The Exaggerations of a Nuclear Iran

I managed to take a break from my studies and slip in

some pleasure reading for about an hour this evening.
One of the articles I read was Eric Edelman, Andrew
Krepinevich, and Evan Montgomery’s The Dangers of
a Nuclear Iran, published in Foreign Affairs.

I’m generally skeptical of the view that Iran obtaining

the bomb would be a strategic and security debacle
for the United States. I’m inclined to believe that containment of a nuclear Iran is a
feasible strategy with limited costs.

An Iran without nuclear weapons is more desirable, of course, but it doesn’t seem like
anything short of military occupation will successfully halt the Iranian nuclear
program.

Sanctions, diplomacy, leaving military force on the table, Stuxnet and other covert acts
of sabotage–none are deterring the Iranians.

My view is largely that of James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh. In a previous volume of
Foreign Affairs, Lindsay and Takeyh argued that the U.S. should adopt a containment
strategy that clearly delineates several ”redlines” that Iran cannot cross without
reprisal from the U.S.

Such redlines include using a nuclear weapon, invading another country, or giving a
nuclear weapon to a third party.

Edelman et al. believe that Lindsay and Takeyh’s containment strategy rests on a
number of suspect assumptions.

Namely, “possessing nuclear weapons induces caution and restraint, that other nations
in the Middle East would balance against Iran rather than bandwagon with it, that a
nuclear-armed Iran would respect new redlines even though a conventionally armed
Iran has failed to comply with similar warnings, and that further proliferation in the
region could be avoided.”

Instead, Edelman et al. suggest that, “Iran would become increasingly aggressive once
it acquired a nuclear capability, that the United States’ allies in the Middle East would
feel greatly threatened and so would increasingly accommodate Tehran, that the
United States’ ability to promote and defend its interests in the region would be
diminished, and that further nuclear proliferation, with all the dangers that entails,
would occur.”

Edelman et al. do make some good points; the challenges involved with military action
against Iran are well-outlined. But much of the article is unconvincing. The authors try
to make that case that Iran or Israel may feel compelled to launch a preemptive or
preventive first strike. The authors argue that “Iran’s nuclear arsenal is likely to be
small at first and perhaps vulnerable to a preventive attack [by Israel].”

And Israel’s missile defense system “might be effective” against an Iranian retaliation
to an Israeli first strike. But it would seem that Israelis would want to be pretty certain
that their missile defense system is very effective.

And it’s not clear that this is the case.

Furthermore, if Israel were to launch such a first strike against Iran’s initially small
nuclear arsenal, the result would be an all-out response with Iranian conventional
weapons, which could possibly be even more deadly than the use of a small number of
nuclear weapons.

As for Iran, the authors argue that Iranian leaders would sense an imminent
preventive attack and face a “use them or lose them” dilemma. But if Iranians aren’t
the “mad mullahs” they’re often portrayed to be, they’ll likely judge that Israel would
not risk attacking its nuclear weapons lest an even more deadly conventional war
break out.

Another concern of the authors is that of nuclear proliferation in the region.

Edelman et al. focus on Saudi Arabia–they argue that Saudi Arabia would seek
outside support (“rumors” point to discussions with Pakistan) to develop a nuclear
weapons program. But as Edelman et al. note, “developing nuclear weapons remains a
slow, expensive, and difficult process, even for states with considerable economic
resources.”

With Secretary of State Clinton’s announcement in 2009 that the US would extend its
nuclear umbrella over the Middle East, and the close security and economic ties
between the Saudis and U.S., it would seem that a more likely Saudi response would
be to take the US up on this offer.

Edelman et al. maintain that the United States’ Middle Eastern allies will be skeptical
of this sort of extended deterrence. They point to incredulous responses by European
states during the Cold War to similar assurances from the U.S., “Doubts persisted
about whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons against the
Soviet Union to stave off a military defeat in Europe. And if the United States’ allies
then were never truly convinced that it would risk New York to save Bonn, London,
or Paris, then why would U.S. allies in the Middle Easy today believe that it would
risk New York to defend Cairo, Dubai or Riyadh once Tehran acquired the means to
target the US homeland.”

While it might seem that it would be quite a while before Iran ever had the capability
to target the U.S. with its future nuclear weapons, the authors say that perhaps Iran
would use unconventional means of delivery like “transport inside a cargo ship”
instead of ICBMs.

But this seems even less likely than a first strike against Israel. After all, what good
would one unconventionally delivered nuclear attack do for the Iranians? The response
would be utter annihilation. So New York is not at risk, and extended deterrence still
seems like a very plausible response to a nuclear-armed Iran.

The authors have other bad arguments but I’ll wrap up with their policy
recommendations.

In rereading the authors’ suggestions, I still fail to see any sort of appreciable
difference with our current policies. They recommend a “three-track approach”: First,
continue to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran.

Maybe the policies will take their toll in the long run and result in a change of course.
Probably not, though it’s worth the effort.

Second, continue to try to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. This would buy more time
for the economic and diplomatic pressures. Last, establish a larger military presence in
the Persian Gulf in order to demonstrate that the U.S. hasn’t taken the military option
off the table. This last recommendation comes despite mentioning numerous times in
earlier parts of the article that the presence of American military forces increases
popular opposition.

With three ongoing wars in three Muslim-majority states, the U.S. would not be doing
itself any favors with regard to its image with an even larger military presence in the
Muslim world.

This article was written by Nathaniel Patin.