Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
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1
The Growth Controversy: Seven Critical
Questions
2
Contents
3
Measuring Inequality and Poverty
Measuring Inequality
Size distributions (quintiles, deciles)
Lorenz curves
Gini coefficients
Functional distributions
4
Size Distribution of Personal Income
5
Typical Size Distribution of Personal
Income in a Developing Country by Income
Shares-Quintiles and Deciles
6
Lorenz Curve
Graphical representation of the size distribution of
personal income.
Shows the actual quantitative relationship between
the percentage of income recipients and the
percentage of total income they received during a
given year.
With the percentage of income on the Y-axis and
the percentage of income recipients on the X-axis,
the diagonal represents perfect equality.
The further the Lorenz curve is away from the
diagonal, the greater the degree of inequality.
7
The Lorenz Curve
8
The Greater the Curvature of the Lorenz
Line, the Greater the Relative Degree of
Inequality
9
Gini Coefficient
The Gini coefficient is calculated by taking the area
between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal and dividing it
by the half-square area in which the curve lies.
So, a Gini coefficient of 0 would mean perfect equality,
and a coefficient of 1 would mean perfect inequality.
Coefficients between 0.50 and 0.70 are considered to mean
a highly unequal distribution of income. Coefficients
between 0.20 and 0.35 are considered to represent
relatively equitable distributions of income.
Since we are dealing in percentage terms, we can compare
Gini coefficients across countries.
10
Estimating the Gini Coefficient
11
Four Possible Lorenz Curves
12
Factor Share Distribution of Income
Rather than looking at separate individuals, this
attempts to explain the share of national income
received by each of the factors of production.
It compares labour’s share of national income with
that of land, financial and physical capital.
With free and competitive markets for output and
the factors of production, each factor should be
paid according to is contribution to national
output. However, non-market forces often
intervene to determine the distribution of factor
payments.
13
Functional Income Distribution in a
Market Economy: An Illustration
14
Measuring Inequality and Poverty
TPG = ∑i =1 (Yp − Yi )
H
16
Measuring the Total Poverty Gap
17
Measuring Inequality and Poverty
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure Pα =
n Yp
18
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Measure (FGT)
1∑
(Y p − Yi )α
The FGT indicator Pα = i =1
n Yp
19
Sen-Shorrocks-Thon Index (SST)
H
⎛ 2( N − i ) + 1 ⎞⎛ YP − Yi ⎞
SST = ∑ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
i =1 ⎝ ⎠⎝ YP ⎠
2
N
20
Human Poverty Index
21
Inequality, Poverty and Social Welfare
22
Problems Arising from Inequality
Economic Inefficiency
Social Instability and Conflict
Most of us as a part of our value system, view
inequality as unfair.
23
Welfare Function
W = Social Welfare
Y = National Income
I = degree of inequality
P = degree of absolute poverty
Welfare funstion W = F (Y , I , P )
+ − −
24
Dualistic development and shifting Lorenz
curves: Some typologies
25
Poverty, Inequality, and Social Welfare
26
Improved Income Distribution under the
Traditional-Sector Enrichment Growth
Typology
27
Worsened Income Distribution under the
Modern-Sector Enrichment Growth
Typology
28
Crossing Lorenz Curves in the Modern-
Sector Enlargement Growth Typology
29
Selected Income Distribution Estimate
30
Income Distribution of Vietnam, 2002-2008
31
Kuznet’s Inverted-U Hypothesis
The hypothesis states that in early stages of
growth, inequality will increase only to fall at later
stages, leading to an inverted-U shaped
relationship between per capita national income
and measures of inequality.
Explanations for the hypothesized relationship
point to the nature of structural change.
The validity of the relationship remains an
empirical question. There is significant evidence
to suggest that increases in per capita income does
not have to paired with worsening inequality.
32
Kuznet’s Inverted-U Hypothesis
Per capita income does not appear to be highly
correlated with any of the three inequality
measures for the set of LDCs that we have
considered.
“Latin America Effect” – the observed inverted-U
relationship may be attributed to the social and
political history of Latin American countries
which while being middle-income countries have
the highest average level of inequality in the
world.
For many countries there is no particular tendency
for inequality to change much in the process of
economic development. 33
Poverty, Inequality, and Social Welfare:
Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis
34
Kuznets Curve with Latin American
Countries Identified
35
Growth and Inequality
36
Income and Inequality in Vietnam, 2002-
2008
14000 0.440
12000
0.435
10000
0.430
8000
0.425
6000
0.420
4000
0.415
2000
0 0.410
2002 2004 2006 2008
37
Income Gini
Long-Term Economic Growth and Income
Inequality, 1965-1996
38
Change in Inequality in Selected Countries,
with or without Growth
39
Extent of Absolute Poverty
40
Growth and Poverty
The traditional thinking was that efforts expended towards
reducing poverty would slow down growth rates and that
countries with lower inequality would experience slower
growth rates.
Reductions in poverty need not come at the expense of
high economic growth. We can look at China – a country
that has experienced the highest growth rates in the past 20
years and the most dramatic reduction in absolute poverty.
Widespread poverty actually retards growth
The developing world elite, unlike their developed
counterparts have lower savings rates and often invest in
foreign assets.
41
Growth and Poverty
43
Poverty Incidence in Selected Countries
44
Poverty Incidence in Selected Countries
(continued)
45
Absolute Poverty: Extent and Magnitude
countries
Impact on productivity
development process
46
Characteristics of Poverty Groups
47
Characteristics of Poverty Groups in
Vietnam
48
Rural Inhabitants
49
Poverty: Rural versus Urban
50
Poverty: Rural versus Urban in Vietnam
40
Country Rural Urban
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2002 2004 2006 2008
51
Women and Children
Women and children are more likely to be poor,
malnourished and less likely to receive medical
attention, access to clean water, sanitation, etc.
Prevalence of female-headed households in LDCs
Large income disparities between male-headed
and female-headed households due in part to the
lower earning power of women who are often paid
less for similar work.
Women have limited control over their spouses
income and other household resources
52
Women and Children
54
Women and Children
When the status of women in the household is favourable
in terms of earnings there is less bias against girls and the
overall welfare of the children improves
At low income levels, nearly all of a woman’s income
goes toward household food consumption. The fraction is
smaller for men. This highlights the importance of
integrating women into the development process.
Poverty alleviation programs that work almost exclusively
with men tend to exacerbate the inequalities between men
and women.
55
Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous People
56
Although it has been shown that poverty tend to decline
as per capita income climbs, high level of absolute
poverty can retard growth and widespread poverty can
still exist in countries with medium to high levels of
income. Attacking poverty by emphasizing growth has
its problems. Poverty itself must be addressed.
57
Poverty: Ethnic groups
Kinh/Chiness Others
Education poverty rate 13.7 27.8
Health poverty rate 51.2 60.7
Shelter poverty rate 12.8 39.7
Water and sanitation poverty rate 33.8 87.8
Child-work poverty rate 7.3 23
Social protection poverty rate 9.8 3.7
58
Indigenous Poverty in Latin America
59
The Range of Policy Options: Policy
Objectives
Areas of intervention
Altering the functional distribution
Mitigating the size distribution
Moderating (reducing) the size distribution at upper
levels
Moderating (increasing) the size distribution at lower
levels
61
The Range of Policy Options: Some Basic
Considerations
Policy options
Changing relative factor prices
Progressive redistribution of asset ownership
Progressive taxation
Transfer payments and public provision of goods and
services
62
Summary and Conclusions: The Need for a
Package of Policies
Policies to correct factor price distortions
Policies to change the distribution of assets, power, and
access to education and associated employment
opportunities
Policies of progressive taxation and directed transfer
payments
Policies designed to build capabilities and human and
social capital of the poor
63
Appendix 1: Appropriate Technology and
Employment Generation: The Price
Incentive Model
Choice of techniques
Factor Price distortions and appropriate
technology
Possibilities of Labor-Capital substitution
64
Choice of Techniques: The Price Incentive
Model
65
Appendix 2: The Ahluwalia-Chenery
Welfare Index
66