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Line 9 , para 1 for"15,000 wagons" read

"1500 \7agons".
Line 4, para 6 for "Flak wagons" read
"flat wagons".

q^-iU t*^—
G.A. RO tAN-ROBINSON
Major, GS
for Ma jor-Gene ral
iX! of S, G-2

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DJSTRIBUTION: as for Intelligence

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 SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORGE

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 2

For i/eek Ending
Ist. April, 1944

CONTENTS.
-
PART ILAND

A. Enemy Operations

1• Russia

2. Italy
B. Enemy Dispositions
1. German Divisions in the 1. OS i>»

2f2 f Balkans,

CV Enemy Capabilities

D. Enemy Supplies and Transportation

1 . Railways

(a) Germany
(b) Prance
(c) Attacks on Railway Centres
2. German />rmy Fuel Distribution in France

3, Note on German Strategic Oil Storage System

E, Economic Notes

1 . Germany

(a) Fears of Food Shortage

(b) The Value of Hunga.ry
(c) The Bombing of Essen
2, France
- Underground Aircraft Factories

3. Belgium
- Production Loss through Raids

F. Political Notes
-
PART II AIR
A, Enemy Air Attacks on the United Kingdom

B# Reconnaissance Activity
C, Disposition of GAF

D. GAF Operations in the Mediterranean

PART 111
- SEA *% ** te ,

A* The Channel
B, The Adriatic "¦Wpl^

C* The Tirpitz
D» Gods v. Mortals
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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
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Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G­

WEEKIY INTELLIGENCE SlkliAßY No. 2

For Week Ending
-
PART I LAND
1 April 1944

ENEMY OPERATIONS

1. RUSSIA

The German Front in the SOUTH continues to disintegrate with ever

increasing thoroughness. As a result of the week's fighting their forces
EAST of the DNIESTER have now only the rail and road crossing at TIGEENA
left open to them in addition to the rail ferry at ODESSA,, though they
may have constructed some pontoon "bridges over the river.

The German reluctance to evacuate TRANSNISTRIA has probably been due

primarily to their unwillingness to allow the Russians the use of the main
lateral BALTI-VOZNSSENSK railway. It appears now, however, that the
Germans have been forced off their last hold on this line. This will
'
ease the Russian supply and reinforcement problems very considerably and
should enable them to increase their speed of advance. ?:

The other important result of the recent fighting is. the fact that
with KOLOMYJA and CERNAUTI in Russian hands the Germans are now forced
to. supply all their Southern forces either through or SOUTH of the CAR­
PATHIANS from advanced bases in RUMANIA and IJUNGARY. Moreover it would
seem that the Russians have got the Germans on the run and they may be
able to force the JABLONICA pass before the Germans have time to organise
¦its defence. The situation would appear to be somewhat similar to that
¦which developed at the end of the Tunisian campaign a when the British
6 Armoured Division rushed the German bottleneck at HAMLIAN-UP and broke
into the CAPE BON Peninsula. The Russians are likely to receive strong
support from the local inhabitants who are mostly pro -Russian. This
advance would probably have to be made in conjunction with a drive to
the NORTH on LWOW in order to secure their right flank.

The main range of the CARPATHIANS SOUTH of CERNAUTI is easy to defend.

Of the four main passes only one is open all the year round and all are
narrow and easily obstructed. The Southern flank is not so easy to defend
but the length of front that has to be defended, i.e. from the Southern
foothills of the CARPATHIANS to the DANUBE Delta at GALATZ, is only about
sixty miles. It is probable that the German defensive SCHWERPUNKT will
be in this area, firstly,, "because the bulk of the German forces in the
SOUTH willbe forced back this way,, and secondly because the enemy is
likely to make every endeavour to defend the approach to the oil wells at
PLOESTI.

2.
- UNCUSSIf
In view of the proximity of LVOV to the scene of operations^ it is
interesting to hear on the German Home Service programme that plans are
in preparation for the performance of German operas in LVOV and that ".many
well known artistes of prominent opera casts in the Reich will cooperate
in the new enterprise^ the most easteiAJteyyMfaiymywMjgage in the
Reich".

IB
On the ADRIATIC flank tne ".fflSmJrhas been showing signs of increased
liveliness, especially in the coastal sector s where he is probably
preparing to launch a local attack. Further SOUTH he has evacuated
lIONTENSRO and ALFADENA. This has probably been forced on him by the threat
'
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lit

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pf# apriiag 3^-wheif conditions will a~!flow the possibility of Allied infil-'
¦

frgj^jjxxy.-in -ft*? mountains and will compel him to make several readjustments
miiin-ir-**
in his forward positions.

In the CASSINO area, having successfully forced a stalemate s the

enemy has decided to postpone indefinitely his withdrawal to the ADOLF
HITLER line and he has not yet found it necessary even to reinforce the
parachutists at CASSINO. 15 pG- Division is now partly behind 1 Parachute
Division and partly flanking it to the NORTH, while 90 FG- Division, which
was brought up to man the FONTE CQRVO-PIEDIMONTE sector of the ADOLF KETLSR
line in the event of a withdrawal, is still waiting there in general re­
serve.

In' the ANZIO bridgehead the enemy's attitude is still defensive. His
artillery, though remaining strong on the flanks, has decreased consider­
ably in the centre. This is due to a series of events starting with the
withdrawal of 29 PG- Division and then 26 Panaer Division into reserve and
to the departure of HERLIANH G-03RING- Division and 114 Light. The forces
around the perimeter may be even further reduced., as prisoners report that
4- Parachute Division is also due for withdrawal, which is quite possible,
as it has not yet completed its training- Assuming, though, that it is
still in the lir^ this leaves five divisions around the perimeter, of
which 3 PG- Division is the only first class formation.

The number of divisions, then, in the SOUTH remains the same (i7i)
as last week, With the withdrawal of 11 4 Light from the bridgehead, how­
ever, the number of divisions. in reserve has increased by one to four.
There are no indications yet as to how these willbe employed, but it is
probable that his success at CASSINO may encourage him to adopt a more
offensive attitude, on the main front, both locally -.on the ADRIATIC Coast
and in. the CASSINO area.

What exactly is going on in Northern ITALY is not yet clear. But

the G-erman occupation of HUNG-ARY is certain to have had some effect on
the internal reshuffling mentioned in Summary No. 1 and KESSELRING- may ,
well be forced to part with a portion of his fox'ces, even if only tempor­
arily.

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1. G-exrnan Divisions in the WEST :

*
The estimated number of Geiman Divisions in the WEST remains at
55.
21 Pz Dlv, which was thought last week to be preparing to move from
MANTES, has not yet "been located in a new area.

17 SS PG Div, reported to have left the THOUARS-POITIERS area for

ALENCON about two months ago, is now believed never to have moved, and is
accepted to be in the former area.

272 Inf Div is reported to have moved from LYONS to the PEKPIGNAN
area.

The possible loss of 21 Panzer Division from the CHANNEL area., to­
gether with the recent departure of 9 SS Panzer Division for the SOUTH
Coast of HtANCE, would reduce the German mechanised forces in the CHANNEL
area to a division in each of three widely separated areas, the LOW
COUNTRIES, SOivME-SEINE area and NORMANDY. In this situation, the enemy
must depend to an even greater extent on Infantry formations and for this
purpose he appears to be utilising static divisions hitherto holding
coastal sectors.

There are as yet unconfirmed reports that. 19 GAP Division has moved
Southwestwards behind 171 Training Division and 17.GAF Division (or 346
Division) has been reported in the GAI.IACHES .area behind the LE TREPORT
coastal sector. These units, together with 182 Training and 326 and 344 1nf
Divisions in the PAS DS CALAIS, present an impressive array of support
units behind the coastal areas from OSTSND to' LE TKSPORT. There are
slight indications of G-errnan attempts to improve the quality of these
divisions for their new role: even so they could only provide poor substi­
.tutes f.or the flexibility inherent in mechanised reserve formations in
the defence of the Coast.

The move of 272 Infantry Division to the MEDITERRANEAN Coast of

FRANCE gives further indication of German apprehensions in this area. It
was preceded to this area during the month of March by 271 Infantry
Division from DIJON and 9 SS Panzer Division from AMIENS.
'
It is becoming increasingly obvious that a certain amount of re­
shuffling of divisions is taking place in FRANCE. At present the motive
behind these moves is difficult to appreicate- and until further. evidence
becomes available no clear picture can be formed.

2. BALKANS

There has been no overall increase in the German garrison in the

BALKANS, although a general redistribution of these forces is believed to
have occurred, incident to the recent occupation of HUNGARY. Troop move­
ments have been noted as far afield as GREECE and ALBANIA and have been
particularly heavy in SLAVONIA and SREM areas of YUGOSLAVIA, fountain
troops and artillery are reported to have been involve 4 /.thus pointing to
1 ..fountain Division as a likely candidate for part of the' new garrison
of HUNGARY. la all, eight German divisions were disposed along the main
LJOBLJANA-ZAGREB-BELGRADE line and it is likely that this force has been
thinned out to provide the saviours of HUNGARY,

The number of troops involved in the occupation of HUNGARY appears

to be merely sufficient to guard the important Hungarian oil fields, air­
fiel'jftdßy^faSg^S^^-f#ions and - c rail routes to the EAST and SOUTH

frit- . ,„,„, .
-•- ¦¦;* mKmm yhr-^^^ :_^,\)pj-n\ '-;-U--'
i^?J&2
*"**
now so vitKto German forces^retreating from SOUTH view of HJSSSittOIn
the lack of opposition to the occupation it seems likely that the fixst­
line elements will be relived "by inferior troops and security personnel
for more active use.

The relief afforded to TlTo*s PARTISANS willbe considerable, but

probably only temporary. Troop movements in GREECE and ALBANIA probably
involve the move Northwards of at least one division.

C. Enemy Capabilities
- Since Weekly Summary No 1 , the enemy situation in EUROPE has
deteriorated still further and there can be no doubt that the Germans
are seriously perturbed at the turn of events on the Eastern front.
The battle SOUTH of TARNOPOL is now largely fluid and even the enemy
spokesmen complain that, there is no true front. This is 'tantamount to
an admittance by the enemy. that he has, for the time "being at all events,
lost control of the situation. Furthermore, the position in HUNGARY
has necessitated the provision of forces in order to "encourage" that
country to continue the fight with the remaining partners of the Axis.
It seems evident that these divisions have had to-be found mainly from
YUGOSLAVIA where GERMANY can ill,afford to .give TITO more 'scope for
his guerrilla activities, and that, in effect, is what itmeans.

In Southern RUSSIA the enemy must now "endeavour, firstly, to

extricate his forces new E4SE/of the ENIESTKR'(no longer can he afford
the extravagance of a STALINGRAD) and-, secondly, to stablise his line
to prevent a deep penetration by the Russians towards the PLOESTI oil-
fields. It looks as though the CRirißA-, is to be held for the time being.
Further NORTH he must at all costs hold the- line of the CARPATHIANS.

To what extend, this willbe achieved. depends partly on the Russian

ability to maintain pressure, but, for the moment, it seems that the
line of the R. PRUTH ds the best that the enemy can hope for and that
they may, well be .driven back further and "forced to attempt to establish
a ;line from 'the Southern
" tip of the CARPATHIANS to GAJLATZ and the
DAjfeßE' basin, . .

In ITALY there has been little change in the enemy situation.

KESSELRING is evidently intent on dinging to the political prize of
ROME and unless he is forced out of his xoresent strong defensive lines
or is filched of divisions to provide stop gaps on other fronts, one
may expect to see a continuation of the German strategy to defend a line
SOUTH of ROME.

In the Yi/EST, the enemy continues to put the finishing touches to

his plan for the defence of FRANCE. There are indications that internal
moves of troops are taking place, the portent of which" is not yet clear,
but one fact stands .out * There is as yet no evidence -that the desperate
situation on the Eastern front ha 3 led to the withdrawal of divisions
from FRANCE. information still points to a German determination to
manage somehow in RUSSIA so that she can present a firm- defence in the
WEST to the Allies.
'
It might not be out of place to quote from Marshal- FOCH s memo­
randum Of 24 July 1918, designed "to induce the conviction that our
concerted efforts v/ould bring decisive results".

He wro.te: "Moreover, all available information is in agreement

-as' to the enemy being reduced to the state of being compelled to have

¦"•
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 *

—
5 ~
UNCLASSIFIED
two armies: an army for occupying the line ... . ; and a shock army,
manoeuvering behind the flimsy protection of the other. This shock
army, though trained with the utmost care "by the German Supreme Com­
mand, has been already weakened in strength. In addition, the .Allies

..
have a material superiority in aviation beyond dispute; also in tanks
." The picture is little different today.
There remains, therefore, one hope only. If a decision cannot
be won by German arms, then somehow it must not be won by Allied a.rms.
In RUSSIA a line must be stabilised; if the ANZIO beachhead cannot be
eliminated, it must be contained; if CASSINO cajinot be retaken, it
must be denied. Above all, the enemy must retain in the WEST sufficient
divisions to achieve his much publicised intention to defeat any Allied
invasion of the European fortress. Whether this need can continue, as
it does at present, to command sufficient priority to lock up 55 divi­
sions, only time and the Russians will show.
 *imm

D. El^fi: SUPPLIES -lffi> TRANSPORTATION |i^ff^l'tt^Ql^l^r f

•
1. Railways

(a) GERMANY
The policy of combing out German railways staffs to provide more
G-erman railway personnel in the V/EST, thereby increasing German
control of railways in the occupied territories, is naturally
having repercussions on the German railways themselves. This is
shown in a report that trains may now be worked with one guard
or "brake-man. In addition to supplying railway personnel for the
occupied territories the Reichsbahn is having to meet further
demands for the release of men for service in special Army rail­
way units and even for combatant service, '/ithdrawals of railway
workers from the EA.ST is insufficient to balance these commit­
ments and the Reichsbahn is trying to meet the staff shortage by
making greater use of women.

(b) FRANCE
French railways are receiving a great derl of attention at the
present time; from ourselves, the enemy, and French saboteurs;
and it is quite clear that the growing tide of sabotage forced
the G-ermans to go to lengths which must be a serious embarrassment
to them. The decision to increase control of the French railways
appears to have been taken quite suddenly towards the end of 1943,
as a direct result of increasing sabotage. According to an official
report stated to have "oeen made to LAVAL last December, 350 loco­

period 1 July
-
motives and 15,000 wagons were put out of action each month in the
30 Nov. Damage by air attack was apparently in­
cluded in these figures but there is no doubt that by far the
majority of the damage was done by sabotage. Since then the
scale of sabotage has probably been even higher. In January,
MDNZER, head of the German Railway Traffic Directorate in FR^TCE,
threatened the Directors of the French Railways and other high
officials with imprisonment on the grounds that the na.ture of
the railway sabotage in FRANCS showed cles.rly that it was being
committed by expert railwayman. MUNZER added that if necessary
the Germans would take over complete control of the French rail­
ways with 65,000 of their own personnel. It seems not unlikely
that the Germans are coming near to carrying out this threat as
the total of German .personnel in FRANCE is now reported to be
about 50,000.

Another difficulty besetting the Germans in FRANCE is the low

state of maintenance which now prevails throughout the French
system, A report on the locomotive failures on the SNCF in
September 1943 shows that failures occurred in no less than 541
steam locomotives and 95 electric locomotives. In addition,
failures occurred to 4,722 wagons due to hot axle boxes. These
figures reflect strikingly the poor condition of the stock and
the inadequacy of maintenance arising from the shortage and poor
quality of lubricants, and probably indicate a shortage of staff
and materials in the running sheds and workshops.

Probably to relieve this state of affairs, locomotives are

reported to be returning to the French railways from GERMANY.
In November las^Jj-t was reported that 200 locomotives had been
returned and* %Hat |550 wore due to be returned. It is now
Y

>l-v
reported that 450 German locomotives have arrived at NAMJR.
This would seem to be direct evidence of an acute shortage of
'
locomotives in the iTEST, This is not actually thought to be the
 >.'

case, There ui#y , however, be a short a^^j^saWali^Typc :s or

*

* locomotives, and serviceability is certainly low. Consequently ,

the Germans may "be preparing to operate some of their own loco­
motives for essential military traffic.

Some fairly recent figures are now available to illustrate fur­

ther the- serious general state of affairs pertaining on the
French railways. The total number of wagons loaded by the SNCF
in October 1943 (excluding purely non-military traffic) as com­
pared with October 1942 was 59^*722 wagons against 825,955 or a
drop of about 255 j. c actual number of SNCF wagons available fo]
non-military traffic inside FRANCE was approximately the same in
October 19^3 as 1942, and the big drop in loadings is a direct

FRANCE, arising from all causes

-
reflection on the deterioration of the railway position in
sabotage, air attacks, bad
maintenance, etc.

The following details, however, are even more illuminating in

case there should be any doubt as to who are the sufferers from
this -present state of affairs.

A study of figures available (for tho &JD-SST Region only) of

the nurober of wagons supplied as against those ordered, reveals
the following: In NcT-einbcr and December 1943? the percentage
of covered, open and Flak wagons supplied for military traffic
and goods traffic on German account as against those actually
ordered varied between 97 and 72^>, However, wagons ordered '!
for French commerical traffic varied between 1 and 18^S. These
figures speak for themselves.

That the Germans intend, if necessary, to squeeze the French

commercial traffic right off the railways is yet further il­
lustrated by a warning addressed by the Vichy Ministry of
Industrial Production and Communications to the SNCF at the end
of January 1 944. The warning set out at great length the chaotic
state of affairs prevailing and which showed no signs of abating.
The warning concluded, however, by. stating that the Germans had
just notified the Ministry in most categorical terms that unless
there was a material improvement within the next few days, they
(the Germans) would be forced to take action against those
responsible and in order to ensure their own vital requirements
being met, they would haze to reduce very materially French
traffic. The warning reminded the SNCF that French traffic was
already restricted to the barest minimum for supplying the French
population with coal and food, and that any further reduction
would have extremely grave consequences for the French population,
Clearer evidence could hardly be as Iced for to show that in a
crisis, be it now or "./hen the battle is on, the Germans will, if
necessary, devote the railways entirely to..their own use, and
the French will have to manage as best they can whatever the
consequences.

(c) Af''C-cks on R:i3 Iv/ay Csiitr. ,•s

(i) FRANCE
Attacks on important fuel centres have continued with
attacks on AULNOIE, HIRSON and TREIL, LaON and VAIEES.
-
AULNOYE In an attack of 26 March severe damage was done
to the locomotive shed and the carriage and wagon repair
shop, both of which were about half demolished. Tracks
were heavil^oratered.

iINPI iicoirirh *^^^^^ ­

UIUJLinMOiritJJ i im.ii
 '*
I?1\jl*:* ..
' -8 ­
HIRSQN
— Attacked
on 25 March, . There again considerably
damage was done to installations. The engine shed was com­
pletely demolished and the main wagon shop, damaged in the
attack of 6 March, was further damaged. Sidings do not
appear to have been heavily crate red.
-

LAON Attacked night 23/^k March. Sidings were heavily

cratered, and servicing shops received. 2o-30 direct hits.
Cover of 26 March revealed that repair work was already in
progress.

VAJRES -» Heavy damage to rolling stock; locomotive shed

half destroyed. /

The most outstanding result of these attacks has clearly been

the destruction of installations such as engine sheds, re­
pair- shops, etc.

Meanwhile repair work ha-s been progressing at AMIENS, TRAPPES,

and LE MANS. By 23 March (12 days after the raid) repairs
were still not far advanced at AMIENS. Clearance for repairs
to be made was being carried out; but apart from through
tracks, extensive track repair has not been carried out.

On the same date at LS MAN'S (2 weeks after last attack)

marshalling yard tracks were sufficiently repaired for partial
working; clearance- work was continuing. The undamaged section
of the locomotive depot was in use.

Cover of TRaPPES on 26 March revealed that about half the

yard was unserviceable and that temporary electric
'
standards
had been erected. This latter repair work is of some interest
since it reveals that the enemy is apparently seriously con­
cerned with keeping electric traction going.

In general, it appears that once through tracks have been

restored, repairs continue at a rather leisurely pace; despite
this, however, it.must be admitted that even large yards like
TRAPPES are fairly quickly restored to adequate operating
carjacity. Little or no attempt appears to be made to repair
locomotive sheds etc.

(ii) BELGIUM
The rail centres of H/JNE ST PIERRE and COURTRAI in BELGIUM
were also attacked.
-

KAINE ST PIERRE- Locomotive shed was partly demolished and

whilst there was severe damage to track and rolling stock in
the yard; through lines escaped serious damage.

COURTRAI
-

The marshalling yard sidings and main lines were

heavily cratered and an engine shed received three direct hits,
A turntable also received a direct hit. Two days after the raid
no repairs had been started.

As in the case of the French centres, engine sheds appear to

have suffered most.
There has as yet been little evidence, apart from re-routing of
certain expresses, of the effect of these attacks on the enemy.
Since this form of attack is definitely one of attrition against
the enemy's transport system, it is as yet too early to expect
results. ?,
¦
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UNCLASSIFIED
2,
~^" ¦

German Army Fuel Distribution in Northern FRABWE

~
*«v*
?

The German Army system of fuel distribution in Northern FRANCS is

relatively simple with few unusual features and is "based on the direct
and indirect method of supply.

The principal GHQ bulk storage transit depot and bulk breaking depot
is at GENNEVILLIERS, a suburb of PARIS. This depot was receiving by
rail (at the end of 1943) an estimated minimum of 8,500 tons of MF
fuel per month. Although the GENNEVILLIERS depot appears to handle
most of the German MT Fuel requirements for FRANCE, it is estimated
however, that a further 3 9 QQO tons a month (not 'known ifMT or A/c
fuel) arrives in PARIS by water up the MARNS-RHINE Canal. The im­
portance- of GEIMEVILLIERS centers not so much on the s tocks it holds
but that.it is the main transit and bulk breaking depot, v/hence sup­
plies are forwarded by road or rail to Army POL depots. Stocks at
GENNEVILLIERS are estimated at about 15000 tons (or sufficient , say,
for 10 motorized divisions for a month).

In addition to the bulk breaking depots in PARIS, smaller amounts of

fuel are routed direct by rail to such places as ROUEN, LE IL2JS, SENS,
RHEIMSj other small depots, and even directly to Array depots. Deliv­
.
eries at ROUEN and LB MANS are estimated at some 1500 tons at each
place

Army depots fall into three distinct categories: firstly, dumps

situated in forest areas; secondly, those using existing civilian
storage facilities, e.g. storage tanks at REMMES, BORDEAUX, etc;
thirdly, those using buried storage installations of which there are
a number linked to the German strategic storage system, as explained
in the succeeding paragraph. Some of the civilian storage and buried
storage installations may, however, be under GHQ control.

About eleven major forest dumps have been located NORTH of the LOIRE
between the BISCAY Coast and the- Belgian frontier. The following
features appear to be common to most of them:

(a.) They are more than 50 miles from the Coast.

(b) They are associated with Army ammunition dumps (AldL's) sited
in another part of the forest.

(c) The average quantity held is estimated at about 1000 tons.

These dumps have perhaps >eon more accurately described as convoy re­
fillingpoints and arc sor'-cc* l Ly road and rail* Fuel is stored in
containers.

Divisional dumps are served by rail and road from Army dumps and Army
(or forward GHQ) tankage, Fuel in tanker wagons is also available for
divisions at railway filling stations; c.g n , the divisions under 81
"
Corps in the DIEPPE' raid U3oC. NLYSRS, VaLOC-UES, CERIDE SUR VIES and
CERENCES. Army apparently -bakes "charge of these dumps to facilitate
the supply tasks of divisions.

From this it appears that there is a definite tendency ( quite in keep­

ing with German regulations) for divisions to keep all their stocks of
POL supplies mobile in divisional transport and to avoid taking
responsibility in setting up dumps. Dumps are conveniently sited for
.
mmmm
the various divisions. Jav_ Armv

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3.
G-ernian Strategic <Dil Storage System

It has for some time "been; known that the Germans had developed an
extensive system of "buried oil storage at strategic points, and a
number of the important localities have been photographed and
described.
A number of further point's have now been identified. It is becoming
clear that reports are trite that the system in GERMANY was planned as
a whole with a view to interconnection by pipelines of sources and
storage. Hoy/ far such pipelines have actually been built remains to
be discovered.

It has become evident also that. the storage installations used or

built by. the Germans in FRANCE and possibly in.ojbher occupied
countries are becoming more and more an extension of the same system
started in GERMANY. . . ¦
¦

The system is based fundamentally upon a line running from HiJvBURG

to DRESDEN-, thence to RrJJPNICE in CZECHOSLOVAKIA v/hich has recently
been connected by pipeline to -VIENNA. Along this line very large
underground storage has been built at four points where the line
crosses the ELBE, namely HETSACKER, DERBEN, ITITTENBURG and DRESDEN,
and also cat KEEL.

To the 1/EST of this line large underground storage installations

exist at VHXHELMSHAVEN, CUXHAVEN and F^RGE, ;.CHIM NIENBURG (all on
}

the l/ESER) and also at SCE7ABJ3H near NIIRNBERG and possibly near
FRANKFURT.

In addition to the above, there is an elaborate grid of secondary

underground storage points with capacities around 20,000 cu\m. Some
of the r>oints appear to bo located as pipeline relay stations con­
necting storage with refineries and with each other.

( a) Extension to FRANCE
The system has now been extended into FRANCE

In the initial stages in FRANCE, the Germans were r>ontent to

occupy commerical depots which fitted broadly into their planned
grid. More recently there has been a tendency for them to move
from such depots to specially constructed installations conform­
ing more closely to what appears to be a strategic defence £>lan.
They have recently established in forests a number of what may be
described as large convoy filling centres and their new depot
construction appears to be designed to supply these. In certain
instances the construction of buried storage has been reported
—
notably at JOINVILLE near NANCY, CE/UMDNT FOULAIN, ROCHE LEZ
BEAUPRE near 3E3ANCON, ST. MARCEL LES VALENCES, CARCASSONE and
MONTBARTIER (former French Army storage). It would seem likely
that following the systematic manner in which the storage points
in GERMANY forming part of the system have been buried, they
will continue their practice of placing their storage underground
at the remainder of their new depots, vfe have as yet no evidence
that any pipeline construction has taken place in FRANCE.

(b) GAP Storage

In addition to the .above < th^pre ;a;r^ d£ number of known GAF underground
centres in GERMiUp", sometimes' combirfed with the system mentioned
tjk%MfikM m above, and usually conforming to its alignment.
above,
 —­

E:. ECONOIHC "NOTES <- • ¦

••' **% _^^^^^^^^^^^^ -^<*w*jr§§ fl If

4a) Fears of X^ood Shortage

Although there is nothing in the statistical picture to indicate a

crisis i,n the German food situation, considerable anxiety on the sub­
ject is revealed in the stream of articles now appearing in the
German press.

This anxiety may be due to fears regarding the 1944 crops. These
may suffer severely from shortages of fertilisers and labour, though
favourable weather might offset these adverse influences. Further
retreats in the WEST willdemand large allocations of home -produced
food for the armies previously provisioned outside the country.
Military operations, particularly bombing, may be expected to hinder
imports from some sources and to aggravate distributional problems.
These pessimistic considerations would tend to modify, the confident
outlook which a statistical picture of the current supply position
and the substantial grain crops would support.

At its present level the bread ration

-

which was increased soon

after the good 1943 harvest -is higher than it has ever >een. Heat
supplies are less favourable and the allowance for the normal con­
sumer since May 1943 has been at the low level of 250 grammes (9
qzs. ) per week. The fats ration, now at 200 grammes (nearly 8 oz. )
weekly is also low # There is a potato shortage, as a result of the
poor crop in 1943 ? and the net result is that the urban consumer
who-over the war years had increased his potato consumption to make
up for the reduced quantities of meats, fats and other food stuffs
-

is now back at approximately the pre^-war level.

Compared with a year ago, the national diet has deteriorated some­
what both in total energy and protein content and in variety. The
decreased and irregular supplies of citrus and of other fruits and
vegetables have aggravated the monotony of the daily fare^

The present scale of rations provides GERMANY'S civilian population

with about 2,500 calories per person per day. For the normal con­
sumer, representing 36 per cent of the total, the intake is, however,
only about 1,900 calories daily, a figure somewhat' below require­
ments, though not seriously inadequate. Although the other adult
categories receive extra allowances of some kind or another, con­
sumption is in all cases below requirements level and no doubt this
is an unsatisfactory situation when viewed in relation to. the strains
and stresses imposed on the German civilian, calls on the workers
for "output", and the possibility of future ration cuts. But the
food rations compare favourably with those of 191 8.,. when there was
a much wider gap between urban and rural conditions and a much less
developed system of differential rationing by consumer category.

The present position, to sum up, justifies either of the two

following schools of thought from the German point of view:­

-
The first school can argue that the situation may become critical
-
if the 1944 harvest in GEE.IaI\tT is a failure, if the offensive in
the EAST having already cut off Ukrainian supplies also shuts
off food from• ROTMANIA and the other Balkan countries, and if air
raids should destroy food stocks on any considerable scale. The
logical development to such an argument is to press for a conserva­
tive policy of cutting rations at once.

The second school can argue that the v;ar willbe won or lost in 1944

to maintain rations at their present scale ~

and that, in view of the r.ood statistical position, it is essential
even at the risk of

(^ '^ical period. '. '"''^

fivcure difficulties •* in order to maintain public morale during "bhis
r^'^^EMHflHlßHii^^^^
 Apart fPOBte-ifca starategiG. valuers a transport centre 5 HUNQ^RY's
economic importance to GERMANY lies in its annual production of
about 1 ,000 3 000 tons of "bauxite, its exportable Wheat
its oil production of over A ,000, 000 tons a year.
- : , -
surplus and

I
It is probable that the Germans "will also 'try to make use &£ the
Hungarian engineering industry. *
t
t
%
In addition to the few arms work's., Hungary had even before the war
a useful steel pro_ducing and engineering capacitor which was* capable
of conversion to war production. Considerable expansion is indeed
reported to have been achieved in small arms and machine gun manu­
facture as well as in ammunition of most calibres. At the same
time artillery production, which was in 1938 limited to light Bofors
.
A.A. guns.j now includes medium field artillery. There is 3 however,
some doubt whether heavy A.A. artillery or adequate anti-tank wea­
pons are' in production in HUNGARY.

In the past two or three years tank or other armoured vehicle pro­
duction has apparently begun in small numbers. These advances
have no doubt been assisted by German, technical aid but were ap­
parently executed independently by the Hungarian Government,

Hungary can probably be organised tb supply most of her own mili­

tary requirements with the exception of heavy armaments, There have
been instances both of HUNGARY'S ability to export arms (e.g. Bofors
guns and certain types of ammunition) and also of b^r desire to
import particular- weapons (e.g. 20*-mm. Swiss cannon),. It is pro- ­
bable that her capacity is stronger in certain direction than others.

As far as is known there are only two items in which GERMANY at

present benefits from Hungarian production of military equipment.
Though their use by the German Army may be on a relatively small
seale 3 there is nevertheless some evidence that both Gamma range-
finders and predictors and Junghans time-fuses (made by Suss) are
being .made available by HUNGARY.

HUNGARY'S aircraft industry is very largely under German influence.

A large new factory built according to plans provided by Messer­
schmitt's was completed in 1943 and is now in production on twin­
engined fighters. Output is still well below designed capacity
(rated at 120 per month) and is believed to be P at the moment,
shared between HUNGARY and GERMANY.

(c.) Bombing of ESSEN

ESSEN 3 home of the .^reat Krupp works , was heavily bombed by
Bomber Command on liarch 26/27- The town had not been heavily
raided since July 25 \ the last of .six heavy attacks which destroyed
nearly three-quarters of the Krupp plant.

Formerly employing 35 3 000 workers on armament work alone , Krupp

specialized in the heaviest calibre guns for naval 5 coastal defence
and siege purposes. In this particular field they were the most
important firm in GERMANY. They also produced A.A.:guns, airborne
recoilless guns- flame-throwers., gun carriages,, mountings, turrets
and many other forms. of armaments.

The destruction of the greater part of the ESSSN works was achieved
in the course of the attacks between March and July 1943. Many
of the forges, machine and armament assembly shops were demolished
and it is thought that at the end of 1943 output of all Krupp pro­
ducts was not running at more than one-third of capacity.

r-Si\«is*<>#lV*-.!> ? *;*4i
l
 ¦'?¦ ¦fc I.*.

It is known that many of Krupp's multifarious activities have

B
"been transferred elsewhere but there is no specific evidence of
what types of ar tade in Essen or in alter­
native premises. 'difficulty of finding
suitable plant fflrnbhe 'prbctuation of the heavier forgings, cast­
ings and machined parts it is unlikely that any such transfer
has been made oh^any large scale and the x^roblem of bridging the
gap in the production of heavy guns has probably been solved by
continuing as far as possible to produce at ESSEN and by using
unemployed v/orkers from ESSEN to help to increase production at
SKODA, WITKOT7ITZ and RHEIMtETALL-BORSIG, This is likely to have
proved only a partial solution.

2, FRANCE

Underground Aircraft Factories

Following reports of the re-opening of the underground aircraft

works at CRAVANT near AUXERRE (XONNS) it is now reported that,
at a conference in PARIS between representatives of the G-.A.F.
and interested French ministers, it was decided that underground
aircraft works should be installed on French territory.

Extensive disused quarries covering some 75 acres at CROG-NAC, a

hamlet just NORTH of ST. ASTI3R (DORDOGNE) are being prepared..
Some equipment from the bombed works of the 3.N.C.A. dv S.O. at
BORDEAUX BACALAN has already been installed and, according to
the report, it was intended between January and March 1944 to
transfer the aircraft works from BEGLES and MERIGNAG.. As from
March, works from ROCHEFORT, NANTES, ST. NAZAIES, BAYONNE and
others are to be transferred and the labor force willnumber
8,000.
Five hundred v/orkers are to be housed in hutments at ST. ASTISR,
while others will be billeted in barracks at JPERIGSUX. Special
rail facilities will be afforded between ST. ASTISR and PERIGEUX
for the transport of workers.

3. BELGIUM.

Production Loss through Raids

Figures have been received which illustrate the interference to

work occasioned by air raid warnings although it must be borne in
mind that the Belgian v/orkers will seize every opportunity to
"go slow".

It has been officially stated that during the month of November

1943, 9,500 tons of crude steel and 9*ooo tons of semi-finished
and finished products were lost owing to the cessation of work
during alerts. These figures correspond to' about' ~J% of the
month's output. Coke production is not affected to the same
extent, the loss of 3,000 tons during the month constituting less
than V/j of the output.

It is of interest to note that losses in production due to air

raid alerts have been such that works are obliged to furnish
monthly statements to the authorities.

|:1-y|ff^H' V^Hfpjipfl

'MM >¦¦'">'¦ '•>

*i*w-:v*v­
 HsuiUa nvn&a ¦¦¦MB "S'n

P. POLITICAL NOTES
| {
.. —
' '
1. "FIfILAXD i, .1
a..
A. >
-^
..,
'
; |
¦¦¦-Li—
¦
'.1b

Hopes of the Finnish public are rising somewhat as the result ®f

no incidents having occurred since the publication of the reoe^t
• • * _
Soviet, and Finnish official statements on the peace
' __
negotiation^ .
If.an armistice or successful geace negotiations are concluded, *the'
-i- S\ I /-»-! !•__!*' ¦ _~1 .Tl H ?

is considerable chance of civil disorder in FINLAND and the pos^ibi1

lity of the Germans attempting to seize HELSINKI and set up a;pi|ppe
government. The possibility of German success along these lines
would be materially lessened if such an event did not take place
until Soviet troops had reached the BALTIC and TALLINN. Soviet-"
Finnish discussions ajjpear to be continuing in MOSCOW.

2. SWEDEN

The Swedish Government is watching the Soviet-Finnish situation with

great care, as a German move into HELSINKI, as the result of a Soviet-
Finnish accord, might seriously affect Swedish-German relations. Full
Swedish mobilization would probably deter any direct German attack
but to take such a step is difficult for the Swedish Government at
present as there is slated to be an election during the current year.

3. HUNGARY
The Germans have Had a comparatively easy task so far in their
occupation of HUNGARY. There has been no sign of any real resistance,
and the airports and railways have fallen plump into German hands.
'
On the political side a puppet government is in the saddle and the
opposition parties consisting of the Social Democratic Party, the
Small Holders'' Party and the Peasa.nt Union are to be suppressed.
HORTHY, the Regent, is being "rigged up by the NAZIS as the St.
GEORGE who will lead the fight against the Bolshevik dragon.

The Hungarian Ministers in BERNE, STOCKHOLM, LISBON and MADRID, who

are reported to have broken with the puppet German government in
BUDAPEST, seem to be desirous of establishing a resistance movement
outside of HUNGARY.

4. ITALY
The -Italian Government, with the full support of the Allied
authorities, is proceeding energetically, according to recent
reports, with the clearing out of FASCISTS from public office.

The Soviet action in establishing relations with ITALY may bring

the Italian Communists around to: serving under BADOGLtO. The ar­
rival in ITALY of ERCOLI, Secretary-General of the underground
Italian Communists during the Fascist regime, on March 28th from
MOSCO.f may clarify Italian Communist policy further.

5. FRANCE
!
DEAT, who has been appointed Vichy Minister of Labor, has nailed
his colors to the Nazi mast by patch of French
workers to GERIvL^NY willbe hisJjS

The Germans on their side are demanding a considerable speed-up of

the transfer of workers in FRANCE to c- s sent Tal Indus trios and have .
 v .
%M t
also ordered VIOHT to take energetic meate-^-^fo-rtJUilff UfT^orEers
who have been allowed to return to FRANCE on leave and who have de­
faulted. H3NPJOT states that these amount to 65,000.

6. FRANCE NORTH AFRICA

The Provisional Consultative Assembly at iiG-lERS has, after con­
siderable debate, approved an ordinance for establishing a govern­
ment in liberated FRANCS. The full text is not yet available but the
i
principle features are that the people of FR/JTCE will be afforded an
;X
Opportunity to vote at latest within one year, for: (1) JL Pro­
visional Assembly and (2) a Constituent Assembly. In addition local
elections arc to be held at the earliest possible moment, and at
latest within 3 months after the liberation of the metropolitan ter­
ritory.

No members of the French Committee took part in the debate except

de GAULLE who made a shox-t speech in which he made two points:

(a) To lea.ye new consitution to decision of a properly

elected assemply^

(b) To hold elections at earliest possible moment.

v
 ' "**""
k
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 '*•»
**¦

T/EBKLY nTTSLLIG^TCE SIMIAJ^T NOy.2.

-
UNCLASSIFIH*
PART TV/O AIR (Prepared by Air Intelligence Section, SHAEF)
For Veek Ending
2 April 1944.

A• 1_ j-h-e ,UNITED KDTGIOI

£_.A!i££^..i :ii
i T

During .the, v;eek ending tc 30, 3*44. the G.A.F. has made two air attacks
on the UNITED JCDIGDOII.. On the first attack the enemy operated 170 aircraft
against Southern El-TGL/'JID, of which 110 attacked land targets. Attacks v/ere
scattered over the v/hole of Southern EJIGIiAIID from ¦".rSSTOTT-SUPSH-II'':RE to
HASTINGS. No where was there any concentration of. effort.. Aircraft
operated in two phases. The first force of 110 Long Range Bombers crossed
the Coast between FAIi-IOUTH and PORTLATTD BILL. The second force consisting
of fighter/bombers operated over the coastal area between FOLKESTONE and
HASTINGS. On the night 30/31 Ilarch, 12 enemy aircraft operated over SvE.
BNGM^ID and the LOI-TDON area. These came in over SUSSEX and SURREY under
cover of our returning bombers z.ncl. operated at heights from 25,000 to 8,000
feet with a minor concentration along the -"toast between BEA^HY HEAD and
DUNG3NESS. 3 enemy aircraft reached the Greater LONDON area, and minor
incidents have been reported on . -.VOOL5. -ICK, ESIiER and E^SISOIMTE. A further

to have been lie.4los engaged on intruder operations.

.
6 enemy aircraft operating from HOLL.JID appeared off the East Ooast, 3 of
them making landfall over NORFOLK and LIlTOOLir These aircraft are believed
No interceptions by
Allied night fighters were made.

B». Reconnaissance Activity

The scale of effort of enemy reconnaissance sorties for the last week
has been from 15 to 20 during the day and up to 10 at night. The majority
of these have been carried out hy long range twin- engine aircraft and TV*'.2oos
over Northern waters. No enemy reconnaissance aircraft have been reported
over the Coast of this country during the last week.. The North Sea and South-
Vestern approaches have been well covered.

C. Disposition of GAF.

It is probable that the fighter units defending GERILJTY, representing

over 70^J of the total operational fighter strength of the G.A.F. , have during
February undergone the heaviest cumulative strain ever imposed on them in the
course of one month's operations. Since, however, the rising crescendo of

reached its peak in the period 20

-
the Allied day and night offensive against German industrial targets only
25 February-, the full effects on the
fighting value of the G.A.F. fighter forces have not yet made themselves felt.
In particular, the result of the destruction of vital factories producing and
assembling fighter aircraft will only become fully apparent during the next
month or two, when a substantial reduction in fighter strength may be
anticipated, provided that wastage is maintained at the February level.

v s ¦MHBHI EQ vu A L s British ¦¦¦¦r

 ¦¦¦¦¦p hs*x iv a siv n5 a ¦¦¦¦£, sn

<?*•*¦«¦"*"¦

Nevertheless certain immeSSSTff L1L1auMwiHMifppar cnt . It is evident

that' the heavy fighter wastage incurred against escorted day-bombers has

alread;/ compelled the G.-^.F. to bring in units from outlying theatres of war

to strengthen the fighter defences of the Reich. Furthermore, attacks on

airfields in HOTXAM) and \[, GERMANY, £-s v/ell as the increasing depth of

U.S.A.A. i*. escorted day-raids, have led to re-disposition of the forces

available in Yfestern EUROPE, resulting iiian estimated increase in the fighter

v
defences of N. .'. GER]¦¦•ANY over last month hy about 15';o. as a result the

fighter defences for the whole of Occupied FRANCE, BELGIUJI and HOLIAI!D have

now been reduced by 26; J.

In spite of the further strengthening of the fighter defences of the

Reich, the G.a.F. fighter "force is still unable to prevent heavy and,, accurate
bombing of GERIIANY by escorted day bombers or during moonless nights. In the
case of day-r"aids, this is attributed in part to the efficiency of the L.R.
!rustang fighters (P-51s), v/hich have largely cancelled out the effectiveness
:
of GERIAN T.E. fighters equipped with rocket-mortars.' It is believed that
the latter owing to thqix* vulnerability, now require strong S.E. lighter escort,
and are therefore in some nays a liability rather than an asset, in so far as
their use tends to divdrt lie.lo9s end 5V .',1905. from an attacking to a defen­
'­
sive role.
*
The cumulative evidence for the month supports the estimate previously
made that gross overall German fighter losses against deep, escorted pene­
trations by day are in the region of one aircraft out of 10 intercepting.
Although reaction to sustained attacks has denoted rapid decline in service­
ability in fighter units, it is, however, probably still true that a relatively
short lull in operations is sufficient to enable the G.A.F. to restore strcnth
and serviceability, since the effects of wastage and loss pf production so
far have been a decrease in depth and reserves, rather than an. immediate
decline in actual first-line strength. The position is thought to be that
everything is now "in the shop-window" and although first-line fighter strength
is apparently intact on paper, it is more vulnerable than at any previous
stage- of the war; it is difficult to see how it can be prevented from de­
clining steeply, provided that Allied attacks on. Germany can be maintained
at the level reached during February.

D* £• A,^.-Operations in the I
uIDITSHPJ^TI&N

G.A.F. operations in Central IT,-'JL.Y, during the week ending 26 i'larch,

although hampered Idv bad weather. conditions, have been on a relatively high

scale, with the main effort concentrated on the \estern "Battle I>ront. The

Long Range Bomber effort, however, has remained negligible, and, with the

exception of one mission over the Dalmatian Islands, operations have been

confined to small scale diversionary attacks in the J^TTUTTO area.

Close support forces carried out an attack on the bridgehead on 20 I larch.

Subsequent operations were concentrated on the CASSUTO area with a maximum
effort of 25/30 escorted F.l/.1905. In spite of the fierce fighting on the
ground, fighter/bocaber support does not appear to have exceeding two operations
per flying Cay; moreover, aircraft were grounded by bad weather conditions on
-
23rd, 25th and 26th March.; Single .engined fighters reacted in moderate strength
to Allied bombers in North ITALY and in the ROIIE ORYIETO area, These

defensive units are -probably supplemented hy a fighter gruppe of the Italian

Republican fascist Air Force.

¦HBf hs 1 1se ti sivnba fIHP sn

v c
Wtttttm EQUALS BRITISH ¦HHHHI

fiAr%^
r-
-
'¦¦¦ ' SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of Assistant Chi^f of Staff, G-2.

WEEKLY INTEyjJg^Cj^aiLMigr No. 2

For Week Ending

2 April 1944

PART 111
-
SEA
A. THE CHANNEL

There have been several actions "by coastal craft during the week, none
of them very conclusive. In an action on the night of the 28/29 th
March, 6 of our M.T.B, scored many hits on an enemy group between
DIEPPE AND ETAFLES, but there was heavy opposition including fire
from shore batteries and 5 of our M.T.B, were damaged with fairly
heavy casualties.

B. THE ADRIATIC

Allied raids have been made on SOLTA ISLAND off SPLIT, where the whole
German garrison was eliminated and on HVAR where Royal Marine Cnnmandcs 9
with the help of the partisans cleared the enemy from practically the
whole of the Island. The enemy will now be unable to send supplies ti
his forces on the mainland South of SPLIT.

C. THE TIRPITZ:

The TIKPITZ, continues to undergo daily trials and the repair ship which
was in attendance has now left. It is not thought, however, that an
immediate move is likely.

D, GODS v MORTALS

Flag Officer, Western Italy reported on 24th March that whereas the
Naples Group of ports is now discharging at the rate of 12,000,000 tons
per year, VESUVIUS was estimated to be doing 30,000,000
" a day irfe ought
to admire,"' he said "this gesture of the Gods,

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