QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF LNG ABOVEGROUND

TANKS BASED ON PAST OPERATING RECORDS OF LNG

REGASIFICATION TERMINALS AND LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT

MIYAZAKI Shinichi, Production Department, Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd.

YAMADA Yoshihisa, LNG Engineering Department, Tokyo Gas Engineering Co., Ltd.

1. Preface
In 2001 Japan imported 54.1 million tons of LNG, which was slightly over half of the world’s
total LNG production of 100 million tons per year. About 60% of Japan’s LNG is stored in
aboveground tanks and the rest is stored in-ground tanks at LNG regasification terminals in Japan.
In-ground tanks have excellent merits; high safety, effective land utilization and not disrupting
scenery. On the other hand, in 1993, pre-stressed concrete (PC) was used for the first time in Japan
to construct a new aboveground LNG storage tank. Currently almost all aboveground tanks in Japan
are single containment, with structurally independent dikes. At present five PC tanks, with this new
design, are in operation in Japan, and some are under construction or in the planning stage. In
Europe and the United States aboveground PC tanks have been constructed since 1960s and was the
common tank design of the 1980s.
Presented here is a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of LNG aboveground tank designs
based on the past operating records of LNG regasification terminals, along with a conventional single
containment tank design. The assessment was conducted after choosing two aboveground tank
designs, among several, to study. One is the PC membrane tank without a structurally independent
dike. It has a high, calculated safety probability. This design, however, has not been constructed
anywhere in the world. The other is a Steel/PC double shell tank without a structurally independent
dike. This design has been constructed only in Japan. A Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) was also
conducted to compare both PC tank designs from the viewpoint of their global environmental impact.

2. Structure and Function of LNG Aboveground PC Tanks Assessed

A summary of the structure and the function of both the PC membrane tank and the Steel/PC
double shell tank (both without a structurally independent dike) is given below. Also a conventional
single containment tank is described. In addition, in-ground tank construction is also referenced,
though it is not assessed in this paper.

2.1. PC Membrane Tank without a Structurally Independent Dike

A 2mm-thick stainless steel membrane serves as the gas and liquid-tight inner container. The
PC outer wall serves both as the structural member supporting the membrane and as a dike during
unexpected loss of LNG containment. Polyurethane foam (PUF) insulation installed between the PC
outer wall and SS membrane transfers the LNG’s liquid pressure to the PC outer wall. The PC outer
wall also supports the gas-tight, dome-shaped steel roof.
This tank design has been standardized by European Code, EN1473, “Installation and
Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas - Design of Onshore Installations”. However, every tank built so
far, however, has been constructed with the dike. There have been two 120,000 m3 tanks constructed
in France and ten 100,000 m3 tanks, in South Korea. All of them are now in operation.

2.2. Steel/PC Double Shell Tank without a Structurally Independent Dike

This tank design consists of PC outer wall, perlite insulation and a structurally self-supported
steel inner container. For low-temperature service, this steel contains 9% nickel. The PC outer wall
serves as a dike during unexpected loss of LNG containment. A liner generally made of metal
installed inside the PC outer wall operates both as a moisture barrier and as a gas barrier to contain the
nitrogen held in the inter-barrier space. Only by the primary container (not by the PC outer wall)
supports the gas-tight, dome-shaped roof, made of low-temperature-service steels.
At present 5 tanks are in operation in Japan. The full containment tanks, similar to the
Steel/PC double shell tank and without a structurally independent dike have been constructed in
Portugal, South Korea, India and other countries. There is a difference in the vapor control method
between a full containment tank and a Steel/PC double shell tank. The roof is supported by the PC
outer wall in a full containment tank (as standardized by EN 1473) and this makes it possible to control
the vapor in the case of loss of LNG containment.
In Japan, “The Preliminary Draft of Recommended Practice for PC LNG Aboveground Tank”
was issued as the first technical standard for Steel/PC aboveground tanks by the Center of Promotion
of Natural Gas in 1990. It was developed as the “Recommended Practice for LNG Aboveground
Storage” in August 2002.

2.1. PC Membrane Tank 2.2. Steel/PC Double Shell Tank

PC Outer Wall PC Outer Wall

Inner Shell
SS Membrane (9% Ni Steel)

GL GL

2.4. In-ground Tank 2.3. Single Containment Tank

CS Outer shell
GL
Inner Shell
(9% Ni Steel Dike
RC Tank Body
or Al Alloy)

SS Membrane
GL

Figure 1 Comparison between PC Membrane Tank and Conventional LNG Tanks

2.3. Single Containment Tank with a Structurally Independent Dike

This tank design consists of an inner container made of low-temperature service steels (such
as steel containing 9% nickel or an aluminum-based alloy), perlite insulation and a carbon steel outer
wall, which is surrounded by a structurally independent dikes. In case of an unexpected LNG spill, the
steel outer wall can not confine the leaked LNG; however, the surrounding dikes can prevent the LNG
from spreading outside the immediate area.
This tank design was developed for LPG storage during the 1950s and is the most common
design in the world. In Japan this design was first constructed in 1969 and since then about 100 tanks
have been constructed, making up approximately 60 percent of those in service in Japan.

2.4. In-ground Tank

This tank design has a 2-mm thick membrane as its primary container. The tank body, which
is installed below grade, is made of reinforced concrete (RC) because large earth and water pressure
forces constantly act on side wall and bottom.
In-ground tanks have following excellent merits:
1. The possibility of spilling large quantities of LNG onto the ground is almost ruled out since
the liquefied gas is stored underground. Auxiliary equipment and sometimes piping are
above ground but these contain limited quantities of LNG relative to the storage tanks
themselves.
2. Land is effectively utilized since storage is below ground level and no protective dikes are
needed around the tanks.
3. The dome-shaped roof does not disrupt the scenery of surrounding area, giving the
 onlookers a sense of safety. For the advanced-class of in-ground tank that is constructed
completely underground at Ohgishima terminal in Yokohama, Japan, the dome-shaped
roof is covered with at least one meter of soil and so it is entirely hidden from view.
Approximately 70 tanks have been constructed in Japan since the first tank was constructed in
1970. The in-ground tanks account for approximately 40% of LNG storage in Japan. They continue
to win approval from local authorities for their high safety level/record. 14 units have been constructed
in South Korea and in other countries.

2.5. Demanded Function for LNG Storage Tanks

The functions demanded of a LNG storage tank are roughly classified into 3 categories:
· the containment of LNG and boil-off gas,
· withstanding the inner gas and liquid pressures, and
· the prevention of liquid spread in case of an emergency LNG spill.
Table 1 shows function of each component of PC membrane tank, Steel/PC double shell tank
single containment tank and in-ground tank.
· In a PC membrane tank, the inner shell membrane operates as the primary container
only. The PC outer wall withstands inner gas and liquid pressure and prevents liquid
spread in an emergency, acting as the secondary container.
· In the Steel/PC double shell tank, the inner shell, made of 9% Nickel Steel, functions not
only as primary container but also it must withstand the inner gas and liquid pressure.
The PC outer wall operates as a secondary container, preventing liquid spread in an
emergency.
· In a single containment tank, the inner shell operates in the same fashion as that in the
Steel/PC double shell tank. The dike functions as a secondary container.
· For an in-ground tank, the inner shell membrane operates as primary container. The
outer PC wall together with earth pressure withstands the inner gas and liquid pressures
and intrinsically prevents liquid spread in an emergency by also acting as a secondary
container.

Withstanding
LNG Containment Prevention of Liquid Spread
LNG pressure
PC Membrane tank Primary Container Secondary Container
Steel/PC Double Shell Tank Primary Container Secondary Container
Single Containment Tank Primary Container Dike (Secondary Container)
In-ground Tank Primary Container Secondary Container and Earth
Table 1 Classification of the Functional Components of LNG tanks

3. Features of PC Membrane Tank

PC membrane tanks derive the following features from their structural characteristics listed
above.

3.1. High Economical Efficiency and Short Construction Time

Since its membrane is supported (through the PUF) by the PC wall behind it, a PC membrane
tank’s capacity is not limited by the strength of its thin-film membrane used as the inner shell.
However, the capacity of a Steel/PC double shell tank is restricted by the strength of the maximum
thickness of its 9% Nickel steel sheet. The larger capacity tank design enables the construction cost
per unit capacity to be cut. Because LNG storage facilities generally makes up approximately one
third of a LNG terminal’s cost, being able to cut the cost of the storage tanks is very important. Also,
as capacity is increased, construction times of a PC membrane tank become much shorter compared
with those of Steel/PC double shell tanks. For example in case of 140,000m3 tanks, a PC membrane
tank’s construction period is 25 months while Steel/PC double shell tank takes 34 months.
 40

35
34

Construction Period (Month)

30
28
25 25

20 21

15
14
12 PC Membrane Tank
10
Steel/PC Double Shell Tank
5

0
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000
Capacity （m3）
Figure 2 Comparison of Construction Period of LNG Tanks

3.2. High Safety

The membrane is not a pressure part but a part of the liquid and gas tightness system.
Defects/flaws in the membrane can not grow rapidly because they instantly release the secondary
stress that predominates on the membrane. Therefore, there is low probability of a LNG spill from a
membrane tank. Even if it were to occur, the LNG would not spread out rapidly. Moreover it would
be easy to detect the gas’s escape, which has good gas permeability, because the tank’s PUF
insulation already fills the inter-barrier space (between membrane and PC outer wall) and therefore
inhibits the LNG from entering. The PC outer wall, operating as secondary container, could contain
any LNG spill within the tank structure. In addition, the inner shell, outer wall, foundation and roof can
be designed and constructed using proven existing technical standards and technology. The ability to
conduct a hydrostatic test enables engineers to enhance the reliability of PC outer wall.

4. Quantitative Risk Assessment

A quantitative risk assessment was carried out in order to evaluate the safety of these two tank
designs. Additionally, the single containment tank design was also assessed for comparison.

4.1. Assessment Content

When doing a QRA, risk is synthetically evaluated from the viewpoints of probability of its
occurrence and the impact of the hazard. Then, in general, the following risk assessments are
executed by QRA for the tank designs.
(a) Impact of Vapor Leakage
Evaluation of the impacts and probabilities of damage to the roof, blow-off from one of the
safety valves and damage to the boil-off-gas (BOG) line (both from gas diffusion and
radiant heat when ignited) are conducted.
(b) Impact of Liquid Leakage
Evaluation of the impacts and probabilities from damage to the LNG receiving and feeding
lines and from overfilling of the LNG tank itself (both from gas diffusion and radiant heat
when ignited) are conducted.
(c) Impact of Tank Rupture
Evaluation of the impact and probability of tank rupture are conducted.
In this report, the object is to evaluate the safety level of the PC membrane tank design
compared to that of the Steel/PC double shell and single containment tank designs. The above two
cases, (a) and (b), do not exert a different result among these tank designs because assumed damage
is irrelevant to tank designs. On the other hand, case (c) is dependent on tank designs and so is the
focus of this paper.
4.2. Assessment Method
Although there are several other methods such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Failure
Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) that are also used in the field of QRA, FTA is employed in this report.
FTA consists of both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Causes of the hazardous event, namely the
loss of LNG containment, are deductively inferred in the qualitative analysis. The probabilities of
these hazardous events based on the deduced qualitative analysis are then computed with failure rate
data, such as the probabilities of basic causes. Finally, a QRA of a tank system is completed both
with the calculated probability of incidence and with an analysis of the hazardous consequences.
However it is noted again that the analysis of the hazardous consequences is not addressed in this
paper adjusting the focus of the above object described in 4.1.

4.3. Cause for Loss of LNG Containment

The following four top events of possible causes for loss of LNG containment were determined
from qualitative analysis. Figure 3 shows Fault Tree of the four top events that could result in leakage
from the tank rupture.
(1) Shortcomings of design and/or inspection (frost heave, welding failure, brittle failure,
excessive vibrations, settling of insulation, wrong material(s) used)
(2) Natural disasters (earthquakes, near earth object (NEO) impact, lighting, excessive snow
load, flooding)
(3) Failure in plant operations (under-pressure in the LNG tank, excessive pressure in the tank,
procedure failures during a plant maintenance or in-tank pump drop, overfilling)
(4) Extra-ordinary events (Jet fire at the site, excessive blast load, missiles)
The probabilities for above each four events were determined by references, or past operating
records of the terminal of Tokyo Gas, depending on the circumstances.

Leakage from the tank

OR

Shortcomings of design
Natural disasters Failure in plant operation Extra-ordinary events
and/or inspection

P1 P2 P3 P4

Figure 3 Fault Tree of the Four Top Events

4.4. Investigation of Past operating Records of LNG Regasification Terminals

Part P3 of Figure 3 denotes the Fault Tree (FT) generated by evaluation of the loss of LNG
containment caused by failure in plant operations. Where possible, among the above four top events,
the past operating records of Tokyo Gas were used to evaluate the events which led to LNG leaks due
to failure in plant operations.
That is to say, the operational records from actual plant are reflected in the following two
factors: rollover and excessive pressure in the tank during an unloading operation, which both can
cause excessive pressure. Details are described below:

4.4.1. Rollover
Rollover occurs when four events occur simultaneously:
· liquids with different densities are loaded into a tank,
· unstable stratification occurs,
· failure of detection (temperature measurement) and intervention, and
· failure of pressure safety valves (PSVs).
Then, the past operating records are reflected in the probability of failure of PSVs.
4.4.2.Excessive Pressure in the Tank during an Unloading Operation
Excessive pressure occurs under conditions of:
· overpressure protection failure, and
· unloading operation ongoing.
Overpressure protection failure occurs under simultaneous conditions of:
· failure of PSVs
· failure to remove boil-off-gas, and
· failure of pressure control valve (PCV) to flare.
Failure to remove boil-off-gas occurs under condition either of:
· failure of first compressor and failure of take-over, or
· common cause failure of compressors.
Then the three probabilities: failure of PCV, failure of first compressor and failure of take-over,
and common cause failure of compressors are deduced from past operational records of the Tokyo
Gas LNG regasification terminals.

P3

Failure in plant operation

OR

Excessive During an
Underpressure maintenance Overfilling
pressure intervention

OR
P28 P37 P38

During an
Rollover unloading
operation

AND AND

Liquids with Occurrence of Excessive

Failure of Failure of
different unstable Failure of PSVs pressure
densities stratification detection protection fails operation

P29 P30 P31 P32 AND P33

Failure to remove Failure of PCV

Failure of PSVs
boil-off- gas to flare

OR
P32 P34

Failure of first
Common cause
compressor and
of compressors
take-over

P35 P36

Figure 4 FT of the Loss of LNG Containment by Shortcomings in Plant Operations

4.5. Results
Table 2 shows the probability of LNG leakage from each tank designs. QRA by FTA finds that
a PC membrane tank design (1X10-7 times/year) has the same safety level as the Steel/PC double shell
tank design (1X10-7 times /year) and that it has higher safety level than single containment tank without
a dike (3X10-5 times /year).
Among the top four events, extra-ordinary events and natural disasters exerted such large
influences (produced large leaks) that primary and secondary container would be simultaneously
damaged. Then little probability distinction is made between two PC tank designs. On the other
hand, shortcomings of design and/or inspection and failure in plant operations gave such smaller
impact (small leaks) that only one of two containers is damaged. Then LNG leaks must be
accompanied by outer wall damage besides inner shell harm. In the PC membrane tank design, the
probability of shortcoming of design and/or inspection is higher than that of Steel/PC double shell tank
design. The difference derives from the fact that the inner shell membrane is structurally incorporated
into the outer wall of a PC membrane tank, while it is structurally independent in the Steel/PC double
shell tank design. The probabilities difference, however, can be neglected because they are very low.
Therefore, it is considered that the safety level of PC membrane tank is equivalent to that of a Steel/PC
double shell tank.
For both the PC membrane and the Steel/PC double shell, natural disasters, dominated by
floods, are the critical events, while for a single containment tank, shortcomings of design and/or
inspection, dominated by welding failure, is critical. This difference is derived from tank structure
features. In the case of leakage from inner shell, LNG can be confined by PC outer wall for both the
PC membrane tank and for the Steel/PC double shell tank, while it would be spread out around a
compromised single containment tank without a dike.
It should be noted, however, for a single containment tank design with a structurally
independent dike around the tank that LNG spilled, due to loss of primary container is held within a dike.
Then the probability of LNG spill due to shortcomings of design and/or inspection dominated by welding
failure (3X10-5 times /year) is greatly reduced (3X10-9 times /year) because LNG leakage is not caused
without simultaneous damage of a dike. Thus, the existence of a dike makes the critical events of
LNG spill over a dike (secondary container) replace shortcomings of design and/or inspection with
natural disasters dominated by floods. Furthermore the final probability of a LNG spill is largely
decreased (5X10-7 times /year). Therefore the tank design has the nearly same safety level as the
other two tank designs, which shows us the significance of a dike for the single containment tank
design.
The minimum allowable safety level is set as 1X10-6 times /year by reference to nuclear power
plant in the U.S. and land-use planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazard in U.K. Then, in order
to compare with the above allowable level, risks obtained for a member of public originally have to be
studied with considering hazardous impacts after LNG spill. However, hazardous impacts are not
described because the QRA is developed in this paper to clarify the relative safety differences among
several tank designs. In the strict sense probability of risks to an individual is obviously smaller than
the analyzed probabilities, since LNG spill does not necessarily cause an actual hazard to public.
However it is an adequate approach to assume that probability of risks to an individual is equivalent to
LNG spill probability because it is quite a large hazard. A PC membrane tank and the Steel/PC double
shell tank, even without structurally independent dike, can satisfy the required level (as can a single
containment tank with dike). The PC membrane tank design has the same safety level as the
Steel/PC double shell, and has a little higher level than a single containment tank with a dike. These
results show that the structural dependence of the inner shell membrane on secondary container (PC
outer wall) is little significant from the viewpoints of safety considerations.

Event Shortcomings of Design Failure in Plant Extra-ordinary

Natural Disasters Total
Tank Design and/or Inspection Operation Events

PC Membrane 1X10-8 3X10-8 3X10-10 7X10-8 1X10-7

Steel/PC Double Shell 7X10-10 6X10-8 3X10-10 7X10-8 1X10-7
Single Containment *1
3X10-5 4X10-7 3X10-10 7X10-8 3X10-5
(without dike)
Single Containment
3X10-9 *2 4X10-7 3X10-14 *2 7X10-8 5X10-7
(with dike)
*1: LNG leak from a primary container (unit: times/year)
*2: multiply as probability of unexpected loss of containment of dike

Table 2 Probability of LNG leakage from Secondary Container

5. Life Cycle Assessment
In Life Cycle Assessment for an industrial product, the impact on the environment and natural
resources will quantitatively be assessed by studying all inputs, such as the required resources and
energy, and all output possibly impinging on environment during all stages of use: mining/extraction,
manufacturing, operating and disposal. Here in this study, priority is given to comparison of
environmental impact between a PC membrane tank and the Steel/PC double shell tank.
LCA falls into two categories, the summation method and the inter-industry-relations method.
The former needs detailed process event analysis because it quantitatively integrates material and
energy use as inputs, and environmental impact as its output, for each sub-process of production.
The latter is called the Simple Appraisal Method because it estimates environmental impact based on
inter-industry-relations table. A collection of statistic data concerning all industry in Japan, is
published every five years by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications.
The LCA analytical tool as the summation method, JEMAI-LCA, was employed in this paper
because insulation is such a special material that it was not listed on the inter-industry-relations table.
The tool has been developed by JEMAI, the Japan Environmental Management Association. All types
of greenhouse gas emissions were converted to a carbon dioxide equivalent in order to access its
environmental impact from the viewpoints of global warming in this assessment.
Moreover, an additional study was executed in the use of state-of-the-art PUF foamed by
carbon dioxide as an alternative to using HCFC-141b, a hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC). This
environmentally friendly PUF was developed by Tokyo Gas four years ago and was installed in 2002
during the construction of the 200,000m3 LNG underground storage tank at the Ohgishima
regasification terminal in Yokohama City.
5.1. Assumed Tank Capacity for this Assessment
While an in-ground tanks with a maximum capacity of 200,000 m3 have been constructed, so
far, the 140,000 m3 tank size has been selected for LNG regasification terminals recently planned in
Japan, since they can handle approximately 3X106 tons of LNG per year. Therefore, the 140,000m3
tank is assumed for this assessment.
5.2. Limitation of the Components for this Assessment
In general, a LCA demands estimation of environmental impact for all components of LNG tank,
such as primary container, secondary container, roof and foundation. This assessment, however, was
executed for the purpose of comparing the relative environmental impact among several tank designs.
This enabled us to limit the LCA to those components (insulation, primary and secondary container)
that make biggest differences in environmental impact. The foundation and roof can be neglected
because there is no differences in these components, between a PC membrane tank and a Steel/PC
double shell tank.

5.2.1. Primary Container

The primary container of PC membrane tank is a 2-mm thick stainless-steel membrane, while
the Steel/PC double shell uses 9% Nickel-steel sheet that is about 30-mm thick.

5.2.2. Secondary Container

Secondary containers of both tanks are made of prestressed concrete. In a PC membrane
tank, liquid pressure and larger thermal load constantly act on the secondary container, while they do
so only in case of an emergency (LNG leak) in the Steel/PC double shell tank design. Rebar and
prestressing tendons somewhat more extensively used in the PC membrane tank.

PC Membrane Tank Steel/PC Double Shell Tank

Stainless-steel membrane 9% Nickel Steel Sheet
Primary Container
2mm thick approximately 30mm thick
Prestressed concrete Prestressed concrete
Secondary Container Constant liquid pressure and thermal Liquid pressure and thermal load
load only in case of a LNG leak
Insulation 20cm thick PUF board 1m thick Perlite

Table 3 Materials Used During Construction

5.2.3. Insulation
Insulation for a PC membrane tank is made of (approximately) 20-cm thick PUF board for both
the side and bottom, while the Steel/PC double shell tank uses 1-m thick perlite for the side and PUF
for the bottom.

5.3. Stage for Assessment

In LCA, it is normal to estimate the environmental impact for all stages of a component’s life:
from mining/extracting the material out of the earth through to disposal of the manufacturing waste and
the material itself (at the end of its useful life) because Life Cycle stands for cradle-to-grave services.
It is, however, enough to consider the stages from mining/extracting up to the end of operation,
because a LNG storage tank has a long design life, 50 years. Moreover it is an appropriate
approximation to neglect the construction and operation stages because this assessment is executed
for the purpose of comparing the relative environmental impact between two tank designs and because
large environmental impacts are not made in these two stages.
It, however, should be noted that, no matter how effectively the conventionally foamed PUF
would be recovered and destructed by countermeasures (such as combustion in a rotary kiln), the
HCFC-141b used to foam the conventional PUF, will be released during tank deconstruction and would
advance global warming at that time. The large impact due to the energy consumed by the kiln can
not be neglected either. The impact of HCFC-141b will be addressed in this paper.

5.3.1. Extracting the Material out of the Earth

Extracting the raw materials out of the earth (e.g., iron-ore mining and oil drilling) were
considered.

5.3.2. Manufacturing
Emission of greenhouse gas is computed by an inventory analysis based on an analysis of the
input-output specification, namely inventory, describing input material, energy, product and waste
during the manufacturing process.

5.3.3. Transporting the Materials

During this stage emissions were calculated based on transportation of the final products a
standard 500 km from their manufacturing plants to the construction site. In addition, ten times the
greenhouse gas emission per carrier is considered for insulation, both perlite and PUF, because it is
too light to take up the maximum authorized payload for the truck.

5.3.4. Construction
Emission of greenhouse gas is neglected in this stage since there should be smaller energy
consumed by the construction machinery used to construct the two designs. Since time required for
the construction is less for a PC membrane tank, in a more complete analysis, this would show up also.

5.3.5. Operation
No relative distinction is made in this stage because insulation thickness is designed so that the
tanks have the same boil-off gas (BOG) rate. Therefore, emission of greenhouse gas is also
neglected in this stage.

5.4. Estimation of Environmental Impact

Global warming was the focus of this study, although various other environmental impacts,
such as energy consumption, ozone depletion, atmosphere pollution, water contamination, and solid
waste generation could have been studied. Emission of greenhouse gas was computed concerning
the previously mentioned components during stages 5.3.1. through 5.3.3. listed in the previous section
of this paper.
The quantity of each material used is described in Table 4.
 Steel/PC Double Shell Tank PC Membrane Tank
9% Nickel Steel Sheet 2,476.90 t 0.00 t
Stainless Steel 0.00 t 266.77 t
Concrete 13,880.00 m3 14,160.00 m3
Rebar 3,090.00 t 3,210.00 t
Prestressing tendons 530.00 t 520.00 t
Perlite 1,046.29 t 0.00 t
PUF 36.00 t 428.16 t
Table 4 Material Use for a 140,000 m3 LNG Tank

5.4.1. Per Unit Emission of Greenhouse Gas

(1) 9% Nickel Steel Sheet
Computing done by JEMAI-LCA
(2) Stainless Steel
Computing done by JEMAI-LCA
(3) Concrete
Recommended value by LCA subcommittee of JSCE, Japan Society of Civil Engineering used.
(4) Rebar
Recommended value for electric furnace rebar by LCA subcommittee of JSCE used.
(5) Prestressing Tendons
Recommended value for blast furnace hot-rolled steel by LCA subcommittee of JSCE used.
(6) Perlite
Computing by JEMAI-LCA employing the value of limestone instead of perlite for exploiting and
import. The computed value is smaller because electricity for the grinder mill in plant was neglected.
While coal oil, for on-site combustion, is considered, electricity (for other purposes) is neglected in the
computing process.
(7) Standard PUF
Unit emission is computed for conventional PUF foamed with HCFC-141b. It is calculated by
JEMAI-LCA such that all HCFC-141b consumed during manufacturing process is contained and
stabilized in the PUF.
(8) PUF Foamed by Carbon Dioxide
The replacement of conventionally foamed PUF to carbon dioxide foamed PUF is a
countermeasure to reduce the tank’s environmental impact. It was developed by Tokyo Gas and has
actually been installed in the 200,000m3 LNG underground storage tank at the Ohgishima regasification
terminal in Yokohama, Japan.

Unit Emission Unit

9% Nickel Steel 2.34 t-CO2/t
Stainless Steel 4.24 t-CO2/t
Concrete 0.3113 t-CO2/m3
Rebar 0.4693 t-CO2/t
Prestressing Tendon 1.507 t-CO2/t
Perlite 9.97 t-CO2/t
Standard PUF 2.95 t-CO2/t
CO2 foamed PUF 2.95 t-CO2/t
HCFC-141b in Standard PUF 90.00 t-CO2/t
Table 5 Per unit Greenhouse Gas Contribution of each Component
5.5. Bottom-line
Table 6 shows the calculation results;

Extraction/mining Steel/PC Double PC Membrane Tank

Unit PC Membrane Tank
through Manufacturing Shell Tank with CO2 foamed PUF
9% Nickel Steel t-CO2 5,795.95 - -
Stainless Steel t-CO2 - 1,131.10 1,131.10
Concrete t-CO2 4,320.84 4,408.01 4,408.01
Rebar t-CO2 1,450.24 1,506.56 1,506.56
Prestressing tendon t-CO2 798.71 783.64 783.64
Perlite t-CO2 10,431.51 - -
Conventional PUF t-CO2 106.20 1,263.07 -
CO2 foamed PUF t-CO2 - - 1,263.07
Summation [1] t-CO2 22,903.45 9,092.38 9,092.38

Transporting t-CO2 450.71 319.12 319.12

Summation [2] t-CO2 23,354.16 9,411.50 9,411.50

Considering effect
t-CO2 - 38,534.40 -
of HCFC-141b
Summation [3] t-CO2 23,354.16 47,945.90 9,411.50

Table 6 Global Warming Impact of the Designs

Summation [1] shows greenhouse gas emission from extraction/mining stage through the
manufacturing stage. This result does not include the environmental impact such as disposal of the
HCFC-141b, contained in the conventional PUF. The numbers for the conventional PUF and CO2
foamed PUF are the same because the same amount of CO2-equivalent is embodied in the unfoamed
components for the PUF.
Next summation [2] shows greenhouse gas emission from the beginning up through the
transporting stage. Here we also see that the construction of a Steel/PC double shell tank would emit
more greenhouse gas than the construction of a PC membrane tank. It is quantitatively proved that
emissions of PC membrane tank are smaller. There was no difference at all between PC membrane
tank with conventional PUF and with state-of-the-art PUF because the HCFC-141b, is still stabilized in
the PUF.
Only the emission of HCFC-141b, in its disposal stage, is considered in summation [3]. The
environmental impact of PC membrane tank (with conventional PUF) is now larger than that of
Steel/PC double shell tank. It is possible, however, to minimize greenhouse gas emission by adopting
the CO2 foamed PUF. Thus the environmental impact of a PC membrane tank is now smaller again.
When CO2 foamed PUF is used, the environmental impact is only 48.7% of the Steel/PC tank and
19.6% of a PC membrane tank made with conventional PUF.
The above LCA calculation shows that when CO2 foamed PUF is used, greenhouse gas
emission of PC membrane tank (total embodied CO2 and CO2 equivalent for the component materials)
is smaller than the other designs. Moreover the use of CO2 foamed PUF has enabled Tokyo Gas to
eliminate the potential risk of greatly increased greenhouse gas emissions during the disposal stage.
PC membrane tank with CO2 foamed PUF is ranked as an environmental-friendly LNG facility.

6. Conclusion
The high safety level of the PC membrane tank design and Steel/PC double shell tank design
have been proven (even without a structurally independent dike) by a Quantitative Risk Assessment
using FTA, based on the past operating records of LNG regasification terminals. Also the LCA
clarifies the inherently low environmental impact of a PC membrane tank with the CO2 foamed PUF
developed by Tokyo Gas.
From now on, in the century of the environment, PC membrane tank will join the mainstream of
LNG aboveground storage tank design, both in Japan and abroad, from the viewpoints of higher safety,
higher reliability, lower cost, and their shorter construction times.

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