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Political Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1984

Anti-Semitismand the Appeal of Nazism

Dieter D. Hartmann'

Although anti-Semitism was fundamental to Nazism, it seems not to have

been essential to the majority of Germans. Nor does it appear to have been
a decisive factor in either the Nazi rise to power or Hitler's vast popularity
throughout the 1930s and in the early years of the war. Yet Nazi Germany
was a society on its way to the Holocaust (Hilberg, 1961). Hitler assumed
power to save Germany from the Jews. Hatred of the Jews had been the
core of his Weltanschauungfrom the very beginnings of his political career
(Jackel, 1969; Waite, 1977). This paper asks whether we may tend to under-
rate the significance of anti-Semitism for the popular appeal of Nazism in
Germany.
KEY WORDS: anti-Semitism; Germany (1933-1945); Holocaust; Nazism.

Both German elite and the general electorate contributed to bringing

Nazism to power. Neither group was motivated mainly by anti-Semitism.
Large parts of the ruling class had tangible interests in destroying liberal and
pluralist democracy. They sided with Nazism because their quest for power
was limited by only hollow moral restraints: for them, the Holocaust was
a side-show that would move them to neither applause nor protest (Baum,
1981). However, anti-Semitism was part and parcel of most of these people's
personal outlooks. (Students' fraternities, for example, had long been strong-
holds of anti-Semitism, and military careers-the most prestigious of all-
were not open to Jews). Indeed, as we learned only recently (Hamilton, 1982),
the Nazi party very largely won support in the upper and upper middle classes,
which, as far as can be determined today, voted Nazi more readily than did

'Kurze Str. 14, D-7000 Tubingen 1, West Germany.

635
0162-895X/84/1200-0635$03.50/1 ? 1984 International Society of Political Psychology
636 Hartmann

all other segments of German society: Interest in power and profit was joined
by sympathy with Nazi ideas.
The upsurge of Nazi votes after 1929 was due to many factors. Quite
probably, national greatness and economic despair loomed much larger in
most people's minds than did the rather remote issue of the so-called Jewish
question. But if so many Germans paid little regard to the very core of Nazi
ideology, they could do so only because they did not truly resent it. Nazi
propaganda was, after all, drenched in hatred for the Jews from beginning
to end. Although the Nazis sometimes adapted anti-Jewish propaganda ac-
cording to its popularity in different regions of the country (Noakes, 1971:
209 f; Pridham, 1973: 237-244; Hamilton, 1982: 366f., 370 f., 422), they never
had to abandon it altogether. Hitler's hatred of the Jews did not lessen his
popularity (Kershaw, 1980: 132 f.). Most people apparentlyfound anti-Jewish
sentiments both familiar and abstract, nothing to object to and nothing to
worry much about.
The seminal study of the Nazi seizure of power in a small West Ger-
man town concluded that people "weredrawn to anti-Semitism because they
were drawn to Nazism, not the other way around" (Allen, 1965: 77). This
conclusion, however, has to be read in context (Allen, 1965): An "abstract
anti-Semitism" prevailed "in the form of jokes and expressions of general-
ized distaste." Enmity thus lurked beneath a civilized varnish. Anti-Jewish
jokes in particular, far from being jolly or good-humored, reveal an emo-
tional hostility that may root deeply. Moreover, research into local history
has to rely much on eyewitness accounts by surviving contemporaries. Such
oral history, however honestly told, may tend to avoid or extenuate the sig-
nificance of anti-Semitism. This may be so, on the one hand, because it was
so common and socially accepted as to escape notice. On the other hand,
this subject may be eschewed in retrospect because it is fraught with painful
and uneasy connotations of hidden guilt and helpless shame.
German culture indeed was infested with anti-Semitism (Massing, 1949;
Ehrlich, 1963; Pulzer, 1964; Mosse, 1964; Mosse, 1966). A pervading un-
dercurrent of hostility and contempt is revealed by the spiteful image of the
Jews in German folkore and popular literature. At best the Jew was expected
to assimilate, that is, cease to be Jewish. In a country whose political culture
and public mind never fully had embracedthe idea of universalhuman rights,
Jews still carriedthe burden of proof that they simply had the right to be there.
The ambiguity of common but abstract anti-Jewish attitudes also
prevailed after the Nazis came to power. German popular opinion about the
persecution of Jews has been investigated recently (Kershaw, 1981, 1983; and
see Steinert, 1977; Stokes, 1973; Kulka, 1975, 1982).2 Without undue

2Sources of popular opinion in Nazi Germany are, of course, subjective and impressionistic.
Recent research, however, presents an overall picture that looks coherent and undistorted. For
a detailed discussion of this problem see Steinert (1977) and Kershaw (1981, 1983). Roughly
Anti-Semitism and the Appeal of Nazism 637

generalization - leaving aside regional differences in particular- it may be

held that most Germans did not want pogroms but proved ready to de-
humanize the Jews. The 1933 boycott was largely a failure, and violence in
subsequent years did not incite rabid Jew baiting in the majority of the popu-
lation. This, however, was not so because of widespread sympathies with
the Jews. People resented lawlessness and disorderly conduct but largely ap-
proved of legal discrimination. They went on buying in Jewish shops when
they were cheapest. In the countryside, the only real contact with Jews usually
was with cattle dealers, and this contact was governed by economic self-
interest. Not infrequently, some reservationsabout Nazi brutalitywere voiced.
Yet there was very little principled opposition (Kershaw, 1981). The weak
stance of the Christian clergy is well known today.
While Nazism failed to rouse fanatical hatred, it did succeed in win-
ning widespread compliance with anti-Semitism as a basic policy of a highly
popular national leadership. The endless chain of violence and humiliation
in years to come was meticulously planned and executed all over Germany.
Millions of allegedly decent people took part in devising or executing legal
vilifications. Virtually all branches of the civil service were involved in im-
plementing anti-Jewish policies. For 1933 alone, reports of anti-Jewish ac-
tions comprise a sizeable Black Book (Schwarzbuch, 1933). Many anti-Semitic
activities in everyday life originated from city councils or business organiza-
tions (for some examples see Saldern, 1979: 204-206). They did not have
to wait for orders from above. (To give but one illustration:in the town where
I am living, the city council as early as 1933 closed the local swimming pool
to Jews). Large numbers of law-abiding citizens also enriched themselves at
the expense of Jews by way of so-called Aryanizations. There were more
hostility and contempt than most Germans would like to admit even today.
More than that, there were indifference and compliance. There also was mut-
ed dissent. But genuine sympathy or plain compassion was rare.
People very frequently approved of legal measures against the Jews,
however drastic; they rejected only wanton lawlessness and downright pil-
lage (Kershaw, 1983: 268 f., 272f.). The Number 1938 pogrom virtuallyevery-
where in Germany met with indignation. But even this signal deed "receded

speaking, current research largely relies on two main groups of sources: First, police and civil
administrations regularly compiled confidential reports about the situation and mood in the
population. They have been particularly well preserved in Bavaria. Select reports about reac-
tions to the persecution of Jews are published in Broszat et al. (1977: 427-486). For material
from other parts of Germany see Heyen (1967: 125-163), Thevoz et al. (1974), Kulka (1975:
260-290). Second, the exiled leadership of the Social Democratic Party issued reports from
inside Germany from 1934 to April 1940. They have been edited recently (Deutschland-Berichte,
1980). Reports on the persecution of Jews are in Volume 2 (1935): 800-814, 920-937, 1019-1021,
1026-1045; Volume 3 (1936): 20-42, 973-992, 1648-1664; Volume 4 (1937): 931-947, 1563-1576;
Volume 5 (1938): 176-206, 732-771, 1177-1211, 1275-1297, 1329-1358:Volume 6 (1939): 201-226,
381-383, 898-940; Volume 7 (1940): 256-268.
638 Hartmann

within a few weeks into the dim background of people's consciousness" (Ker-
shaw, 1981: 281). Later on, deportations and rumors about mass killings did
not evoke strong reactions. In part at least, this may be due to most people's
desperate situation at that time. But people did protest against other Nazi
measures. Many Germans objected for truly humanitarian reasons when the
Nazis began to murderthe insane. Some Germans stood up for a moral cause
when the Nazis ordered crucifixes to be removed from classrooms. Symbols
thus brought forth more deeply felt reactions than did the fate of humans
as alien as were the Jews.
On the other hand, there has been a broad consensus in postwar Ger-
many that the Wehrmacht had no share in mass killings. Today we know
that this was not the case (Krausnick, 1981). Over and again, the German
army readily cooperated with the killing units; and, quite frequently, high-
ranking army officers showed their sympathy with the Nazi cause.
The Nazis virtually never met with any difficulties in mustering their
executioner wherever they looked for them (Hilberg, 1961). Nazism did not
unleash much passionate hate. Nor did it need to. Hitler did not want anti-
Semitism to be motivated by passion. He asked for detached and ruthless
efficiency. Callous toughness ("Harte")was far from being unpopular. Raul
Hilberg recently summed it up in a simple question (1980: 100): "Amazing
to me, after involving myself for thirty years in this research, is still the ques-
tion: why were they not inefficient?"
The dismal features of relentless compliance and stunted compassion
may cover a still deeper and less conscious level of sympathy with the ulti-
mate goal of Nazism. Contemporary observers, while stating widespread dis-
approval of wanton lawlessness, underlined the fact that Nazi propaganda
eventually had its effect (Kershaw, 1981: 274; 1983: 275, 371 f.). People
proved ready to dehumanize the Jews. A great many Germans agreed that
there really was a Jewish question. (This quite probably was true for a majori-
ty of contemporary Germans). Many people wanted the Jews to disappear
and be gone for good. They agreed that the Jews should be out of sight.
They did not want to share their own world with Jews. They just did not
bother to think what this meant for the victims.
Sigmund Freud noted (1900: 254 f.) that for children, "to have died"
means to be gone away forever, no longer to trouble the survivors. The child,
in Freud's view, does not distinguish the ways and means that bring about
such absence. A death wish basically is for someone to be gone, away and
out of sight, forever. Such is infantile imagery; but it lingers on in the adult
mind. A death wish, therefore, need not include the wish to kill or to see
somebody die. Killing might add cruel satisfaction, but it is not indispensa-
ble. The Nazis did not want individual sadism; they wanted a world without
Jews.
Anti-Semitism and the Appeal of Nazism 639

Most Germans probably would have recoiled from the ultimate conse-
quence of their own hostile feelings toward the Jews. But they did not want
to know. Nobody was requested to offer any clear-cut ideas about the fate
of the doomed. Wishful thinking need not be vehement or conspicuous. Peo-
ple may harbor destructive fantasies without giving heed to their significance
and implications. This makes them no less pernicious, but renders it more
difficult to face and overcome them by way of accepting civilized limits.
Therefore, the fact that Nazi anti-Semitism did not result in blood-lust does
not imply that it had little appeal. Nazi policies of dehumanization could
work because they struck a consonant chord. People were led along a road
they were willing to go. Few shared their leadership'sresoluteness. Many more
agreed with their Fuhrer that the Jews should be marched off into some bleak
nowhere.
These are dim and vague notions, but they must not be taken for being
insubstantial because they are so thoughtless; nor are they innocuous because
of their seeming triviality. Their uncaring callousness points to an inclina-
tion, so grave with consequence, to treat human beings as matter. They re-
veal indifference and contempt rather than hate or fear.
Disdain for the Jews' humanity, however vague and trivial, constitut-
ed an essential component of some of the most prominent aspects of Nazism's
popular appeal. Anti-Semitism not only allowed for extreme forms of
scapegoating, but also it is linked to what may well be the most enticing fea-
ture of Nazism: the delusion of German superiority. The indifference and
the unemotional quality of contempt signify narcissistic grandiosity, no less
than does vengeful rage. The emotional appeal of Nazism focused on im-
ages of greatness, purity, and impregnability. Beyond economic despair and
political troubles, Nazism answered to forceful emotional needs. It offered
opportunity to distance oneself from the weak, the vulnerable, and the ugly.
Such imagery needs human symbols. The dream of power and purity stands
above some foil of utter human refuse.
Identification with ruthless grandiosity also makes it possible to exe-
cute licensed violence without remorse. This is a lesson many a German
had learned from earliest childhood on3. Most people who went a long way
with Nazism did so with a clear conscience. In their coarse language, com-
passion had no voice. In an era when many Germans tried to dissociate their
fatherland from Western liberal and humanitarian ideas, German political
culture approved of many forms of violence. It remains one of the more in-
triguing questions why Hitler's eligibility for Chancellor of the Reich was

30n the psychodynamicsand psychohistoryof these emotional scars see Loewenberg, (1975, 1983:
205-283). Much insight into the social causes of Nazi anti-Semitism may still be gained from
Reichmann (1950).
640 Hartmann

not ruled out by his well-publicized "Potempa telegram" of August 1932,

when he ferociously sided with some storm-troopers who (in a Silesian vil-
lage by the name of Potempa) had committed murder. Research on Hitler's
popular image has emphasized the satisfaction among large segments of the
populace that accompanied confessions to drastic measures (Kershaw, 1980:
49f., 75, 79). Together with the authoritarian inclination to sanctioned ruth-
lessness, commonplace anti-Semitism enabled large numbers of Germans to
somehow get involved in the preparation for and administration of the
Holocaust.
In trying to assess the impact of anti-Semitism, we must appreciate cer-
tain confounding factors. Looking back 50 years, our insight depends upon
fragmentary knowledge of opaque and ambiguous human reactions. And
we are constrained, too, by our own backgrounds and environments. Gen-
tiles and Germans, like myself, may realize with distress that we are related
more closely to the perpetrators than to the victims: With the Nazi genera-
tion we share many of the culturaltraditions, social conventions, and the very
language that shape our outlooks. There is much in our environment that
asks us not to be so hard on our own fathers and grandfathers. In effect,
we unwittingly are urged to side with the Nazi constituency from the outset.
It is a disturbing experience to no longer minimize the traits of destruction
and hostility in the minds of common people who are so close to ourselves.
And indeed we may hesitate to allot so much concern to the Jewish
minority. Much talk about German Fascism stops short of really facing the
Holocaust. Quite frequently, anti-Semitism is seen as being just an extreme
case of racism, xenophobia, or totalitarian terror and manipulation. The very
names of Auschwitz and the Holocaust tend to be used as general symbols
of gross destruction. The significance of the Holocaust is being sidestepped
even in much of the scholarly literature, both in the East and in the West
(Dawidowicz, 1981). Our approachin explainingNazism thus may subtly serve
to detach us from the Jews.
Many aspects of Nazism are fading into the past. Not so anti-Semitism.
There are indications that it is gaining ground with the young. Only recently
have we begun to study the impact of the Holocaust on the children of the
Nazi generation(Bergmanand Jucovy, 1982). Little, as yet, do we know about
the legacy of Nazism to the third generation. Through anti-Semitism, the
inequities of the fathers might be visiting the children, even unto the third
and fourth generation.

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