Aborting Abortion:

The Demographic Effect of Abortion Practice on Abortion Support

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 Abstract

Support for legal abortion in the United States declined from 67.2% of the population in 1974 to
52.1% in 2004, according to the U.S. General Social Survey (N=50,990). Logit/logistic models
that disaggregate age, period and cohort (APC) effects in this trend reveal modest effects of period
and cohort—odds on abortion support drop by 2.1% for 5-year cohorts and by 9.4% every 5
years—but most of the decline is due to the increasing entry into the population of persons born
after 1972. Members of this “post-abortion generation” (for which the onset of legal abortion
coincides with their beginning birth year) are 35% less likely to express support for abortion, and
40% more likely to express unqualified opposition to abortion, than are their elders. Three
possible mechanisms are proposed to account for their increased opposition to abortion—the
normative effect of the ready availability of abortion; the interaction of abortion practice with
population change, family formation and dynamics; and the demographic effect, a cohort
inversion, of selectively aborting persons who are more likely to support abortion.

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INTRODUCTION

Social scientists once confidently expected opposition to abortion, much like religion, to

fade away in American life. And not without reason; poll results documented declining

opposition to abortion through the 1960s (Blake 1971), a decade which also saw a growing social

movement to reverse state statutes criminalizing abortion. This trend was interpreted as reflecting,

in part, a demographic trend toward social liberalism led by the young, due largely to education

(Stouffer 1954). As Davis (1980) neatly summarizes: “Since study after study shows better-

educated and younger Americans to be more liberal, and since older Americans are inexorably

replaced by better-educated, more-recently-born cohorts, there is every reason to expect a long-

term trend toward liberalism.” When, then, in early 1973 the Supreme Court effectively legalized

abortion-on-demand nationwide, sociologists and demographers widely expected that it would

“undoubtedly presage a sharp increase in permissive views on abortion, especially in the

generations to come” (Westoff and Ryder 1977:163). The persistence and political salience of

opposition to abortion, evident by the end of the 1970s, was accordingly “perplexing. . .to social

scientists” (Blake and Del Pinal 1981:310), who labored to explain it as a short-term reaction to the

larger trend toward permissiveness--“conservative weather in a liberalizing climate” (Davis

1980)—or the result of public ignorance about abortion (Blake 1977).

But the ensuing 25 years since 1980 have demonstrated that opposition to abortion is not an

anomaly, nor is it disappearing. On the contrary, it appears that, if anything, it is support for

abortion that is fading. As measured by NORC’s General Social Survey (GSS), support for

abortion1 peaked in 1974, at 67.2% of the population; since then it has slowly but monotonically

receded (correlation with year is -.05, significant at .001) to a low of 52.1% in 2004.

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 This study re-examines the thesis that cohorts are successively liberalizing on abortion in

light of this long-term decline in abortion support, by attempting to specify the population

dynamics affecting U.S. abortion opinion. If newer cohorts are more liberal, why has abortion

support not increased as successive cohorts have entered the population in the last thirty years?

Has cohort replacement been displaced by other factors with regard to abortion, or have newer

cohorts—that is, younger Americans—stopped growing more liberal? Or is some other population

factor at work?

DATA

The most reliable and detailed representative measure of opinion on abortion over recent

decades is that found on the General Social Survey (GSS), administered in most years since 1972

to a representative sample of the U.S. population by the National Opinion Research Center at the

University of Chicago and funded by the National Science Foundation. Through 2006 the

combined GSS data report results from interviews with 50,990 U.S. households. Since 1972 the

GSS has asked respondents to choose “whether or not you think it should be possible for a

pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion. . .” (GSS Cumulative Codebook, NORC 2006;

emphasis in original) in six circumstances: “if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the

baby”; “if the woman’s own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy; “if she became

pregnant as a result of rape”; “if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more

children”; “if she is not married and does not want to marry the man”; and “if she is married and

does not want any more children”. Data for this study are derived from the responses to these

questions.

According to the GSS, for the past 30 years a large majority (at least 81%) of Americans

has supported access to legal abortion in one or more of the “hard” cases of rape, serious birth

defect, or threat to the mother’s health (the first three circumstances listed above), but less than a

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majority (not more than 48%) has supported abortion in any of the three remaining “soft”, social or

economic, cases. Figure 1 reports the percent support for each of the six circumstances. Because

support varies in this way according to the justification for abortion access, both “pro-choice (pro-

abortion)” and “pro-life (anti-abortion)” advocacy groups can be correct, albeit misleading, when

the former, focusing on the hard cases, claim that a majority of Americans supports legal abortion

while the latter, focusing on the soft cases, claim that a majority opposes it. In fact, over the past

three decades only a minority of Americans has supported access to abortion in all (39%) of the six

cases, and a much smaller minority (8%) has supported abortion in none of them. The majority

(54%) has taken a more pragmatic or situational position, supporting abortion access in some

circumstances but opposing it in others: 36% do not rule out abortion altogether, but would permit

it in only one or more of the hard cases; 18% would also support it in one or more of the soft cases,

but do not go so far as to always permit it.2

While there is a large difference in support between the two groups of hard and soft cases,

support varies little among the three hard or soft cases. This stratification indicates that the

meaningful differences in abortion views among Americans can be captured in four categories of

opinion: those who support access to abortion in none of the six circumstances, showing

“Consistent Opposition”; those who support it in all circumstances, showing “Consistent Support”;

those who support it for the three hard cases but none of the soft ones, expressing “Qualified

Opposition”; and those who support it for the hard cases and at least one of the social cases, or

“Qualified Support”. The stratification of U.S. abortion opinion into these four response sets is

extremely strong. A four-point scale of support for access to abortion based on them captured

almost all of the variation in abortion opinion measured by the six abortion measures. The r-

square (percent of variance explained) for the regression of a 7-point scale constructed from the six

abortion variables on this 4-point measure is .92. Residual mean square is only 0.32, compared to

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mean square of 230,650.35 accounted for by the model. The correlation between the two scales is

.96.

The middle two categories of opinion could plausibly be conceived differently; as just

noted, their definition constitutes contested terrain in the abortion “culture wars”. It could be

argued that all of those labeled “Qualified Opposition” would permit some abortions; and Blake

(1981) has argued that all of those here labeled “Qualified Support” may be better understood as

expressing qualified opposition to abortion. Since the present paper focuses on population

determinants, not substantive correlates of abortion opinion, however, the categories here are

conceived pragmatically. Empirically, those (36%) who support abortion access only in cases of

deformity, rape or a serious health threat (“Qualified Opposition”) are expressing opposition to

over 85% of abortions currently performed in the United States. On the other hand, those (18%)

who additionally support abortion access in one or more of the hard cases (“Qualified Support”)

are expressing support for the majority of U.S. abortions. In the discussion that follows, the sum

of the consistent and qualified categories are taken to show “moderate” support or opposition

overall, on the justification that the line between these two sets of categories best approximates the

tipping point between favoring or opposing greater restrictions on abortion access in the United

States. To the extent that voting behavior is in line with expressed opinion, this line will also best

predict voting outcomes. For these reasons this interpretation of these categories seems useful and

plausible. However, it is not essential to the argument of this paper, which turns on the formal

trends, not the substantive interpretation, of these four sets of responses.

ANALYSIS
Summary Trends

Table 1 About Here

Table 2 About Here
Table 3 About Here
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 Tables 1-3 report the raw trend data for the four categories of abortion support identified

above. Table 1 reports the level of moderate support for abortion from 1972 to 2006 cross-

classified by age and year. Subtracting the percentage reported from 100 provides the

corresponding moderate opposition for each cell of the table. Tables 2 and 3 report the

corresponding levels of consistent support and opposition respectively.

These three tables follow a standard form for demographic tables that attempt to identify

the distinct effects of age, time period, and birth cohort on social or population change. Since the

1960s it has been recognized that most social changes over time can be usefully conceived of as

the resultant of (at least) these three interacting sets of effects (Ryder 1965, Hobcraft et al. 1982).

Period effects result from factors that affect an entire population equally and simultaneously during

the transition from time A to time B. These “direct” causes are the most commonly recognized

sources of social change. Persons also undergo observed patterns of change as they age, however,

and when the age structure of a population changes, these age effects, rather than any actual period

change, may account for differences in the population from time A to time B. Finally, it is

observed that persons who are born and thus come of age at or around the same time, or before or

after certain watershed events—a group called a cohort or, with a wider time range, a generation—

often have distinctive qualities due to their common experiences that characterize them throughout

their lives (Ryder 1965). Social changes over time may be due to any of these factors, or a

combination of them. This section will proceed by summarizing the distinct period, age, and

cohort trends, before combining these three factors in a single statistical model to account for the

data in Tables 1-3.

Period Effects

Figure 2 About Here

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 Over the past three decades opinion has been slowly changing toward a somewhat less

permissive outlook on abortion. Figure 2 and accompanying table show the trends by 5-year

period since 1972. From the early 1970s to the 2000s the proportion of Americans who would

never permit abortion, and those who would limit it to the hard cases, have risen by 3.6% and 8.1%

respectively, while those who would also permit it for one or two of the soft cases, and those who

would never restrict abortion, have dropped by corresponding amounts. We can observe in Figure

2 that the proportion of Americans holding at least a moderate pro-choice view on abortion (the

bottom two bar segments) has declined from 64.3% in the early 1970s to 52.7% in the current

decade. The slope (b-coefficient) of the linear regression equation for this decline is negative .32.

Figure 3 About Here

In terms of absolute values most of the change in abortion opinion has occurred, not at the

extremes, but in the middle of the range of Americans’ views on abortion. As Figure 2 shows, in

the early 1970s, those expressing qualified opposition to abortion exceeded those expressing

qualified support by only 2.5 (29.6 minus 27.1) percentage points. Three decades later that gap

had increased six-fold, to over 19 points. By comparison, the excess of consistent support over

consistent opposition declined by 5.5 of 29.2 points over the same period. Likewise, the regression

slopes, shown in Figure 3, for annual changes in the middle categories are two to five times as

large as those for the extreme categories. Considering relative change, however, the picture is

quite different: the very large percentage increase over the past three decades in those expressing

consistent opposition (from 6% to 9.6%, a 60% increase) dwarfs any other effect (moderate

opposition increased by 27.4%, moderate and consistent support dropped by 28.4% and 10.5%

respectively). However it is measured, Figure 2 suggests that the trend in opinion has not been

monotonic. Most of the increase in opposition occurred in the transition between the first and last

two decades of the period. From the 1980s to the 1990s it appears that there was little change in

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opposition but something of a polarization as both of the moderate categories declined and both of

the extreme categories grew. These irregularities suggest that the changes observed are sensitive

to factors other than general shifts in opinion over time.

Age Effects

Figure 4 About Here

Ignoring changes over time, support for abortion appears to decline slightly with age; the

correlation is about -.06.3 Figure 4 illustrates. While 40% of respondents under age 40 report

consistent support for abortion, only 33% of those over age 60 report this opinion. Likewise, only

6% of the younger respondents, but 10% of the older ones, express consistent opposition. As with

many other social issues, Americans appear on this view to grow somewhat more conservative on

abortion as they age.

Cohort Effects

Figure 6 About Here

Figure 6 shows the ratio of abortion support to opposition, both consistent and moderate,

for all birth cohorts since 1882 sampled in the GSS, illustrating data in Tables 1 - 3. It should be

borne in mind that the cohort differences observed include effects of period and age. The chart

makes clear that, as with period effects, most of the variation in relative abortion opinion by cohort

in the 20th century was in the changing proportion of views on the extremes. While moderate

support for abortion declined slightly in successive cohorts throughout the century, consistent

support (relative to consistent opposition) rose strongly among those born through the middle of

the 20th century and has since dropped just as strongly, in an inverted “V” pattern. There is no

significant correlation between the two opinion ratios.

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 Both moderate and strong support for abortion has declined in successive cohorts since the

1950s. This decline is associated with the postwar baby boom population increase. For cohorts

born since 1972, however, the decline has accelerated, even though population growth moderated.

The sudden and large decline for these cohorts appears to be in excess of the (possibly) population-

related changes in the support ratio in earlier cohorts.

Distinguishing Age, Period and Cohort Effects

Thus far we have considered age, period and cohort effects separately, recognizing that the

trend observed for each factor also includes the possible effects of the other two. In order to better

interpret the trends and to predict possible future outcomes, it is necessary to examine all three

factors simultaneously, as it were, in an analysis that specifies the unique contribution of each to

the overall trends observed. Statistical models that specify age, period and cohort (APC) in a

single function are difficult to estimate due to the well-known identification problem, which makes

the estimation of a three-way APC predictor indefinite. While many strategies have been proposed

for dealing with this problem, no method has solved this problem completely. Even without fitting

an APC function, moreover, statistical models are hard to fit for the two-way effects, since the

three factors are perfectly collinear (cohort always equals period minus age).

Several strategies were employed to address these constraints. First, I aggregated the

continuous data for age, period and cohort into 5-year interval categories. The primary purpose of

this was to reduce short-term variation extraneous to the secular trends. However, the resulting

cross-classification of 13 age groups with 21 cohort groups and 7 period groups also rendered the

three variables no longer perfectly collinear. The collapsing of categories also greatly reduced

sparseness in these data. I then employed loglinear models, which are less sensitive to collinearity

and provide clear indications of model fit, in a preliminary analysis to determine whether the three-

way APC function was significant in these data.

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 Table 5 About Here

Table 5 About Here

Tables 4 and 5 present selected models from this analysis. The two tables fit identical

logit-specified models predicting two different independent variables. Table 4 predicts the

probability of moderate support versus moderate opposition for abortion; Table 5 predicts

consistent support versus consistent opposition. Empty cells reduce the reported degrees of

freedom for most models from the number that would be expected from the model parameters

alone.

Models 8 and 9 in each table indicate that the three-way APC interaction is significant,

since Model 9, which fits it, improves significantly upon the fit of Model 8, which fits all of the

one and two-way effects. This information is of little use, however, since fitting the APC

interaction produces a saturated model which replicates the observed frequencies exactly.

Moreover, there are far simpler models, such as Models 1 and 2 in each table, which also provide

an acceptable fit to the data and have a larger number of degrees of freedom. Model 9 is thus

neither sufficient nor necessary to account for the variation observed in the data. The APC

interaction is unimportant to measuring or predicting the underlying trends in abortion opinion.

Models 6 and 7 impose linear constraints on the factors of Models 8 and 9. They thus

express predictive models, that is, logit regressions which linearly predict probabilities of pro-

choice opinion. Linear model fit is assessed both by improvement from independence as indicated

by lower likelihood-ratio chi square (L2) and by the Hosmer-Lemeshow decile goodness of fit

statistic. This number provides a better measure of fit for these data than alternative linear

assessments since it is not sensitive to the sparseness of the data. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic

is interpreted as chi-square with 8 degrees of freedom; lack of significance indicates good model

fit. In Tables 4 and 5, the far right column reports the p-value for the goodness of fit measure.

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 Model 7 does not significantly improve upon the fit of Model 6 in predicting consistent

support (Table5), but it does do so in predicting moderate support (Table 4). For both

independent variables, however, Model 6 provides a better fit to the data than Model 7. Consistent

with this, the odds ratio estimating the APC interaction, for both independent variables, is only

1.001. Two conclusions were drawn from the examination of these logit regressions. First, the

age, period and cohort trends in abortion opinion are effectively linear. Second, fitting the APC

interaction adds little, if anything, to the power of these linear predictive models.

Table 6 About Here

Table 7 About Here

Having established that the best model for these data is linear with no more than second-

order effects, further model assessment and selection was augmented by logistic regression.

(Logistic regression functions are numerically equivalent to the corresponding logit regressions,

but provide more interpretable estimates of model parameters.) Tables 6 and 7 report the results,

showing estimated coefficients and measures of fit of pertinent models. The coefficients are

expressed as the exponent of the log odds coefficient estimated by the regression, which can be

interpreted as odds ratios. Deviance and G report the change in log likelihood of the model from

independence and the previous model in the table (with which the model can be hierarchically

compared) respectively.4 “EV” reports the proportion of variation from independence that is

explained by the model, as indicated by the corresponding logit regression.

Models 1-3 of Tables 6 and 7 fit the age, period and cohort effects singly. Except for the

cohort effect predicting moderate support, all of the main effects individually improve upon

independence. Age, by itself, provides an acceptable fit to the data. Model 5, which fits all three

main effects, significantly improves upon independence, and upon each of the single effects

models, in both tables.

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 Model 4 fits the post-abortion cohorts effect, labeled “PAC”. This effect constrains the

probabilities regarding abortion opinion to be different for those born in or after 1972 than for

those born before that time. This variable significantly improves upon independence for both

outcome variables. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that, as hypothesized, the odds on

abortion support opinion are lower for this cohort than for prior cohorts.

Model 6 includes the PAC effect with the three main effects. For both independent

measures, this model significantly improves upon the main effects model, improves upon

independence, increases the explained variation of the model, and provides an acceptable fit to the

data. Dropping the age effect, however, as Model 7 does, does not significantly harm any of these

desirable model characteristics. Models 8 and 9, which also drop the cohort and period effects

respectively, significantly reduce deviance from Model 7 and do not fit the data acceptably. Model

7, therefore, is the preferred model for these data.

Model 7 predicts the probabilities of support on the basis of linear period and cohort effects

and the post-abortion cohort effect. For moderate support this model fits the data acceptably and

explains 38% of the variation from independence in these variables. For consistent support the

model provides a very close fit to the data and explains half of the variation from independence.5

The fit of Model 7 provides clear evidence to support the conclusion that these effects are indeed

present and together provide a sufficient account of the trends observed above in abortion opinion

with respect to age, period and cohort. Taking those observations as hypotheses, Model 7

confirms, that there is in these data 1) an independent period effect; 2) an independent cohort

effect; and 3) a post-abortion cohort effect. The model fails to confirm the presence of 4) an

independent age effect or 5) an age by period interaction. As Model 1 suggests, when age alone is

considered, an age effect appears to be present, but it is fully explained by the mutual action of

other period and cohort effects when these are included in the model.

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 Table 8 About Here

Table 8 presents odds ratios for the preferred model predicting moderate support, consistent

support and consistent opposition to abortion. Odds ratios were controlled, or adjusted, for

standard demographic stratifiers—age, race and sex—and for known and expected confounders of

abortion opinion. Previous research (Westoff et al. 1969), including research in these data (Mauss

and Peterson 1976) has found that education, church attendance and religious affiliation are

strongly associated with abortion opinion. Marital status and social class are also frequently found

to be correlated with abortion views. As noted above, age was not significant after including

period and cohort. Education and other class indicators were not significant after including an

occupational prestige scale.

For all three measures of opinion, after adjusting for controls the cohort and period effects

are attenuated slightly—less than 5%--but remain highly significant. By contrast, the post-

abortion cohort effect is even stronger after controls are included. For all three measures, a cohort

trend toward greater support for abortion is countered by a larger period trend toward lower

support. However, the adjusted odds on moderate support (.979) are also lower for successive

cohorts. The adjusted odds on consistent support for abortion rise 2.4% (1.024 – 1.0) in successive

5-year cohorts, but decline by 7.4% (1.0 - .926) in successive 5-year periods. Successive cohorts

are 3.0% less likely to report consistent opposition to abortion, but the odds on consistent

opposition rise by 14% in successive periods.

These contrasting effects are overshadowed by the powerful effect of membership in the

post-abortion cohort. Those born after 1972 are almost 40% less likely to express consistent

support for abortion, 35% less likely to express moderate support, and 42% more likely to express

consistent opposition, than are persons born in earlier years. The similar magnitude of these

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effects suggests that the change in opinion affecting this generation is not concentrated in one part

of the spectrum of views on abortion, but represents a broad shift “across the board”.

DISCUSSION

The third and most likely mechanism I propose is directly demographic. In a sense that is

not true for any prior cohort, Americans born since 1973 are a select cohort: they are all children

who were specifically not aborted. Little is yet known about the selection effects of abortion, but,

since about one-fourth of the otherwise viable children in this cohort were not born due to

abortion, such effects are certainly not trivial. Donohue and Levitt (2001) attribute much of the

drop in violent crime during the late 1990s to this effect, since children more likely to grow up in

conditions that promote crime were also more likely to be aborted. The demographic effect I

propose is an instance of an “impaired-lives” or cohort inversion model. Such a hypothesis looks

to the selection effects of early cohort experiences to account for contrasting susceptibilities later

in life. A cohort inversion model of mortality, for example, proposes that “unfavorable health

conditions early in life will eliminate the more susceptible and thus reduce cohort mortality later in

life.” In such a model, “the transition from birth order i to birth order i + 1 could be subject to the

impaired-lives phenomenon through underlying differences in fecundity, fertility control, and

motivations” (Hobcraft et al. 1982). As a means of fertility control, then, abortion removed from

the population those persons who may have been more supportive of abortion later in life.

As the analysis above indicates, the advent of near-universal access to private, safe

abortions in the United States was accompanied, no doubt contrary to intentions, by the beginning

of increased generational qualification and opposition regarding abortion. This section discusses

and illustrates three implications of this fact and proposes three mechanisms to account for it.

Table 9 About Here

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 First, a direct effect of the reduced support for abortion of the cohort born since 1972 is that

the age structure of views on abortion is today the reverse of what it was in the 1970s. Table 9

illustrates, comparing the observed responses6 on all 6 abortion measures of persons in their 20s

and in their 50s in the early 1970s and early 2000s. In the earlier period the older group favored

abortion less than the younger one on every measure; in the later period the opposite is the case. In

the early 1970s 5.7% less of the younger group expressed consistent opposition, and 5.5% more

consistent support for abortion, than did the older respondents. By the early 2000s 2.6% more of

the younger group expressed consistent opposition, and 13.8% less showed consistent support. In

the 1970s, then, it was older Americans who were most opposed to abortion; today it is the

youngest Americans. Other recent research has also noted this reversal of the “generation gap” on

abortion (Dominus 2005).

The emergence of the post-abortion cohort also implies, second, that the magnitude of the

resultant changes in abortion opinion are not small. Comparing those of the same age in the earlier

and later periods (columns 1 and 4 and columns 2 and 5) in Table 9 provides an indication of the

period trend, which is, as indicated by the model, generally in a less permissive direction. The

difference in the drop in support for abortion by age group indicates the effect of being in different

cohorts. In this comparison the difference is striking.

Those currently in the 20s are four times more likely to express consistent opposition to

abortion, and 40% less likely to express consistent support, than those in their 20s in the early

1970s. By contrast, those in their 50s today are about a fifth more likely to express a consistent

opposition and only negligibly less likely to express consistent support than their counterparts in

the 1970s. Between the younger age cohorts, the drop in support for abortion is substantial for

each of the six cases, ranging from a low of 10.8 percentage points for danger to the woman's

health to a high of 23.9 points--nearly a quarter of the possible range--when the woman is

16
unmarried. By comparison, the decline in abortion support between the older cohorts is small and

uneven. In cases of family planning and a threat to the mother's health, those in their 50s today are

more likely to support abortion than those of the same age in the 1970s. For the other four cases,

the drop in support for abortion between these groups is never larger than 8.7 points.

Third, although a small majority of Americans still report moderate support for abortion,

both the period and cohort trends in these data predict that support for abortion will continue to

drop. If the 30-year period decline in abortion support were to continue linearly, those expressing

at least moderate support for abortion will constitute a minority of the U.S. population no later than

the 5-year period beginning in 2012. Because the effect of the post-abortion cohort is cumulative,

this decline may occur more rapidly and steeply, a point I discuss more fully in the conclusion of

this paper.

I have suggested above that the size, suddenness and contiguity of the cohort change in

opinion beginning in 1972 raises the likelihood that it is related in some way to the

contemporaneous onset of widespread abortion practice in the United States. Here I propose three

mechanisms by which widely available legal abortion may have had a strong influence on this

cohort. They are not mutually exclusive; all may be true.

First, the availability of abortion may have had a normative effect. This cohort has come of

age having direct knowledge of a society in which abortion is available, but no direct knowledge of

one in which it is not available. They are well aware of the problems that may be engendered by

access to abortion, but perhaps not as aware of the problems that arise when legal abortion is not

available. Because of this, this cohort may be more cautious regarding abortion than those who

recognize, not only the problems that may attend legal abortion, but also the problems to which

legal abortion provides a solution. As the journalist Katha Pollitt observes: “Young women have

grown up with legal abortion, so they don’t believe there’s a real threat to it. . . .[T]hey’re able to

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say, ‘Oh, I’m against abortion,’ knowing it’s there for them if they really need it” (Dominus

2005:202). In the same way, this cohort has been exposed to highly controverted discourse

regarding the moral and social acceptability of abortion, but has not known a time in which there

was a prevailing social consensus against the practice of abortion. If conformity to social norms is

lower among the young, for this cohort the “norm” to which they are less likely to conform is the

presence, not the absence, of legal abortion.

Second, it is possible that the widespread practice of abortion has interacted with family

formation and dynamics in such a way as to reduce support. Prior research has explored varying

theses regarding the relation between population context and support for abortion and

contraception (Blake 1971, Critchlow 1996, Renzi 1975). Two preliminary findings in the data

examined here confirm related suggestions about the operation of such relations. As the first

suggestion, perhaps the reduced support for abortion of the post-abortion cohort is related to their

emergence following the baby boom generation as well as or instead of coincident with the advent

of legalized abortion. In the 1970s population was perceived to be exploding; today, it is known to

be shrinking in the industrialized world. In the same way that crowded classrooms and job

markets for the baby boom has been thought to make the image of an overcrowded world plausible

to that generation, perhaps a childhood relatively bare of siblings in a world relatively bare of new

population induced in the post-abortion cohort greater reticence toward the prevention of children.

In support of this suggestion, it was found that abortion support by cohort on the GSS is inversely

related to lagged population growth: the level of consistent support correlates strongly (-.76) with

the percent growth of the U.S. population 15 years prior to birth.7

For the second suggestion, prior research has noted a strong inverse relationship between

support for abortion and ideal family size, predicting the former to normalize as the latter

continued to decline. Such a mechanism may work both ways, however. Perhaps the effects of

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abortion practice, both direct and subtle, have influenced this cohort toward a more positive

natality. Many abortions occur due to contraceptive failure; and abortion practice in general has

reflected the family planning choices enabled by increased contraceptive use earlier in the 20th

century, with the result that families are smaller, and childbirth occurs later in life, than in prior

generations. Americans since 1973 have grown up with fewer siblings and older parents than did

their elders.

The construction of abortion decision-making has assumed that greater optionality will

promote a greater sense of personal value in children, who will each have been “wanted”. To the

extent that children find their identity as part of a family, however, optionality may have had a

different, opposite effect. The cohort born in the 1970s knows that their limited number of siblings

represents a choice on the part of their parents. There is nothing, however, that requires them to

ratify that choice for themselves. In fact, the post-abortion cohort reports a sharp rise in ideal

family size. Forty-seven percent of those under 30 in 2002-04, compared to 37% of those in their

50s, consider more than 2 children to be ideal.

Whether the drop in abortion support is related to the onset of legally available abortion at

all cannot, of course, be known for certain from the evidence available here. If they are not

related, however, we are then left with the question of how otherwise to account for the

distinctiveness, with respect to the evaluation of abortion, of the emerging generation of

Americans born since 1972.

CONCLUSION

The confidence of social scientists in the 1970s that opposition to legal abortion would

rapidly give way to acceptance has not been borne out. On the contrary, opposition to abortion

today is greater than it was during the 1970s, and it is about 40% greater among younger

Americans, who have come of age since that time, than among their elders. This is not to say that
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abortion is likely to be prohibited anytime soon; those with a principled opposition to all abortion

still form only a small minority of Americans, and moderate support for abortion still

predominates. But moderate opposition to abortion, that is, opposition to legal abortion except in

relatively rare circumstances, currently at over 47%, will likely become the majority view of

Americans within the next decade.

Table 10 About Here

This will occur in part due to the determinants—political, social and socializing trends—of

small cohort and period change toward greater moderation on abortion. For the most part,

however, it will occur due to the relatively sudden and disjunctive drop in support abortion among

the youngest generation, specifically those Americans born since 1973. As Table 10 shows, the

views of these cohorts only began to be measured in the data examined here 1991, as the first of

them turned 18. To date their collectively lower support for abortion has had only a modest

overall affect on measured public opinion, since they presently comprise only about a quarter of

adult Americans. As with any cohort, however, their numeric influence on collective opinion will

rise sharply and linearly in the future. As they become a larger part of the population, mean

support for abortion will decline. This prediction assumes that their support for abortion will

remain low, which cannot be known with any certainty. But we have discovered no age trend by

cohort in these data; and, as Table 10 shows, their support is, if anything, declining by period.

It should be noted by way of qualification that, while certainly distinct, the current younger

generation may not be as unique in their opposition to abortion as they first appear. Due perhaps

in part to an incompatibility with the commonly accepted frame of growing reform, research

during the 1970s often overstated the perception of youthful liberalism on abortion. In fact,

opposition to abortion has not persistently been lower among younger persons. In reviewing the

findings of Gallup surveys on the subject during the 1960s, Blake (1971:544) observes:

20
 An examination of opinions by age does not lend support to the notion that those under 30
are an avant-garde in attitudes about abortion reform. Early in the decade, 75 percent of the
young men and 80 percent of the young women (an average of Gallup surveys for 1962 and
1965b in Table 4) were opposed to permitting abortion on economic grounds, whereas
among those 45 and over, only about two-thirds of both men and women were opposed.

She comments hopefully that “the age differential is disappearing” as approval of abortion rises,

but then notes, in examining opinions from the end of the decade, “When broken down by age, the

data are somewhat surprising. Young women (those under 30) consistently disapprove elective

abortion more than older women. . .” (1971:544).

Extensive suggestions for further research have already been proposed in the previous

section. Further research into the substantive correlates of abortion views would be valuable to

confirm or refute the mechanisms proposed there for the post-abortion cohort’s views. In

particular, studies examining the social and familial context or imputing the social and religious

characteristics of aborted children could help to establish the extent, if any, to which those more

likely to be aborted would be more likely to support abortion. Panel data on abortion views could

also contribute to a more precise allocation of age, period and cohort effects. The strong effect of

prior population change on fertility decisions, including abortion, deserves much more attention

from social scientists than it has received to date. Perhaps the presence of relatively many children

in the population reduces the current valuation of unborn children. Family size concerns and

changing social approval of contraception use may also play a part.

Policy analysts and activists on both sides of the abortion issue implicitly assume that the

direct effect of policy changes are what most affect outcomes in this controversial area of civic

discourse. But the indirect, demographic effect due to population change is often far stronger, if

less immediate, in shaping social outcomes. This is particularly the case with policy that affects

fertility, for which the law of unintended consequences operates with a multiplier effect. Small

changes in fertility today can induce huge changes a generation removed. The sudden initiation or

21
expansion of such a widespread population-shaping practice as abortion constitutes, in effect, a

powerful social experiment. The proportion of children aborted since 1973 has not been trivial;

estimates range from one-sixth to one-fourth of pregnancies. The post-abortion generation is

constituted by the survivors of this practice, and will differ from prior populations exactly as the

“differential mortality” of abortion has not been applied randomly. The outcomes of this treatment

are only now becoming visible, as the population shaped by abortion gains a larger share of the

total population.

22
 TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1
Should a woman have access to legal abortion in case of . .
? (Percent "Yes") : GSS 1972-2004

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Threat to Serious
Pregnancy Can't afford Woman Family
woman's defect in
due to rape a child unmarried planning
health child
Percent "yes" 90 82.4 81.1 48 44.6 44

23
 Table 1
Percent of Moderate Support for Abortion by Age and Year

Year 1972- 1977- 1982- 1987- 1992- 1997- 2002-

Age 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
20 70.3 64.4 56.9 59.2 56.1 53.1 48.7
25 66.1 66.1 61.0 59.6 61.8 59.1 48.1
30 63.8 63.9 59.5 61.8 59.5 56.0 46.7
35 62.5 59.5 60.6 61.8 61.4 59.2 52.9
40 64.2 57.8 62.0 59.3 62.7 52.1 56.7
45 62.0 60.9 53.7 52.2 62.8 55.6 56.8
50 63.0 60.6 55.8 59.5 60.0 55.7 57.5
55 58.7 59.8 50.5 55.5 57.1 50.8 52.2
60 64.6 66.1 55.3 52.9 58.8 46.1 54.0
65 61.4 64.0 53.2 55.4 53.8 52.7 52.0
70 63.2 60.0 57.9 62.6 64.4 51.7 51.6
75 65.2 63.4 53.4 54.0 61.7 55.0 55.9
80+ 64.6 56.8 60.9 50.0 65.2 63.2 56.2

24
 Table 2
Percent Reporting Consistent Support by Age and Year

Year 1972- 1977- 1982- 1987- 1992- 1997- 2002-

Age 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
20 41.7 32.0 30.1 31.1 36.2 31.4 24.4
25 42.2 42.0 37.0 36.9 39.3 36.0 31.3
30 40.7 42.0 40.5 40.2 39.8 35.7 30.3
35 38.6 38.1 38.4 43.0 43.6 38.0 34.2
40 38.0 33.0 38.1 41.0 44.2 36.1 35.8
45 36.5 32.7 29.9 35.0 45.2 38.0 38.1
50 38.7 33.9 33.3 34.7 39.3 34.6 43.3
55 32.5 30.2 29.7 34.9 37.4 32.4 33.6
60 35.3 36.9 29.7 24.8 30.4 25.5 37.1
65 29.7 33.0 27.2 29.3 29.4 28.8 29.7
70 25.4 27.7 27.7 29.5 35.3 28.2 30.6
75 25.1 24.9 19.1 27.2 34.2 27.2 31.2
80+ 22.1 17.6 26.2 25.2 33.3 27.0 27.4

Table 3
Percent Reporting Consistent Opposition to Abortion by Age and Year

Year 1972- 1977- 1982- 1987- 1992- 1997- 2002-

Age 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
20 2.8 4.4 5.6 3.1 7.3 6.4 11.4
25 3.3 5.3 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.7 10.0
30 5.9 4.4 6.3 5.1 5.6 9.6 9.0
35 6.5 4.9 6.9 7.2 6.7 9.8 7.8
40 5.4 10.7 5.7 5.8 8.8 8.5 12.0
45 5.9 6.0 8.2 10.8 7.7 9.4 6.6
50 7.0 5.0 9.0 10.0 7.2 9.0 10.2
55 9.5 7.4 8.6 8.4 11.7 8.0 13.1
60 5.6 6.5 6.8 7.7 8.7 8.1 7.7
65 9.5 7.0 9.3 8.8 7.4 9.5 5.9
70 8.6 8.6 8.4 10.7 5.2 10.0 10.5
75 12.5 9.4 10.8 10.2 5.6 11.1 6.9
80+ 13.3 16.2 11.4 15.3 7.7 9.3 8.2

25
 Figure 2
U.S. opinion on whether abortion should be permitted (in
%), by 5-year periods: GSS 1973-2004

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1972- 1977- 1982- 1987- 1992- 1997- 2002-
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Never (Consistent 6 6.3 7.1 7.1 7.1 8.5 9.6
Opposition)
Only for medical reasons 29.6 31.4 35.5 34.7 32.6 36.6 37.7
or rape (Qualified
Opposition)
Also for some but not all 27.1 27.6 24.2 23.2 21 21 19.4
social reasons (Qualified
Support)
Always (Consistent 37.2 34.7 33.2 35 39.3 33.8 33.3

26
27
 Figure 3
U.S. opinion on whether abortion should be permitted (in %), by year: GSS 1973-2004
100%

90%
M = -.05
80%

70%

60%

50%
M = -.27

40%

30%

20% M = .23

10%

M =.09
0%
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Consistent Support 32.5 39.7 37.6 37.6 39.0 36.1 30.7 37.5 34.6 29.8 35.5 32.9 32.7 32.3 37.9 36.1 37.7 40.2 41.5 36.4 34.8 32.8 34.5 31.7 33.4
Qualified Support 30.6 24.5 29.6 26.9 23.8 29.0 27.6 26.0 27.3 24.8 21.5 22.5 24.1 23.3 21.4 25.4 21.5 20.8 19.2 23.1 20.7 21.4 18.7 20.4 19.4
Qualified Opposition 28.5 30.7 28.3 29.2 31.5 29.2 34.5 30.4 31.3 38.7 35.4 37.3 34.8 36.7 34.0 32.9 35.0 31.3 31.9 34.1 34.6 38.6 39.5 36.7 37.3
Consistent Opposition 8.5 5.1 4.5 6.2 5.7 5.7 7.2 6.1 6.8 6.7 7.6 7.3 8.4 7.7 6.7 5.7 5.8 7.7 7.4 6.4 9.8 7.2 7.3 11.3 9.9

”M” reports the slope of the regression line (by decade) for each data series.

28
 Figure 4
U.S. opinion on whether abortion should be permitted
(in %) by age: GSS 1973-2004

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
18-39 40-59 60 +
Never (Consistent 5.9 8.5 9.9
Opposition)
Only for medical reasons 35.5 36 37.5
or rape (Qualified
Opposition)
Also for some but not all 18.5 16.3 19.4
social reasons (Qualified
Support)
Always (Consistent 40.2 39.1 33.3
Support)

29
 Figure 6
Ratio of abortion support to opposition (Consistent and Moderate) by 5-year birth
cohort:
8 GSS 1972-2006

0
1882- 1892- 1897- 1902- 1907- 1912- 1917- 1922- 1927- 1932- 1937- 1942- 1947- 1952- 1957- 1962- 1967- 1972- 1977- 1982-
1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

Consistent Support Ratio Moderate Support Ratio

30
 Table 4
Fit of Selected Non-Hierarchical Loglinear Models Predicting Moderate
Abortion Support (vs. Moderate Opposition) by Age, Period and Cohort:
GSS 1972-2006
H-L
goodness
Model Effects L2 df P of fit H-L p
0 Independence 438.104 195 <.0001
1 PC 179.243 169 .280
2 APC 165.529 157 .305
APC
6 (L) 279.708 189 <.0001 12.665 .124
AP PC AC
APC
7 (L) AP PC AC 265.402 188 <.0001 15.494 .050
APC
APC
8 272.107 194 <.0001
AP PC AC
APC
9 AP PC AC 0 0 1.0
APC

Note: Preferred model indicated in bold. (L) indicates linear constraints on all model effects.
Factors report unweighted cases in 5-year intervals. Degrees of freedom may be reduced due to
empty cells.

31
 Table 5
Fit of Selected Non-Hierarchical Loglinear Models Predicting
Consistent Abortion Support (vs. Consistent Opposition) by Age, Period and
Cohort: GSS 1972-2006
H-L
goodness H-L
2
Model Effects L df P of fit P
0 Independence 538.431 195 <.0001
1 PC 190.762 169 .110
2 APC 176.263 157 .176
APC
6 (L) 237.031 189 <.0001 11.70 .165
AP PC AC
APC
7 (L) AP PC AC 234.956 188 <.0001 13.428 .098
APC
APC
8 326.177 194 <.0001
AP PC AC
APC
9 AP PC AC 0 0 1.0
APC

Note: Preferred model indicated in bold. (L) indicates linear constraints on all model effects. Factors
report unweighted cases in 5-year intervals. Degrees of freedom may be reduced due to empty cells.

32
 Table 6
Estimated Coefficients (in Odds Ratios) and Measures of Fit of Selected Non-Hierarchical
Logit/Logistic Regression Models Predicting Consistent Abortion Support (vs. Consistent
Opposition) by Age, Period and Cohort: GSS 1972-2006 (n=50,991)

H-L
Model Age Period Cohort PAC Deviance G (p) EV Good Fit (p)
1 .911 205.70 205.70 <.001 .39 15.024 .057
2 .940 30.88 30.88 <.001 .06 18.926 .005
3 1.059 102.43 102.43 <.001 .19 73.405 <.001
4 .802 4.76 4.76 .029 .01 NA NA
5 1.074 .802 1.176 243.68 243.68 <.001 .45 7.907 .44
6 .990 .803 1.196 .544 271.97 28.29 <.001 .51 7.130 .52
7 .867 1.109 .546 268.94 -3.03 .082 .50 6.253 .62
8 .942 .944 31.19 -237.75 <.001 .06 18.835 .002
9 1.076 .465 146.72 -122.22 <.001 .27 55.08 <.001

Note: Preferred model indicated in bold. Factors report unweighted cases in 5-year intervals. 2Deviance reports the
likelihood ratio chi square testing improvement of the model from independence, which is numerically equivalent to twice
the Hosmer-Lemeshow deviance statistic. 2G reports the change in 2Deviance from the first prior model with which the
model can be compared; models 1-5 are compared to the independence model (not shown). EV reports the percent of
variance explained by the model, as determined by the improvement in likelihood-ratio chi-square of the corresponding
logit regression model. H-L Good Fit reports the Hosmer-Lemeshow decile goodness of fit statistic, which is evaluated
as chi-square with 8 degrees of freedom.

33
 Table 7
Estimated Coefficients (in Odds Ratios) and Measures of Fit of Selected Non-Hierarchical
Logit/Logistic Regression Models Predicting Moderate Abortion Support (vs. Moderate
Opposition) by Age, Period and Cohort: GSS 1972-2006 (n=50,991)

H-L
Model Age Period Cohort PAC Deviance G (p) EV Good Fit (p)
1 .985 23.38 23.38 <.001 .05 10.536 .229
2 .940 121.26 121.26 <.001 .28 42.268 .005
3 1.059 1.78 1.78 .182 .004 89.697 <.001
4 .717 44.57 44.57 <.001 .10 NA NA
5 .996 .931 1.010 142.72 142.72 <.001 .33 31.194 <.001
6 1.00 .932 1.019 .762 167.03 24.31 <.001 .38 11.906 .155
7 .932 1.019 .762 167.02 -.01 .92 .38 11.933 .154
8 .946 .848 132.58 -34.45 <.001 .30 42.206 <.001
9 1.005 .693 46.94 -120.09 <.001 .11 55.721 <.001

Note: Preferred model indicated in bold. Factors report unweighted cases in 5-year intervals. 2Deviance reports the
likelihood ratio chi square testing improvement of the model from independence, which is numerically equivalent to twice
the Hosmer-Lemeshow deviance statistic. 2G reports the change in 2Deviance from the first prior model with which the
model can be compared; models 1-5 are compared to the independence model (not shown). EV reports the percent of
variance explained by the model, as determined by the improvement in likelihood-ratio chi-square of the corresponding
logit regression model. H-L Good Fit reports the Hosmer-Lemeshow decile goodness of fit statistic, which is evaluated
as chi-square with 8 degrees of freedom.

34
 Table 8
1
Odds Ratios (Unadjusted and Adjusted ) for Period, Cohort and Post-Abortion Cohort Effects
Predicting Moderate Support, Consistent Support, and Consistent Opposition to Legal
Abortion: GSS 1972-2006 (n=50,991)

Moderate Support Consistent Support Consistent Opposition

Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.

Cohort 1.017 .979 1.052 1.024 .935 .970

[1.010-1.024] [.972-.986] [1.044-1.059] [1.016-1.032] [.923-.947] [.957-.984]
Period .932 .906 .961 .926 1.130 1.140
[.919-.944] [.893-.919] [.948-.974] [.912-.939] [1.102-1.159] [1.111-1.171]
PAC
.744 .652 .630 .603 1.335 1.418
[.663-.835] [.576-.738] [.558-.712] [.529-.688] [1.074-1.659] [1.130-1.779]

1
Adjusted for race, sex, marital status, occupational prestige, church attendance and religious affiliation.

“Consistent Support” supports access to legal abortion in all circumstances. “Consistent Opposition” opposes it in all
circumstances. “Moderate Support” supports legal abortion in cases of rape, probably deformity or threat to the mother’s
health as well as some social circumstances.

35
 TABLE 9
Age differences in U.S. abortion opinion (in percent),
showing the reversal of the generation gap: GSS 1973-2004

1973-5 2002-4
Support for abortion A B Gap: C D Gap: Age Effect:
20-29 50-59 A-B 20-29 50-59 C-D D-A
Consistent Opposition (No to all six
2.9% 8.6% - 5.7 12.7% 10.1% + 2.6 + 7.2
situations)
--there is a strong chance of serious defect in the
85.1% 80.6% + 4.5 67.7% 75.0% - 7.3 - 9.9
baby. (% Yes)
--the woman’s own health is seriously endangered
95.3% 89.2% + 6.1 84.5% 89.7% - 5.2 - 5.4
by the pregnancy. (% Yes)
--she became pregnant as a result of rape. (% Yes) 86.5% 81.9% + 4.6 74.9% 75.4% - 0.5 - 11.1
--the family has a very low income and cannot
57.7% 49.9% + 7.8 35.3% 41.2% - 5.9 - 17.5
afford any more children. (% Yes)
--she is not married and does not want to marry
53.1% 48.6% + 2.5 29.2% 43.6% - 14.4 - 9.5
the man. (% Yes)
--she is married but does not want any more
52.7% 43.2% + 9.5 32.6% 45.4% -12.8 - 7.3
children. (% Yes)
Consistent Support (Yes to all six
45.4% 39.9% + 5.5 25.3% 39.1% - 13.8 - 6.3
situations)

36
 Table 10
Effect on Abortion Support of the Entry of the PAC into
the Population
Moderate Support (%) PAC Percent of
Period PAC All others Sample
1992-1996 61.2 59.0 6.5
1997-2001 56.1 54.7 14.5
2002-2006 56.3 47.9 21.3

37
 REFERENCES

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Blake, Judith. 1977. The Supreme Court’s Abortion Decisions and Public Opinion in the United
States. Population and Development Review 3:45-62.

Blake, Judith and Jorge Del Pinal. 1981. Negativism, Equivocation, and Wobbly Assent: Public
"Support" for the Prochoice Platform on Abortion. Demography 18(3):309-320.

Critchlow, Donald, ed. 1996. The politics of abortion and birth control in historical perspective.
Penn State University Press.

D’Antonio, William and Steven Stack. 1980. Religion, ideal family size, and abortion: Extending
Renzi’s hypothesis. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 19(3):397-408.

Dominus, Susan. 2005. The mysterious disappearance of young pro-choice women. Glamour
(August):200-219.

Davis, James A. 1980. Conservative Weather in a Liberalizing Cliimate: Change in Selected

NORC General Social Survey Items, 1972-78. Social Forces 58(4):1129-1156.

Donohue, John and Steven Levitt. 2001. The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime. Quarterly
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Peterson, Larry and Armand Mauss. 1976. Correlates of Opposition to Abortion. Sociological
Analysis 37(3):243-254.

Renzi, Mario. 1975. Ideal Family Size as an Intervening Variable between Religion and
Attitudes towards Abortion. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 14(1):23-27.

Ryder, Norman B. 1965. The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change. American
Sociological Review 30:843-861.

Stouffer, Samuel A., 1955. Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties. New York: Doubleday.

United States Department of Commerce. 2005. Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Westoff, Charles F., Emily C. Moore, and Norman B. Ryder. 1969. The structure of attitudes
toward abortion. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 47: 11-37.

Westoff, Charles F. and Norman B. Ryder. 1977. The Contraceptive Revolution. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.

38
 NOTES
1
Reported here is “moderate support” for abortion, as defined in the “Data and Methods” section. The full
percentage distribution of abortion opinion by year is presented in Figure 3.
2
Based on aggregated GSS data 1973-2004 (n=50,990). Cases from 1972, prior to the legalization of abortion, were
ignored, since support for abortion increased substantially and anomalously from 1972 to 1973, a change attributed
to the legitimizing effect of the Roe v. Wade decision (D’Antonio and Stack 1983).
3
The Pearson correlation coefficient between age in single years and the 4-category index of abortion opinion
reported in Figure 2 is -.062. The Spearman ordinal association measure is -.052. The corresponding correlations
using an additive measure of abortion support that sums positive responses to the six abortion items are -.063 and
-.056.
4
The deviance measure reported here is twice the log likelihood of the model, providing stronger discrimination of
the significance of model effects than the deviance statistic sometimes reported.
5
Models 8 and 9 indicate that the PAC effect is confounded upward in the presence of the period effect alone and,
not surprisingly, reduced in the presence of the cohort effect. Including the corresponding interactions, however, did
not improve the fit or power of the model.
6
This comparison illustrates responses predicted by the preferred model for the corresponding 5-year intervals,
which, as indicated by the close fit of the model to the data, differ only slightly from the observed frequencies.
7
This reports the correlation of percent consistent support for abortion by 5-year cohort group beginning at time t
with 5-year percent growth in the U.S. population at t – 15. Population data were obtained from the 2005 Statistical
Abstract of the United States.

39