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Aquinas's Moral Theory

Author(s): Ralph McInerny
Source: Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 31-33
Published by: BMJ Publishing Group
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27716553 .
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 Journal of medical ethics, 1987, 13, 31-33

Moral theories

Aquinas's moral theory

Ralph Mclnerny University ofNotre Dame, Indiana, USA

The moral theory of St Thomas Aquinas their truth can be decided to what anyone
(1225-1274) by appeal
has a as well as a philosophical knows. Such truths may be believed to be true because
theological aspect;
indeed Thomistic moral philosophy, while God revealed them, but in their case belief can be
theoretically complete in itself, is subsumed into moral replaced by knowledge. De fide truths, like the
incarnation and and
theology. I shall here be concerned only with the moral trinity general resurrection,
on the
philosophy of Aquinas, but first a word
cannot be known to be true in this life.
his moral without If what has been contains
revealed de fide truths as
possibility of considering philosophy
his moral well as truths which can
be known, we would expect
discussing theology.
a great number of the latter to show up in the teachings of pagan
As a Christian, Thomas accepts
as true because have been revealed Exactly this happens, Thomas holds;
propositions they philosophers.
as interest in the writings of Aristotle,
by God. A proposition is defide if (a) it is accepted
hence his insatiable
true (b) because God has revealed it and (c) there is no all of which were becoming available in Latin for the
to decide its
Thus, Thomas
truth. first time.
independent way
that Christ is human and divine, that there are Moral can now be defined as that
believes philosophy
in God and that there will be a general knowledge of how we ought to act which is
three persons
resurrection. It is another feature of the de fide that, independent of religious belief for its acceptance.
while its truth can not be decided by appeal to The moral philosophy of Aquinas is a version of

other than God's say-so, neither can such Aristotelian ethics. Like Aristotle, he will take the end
something
some such
propositions be known to be false. Although
to be of practical
the beginning considerations,
Christians have described faith dramatically as the that moral precepts are in effect judgements as to how
as true of what is known to be the end is to be achieved. A certain kind of action can
acceptance false,
Thomas is not them. be assessed as good or bad to the degree that it is
Aquinas among
De fide truths are chiefly about God, but they can conducive to the end desired. But ends too are subject

also be about human actions as these are ordered to to moral appraisal. As with Aristotle, ends sought and
that one should love one's the actions which are the means of attaining them, are
God. The injunction
as oneself is such a truth. What about the appraised with reference to the nature of the human
neighbour
which were to Moses Good ends and means are those befitting the
precepts of the Decalogue given agent.
human bad ends and means are those which are
on Mount Sinai? Are they not obviously revealed agent;
truths? not thus fitting. This is what ismeant by Natural Law.

the injunction to charity seems one that is Human actions and moral actions are synonymous
While
the believer as believer, it would seem for What counts as a human action?
incumbent upon Aquinas.
odd to think the prohibitions of murder, lying, Anything done with deliberation, consciously,
and theft are moral whose acceptance voluntarily. Not every event or activity that can truly
adultery precepts
belief. And in fact Thomas be ascribed to a human person counts as a human act.
is contingent upon religious
when are what
maintains that by and large the Ten Commandments Digesting, ageing, falling dropped,
believer or Thomas calls 'acts of man' but not human acts.
are moral principles any human person,
as true. Either he is guilty of Thinking and all other activities that come under the
not, should recognise
or further is necessary. sway of thought are moral actions, human acts. It is one
gross confusion precision
does not revealed' and thing for Socrates's beard to be growing, it is another
Thomas identify 'being
de revealed is a necessary though for Socrates to grow a beard.
'being fide'. Being
of being de fide and some truths Human acts are teleological; that is, whatever we do,
not sufficient condition
which need not have been because we do for some end or purpose. Actions are responsible
have been revealed
because we are answerable for them, and the question
asked is: 'Why did you do that'? If it is granted that
Key words each and every human act is undertaken for some end,
of St Thomas it could be that there is simply a vast number of
Moral theories; moral theory Aquinas.
32 Ralph Mclnerny

disparate and unrelated ends. But clearly some had when the virtues of rational activity in its various

objectives are ordered to further objectives. One senses are had. The human good will then have as its
studies to pass the course in order to get the degree in constituents the virtues of the speculative intellect, the
order to cure the sick. There are subordinate and virtues of the
practical intellect, and the virtues of

superordinate ends for which we act. What if there rational activity in the third sense, moral virtues.
were some ultimate superordinating end of all that It is now clear that 'Performing well some single
human persons do? If there were, we would have a kind of act' is not a good description of man's ultimate
single ultimate criterion for assessing actions as good or end. The ultimate objective of human action is to act
bad. The good ones would be those conducive to that rationally well but that turns out to mean achieving the
end; the bad ones those which thwart it. virtues (in the plural) of rational activity. These virtues
Like Aristotle, Thomas holds that there is such an can be ranked in two ways, either in terms of dignity or
ultimate end of all we do. Aristotle cited two reasons in terms of priority and necessity. Virtues of the
for thinking so. First, we have a name for it, viz speculative use of our mind such as science and wisdom

'happiness'. Second, it is the assumption of legislation are more desirable as perfective of the activity which is
that all overt acts can be regulated for the peculiar to man in its purest form. Moral virtues, such

commonweal, which is thus taken to be the ultimate as temperance and justice, will be more necessary and
criterion for or Aristotle come first; if they do not, circumstances conducive to
commanding prohibiting.
takes these as prima reasons for assuming itmakes the acquisition of speculative virtues are unlikely to
facie
sense to ask what in fact the ultimate end of human obtain. Thomas, like Aristotle, will speak of the
action is. ultimate end, the human our happiness, as
good,
The for man will be the fulfilment or perfection consisting in contemplation. This should not be taken
good
of that activity or function or task which is peculiar to to mean that there is some single activity the virtue of
human agents. If you know what a thing is for, you which is the human good without qualification.
have a basis for deciding whether it is a good instance It is sometimes taken to be an objection to this
of its type. If a knife is for cutting, a knife that cuts well procedure to say: stealing and cheating and spoiling the
is a good one. If the eye is for seeing, the eye that sees environment are peculiar to human and, since
beings
well is a good one. Does man have a function in this such activities are generally regarded as immoral,
sense? Is there some peculiarly human task or distinctively human behaviour is no guide to the human
function? good. But of course the distinctively human function
Thomas's affirmative answer to this question relies can be performed well or badly. That is the point of
on his earlier distinction between human acts and acts speaking of virtue as performing it well. The activities
of a man. Quite a number of activities can be truly mentioned are precisely instances of performing it
ascribed to human beings which are not peculiar or badly. Thomas Aquinas is scarcely guilty of saying that
proper to them. All of the following may be true (a) every human act is just as such good.
Socrates is falling, (b) Socrates is hungry and (c) What criteria are there for distinguishing good
Socrates tells Xanthippe he is going to the Agora to human action from bad? It is here that Thomas's talk of
engage in dialogue. The subject of (a) could be any the ultimate end should be connected with his teaching
physical body, of (b) any animal, but only humans on the natural moral law. What reply to
would Thomas
engage in the kind of activity mentioned in (c). this objection: talk of acting for ends and of rational
Peculiarly human activity is rational activity. Thus, on activity as peculiar to men, talk of virtue as perfective
the analogy of the examples in the previous paragraph, of that activity, is all well and good. Indeed, it is quite
the human good consists quite simply in performing useful. Alas, it remains purely formal, since it is
rational activity well. compatible with radically different notions of the good
The difficulty is that 'rational activity' can mean a life. I may define virtues connected with rational
variety of things, and we are back again to the point of activity undertaken in relation to others as taking
saying that even if whatever humans do is truly advantage of another's ignorance, telling untruths
describable as rational activity, things humans the
do when they are to my advantage, etc and you may
are infinitely various, and we not seem to have
do embrace some classical conception of justice. We
achieved a unified view. One thing we can do is sort out disagree. There is no way to adjudicate the
some major meanings of 'rational activity'. It can first disagreement by argument.
of all be taken to mean the activity of thinking as such, The Thomistic doctrine on a natural moral law is in
an activity which aims at ascertaining the truth about effect a response to that view. Thomas would take the
the way things are. Call this theoretical thinking. objection to be incoherent. He holds that there are
Sometimes thinking is engaged in with an eye to common guidelines of human action which are
directing some activity other than thinking, like embedded in the very nature of the human agent and
choosing. Call this practical thinking. Activities other which no one can fail to know. That may seem an
than thinking which come under the sway of reason can adventurous claim. Reflection on it makes manifest
be called rational activity in a further sense. Virtue is that what is difficult is to maintain its opposite.
the word used to express a settled way of performing a By natural law precepts Thomas means the first and
function well. Thus, we can say that the human good is self-evident precepts of the practical use of reason, and
 Moral theories: Aquinas's moral theory 33

he discusses them on an analogy with the first and self of murder, theft, adultery and lying. Thomas fashions
evident precepts of the theoretical or speculative use of arguments to the effect that these are kinds of activity
reason. Any notion we form will be an instance of the which are always and everywhere wrong because
most general notion, 'being'. Any judgement we make essentially destructive of the good for man. These are
will have embedded in it the primary judgement that a precepts of great generality and relate to more specific
thing cannot simultaneously and in the same sense be precepts in two ways.
and not be. In the practical use of our mind, the First, as the selection of the term 'law' suggests,
primary concept is 'good' and the first nongainsayable these precepts are taken to be presupposed by positive
precept that the good should be pursued and done and law, such that positive laws which are in conflict with
evil avoided. The theory does not say that 'being' is the them are not morally binding. A law may incorporate
first word anyone utters, that the first idea he a natural law prohibition murder
only against by
forms is of a being. So too one's first sentence is not 'An distinguishing its degrees with an eye to punitive
affirmation and its contradictory cannot be sanctions. Such extensions do not of course share in the
simultaneously true'. But all human discourse is character of general moral precepts which are always
guided by that basic truth. Knowledge of it is implicit and everywhere the same.
in any knowledge we have. If this analogy works, the Second, moral knowledge of a generalised kind that
common precepts of natural law are precepts is embedded in various ways in a given culture is an
embedded in our actions and which are implicitly extension of those very general and universally binding
which are natural law. It does not at all follow
recognised by all human agents. precepts
The basis for the precepts of natural law are the from the theory of natural law that all morally well
ordered societies will look alike. No more will all moral
goods we instinctively seek, ends we naturally desire.
Thomas a number of such natural persons look alike. The moral
task, for societies, for
recognises
inclinations. First, there is the nature we share with all peoples, for
persons, is to make the moral ideal
concrete and this can be done in numberless
things, and regard we have a natural
in this inclination ways.
to preserve ourselves in being. For us to be is to live, so Natural law precepts can be either negative or
nature in this sense inclines us to seek nourishment. positive. The
negative are more easily applicable since
we share a nature with all animals and in this they prohibit acts which are wrong in their kind. Once
Second,
an inclination to reproduce ourselves and an action is seen to be an instance of this type, we know
regard have
to raise our young. our rational nature inclines what we ought to do. Positive precepts like 'Be brave'
Finally,
us to live in society and to pursue the truth, particularly or 'Be just' are not so easily Many possible
applicable.
about God. The of these inclinations are goods acts may be instances of just action and the precept
objects
we cannot not want, what we are. These natural alone does not tell us which to perform. Justice,
given
-
are not means wisdom these cardinal
inclinations what Thomas by natural courage, temperance,
moral law. The precepts of natural law are directive of constituents of the human good are infinitely realisable
our pursuit of these naturally desired and not only permit but entail diversity both of persons
goods.
The most that good should be done and of cultures. It is the actions which thwart these
general precept,
and evil means that we should ideals which always and everywhere are evil.
avoided, rationally
our actions as on Thomistic moral consists of three
direct they bear these naturally philosophy stages.
desired Reason is the note of law. Precepts of The first stage is that of natural law precepts, negative
goods.
natural law are directives
of practical reason. That our and positive. The second is the level of positive law or
less enshrined moral codes: here both
pursuit of food and sex should be regulated by reason formally
is self-evident. For one thing, it is impossible for us to prohibitions and prescriptions admit of exceptions.
such goods For it is Finally, there is the level of
application, of singular
pursue unconsciously. another,
clear that without rational these natural decisions, the prudential (in the classical sense of the
direction,
inclinations are more likely to fc>e thwarted than term) order. Neither knowledge of natural law, a sane
fulfilled. The precepts formulated by natural reason legal code nor a reasonable ethics can assure that our
must take into account the finality of the inclinations actions will be good. Good action is the product of
would under the of reason. character, not simply knowledge, and character is
they bring sway
which would counsel formed by repeated acts of a given kind until our hearts
Prescriptive guidelines
desire are inclined to good action. Given good character,
regulating by blinding oneself, controlling
limbs and regulating birth moral virtue, a person is enabled to do the right deed
trespassing by amputating
the activity of sexual intercourse would for the right reason and enjoy doing it.
by frustrating
be false. That is, it is false to suggest that the good for The moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas
man is to thwart the attainment of goods men continues to exercise influence today on both non
naturally
desire. Virtue will consist in so pursuing these Catholic and Catholic thinkers. Friend and foe alike
desired that their constitutive role in find in Thomas insights and arguments well worth
naturally goods
human and fulfilment is fostered. taking into account.
well-being
Among the precepts of natural law that Thomas is the Michael P Grace
Ralph Mclnerny Professor of
on a level of less generality than 'Pursue Medieval Studies in the University
recognises of Notre Dame,
virtue' or 'Do good and avoid evil' are the prohibitions USA.
Indiana,