0809.2135v1 (1) Cantor Paradox

EXTENDING CANTOR’S PARADOX
A CRITIQUE OF INFINITY AND SELFREFERENCE

Antonio Leon Sanchez
I.E.S Francisco Salinas, Salamanca, Spain
http://www.interciencia.es
aleon@interciencia.es
arXiv:0809.2135v1 [math.GM] 12 Sep 2008
Abstract. This paper examines infinity and self-reference from

a critique perspective. Starting from an extension of Cantor Para-
dox that suggests the inconsistency of the actual infinite, the paper
makes a short review of the controversial history of infinity and sug-
gests several indicators of its inconsistency. Semantic self-reference
is also examined from the same critique perspective by comparing
it with self-referent sets. The platonic scenario of infinity and self-
reference is finally criticized from a biological and neurobiological
perspective.
1. Introduction
The most relevant problems of contemporary philosophy were already
posed by Presocratic thinkers as early as the VII century b.C. (some of
them perhaps suggested or directly taken from the cultural precedents
developed in the Neolithic Fluvial Cultures [16], [147], [123], [161]).
Three among those problems deserves special consideration: the prob-
lem of change; infinity; and self-reference. The first one is surely the
most difficult problem ever posed by man. For that reason, it surprises
the little attention we currently pay to such a challenging question,
specially when compared to the attention we pay to the other two. Af-
ter more than twenty seven centuries, the problem of change remains
unsolved (for a general background see [117]). In spite of its apparent
obviousness, no one has been capable of explaining how one leaves a
place to occupy another. The science of change -physics- seems to have
forgotten its most fundamental problem. In their turn, some philoso-
phers from Hegel declared it as an inconsistent process! [78], [80], [110],
[125], [136], [169], while others, as McTaggart, came to the same con-
clusion as Parmenides on the impossibility of change [109].
Contrarily to the problem of change, which has an immediate re-
flection in the agitated evolution of the Universe, both infinity and
self-reference are pure theoretical devices without reflection in the nat-
ural world. Cantor and Gödel (the princes of infinity and self-reference
respectively) were two platonic fundamentalists of scarce devotion to
natural sciences and enormous influence in contemporary mathematics
(for the case of Cantor see [44], [112], [33, pag. 141]; for that of Gödel
1
2 Extending Cantor’s paradox
[66, pags. 235-236], [67, pag. 359], [46] [118], [68]). Twenty seven cen-
turies of discussions were not sufficient to prove the consistency of the
actual infinity, which finally had to be legitimated by the expeditious
way of axioms. Although the consistency of self-reference has been less
discussed, the paradoxes it originates have been, and continue to be,
the source of interminable discussions. One of them, the Liar Paradox,
became (via Richard Paradox) the first of the two celebrated Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems1 [64].
Infinity and self-reference may be two of the most important ob-
structions in the history of human thought. Obstructions that may
have been driving our attention, effort and resources in the wrong way
if what we pretend is to explain the physical world our lives evolve in.
The scarce (frequently null) naturalist education of mathematicians as
well as the scarce mathematical education of naturalists perhaps ex-
plain because we have come so far in both affairs.
2. Paradoxes and inconsistencies

It is paradoxical that formal literature be not more exigent in the use
of the term ’paradox,’ frequently used in the place of ’contradiction’ or
’inconsistency.’ When, for instance, we write:
H ⇒ (c ∧ ¬c) (1)
we say H is inconsistent because it is the immediate cause of con-
tradiction (c ∧ ¬c). But when the cause of the contradiction is not
so immediate and well known it is relatively frequent to use the term
paradox instead of contradiction. When, finally, we write a self-referent
proposition as:
p = p is false (2)
we have on the one hand, and according to the Principle of Identity:
p⇒p (3)
and on the other, and according to the own proposition p:
p ⇒ ¬p (4)
Whence:
p ⇒ (p ∧ ¬p) (5)
In these cases we invariably use the term ’paradox’ instead of ’contra-
diction’ (in this case the celebrated ’if p then not p’ and ’if not p then
p’).
1
In secondary literature, the first Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is invariably
presented in a dishonest way. The reader get the idea that in every formal system
there are true propositions which are undemonstrable. Gödel actually proved the
existence of one proposition which is both true and undemonstrable; but that
proposition is a very very special one: it is a self-referent proposition. One that,
conveniently interpreted, says of itself that it is undemonstrable in a certain formal
calculus. Something like: this proposition is undemonstrable
Extending Cantor’s paradox 3
The paradoxes of Set Theory we will examine here are surely in-
consistencies derived from both the actual infinity and self-reference.
As is well known, Burali-Forti made use of his famous paradox as an
inconsistency to prove that the law of trichotomy does not hold for all
transfinite ordinals [25]. In his turn, Cantor did not hesitate in using
the expression ’inconsistent totalities’ (letter to Dedekind quoted in
[44, pag. 245]) to refer to certain sets we will immediately deal with.
In any case, it is not the purpose of this work to state when and how
we should use the terms paradox and inconsistency or contradiction.
In this sense we will be so informal as the formal literature related to
mathematical formalism.
3. Extending Cantor Paradox

Although Burali-Forti was the first in publishing an inconsistency re-
lated to transfinite sets [24], [62], Cantor was the first to discover a
paradox in the nascent set theory: I am referring to the maximum
cardinal paradox [62], [44]. There is no agreement regarding the date
Cantor discovered his paradox [62] (the proposed dates range from 1883
[135] to 1896 [70]). Burali-Forti Paradox on the set of all ordinals and
Cantor Paradox on the set of all cardinals are both related to the size
of the considered totalities2, perhaps too big as to be consistent. From
an infinitist perspective it results ironic that a set may be inconsistent
just because of its excessive size. One can be infinite but only within
certain limits.
A common way of presenting Cantor Paradox is as follows: Let U be
the set of all sets, the so called universal set3 and P (U) its power set,
the set of all its subsets. As Cantor did, let us denote by U and P (U)
their respective cardinals. Being U the set of all sets, we can write:
U ≥ P (U) (6)
On the other hand, and according to Cantor theorem on the power set
[29], it holds:
U < P (U) (7)
which contradicts (6). This is the famous Cantor inconsistency or para-
dox. As is well known, Cantor gave no importance to it [59] and solved
the question by assuming the existence of two types of infinite totali-
ties, the consistent and the inconsistent ones [28]. In Cantor opinion,
the inconsistency of the lasts would surely due to their excessive size.
2Later we will deal with Russell Paradox, although this paradox is related to
self-reference rather than to cardinality. As we will see, Burali-Forti and Cantor
Paradoxes are also related to self-reference.
3Cantor Paradox arose in what we now call naive set theory, which admits sets
as the universal set.
We would be in the face of the mother of all infinities, the absolute

infinity which directly leads to God [28].
As we will immediately see, it is possible to extend Cantor Paradox
to other sets much more modest than the universal set. But neither
Cantor nor his successors considered such a possibility. We will do
it here. This is just the objective of the discussion that follows. A
discussion that will take place within the context of Cantor set theory
(naive set theory), although with some side effects on modern axiomatic
set theories.
We begin by considering a set X such that X = C > 1. From X we
define set TX as:
TX : P (X) ⊂ TX ∧ ∀Y (Y ⊂ TX ⇒ P (Y ) ⊂ TX ) (8)
Id est, TX contains as elements all subsets of set X; in addition, if Y is
a subset of TX , its power set P (Y ) is also a subset of TX . We will see
now that TX is an inconsistent totality. For this, let A be any proper
nonempty subset of X. From A we define set TA in accordance with:
TA = {Y |Y ∈ TX ∧ Y ∩ A 6= A} (9)
TA is, therefore, the set of all elements of set TX that do not contain as
subset the subset A of X. TA is then a subset of TX . Consequently, and
according to (8), its power set P (TA ) is also a subset of TX . Therefore
the elements of set P (TA ) are also elements of TX . Moreover, it is clair
that:
∀Y ∈ P (TA ) : Y ∩ A 6= A (10)
In consequence all elements of set P (TA ) satisfy definition (9). So,
them all belong to TA . We have therefore a similar situation to that
of Cantor Paradox. On the one hand and taking into account that TA
contains all elements of P (TA ) we will have
TA ≥ P (TA ) (11)
On the other and according to Cantor theorem it must hold:
TA < P (TA ) (12)
Again a contradiction. And then the totalities TA and TX from which
it arises must be inconsistent. But X is any set of any cardinal C > 1
and A any one of its nonempty proper subsets. We can therefore state
that every set of cardinal C gives rise to at least 2C − 2 inconsistent
totalities.
The above argument not only proves the number of inconsistent to-
talities is inconceivable greater than the number of consistent ones, it
also suggests the excessive size of the sets could not be the cause of
the inconsistency. In fact, consider, for instance, the set X = {1, 2};
according to the above argument, the totality T{1,2} defined in accor-
dance with (8) is also inconsistent. But compared to the universal set
it is an insignificant totality: it lacks of practically all sets of numerical

content4 or related to numbers (integers, rationals, reals, complexes,
hiperreals, etc.); and all of non numerical content. T{1,2} is in fact an
insignificant subset of the universal set, it lacks of almost all its ele-
ments. But it is also inconsistent. What both sets have in common,
from the infinitist perspective, is that they are complete infinite total-
ities; i.e. totalities whose infinitely many elements exist all at once.
Had we know the existence of so many inconsistent infinite totali-
ties, and not necessarily so greater as the absolute infinity, and perhaps
Cantor transfinite set theory would have been received in a different
way. Perhaps the very notion of actual infinity would have been put
into question; and perhaps we would have discovered the way of prov-
ing its inconsistency: just the ω-order (see below). But this was not
the case. The history of the reception of set theory and the way of
dealing with its inconsistencies -all of them promoted by the actual
infinity and self-reference- is well known. From the beginnings of the
XX century a great effort have been carried out to found set theory on
a consistent background free of inconsistencies. Although the objective
could only be reached with the aid of the appropriate axiomatic parch-
ing. At least half a dozen axiomatic set theories have been developed
ever since5 [84]. Some hundred pages are needed to explain all axioms
of contemporary axiomatic set theories. Just the contrary one expects
on the foundations of a formal science as mathematics.
4. Criticism of the actual infinity

The history of infinity is one of a long and interminable controversy
between its supporters and opponents. A controversy in which one of
the alternatives always dominated on the other, although the domi-
nant alternative was not always the same. Fortunately we dispose of
an excellent and abundant literature on the history of infinity and its
controversies (see for instance: [178], [101], [149], [18], [141], [39], [94],
[113], [116], [89], [90], [1], [114], [38], [170] etc.). Here we will limit our-
selves to recall the most significant details of that history, from Zeno
of Elea to the actual paradise. Apart from the absolute hegemony of
infinitism (supporters of the actual infinity) in contemporary math-
ematics, it surprises the lack of critical attitudes towards the actual
infinity, even among its opponents (finitists). And that in spite of the
paradoxes and extravagances its assumption gives rise, not to say its
cognitive sterility in experimental sciences or the tremendous difficul-
ties it poses in certain areas of physics (as renormalization in physics
of elementary particles).
4Recall, for instance, that between any to real numbers an uncountable infinity
ℵ0
(2 ) of other different reals numbers do exist. What, as Wittgenstein would surely
say, makes one feel dizzy [174].
5There are also some contemporary attempts to recover naive set theory.
As is well known, the history of infinity begins with Zeno of Elea and
his famous paradoxes. Although we know nothing on the true Zeno’s
intentions, surely more related to the problem of Change6 than to the
mathematical infinity. Scarcely 300 words from the original Zeno’s
texts have survive until the present [16]. It is by his doxographers7
that we know Zeno’s original works. Thus it seems proved he written a
book with more than forty arguments in defense of Parmenides’ thesis.
We also know the book was available in Plato Academy and that it
was read by the young Aristotle [40]. By way of example consider the
reader to following original Zeno’s argument ([16, pag. 177]):
What moves, don’t move neither in the place it is nor
in that it is not.
It seems impossible to say more with so few words. The famous race be-
tween Achilles and the tortoise and Achilles passing over the so called
[168] Z-points8 (Dichotomy I) and Z ∗ -points9 (Dichotomy II) posed
very difficult problems in which the actual infinity was already involved
[144], [114], [106]. Aristotle suggested a solution to both dichotomies:
the one to one correspondence between the successive Z-points (or Z ∗ -
points) and the successive instants at which Achilles passes over them
[9]. But Aristotle was not convinced of his own solution and suggested
another radically different one: the consideration of two types of in-
finities, namely the actual and the potential infinity. According to the
first, infinite totalities would be complete totalities. In accordance with
the second, infinite totalities would always be incomplete so that the
only complete totalities would be the finite totalities. As is well known,
Aristotle preferred the second type of infinitude, the potential infinity.
And until the ends of the XIX century that was the dominant alter-
native on the infinity, although the other always maintained an active
affiliation. In its turn, Zeno’s Paradoxes still remains unsolved, in spite
of certain proposed solutions and pseudo-solutions10
6Both Parmenides and his pupil Zeno defended the impossibility of change with
many convincing arguments.
7Among them Plato [127], Aristotle [9] and Simplicius [152].
8The ω-ordered sequence of points 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, . . . Achilles traverses in
his race from point 0 to 1.
9The ω ∗ -ordered sequence of points . . . , 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2 Achilles traverses in
his race from point 0 to 1.
10Most of those solutions needed the development of new areas of mathematics,
as Cantor’s transfinite arithmetics, topology, or measure theory [73], [74], [176], [75],
[77], [76], and more recently internal set theory [108], [107]. It is also remarkable
the solutions posed by P. Lynds in the framework of quantum mechanics [97], [98].
Some of those solutions, however, have been seriously contested [124], [3], and in
most cases the proposed solutions do not explain where Zeno arguments fail [124],
[133]. In addition, the proposed solution have given rise to new problems so exciting
as Zeno’s original ones [144], [86] [150].
Galileo famous paradox11 on the natural numbers and their squares

[61] introduced a significant novelty in the controversy on the mathe-
matical infinity: the properties of infinite numbers could be different
from those of the finite numbers. That is at least the only explanation
Galileo found to the paradoxical fact that existing more natural num-
bers than perfect squares both sets can be put into a one to one corre-
spondence (f (n) = n2 , ∀n ∈ N). In fact, Galileo paradox only arises if
both sets are considered as complete totalities (hypothesis of the actual
infinity). From the perspective of the potential infinite Galileo para-
dox don’t arise because from that perspective both sets are incomplete
totalities so that we can only pair finite totalities of each one of them,
finite totalities with the same number of elements. As large as we wish
but always finite and incomplete. If in the place of the perfect squares
Galileo would had considered the expofactorials perhaps he would not
have come to the same conclusion. The expofactorial of a number n,
written as n! , is the factorial n! raised n! times to the power of n!. So,
while the expofactorial of 2 is 16, the expofactorial of 3 is:
66 646656
66 66 66
26591197721532267796824894043879...
! 66
3 =6 = 66 = 66 (13)
where the incomplete exponent of the last expression has nothing less
than 36306 digits (roughly ten pages of standard text). Modest 3! is
a number so large that no modern (nor presumably future) computer
can calculate it. Imagine, for instance 100! . The set E of expofactori-
als lacks of practically all natural numbers and, however, can also be
put into a one to one correspondence with the set of natural numbers
(through the bijection f (n) = n! ). Naturally, there is no problem in
pairing off the firsts n natural numbers with the firsts n expofactorials,
being the n-th expofactorial inconceivably greater than the n-th natu-
ral. Other thing is to claim that both sets exist as complete totalities
with the same number of elements. And things may get worse with
hyperfactorials, being the hyperfactorial of n, denoted by n!! , the expo-
factorial n! raised n! times to the power of n! . Or ultrafactorials, being
the ultrafactorial of n, denoted by n!!! the hyperfactorial n!! raised n!!
times to the power of n!! . . .
The Euclidean Axiom of the Whole and the Part12 controlled the in-
finitist impulses of authors as al-Harrani [96], Leibniz13 [91] or Bolzano
11Un example of the so called paradoxes of reflexivity, in which a whole is put
into a one to one correspondence with one of its proper parts [149], [50]. This
type of paradoxes had already posed by many other authors as Proclus, J. Filopón,
Thabit ibn Qurra al-Harani, R. Grosseteste, G. de Rimini, G. de Ockham etc. [149].
12”The whole is greater than the part”. Common Notion 5. Book 1 of Euclid’s
Elements [57]
13Leibniz position on the infinity is more ambiguous [114], [10] than could be
expected from his famous declaration of supporter of the actual infinity [91, pag.
416]
[22]. Among the most famous bijections (one to one correspondences)

between a whole and one of its parts are the classical ones defined by
Bolzano between a real interval and one of its proper subintervals. In
spite of which, Bolzano did not believe they were a sufficient condition
to prove the equipotence of the paired intervals. [21, §22, 33, translated
from [149]]. Dedekind took the next step by assuming that exhaustive
injections (bijections or one to one correspondences) were in fact a suf-
ficient condition to prove equipotence. This implies to assume that
two sets have the same number of elements if they can be put into a
one to one correspondence. Or in other words, if after pairing every
element of a set B with a different element of a set A, no element of
A results unpaired (exhaustive injection), then sets A and B have the
same number of elements. This is a reasonable assumption. But it is
also reasonable to assume that if after pairing every element of a set B
with a different element of a set A, one or more elements of A remains
unpaired (non-exhaustive injection), then A and B have not the same
number of elements. We are then faced with a dilemma: if exhaustive
injections and non-exhaustive injections have or not the same level of
conclusiveness when used as instruments to compare the number of
elements of two infinite sets. If they have, then the actual infinity is
inconsistent because in these conditions it can be proved that an infi-
nite set have (exhaustive injection) and does not have (non-exhaustive
injection) the same number of elements as one of its proper subsets14.
There is no reason to assume that non-exhaustive injections are less
relevant than exhaustive ones to state if two sets have, or not, the
same number of elements. Thus modern infinitism should explicitly
declare, by an appropriate ad hoc axiom, a new singularity of infinite
sets, namely that the number of their elements cannot be compared
by means of non-exhaustive injections. But, as is well known, no step
has been taken in this direction. On the contrary, infinitists define
infinite set just as those that can be put into an exhaustive and injective
correspondence with one of its proper subsets, ignoring that this subset
can also be put into a non-exhaustive and injective correspondence with
the infinite set. As Dedekind proposed, infinitist definition of infinite
sets is entirely based on the violation of the old Euclidean Axiom of the
Whole and the Part. And committed the violation, the infinitist orgy
don’t make us wait: Cantor inaugurated the actual infinitist paradise
just at the end of the XIX century. Paradise that for others authors as
Brouwer, Poincaré o Wittgenstein, was rather a nightmare, a malady
or even a joke. Thus, from the beginning of the XX century, infinitism
become absolutely dominant in mathematics. Although finitist has
not disappeared its presence in contemporary mathematics is almost
irrelevant. In addition, the critique of infinity is practically non-existent
and the scarce efforts carried out have been systematically rejected in
14See ’Reintrepreting the Paradoxes of Reflexivity’ at http://www.interciencia.es
behalf of the supposed differences between the infinite and the finite
numbers (see for instance [142]).
At the beginning of the XXI century a new way of criticism has been
opened. It is based on the notion of ω-order, a formal consequence of
the actual infinity as Cantor himself proved [32, pags. 110-118]. Al-
though the new way of criticism has its roots in certain discussions that
took place at the beginning of the second half of the XX century. In
fact, in the year 1954 J. F. Thomson introduced the term supertask15
in a famous argument regarding a lamp that is turned on and off infin-
itely many times. Thomson defended the impossibility of performing
such a supertask [166]. His argument was motivated for other similar
arguments defended by M. Black with its infinite machines [19], and
criticized by R. Taylor [165] and J. Watling [171]. The argument of
Thomson lamp was in turn severally criticized by P. Benacerraf [15],
and that criticism gave rise to a new infinitist theory at the end of the
XX century: supertask theory (see, for instance, [23], [37], [133]). In
the last years supertask theory has extended its theoretical scenario
to the physical world. The possibility of actually performing certain
supertask have been discussed ([126], [129], [133], [144], [75], [77], [76]
([129], [130], [131], [55], [132], [122], [4], [5], [134] [172], [83], [53], [54],
[122], [52], [150]. As could be expected the performance of such su-
pertasks would imply the most extravagant pathologies in the physical
world, both newtonian and relativist. But what really surprises is that
in the place of considering such unbelievable pathologies as clair indica-
tives of the inconsistency of supertasks (and then of the actual infinity),
its defenders prefer to accept those pathologies before questioning the
consistency of the actual infinity.
As is well known, a set is ω-ordered if it has a first element and
every element has an immediate successor and an immediate prede-
cessor (except the first one). The set N of natural number with its
natural order of precedence is a clair example of ω-ordered set. From
the point of view of the actual infinity, an ω-ordered set is a complete
totality, although no last element completes it. Thus an ω-ordered list
is one that is simultaneously complete (as the actual infinity requires)
and uncompletable (because no last element completes it). The exis-
tence of lists that are simultaneously complete and uncompletable is
another inevitable extravagance of the actual infinity, although in this
case it is less known than others (perhaps because being simultaneously
complete and uncompletable seems contradictory even for infinitists).
Still less known is the following asymmetry also derived from ω-order.
Imagine a straight line segment of 30000 millions light-years (within
the scale of the supposed size of the Universe) and denote its two ex-
tremes by A and B. Assume AB is divided into an ω-ordered sequence
15The notion of supertask is much more older. J. Gregory used it in the XVII
century [114, pág. 53].
of adjacent intervals (an ω-ordered partition as is usually called) whose

first interval begins just at point A. Let C be a point on AB placed at a
distance of B far less than Planck distance (10−33 cm). ω-Order makes
it inevitable that between A and C only a finite number of intervals
lie, while an infinite number of them (i.e. practically all of them) must
necessarily lie between C and B. No matter how close is C from B,
between C and B will always be an infinite number of intervals while
between A and C only a finite number of them will exist. The same
applies to supertasks: if tb if the first instant at which a supertask
has been accomplished, then at any instant prior to tb , whatsoever it
be, only a finite number of tasks will have been carried out and in-
finitely many of them must still be performed. There is no way that
only a finite number n of tasks remain to be performed simply because
they would be the impossible last n tasks of an ω-ordered sequence
of tasks16. Thus while a supertask be performing only a finite num-
ber of tasks will have been performed and an infinite number of them
will always remain to be performed. By way of example, imagine that
God decides to successively count all natural numbers in its natural
order of precedence (which, as St. Augustine believed [2], He could).
Although He has been counting during an eternity and only a time
less than Planck time (10−43 s) remains to finish, He will have counted
only a finite number of numbers and practically all of them -infinitely
many of them- have still to be counted. Or in other words, while He be
counting He will have counted only a finite number of numbers and an
infinitude of them remain still to be counted. It is impossible to avoid
this huge and unaesthetic asymmetry. As Aristotle claimed, perhaps
it is impossible to traverse the untraversable [8], or to complete the
uncompletable.
The criticism of ω-order I have just referred to, analyzes the as-
sumption that it is possible to complete an uncompletable sequence of
actions, be them the tasks of a supertask or the definitions of a recur-
sive ω-ordered sequence of definitions. Benacerraf was right in that we
cannot infer consequences on the final state of a supermachine from the
successive performed actions with that supermachine. But Benacerraf
did not consider the consequences of having completed the supertask
on the supermachine that performs it. The formal development of this
line of argument leads to many contradictions involving ω-order and
then the actual infinity. It can be proved, for instance, that, as a conse-
quence of a supertask, the magnetic beads of Hilbert machine are and
are not placed in the left side of the machine17. None of those argu-
ments have been refuted. Although some recalcitrant infinitists defend
arguments so picturesque as for instance that the magnetic beads -in
the above example- disappear for reasons unknown; others pretend to
16See ’The Aleph-Zero or Zero Dichotomy’ at http://www.interciencia.es
17A collection of these arguments are available at http://www.interciencia.es
invalidate an argument by confronting its conclusions with the conclu-

sions of other arguments with have nothing to do with the original one;
or defend the idea that the inconsistencies of ω-order found in super-
task theory do not apply to ω-ordered sets. But ω-order is ω-order in
all circumstances, and consists of being a complete totality that has a
first element (be it the element of a set or the task of a supertask) and
such that every element has an immediate successor and an immediate
predecessor (except the first one); i.e. a totality that is both complete
and uncompletable. To be complete and uncompletable not only seems
contradictory, the criticism of ω-order I am referring to, actually proves
that is in fact the case.
It is even possible to develop arguments of this type in set theoretical
terms. For instance, in each step of the recursive definition of an strictly
increasing ω-ordered sequence of finite nested sets, a real variable x is
defined as the cardinal of the set just defined at each step. It can
then be proved that x is and is not defined as a finite cardinal18. We
could also consider the set Q+ of positive rational numbers and prove
a consistency derived from the fact that Q+ may be densely ordered
(between any two rationals infinitely many other rationals do exist)
and ω-ordered (between any two successive rationals no other rational
exists). In effect, being Q+ denumerable there exists a bijection f
between Q+ and the set N of natural numbers so that Q+ can be written
as {f (1), f (2), f (3), . . . }. If x is a rational variable whose initial value
is 1, and hdi ii∈N a sequence of positive rationals, both defined according
to: (
di =| f (i + 1) − f (1) |
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . (14)
di < x ⇒ x = di
where | f (i + 1) − f (1) | is the absolute value of f (i + 1) − f (1); and ’<’
represents the natural order of Q, then it can be proved that f (1) + x
is and is not the less rational greater than f (1)19.
5. Criticism of self-reference
The other great obstruction in the history of human thought is self-
reference. Also of Presocratic origins (paradoxes of Epimenides and
Eubulides) it has been, and continues to be, an inexhaustible source
of discussions (see, for instance, [104], [13], [81], [151], [160], etc.). To
begin, the very term ’self-reference’ is equivocal: in all cases there is
a sentence or symbol chain referring to itself. But no object has the
ability to refer to itself or to other objects, only humans beings have
that ability. No sentence nor symbol chain has autonomous existence.
Even if they are automatically generated, the engine that generated
18See ’On the consistency of ω-order’ at http://www.interciencia.es
19See section ’An inconsistency in the field of rational numbers’
them is always conceived of and turn on by a human being. In addi-

tion, they have no meaning if no human interpret them. They do not
symbolize for themselves, they exclusively symbolize for us. So, beyond
any sentence or symbol chain there always is a man or a woman trying
to say something. Thus, beyond the celebrated liar sentence:
This sentence is false (15)
there is a human trying to say something. He exactly says:
This I say is false (16)
If in the place of saying (16) our human says
This I tread is yellow (17)
we would look at his foots and could identify the object he is referring
to. But what object is being referred to when he says (16)? As far as
I’m concerned, I must recognize I don’t know of what I’m predicating
its falseness when I say (16). I even have the impression of be saying
nothing when I say (16). In any case let us consider the following two
alternatives regarding the possibilities of the subject whose falseness I
predicate when I say (16). It may be either:
This I say is false (18)
or
This I say (19)
In the first alternative the words ’is’ and ’false’ have a confusing double
syntactic function, the one as a part of the subject of the sentence; the
second as the verb (in the case of ’is’) or the predicate (in the case of
’false’) of the same sentence. But no language exists whose grammar
consider the possibility for a term to have two syntactic functions at
the same time in the same sentence. This should suffice to rule out the
first alternative. In the second alternative the true subject is:
This (20)
because the words ’I’ and ’say’ are to determine a particular (20), the
one I utter when I say (19). But to say this or that and nothing more
is to say nothing. I must therefore conclude that, in fact, I don’t know
of what I am stating its falseness when I say (16). And I suspect no
one knows it20. If that were the case, and taking into account that we,
the humans, are its only interprets, to say (16) is to say nothing. And
the same applies when I say things as:
This I say is P (21)
20Andthat assuming we have previously selected the appropriate theory of true
to deals with those declarative sentences, because some dozens of them are available
[121]
where P is any predicate, for instance:

This I say is not C-demonstrable (22)
where C is a certain formal calculus. Furthermore, since the subject
of a self-referent sentence is the whole sentence, we will not know the
subject of the sentence until the whole sentence has been uttered; but
at this moment we have already predicated the subject. This is as
to count one’s chickens before they are hatched. That is in fact the
case of the liar paradox and the like21, we are saying that something
is false before to know of what are we predicating its falseness. This
situation resembles the one originated by Russell’s Paradox as we will
immediately see. Probably our mind processes two times self-referent
sentences, the first to state the subject -the referent- and the second
to predicate it. If that were the case, self-reference would be only a
semantic illusion.
Russell Paradox of the set R of all sets that do not belong to them-
selves22 is a set theoretical version of the Liar Paradox. In fact, accord-
ing to its definition R belongs to itself whenever it does not belong to
itself. We are again in the same above situation of trying to count one’s
chickens before the are hatched. In effect, all elements of a set should
have been defined before grouping them as a set. That is the only way
to know which elements are we grouping (in the same way we should
know the subject of a predicate before we can predicate it). But the
set R as element of the set R is not defined until the set R be defined
as a set, which in turn is impossible until R be defined as an element.
Shortly before Russell discover his famous paradox, Charles Dogson,
better known as Lewis Carroll, proposed the following definition of
Class: ([34], p. 31) :
Classification or the formation of Classes is a Mental
Process, in which we imagine that we have put together,
in a group, certain things. Such a group is called a
”Class”.
Carroll’s proposal is clearly non platonic. Classes are mental construc-
tions, theoretical objects resulting from our mental activity. Carroll’s
definition could be rewritten as:
Definition 1. A set is the theoretical object that results from a mental
process of grouping arbitrary objects previously defined.
Constructive Definition 1 is incompatible with self-referent sets because
before defining the set, all its elements have to be previously defined
-either by enumeration or comprehension. And this excludes the set
21Self-reference can be ingenuously hidden through a group of sentences that
refer to each other in a circular way.
22Russell discovered his famous paradox when he was analyzing Cantor’s paradox
on the set of all cardinals [24], which is also a self-referent set.
being defined, simply because the set cannot be defined as element be-
fore it be defined as set; and if it is not previously defined as element
it cannot be grouped to form the set. It is remarkable, on the other
hand, that constructive Definition 1 is not circular, a mental process
of grouping is not a group but a mental process. In addition, it seems
reasonable to require that all elements to be grouped be previously de-
fined, particularly if we pretend to know what are we grouping. Being
self-referent, Russell’s set R is not a set according to Definition 1. And
for the same reasons of self-reference neither the set of all cardinals
nor the set of all ordinals could be sets according to the same defini-
tion. Thus, to assume the above non platonic definition of set suffices
to solve Cantor, Burali-Forti and Russell paradoxes. But modern set
theories have never considered this non platonic option. Self-reference
had finally to be removed from set theory, but by less elegant means
as the Axiom of Regularity [120], [179], the Theory of Types [143] or
the Theory of Classes [17], [65].
The removal of self-reference from set theory should serve us to reflex
on the future of semantic self-reference. Sets and monadic sentences
are more related to each other than it may seem. When we say:
S is P (23)
we assert the subject S has the predicate or property P. The elements
of a set are as the subject of the above monadic sentence, all them
share the same property of membership. A set that belong to itself is
as a self-referent sentence: it also states a predicate of itself, in this
case its membership to the set, i.e. the membership to itself. Now
then, if self-reference is not appropriate for set theory and we had to
remove it in order to avoid inconsistencies, why not to remove semantic
self-reference from languages?
6. Platonism and biology

Dobzhansky written a famous paper entitled Nothing in Biology Makes
Sense Except in the Light of Evolution [51]. I think it would have been
more appropriate to write reproduction in the place of evolution 23. And
not only because evolution is powered by reproduction. Mainly it is
because only reproduction explains the extravagances of living being.
Living organisms are, in effect, extravagant objects, i.e. objects with
properties that cannot be derived from physical laws. To have red
feathers, to move by jumping, or to be devored by the female in ex-
change for copulating with it, are examples (and the list would be
23Ofcourse, evolution is a natural process and denying it is so stupid as denying
photosynthesis or glycolysis. Other different affair is the scientific theory available
to explain it. As any other scientific theory, the theory of organic evolution remains
unfinished and currently opened to numerous discussions (see for instance [157],
[20], [162], [138], [146], [102], [56], [137], [36], [69], [145], [35] etc.)
interminable) of properties that cannot be derived from physical laws.

Living beings are subjected to a biological law that dominates over
all physical laws, the Law of Reproduction (reproduce as you might).
This law is the only responsible for all past, present and future extrav-
agances of living beings. The success in reproduction depends upon
certain characteristics of living beings that frequently have nothing to
do with the efficient accomplishment of physical laws but with arbitrary
preferences as singing, or dancing, or having brilliant colors. Although,
on the other hand, to achieve reproduction is previously necessary to
be alive, which in turn involves a lot of abilities related to the partic-
ular environment of each living being. But this is in fact secondary:
adapted and efficient as an organism may be, if it don’t reproduce, its
excellence will have no future in the Biosphere.
Living beings are topically viewed as systems efficiently adapted to
their environment. No attention is usually payed to its extravagant
nature, although extravagance -in the above sense- is undoubtedly its
more relevant characteristic. We are the only (known) extravagant sys-
tems in the Universe. By the way, these extravagances could only be the
result of capricious evolution rather than of intelligent design. Capri-
cious evolution restricted by the physical laws governing the world. One
of the latest extravagances appeared on Earth is the consciousness ex-
hibited by some primates and notably by most of humans. Surely, the
sensation of individual subjectivity is the responsible for our peculiar
way of interpreting our internal symbolic reflex of the world (see be-
low). I refer to Platonism, the belief that ideas do exist independently
of the mind that elaborate them and use them in its continuous inter-
action with the physical world. It is surely a side effect of consciousness
that ideas become alive.
Animals must have a symbolic and abstract representation of their
natural environments (surely inscribed in some neural networks), par-
ticularly of all those objects and processes that may have consequences
on their own survival and reproduction. It is a symbolic, abstract
knowledge: a leopard has in its mind the (abstract) idea of gazelle, it
knows what to do with a gazelle, whatsoever be the particular gazelle
it encounters with. The abstract idea of gazelle, and of any other,
is elaborated in the brain by means of different components -atoms
of knowledge- that not only serve to form the idea of gazelle but of
many other abstract ideas. And not only ideas, sensorial perceptions
are also elaborated by similar process in atomic and abstract terms,
which surely serves to filter the irrelevant details from the highly vari-
able information coming from the physical world, and thus to identify
with sufficient security the many objects forming part of the natural
environments [177], [115]. It is, on the other hand, much more efficient
and plausible this way of functioning. To have a symbolic represen-

tation of every particular object of a natural environment would be
inconceivable more complex and expensive from all points of view.
To have an abstract representations of the world is indispensable for
animals in order to find the appropriate response to each of the nu-
merous stimuli coming from the highly dynamic world they evolves in.
And an error in this affair may cost the higher price. A ball rolling
down towards a precipice will not stop to avoid falling down; but the
dog running behind it, will do; the dog knows gravity and its conse-
quences. Organisms interact with their surroundings and must know
its singularities, its peculiar ways of being and evolving, i.e. its its
physical logic, and even its mathematical logic24. Organisms need an
abstract and symbolic representation of the physical world, and that is
not a minor detail. It must therefore be an efficient and precise repre-
sentation, otherwise life would be impossible. It is through their own
actions and experiences, including imitation and innovation [87], [63],
[139], [173], that living beings develop their neurobiological represen-
tations (symbolic reflections) of the world. Although genetics is also
involved in those cognitive abilities [128].
Perception and cognition are constructive process in which take part
different brain areas, as we are now knowing with certain details [140],
[42], [156], [43]. Doubtless, concepts and ideas are mental elaborations
rather then transcendent entities we have the ability to contact with.
Evolutionary biology and neurobiology are then incompatible with pla-
tonism. Our consciousness of ideas together with our recursive thought
(an exclusive ability of humans [41], [79]) could have promoted the
raising and persistence of platonism. But the evolutive and neurobio-
logical fundaments of human cognition suggest that platonic idealism
is a wrong way of thinking. If there is a word expressing the essence of
the Universe, that word is evolution. And as E. Mayr said Plato is the
antihero of evolution [105]. It seems reasonable that Plato were pla-
tonic in Plato times, but is certainly surprising the persistence of that
primitive way of thinking in the community of contemporary mathe-
maticians, though as could be expected, a certain level of disagreement
on this affair also exists [99], [92], [100], [12]. It is remarkable the fact
that many non platonic authors, as Wittgenstein, were against both
the actual infinity and self-reference [103].
The reader may come to his own conclusions on the effects the above
biological criticism of platonic idealism could have on self-reference and
the actual infinity. Although, evidently, he can also maintain that he
does not know through neural networks and then to persist in his pla-
tonic habits. But for those of us that believe in the organic nature
of our brains and in its abilities of perceiving and knowing modeled
24Primates and humans could dispose of neural networks to deal with numbers
[48], [49], [79]
through more than 3600 millions years of organic evolution, platonism

has no longer sense. And neither self-reference nor the actual infinity
may survive away from the platonic scenario. On the other hand, it
seems convenient to recall the long and conflictive history of both no-
tions (would them have been so conflictive if they were consistent?); and
above all their absolute uselessness in order to know the natural world25.
Physics [153], [155] and even mathematics [119], [154] could go without
both notions26. Experimental sciences as chemistry, biology and geol-
ogy have never been related to them. The potential infinity probably
suffices27. Even the number of distinguishable sites in the universe is
finite [82]. Finite and discrete: not only matter and energy are discrete
entities, space and time could also be of a discrete -quantum- nature as
is being suggested from some areas of contemporary physics as super-
string theory ([71], [72] [167], [58]), loop quantum gravity ([158], [11]
[159]), euclidean quantum gravity ([6]), quantum computation ([164],
[14], [93]) or black holes thermodynamics [14], [164]. Beyond Planck’s
distance nature seems to loss its physical sense. The continuum space-
time, as self-reference and the actual infinity, could only be a uselessness
rhetorical device. The reader can finally imagine the enormous simpli-
fication of mathematics once liberated from infinity and self-reference
(Ockham Razor agitates within its box).
25Not only uselessness, the actual infinity is also extremely annoying in certain
disciplines as physics of elementary particles (renormalization [60], [85], [94], [175],
[148], [7])
26Except transfinite arithmetic and other related areas, most of contemporary
mathematics are compatible with the potential infinity, including key concepts as
those of limit or integral.
27Some contemporary cosmological theories, as the theory of multiverse [45] or
the theory of cyclic universe [163], make use of the infinity in a rather imprecise
way.
Appendix A. An inconsistency in the field of rational

numbers
As in modern physics with superstring theory [88], [95], the actual
infinity in contemporary mathematics plays such a dominant role that
it almost impossible to maintain a critical attitude (perhaps another
sociological version of the so called Principle of St. Matthew [111]).
But the actual infinity is an inconsistent notion and soon or later the
nightmare will finally end, as Poincaré and Wittgenstein, among others,
announced.
Along the last twelve years, and motivated by supertask theory, I
could develop several arguments against the actual infinity based on
the notion of ω-order, an inevitable consequence (as Cantor himself
proved [31]) of assuming the existence of actual infinite totalities. To
be ω-ordered means to be complete (as the actual infinity requires)
and uncompletable (because no last element completes ω-ordered se-
quences). To be complete and uncompletable is not only apparently
contradictory, it is an actual contradiction28. The following short ar-
gument has nothing to do with this line of reasoning, although it is
based on another schizophrenic ability of the actual infinity; in this
case the ability of the set of rational numbers of being both densely
ordered (between any two rationals infinitely many other rationals do
exist) and ω-ordered (between any two successive rationals no other
rational exists).
As Cantor did29 [30], we will also assume the existence of the set of
all finite cardinals as a complete totality (axiom of infinity in modern
terms). The discussion that follows will be entirely based upon that
assumption. In those conditions, consider the field of rational numbers
with its usual operations and ordering. As is well known, Cantor suc-
cessfully proved the set Q of rationals is denumerable [26], and so it is
the set Q+ of positive rationals. In consequence, there exists a one to
one correspondence f between the set N of natural numbers and Q+ .
We can then write:
Q+ = {f (1), f (2), f (3), . . . } (24)
In this way, bijection f induces a new ω-ordering in Q+ . Consider now

a positive rational variable x whose initial value is 1, and a sequence
of positive rationals hdiii∈N , both defined in accordance with:
(
di =| f (i + 1) − f (1) |
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . (25)
di < x ⇒ x = di
28A collection of arguments proving it are available at http://www.interciencia.es

29Although he never recognized the hypothetical nature of complete infinite
totalities.
where | f (i + 1) − f (1) | is the absolute value of f (i + 1) − f (1); and ’<’

stands for the usual ordering of Q; i.e d1 < x means x − di > 0. Infini-
tist procedures as (25) are common in infinitist mathematics. Cantor
himself used them in the demonstrations of some of his most relevant
infinitist conclusions (for instance in his two celebrated proofs on the
uncountable nature of the set R of real numbers [26], [27] [29]). In our
case, and being Q closed with respect to addition and substraction, def-
inition (25) defines the sequence hdi ii∈N as a complete infinite totality
of positive rationals. But it also redefines rational variable x whenever
the term just defined be less than its current value. Notice we have
make used of both ω-order (<ω ) and Q dense order (<). The first to
define the successive terms of hdiii∈N ; the second to redefine variable
x. We are now in the appropriate position to prove the following two
contradictory results:
Proposition 1. f (1) + x is the less rational greater than f (1) in the
usual ordering of Q+ .
Proof. Being Q+ closed with respect to addition, it is clear that f (1)+x
is a positive rational number. Assume that it is not the less rational
greater than f (1). In this case there will be a positive rational f (n)
such that f (n) − f (1) < x. But this is impossible because
x ≤| f (n) − f (1) | (26)
just from the definition of dn−1 on. f (1)+x is therefore the less rational
greater than f (1) in the usual ordering of Q+ .

Proposition 2. f (1) + x is not the less rational greater than f (1) in
the usual ordering of Q+ .
Proof. The rational f (1) + x × 10−1 is evidently grater than f (1) and
less than f (1) + x. Therefore, the rational f (1) + x is not the less
rational greater than f (1) in the usual ordering of Q+ .

We have therefore derived a contradiction from our initial assumption,
the Axiom of Infinity, that legitimates the existence of complete infinite
totalities, the only ones that can be ω-ordered and densely ordered.
From the perspective of the potential infinity, on the other hand, only
finite totalities can be considered, and finite totalities cannot be neither
ω-ordered nor densely ordered. Thus no contradiction arises from this
perspective. It is significant that while the history of infinite sets is
marked out by a lot of contradictions that could only be avoided either
by stating ad hoc differences between finite and infinite numbers or by
axiomatic parching set theories, neither paradoxes nor contradictions
are known in the case of finite sets.
Appendix B. Reinterpreting the paradoxes of reflexivity

The formal strategy of pairing off the elements of two sets is more
ancient than it is usually recognized. In fact, Aristotle used it to reject
Zeno’s Dichotomies [9]. And since then, the same strategy has been
used by many authors with different discursive purposes, almost always
related to infinity (Proclus, J. Filopón, Thabit ibn Qurra al-Harani,
R. Grosseteste, G. de Rimini, Duns Scotus, G. de Ockham, Galileo
etc. [149]). But none of those authors, including Bolzano, rejected the
Euclidean Axiom of the Whole and the Part30. Things began to change
with Dedekind, who assumed the violation of the old Euclidean axiom
and stated the definition of infinite sets based just on that violation:
a set is infinite if it can be put into a one to one correspondence with
one of its proper subsets [47]. Dedekind and Cantor inaugurated the
so called paradise of the actual infinity, where exhaustive injections
(bijections or one to one correspondences) play a capital role. The
absolute dominance of infinitism in contemporary mathematics and the
practical absence of contestation perhaps explain some things otherwise
unexplainable. In fact, in the short discussion that follows we will have
the occasion to discover a really uncomfortable situation related to the
violation of the Axiom of the Whole and the Part.
In the core of our discussion will be two functional definitions contend-
ing with the number of elements (power or cardinality) of two different
sets. I refer to the two following ones:
Definition 2. Two sets have the same number of elements if there
exists an exhaustive injection from one of them to the other.
Definition 3. Two sets have not the same number of elements if there
exists a non-exhaustive injection from one of them to the other.
Or in other words, if after pairing every element of a set with a different
element of other set all elements of this last set result paired (exhaustive
injection) then both sets have the same number of elements. Otherwise,
if at least one element of the last set results unpaired (non-exhaustive
injection) then both sets have not the same number of elements. While
Definition 2 is fundamental in transfinite set theory, Definition 3 is
usually ignored, although both definitions are complementary; and the
way of comparing the number of elements in both definition is similar:
if after pairing every element of a set B with a different element of set
A, one or more elements of A remains unpaired then A and B have
not the same number of elements. This seems so reasonable as to say
that if after pairing every element of B with a different element of
A, no elements of A remains unpaired then A and B have the same
number of elements. Thus, being both definitions of the same level of
30’The
whole is greater than the part.’ Common Notion 5. Book 1 of Euclid’s
Elements [57]
basic reasoning31 and having the same reasonable credibility, we should

assume that both exhaustive and non exhaustive injections have the
same level of conclusiveness when used as instruments to compare the
number of elements of two finite or infinite sets (from now on this
assumption will be referred to as A1).
There is no reason (except reasons of convenience) to reject A1. Sup-
pose then we assume it. In this case, consider any infinite set A. By
definition, at least a proper subset B of A exists such that both sets
can be put into a one to one correspondence, and then both sets have
the same number of elements (Definition 2). But it also exists a non-
exhaustive injection f from B to A defined as:
f
B→A (27)
f (b) = b; ∀b ∈ B (28)
according to which A and B have not the same number of elements
(Definition 3). Thus, A1 leads to a contradiction: A and B have and
do not have the same number of elements.
From the infinitist perspective the paradoxes of reflexivity (all those
in which a whole is put into a one to one correspondence with one of
its proper parts32) are usually interpreted as side effects resulting from
the supposed singularities of the actual infinity. Infinity is different,
is monotonously claimed33. The reasonability of A1 suggests, however,
a new interpretation of those paradoxes: that rather than paradoxes
they are true contradictions. Contradictions derived from the incon-
sistency of the actual infinity. It is the actual infinity, in fact, that
makes it possible that two sets, as A and B, can be put into injective
correspondences that may be exhaustive and non exhaustive. This is a
clear indicator of inconsistency. Unless we explain the reason for which
A and B have the same number of elements in spite of the fact that
after having paired each element of B with a different element of A,
at leats one element of A remains unpaired. And the reason cannot be
the exhaustive injection (bijection) between A and B just because it
could be the case that the non-exhaustive injection between both sets
be so legitimate and conclusive as the exhaustive one (A1). If we were
faced with a contradiction we could not use one of the contradictory
conclusions to arbitrarily deny the other.
There is a long tradition in the history of human thought, particu-
larly in formal sciences, that consists in taking as paradoxes what really
31Transfinite arithmetic will be later derived from this basic initial assumptions
and then we will get results as ℵ0 + n = ℵ0 ; ℵn0 = ℵ0 and the like, where n is a
finite cardinal or natural number. Evidently those results cannot be used to state
the convenience or inconvenience of Definition 3, otherwise we will making use of a
circular reasoning
32Galileo Paradox [61] is a well known example of this type of paradox.
33So different that it could be inconsistent.
are contradictions. And this has surely contributed to increase the con-
fusion on certain notions as the actual infinity. In our case, we must
decide whether exhaustive and non-exhaustive injections have or not
the same level of conclusiveness when used as instruments to compare
the number of elements of two infinite sets. If we decide they have the
same level of conclusiveness, then the actual infinity is an inconsistent
notion (infinite sets have and do not have the same number of elements
of some of its proper subsets). Otherwise we should explicitly declare,
by the appropriate ad hoc axiom, that the number of elements of infi-
nite sets cannot be compared by means of non-exhaustive injections.
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0809.2135v1 (1) Cantor Paradox

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EXTENDING CANTOR’S PARADOX

A CRITIQUE OF INFINITY AND SELFREFERENCE

Abstract. This paper examines infinity and self-reference from

2. Paradoxes and inconsistencies

3. Extending Cantor Paradox

We would be in the face of the mother of all infinities, the absolute

it is an insignificant totality: it lacks of practically all sets of numerical

4. Criticism of the actual infinity

Galileo famous paradox11 on the natural numbers and their squares

[22]. Among the most famous bijections (one to one correspondences)

of adjacent intervals (an ω-ordered partition as is usually called) whose

invalidate an argument by confronting its conclusions with the conclu-

them is always conceived of and turn on by a human being. In addi-

where P is any predicate, for instance:

6. Platonism and biology

interminable) of properties that cannot be derived from physical laws.

and plausible this way of functioning. To have a symbolic represen-

through more than 3600 millions years of organic evolution, platonism

Appendix A. An inconsistency in the field of rational

In this way, bijection f induces a new ω-ordering in Q+ . Consider now

28A collection of arguments proving it are available at http://www.interciencia.es

where | f (i + 1) − f (1) | is the absolute value of f (i + 1) − f (1); and ’<’

Appendix B. Reinterpreting the paradoxes of reflexivity

basic reasoning31 and having the same reasonable credibility, we should

histórica (I. Grattan-Guinness, ed.), Alianza, Madrid, 1984, pp. 283–327. 3,

[98] Peter Lynds, Zeno’s Paradoxes: A Timely Solution, philsci-archives (3003),

[152] Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Physics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New

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