Vacula 1 Justin Vacula M/C Philosophy Dr.

Reitsma March 17, 2011 Is it Reasonable to Believe Something Because it Will Make You Happy? William James, Blaise Pascal, and W.K. Clifford have been very influential in discussions regarding belief. Clifford's essay, The Ethics of Belief, produced what is often called the Clifford Principle which states, It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence. Pascal believed that if reason could not decide a matter, one should consider the consequences of the belief and choose accordingly. William James believes that matters exist in which reason cannot lead us to arrive at a conclusion based on evidence, thus we are obliged to make a decision independent of evidence a stark departure from the Clifford Principle. James states, Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds (James 5). William James does not suggest that we believe what we wish simply because it makes us happy; James specifies some main conditions which must be met before one is obliged to arrive at a conclusion independent of evidence. An option must be what James calls a living hypothesis which means that this specific belief must be a realistic possibility in regards to the thinker; living hypotheses must exist in one's culture, seem reasonable, and be widely held for example. James explains that the Madhi, an Islamic redeemer, is a dead hypothesis for, presumably, an American, while it is a live hypothesis for an Arab. Another condition is whether the proposition is forced or avoidable. An avoidable option, James explains, is a case in which one need not act; if faced with a dilemma of going outside with or without an umbrella, one can simply fail to leave one's house. A forced option is one which can't be avoided; if

Vacula 2 faced with a dilemma such as accept a truth or go without it, James believes, one must choose one of these options. The final consideration is where the option is momentous or trivial. James describes a trivial option as common, having an insignificant stake, or one that is reversible if the future proves a decision unwise. James concludes that one is permitted to arrive at a conclusion independent of evidence if a genuine option is a living hypothesis, a forced option, and momentous if a conclusion can't be arrived at on purely intellectual grounds (1-2). James initially suggests that Pascal's reasoning, when regarding religious options, is put to its last trumps and is a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving heart (3). James also believes that a deity would be justified in depriving a person who employs Pascal's reasoning of an infinite reward because such a mechanical calculation lack[s] the inner soul of faith's reality (3). Without cultural exposure or some sort of disposition to believe in Christian rituals, James notes, the option of belief in God is a dead hypothesis for such a thinker. James believes that belief out of volition (presumably according to Pascalian wagering) is from one point of view, simply silly. From another point of view it is worse than silly, it is vile (3). In response to Clifford's Principle, James notes that there is lack of widespread agreement regarding truth; no concrete test of what is really true, James says, has been agreed upon (6). This reality, according to James, undermines the idea that evidence can be sufficient, thus the Clifford Principle is compromised. James states, Where is a certainly true answer found? Apart from [...] propositions which tell us nothing by themselves about concrete reality, we find no proposition ever regarded by one as evidently certain that has not either been called a falsehood, or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by someone else (6). If our cognitive faculties cannot

Vacula 3 yield beliefs with a high level of being certainly true, James appears to think, objective evidence goes out the window and statements are only believed to be true because a person thinks that they are so; one's conviction that the evidence one goes by is of the real objective brand, is only one more subjective opinion added to the lot (6). James believes that withholding judgment is a passional decision that can lead a person to risk a great deal and deprive a person of truth (5). Using Clifford's principle, a person should never accept the truth value of a proposition without holding sufficient evidence and thus could risk losing the truth of a matter that could be had using Jamesian reasoning when meeting the qualifications that James described. When speaking of losing truth, James means that a person may benefit epistemically, practically, or otherwise by holding a belief and would not gain these goods if he/she were to withhold judgment. One can choose, James suggests, placing the search for truth as a paramount concern and avoiding error as a secondary concern or regarding avoidance of error as a primary concern and placing the search for truth as a secondary concern and let truth take its chance (7). If a person lets truth take its chance while prioritizing the search for truth and places avoiding error as a secondary concern, knowledge can be had that otherwise would be forfeited. James believes that holding fast to Clifford's principle in the face of a proposition that is not backed with sufficient evidence disposes a person to a great amount of fear and a certain intellectual crippling. If we follow the maxim, Better go without belief forever than believe a lie, Clifford notes, a person shows his own preponderant private horror of being a dupe (7) and is a slave to this maxim and Clifford's principle. James likens a person who behaves in this slavish manner to a general who tells his soldiers to stay out of battle in fear of risking a single wound.

Vacula 4 James appears to believe that life is full of mistakes and trial and error, thus holding some beliefs that might happen to be false and avoiding fear greatly outweighs being fooled. James explains, Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf (8). Objections: (a) James' ideas regarding living and dead hypotheses are on shaky ground; why

ought lack of belief that is apparent in one's culture permit a person to totally reject a belief prima facie? Should not the person consider and reconsider living hypotheses for persons in other cultures? When considering whether or not the metaphysical claims of Islam are true, for example, it does not seem moral or fair to automatically write off this proposition simply because a person lives in America. Thomas Nagel states, Pursuit of the truth requires [] the generation and decisive elimination of alternative possibilities until, ideally, only one remains (Nagel 9). If this statement is correct, we ought to consider hypotheses that are living for people in other cultures. This objection attacks one of James' criterion about a genuine option, thus many more hypotheses, not just few live ones, should be considered. If more hypotheses exist because fewer considered are dead, James' method yields a lesser amount of truth and makes a person more likely to hold false beliefs. (b) James discusses absolute empiricists (people who profess to have certain

knowledge) and non-absolute empiricists (people who understand that knowledge is fallible) and presents a pragmatic view of truth, but this conception of truth is false because truth isn't pragmatic. Truths exist apart from human minds; whether or not humans existed, for example, would have no bearing on whether or not the

Vacula 5 proposition the universe is billions of years old is true. In light of the former statement, truth is not a matter of subjective standards (although some people may claim subjective justification for certain experiences, but this does not matter). Knowledge can also have a high degree of epistemic warrant when the truth value of a proposition is heightened by peer review like that often employed by scientists. When a group of experimenters reach a conclusion, this conclusion can be replicated by others, and thus is not simply a matter of a single person believing a proposition to be true, but rather the conclusion is supported by many people, thus the proposition has a great deal of justification. This does not entail that truth is a matter of democracy, but rather shows that the likelihood of a proposition is raised when experimental results are replicated and people with specific credentials who are experts in a field make judgment about matters relating to that field. Since truth is not a matter of pragmatics as James describes, this undermines the legitimacy of applying a pragmatic attitude to belief. (c) James explains that withholding judgment deprives a person of holding truth,

but he fails to look at the other side of the coin: withholding judgment also relieves a person of holding false beliefs that may lead to disaster. James thinks that holding some false beliefs is not a huge concern, but it certainly can be in some cases. Suppose Jim takes James' attitude toward belief and thinks that the issue of whether or not Islam is true cannot be intellectually resolved, so he accepts the metaphysics of Islam and joins a mosque which houses a radical cleric. Soon after joining, Jim accepts more propositions that the cleric makes because he believes they can't be intellectually resolved and eventually completes a task as a suicide bomber killing himself and twenty civilians. Much to Jim's chagrin, there was no afterlife and his life had ended prematurely. In this case, withholding belief would have been a better

Vacula 6 course of action and holding a false belief was disastrous. The consequence of belief was not a single minor wound that James describes when he speaks of a general withholding soldiers from battle. (d) Further, in addition to the previous line of objections in the last paragraph,

withholding belief is intellectually honest while failing to do so in matters that can't be intellectually resolved is not intellectually honest and displays poor intellectual acumen. People who view others with high regard (or even with low regard) may model behavior and perpetuate poor epistemic practice, thus leading to a degeneration of the truth accepted by others and a hampering of intellectual progress. (e) If concern for the truth is the primary goal of epistemology (or something else),

society should never place this as a secondary value and say that errors in reasoning are to be avoided and are not like simple wounds on soldiers. False beliefs are not contributing to the lexicon of knowledge in society and make acquiring the truth much more difficult. For example, many Americans deny evolution and thus hold false beliefs. Notions of intelligent design, creationism, and rejection of evolution are wasting the time that science educators are instead spending on defending evolution, dealing with complaints of parents, and working against beliefs instilled into children via indoctrination. The harm of holding false beliefs is not only restricted to the individual, but can effect a society as a whole and stifle progress. Author's Response: A defender of James might respond to objection (a) in the following manner by saying, Certain hypotheses must be considered dead because if this were not the case, there would simply be too many. Also, many hypotheses were raised in other cultures because the belief only makes sense in context of their cultures. The first

Vacula 7 part of this response must be rejected because thinkers should consider a wide range of possibilities and not just limit considerations to their culture or time period. Perhaps some beliefs can be rejected prima facie because our current knowledge has eclipsed that of people of different times and cultures and we can do so with high confidence. For example, we can reject the belief in demon possession or the belief that demons cause diseases because our scientific understanding has produced explanations that are more conservative, fruitful, and the most sensible explanation in light of the given evidence. This prima facie rejection is not done as a matter of convenience, but rather is a product of rational reflection. It seems awfully ethnocentric to assume that just because beliefs originated in different cultures, they are automatically suspect or impossible to understand. The truth value or seriousness of a claim should not be diminished just because it was produced in another culture. It's also quite possible to consider different perspectives of those outside our culture, so we ought not automatically discount them. An objector to objection (b) seems to be lost for words because James views evidence in an incorrect fashion, thus his whole enterprise is compromised, but a response may be, Well, even if truth exists apart from humans and is not a matter of subjectivity, truth is still very difficult to obtain. This response does not salvage James' principles, but rather just states that truth is difficult to obtain, but difficulty in attaining truth ought not entail that we should allow our passions to guide belief. We should simply work harder and forsake intellectual laziness. If a belief still cannot be substantiated by evidence, we can simply withhold belief and continue research. Objection (c ) can be met with a refutation like this, Suppose a person who uses James' principles happens to arrive at a belief that would not be had by waiting for more evidence to come in and does a great deal to help the world because of this

Vacula 8 belief. Wouldn't this be a good thing? Humans ought not hold belief simply because of the consequences that the belief might entail, for this is forsaking reason in the highest extent and might not only harm the person, but as noted, can harm others. Imagine if someone held a belief that she won a massive lottery jackpot. This belief might initially be a good thing because the woman may give more to charities, treat her friends better, financially support family members, but this would eventually prove to be disastrous once her bank account was emptied, she could not pay her bills, etc. In the case, the women should have waited for the lottery drawing to take place instead of believing that she had won. Truth, not happiness, should be the goal and both don't have to be mutually exclusive. Happiness can be had as a result of pursuing the truth and arriving at a conclusion which one can publicly defend and feel intellectually fulfilled about. In response to objection (d), a person may respond with the following, People are often independent thinkers and don't model others! People often compartmentalize beliefs, so one cognitive failure might not effect other areas of life. For example, if one were to believe in a conspiracy theory, he/she would not necessarily carry this thought process over to other areas of life. It's not clear that many are really good independent thinkers because people tend to follow figures of authority and hold beliefs because of tradition, the result of upbringing, what others in a culture think, etc. It's also not clear that compartmentalization happens. If a woman were a racist, for example, she may not vote for political candidates on the basis of skin color, may exclude the ideas of members of other races from conversations and may view their ideas as illegitimate. She may teach her children to be racist and perpetuate a vicious circle. Even if people were independent thinkers

Vacula 9 and compartmentalization happened, displaying great intellectual behavior is still desirable and will surely rub off on others. Objection (e) seems to be quite a strong defeater to James' enterprise. The objector may agree that true beliefs are valuable and desirable and may propose a more ultimate goal than finding the truth about certain matters, but whatever this desirable goal may be, true belief ought to make it possible. If the goal of society should be to help the poor, certainly true beliefs must be had to achieve this goal and would make the goal more easily attainable. Suppose the intellect, as James would say, cannot resolve the matter of which charity to donate to, so the person decides to give to a local religious charity. Instead of this money going to help the poor, the charity may instead primarily spend the money on evangelization which would undermine our goal. Final thoughts: Humans should hold true belief in high esteem because it is intrinsically valuable: it is action-guiding, can improve society, and is intellectually fulfilling to hold true beliefs. If a matter can't be resolved by the intellect (or so one would think), judgment should be withheld and more research should be done instead of following what our passions lead us to. Many people, using Jamesian methods can come to different beliefs, thus the process isn't very reliable at all; Jones may believe the doctrines of Islam while Jake may become a Mormon. Happiness can still be a high goal of humans, but this goal can be had through an intellectually honest, rigorous, and fulfilling process. Few experiences in the intellectual life can make a person happier than arriving at true belief and standing on firm ground. Critical thinking skills provide us with a certain type of mental armor that makes people less prone to being

Vacula 10 swindled, taken advantage of, looking silly, or providing someone else with false information while, on the other hand, false beliefs make the opposite more likely.

Works Cited J a m e s , Wi l l i a m . " Th e Wi l l t o B e l i e v e . " J M U . e d u , 1 9 9 7 . We b . 3 1 M a r 2 0 11 . <http://educ.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html>. Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford, 1986. Print.

Background and Further Reading

C l i f f o r d , W i l l i a m K . " T h e E t h i c s o f B e l i e f . " 1 9 9 9 . We b . 3 1 M a r 2 0 1 1 . < h t t p : / / w w w. i n f i d e l s . o r g / l i b r a r y / h i s t o r i c a l / w _ k _ c l i f f o r d / e t h i c s _ o f _ b e l i e f . h t m l > . P a s c a l , B l a i s e . " P e n s e e s . " We b . 3 1 M a r 2 0 1 1 . <http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/pascal/pensees-contents.html>.