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tasks, for example, using a mobile phone whilst driving. By studying divided attention knowledge is
gained about the human information-processing system. Eysenck and Keane (2005) explain how there
are three factors that determine how well an individual can undertake multiple tasks; task similarity,
task difficulty and amount of practice. Divided attention is typically investigated using the dual-task
paradigm. Experiments involve participants undertaking one task while simultaneously conducting
another. The fundamental idea behind a dual task experiment is that if participants score worse on tasks
when conducted simultaneously then there is an interference effect. A good example is the Stroop Test
(Stroop 1935) in which participants are asked to indicate the color of a word rather than processing its
meaning. Thus, if an interference effect is observed a dual-task experiment it can be proposed that both
Kahneman’s (1973) model of divided attention proposes that cognitive capacity is moderated by
a central processing unit, much like that of a single core computer. Processing resources are allocated by
degree of importance as well as an individual’s arousal. If comparing to a computer system, one could
draw the analogy of degree of importance being similar to processing priority, and arousal being similar
to overclocking a central processing unit. Overclocking a CPU, although increasing capacity can only be
done for a temporary amount of time as it will overheat. Similarly, human attentional capacity can be
increased temporarily by arousal from natural causes or use of substances. Spelke, Hirst and Neisser
(1976) conducted study suggesting that there are not fixed limitations on central processing capacity.
Further, Kahneman suggested an innate capacity to filter the priority of attentional stimuli, thus as a
task requires more attention, more resources are allocated. One of the major issues with Kahnemans
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model is its inability to satisfactorily explain how individual abilities can be eliminated due to
neurological damage (Eysenck and Keane 2005). A study conducted by Wickens and Gopher (1977) was
able to provide evidence that allocation of resources by central capacity is under strategic control.
Participants on instruction were able to switch the priority of a task and perform accordingly. This
Unlike Kahneman’s model of divided attention, Allport’s module resource theory (1980)
provides an explanation of how resources are allocated to individual tasks. Allport states that attention
is broken down into separate cognitive modules relevant to a specific skill or ability. Rather than, a
shared limited capacity such as in Kahneman’s model, each module has its own capacity and resource
bank. By proposing this idea, Allport shows how there can be similarities in performance in dual-task
paradigms as well as how resources are allocated to each task. Multiple module resource theories i.e.
(Navon and Gopher 1979) suggest that modules although specialized can be traded between different
skills and abilities. That is to say audio module resources could be used for visual attention, however
they would not be as efficient as within their own specialization. However in all module resource
theories there is no agreed number of modules, thus the model cannot be falsified.(Allport 1983,
Wicken 1984). Further, it does not explain how modules are coordinated to perform complex tasks
(Underwood 1974). Baddeley (1986) proposed that divided attention is made up of a hierarchical system
consisting of a combination of central capacity theory and multiple resource theory. Although, this is
refuted as it disagrees with accepted cognitive neuropsychological systems, that there is a general
processing mechanism. Without a general processing mechanism it cannot be shown how the
Strayer and Johnstons (2001) study on mobile telephone use while driving supports Kahneman’s
concept in an experimental format. The experimenters hypothesized that talking on a mobile phone
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takes away from the attentional resources to be used while driving the car, thus, causing a deficit in the
required capacity to drive a car safely. Initially the experimenters tested the impact of listening to
conversation on driving skill, concluding that listening either does not affect capacity for driving or
requires very little processing power, resulting in driving skill being unchanged. This may be due to
practice, discussed further in the essay. Secondly, participants were tested on driving skill while actively
however when generating words or listening for conversational cues, driving ability declined
significantly. Most importantly this shows that the attentional ability while participating in a dual-task
scenario is dependent on the type of task being undertaken. Using the computer analogy again, some
tasks have greater minimum system requirements and thus cannot be run in parallel with tasks using
The results of this experiment seem to agree with Kahneman’s proposed theory. Processing
ability appears finite due to the interference effect between the two different tasks. However, it is
unclear how resources are allocated. Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) proposed that as one repeats a task
through practice, it creates a greater ability. It is this practiced ability that allows for individuals to
undertake automatic behavior. Logan (1984) describes in the instance theory of automization how
practicing creates multiple instances of a process. This leads to a larger knowledge base of a task
providing a greater store of previously encountered scenarios. It is believed that having an extensive
store of instances allows an individual to react more proficiently to scenarios within the aforementioned
behavior as the probability of previously experiencing said scenario increases. Therefore it could be
argued that listening and shadowing are processes that have acquired an extensive history of practice,
suggesting execution of these processes require relatively little attentional capacity. However, in the
case of verbal communication using a mobile phone, cues come in unexpected format. This puts
cognitive load on the task, increasing priority, ultimately reallocating resources as needed. Further, it
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can be said that mobile phone conversation is a significantly different task than person to person
conversation. In a normal conversation in a vehicle the passenger can regulate conversation as they
experience the same visual cues as the driver, whereas this ability is absent in the other end of a mobile
conversation. This was demonstrated in Parks (1991) experiment as conversation within a vehicle
A study conducted by Segal and Fusella (1970) where participants were tested on visual
imagery, audio imagery and visual detection, found that participants performed worse on tasks engaging
two visual systems than a visual system and an audio system. This supports the module resource theory
as it seems to show the existence of separate resources for each system rather than a single resource
used by a central capacity. Further, an experiment by Dawson and Schell (1982) suggests that separate
hemispheres of the brain act as distinct resources banks (Lund 2001). By pairing audio cues with an
electric shock response, Dawson and Schell (1982) discovered that the right hand side of the brain (for
the left ear) undertook an autonomic response to the audio cues, however the opposite hemisphere did
not upon receiving input from the right ear. If separate hemispheres undertake different abilities, then
resources must be distinct. A central capacity model would predict that both ears (and thus both sides
of the brain) would respond to the audio cue or neither sides would respond to the audio cue (Payne
and Wenger 1998). Thus, with the notion that Kahneman’s central capacity does not support
neuropsychological findings, it appears as if it will be replaced or modified in the near future as brain
Although central capacity has its flaws, as a model that has significant experimental backup, it
seems to explain attention in a more satisfactory basis to multiple module resource theories. Like
Baddeley (1986) suggests a correct model of attention is more like to be a fusion of both theories with
the support for central capacity coming from experimental research using dual task paradigms and the
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support for multiple resources executed by the central capacity coming from the neuropsychological
research being conducted. To once again use a computer analogy, it seems that evidence for multiple
resources will be in the hardware (as in the components of the brain) and the strategic command of the
central capacity will come from the cellular instructions (or software) that specific neural networks run.
Traditional operating systems such as windows use common driver components to run families of
distinctively different software programs. For example the save box in is a shared component of all
programs in the package. However, the resources needed to run that shared component come from the
hardware in the RAM or central processing unit. If the RAM is full or processing power is being utilized
by a high priority, resource intensive task then other software will either not run or not run at the same
capability. Further, by having additional graphics and audio cards one is able to increase the ability of
the computer to run tasks of the relevant nature. Practice on a neuropsychological basis involves
creating and modifying new neural networks, again this is much like updating software for it to run more
In sum, Kahneman’s (1973) model works well in practice. It’s limits lie in its statement that
capacity is limited. Until experimental evidence can be provided that capacity is limited and how
resources are allocated to tasks, it still exists as a flawed model. However, although module resource
theories have a good neuropsychological foundation, they are not correct scientific theory as they are
unfalsifiable. Thus, one can conclude on this basis alone that Kahneman’s (1973) model of divided
References
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Dawson, M.E. and Schell, A.M (1982) Electrodermal responses to attended and non-attended significant
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Eysenck, M.W. and Keane M, (2005) Cognitive Psychology A Student’s Handbook 5th Ed. Psychology
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