheel.
11.2 Helps you read the Bible better.
11.3 Enables you to take a distinctively Christian view toward the world.
11.4 Summary:
Heresy Humanity Deity Correction
Docetic denied affirmed 1 John 4:1-3
Ebionite affirmed denied Irenaeus
Arian affirmed reduced Nicaea (325)
Apollinarian reduced affirmed Constantinople I (381)
Nestorian split split Ephesus (431)
(consolidation) Chalcedon (451)
Monophysite mixed mixed Constantinople II (553)
(Eutychian)
Monothelite mixed mixed Constantinople III (681)
Iconoclasm reduced affirmed Nicaea II (787)
11.5 What becomes clear from the Patristic period is the deity of Christ is absolute
and cannot be tinkered with; but the human nature is what is worked on during the
medieval period.
12. Medieval Christology (approx. A.D. 787 after the seventh ecumenical council)
12.1 Scholastic philosophical theology
12.1.2 Scripture is authoritative but the interpretation by the Councils was
authoritative. Within the scope of the Councils, the Bible is to be interpreted.
12.1.3 Commentary, not innovation. There was strict church discipline for new
ideas, including death. Detailed, abstract distinctions were made, which
accounts for the reputation of scholastic theology as opaque and picyune.
12.1.4 Preoccupation with metaphysics
12.1.4.1 Theistic rationalism in epistemology—somewhat fideistic by means
of the authority of the church.

12.1.4.2 The sophisticated opponents were Islamic philosophers, along with a
few Jewish philosophers, who had great logical abilities and knew Aristotle’s
work well.
12.1.5 One person with two natures was well-established.
12.1.6 The divine nature was unproblematic. Theology at this time was
primarily via negativa—what is known about God is primarily in terms of what
He is not. It is undefined enough that it doesn’t pose philosophical problems.
12.1.7 Human nature presented problems. What sort of human nature did Jesus
have? Four contingent states in which the human nature can exist with different
properties attaching in each state:
12.1.7.1 innocence (ante-lapsarian state—Adam before the fall)
12.1.7.2 after the fall, before grace (post-lapsarian)
12.1.7.3 after the fall, after grace (post-lapsarian with the indwelling of the
Holy Spirit)
12.1.7.4 glorified
12.1.8 What are the moral categories of the atonement? To a large extent, the
nature of the atonement drives the previous question. What kind of human
nature is necessary for the atonement to be accomplished?
12.2 Anselm (1033-1109)
12.2.1 Monologion—God’s nature and attributes
12.2.2 Proslogion—God’s existence and nature (the source of the ontological
argument)
12.2.3 Cur deus homo?—Why did God have to become man? This work
establishes his contribution to Christology.
12.2.3.1 The work of Christ
12.2.3.1.1 make satisfaction for sins—primary for deciding what sort of
human nature
12.2.3.1.2 conquer Satan
12.2.3.1.3 teach humankind how to live
12.2.3.2 What sort of human nature is necessary to accomplish these tasks?
12.2.3.3 Anselm’s doctrine of satisfaction is what drove His view of what
kind of human nature was necessary.
12.2.3.3.1 Satisfaction of God’s honor—“Everyone who sins ought to pay
back the honor of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction
which every sinner owes to God.” (Cur deus homo? 1:11)
12.2.3.3.2 Satisfaction is made by complete obedience.
12.2.3.3.3 But we already owe God complete obedience in virtue of our
nature in relation to His nature. It cannot make up for the debt of our sin.
12.2.3.3.4 Therefore, anything we can give God is what we already owe
Him, so we cannot repay Him.
12.2.3.3.5 Christ paid a debt He did not owe because we owed a debt we
could not pay.
12.2.4 Evaluation
12.2.4.1 Is it God’s honor that needs to be satisfied? Then God’s demand of
Jesus’ death to satisfy His honor seems cruel.
12.2.4.2 Satisfaction isn’t a New Testament term. In Anselm’s case, it comes
from his legal background in Church law. He imports the category.
Propitiation is a New Testament term and has in view God’s justice and
wrath. He is angry at sin and He cannot compromise His justice.
12.2.5 “Fitting” requirements of satisfaction—“Fitting” is a major feature in
Anselm’s view of Christology. List of qualities necessary for Jesus to make
satisfaction:

12.2.5.1 Member of Adam’s race—Were there human races other than
Adam’s?
12.2.5.2 One, not two, parents because Adam had only one parent (asexual
reproduction) is a rationale for the virgin birth.
12.2.5.3 From a virgin—Because Eve was taken from a man, it’s fitting that
Jesus be taken from a woman. It rounds things out.
12.2.5.4 Without original sin or else He would have a debt to pay Himself.
12.2.5.5 Actually sinless so that He not incur a debt that would have to be
repaid.
12.2.5.6 Incapable of willing to sin because if He could will to sin it would be
possible for Him to sin. It’s inconceivable that the incarnate God could sin.
12.2.5.7 Omniscient—Jesus would have to have all knowledge to know the
highest good in order to resist temptation, otherwise He might have sinned
unawares.
12.2.5.8 Able to die
12.2.5.9 Passable—able to suffer and experience emotions
12.3 Peter Lombard (1095-1160)
12.3.1 An Italian who was a great systematizer, not an originator at all.
12.3.2 Quator libri Sententiarum—four books of systematic questions and answers
about the whole of theological doctrine. He considers pro and contra answers
before arriving at his recommended conclusion, always steering between two
extremes.
12.3.2.1 Book I: God, the Trinity providence, predestination, evil
12.3.2.2 Book II: Creation, angels and demons, the fall, sin, and grace
12.3.2.3 Book III: Incarnation, redemption, the virtues, ten commandments
12.3.2.4 Book IV: Sacraments, last things
12.3.3 All systematic theologies have followed this organization since. He fixed
the territory for the debate thereafter.
12.3.4 The Sentences on Christ’s humanity
12.3.4.1 What was fitting for Christ? What was expedient for us? Christ
must assume some features of each state of human nature:
12.3.4.1.1 innocence—no sin nature
12.3.4.1.2 before grace—human nature after the fall; human defects, able
to suffer. All defects expedient for him, but not sin. Passibility
12.3.4.1.3. after grace—fullness of grace
12.3.4.1.3.1 Potentially omniscient (scope, not clarity): a second order
capacity unrealized, not a first order capacity so Jesus grew in
knowledge. Finite beings can know an infinite number of
propositions if there is an infinite amount of time to learn. Not
potentially omnipotent because it was not necessary to accomplish
atonement.
12.3.4.1.3.2 Two wills (divine and human): Two affections (rational
affection belongs to the divine will and rules the sensory affection,
sensory affection belongs to the human will because it is subject to
temptations).
12.3.4.1.4 glory: non posse peccare
12.4 Bonaventure (1221-1274)
12.4.1 Minister General of Franciscans; Cardinal-Bishop; “tender piety and
profound learning”; wrote a number of books, including Commentary on the
Sentences
12.4.2 Robert Grosseteste vs. Bonaventure
12.4.2.1 G: The incarnation was necessary in spite of sin; logically necessary.
It’s primary purpose is to perfect human nature.

12.4.2.2 B: The incarnation is only necessary because of sin. It’s primary
purpose was cleansing. Because Jesus was divine, He stored up a surplus of
good that could be drawn on to perform miracles and execute satisfaction for
sin.
12.4.3 Thomas vs. Bonaventure
12.4.3.1 B: Synthetical; Augustinian (practical applications of theology);
teacher of practical life; inflamed the heart; theology of love; mystic
12.4.3.2 T: Analytical; Aristotelian; teacher of the schools; enlightened the
mind; love of theology; rationalist
12.5 Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
12.5.1 Greatest of the scholastics—one of the greatest thinkers in history;
Christian Aristotelianism;
12.5.2 Works: His undisputed writings add up to 8 million words. Summa
theologiae (Christology from above); Summa contra gentiles (Christology from
below); commentaries and lectures.
12.5.2.1 His argues from natural reason to prove conclusively and
deductively that God exists and what His character is like. These arguments
are for the infidels.
12.5.2.2 He then moves to what we know only by revelation, like the Trinity.
These arguments are for the faithful.
12.5.3 Christ’s nature
12.5.3.1 Omniscience (passive power)
12.5.3.1.1 Jesus had the beatific vision from conception because of His
omniscience.
12.5.3.1.2 His human nature also had “infused” knowledge of angels and
prophets, as distinguished from knowledge they have naturally.
Knowledge of vision is of actual things. He has as much knowledge as it
is possible for a human being to have. He also has knowledge of simple
intelligence, that is knowledge of what is possible.
12.5.3.1.3 His human mind grew in intensity of knowledge as he sees
things more clearly. Jesus has a strong capacity for close to omniscience.
12.5.3.2 Omnipotence (active power)—not symmetrical to omniscience
12.5.3.2.1 Jesus’ human nature is not omnipotent. Because omniscience is
a passive power, it is possible for Jesus to have it in His human nature
and not use it. But because omnipotence is an active power, He cannot
have it in His human nature.
12.5.3.2.2 Jesus’ human nature can be used by the divine nature to act,
such as working miracles.
12.5.3.3 Satisfaction theory of atonement
12.5.3.3.1 It was not absolutely necessary for Jesus to be incarnated, but
was done out of love.
12.5.3.3.2 Jesus’ death placates, propitiates God’s wrath.
12.5.3.4 Grace
12.5.3.4.1 Passibility
12.5.3.4.2 Human nature sanctified and perfected
12.5.3.4.3 Headship: power to sanctify others
12.5.3.5 Sin: Jesus is impeccable.
12.6 John Duns Scotus (1266-1308)
12.6.1 Biography
12.6.1.1 Graduate of Oxford and studied in Paris at the end of the years of
Aquinas and Bonaventure.

12.6.1.2 Called the “subtle doctor” because he was adept at making fine,
exact distinctions. Theologian of the Franciscans as Thomas is of the
Dominicans.
12.6.1.3 It is said that he made the controversial claim that began to divorce
faith and reason. Scotus is the beginning of the end of the great Scholastic
synthesis.
12.6.1.4 He’s the first, in virtue of synchronic contingency, to suggest that
God is in time in virtue of God’s mental states.
12.6.1.5 Stresses the authority of the Bible and the Church.
12.6.2 Voluntarist
12.6.2.1 God is completely free, but He is not capricious. He can do what He
wills, but He won’t. It follows that our reason could not discover moral
principles because God could change at any time.
12.6.2.2 God is not bound by reason and could save however He wanted to.
Satisfaction isn’t necessary.
12.6.3 Humans have libertarian free will.
12.6.4 Famous for his formal distinctions (cf. intellectual and real distinctions)
between things that can be logically separated but not metaphysically separated.
E.g., the soul is metaphysically unified, but has faculties that can be considered
separately.
12.6.5 Doctrine of “intuitive cognition”—Rather than thinking that we abstract
the nature of universals out of particulars, we have an innate cognition. This
influenced Calvin with his “sensus divinitatus.”
12.6.6 Soteriology
12.6.6.1 The incarnation was necessary but not for salvation. The atonement
is a logically later purpose of the incarnation otherwise the greatest thing
God did would be in response for the worst thing man did.
12.6.6.2 Human nature must be fit for “Trinitarian love-life.” Christ’s human
nature is created “fit” for the role as the head of community of created co-
lovers. Angels and humans are raised almost to the level of God to
participate in the divine love life.
12.6.6.3 This is a teleological approach. The first cause must not be directed
at any effect otherwise the effect would serve as the cause. That would mean
that there’s something necessary besides the first cause. God, in His nature,
is the first and final cause. The persons of the Trinity are related by love. The
essential causal chain will direct everything to God. Since God is the goal for
which everything was made, everything will be subsumed into relationship
with God. That is the final goal.
12.6.7 The hypostatic union
12.6.7.1 The hypostatic union is the relation between the divine and human
natures. It cannot raise the metaphysically finite to the infinite. The divine
nature does not communicate the beatific vision or impeccability to the
human nature. He disagreed with everyone before him who thought that
Jesus’ human nature was omniscient.
12.6.7.2 Omniscience is a passive power versus an active power to cause.
12.6.7.2.1 If a substance S can possess a degreed property P, then if S is
not limited to a determinate degree of P, then S can receive any degree of
P. As a passive power, our intellect can possess as a degreed property the
ability to know more and more propositions; we are not essentially
limited to a certain degree of knowledge. Therefore our human nature
can possess any degree of knowledge. He arrives at the same conclusion
that human nature can be omniscient, but by a different route with fine
metaphysical distinctions.

12.6.7.2.2 He draws a distinction between apprehending versus
comprehending. You can have true knowledge without having
comprehensive knowledge.
12.6.7.3 Impeccability is due to grace.
12.6.8 He introduced haecceity.
12.7 William of Ockham (1285-1347)
12.7.1 Rebel by nature
12.7.1.1 Supported the secular power of the Emperor over the Pope. Some
Catholics say he was the “first protestant.”
12.7.1.2 Reason cannot demonstrate any truths of God—must rely on the
authority of the Church.
12.7.1.3 Prolific philosopher, logician, and theologian
12.7.1.4 Perhaps died of the Black Plague
12.7.1.5 He was a significant influence on Luther.
12.7.2 Ockham’s Razor—“Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate.”
12.7.2.1 He wanted to reform both scholastic methodology and scholastic
metaphysics. His goal was to simplify.
12.7.2.2 He opened the door to skepticism of reason in matters of faith
because some of the entities that couldn’t be verified were the existence of
immaterial things.
12.7.3 Denied
12.7.3.1 He denied the distinction between essence and existence. There’s no
such thing as an individual essence.
12.7.3.2 He denied the distinction between the active and passive intellects.
12.7.3.3 He denied abstract universals. He was a conceptualist.
12.7.4 Reduplicative sense of propositions (from nominalism).
12.7.4.1 “The man Christ began to exist.” “Christ the man began to exist.”
12.7.4.2 Ockham says both of these are false. He denies that there is any
human nature. The name must pick out a particular and there is no nature of
man for the terms to refer to. Natures are scattered particulars, scattered over
the existing particulars.
12.7.4.3 If it was an individual human nature Jesus assumed, nestorianism is
a natural conclusion, though Ockham would not want to affirm this.
12.7.4.4 Ockham’s metaphysics doesn’t have the resources to explain
Chalcedonean Christology.
13. Reformation Christology

13.1 Luther (1483-1546)
13.1.1 He accepted the standard creedal formulations, i.e., Chalcedon,
Constantinople, but his focus was soteriology, not metaphysics (function, not
ontology). He asks what it means for us? He moves beyond the metaphysics to
the application.
13.1.2 Insight: God the Father is revealed in Jesus Christ. We came to accept the
words of Scripture as authoritative because they lead us to the Father, and then
that lends further authority to the Bible as God’s word.
13.1.3 Christological emphases
13.1.3.1 Greek Fathers: Christ brought immortal life of God, which redeems
from sin and death. Justification is a process of becoming God-like.
Justification and sanctification are synonymous.
13.1.3.2 Latin Fathers: Christ made satisfaction for the guilt of sin.
13.1.3.3 Both: Sought the divine in Christ. He must be divine to accomplish
justification and satisfaction.

13.1.3.4 Luther: Christ shows us the heart and the will of the Father, as well
as the above. So He seeks God the Father in Christ. The way Luther will
work out Jesus’ humanity and deity will be by following this principle that
Jesus reveals the Father.
13.14 Purpose of the incarnation
13.1.4.1 To reveal God’s love, heart, and will
13.1.4.2 To propitiate God’s wrath
13.1.4.3 To conquer the devil
13.1.4.4 To be an example
13.1.5 The devil and Jesus
13.1.5.1 The devil allows men to honor the man Jesus in their piety. The
devil loves it when men look to Jesus as just a moral example.
13.1.5.2 The devil allows men to be convinced of Christ’s eternal deity
because this is salvifically sufficient.
13.1.5.3 Christological orthodoxy is not true faith. It’s not necessary to work
out the details of Christology in order to have saving faith. No need to
affirm, but also cannot deny.
13.1.5.4 True faith grasps the Father in the Son.
13.1.6 Incarnational distinctions
13.1.6.1 Communicatio idiomatum: He believed that there was a full sharing of
attributes. God died in Jesus. A man created the heavens and the earth.
13.1.6.2 Human nature, not human person (anhypostasis)
13.1.7 Luther’s kenotic theology
13.1.7.1 “He emptied Himself” means He became obedient to the Father.
13.1.7.2 The kenosis was an on-going act of Christ’s giving Himself for sinful
men so that He entered into all the difficulties of humanity even though,
being in the form of God, He was free from them all. Jesus participated in
human nature without being subject to its limitations. He doesn’t make
distinctions of human nature anti-lapsarian, post-lapsarian, glorified, etc.
Jesus’ human nature was susceptible to sin, but the will was in the person
Jesus, who was divine so He couldn’t sin.
13.1.7.3 From conception, the human nature was omniscient, omnipotent,
and omnipresent.
13.1.7.4 Luke 2:52 – “The Spirit descended more and more upon Him and
moved Him more as time went on.” He was more Spirit-filled as time went
on.
13.1.8 Tensions in Luther’s Christology
13.1.8.1 At the crucifixion: “The deity withdrew and hid….The humanity
was left alone, the devil had free access to Christ and the deity withdrew its
power and let the humanity fight alone.”
13.1.8.2 But: How then did God suffer? How did the God of all eternity die?
Are the two natures separable?
13.1.9 He believed that the scholastics had missed the whole point, so He did not
try to iron out philosophic problems with His Christology.
13.2 John Calvin (1509-1564)
13.2.1 Introduction
13.2.1.1 Commentaries, sermons, Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559)
13.2.1.2 Affirmed the creeds
13.2.1.3 Stressed Christ’s roles: prophet, priest, king. He works out his
understanding of Jesus’ human nature through these roles.
13.2.1.4 Human nature is the “material cause” of our salvation. Can an
immaterial substance be a material cause? In Calvin’s mind, human nature
includes having a body.

13.2.2 Calvin’s Christology
13.2.2.1 He was particularly concerned with Appolinarianism and
euthychianism
13.2.2.2 He takes issue with the monophysite tendencies of Lutheranism’s
view that the human nature is assumed into the divine. This becomes a
major point of controversy between Lutheranism and Calvinism.
13.2.2.3 Communicatio idiomatum is a figure of speech. Calvin’s
understanding of how to attribute the divine attributes to Jesus: You cannot
predicate attributes of each nature to the other.
13.2.2.4 Communicatio operatiomun—The properties coincide in one person,
but cannot be mutually interpenetrated in the different natures.
13.2.2.5 Jesus’ role as mediator is the key to understanding Christ’s natures.
In order to be a mediator, Jesus would have to be both God and man.
13.2.2.6 Denied that the incarnation was necessary without sin.
13.2.2.7 He denies the passability of Jesus’ human nature.
13.2.2.8 Rational will and appetitive will—Jesus did not want to suffer, but
His rational will determined to.
14. Summary of the historical analysis

14.1 The first through fifth ecumenical councils were correct in their analysis.
14.2 The sixth and seventh ecumenical councils and the scholastics probably said too
much. They pushed questions further than they should have beyond where the
biblical evidence and logical entailments could take them.
14.3 Luther and Calvin retreat from the scholastics, perhaps too far, but maintained
the ecumenical councils.
14.4 The ground between the ecumenical councils and the Reformers is fertile
ground for philosophical theology.
14.4.1 What is a person?
14.4.2 What is a nature? What is a human nature as opposed to a divine nature?
14.4.3 How does a body relate to a person and to a nature?
15. Review of Metaphysics

15.1 Properties
15.1.1 “This book is red.” This is a statement of predication; the subject and
predicate both have to pick out something.
15.1.2 The predicate picks out something that can be shared by more than one
thing. Properties are universals that are shared by multiple things, though the
instances of properties are different.
15.1.3 Our normal way of talking seems to commit us to things and universals,
i.e., properties and individuals.
15.1.4 Particulars can have properties; and properties can have properties.
15.1.5 Properties is a monadic entity, i.e., it is instantiated in one thing. There is
one thing that has a property.
15.2 Relations
15.2.1 Relations are diatic or polyatic, i.e., there are multiple things involved.
15.2.2 There are different kinds of relations.
15.2.2.1 External relation—The relation is outside of the essential being. The
things it is related to can be removed and not affect the thing itself.
15.2.2.2 Essential relation—The relation is internal to the essential being
itself, i.e., the things it’s related to cannot be removed without changing the
essential being of the thing. Internal relations are grounded in the nature of a
thing.
15.3 Substances

15.3.1 The subject of the sentence “Grass is green” picks out a kind or species.
15.3.2 Natural kinds are such in virtue of their nature. Unnatural kinds are such
in virtue of convention.
15.3.3 A natural kind can serve as a subject or a predicate. When it serves as a
subject, we tend to think of it as a substance. When it serves as a predicate, we
tend to think of it as a property.
15.3.4 A kind picks out a class united by a similarity of properties.
15.3.5 A collection of properties that are united in a certain way in an individual
constitutes a substance.
15.4 Things
15.4.1 Material things are difficult to define, but we are tempted to say that a
particular space-time region filled by a thing is a material object. A thing is a
collection of parts that is held together by some kind of unity relation, and the
unity relation changes depending on what kind of thing it is.
15.4.2 Aggregates are material things that are brought together for a particular
function. Aggregates are unified in virtue of the final cause, the function. So
strictly speaking, when we swap parts of an artifact it isn’t the same object; but
since artifacts are identified in virtue of its function, it is still the same object.
15.4.2.1 As an artifact, the Good Ship Theseus is still the same ship even
when its parts are swapped out.
15.4.2.2 Artifacts are generally functional things. It is constituted by a
subjective property; it depends on minds.
15.4.4 Natural formation things have a different kind of unity, that isn’t entirely
functional.
15.4.5 The unity of organisms is deeper than the unity of an artifact. We only
assign the term substance to things that have a deep unity. In the case of
biological things, the unity it has gives life.
15.4.6 Mereological compounds—a sum of parts. They have their parts
essentially, therefore these things cannot have gaps in their identity. Aggregates,
artifacts, and natural formations have their parts contingently; they can gain,
add, and lose parts and still be what they are. For this reason, these three things
can have temporal gaps in their identity.
15.4.6.1 One object can be under two descriptions and fit under different
categories of things.
15.4.6.2 A chunk of marble isn’t the same chunk of marble if parts are taken
away to form a statue. In this case it’s a mereological compound. The good
ship Theseus as a mereological whole isn’t the same ship when its parts are
changed because it has its parts essentially.
15.4.6.3 A statue is still the same statue when we replace the arms and legs
with identical ones because the statue is an artifact and has its parts
contingently. As an artifact, the good ship Theseus is still the same ship
when viewed as an artifact.
15.4.6.4 Which way the object is viewed is a matter of convention.
15.4.7 Kinds of unity that give rise to substances: biological and compositional.
15.5 What possesses properties?
15.5.1 Bare particulars—A substratum besides the substance that possesses the
properties. Bare particulars have no properties whatsoever so they cannot serve
the purpose of individuating.
15.5.2 Aristotelian—A substance possesses properties. Some properties are
essential to that substance and the unifying relation is internal; other properties
attached to the substance are accidental.
15.5.3 Substances are natural kinds that stamp out individuals like a cookie
cutter, and the things stamped out have the same essential properties. And once

it has been stamped out it has the property of being self-identical (haecceities).
Now you have an individual thing that is a member of a kind called a substance.
15.5.4 Thus, kinds straddle the ontological space between particulars and
properties. They can be universals or particulars.
15.6 Relevance to Christology
15.6.1 The nature of properties is to be universals that are instantiated by
substances and other properties as individuals.
15.6.2 Substance can be used of a genus and applies to all individuals under that
kind. If it’s used specifically it’s used of a kind that has essential properties.
15.6.3 Natures are essences minus the haecceity. A nature is a kind in the
generic sense. A nature is a cookie cutter before it has stamped anything out.
15.6.4 A person with two natures is one that has two sets of essential properties
that are internally related.
15.7 Entity
15.7.1 Two categories: abstract and concrete entities.
15.7.1.1 Abstract entities: properties, relations, propositions, numbers
15.7.1.2 Concrete entities (not in the sense of material; rather in the sense of
particular or individual):
15.7.1.2.1 Events—There is some difficulty making events entities
because it’s notoriously difficult to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for marking off one event from another.
15.7.1.2.2 Time
15.7.1.2.3 Place
15.7.1.2.4 Limit—boundaries, surfaces. There are physical and non-
physical limits.
15.7.1.2.5 Collections
15.7.1.2.6 Privations
15.7.1.2.7 Tropes
15.7.1.2.8 Substance
15.7.1.2.8.1 Material (corporeal)
15.7.1.28.2 Immaterial (incorporeal)
15.8 Substance
15.8.1 There’s a difference between thinking of substance in a stuffy way or a
thingy way.
15.8.1.1 Stuff is compositional, either material or immaterial.
15.8.1.2 Aristotle defines substance as a thing. It is a thing that has
independent existence; and that which has properties but cannot be had by
anything. It doesn’t depend on anything for its existence.
15.8.2 A nature is a kind that stamps out individuals. What it stamps out are
things.
15.8.3 Unity of substances
15.8.3.1 There’s a causal relation of compounds, such that different parts of
this compound are held in dynamic equilibrium, such that the displacement
of any one of the parts results in the displacement of the whole. This is a
physical unity.
15.8.3.2 The tightness of the physical bonding accounts for why we want to
call certain physical things substances.
15.8.3.3 Mereological compounds and fundamental particles are substances.
Certain artifacts are substances in a secondary sense depending on their
unity. Natural formations are not substances. E.g., H2O is a substance, but a
lake is not a substance. Organisms are substances and the unifying relation is
life.
15.8.4 A natural substance kind (K) meets three conditions.

15.8.4.1 K is essential to whatever instantiates it.
15.8.4.2 K is the proper investigation for natural science or it figures in the
natural laws.
15.8.4.3 K is objectively instantiated, that is the instantiation of K doesn’t
depend on anything mental. It’s instantiated apart from intentions.
15.8.5 A non-natural substance kind, an artifact substance kind (A)
15.8.5.1 A is essential to whatever instantiates it.
15.8.5.2 A is not necessarily the proper object of scientific inquiry and
probably will not figure in any kind of natural laws.
15.8.5.3 It is subjectively instantiated. Whatever instantiates A has an
artificial function, determined by intentionality.
15.8.5 Immaterial (non-natural) substance kinds
16. What is a human nature?

16.1 Essential properties: E is an essential property if in any relevantly similar
world S possesses E, where relevantly similar is itself relative to universal discourse
(i.e., how we are conceiving of E).
16.1.1 First, we must determine the discourse that we are using when referring
to E.
16.1.2 This is the intuition driving the distinction between common properties
and universal properties.
16.1.2.1 Common properties are common iff there is some finite probability,
which is greater than .5 and less than 1, such that for any x, if x is a member
of that natural kind, then x has property c. In other words, this is a property
that is common to most members of a natural kind.
16.1.2.2 Universal properties are common iff there is a finite probability of 1,
such that for any x, if x is a member of that natural kind, then x has property
c.
16.1.2.3 So you can have universal properties that are not essential, but
accidental. Ask: Is it possible for human beings to exist without that
property?
16.1.3 Merely N vs. fully N: N is merely P, but is not merely P; N may have
additional properties that are not essential to N. There are other properties in
addition that may not be essential.
16.1.4 This helps to diffuse many of the objections to Chalcedonian Christology.
E.g., it is not essential, but common, to all human beings that they have two
human parents. Adam and Eve, and Jesus did not. This would also declassify
clones as human beings.
16.2 A substance S has the essence or nature of humanity iff(df):
16.2.1 S is a person (a soul). There are no human non-persons. Person is the
genus, human is the species.
16.2.2 S is or has been embodied as a living organism of the natural kind homo
sapiens (with a micro-structural blueprint, which marks it as a natural kind) such
that
16.2.2.1 normally, S apprehends objective reality (universals and particulars;
tokens and types) perceptually
16.2.2.2 S’s development (the realization of S’s higher-order capacities) is (at
least partly) tied to the development of S’s body
16.2.3 S possesses the faculty of “spirit” (a grouping of higher-order capacities to
relate to God); an additional capacity of human nature added to the soul’s
capacity. There could be kinds of person who cannot relate to God.
17. Divine nature

17.1 A substance S has the essence or nature of divinity iff(df):
17.1.1 S is a person (a soul):
17.1.2 S necessarily coexemplifies all perfections (it’s not necessary to determine
the extension of the perfections)
17.2 If this is what divine nature is and the previous is what human nature is, there
doesn’t seem to be a problem with a person exemplifying both sets of properties.
18. Persons
18.1 What is it to be a person?
18.1.1 Substance—a soul
18.1.2 Mind—a collection of capacities that deliberates, intuits, reasons, etc.
18.1.2.1 Rationality
18.1.2.2 Intentionality
18.1.2.2.1 Mental states are always directed at an object
18.1.2.2.2 Beliefs are directed at propositions
18.1.2.2.3 Desires are directed at mental states, states of affairs
18.1.2.2.4 Thoughts
18.1.2.2.5 Consciousness and self-consciousness
18.1.2.3 Affect
18.1.2.3.1 Emotions (feelings) about propositions (as opposed to a free
floating emotion without an object, e.g., anxiety, seasickness). This is the
source of intuition. There are states of affairs that the emotion is directed
at, and these states of affairs can be uncovered with careful analysis and
contain the objective facts that are subject to judgment.
18.1.2.3.2 All of these mental states play a causal role in dispositions and
action, and become a source of evidence for making judgments.
18.1.2.4 Volition
18.1.2.5 Perception—The capacity to acquire information from objectively
existing reality
18.1.2.6 Relational capacities are the functioning of more than one of the
mind capacities together.
18.1.2.7 Morality
18.1.3 All of these faculties can be broken down and further analyzed as
subordinate capacities.
18.1.3.1 There are thousands of capacities in the human soul depending on
how carefully we do the analysis.
18.1.3.2 There probably is not one way to break them down.
18.2 Are these faculties necessary and sufficient to be a person? This is in the sense
of a priori necessary, not a posteriori necessary.
18.3 Could these personhood capacities be instantiated in other forms besides
human?
18.3.1 Could it be instantiated in granite? No. It’s logically possible, but not
metaphysically possible because it doesn’t have the material capability of
developing the capacities.
18.3.2 Could it be instantiated in an orchid? No.
18.3.3 It must be instantiated in an organism that has the organic capacity to
express these capacities.
18.4 Person cannot exist without being instantiated with a nature.
19. One Person, Two Natures?

19.1 Is it possible for a single substance to have two distinct natures?
19.1.1 No, if the two natures are such that they cannot be co-exemplified.
Nothing can be both a person and a number at the same time.

19.1.2 Yes, if the two natures exemplify possibly coexemplified properties.
19.2 Are the divine and human nature such that they can be exemplified in a
person? To be human or divine is to be a person with some additional properties.
19.3 Is there any relation or entailment between the divine and human properties
that are contradictory?
19.3.1 The chief motivating factor for saying Jesus had two wills is to avoid
saying that everything Jesus did, the Father did (“Not my will, but yours be
done”). They located the will in the nature. They took mind and will out of
person. But if you do that, it’s not clear you can maintain the other capacities of
person and then the concept of person is vacuous.
19.3.2 Thomas Morris seems to describe nature in terms of consciousness, so that
the divine consciousness could access the human consciousness, but not the
other way.
19.3.3 In the kenosis, Jesus chose to limit the exercise of His personal faculties
through his human nature, which includes a body. He developed His
knowledge and recorded His memories in the same way we do, through our
perceptions and the use of our bodies. So His capacities were necessarily limited
while in a body. His consciousness was limited through His human nature and
body.
19.4 If Jesus was one person, having the capacities above (18), then as of the
incarnation His capacities of person were worked out through His human nature
and voluntarily did not work through His divine nature.
19.5 The personal substance is the basis for the hypostasis; it is what joins the
natures.
19.6 The volition resides in the personal substance, but it must be expressed through
a nature. Being joined to a human nature and body greatly restricts the ways the
personal capacities are expressed.
19.6.1 Derivatively, we may be able to speak of a human will and a divine will.
19.6.2 Therefore, Jesus’ single will was expressed in accordance with His human
nature, which had limited capacities to express the will. The request for the cup
to pass was the divine mind knowing that the human nature was too weak to
carry out the divine will. The human nature brings the associated fears of pain
and suffering and desiring to escape.
19.6.3 The spiritual capacity to relate to God is in the human nature, so Jesus’ cry
was the inability of the human spiritual capacity to relate to God in a unified
way.
19.7 Could Jesus have acquired justified false beliefs?
19.7.1 If He limited Himself to forming beliefs the way all humans do, it seems it
would be possible to form justified false beliefs. But this seems intuitively
wrong.
19.7.2 He operated at the maximal intellectual capacity a human can have, so He
would not accept false beliefs, but instead withhold belief without correct
justification.
19.7.3 If that is the case, then Jesus had a much smaller stock of beliefs than most
humans.
19.7.4 Or it could be that since his spiritual capacity was maximal, that the
Father and Spirit kept Him from forming false beliefs and gave Him information
to form beliefs most humans wouldn’t be able to form. Jesus’ prophecies and
miracles were mediated through His spiritual capacity.
19.8 It is possible that without a limited, human body that human persons have a
capacity for infinite knowledge.
20. Is God necessarily good?

20.1 Three conceptions of “good.”
20.1.1 Intrinsic desirability—what we should want for itself. This doesn’t satisfy
what we mean when we say God is good.
20.1.2 Plentitude of being—whatever it is better to be than not to be. Aquinas
uses this type of good in regards to God as having all abstract perfections, but
not to refer to God as a good moral agent.
20.1.3 Moral conceptions
20.1.3.1 Deontological goodness—doing His moral duty
20.1.3.2 Supererogatory goodness—going above and beyond His duty
20.2 The modality of God’s goodness
20.2.1 God is wholly good. There is as a matter of fact no moral defect in God’s
character, intentions, or actions. Contingently de re true.
20.2.2 God is necessarily good. It is impossible that there be any moral defect in
God’s character, intentions, or actions.
20.3 The necessity of God’s goodness
20.3.1 Thomas Aquinas
20.3.1.1 The argument
20.3.1.1.1 (1) One can only do what one sees as good.
20.3.1.1.2 (2) To see evil as good is to be in error.
20.3.1.1.3 (3) God cannot be in error.
20.3.1.1.4 (4) Therefore, God cannot see evil as good.
20.3.1.1.5 (5) Therefore, God cannot do evil.
20.3.1.2 Problem: premise (1) seems false. The result of this argument is that
you only do evil out of ignorance, which is a Platonic notion but not a Biblical
one.
20.3.2 William of Ockham
20.3.2.1.1 (1) Necessarily, God does whatever God wills.
20.3.2.1.2 (2) Whatever God wills is good.
20.3.2.1.3 (3) Therefore, necessarily God does good.
20.3.2.2 Problems
20.3.2.2.1 God is good is a vacuous statement. It’s purely definitional and
has no content.
20.3.2.2.2 Euthyphro’s dilemma—no objective grounding for morality
20.3.3 Anselmian: Perfect being theory
20.3.3.1.1 It is more perfect to be utterly incapable of evil than to be
capable but refrain from evil.
20.3.3.1.2 God is whatever is it better to be than not to be.
20.3.3.1.3 Therefore, God is utterly incapable of evil.
20.3.3.2 Problem: moral freedom and praiseworthiness—On this view, God
doesn’t have moral freedom; and if He isn’t free not to do good, how can He
be praiseworthy. Premise one seems to be problematic, though not false.
20.4 The objection from moral freedom
20.4.1 The argument
20.4.1.1(SLF) A moral agent S has (strong) libertarian freedom with respect to
act A iff:
20.4.1.1.1 S does A “on her own” (autonomy).
20.4.1.1.2 S could have done otherwise (alternate possibilities).
20.4.1.2 But if God is necessarily morally perfect, He could not have done
otherwise.
20.4.1.3 Therefore, on SLF, God is not morally free.
20.4.2 Frankfurt-style counter examples call into question alternate possibilities.

20.4.3 Reframe the argument
20.4.3.1 (WLF) A moral agent S has (weak) libertarian freedom with respect
to act A iff:
20.4.3.1 S does A “on her own” (autonomy)
20.4.3.3 Therefore, on WLF, God can be necessarily good and morally free.
20.4.4 So moral freedom is compatible with necessary goodness.
20.5 The objection from moral praiseworthiness
20.5.1 The argument
20.5.1.1 (1) A person is praiseworthy for an action only if he could have
refrained.
20.5.1.2 (2) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing good
actions.
20.5.1.3 (3) If God is necessarily good, then God cannot refrain from
performing good actions.
20.5.1.4 (4) Therefore, if God is necessarily good, God is not morally
praiseworthy.
20.5.1.5 (5) But God is morally praiseworthy.
20.5.1.6 (6) Therefore, it is not the case that God is necessarily good.
20.5.2 Problems
20.5.2.1 Premise (2) is ambiguous. A necessarily good being cannot refrain
from performing good actions can mean either
20.5.21.1 (2a) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing
any good actions whatsoever. Or,
20.5.2.1.2 (2b) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing
the good actions He in fact performs.
20.5.3 The argument rephrased
20.5.3.1 (1) A person is praiseworthy for an action only if he could have
refrained from performing it.
20.5.3.2 (2a) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing any
good actions whatsoever.
20.5.3.3 (3a) If God is necessarily good, then God cannot refrain from
performing any good actions.
20.5.3.4 (4) Therefore, if God is necessarily good, God is not morally
praiseworthy. DNF
20.5.3.5 (5) But God is morally praiseworthy.
20.5.3.6 (6) Therefore, it is not the case that God is necessarily good. DNF
20.5.4 Premise (2b) would yield the conclusion, but (2b) is false: Among God’s
good actions are supererogatory actions that He is free to refrain from
performing
20.5.4.1 The only way this argument works is to claim that a necessarily good
being must perform every good act, which would mean acts like grace are
required.
20.5.4.2 God might be praiseworthy not because of the necessity of His
goodness, but because His goodness flows from His character and produces
supererogatory acts.
20.6 The objection from omnipotence
20.6.1 The argument
20.6.1.1 (1) If God is necessarily good, then there is no possible world in
which He actualizes (some SOA) E.
20.6.1.2 (2) If God is omnipotent, He has the power to actualize E.
20.6.1.3 (3) If God has the power to bring about E, then there is a possible
world in which God actualizes E.
20.6.1.4 (4) Therefore, either God is not omnipotent or not necessarily good.

20.6.2 Problems
20.6.2.1 There is an obvious contradiction here, so will we give up His
goodness or His omnipotence?
20.6.2.2 Against (1): distinguish between strong vs. weak actualization
(Plantinga). The difference is this: strongly actualize the state of affairs if
you actualize that state of affairs or actualize a state of affairs that directly
brings the original state of affairs about. Weak actualization is one in which
God actualizes a state of affairs in which agents bring things about. The
power necessary for omnipotence is weak actualization, so God does not
actualize E. But this response doesn’t comport with omnipotence.
20.6.2.3 Against (2): Omnipotence does not include the ability to do
anything incompatible with the omnipotent being’s essential nature
(Wierenga). We don’t require an omnipotent being to do things that are
logically impossible or to do things incompatible with His nature.
20.6.2.4 Against (2): E is not metaphysically possible. Conceptual possibility
isn’t identical to logical or metaphysical possibility. (Morris) It doesn’t map
easily on either of the other two categories. Just because something can be
conceived, doesn’t mean it is possible. There are states of affairs that are not
metaphysically possible because God is the basis of every possible world, and
by virtue of His being, He would not bring them about. This is one of the
best responses.
20.6.2.5 Against (3): God has the power, but because of His moral goodness
cannot bring Himself to exercise it. (Swinburne) God does have the power
to bring about any conceivable state of affairs that is not self-contradictory,
but He doesn’t exercise that power of necessity. In his view, omnipotence is
an abstract power. Reason will always guide God to do the right thing;
unlike in our case we have desires that overcome the action-guiding
principles of reason. God’s character is immutable. Denying (3) seems to be
the best way to go.
21. The impeccability of Jesus

21.1 To be God, something must be minimally O3 + C (the three omnis and creator).
It is the three omnis that pose the problem for the incarnate Jesus.
21.1.1 Omniscient: There doesn’t seem to be any rational limit to the capacity of
humans to know an infinite number of things, apart from the limitations of our
embodied state. A creature can have this capacity yet never develop it to the
fullest degree. So this doesn’t pose a contradiction for the incarnation. Jesus
voluntarily chose to limit the exercise of His cognitive abilities to the normal
mode of humanity.
21.1.2 Omnipresence: Aquinas characterized this attribute as God is in all things
by His power, by His knowledge of all things, and by the direct cause of being.
21.1.3 Omnibenevolence
21.1.3.1 The complications:
21.1.3.1.1 If Jesus was God, He was necessarily good.
21.1.3.1.2 If Jesus was genuinely tempted, it must have been possible for
Him to have sinned.
21.1.3.1.3 The problem of impeccability: Jesus could not give up
necessary goodness without ceasing to be God; or He was not tempted.
21.3.2 Three solutions
21.3.2.1 It was possible for Jesus to sin, but He was so constituted that He
would not. This is inadequate because as stated Jesus was not necessarily
good.

21.32.2 Middle knowledge view: The substance of the divine person
assumed Christ’s human nature, which is also taken as a substance. God
knows in which worlds Jesus would sin and which worlds He would not sin,
so He only places Jesus in a possible world in which Jesus will not sin.
Again, Jesus is not necessarily good. The model of the substance/nature
relation is unclear.
21.3.2.3 Temptation of Jesus
21.3.2.3.1 It is not necessary that Jesus have formed any beliefs about His
necessary goodness. If He had, the temptation would not have been real.
21.3.2.3.2 He could have had a belief that was probabilistic in nature, to
the effect that He could very likely resist any temptation; but it would be
real if it was quantitatively or qualitatively distinct from previous
temptations.
21.3.2.3.3 If we cash out moral freedom in weak libertarian terms, i.e.,
that He acted on His own, then we can say that Jesus had the power to
sin, but not the ability to sin. (See Frankfurt counterexample of man
locked in room)
21.3.2.3.4 Hebrews 2:17-18: What does it mean that Jesus suffered when
He was tempted?
21.3.2.3.5 Sources of temptation: the flesh, the world, the devil
21.3.2.3.5.1 The flesh is commonly understood to be a sin nature, so
this wasn’t a source of temptation for Jesus.
21.3.2.3.5.2 The world
21.3.2.3.5.2.1 The nature of temptation with regards to belief-
desire sets. Relation of beliefs and desires:
21.3.2.3.5.2.1.1 asymmetrical—we can have beliefs about
desires, but not desires about beliefs
21.3.2.3.5.2.1.2 intentional
21.3.2.3.5.2.1.3 create behavioral dispositions—We have
desires because we have beliefs about the object. A
disposition is created from the complex interplay of beliefs
and desires. When a desire arises in us, there are beliefs about
what will satisfy that desire.
Desires can arise because we have certain beliefs or because of
other desires.
21.3.2.3.5.2.1.3.1 Temptations play on desires, so the world
provides illegitimate objects of appropriate desires.
21.3.2.3.5.2.1.3.2 The temptation to avoid suffering and pain
came from the illegitimate option of avoiding the crucifixion.
He could not use His divine powers to avoid any of the
suffering involved in His death because He would not then be
able to identify with us since He would have used powers not
available to us.
21.3.2.3.4.6 Hebrews 5:7 How did Jesus learn obedience through
suffering? Jesus had a legitimate desire from His human nature and
human noetic structure and learned for the first time what it was like to
have illegitimate objects of fulfillment presented to Him. That can even
take place in a personal psychology unmarred by sin. And there is still
suffering involved in the presence of the illegitimate object even if it is
impossible for that object to be actualized. Legitimate desires presented
with illegitimate objects constitute suffering in temptation.
22. Parts of the incarnate Christ

22.1 Full human body within the kind homo sapiens
22.2 Soul
22.2.1 A biblical concept of soul includes immaterial, affective life, life as
experience, the part of us that survives physical death, and natural life. It has no
technical meaning, but has some flexibility.
22.2.1.1 When we conceive of soul an the affective experience, then it could
be said that Jesus had two souls.
22.2.1.2 We could say that a sense of soul is personality, and different
functional aspects of a person’s personality are known in different contexts.
So it is possible to say that someone has more than one personality, in a
functional sense.
22.2.2 In terms of personhood, soul is an immaterial substance that is the seat of
identity. In these terms, Jesus had only one soul.
22.3 Nature—two natures
22.4 Spirit
22.4.1 “God is spirit” is a predication. Spirit refers to the mode of being. In this
sense, it’s an adjective, not a noun.
22.4.2 If a person has a spirit, it is being used as a noun. It can refer to the life
principle or the faculty by which we know God and have relationship with Him.
22.5 With respect to belief-desire sets, they arise from the nature. So we could speak
of one belief-desire set of the unified person, or we can speak of two with reference
to the different natures. Jesus voluntarily limits Himself to the exercise of cognitive
powers common to humanity, which is a subset of the divine cognitive powers.
22.6 The will is used in two senses: as a volition to bring something about, or as a
belief-desire set.
22.6.1 As a desire, Jesus could have two wills.
22.6.2 As a commitment to active power, it only makes sense to speak of one
will.
22.6.3 The impeccability of Christ refers to will in the volitional sense. He cannot
bring about a sinful state of affairs. It also doesn’t seem to make sense to say that
Jesus could have formed a faulty belief-desire set to sin if His one mind is the
mind of God.
22.6.3.1 A belief-desire set creates a disposition, that creates a volition to
exercise active power, that causes an action.
22.6.3.2 It seems impossible for Jesus to form either a wrong belief or a
wrong desire.
22.6.5 On a one-mind view of Jesus, there is no possible world in which Jesus
would sin because God’s goodness is necessary. Only the two-minds view
allows for the possibility of Jesus sinning because God is only contingently good.
22.6.6 Temptation is possible because it goes to the formation of belief-desire
sets. Jesus could be presented with the illegitimate fulfillment of a desire and
recognize the attraction of it.
22.7 God the Father is necessarily good. God the Son is necessarily good. Jesus is
necessarily good. There could be an epistemic possibility of sinning, that doesn’t
entail a metaphysical possibility. Therefore, there is no possible world in which
Jesus could have sinned.
23. Cosmic Cosmology—Is there life on other planets in need of salvation?

23.1 Two ancient views:
23.1.1 The principle of plentitude held that everything was possible was actual,
so since there was a possibility of life on other planets, it was actual that there
was life on other planets.

23.1.2 Aristotle and Augustine believed that the universe was geocentric so there
were no other possible inhabited worlds. Aquinas believed that it was possible,
but not actual.
23.1.3 This isn’t an new question, as some have suggested.
23.2 Is the incarnation necessary?
23.2.1 Aquinas believed that the incarnation was not necessary strictly speaking.
There is no logical necessity to the incarnation. But once God decided to save
through the incarnation, then certain things follow from that. It would follow
that if there were other possible worlds, it wouldn’t be necessary for God to save
through the incarnation in those worlds.
23.2.2 Lomard believed that it would not be “fitting” for Christ to incarnate in
multiple forms.
23.2.3 Melanchthon believed that Jesus’ death here would be sufficient for the
entire universe.
23.3 Anthropocentrism
23.3.1 If Christ became human then humanity is special. If humanity is special,
then humanity is at the center. Specialness seems to imply centrality.
23.3.2 Modernity has denied this based on the size of the universe. The
contrapositive denies the centrality of humanity. Humans are not special, then
humans are not central. If humans are not special, then Christ did not take on
human nature.
23.3.3 In 1960, Francis Drake presented an equation that demonstrated the
number of possible civilizations in the universe that could communicate by
radio. He calculated the probability at 1. This became the basis of the SETI
project.
23.4 Is this a real issue or should we dismiss it?
23.4.1 Whatever opinions we form should be held contingently so that not too
much is riding if we are wrong.
23.4.2 Whatever opinions we form must have grounds, and right now there
don’t seem to be sufficient grounds to form strong opinions.
23.5 What are the issues here?
23.5.1 If something like theistic evolution occurred, would God have made
creatures on other planets capable of having relationship with Him? If rational
life existed on other planets, it doesn’t seem plausible that he would withhold the
capacity to relate to Him. If we exist to glorify God, then it would increase His
glory to have more creatures that could relate to Him.
23.5.2 If life capable of relationship with God does exist on other planets, then it
seems likely that God would have saved them if they were in need of salvation,
too.
23.5.3 What is the likelihood that they would sin also? It seems highly likely that
free will embodied creatures like us would have sinned.
23.5.4 “The unassumed is unhealed.”
23.5.4.1 Aquinas didn’t believe this. He believed that the value of Jesus’
death was sufficient for all creatures in need of salvation.
23.5.4.2 If we grant the premise, then multiple incarnations are in principle
possible.
23.5.4.3 Or we relativize the statement and make the assumed creaturely
nature, not human nature specifically.
23.6 Questions for theistic evolution
23.6.1 What demarks the difference between hominids and human beings in
value and capability of having relationship with God without God intervening?
23.6.2 How do you account for the entry of sin and its generational effects in the
human race?

23.6.3 It’s not the length of time at issue, but the inherent capacity of matter to
create new forms with new capacities.
23.7 Multiple incarnations
23.7.1 The “scandal of particularity” is the cosmic equivalent to the problem of
the heathen.
23.7.2 Romans 8—all of creation groans for redemption. The effects of sin could
be seen as having cosmic consequences, and therefore the redemption Jesus
brought affects the entire creation. Additionally, the Bible speaks of creating a
new Heaven and new Earth with regards to the work Jesus has accomplished on
earth, and this seems to add to the inference that Jesus’ redemption is cosmic.
Colossians 1 seems to imply that one incarnation would suffice for all of creation.
23.7.3 “What is not assumed is not healed” is either wrong or in terms of general
creaturehood. By entering into creation, He redeemed all of creation. The only
form of creatureliness that was appropriate for a personal substance to assume is
humanity.
23.7.4 Theologically, Jesus’ death is taken as sufficient to conquer sin. If multiple
incarnations were required to redeem other kinds of rational creatures, then His
death was limited in its efficient scope.
24. Trinitarian Concerns

24.1 The incarnation is a good argument for more than one person of the Trinity.
The running of the universe doesn’t seem like the kind of thing that can be put on
hold or delegated during Jesus’ three decades as a limited human being. This is a
good argument against modalism.
24.2 Sooner or later the category of mystery must be acknowledged in the Trinity.
But it is better to do this later rather than soon. We must avoid fideism on the one
extreme and heresy on the other. There’s more to God than we know and
understand.
24.3 The problem of individuation—How can A and B be individuated?
24.3.1 If A and B have different natures, then we can individuate them in virtue
of the different properties.
24.3.2 If A and B share the same nature, then we must appeal to something other
than properties to individuate. On Liebnitz’s Law there must be something
different between A and B that individuates them. The indiscernability of
identicals comes in various formulations depending on what counts as a
property. Kinds of properties:
24.3.2.1 Monadic properties: a pure property that can be possessed without
presupposing the existence of some other substance property-bearing thing.
No modanic property would suffice to distinguish them.
24.3.2.2 Polyatic properties
24.3.2.2.1 Relational properties would have to presuppose some kind of
privileged reference frame that would make the relationship property
absolute and not accidental.
24.3.2.2.2 Different spatial and/or time location would suffice to
distinguish physical entities only and would presuppose a theory of time
and space.
24.3.2.2.3 Order of origin would not individuate things with
simultaneous origins or things that are atemporal, like numbers.
24.3.2.2.4 Nature of origin can explain individuation. In virtue of having
been created, entities have haecceities (thisness), a property of being
identical to itself. Uncreated things like abstract objects don’t have
haecceities. Do properties, numbers, etc. have haecceities? This is a
relational quality.

24.3.2.3 Bare particulars
24.4 How is God individuated?
24.4.1 Swinburne believes that all of the divine attributes can be subsumed
under one property: a single pure, limitless, intentional power. This is how he
works out the view of divine simplicity.
24.4.2 If simplicity doesn’t have a hold on us, we can say that it is a substance
that marks off the divine being. But kind essential properties must be worked
out carefully so that we don’t leave the door open for either more than one God
or God’s existence being world contingent.
24.4.3 The problem with saying there are haecceities associated with divine
individuals is that that seems to lead to tritheism. In that case, substance just
means genus and three individuals belong to the genus. This clearly isn’t what
orthodoxy holds to.
24.4.4 A causal relation distinguishes them. Eternal causation is a legitimate
way to individuate the persons of the Trinity. The Father is self-caused, the Son
is eternally generated, and the Spirit eternally processes from the Father and the
Son. To differentiate the Son and the Spirit, they must have different causes, so
the Son is causally dependent on the Father and the Spirit is causally dependent
on the Father and the Son, thus they can be distinguished. The Son and Spirit are
ontologically dependent, but not temporally dependent. Their kind essence is
their individual essence. It’s somewhat misleading to call the divine substance a
kind because there is only one individuation. To call it a kind is conceptual. The
persons of the Trinity share the one and same essential properties of the divine
kind and are distinct by virtue of their cause.
24.4.4.1 Are the persons of the Trinity necessary? Yes, because the attribute
of divine other-love must be expressed. There must necessarily be more than
one person of the Trinity in order for Him to be able to love another eternally.
Divine love must seek the good of something else. Divine love also requires
cooperating, which makes the necessity of the third. In this argument, the
Son and Spirit also provide a reciprocal causation for the Father because they
make it possible for the Father to express divine love. It is not a
subordination causation, but a reciprocal causation.
24.4.4.2 There is a distinction of consciousness brought about by the causal
differences, yet sharing the same substance.
24.4.4.3 What is the difference between generation and procession as the
nature of the relations of the Son and Spirit? Augustine said that we know of
the difference, but do not understand the difference.
24.5 God is one substantia existing in three hypostatses in virtue of causal relations.
24.5.1 Each person is a soul, with a will and rational capacities of a person.
24.5.2 The sixth council seemed to hypostasize the concept of nature and locate
the wills there. They created some new concepts that had not been previously
understood and have not been developed that way since.
24.5.3 Each soul is not a substance, but three souls in one substance. A soul is a
substance, but this is an “is” of predication, not the “is” of identity. Substance is
a metaphysical category, an individual, concrete thing. Normally there is a one-
to-one correspondence to souls and substances, but in the case of God there is a
three-to-one correspondence. They share the same identical substance.
24.5.4 God does not have haecceities because that would individuate the
substance.
24.6 What reasons could there be for the incarnation apart from sin?
24.6.1 Taking on human nature is not inappropriate because human nature is the
highest created good. It would not be inappropriate for God to assume His own
best design, and by doing so may receive greater glory.

24.6.2 To teach the dignity of human nature above the rest of creation
24.6.3 To teach God’s love
24.6.4 To serve as an example of a good life through the power of the Holy Spirit
24.6.5 Propositional revelation in Jesus’ teaching. The authority of Jesus’
teaching also authenticates the rest of Scripture.
24.6.6 Add to this list, then, the need for the atonement and we have substantial
independent reasons why there would be an incarnation.
24.6 The Trinity must be of a certain nature to accomplish the incarnation, it entails
certain limitations. If God were to become incarnate, then we must assume
something about the nature of God that entails at least a separation of individuals
and what would individuate them as centers of consciousness.
24.6.1 Someone has to continue to sustain the universe and be about God’s
business. Unless there are distinctions of consciousness in the Godhead instead
of a modal view, then the incarnation cannot happen.
24.6.2 Chalcedonian Christology allows a framework to develop this kind of
view to God. Rigorous philosophical analysis produces a view of God within
orthodoxy.
25. Metaquestion
25.1 What has been the method?
25.1.1 An analytic approach to theology, as opposed to a descriptive or
systematic approach. The primary and controlling data of the Bible is analyzed
with philosophic formulations. It integrates data from other disciplines.
Philosophy is the best discipline to do the integration because it engages in meta-
questions.
25.1.2 Investigate the philosophic soundness of systematic conclusions. If a
synthesis cannot be arrived at between theology and philosophy, then it suggests
a reevaluation of the systematic conclusions. This doesn’t mean that philosophy
is primary, but it is a check.
25.1.3 Systematic theology provides the boundaries, but further questions can be
investigated with philosophic tools. Philosophy can answer some questions that
systematic theology cannot answer. Philosophy is an assistance to systematics.
25.1.3.1 Systematic theology engages the world of thought using the
categories of the time.
25.1.3.2 Systematic theology needs to reengage modern thought.
Confessions and doctrinal statement might need updating to engage current
challenges.
25.1.3.3 Part of that bridge to engage culture is the work of philosophic
theology.
25.2 Benefits of philosophic theology
25.2.1 More apologetic in nature. It can address specific challenges to Christian
theology.
25.2.2 It demonstrates the rationality of Christian theology. It can build a
plausibility structure that is better able to persuade someone of the grounding
for Christian belief. It affirms Biblical revelation and can be recommended to
non-believers with strong justification.
25.2.3 Integration of different fields of knowledge is best done by philosophy to
ensure the system is a coherent and unified whole. It’s not ad hoc and has great
persuasive power.
25.2.4 It demonstrates that Christianity can compete in philosophic discourse
and is intellectually respectable. It has incredible resources to bring to other
disciplines of philosophy.
25.3 Other thoughts

25.3.1 Have the courage to allow the conclusions of philosophic theology filter
into all of our philosophy and have the courage to defend that even when it runs
against the course in the academy. Stay with the convictions that match the
theology.
25.3.2 Philosophic theology should be a corporate endeavor as a check for error
and heresy.
Texts
The Logic of God Incarnate, Thomas V. Morris
The Word Became Flesh, Millard Erickson
Suggested Reading:
The Christian God, Richard Swinburne

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Philosophical Theology: Christology

Dr. Garry DeWeese

2. The nature of identity statements

1 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

2 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

3 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

4 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

5 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

6 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

7. Christology of the Gospels (lecture by Dr. Mike Wilkens)

7 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

8. Christology of Colossians 1:15-20 (lecture by Dr. Clint Arnold)

8 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

9 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

10 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

11 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

12 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

13 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

11. Why study the seven councils?

14 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

15 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

16 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

17 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

18 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

13. Reformation Christology

19 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

20 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

14. Summary of the historical analysis

15. Review of Metaphysics

21 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

22 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

23 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

16. What is a human nature?

17. Divine nature

24 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

19. One Person, Two Natures?

25 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

20. Is God necessarily good?

26 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

27 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

28 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

21. The impeccability of Jesus

29 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

22. Parts of the incarnate Christ

30 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

23. Cosmic Cosmology—Is there life on other planets in need of salvation?

31 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

32 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

24. Trinitarian Concerns

33 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

34 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

35 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

36 Stand to Reason, Spring 2001

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