Gaby Day v. The City of New York and New York City Police Officers - U.S. District Court, SDNY

Case 1:11-cv-02956-UA Document 1 Filed 05/02/11 Page 1 of 16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________
GABY DAY,
PLAINTIFF
11 Civ 02956
vs COMPLAINT [JURY TRIAL]
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, a

municipal entity, NEW YORK
CITY POLICE OFFICER VINCENT
KONG, Shield # O1661, NEW YORK
CITY POLICE SERGEANT
CHRISTOPHER KOCH, Shield #
2875, NEW YORK CITY POLICE
LIEUTENANT “JOE” COSTELLO,
NEW YORK CITY POLICE CAPTAIN
STEVEN BRAILLE, NEW YORK CITY
NEW YORK CITY POLICE CHIEF
BRIAN CONROY, NEW YORK CITY
UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICER 293
(previously known as NEW YORK
CITY UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICER
2948, and prior to that as NEW
YORK CITY UNDERCOVER POLICE
OFFICER 4325), NEW YORK CITY
POLICE OFFICERS ”JOHN DOES”, each
of the identified and the non-
identified persons in his
individual capacity and in his
official capacity,
DEFENDANTS
________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This litigation arises out of the custodial arrest

of the Plaintiff on the late evening of Thursday, July 17,
2008 and the early morning of Friday, July 18, 2008 at the
Hot Lap Dance Club, 344 West 38th Street, New York City, New
York and the preferral of criminal charges and the
prosecution of the Plaintiff associated therewith.
2. The Plaintiff was detained in custody for

approximately twenty seven hours until at or about 2:30
A.M. in the morning of Saturday, July 19, 2008 when the
Plaintiff appeared at an arraignment in the Criminal Court
of the City of New York, County of New York, and State of
New York and was then released without bail and directed to
return to Court for further proceedings on September 25,
2008.
3. The Plaintiff appeared in Court on September 25,

2008.
4. Thereafter, the Plaintiff returned to Court again

on November 10, 2008 where and when, on the motion of the
New York County District Attorney’s Office, the Criminal
Court charge against the Plaintiff was dismissed and the
matter sealed.
5. This is an action in which the Plaintiff seeks

relief for the violation of his rights as guaranteed under
the laws and Constitution of the United States.
6. The Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and such

other relief, including injunctive relief and declaratory
relief [if appropriate], as may be in the interest of
justice and as may be required to assure that the Plaintiff
secures full and complete relief and justice for the
violation of his rights.
II. JURISDICTION
7. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to

and under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1343 in conjunction
with the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
8. The Plaintiff also invokes the jurisdiction of

this Court in conjunction with the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201, et seq., this being an action
in which the Plaintiff seeks, in addition to monetary
damages, whatever other relief is needed to provide full
and complete justice including, if appropriate, declaratory
and injunctive relief.
2
9. This is an action in which the Plaintiff seeks

relief for the violation of his rights as guaranteed under
the laws and Constitution of the United States.
III. THE PARTIES
10. The Plaintiff is an American citizen and resident

of the State of New York, the City of New York, and the
County of Kings.
11. The Defendant City of New York is a municipal

entity which was created under the authority of the laws
and Constitution of the State of New York and which is
authorized with, among other powers, the power to maintain
a police department for the purpose of protecting the
welfare of those who reside in the City of New York.
12. Defendants Christopher Koch, Shield # 2875,

Vincent Kong, Shield # 01661, “Joe” Costello, Steven
Braille, Brian Conroy, New York City Undercover Police
Officer 293 (previously known as New York City Undercover
Police Officer 2948, and prior to that as New York City
Undercover Police Officer 4325), and “John Does” are New
York City Police Department line and command Officers and
agents and employees of the City of New York.
13. Although the Defendants’ actions and conduct

herein described were unlawful and wrongful and otherwise
violative of the Plaintiff’s rights as guaranteed under the
laws and Constitution of the United States, they were taken
in and during the course of their duties and functions as
New York City Police Department line and command Officers
and as agents and employees of the City of New York and
incidental to the otherwise lawful performance of their
duties and functions as New York City Police line and
command Officers and agents and employees of the City of
New York.
IV. ALLEGATIONS
14. This litigation arises out of the Plaintiff’s

custodial arrest on Thursday night, July 17, 2008 and on
Friday morning July 18, 2008 at the Hot Lap Dance Club
which is located at 344 West 38th Street, New York, New York
3
15. The Plaintiff was released from custody without

bail at an arraignment at or about 2:30 A.M. on July 19,
2008 and he was directed to return to the Court on
September 25, 2008 for further proceedings in connection
with his arrest allegedly for promoting prostitution.
16. The Plaintiff appeared in Court on September 25,

2008 when and where the Plaintiff was directed to appear
again.
17. Thereafter, the Plaintiff returned to Court on

November 10, 2008 when and where, upon the Motion of the
Office of the New York County District Attorney, the charge
against the Plaintiff was dismissed and the proceedings
sealed.
18. The Plaintiff, who is an American citizen and

resident of the City of New York, County of Kings, State of
New York, is thirty seven [37] years of age.
19. The Plaintiff’s birth date is June 10, 1973.
20. The Plaintiff is single. The Plaintiff has an

eleven year old child who lives with his child’s mother in
Queens, New York.
21. Plaintiff resides on Halsey Street in the Bedford

Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn, New York.
22. The Plaintiff was born in Brooklyn, New York and

raised, for most of his young life, in Queens, New York.
23. The Plaintiff attended and graduated from Jamaica

High School in Jamaica, Queens, New York.
24. After graduating from Jamaica High School, the

Plaintiff attended the State University of New York at Old
Westbury for approximately two years where he studied
business administration.
25. The Plaintiff did not graduate or receive a degree

from the State University of New York at Old Westbury.
26. The Plaintiff also attended Pratt Institute of

Technology in Brooklyn, New York where he studied graphic
design.
4
27. The Plaintiff is presently unemployed.
28. On July 17, 2008 the Plaintiff was employed at Hot

Lap Dance Club which was located in a loft like area on the
5th floor of a building whose address was 344 West 38th
Street, New York, New York.
29. The Plaintiff commenced his employment at the Hot

Lap Dance Club [hereinafter referred to as the Club] in or
about 2006.
30. The Plaintiff was a part time employee.
31. The Plaintiff ordinarily worked three shifts a

week on various days during any one week but not
necessarily the same days each and every week.
32. Ordinarily, the Plaintiff commenced his part time

work shift at or about 6:00 in the evening and concluded
his part time work shift at or about 6:00 A.M. of the
following morning.
33. The Plaintiff was employed in his part time

capacity as an individual who performed multiple tasks at
the club.
34. In his part time capacity, the Plaintiff set up

tables and chairs at the Club, cleaned the Club, assisted
in the catering at the Club, and, during the operating
hours when the Club was open to patrons, the Plaintiff
walked in and about the Club area as an observer.
35. The Plaintiff was not employed as a security agent

at the Club and did not perform security functions at the
Club.
36. If and when he observed any conduct of which he

was concerned among the patrons, for example intoxication,
he ordinarily would report such to security personnel for
the security personnel to handle although, on occasion, he
would, himself, speak to an individual whose conduct
appeared to be inappropriate [for example, a patron who
appeared to be intoxicated].
37. Moreover and to the extent that there was

inappropriate patron conduct directed toward a lap dancer
in the Club and the Plaintiff either observed it or it was
5
reported to him by a lap dancer, the Plaintiff would, in

turn, report such to a security agent for the security
personnel to address such.
38. The Plaintiff secured the part time employment at

the Club to supplement his regular income as a personal
trainer.
39. From on or about some time in 2005 to on or about

some time in 2009, the Plaintiff was employed full time as
a personal trainer, first from about 2005 to 2007 at an
Equinox gym on Broadway and then from 2007 until 2009 at a
Reebok gym on Columbus Avenue.
40. On July 17, 2008, the Plaintiff reported to work

at the Club in his part time employment capacity as
described above.
41. The Plaintiff, per his functions, undertook

efforts to set up the Club including setting up and
cleaning tables and chairs and otherwise doing some
catering related work and some overall Club cleaning work.
42. The Club opened to patrons at or about 8:00 P.M.
43. When the Club opened and per the Plaintiff’s

regular duties and functions, the Plaintiff remained in the
Club and observed.
44. The Club became crowded with patrons who were, for
the most part, sitting in chairs at tables.
45. At or about 11:30 P.M. the Plaintiff observed a

number of individuals come into the Club bearing shields
and wearing helmets.
46. Those individuals moved through the Club toward an

area where there were backrooms and where the Plaintiff
understood private lap dancing took place.
47. The Plaintiff observed those shield bearing,

helmeted individuals, whom the Plaintiff believed to be New
York City Police Officers, kick in the doors to the back
rooms and, then, return to the main area of the Club.
48. When the afore-described Officer returned from the

backroom area of the Club to the main area of the Club, the
6
Plaintiff observed what he believed to be a number of plain

clothes New York City Police Officers enter into the main
area of the Club.
49. A plain clothes New York City Police Officer

informed the patrons in the Club to sit, that nothing would
happen to them, and they would be permitted to leave in due
course.
50. The employees of the Club, including dancers and

including the Plaintiff, were directed to sit.
51. Eventually the plain clothes Officers, utilizing

what appeared to be a list of employees, identified some of
the employees from their list and took all the employees
(all of whom were arrested) to the office in the Club and
handcuffed each individual and placed each individual under
arrest.
52. The employees, including the Plaintiff, were asked

for identification, handcuffed, and arrested.
53. When the Plaintiff was brought into the area where
he was asked for identification and handcuffed and placed
under arrest, the Plaintiff asked Officers what was going
on and why he was being arrested.
54. The Plaintiff received no response.
55. During the process of the arrest of the Plaintiff

and others, patrons, who were in the Club, were permitted
to leave.
56. The Plaintiff was frisked.
57. The Plaintiff was transported to the 7th Precinct.
58. The Plaintiff was fingerprinted and photographed.
59. The Plaintiff had no criminal record although,

when he believes he was in his late twenties, the Plaintiff
had been stopped in Queens, New York and arrested for
driving with a suspended license.
60. The Plaintiff presently has an operative driver’s

license.
7
61. After being detained at the 7th Precinct for some

period of time, the Plaintiff, along with others, was
transported to Manhattan Central Booking where he remained
until he and others were brought to Court for an
arraignment at or about 1:30 to 2:30 A.M. on the morning of
July 19, 2008.
62. The Plaintiff was in custody for 26 hours or

thereabouts.
63. The Plaintiff was arraigned and released on his

own recognizance and without bail being set and he was
directed to return to Court on September 25, 2008.
64. The Plaintiff returned to Court on September 25,

2008.
65. The Plaintiff was directed to return to Court on

November 11, 2008 when and where the charge of promoting
prostitution was, upon the motion of the New York County
District Attorney’s Office, dismissed and the record
sealed.
66. The Plaintiff had no information or idea

whatsoever as to the basis for his arrest.
67. The Plaintiff had no idea about any unlawful or

illegal conduct, if any, which was alleged, as part of the
police operation, to have occurred at the Club location.
68. The Plaintiff never promoted prostitution or other

unlawful conduct, ever, in the Club location or otherwise;
and he was unaware of any unlawful conduct whatsoever in
the Club location.
69. The Plaintiff never engaged in any criminal

conduct or other unlawful conduct while employed part time
at the Club.
70. The Plaintiff’s arrest on the night in question,

in front of employees and others, was humiliating and
embarrassing and stress and anxiety inducing.
71. The Plaintiff’s arrest and the pendency of the

Criminal Court proceeding, until it was dismissed, were
stress and anxiety inducing, emotionally distressful, and
otherwise publicly humiliating and embarrassing.
8
72. Defendants “Does”, Costello, Braille, Koch, Kong,

New York City Undercover Police Officer 293 (previously
known as New York City Undercover Police Officer 2948, and
prior to that as New York City Undercover Police Officer
4325), and Conroy were involved in the pre-planning and/or
the execution of the Hot Dance Lap Club field operation on
July 17, 2008.
73. It is believed that, among the Defendants, all or

some had been in the Hot Lap Dance Club as part of a pre-
July 17, 2008 undercover operation which was taking place
in said Club.
74. Among other efforts in which some or all of the

Defendants engaged was an undertaking and effort to secure
a search warrant for the premises where the Hot Lap Dance
Club was located.
75. Notwithstanding that it is believed that a search

warrant was obtained for the search of the Hot Lap Dance on
July 17, 2008, no pre July 17, 2008 arrest warrant was
obtained from a Court for the arrest of the Plaintiff.
76. It is believed that no pre-July 17, 2010 arrest

warrant was obtained for the arrest of the Plaintiff
notwithstanding undercover operations which the Defendants
had taken in the Club prior to July 17, 2008 because the
Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable probable cause
fact basis on which to believe that the Plaintiff was
engaged in any criminal conduct prior to July 17, 2008 just
as, on July 17, 2008, there was no such objectively
reasonable probable cause fact basis for the Defendants to
believe that the Plaintiff was engaged in any kind of
criminal conduct to justify the Plaintiff’s arrest.
77. The Plaintiff committed no criminal offense or

other offense whatsoever and no reasonable police officer
could have reasonably and objectively believed that the
Plaintiff committed any criminal offense or any other
offense under the law to justify even a stop let alone an
arrest, a custodial arrest, incarceration and detention,
the preferral of any charge, including but not limited to
promotion of prostitution charge, against him, and his
criminal prosecution associated with the preferral of any
criminal charges including but not limited to the promotion
of prostitution charge.
9
78. There was no basis for the stop, arrest and

custodial arrest of the Plaintiff by the New York City
Police Officers, each of whom is an agent and employee of
the City of New York.
79. In addition to the lack of any basis for the

stop, arrest and custodial arrest of the Plaintiff, there
was no reasonable basis to believe that the Hot Lap Dance
club was a brothel or promoted any sort of systemic
prostitution business, as New York City Undercover Police
Undercover Police Officer 4325) - as well as his partner,
named Detective Rijos, Shield No. 3026 - have testified
that in the course of their undercover operation at the
club there were a number of times where they reached
“negative results” in their attempts to reach prostitution
agreements with the dancers at the club.
80. There is, in fact, significant doubt as to

whether they in fact reached those prostitution agreements
with those particular dancers with whom they claim to have
reached agreement. Their investigatory techniques and
procedures were rife with dishonesty and incompetence.
81. There was no justification to handcuff the

Plaintiff, frisk search the Plaintiff, or to detain the
Plaintiff in custody for the period of time he was held in
custody until he appeared at his arraignment when and where
he was released without bail and required to return to
Court thereafter when and where, upon the motion of the New
York County District Attorney’s Office, the charge
preferred against the Plaintiff was eventually dismissed
and the records sealed.
82. The Plaintiff was simply rounded up as part of a

collective group of employees at the Club without any
specific and particularized objectively reasonable fact and
information basis to believe that the Plaintiff had engaged
in any unlawful conduct.
83. The Plaintiff was rounded up and left to be sorted

out as part of a wholesale New York City collective
probable cause arrest policy and without any objectively
reasonable specific and particular fact and information
10
basis to believe that the Plaintiff was involved in any

criminal conduct associated with the Club.
84. The Defendants, per the policy of the City of New

York, “employed a ‘shoot ‘em all, and let God sort ‘em out’
arrest psychology”, which is “abhorrent to the Fourth
Amendment”, by arresting the Plaintiff simply because he
was present in the Club as an employee of the Club without
possessing any specific and particularized conduct by the
Plaintiff that linked the Plaintiff to any alleged unlawful
conduct supposedly taking place in the Club.
85. Employment at the Club and by the Club in and of

itself and without any specific and particular independent
fact and information basis to believe that the Plaintiff
even knew about any alleged unlawful conduct at the Club,
let alone was involved in any such alleged unlawful
conduct, is not a crime.
86. While the actions and conduct of the New York City
Police Officers were unlawful they were taken in the course
of their duties and functions and incidental to the
otherwise lawful performance of those duties and functions
as New York City Police Officers and as agents and
employees of the City of New York. Among others involved
in the challenged actions and conduct herein were
Defendants New York City Police Officers “Does”, Costello,
Braille, Koch, Kong, New York City Undercover Police
Undercover Police Officer 4325), and Conroy.
87. There was no probable cause for the arrest of the

Plaintiff or for the preferral of any — any - charges
against the Plaintiff or for the criminal prosecution of
the Plaintiff.
88. The Plaintiff was subjected to a Fourth Amendment

offensive probable cause lacking stop, false arrest and
unlawful custodial detention and imprisonment, and he was
subjected to excessive, unreasonable and unnecessary force
in the form of his handcuffing. Moreover, he was subjected
to an unlawful frisk search and to malicious prosecution,
and to a malicious abuse of criminal prosecution.
89. The actions and conduct herein described were

propelled by the vice crime offense enforcement initiatives
11
of the City of New York which are grounded in the

philosophy of the “ends justifies the means” and which
propel New York City Police Officers to make unlawful and
otherwise unjustified arrests.
90. Such vice crime offense enforcement initiatives,

for which the City provided inadequate training, propelled
the Defendant officers to make “collective probable cause”
custodial arrests of multiple individuals in this
situation, including the Plaintiff’s arrest, where there
was no specific and particular Plaintiff linked objectively
reasonable probable cause factual basis to believe that the
Plaintiff was engaged in unlawful conduct to justify the
arrest of the Plaintiff.
91. The Plaintiff was falsely arrested and subjected

to an excessive and unreasonable and unnecessary force [in
the form of handcuffing] and excessive detention and an
unlawful frisk search and a malicious abuse of criminal
process and to a malicious prosecution.
92. The actions, conduct, policies and practices and

customs herein described violated the Plaintiff’s rights as
guaranteed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
93. The Plaintiff suffered injuries and damages

including loss of liberty, fear, anxiety, mental distress,
emotional anguish, and psychological trauma and physical
pain and suffering.
94. The Plaintiff suffered public humiliation and

embarrassment.
95. The Plaintiff has not yet placed a monetary value

on the damages which he incurred although he believes them
to be substantial and to include compensatory and punitive
damages.
96. The Plaintiff has no other adequate remedy of law

other than for the institution of this litigation.
12
V. CAUSES OF ACTION
A. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
97. The Plaintiff reiterates Paragraph #’s 1 through

96 and incorporates such by reference herein.
98. The Plaintiff was unlawfully and falsely arrested

and falsely and excessively imprisoned and detained and
subjected to excessive force and unreasonable conditions of
his confinement, all in violation of his rights as
guaranteed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
99. The Plaintiff suffered injuries and damages.
B. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

101. The Plaintiff was subjected to malicious

prosecution in violation of his rights as guaranteed under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.
C. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

104. The Plaintiff was arrested for collateral

objectives other than legitimate law enforcement functions
including, as a collateral justification, that it was
simply easier to arrest someone and sort it out later than
it was to utilize the power of arrest in its proper,
probable cause grounded form and fashion based on an
objective and reasonable belief of the arresting law
enforcement officer at the time of the arrest that the
individual was engaged in unlawful conduct.
105. Simply being present at a location and being

employed by the entity which does business at the location
13
is not a sufficient basis on which to form the required

objectively reasonable probable cause fact based and
information belief to arrest an individual thereby
propelling a belief that a non legitimate, ancillary
purpose was the basis on which the arrest of the individual
was grounded.
106. The Plaintiff was subjected to malicious abuse of

criminal process in violation of his rights as guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.
D. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

109. The policies, practices and customs herein

described, including the vice crime offense enforcement
initiatives and the inadequate training policy associated
therewith, propelled the actions and conduct herein. Those
policies, practices, and customs violated the Plaintiff’s
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
E. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

112. If the City of New York elects to represent its

officers as it does in the overwhelming number of cases
brought against its officers [it is believed that the City
of New York elects to represent its officers in
approximately 99 percent of the cases brought against its
officers in the federal courts for alleged police officer
misconduct], the City of New York uniformly and as a matter
of policy and practice and custom pays the judgments
awarded against its represented officers [both compensatory
and punitive damages] and otherwise pays settlements, all
without requiring contribution from the officers.
14
113. The named and unnamed individual Defendants are

employees and agents of the City of New York and their
conduct, as described, was taken in the course of their
duties and functions as New York City Police Officers and,
in their capacities as such, as agents and employees of the
City of New York.
114. Their actions and conduct, while unlawful and

unconstitutional, nonetheless were actions and conduct
taken in connection with the otherwise lawful performance
of their duties and functions as agents and employees of
the City of New York.
115. The Plaintiff is entitled to recover directly

against the City of New York for the conduct of its named
and unnamed Officers under the federal claim jurisdiction
and/or against the City pursuant to the doctrine of
respondeat superior as the City is, as a matter of fact and
law and policy and practice and custom, the real party in
interest in this litigation.
15
WHEREFORE and in light of the foregoing, it is

respectfully requested that the Court assume jurisdiction
and:
[a] Invoke pendent party and pendent claim

jurisdiction.
[b] Award appropriate compensatory and

punitive damages.
[c] Award appropriate declaratory and

injunctive relief.
[d] Empanel a jury.
[e] Award attorney’s fees and costs.
[f] Award such other and further relief as

the Court deems to be in the interest
of justice.
DATED: New York, New York

May 1, 2011
Respectfully submitted,
/s/James I. Meyerson___
JAMES I. MEYERSON
64 Fulton Street @ Suite # 502
New York, New York 10013
[212] 226-3310
[212] 513-1006/FAX
jimeyerson@yahoo.com
JEFFREY A. ROTHMAN
315 Broadway @ Suite # 200
New York, New York 10007
[212] 227-2980
[212] 591-6343/FAX
rothman.jeffrey@gmail.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

BY:_______________________
16

Gaby Day v. The City of New York and New York City Police Officers - U.S. District Court, SDNY

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Gaby Day v. The City of New York and New York City Police Officers - U.S. District Court, SDNY

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Case 1:11-cv-02956-UA Document 1 Filed 05/02/11 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, a

1. This litigation arises out of the custodial arrest

2. The Plaintiff was detained in custody for

3. The Plaintiff appeared in Court on September 25,

4. Thereafter, the Plaintiff returned to Court again

5. This is an action in which the Plaintiff seeks

6. The Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and such

7. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to

8. The Plaintiff also invokes the jurisdiction of

9. This is an action in which the Plaintiff seeks

III. THE PARTIES

10. The Plaintiff is an American citizen and resident

11. The Defendant City of New York is a municipal

12. Defendants Christopher Koch, Shield # 2875,

13. Although the Defendants’ actions and conduct

14. This litigation arises out of the Plaintiff’s

15. The Plaintiff was released from custody without

16. The Plaintiff appeared in Court on September 25,

17. Thereafter, the Plaintiff returned to Court on

18. The Plaintiff, who is an American citizen and

19. The Plaintiff’s birth date is June 10, 1973.

20. The Plaintiff is single. The Plaintiff has an

21. Plaintiff resides on Halsey Street in the Bedford

22. The Plaintiff was born in Brooklyn, New York and

23. The Plaintiff attended and graduated from Jamaica

24. After graduating from Jamaica High School, the

25. The Plaintiff did not graduate or receive a degree

26. The Plaintiff also attended Pratt Institute of

27. The Plaintiff is presently unemployed.

28. On July 17, 2008 the Plaintiff was employed at Hot

29. The Plaintiff commenced his employment at the Hot

30. The Plaintiff was a part time employee.

31. The Plaintiff ordinarily worked three shifts a

32. Ordinarily, the Plaintiff commenced his part time

33. The Plaintiff was employed in his part time

34. In his part time capacity, the Plaintiff set up

35. The Plaintiff was not employed as a security agent

36. If and when he observed any conduct of which he

37. Moreover and to the extent that there was

reported to him by a lap dancer, the Plaintiff would, in

38. The Plaintiff secured the part time employment at

39. From on or about some time in 2005 to on or about

40. On July 17, 2008, the Plaintiff reported to work

41. The Plaintiff, per his functions, undertook

42. The Club opened to patrons at or about 8:00 P.M.

43. When the Club opened and per the Plaintiff’s

45. At or about 11:30 P.M. the Plaintiff observed a

46. Those individuals moved through the Club toward an

47. The Plaintiff observed those shield bearing,

48. When the afore-described Officer returned from the

Plaintiff observed what he believed to be a number of plain

49. A plain clothes New York City Police Officer

50. The employees of the Club, including dancers and

51. Eventually the plain clothes Officers, utilizing

52. The employees, including the Plaintiff, were asked

54. The Plaintiff received no response.

55. During the process of the arrest of the Plaintiff

56. The Plaintiff was frisked.

57. The Plaintiff was transported to the 7th Precinct.

58. The Plaintiff was fingerprinted and photographed.

59. The Plaintiff had no criminal record although,