Friends and Foes: A Research Note Re-examining the Alliance – Contiguity

Relationship.

Michael Koch
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
mtkoch@polisci.tamu.edu

Zowie Hay
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
zowiehay@polisci.tamu.edu

Douglas W. Kuberski
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
dkuberski@polisci.tamu.edu

We thank Christopher Sprecher and Randolph Siverson for their comments and
suggestions. However, all mistakes remain solely ours.
Abstract: Quantitative studies of interstate conflict usually include a variable to control
for the effect of alliances on conflict behavior, yet the results of these studies vary quite
considerably. We argue that the reason for these varying results is that the impact of
alliances between states on conflict is conditioned by geographic distance, at least in
terms of how these measures are commonly operationalized in the conflict literature. We
provide an argument for why the influence of alliances is conditioned by geography. We
then demonstrate that inter-acting the two measures provides consistent results by
replicating a number of studies, both monadic and dyadic in nature, which included a
measure controlling for alliances.

1
 In “Dangerous Dyads” (1992) Stuart Bremer noted that both the absence of an

alliance and whether states where contiguous or not were the two most important factors

contributing to a “dangerous dyad.” Since then much of the quantitative literature on

interstate conflict has heeded the words of Bremer and included measures controlling for

both shared alliance membership and spatial proximity. The quantitative conflict

research over the past 10 years provides ample evidence that alliances are still thought to

influence the probability of conflict between states. Arguments range from how alliances

reduce conflict between states to how they might exacerbate conflict between states.

Among the most common reasons cited, alliances are thought to reduce the probability of

conflict between states by providing a framework by which states can negotiate

differences without resorting to arms. Conversely others suggest that they increase the

probability of conflict because allies may value similar things but their preferences may

diverge, giving allies more to fight over. And while there are different theoretical

propositions explaining the alliance-conflict relationship, there are equally divergent

findings in terms of empirical relationships.1

Whether by reducing or increasing the probability of conflict between states,

alliances are seen as integral to understanding conflict among nations. Reflecting this

importance, much of the quantitative research on the causes of inter-state conflict has

included some measure of alliance commitments. For example of the nine quantitative

pieces that focused on interstate conflict in volume 50 of International Studies Quarterly

in 2006, eight included a measure of whether an alliance was present between dyads

1
For a summaries of the research on whether alliances increase or decrease conflict, see both Sprecher and
Krause (2006) and Kimball (2006).

2
while the other controlled for alliance similarity. Similarly, the Journal of Conflict

Resolution published ten articles containing quantitative tests of inter-state conflict

between 2005 and 2006. Of these ten, eight included a control measure for alliances.

However, does this research accurately capture the effects of alliances on

conflict? If researchers are going to include measures of alliances and proximity, either

to control for alternative explanations or because they might influence the dependent

variable under study, then it is important to properly specify those measures.2 In this

article we suggest that one of the reasons for conflicting findings or even null findings

concerning the influence of alliances on conflict is that the use of alliances as a control

variable is often mis-specified. We demonstrate that the effect of alliances is often

conditioned by geographic proximity. In this paper we briefly review the literature on the

conditions under which alliances between states lead to conflict or peace. We then review

some of the empirical work that incorporates alliances both monadically and dyadically

as “controls” and the results that have emerged from this research. Next we discuss how

geographic distance might influence the relationship between alliances and conflict. We

then present an alternative specification of alliances and geographic proximity and test its

performance using previous published studies in the international conflict literature.

Overall, the results suggest that there is a strong relationship between alliances, the

distance between states, and conflict.

Alliances and Conflict:

The most common explanation for controlling for the presence or absence of

alliances is that alliances are a catalyst for peace. By clarifying commitments to defense,

or, by creating uncertainty in calculating relative power, alliances make potential

2
For an excellent discussion of when and how to use control variables see Ray (2003).

3
belligerents more cautious (Morgenthau, 1967). In other words, alliances are thought to

deter aggression by enhancing the military capability of potential military targets (Levy,

1981; Smith, 1995). Moreover, alliances are seen as enhancing peace when they are

primarily perceived as sending a signal that is defensive in nature (Gibler, 2000; Leeds,

2003). For example, when alliances are signed during times of relative peace between

countries with no clashing interests, or, signed between states that have failed in their

previous war experience, they lead to peace because of the specific signals that they send

to other states about the intentions of the states involved (Raknerund and Hegre, 1997;

Gibler and Vasquez, 1998). Alliances also allow for states to potentially constrain their

allies’ behavior, meaning states with allies are less likely to initiate conflict (Ireland and

Gartner, 2001). Smith (1995) emphasizes the informational benefits of alliances in

promoting peace, whereby states who are signatories of a particular alliance are better

able to send information to each other and eliminate uncertainty with potential

adversaries.

In terms of why alliances are likely to lead to conflict, Bueno de Mesquita’s

(1981) expected utility model suggests that allies are more likely to engage in bilateral

conflict because alliances between states reduce the likelihood of third party intervention.

Additionally, as states alter their foreign policies this can lead to disagreements over

security issues and increase allies’ incentives to attack one another. Furthermore,

alliances are likely to lead to a state becoming involved in a conflict by increasing

conflict opportunities because states form alliances in anticipation or preparation for

future conflict (Morgenthau, 1967; Levy, 1981; Smith, 1995; Gibler and Vasquez, 1998).

By arousing suspicion in other states, alliances have the potential to incite conflict

4
because they spark a security dilemma and have the potential to entrap states who are

concerned about national prestige and the ramifications of not fulfilling their alliance

commitments (Levy, 1981; Oren, 1990; Snyder, 1997, Sprecher, 2004).

Alliances and Quantitative Models of Conflict:

Given the importance that international relations scholars have placed on the role

of alliances and the probability of conflict, it is not surprising that alliances have taken on

such a prominent role in studies of IR. This importance has been reflected in much of the

recent quantitative work in international relations. In Bremer’s seminal article

“Dangerous Dyads” (1992) his bivariate analysis revealed that war is more likely to occur

between allies. However, results of his multivariate analysis revealed that the absence of

an alliance between states leads to an increased probability of war. Even though these

mixed results suggested that the presumed relationship between alliances and war was

spurious, or perhaps conditioned by some other variable, Bremer argued that both the

absence of an alliance and whether states where contiguous or not were the two most

important factors contributing to a “dangerous dyad.”

Recent research continues to control for the influence of alliances on interstate

conflict. In their dyadic assessment of the “liberal” peace Oneal and Russett (2001)

include a control for alliances, and find a negative relationship between alliance

commitments and conflict. More recently, Clark and Regan (2003) provide an alternative

statistical method to model the role of opportunity and willingness to fight in the study of

conflict. They also find that an alliance significantly reduces the willingness and hence

the probability that two states will fight. Gartzke (2007), in testing a theory of liberal

5
peace based on capitalism and common interstate interests rather than regime type, also

finds that alliance ties decrease the probability of war.

However, others have found that alliances often have no effect on the probability

of conflict (Barbieri, 1996; Benson 2005; Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002). For

example, Barbieri’s (1996) analysis of the effects of economic interdependence on

conflict suggests that alliances have no significant impact on the probability of a dispute

occurring between states. Benson (2005) in her re-examination of politically relevant

dyads finds no statistically significant relationship between alliances and conflict while

employing a number of different datasets. In their examination of the “Dictatorial Peace”

Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) also find no statistically significant effect of

alliances on conflict behavior.

While dyadic studies have found either a negative relationship or no relationship

between alliances and conflict, others have taken the monadic approach, with conflicting

results. Ireland and Gartner (2001) examine how executive constraints in democratic

states, as determined by parliamentary government type, affect the hazard of that state

entering into a conflict. Controlling for the presence of a defense alliance, the authors

find that alliances decrease the probability of conflict initiation. Lai and Slater (2006),

predict that the more allies states have, the more opportunities for conflict. However,

their results show that no statistical relationship exists between the number of alliances a

state has and conflict. Finally, Siverson and Starr (1990) show a positive connection

between conflict and alliances as alliances create opportunities for conflict diffusion.

In sum, research at both the monadic and dyadic level has failed to clearly

demonstrate a consistent relationship between alliances and conflict; at different times

6
different studies have asserted that alliances can lead to peace, have no effect on conflict,

or lead to war. We feel that these mixed empirical findings are a misspecification of the

relationship between alliances and conflict, as they do not consider the interactive effect

of alliance proximity. .

Re-specifying Alliances:

As noted above, Bremer concluded that the two best predictors of conflict

between states were proximity and alliances. We agree with Bremer’s initial assessment

that both allies and proximity are important predictors of conflict but suggest that a

missing link is their interaction. Rather it is not only whether you have an alliance but

also where your ally is located.

Some of the more common reasons given to control for the presence of alliances

are that they reduce conflict; either by signaling intentions or by providing alternative

mechanisms for conflict resolution. Alternatively, others control for alliances because

they may increase conflict as more allies represent more conflict opportunities. The more

alliances a state is involved in the greater the potential for being drawn into a conflict.

We posit that alliances that are geographically proximate have the intended effect of

reducing conflict. Alliances with neighboring states are likely to reduce the conflict

opportunities that occur via geographic contiguity (e.g. Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1993).3

However, alliances with geographically distant states do not mitigate the influence of

geography. In fact the distance between them may embolden either the distant ally or

3
For an overview of the role of spatial proximity and conflict see Starr (2005).

7
opponents of the ally. Below we articulate a reason why we should see differential

impact of alliances as conditioned by geography4

We agree with Morrow (1991) that one of the motivations for states to engage in

alliances with other states is the trade-off of security for autonomy. Morrow argues states

seek alliances when they are already facing some threat and/or cannot internally balance

through the build-up of arms, therefore trading some policy autonomy for security or vice

versa. While alliances provide gains of trade for each party, those seeking greater security

versus those seeking greater autonomy, depending on the alliance there may be times in

which states that have engaged in this trade off do not see eye to eye over the same

issues. Under certain circumstances, the ties that bind in terms of security also create

conditions for disputes to emerge among allies Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman (1992).

Bueno de Mequita and Lalman contend that under many circumstance allies are

more likely to have disputes with one another than they are with non-allied states. They

posit that the stronger side in an alliance may have somewhat of a free hand to bully the

weaker member given the reduced expectation of third party intervention and the

provision of increased security. Conversely, the weaker party has an incentive to act

preemptively in anticipation of such bullying. They conclude that these, “circumstances

foster prisoner’s-dilemma conditions that encourage wars (167).” Thus, if states within an

alliance begin to disagree with one another the conditions exist which can lead to

conflict.

However, under the above circumstances, we argue that geographically

proximate allies are less likely to go to war than geographically distant allies. Bueno de

4
We recognize that this is only one a number of plausible arguments to explain the following results. Our
main goal here is to demonstrate the relationship so that future research employ better specified models.

8
Mesquita and Lalman (1992) suggest that the incentive for conflict can be removed if

each ally faces a substantial political cost for using force and that this information can be

conveyed to the other. We argue that geographically proximate allies are better able to

convey this information to one another than geographically distant allies. As Kimball

(2006) notes, contiguity provides constant interaction opportunities between states,

meaning there are greater opportunities to share information. Furthermore proximity

facilitates increased opportunities to interact not only negatively but positively as well

(Siverson and Starr 1991; Diehl 1992). Thus we suggest that proximate states that have

reached an alliance have a greater potential to share information with one another

reducing conflict between them. Similarly, geographically proximate neighbors are more

likely to create security communities further reducing conflict (Adler and Barnett 1996

Deutsch et al. 1957, Lake 1997). Thus given similar security concerns and the ability to

better convey information, geographically proximate alliances mitigate the influence of

geography on conflict. Conversely geographically distant allies increase the probability

of a dispute occurring given the prisoner-dilemma like conditions created by the alliance,

the likelihood of disagreements over changing preferences, and the reduced ability to

convey information credibly.

Rather than creating a new data set to examine the connection between alliances

and geography, we replicate three relatively recent studies but include the interactive

term between allies and proximity. Specifically, we replicate three relatively well known

models of interstate conflict comparing the published model to a model interacting

alliances and proximity (Oneal and Russett 2001; Peceny Beer and Sanchez-Terry 2002;

9
Lai and Slater 2006).5 In each of the dyadic models we follow the researchers’ coding

schemes. We then replicate the models using the same regression techniques but with an

interactive term between alliance and proximity. For the monadic study we create a

measure of the number of proximate alliances and include this with the already present

measure of total allies. We assess whether the interactive term improves the model by

examining changes in the individual coefficients as well as using goodness of fit tests to

gauge whether the interactive term improves the overall model fit.

Replication:

In one of the seminal pieces on the democratic peace proposition, Oneal and

Russett (2001) examine the relationship of both regime similarity and trade levels to the

onset of inter-state disputes. Included in their model are controls for the influence of

alliances and contiguity on dispute onset. Alliance is coded as one if the dyad shared a

defense pact, non-aggression pact or entente and zero otherwise. Instead of coding

whether states are contiguous they create a measure of non-contiguity. States are said to

be non-contiguous if they do not share a border and are separated by more than 150 miles

of water. Non-contiguous states are coded as one with contiguous states coded as zero.

They use Generalized Estimating Equation using an AR1 specification to control for

temporal dependence. Model 1 of table 1 replicates the results of their Model 5.1 (p316).

Both the presence of an alliance and being non-contiguous has statistically significant

negative influences on whether a dyad engages in conflict.

(Insert Table 1 Here)

5
We also replicated the other models from the articles above where data was available. Our main result
remained robust.

10
 Model 2 represents the replication of their model interacting their measures of

contiguity and alliance commitment. While the contiguity measure is still negative and

significant the alliance measure is no longer significant. More importantly the interactive

term is positive and significant. The results suggest that alliances by themselves do not

inhibit conflict within the dyad. Rather, they suggest that states that have an alliance and

are not contiguous are more likely to engage in militarized disputes, while alliances with

contiguous states have no effect. Thus Oneal and Russett’s result, in terms of their

alliance measure, is due to the number of contiguous states with alliances. To test for

whether the interactive term provides a better fit of the data, we employ a Hosmer and

Lemeshow (HL) Goodness of Fit Test given that using the GEE model prevents us from

directly calculating the Bayesian Information Criterion statistic or comparing likelihood

ratios. In general, a lower Chi Square value indicates a better fit between the observed

and predicted outcomes. The HL statistic for the interactive model is 57.38 with a p value

of .000. In comparison, the HL statistic for the Oneal and Russett model is 90.93 with a p

value of .000.6

Our second replication examines the “Dictatorial Peace.” Peceny, Beer and

Sanchez-Terry (2002) suggest that certain non-democratic dyads have a lower probability

of engaging in militarized disputes than dyads composed of democratic and non-

democratic states. In their models they code the presence of an alliance within the dyad

as one, and no alliance as zero. Their contiguity measure identifies states that share a

6
The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test is performed by dividing the predicted probabilities into
deciles (10 groups based on percentile ranks) and then computing a Pearson chi-square that compares the
predicted to the observed frequencies (in a 2 X 10 table). Lower values indicate a good fit to the data and,
therefore, good overall model fit.

11
land border or are separated by no more than 400 miles of water as contiguous. They

employ a logit specification with cubic splines to control for temporal dependence.

(Insert Table 2 Here)

Model 1 of table 2 replicates their Model 2 of Table 4 (p25). The dependent

variable is whether the dyad experienced a militarized interstate dispute involving the use

of force or greater. The results show that contiguity is associated with an increased

probability of a dispute occurring within the dyad, while alliance has no effect. Model 2

of table 2 shows the interactive affect between alliances and contiguity. Both alliance and

contiguity are positive indicating that contiguous states without an alliance, and non-

contiguous states with an alliance have a statistically higher probability of experiencing a

militarized dispute. However, the combined effect is that contiguous allied states are less

likely to engage in a MID involving the use of force. What happens if we change the

criteria for states being contiguous? Models 3 and 4 present the same models as models 1

and 2 but with the more conventional 150 mile cut-off used to determine contiguity. The

magnitudes of the coefficients increase in both models. But is the model a better fit as

well? Comparing Bayesian Information Criterion statistic we find the difference between

them is 37.061, strongly suggesting that the interactive model is the correct model even

with the addition of another parameter.7 Finally, the proportional reduction in error

increased from 3.75% in the non-interactive model to 4.24% by including interactive

term.

7
The difference in BIC between Models 1 and 2 of Table 2 gave some positive support to the interactive

model.

12
 Our third replication is based on the monadic study of Lai and Slater

(2006) who examine differences among autocratic regimes. Focusing on not only the size

of the authoritarian regimes winning coalition but the also on type of regime and support

provided, they find that military regimes are much more conflict prone that other types of

autocratic regimes. To control for the effects alliances on conflict they create a measure

of the total number of alliances a state has, using the common dichotomous coding

scheme. For contiguity they control for the number of borders that a state shares with

other states. They employ a negative bi-nomial regression with robust standard errors on

the state and a lagged dependent variable to account for heteroskedasticity and

autocorrelation, respectively.

(Insert Table 3 here)

Model 1 of table three replicates their results. While they find a positive

relationship between the number of bordering states and the number of initiated disputes

in a year, they find no statistical relationship between the total number of allies a state has

and the number of conflicts. Model 2 of table 2 includes a variable we created that counts

the number of geographically proximate allies. As the results show, the coefficient for

the number of borders is positive and significant but the measure of total allies is also

positive and significant, which is what Lai and Slater expected. More importantly our

measure of proximate alliances is negative and significant, which is what we expected.

Again the difference in BIC points strongly towards the model including the proximate

allies measure (34.46)

13
Conclusion:

Overall, the inclusion of an interactive term between alliances and contiguity

improves statistical significance, model fit and most importantly fits with the existing

expectations about the conditions with which alliances will lead to peace or will

exacerbate conflict among states. The results are robust across a variety of statistical

methods as well as a variety of dependent variables. In all but one of the models, the

expected alliance-proximity relationship was found except for the effect of contiguous

alliances in replicating Oneal and Russett’s results. The results of our replications suggest

that the null findings produced in many studies in regards to alliances is not due to the

“key explanatory” measures somehow better accounting for the relationships between or

among states but rather due to mis-specification. Our results also suggest that

researcher’s take care in how they operationalize the alliance-proximity relationship. As

the models in table 2 demonstrate using the 150 mile cut off provided better estimates

than the 400 mile cut off initially employed. However, it is also worth noting that while

magnitudes of co-efficients changed slightly in many of the models, the relationships of

theoretical interest in the results analyzed here remained robust.

Our examination of the relationship between alliances and proximity fits into a

small but growing body of research that suggests contextual factors need to be thought

through more carefully when specifying models.8 As Ray (2003) notes “the construction

of pooled cross-sectional, time series analyses is consistently based on the assumption

that the key explanatory factor, as well as the control variables, have essentially identical

impacts on interstate conflict across space, and over time. Substantial evidence …

suggests that this assumption is unwarranted (1).” Of course we do not suggest that
8
For example see Ward, Siverson and Cao (2007), Ray (2003), and Clark and Regan (2003)

14
researchers should always specify alliances, conditional on proximity. Specification

should be driven both by the questions being asked and the theoretical expectations

concerning the relationship between alliances, geography and international conflict.

However, we do hope that this study will motivate others to avoid ritualistically including

the “Usual Suspects” as controls. Indeed, future research should seriously consider how

certain relationships might be conditioned by one another as well as by other influences. .

15
References

ADLER, E., and M Barnett. (1996) Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the
Study of Security Communities. Ethics and International Affairs 10 (1): 63-98.

DIEHL, P. F. (1992) What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in
International Conflict Research Journal of Peace Research 29 (3): 333-344.

BENSON, M. A. (2005) The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the study of

Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes. Conflict Management and Peace Science 22: 113-
133.

BREMER, S. (1992) Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate

War, 1816–1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36: 309–341.

BUENO DE MESQUITA, B. (1981) The War Trap. New Haven : Yale University Press.

BUENO DE MESQUITA, B., and D. Lalman (1992) War and Reason. New Haven :
Yale University Press.

CLARK, D. H., and P. M. Regan (2003) Opportunities to Fight: A Statistical Technique

for Modelling Unobservable Phenomena. Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (1): 94-115.

DEUTSCH, K. W., S.A. BURELL, R.A. KANN, M. LEE JR., M LICHTERMAN, R. E.

LINDGREN, F. L. LOEWENHEIM, and R. W. VAN WAGENEN. (1957) Political
Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of
Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

GARTZKE, E. (2007) The Capitalist Peace. American Journal of Political Science 51

(1): 166-191.

GIBLER, D. M. (2000) "Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Why Others Cause
Peace." In What Do We Know about War? edited by J. A. Vasquez.Lanham, MD :
Rowman & Littlefield.

GIBLER, D. M., and J. A. Vasquez (1998) Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495–
1980. International Studies Quarterly 42: 785–807.

IRELAND, M. J., and S.S. Gartner (2001) Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict
Initiations in Parliamentary Systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (5): 547-568.

KIMBALL, A. L. (2006) Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link.
Journal of Peace Research 43 (4): 371-389.

LAI, B., and D. Slater (2006) Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute
Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political Science
50 (1): 113-126.

16
LAKE, D. A. (1997) Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach.. In Regional
Orders. Building Security in a New World, edited by D. A. Lake and P. M. Morgan.
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 45-67

LEEDS, B.A. (2003) Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military

Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. American Journal of
Political Science 47 (3): 427-439.

LEVY, J. S. (1981) Alliance formation and war behavior. Journal of Conflict Revolution
25: 581-613.

MORGENTHAU, H. (1967) Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace.
New York: Alfred A Knopf.

MORROW, J. D. (1991) Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability

Aggregation Model of Alliances. American Journal of Political Science 35 (3): 903-993.

ONEAL, J., and B. Russett. (2001) Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal
Peace. International Organization 55 (2): 469-485.

OREN, I. (1990) The War Proneness of Alliances. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 (2):
208-233.

PECENY, M., C. Beer and S. Sanchez-Terry. (2002) Dictatorial Peace? American

Political Science Review 96: 15-26.

RAKNERUD, A., and H. Hegre (1997) The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence
for the Democratic Peace. Journal of Peace Research 34 (4): 385-404.

RAY, J. L. (2003) Explaining Interstate Conflict and War: What Should Be Controlled
For? Conflict Management and Peace Science 20: 1-31.

SIVERSON, R. M., and H. Starr (1990) Opportunity, Willingness and the Diffusion of
War. American Political Science Review 84 (1): 47-67.

SMITH, A. (1995) Alliances and War. International Studies Quarterly 39: 405-425.

SNYDER, G. H. (1997) Alliance Politics Ithaca, N.Y : Cornell University Press.

SPRECHER, C. (2004) Alliance Formation and the Timing of War Involvement.

International Interactions 30: 331-347.

SPRECHER, C., and V. KRAUSE (2006) Alliances, Armed Conflict and Cooperation:
Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Peace Research 43 (4): 363-
369.

17
STARR, H. (2005) Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality: The Geography of International
Conflict The International Studies Review 7 (3) :387-406.

VASQUEZ, J. A. (1993) The War Puzzle Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University
Press.

WARD, M. D., R. M. Siverson and X Cao (2007) Disputes, Democracies, and

Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Kantian Peace. American Journal of Political
Science 51 (3): 583-601.

18
Table 1. Replication of Triangulating Peace: Model 5.1
Dependent Variable MID Onset

Original Interaction
Model 1 Model 2
Allies -.539*** .011
(.159) (.322)
Non-Contiguity -.989*** -1.05***
(.168) (.174)
Allies X Non Contiguity .642*
(.354)
Lower Democracy -.061*** -.062
(.009) (.009)
Lower Dependence 52.92*** -54.41
(13.41) (13.75)
International Organizations -.013*** -.013
(.004) (.004)
Log Distance -.376*** -.374
(.064) (.064)
Only Minor powers -.647*** -.626
(.178) (.178)
Constant -.128 -.171
(.536) (.532)
N 39988 39988
Groups 1178 1178
Chi Square 288.11*** 244.48***
*p < .05, **p < .01,***p < .001

19
Table 2. Replication of the Dictatorial Peace: Table 4 Model 2
Dependent Variable Use of Force

Original Replication Contiguity 150 miles

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Allied -.017 .290* -.086 .798**
(.080) (.150) (.085) (.131)
Contiguous 2.945** 3.001** 3.109** 3.287**
(.068) (.072) (.068) (.072)
Allied X Contiguous -.400** -1.229**
(.173) (.163)
Personalist Regime .191 .191 .102 .136
(.256) (.256) (.254) (.254)
Military Regime -.132 -.101 -.156 -.051
(.592) (.591) (.593) (.591)
Single-Party Regime -.682** -.676** -.835** -.826**
(.135) (.136) (.137) (.138)
Democracy -1.223** -1.216** -1.199** -1.201**
(.149) (.149) (.149) (.149)
Major Power dyad 2.281** 2.268** 2.370** 2.336**
(.078) (.079) (.079) (.079)
Higher/lower Ratio -.318** -.315** -.321** -.319*
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023)
Economically Advanced -.307* -.299** -.246* -.219**
(.108) (.109) (.109) (.109)
Time since last display or -.365** -.364** -.354** -.352**
use of force (.022) (.022) (.022) (.021)
Cubic Spline 1 -.004** -.004** .003** .003**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Cubic Spline 2 .003** .003** .002** .002**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Cubic Spline 3 -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant -4.277** -4.309** -4.279** -4.279**
(.082) (.084) (.082) (.082)
N 376728 376728 376728 376728
Log Likelihood -5903.34 5900.83 5856.66 5831.71
Chi Square 4685.8 4690.82** 4779.17 4829.07

*p < .05, **p < .01

20
Table 3. Replication of Institutions of the Offensive: Table 1 Model 1
Dependent Variable # of MIDS Initiated

Original Interaction
Model 1 Model 2
Total Allies .007 .021***
(.006) (.006)
Total Borders .070*** .113***
(.018) (.018)
Near Allies -.160***
(.039)
Single Party Regime .125 .205
(.207) (.188)
Military Regime .516* .602**
(.224) (.216)
Capability 4.68** 4.06***
(1.61) (1.22)
Openness -.947*** -.961***
(.283) (.283)
Lag DV .549*** -.514***
(.097) (.099)
Constant -2.17*** -2.34**
(.280) (.243)
N 4960 4960
Log Likelihood -2612.5 -2591.06
Chi Square 135.1*** 285.78***

Democracy is the excluded reference category for the regime type variables.
*p < .05, **p < .01,***p < .001 All tests are two-tailed. Robust Standard Errors (clustered on each
state) are in parentheses.

21