WATER SYSTEM MASTER PLAN

14. SURGE ANALYSIS

Pressure surges developed during pump startup and shutdown and under accident conditions such as loss of
power to the pumps or inadvertent valve closure may exceed (steady-state) design values. Cavitation or
excessive pressure surging can lead to pipeline or component failure. Surge protection devices are often
required to prevent the development of such conditions. This section provides a quantitative assessment of
the District’s existing distribution system to identify potential surge issues.

14.1 Methodology
Transient pressures in water distribution systems are most common at pump stations, control valves, high
elevation areas, and areas that are far from elevated storage (Wood, 2005). Specific events that can cause
surge include:
1. Pump startup or shutdown (possibly due to power failure as described in Section 13)
2. Rapid opening or closing of valves
3. Rapid opening or closing of hydrants
4. Pipeline break
The District’s hydraulic model was used to evaluate surge issues at the well sites that do not have
hydropneumatic tanks. See Figure 14-1 for the location of existing surge protection within the system. This
includes the District hydropneumatic tanks, combined air valves, and air release valves throughout the
system. The sudden shutdown of well pumps was analyzed at various locations and elevations throughout
the water system. Because most of the well facilities have pump-to waste features, this analysis focused on
system impacts due to pump shutdown. The proximity to elevated storage was not considered because the
District does not commonly utilize the elevated storage in the system. The District’s large transmission mains
all have combination vacuum/air release valves which can also help alleviate surge issues.
Surge issues for other situations such as opening or closing valves or hydrants were not modeled because they
can occur anywhere in the system and can be avoided by good operating practices such as opening and
closing valves and hydrants slowly. It is also not possible to model all of the potential events that could cause
surge. Therefore, the surge analysis was focused on the occurrence of surge at a well pump and at booster
pumping facilities.
The analysis was done using the InfoSurge modeling software. This is a cost effective method of modeling
the system for surge potential because this software is fully compatible with the District’s hydraulic model
InfoWater software. A transient condition is created in the model by specifying an emergency shutdown or a
startup at a pump. The model then calculates the pressure throughout the system thousands of times each
second.

14-1
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 80
N35

MC-C3
N34 N32A
Antelope
N32B
MC-C1 Conveyance
N33 N32C
MC-C2 Pipeline

57 59
N26
59A
64
N25
39
52 N24 N36
31A
34
80
58 N5
N18 N8
15 27
44 N30
56A N11
56 N7
16 N28
N15

MC10 N6 N29
N13

- N10

N23
N17 N22 N27
N21 N31
N9
N14 0 1,500 3,000 6,000
244 N1 N12
Feet
33A
N20
38 65

22 N3
40A
N19
60
Legend
40 10 Well with
54
07 24 Hydropnuematic Tank
51 43 66
23 13 Combination Air Valve
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42
41 4B 26 Air Release Valve
28 32A
14 08 SSWD Well
19 Booster Pump
05
WATT

09 Stations (BPS)
67
2A Elevated Storage Tank
30 37
12 Ground Storage Tank
35 Pipes
160
45 20A Street
3A 18 25
47 Highways
51 Capehart
69 McClellan
55A NSA-1
46 71 NSA-2
72
75 68 74 73 NSA-3
77
50 NSA-4
70 SSA-1
50
76 SSA-2
OM SSA-3
LS
FO SSA-4

PROJECT SITE Water System Master Plan Figure

135849 Sacramento Suburban Water District
DATE TITLE 14-1
6-12-09 Existing Surge Protection
14: Surge Analysis Water System Master Plan

14.2 Analysis Results

The facilities that were included in this analysis as representative facilities within the District are shown in
Table 14-1 and 14-2. The high and low pressures resulting from abrupt pump shut down are also shown.

Table 14-1. Representative Facilities Analyzed for Surge

Low/High
Duration of negative
Facility VFD Location Pressure
pressure, seconds
Results (psig)

N7 Rosebud No NSA 4/85 Less than 1

Model could not

N29 Merrihill No NSA Less than 1
solve

N33 Walerga No NSA -14/140 Less than 1 (near facility)

Jonas/Sierra
46 No SSA -14/142 Less than 1 (near facility)
Mills
River
71 Yes SSA -2/83 Less than 1 (near facility)
Drive/Jacob
Enterprise/
-- Northrop Yes SSA -13/132 ~ 2 (near facility)
BPS

A pressure surge analysis was also conducted at the Enterprise/Northrop booster pump station with pumps
A through E running fully open. Similar to the analysis at the wells, the minimum pressure was -13 psig at a
dead end near the booster pumps. The maximum pressure was 132 psi.
In the model analysis, negative pressures near the facility resulting from the booster pump shutdown
occurred for a duration of 2 seconds approximately 7 seconds after shutdown. This was longer than the
duration of negative pressures resulting from the well pump abrupt shutdown.
The surge analysis identified high and low transient pressures that could occur during an emergency pump
shutdown. The most extreme pressure range was found to occur immediately downstream of the pump and
at the end of dead-end pipes near the pump, with the worst case occurring in the dead-end pipes. Pressure
surge within the looped distribution system did not appear to be a problem because the looping helps to
dissipate the pressure waves. Pressure surge at pump startup also did not cause the extreme pressures that
occurred during pump shutdown. For example, Figure 14-2 shows the pressures for Well 46 pump startup
and emergency shutdown at the end of a 6-inch dead-end line near the well. For this situation, the pressures
for the pump startup did not vary much as compared to normal system pressures. However, the pressures
during shutdown varied from 0 psi absolute (-14.7 psig) to pressures over 125 psig.

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14: Surge Analysis Water System Master Plan

150

Pump Shutdown
125
Pump Startup

100
Pressure (psi)

75

50

25

-25
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time (seconds)

Figure 14-2. Pressures for Well 46 Pump Startup and Shutdown

14.3 Surge Protection and Pressure Relief Recommendations

This analysis was performed to give an overview of potential surge issues that could occur in the District’s
water system. Issues identified were limited to emergency pump shut down that would only occur if the
pump was running during a sudden power failure event. Therefore, the risk of surge on the system is not
high. Below is a list of recommendations related to this surge protection analysis that should be considered
by the District.
1. Model parameters that were added to the well pumps to simulate the pump startup and shutdown
were selected based on typical parameters. A more detailed analysis would be necessary to calculate
the actual transient pressures at each well pump. This would include verifying the well pump setup
(e.g. type of check valve installed at pump and the piping at the pump).
2. Because this analysis identified dead-end pipes as being vulnerable to negative pressures during
abrupt pump shutdown, it is recommended that a more detailed surge analysis be done at the well
sites that do not currently have surge protection. Based on the analysis, preventative measures could
be identified such as looping the piping, two-way surge valve anticipators at the pump, or
hydropneumatic tanks.
3. The surge analysis for the system indicated that, in general, there are limited concerns for surge
events. However, some dead end pipes near pumps did show the potential for surge related low
pressures. A detailed analysis of every pipe in the system is beyond the scope of this report, but
these events are most likely to occur in areas that are farthest away from surge dampening
components such as hydropneumatic tanks or elevated storage tanks floating on the system. As
shown on Figure 14-1, each of the subareas within the District contains well sites with surge reducing

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14: Surge Analysis Water System Master Plan

hydropnuematic tanks facilities. Areas that may have a higher potential for surge events, due to the
lack of hydropnuematic tanks in the area, are the northern portion of NSA-1 and the northern
portion of NSA-3. It is recommended that any detailed surge analysis of the system begin in these
areas with the highest surge potential. As previously noted, even these areas were found to have
limited potential for surge events.
InfoSurge allows the detailed modeling of surge protection devices. For example, a hydropneumatic tank was
added to the Well 46 situation discussed above. Figure 14-3 compares the pressures for an emergency
shutdown before and after adding a 5,000 gallon hydropneumatic tank.

150

Pressure without Tank

125
Pressure with Tank

100
Pressure (psi)

75

50

25

-25
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time (seconds)

Figure 14-3. Pressures after Emergency Shutdown of Well 46 Pump With and Without Hydropneumatic Tank

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