The euro conundrum

Zsolt Darvas, 10 November 2010

Markets are charging high interest rates for sovereign bonds of peripheral eurozone countries, but
are at the same time keeping the euro exchange rate strong. Indeed, the euro-dollar exchange rate
continues to stay well above its equilibrium
Exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar and
value as defined by purchasing power parity
the purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rate, since mid-2003, and its depreciation earlier this
1.6
4 January 1999 – 9 November 2010
1.6
year, which frequently occupied press
headlines, meant just a correction toward
1.5 1.5 equilibrium (see Figure). Is there not an
1.4 1.4 anomaly? And do recent eurozone governance
proposals play a role?
1.3 1.3

1.2 The strength of the euro suggests that markets

1.2

1.1 1.1 do not expect a disorderly dissolution of the euro

project, but large sovereign bonds spreads
1.0 1.0
suggests that a government default (or debt
0.9 0.9 restructuring) is not unthinkable. Recent worries
0.8 0.8
about possible defaults have been amplified by
the debate on a possible EU sovereign debt
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

restructuring mechanism, following the

Market rate (daily data) Merkel/Sarkozy agreement in Deauville on 18
PPP conversion rate (annual data)
October 2010 and the conclusions of the
Source: author’s calculations using data from the IMF and ECB.
European Council of 28-29 October. Such a
mechanism would facilitate any orderly defaults
by governments in a similar way to existing bankruptcy rules for corporations.

This proposal makes sense, but was missing from the recent eurozone governance reform proposals
of the European Commission and of the Task Force headed by European Council President Herman
Van Rompuy, which placed major emphasis on strengthening existing rules and imposing sanctions.

Sanctions do not offer an appropriate solution to current eurozone fiscal worries. They would not
have helped much in averting the current crisis except perhaps in Greece and Hungary, because the
major reason why 24 EU countries are currently under the EU’s excessive deficit procedure was
private sector imbalances and weaknesses of the European banking industry. Sanctioning at a time
of a crisis or when countries are struggling to get out of the fiscal mess caused by the crisis does not
make much sense.

Also, sanctions will result from decisions of the European Commission and the European Council and
there will be fruitless debates and unsettling disputes, which would not help much to foster the

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European project further. Sanctions can easily carry the political message that ‘Brussels fines us
and does not understand our situation and social problems’. This may give rise to anti-EU sentiment,
which would clearly be undesirable. It would be much better to design institutions that encourage
discipline through market forces.

The sovereign default mechanism could be such an institution, but there is an even better solution:
the introduction of a common Eurobond covering up to, say, 60 percent of member states’ GDP (‘Blue
bond’) with the joint guarantee of all participating countries. Countries would issue any additional
bonds with their own guarantee (‘Red bond’), which would be junior to the Blue bond, and the orderly
sovereign default mechanism should be put in place for the red bonds only. Thereby, this system
would provide an extremely strong incentive for countries to convince markets that their red debt is
safe, thus promoting fiscal discipline.

Unfortunately, there is little hope that the common Eurobond will be introduced. Instead, the
Commission/Task Force proposals will probably be adopted. These also include a number of good
initiatives, such as the new ‘excessive imbalance procedure’, which may help to design remedies for
private sector vulnerabilities, and the requirement to improve national fiscal frameworks. There is an
increasing chance of agreement on a European sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.

Are these reform proposals causing the seeming anomaly between the pricing of the euro and the
pricing of peripheral eurozone bonds? The possibility of a restructuring mechanism has likely
contributed to rising interest rates, even though the mechanism should apply only to bonds issued
after its introduction. But openly discussing the possibility of future sovereign defaults has given
rise to the current worries. And Greece indeed has a real solvency problem: high debt, a high deficit,
weak tax-collection capability, social unrest and a loss of confidence, and it is difficult to see how
this country will be able to avoid default or debt restructuring should a new negative shock occur.
But the cases of Ireland and Portugal are different and the best solution for them would be to turn to
the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) and the IMF in order to buy time.

The continuing strength of the euro does not primarily originate in the recent quantitative easing of
the Federal Reserve, nor in governance reforms. Markets have likely realised that earlier worries
about the break-up of the eurozone were unjustified and may have also grasped the political
commitment behind the euro. It is in Germany’s best economic interest as well to stay inside: a new
D-Mark would appreciate excessively, thus halting the German recovery. And even if a eurozone
sovereign were to default, it should not impact the existence of the euro. The most difficult challenge
the eurozone will face is the joint fiscal and competitiveness adjustment of certain Mediterranean
economies which will likely lead to significant growth divergences within the eurozone. But at least
the fiscal adjustment is not mission impossible: several east Europeans gave examples of how to do
this in the midst of much deeper recessions.

Zsolt Darvas is Research Fellow at Bruegel, Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Associate Professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest.

© Bruegel 2010 www.bruegel.org

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