Cases: Legal Profession (midterms)

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2 A.C. No. 5305            March 17, 2003

MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.

6 A.C. No. 7136             August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

17 Adm. Case No. 4680       August 29, 2000

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON,
respondents.

22 A.C. No. 6313             September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent

31 Adm. Case No. 4749           January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

36 A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC             July 10, 2003

URGENT APPEAL/PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION

& UDGE EMILIO B. LEGASPI, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,
Branch 22.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 5305            March 17, 2003

MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent,
Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes,
Jr.1 The decretal portion of our resolution in Atienza reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all

leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.2

Respondent’s dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was found guilty of
Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual disqualification
imposed upon him from assuming any post in government service, including any posts in
government-owned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy
post at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said
consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of Directors
of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy
agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.

Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a proviso to the
effect that nothing therein should be construed as establishing an employer-employee
relationship between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was only a
ploy to circumvent our order barring respondent from appointment to a government
agency. Petitioner points out in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights and privileges
as a regular employee, to wit:3

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1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories, as evidenced
by the covering Property Issue Slips with respondent signing as "Accountable
Employee";4

2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of Authorized

Travel kept by LWUA’s General Services Division5 and Report of Travel accomplished
by respondent himself;6

3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as brought to light by

written instructions personally signed by respondent;7

4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various provinces;8

5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as the Prequalification, Bids,

and Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Committee, among
others, with receipt of corresponding honoraria as borne out by various Disbursement
Vouchers;9

6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the minutes of

such meetings;10 and

7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.

Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct, gross misconduct,
and willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and show that respondent is unfit to be
a member of the Bar.

In his comment,11 respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as
well as the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense that
under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993,
services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered government
services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular issued by the
Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be submitted to the Commission for
approval. With respect to his designation as the 6th Member of the Board of Directors of
the Urdaneta Water District, respondent reasons out that the same is not a
"reappointment", which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said designation is not
an organic appointment to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence, according to respondent,
the CSC need not pass approval upon his temporary designation.

Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water District Board,
especially the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA, assumed such functions merely
by virtue of a designation and only in addition to their regular duties. In any event, says
respondent, his designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000 and the Special
Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on April 30, 2000. It has never been renewed

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since then. With respect to his use of LWUA properties, respondent admits receiving the
cellular phone unit but insists that he merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a
former LWUA Board of Trustees Member.

In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline found that respondent willfully violated a lawful order of this Court and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year and
fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.

There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation,

created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198.12 As such, our ruling in the Atienza
case, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically prohibits respondent’s appointment to
any position in any government-owned and controlled corporation, clearly encompasses
and extends to LWUA positions.

In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioner’s allegations.13 Instead, he
offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s.
1993) to exculpate himself from the charge against him. However, it does not escape our
attention that the very Memorandum Circular that respondent cites before this Court
provides that the duties enumerated in the consultancy contract are mainly advisory in
nature.14

Without belaboring the definition of "advisory,"15 it appears obvious to us that the tasks
and duties that respondent performed pursuant to the consultancy contract cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be deemed merely advisory in nature.

An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor does he
issue written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a seat in such vital LWUA
committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondent’s continuous receipt
of honoraria for sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT
Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on
record clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order implementing National Compensation
Circular No. 75-9516 refers to payments of honoraria to officials/employees in
consideration of services rendered.

Most telling, in our view, is respondent’s acceptance of his 1998 Productivity Incentive
Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, of the LWUA,17
which governed the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said bonus only to
"officials" and "employees" (permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.

In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and
functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA.
As stated by petitioner in his reply,18 there is a difference between a consultant hired on a
contractual basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual
employee (whose appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on

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Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By performing duties and functions, which
clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant,
respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of this Court’s decree in Atienza.

The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.19
That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the courts.
Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and
controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special
consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a contractual employee of
LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving compensation and perquisites as such, he
displayed acts of open defiance of the Court’s authority, and a deliberate rejection of his
oath as an officer of the court. It is also destructive of the harmonious relations that
should prevail between Bench and Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper
administration of justice. Such defiance not only erodes respect for the Court but also
corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.

What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary lawyer.
Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very well aware of the standards
of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. His propensity to try to "get
away" with an indiscretion becomes apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a
legal "consultancy" contract with the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own mistake, LWUA
terminated said contract with respondent, but then proceeded to give him a "special
consultancy." This travesty could not be long hidden from public awareness, hence the
instant complaint for disbarment filed by petitioner. Given the factual circumstances
found by Commission on Bar Discipline, we have no hesitance in accepting the
recommendation of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that
respondent be fined and suspended from the practice of law. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For violating the Code as well as transgressing his oath as
an officer of the court, his suspension for one (1) year and a fine of ten thousand
(P10,000) pesos are in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for having
willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in our decision of March 29, 1995 rendered
in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F.
Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent as well as circulated to all
courts in the Philippines. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

5
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7136             August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)
against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
(sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to
March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he
asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned
the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which
he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that
incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

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Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words
"I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle.
I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness
but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it
again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything
humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my
own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on
you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But
more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to
last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in
my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND

YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M

LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B
11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about
January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the
above-quoted letter was handwritten.

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On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS

RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or
about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
"Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4
(Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting
their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship

with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter
being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne
Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent
abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He
flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper."
Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the
very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are
together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint

regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral
depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason
being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his
wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary
Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

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 5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is
the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his
illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the

Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent
with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth
to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13
bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha
Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated

January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the
Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

9
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and
Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's
counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-

page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge
against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by
Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET

ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics
and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section
12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason
therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

1
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there
is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the
news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do
not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship
with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent

through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]
their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is

indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted
that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was
the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father
of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous

relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal
Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a
man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied)
What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was
"low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the

1
 averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication
of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's

daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene
named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT
MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with
her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent
never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January
29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the
information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced
by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and,
therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum of evidence needed
in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with
Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath

1
 which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent

court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension
uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances."
Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with
a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with
a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-
marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
disagree.

xxxx

1
 While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow
of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers
upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

1
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the
IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene
had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the
criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on
the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion
to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the
same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab
initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair
with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null
and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent
glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to
Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on
September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of
complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair

estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense
of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,

1
 and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone
calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and
Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the
fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself
was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only
served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This
becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th
Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church
where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since
Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he
held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje
had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a
coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that
was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It
was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje
furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently
of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate
is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his
petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery
after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have
been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x
criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47
(Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

1
 Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on

January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records
of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And
let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 4680       August 29, 2000

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya
P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's
oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board
of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while
Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-

1
chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b),2 respondents tampered
with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes
(SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1)
senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan,
Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were
above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioner's
votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes were in excess of the total number
of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice
recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite
respondents' knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a
serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers' oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the
SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to
assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be
attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held

responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the
irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their
control and supervision.

On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had
been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.3 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).

It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the
COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b). In its
resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainant's charges for
insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this
Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal
charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.

Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.

First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it
was filed late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
under Rule 139-B, §12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board
of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further
contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to

1
indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his
motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed
within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, §12(c).

The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Villanueva,6 in which this Court held:

Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration,

nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may
therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such
motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the
judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced.7

On the question whether petitioner's present petition was filed within the 15-day period
provided under Rule 139-B, §12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4,
1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear,
however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally
served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18,
1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the
copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be
assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP
resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that
the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.

Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999,
i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the delay would only be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit
of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole
question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the
privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
Court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with
procedure like verification of pleadings12 and prejudicial questions13 have no application
to disbarment proceedings.

Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest
of justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given
due course to appeals even though filed six,14 four,15 and three16 days late. In this case, the
petition is clearly meritorious.

1
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the basis of the
following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns,
because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been
accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in
the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the
general public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any
irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, §27(b) are mala in se and not
mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of
respondents.17

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the

bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.18 As long as
the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court19 is
more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto,20
the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified..

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the
canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for
such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or
fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting

this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646,
§27(b), this Court said:

There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or

oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude
of she error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned
candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that
reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for
senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who
actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the
defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable.22

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of
votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the
erroneous figures in one or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of
certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the
tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner
reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile
exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs,
returns from 22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in
Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in
question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.24

2
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns
from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and
CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves
substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and
correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.

Respondent Llorente's contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due
execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct

is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the
City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ________ this _______ day of
May, 1995. (Emphasis added)

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous
individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is
that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare
them and detect the discrepancies therein.

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However,
if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
or the lawyer's oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of
the bar for such misconduct.26

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By express provision of Canon 6,
this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise
violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood."

Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their
public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said:

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to behave at all

times in a manner consistent with truth and honor it is important that the common
caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and
to act honestly, should not become a common reality . . .28

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under
greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a
public trust.

Third. Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal

profession, in general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the

2
performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the
popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension
were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case
of Salayon, after a long public service.29 Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the
amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of
P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6313             September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry,
from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.1

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine

Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic
case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the
records are hereinafter presented.

2
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she
was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological
father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay
Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant,
respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the
continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than
P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her congenital heart
ailment.

At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having
a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent
started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent
allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making
sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such
as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for
the prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she
succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to
marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of

Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the
father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was
not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly
assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that
Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent
purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case
against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she
completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him
P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical
expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of
P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent
informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his
political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member
of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise
to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her
instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed,

2
the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It
was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the
Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her
disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated
by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly
deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and
confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and
dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money
that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and
Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant

needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's
former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay
official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover,
Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated
through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with
his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to give
complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that
Aquino is not the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also
explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested
that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When
Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to
P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts
within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the
checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was
P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that
respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing
her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what
the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the
draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college
graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise
vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant
allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash
and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00, not

2
P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it
was for his attorney's fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises.
According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11
complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his
marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to
demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced
what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through
his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second,
they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his
wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to
his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to
call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected
President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of
Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was
impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she
lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped
him in his campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being
worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had
promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job
never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received
from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for
financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While
respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for the right man"12 and to
stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not
assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he
agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since
then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by
cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when
her alleged fiancé from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July
2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down.
Since then he had stopped communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She
told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she
wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant
showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the
Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being

2
blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the
instant complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
for investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their
respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner
rendered his Report and Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the
parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that
of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this
wise, to wit:

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting
in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member
of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law
confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time
have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.

Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice

complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent
kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid
while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It
signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took
advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x15

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00
within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report
and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
"considering Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship
and the financial and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the
Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with
a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to

2
Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the
Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account
of the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays
complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial
support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based
its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory
questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it
has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the
Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP
has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair
with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of
the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that
to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.25

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27
Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule

1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is
aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low

2
spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP
concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.

Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his
promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case
against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into
having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of
sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled
into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when
there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to
justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.29 Respondent's numerous visits
and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her.
At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on
which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her
P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she
never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status
inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her
not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were
introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay
official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that
she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official
who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted
respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that
she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot
of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural
for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had
known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she
preferred "to change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe
that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant
evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the most logical conclusion that
she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent
sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral
control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting
her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel,
she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support
from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot
fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple
of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a
document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit

2
consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able
to read it before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents
of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even
urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's
medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If
her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going
negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the
execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign
the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows and
understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the
Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a
document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the
negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with
Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable
settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed
in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father
of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily
and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel
when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to
whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the case. Again,
we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.34
Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what
will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by

Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to
her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining
P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in
order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she
should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00
that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is

2
in fact more than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he
could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed
two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand,
respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no
evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep
the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in
favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration
where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what
the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not want to
travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding
in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently
finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer
modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is
called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are
constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this
aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the
cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively
earmarked for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is
distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the
fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such.
Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its
officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and
affords no redress for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.39

Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the

Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality
where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit
with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into
marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily

3
differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on
decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was found to have
sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the
illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible
and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v.
Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there
was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his
conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago.
We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should
be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his
first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is
without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged
misappropriation of funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of

immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 4749           January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

3
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.

Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated
the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If
at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in
1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).

Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995

in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.

Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996

in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.

Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not
Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

3
 1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-
CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February
14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November
13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof,
what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number
"IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995,
issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No.
11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged:5

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically
no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the
bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside
and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

3
 Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal
as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of
conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in
his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return,
up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income
Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares
orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in
1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only
in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated
Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and
if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and
refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him
to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on
the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the

proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of
the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least
three years."

3
 The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his
IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by

respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in
1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.

xxx     xxx     xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondent's Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings
of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections
from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of
the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12

of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for

3
 one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting

to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent
is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

3
 FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC             July 10, 2003

URGENT APPEAL/PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION & DISMISSAL

OF JUDGE EMILIO B. LEGASPI, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 22.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified letter complaint1 dated April 24, 2000, Rolando R. Mijares charged Judge
Emilio B. Legaspi, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, with Gross Ignorance
of the Law, Incompetence, Falsification and Corruption. Complainant alleged that Judge
Legaspi failed to resolve more than 200 cases submitted for decision assigned to him
within the reglementary period of ninety days while he was detailed as Presiding Judge of
the RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch 10; that he rendered judgment in favor of a multi-
millionaire Chinese businessman in consideration of five hundred thousand to one
million pesos and a Mercedes Benz vehicle; and that in Civil Case No. 2639, entitled
"Ernesto L. Villavert, Plaintiffs versus Nenita Mijares, et al., Defendants", he erroneously
entertained an appeal and reversed the order of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose,
Antique which denied2 the execution of the judgment by compromise therein.

In his Comment,3 Judge Legaspi claimed that Mijares was ill-motivated when he
instituted this complaint because of the adverse decision he rendered in Civil Case No.
26394 against him and his wife. He denied the allegation that he failed to resolve 195
cases submitted for decision, explaining that while he was detailed in Antique, only eight
cases were assigned to him since the other cases were ordered re-raffled among the RTC
judges of Kalibo, Aklan who had lesser caseloads, per this Court's Resolution in A.M.
No. 98-6-201-RTC.5 He decided the said eight cases within the ninety-day period counted
from the time the last pleading was filed.6 When he returned to the RTC of Iloilo City,
Branch 22, there were sixty-eight cases assigned to his court which had accumulated
during his detail in Antique. As a result thereof, he was temporarily relieved of his trial
work by this Court in order to concentrate in deciding said cases, which he was able to
resolve within the 90-day period.7 He was, however, unable to decide two cases because
he was assigned Judge of RTC, Kabankalan City, Branch 61. Nevertheless, he resolved
these two cases within ten days from receipt of this Court's Resolution ordering him to do
so.8

He vehemently denied having received money and a Mercedes Benz vehicle from a
Chinese businessman in exchange for a favorable judgment. He asserted that his two
lawyer sons and a daughter who is a U.S. based registered nurse gave the vehicle to him
as a birthday present. He declared that he lived a comfortable life even before he joined
the judiciary. His wife is a well-accomplished private medical practitioner in Antique, his
other daughter is a doctor of medicine, while his other son is a law graduate.

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In his Reply, complainant emphasized Judge Legaspi's error in entertaining the appeal of
the MTC's Order which denied the Motion for Execution of the Judgment by
Compromise, in violation of the settled principle that an interlocutory order is not
appealable. He also alleged that Judge Legaspi employed coercion on his court personnel
so that the certification and the monthly reports would reflect that no case was left
undecided within the 90-day period.

Furthermore, complainant questioned the sound discretion of this Court in ordering the
re-raffle of the cases left unresolved by Judge Legaspi in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch
22, while he was detailed presiding Judge of RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch 10. He
assailed the act of this Court in tolerating Judge Legaspi's ineptitude and insinuated that
there must be someone "up there" protecting and coddling Judge Legaspi.9

On February 19, 2001, the Urgent Appeal/Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and
complainant was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt
for wasting the time of the judiciary.10

Complainant filed his explanation stating that his intention in filing the complaint was not
to waste the time of the Court but as part of his crusade to clean up the judiciary. He
reiterated his belief that this Court will not tolerate fraud, dishonesty and corrupt
practices.

On August 29, 2001, the February 19, 2001 Resolution was recalled in view of the
gravity and seriousness of the charges. The case was referred to Justice Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.11

On February 6, 2002, Justice Magtolis submitted her report recommending that Judge
Legaspi be exonerated of the charges against him for lack of a showing of malice or bad
faith.12 The case was thereafter referred to the OCA for evaluation. The OCA
recommended that the Urgent Appeal/Petition for Immediate Suspension and Dismissal
filed against Judge Legaspi be dismissed for lack of merit, but that complainant Rolando
R. Mijares be found guilty of indirect contempt and fined in the amount of P1,000.00.

The recommendation of the OCA is well taken.

The records show that there were seventy-eight cases assigned to Judge Legaspi, all of
which were resolved by him, according to the Reports of Compliance and the
Certifications issued by the respective Branch Clerks of Courts. Anent the raffle of some
of the cases of Judge Legaspi to other judges of Kalibo, Aklan, this Court in the exercise
of its administrative supervision over lower courts, may order their re-raffle considering
that they have accumulated in Judge Legaspi's court while he was detailed at the RTC of
Aklan.

With regard the charge of falsification, the record is bereft of any evidence to
conclusively show that Judge Legaspi falsified his Reports of Compliance with the

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Resolutions of this Court. The Certifications issued by the respective clerks of court
corroborate said Reports.

Anent the charge of corruption, Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that
complaints against judges must be supported by the affidavits of persons who have
personal knowledge of the acts therein alleged and must also be accompanied by copies
of pertinent documents to substantiate the allegations. In the case at bar, except for
complainant's bare allegations, surmises, suspicions and rhetorics, no competent evidence
was presented to prove that Judge Legaspi committed corruption.

Regarding the charge of ignorance of the law, the settled doctrine is that judges are not
administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial
functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.13 A judge may not be
held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.14 To
hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.15 For a judge to be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the
error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad
faith.16 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.17 It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive
of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.18

While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would
violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples' faith in the judiciary,
neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only
serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.19

In the instant case, any perceived error which Judge Legaspi may have committed in
entertaining the appeal of the order of the Municipal Trial Court, denying the motion for
execution in Civil Case No. 872, can only be deemed an error in judgment which is more
properly the subject of an appeal or petition for certiorari, as the case may be, and not this
administrative charge against respondent judge.

Finally, we agree with the Court Administrator that complainant was guilty of indirect
contempt of court. Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides:

Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in

writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:

xxx             xxx             xxx

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 (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.

This Court may motu proprio initiate proceedings for indirect contempt. Inherent in
courts is the power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every
manner appertaining thereto.20

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel, etc., et al.,21 we held that the use
of language tending to degrade the administration of justice constitutes indirect contempt.

In the case at bar, complainant made the following insinuation:

Apparently, petitioner was in quandary why Judge Legaspi was given premium of
being "sitting-pretty," despite of his glaring "ineptitude", instead of choking
himself of the High Tribunal's wrath of hell, while those who failed to resolve
their few cases within 90-days period their salaries were suspended? Isn't equal
justice the equivalent of "pantay-pantay lahat", or are some, with big connections,
or "padrino", more equal than others? Or, maybe because, Judge Legaspi have
someone "up there" to protect and coddle him?22

The foregoing statements constitute contemptuous conduct. Complainant's imputation

that this Court protects one of its own is malicious and offends the dignity of the
Judiciary. His explanation that he made those statements merely as part of a crusade to
clean up the judiciary is unavailing. Indeed, this can be done even without making
malicious imputations on the Court. For this, complainant must be sentenced to pay a fine
of P1,000.00.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint against Judge Emilio B. Legaspi
for gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, falsification and corruption, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Rolando R. Mijares is found guilty of
indirect contempt and is FINED in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) with
the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.