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Alexis de Toequeville on the Natural State
of Religion in the Age of Democracy

Aristide Tessitore
Furman University

Contemporary scholars, journalists, and politicians are deeply divided with respect to the religious
or secular character of America's founding principles. In sharp contrast to the narrowing tendencies
of contemporary intellectual and political life, Tocqueville's classic study of democracy in America
is the first of any scope to give weight to America's dual founding—biblical and philosophic. For
Tocqueville it is the combination of two different traditions, neither of which can be reduced to the
other, that is the hallmark of the new political science he bequeaths to the dawning democratic age. In
this article, I draw out the natural state of religion in a democratic society, particularly as it comes
to light in America, as well as Tocqueville's attempts to address the particular problems and
possibilities to which it gives rise.

Man's true grandeur lies only in the harmony of the liberal sentiment and
religious sentiment, both working simultaneously to animate and to restrain
souls, and ... [my] sole political passion for thirty years has been to bring
about this harmony. (Tocqueville [1853] 1985, 295)

Shortly after arriving in the new world, Tocqueville wrote to one of his oldest
friends about the flurry of conflicting impressions that greeted him in New
York. He was struck by "a mixture of vices and virtues that is rather difficult to
classify and that does not form a single picture" (Tocqueville 1985, 44). On the
one hand, he was taken by the purity of American mores, especially as they
pertained to marriage and religion. On the other, he noted a perpetual instabil -
ity of desires, the most visible expression of which was a pervasive and immod -
erate preoccupation with wealth. Notwithstanding the evolution of Tocqueville's
thinking about America, these first impressions remain prescient: the mixture
of virtue and vice characteristic of the American people does not form a single
picture. As Tocqueville traces these conflicting tendencies to their root, he dis -
covers a nation characterized not by one, but by two foundings, each of which
is drawn from a radically different source—biblical religion and secular philosophy.

I wish to thank the Earhart Foundation for their generous support in the summer of 2000, during
which time the body of this essay was written.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 64, No. 4, November 2002, Pp. 1137-
1152 © 2002 Southern Political Science Association
1138 Aristide Tessitore

If the first New England settlers, to whom Tocqueville gives careful atten -
tion, were motivated by biblical zeal, the Constitution to which they acceded
170 years later bears the unmistakable imprint of secular developments in the
science of politics. This dual parentage of America ensured the persistence of
conflict for future generations, a conflict that could cease only with the com -
plete victory of one of the antagonists. As America begins its third century of
independent existence, it is a victory that neither side is willing to concede.
Tocqueville's classic study of democracy in America is the first of any scope
to give weight to America's dual founding—biblical and philosophic. I argue
that he is the first student of modern democracy to recognize, not merely the
existence of this conflict in the root principles of American democracy, but
also and especially the importance of conflict itself for the maintenance of
healthy democratic politics, something that leads him to reflect on the natural
state of religion in the dawning democratic age. Before turning directly to this
topic, it is necessary to provide a brief summary of America's better known
Enlightenment inheritance inasmuch as it provides the context against which
Tocqueville's distinctive reflections on religion and democracy become visible.

America's Philosophic Founding

Tocqueville observes that it was especially in the eighteenth century that
men of letters began to take the lead in politics (Tocqueville 1955, 138). Both
the American and French revolutions drew their inspiration from ideas gener -
ated by the Enlightenment, but it was especially in America that "the boldest
political theories of the eighteenth-century philosophers" were most effectively
put into practice (Tocqueville 1955, 153, 6, 146). Tocqueville observes two
distinct and separable features in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The
first consisted in new (or resuscitated) opinions regarding human nature and
political jurisprudence discovered and defended by the light of reason alone
(Tocqueville 1955, 6, 140). The second was the fundamentally antireligious
character of this thought (Tocqueville 1955, 6). Whereas both attributes were
constitutive of the tradition of modern political thought that had developed in
Europe, this was not—at least in an obvious way—the case in America. Al -
though the ideas of Enlightenment thinkers profoundly shaped the thinking of
America's founding generation, the virulently antireligious dimension of this
thought failed to make the same kind of headway in the new world, at least
among the citizen body as a whole. Tocqueville's explanation for this develop -
ment (and qualification of these claims) is addressed in the following section.

The new discoveries employed in framing the American Constitution are well-
known.' American democracy would succeed where others had failed because

' The Federalist Papers explain and defend now axiomatic principles, such as
separation of powers, legislative checks and balances, independent
judiciary, elected representatives, and increased scope of the nation
(esp. Hamilton, Madison, Jay 1961, 72-73, 81-84).
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1139

it could harness ingenious institutional solutions to check the debilitating ten -

dencies of popular government. More deeply, the framers of the Constitution
had learned to abandon the quixotic attempt to reform human beings and to
build government instead on a sober, even harsh, understanding of human na -
ture. 2 The most effective solution to the problem of government was to accept
human beings as they are and to channel self-interest, passion, greed, and am -
bition in such a way as to avert the politically destructive consequences of
these tendencies. 3 Although the architects of the Constitution would prefer to
have enlightened and virtuous leaders at the helm, the chances of success for
the American enterprise were increased by institutional measures directing, even
employing, the darker and more self-interested motives of the human heart. By
emphasizing the radical character of its break with historical antecedents,
Publius throws into relief the extent to which the American founding drew its in -
spiration from "wholly new discoveries" in the science of politics, discoveries
that had been forged in the fire of religious controversy.

Although Enlightenment thinkers and their precursors differed on many im -

portant issues, they were unified in their concern to wrest the notion of legiti -
mate government from its religious, particularly Christian, foundations. o

Notwithstanding the fact that there was and continues to be debate about the
proper place of religion in the American republic, the legitimacy of the
republic itself does not presuppose belief in a particular god or any god at all.' The
Constitution is not based on the sovereignty of God, but rather on the sover -
eignty of the people. As Tocqueville later writes, "The people reign over the
American political world as does God over the universe" (55), 6
If it is possible to recognize in Tocqueville's analysis of the Constitution
some of the optimism of the Enlightenment thinkers, his consideration
reveals as well ways in which the framers drew upon the darker insights
characteristic

2
Hamilton maintains that human beings are "ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious" and that as a
consequence, the causes of war arise from the unalterable ground of human nature itself (Hamilton,
Madison, Jay 1961, 54). Madison famously echoes these sentiments when he explains that the causes
of faction cannot be removed because they are sown into the nature of man (Hamilton, Madison,
Jay 1961, 79). He adds that it is vain to rely on enlightened statesmen and that moral or religious
motives are insufficient to curb the base tendencies of the human heart (Hamilton, Madison, Jay
1961, 79-81).
3
Again echoing Hamilton, who summons his reader to wake from the dangerous dream of "a
happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue" (Hamilton, Madison, Jay 1961, 59), Madison
explains that opposite and rival interests will supply the dearth of lofty motives because the Consti-
tution is arranged so as to use ambition to counteract ambition (Hamilton, Madison, Jay 1961, 322).
°This argument is developed in the trenchant analyses of Walter Berns (1977) and Harvey Mans-
field (1991, esp. 101-114).
5
1n his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson famously argues: "The legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my
neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god" (Jefferson [1975] 1977, 210).
'Unmodified citations refer to Tocqueville 2000. Page numbers to this edition are given in the
text.
1140 Aristide Tessitore
of early modern political thought. Tocqueville notes that legislators in America
have little confidence in the honesty of citizens, preferring instead to appeal to
personal interest, "the great principle one constantly finds when studying the
laws of the United States" (74). Although the doctrine of self-interest well un -
derstood derives from the tradition of modern political thought (Tocqueville
specifically cites the early modern thinker and essayist Montaigne), what is
distinctive about America is its universal acceptance of this principle (501). As
Tocqueville explains, self-interest well understood is a notion that is "marvel -
ously accommodating to the weaknesses of men" (502). In the measure that
this doctrine comes to dominate moral thinking, Tocqueville expects that both
extraordinary virtue and extraordinary vice will diminish. Although some indi -
viduals will be lowered in the process, humankind in general will be raised.
Tocqueville's study of America convinces him that "of all philosophical theo -
ries" self-interest well understood "is the most appropriate to the needs of men
in our time," and he expects that "individual interest will become more than
ever the principal if not the unique motive of men's actions" (502-03). 7

Justice, public-spiritedness, and political prudence are difficult virtues to nur -

ture in citizens. It is distinctive of modern political thought to teach that a
sufficient and reliable simulacrum for these virtues could be grounded in the
appeal to self-interest and greed. 8 Indeed, as Tocqueville contemplates this mix -
ture of vice and virtue in America, he is inspired to pen a new beatitude:
"What a happy country is the New World, where man's vices are almost as
useful to society as his virtues!" (272). If this is in some part due to the fortuitous
circumstances of history and geography, it is more deeply indebted to law or,
more precisely, the wisdom of those who made the laws.
Tocqueville marvels at the astuteness of the work of the founding generation
and appreciates as well the novelty of their accomplishments. However, he was
at the same time concerned about dangers to which their handiwork could give
rise: most deeply, the complete loss of any real distinction between virtue and
vice as a standard for political practice. Tocqueville gives qualified and cau -
tious endorsement to a framework of laws that however ingenious, effectively
sanctions self-interest, greed, envy, and ambition. He writes,

7
Delba Winthrop (1991) argues forcefully on behalf of Tocqueville's
awareness of the inadequacy of the doctrine of "self-interest well
understood" and his attempt to supplement it with an essentially
aristocratic appreciation for honor (appropriately modified for
democracy). My own essay emphasizes the place that Tocqueville's
analysis gives to religion in providing the needed antidote.
8
Rather than depend on lofty notions of justice, Americans are motivated
by the perception that it is in their own best interest to abide by the law
(230-31). In place of heroic examples of public- spiritedness, a less
generous but more rational patriotism engendered by enlightenment and
mingled with self-interest is widespread in America (225). The insatiable
passion for well-being gives rise to commercial habits that foster
characteristically American expressions of prudence; appreciation for
order, regularity in mores, and sober good sense arise from a pervasive
and frenetic American concern to accumulate wealth (270-73).
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1141

Up to now no one has been encountered in the United States who dared to advance the
maxim that everything is permitted in the interest of society (280, emphasis mine).

The belief that everything is permitted for the good of society is dangerously
close to Machiavelli's notorious teaching that the end excuses the means (Machia-
velli 1996, 1.9; Machiavelli 1985, 18),9 as well as more contemporary articu-
lations of this principle in the thought of both the English utilitarians and Karl
Marx. America in the 1830s had so far managed to resist this conclusion, and
Tocqueville is unambiguous about the reason. The salutary restraint practiced
by Americans did not arise from the profound insight or clever institutional
design of the Constitution, but from the indirect influence of religious belief
on mores in America (279-80). Notwithstanding the fact that "the law permits
the American people to do everything, religion prevents them from conceiving
everything and forbids them to dare everything" (280). Although religion does
not intervene directly in government, Tocqueville insists that it should never-
theless be considered "the first of their political institutions" (280) because of
its powerful and salutary effect on the mind and imagination of the American
people. This does not, however, imply that American religiosity is above criti-
cism. Tocqueville's own study of America is framed by an awareness of the
uneasy combination of Enlightenment principles with an earlier, even ancient,
biblical tradition. For Tocqueville it is the reciprocal influence of two different
traditions, neither of which is reducible to the other, that becomes the center-
piece for the new political science he bequeaths to the dawning democratic age.10

America's Biblical Founding

If the crucial and precarious period after the war for independence incorpo-
rated the philosophic principles of the Enlightenment into America's fundamen-
tal law, this was preceded by a first founding that was emphatically religious.
Tocqueville insists that the infancy of a nation is particularly important for
gaining an understanding of the prejudices, habits, and passions that give rise
to its distinctive national character. Many of the apparently inconsistent opin-
ions, customs, and laws that persist in a society can be rendered intelligible by
a proper understanding of its origins (27-29). In the case of America, this early

9
Tocqueville read The Prince and The History of Florence "with reflection and deliberateness."
While Tocqueville is critical of Machiavelli's teachings in these books, he maintains that The Prince
is a "good book to have at the present time" since it, like The History of Florence, reflects the
sentiments of "so many people of our day" (Tocqueville 1985, 109-111).
1°
Ceaser (1990, esp. pp. 166-69) offers a lucid argument on the disparate theoretical foundations
of American liberal democracy and, following Tocqueville, the kind of political science that might
best address and preserve this complexity. Rogers Smith's (1993) sympathetic critique of "the
Tocquevillian thesis" in favor of a "multiple traditions thesis of American identity" concludes with
the assertion that America is best analyzed "as the ongoing product of often conflicting multiple
traditions" (563). Although focused on a very different issue (Smith focuses on the political status of
racial, ethnic, and gender groups in America), my essay finds the presence of "a multiple traditions
thesis" in Tocqueville himself.
1142 Aristide Tessitore

period provides "the password to the great social enigma that the United States
presents to the world in our day" (37). Indeed, early in Democracy in America,
Tocqueville claims that his discussion of the Puritan immigration to America is
"the seed of what is to follow and the key to almost the whole work" (29).t~

America's First Founding

It was especially in the English colonies of New England that the basic social
theory of the United States first emerged (31). Although originally limited in
scope, this influence gradually extended to the entire nation. 12 Whereas the wars
of religion that shook England and all of Christendom were deplored by
Tocqueville, they did at least have the positive effect of advancing education
and deepening religious culture (29). It was genuine religious zeal, rather than
any material or social necessity, that led the Puritans to seek a new world where
they might live and pray according to their own deepest convictions. Not only
was the origin of this immigration emphatically religious, but it was character-
ized by a kind of zeal more typical of original or primitive biblical faith (33).
The peculiarly ancient quality of Puritan fervor is evidenced in extant criminal
codes, some of which were taken word for word from the books of the Hebrew
Bible (37-39). The Puritan framers of these penal codes were especially con-
cerned about preserving good behavior and sound mores, but they often went
to ludicrous extremes to do so. Not only were blasphemy, sorcery, adultery, and
rape all punishable by death, but the criminal codes also provided penalties for
kissing, idleness, and lying. Tocqueville is critical of the intolerance of the early
Puritans, most especially of the "narrow spirit of sect" that sometimes gave rise
to "bizarre or tyrannical laws" (39).

At the same time, Tocqueville admired Puritanism because it incorporated

profoundly democratic and republican theories (32). This dimension of Puritan
life proved to be a seedbed for the kind of local independence that Tocqueville
considered "the principle and the life of American freedom" (40). In sharp
contrast to the narrow and invasive penal codes, Tocqueville finds a body of
political laws that "still seems to anticipate from very far the spirit of freedom
in our age" (39).
Tocqueville insists that an accurate understanding of Anglo-American cul-
ture is possible only if one realizes that it is the product of two perfectly dis-
tinct elements: the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom (43). Whereas
these two different but not necessarily contradictory aspects of human life had

"Given the importance Tocqueville gives to the Puritans in his analysis, it

is surprising that they are given so little attention by several excellent
Tocqueville scholars. See, for example, Lively (1962); Zetterbaum
(1967); Koritansky (1986, 1990); Boesche (1987); Hancock (1991);
Manent ([1982] 1996). A notable exception is Kessler (1992, 1994 esp.
chap. 5).
12
The influence of the Puritans on America has been variously interpreted
by scholars to include both political institutions and national character. For
the contours of scholarly debate about the content of the Puritan legacy,
see Kessler (1992 and 1994, 192, nn. 13-15).
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1143

often been at war with one another in Europe, they somehow managed to work
in harmony and even to lend mutual support in America. The very intensity of
religious passions stimulated by European persecution produced, among the
American refugees, a fixed horizon for moral and religious truths. With this
foundation solidly in place, America's first founders felt free to open the hu-
man world of politics to radical and bold innovation.
According to Tocqueville, the attempt to remove any dissonance between
religion and politics is entirely natural for human beings:

Allow the human mind to follow its own tendency and it will regulate political society and the
divine city in a uniform manner; it will seek, if I dare say it, to harmonize the earth with
Heaven (275, emphasis in original).

It is this tendency that accounts for both the narrow sectarian spirit of the Pu-
ritans' penal code and the enlightened spirit of freedom characteristic of their
political laws. Although the combination of legal censure for failure to comply
with a set of severe moral strictures and unparalleled freedom in politics seems
inconsistent, Tocqueville is careful to point out that this appearance derives
from a deeper consistency. The key to Tocqueville's explanation lies in the fact
that the Puritan code of behavior was not something to which they were sub-
jected by any external authority; it was, rather, a standard of conduct that they
democratically imposed upon themselves. The elevation of private conscience
in fact requires political freedom in order to manifest itself. In the measure that
the Puritans recognized something "heavenly" in the workings of individual
conscience, consistency required political freedom in order to heed its prompt-
ings in their "earthly" lives. The early Puritan settlement in New England sought
to establish heaven on earth or at least "to harmonize" earth with heaven.

If, in Tocqueville's view, the desire to harmonize earth and heaven is a uni-
versal and natural tendency of the human heart, America proves to be a singu-
larly important case. Unlike Europe, Tocqueville writes that America had the
good fortune of being able to disclose "in our day, the natural state of men in
the matter of religion" (286, emphasis in original). By studying the American
experience, Tocqueville wished to direct his European readers to the proper and
natural relationship between religion and politics in the dawning democratic
age.

Nature and Religion

To understand what Tocqueville means by "the natural state of men in the
matter of religion," it is necessary to understand what it is that he discovers in
America. Whereas the wars of religion had provided fuel for the religious zeal
of America's first founders, once in the new world they were free to live out
their religious convictions as they saw fit. In ensuing generations, the enlight-
enment principle of separation of church and state removed from religion both
the artificial supports and equally artificial liabilities that had marred the evo-
1144 Aristide Tessitore

lution of Christianity in Europe. By escaping the political distortions character-

istic of religious development in Europe, America reveals in an unprecedented
way that the natural horizon for religion is not politics but the family. More
precisely, Tocqueville writes that the unfailing source of strength for religion
lies in human nature and that religion "is as natural to the human heart as hope
itself" (283-84). Tocqueville explains that the incomplete joys of this life nat-
urally incline human beings to contemplate another world. The artificial sup-
port of laws and temporal powers may buoy religion for a time, but given the
ephemeral character of all temporal arrangements, such an alliance can, in the
long run, only prove burdensome to religion. If, however, religion draws only
upon its proper source of strength in the sentiments, instincts, and passions that
surface in all periods of history, it can defy "the effort of time" (285). Toc-
queville does not of course deny that it is possible for human beings to turn
away from religious belief, but notes that this is accomplished by a sort of
intellectual aberration that requires one to do violence to human nature (284).
For Tocqueville, separation of church and state is not only good for politics, it
is especially good for religion because it allows religious sentiment to arise
unclouded from its true source of strength as one of the constitutive principles
of human nature. Faith, not disbelief, "is the permanent state of humanity" (284).

If this summary describes something of the natural condition of human be-

ings with respect to religion, Tocqueville is also keenly aware of the extent to
which natural dispositions are shaped by the always contingent circumstances
of history. The aim of Tocqueville's own enterprise comes more sharply into
focus when we compare these remarks about the natural and universal religios-
ity of human beings with the three different historical manifestations of reli-
gion that frame his study of America. It is especially in this way that we can
understand Tocqueville's provocative claim that America is able to disclose the
natural state of human beings with regard to religion "in our own day" (286,
emphasis added).

Historical Variations on Nature

The first historical manifestation of the natural human proclivity to belief is
found in what Tocqueville calls "ages of fervor" (286). During such periods,
the great danger to religion is schism rather than unbelief: faith changes alle-
giance but does not die. Indeed, the European wars of religion that propelled
the Puritans into the new world constitute the most relevant example of an age
of fervor. Religious persecution had deepened the understanding and zeal of
the Puritans, something that also gave rise to the narrow and intolerant character
of their faith (Tocqueville 1985, 48). For Tocqueville, some degree of intol-
erance is inseparable from the moral good that religion brings with it (Tocqueville
1959, 206). Although conviction for worshipping false gods was legally punish-
able by death (38), Puritanism was spared the monstrous expressions of intol-
erance that ravaged Europe initially because of its geographical remoteness but
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1145

also because of the subsequent institutional separation of church and state. 13

However, once removed from the persecutions that gave rise to the first flow -
ering of Puritanism in America and once allowed to follow their own course
unimpeded by governmental constraints, the passionate convictions and degree
of intolerance characteristic of the early Puritans were steadily eroded in suc -
ceeding generations, a fact to which we will return shortly.
Contemporary Europe provides the second relevant historical example of the
way in which religion can play itself out in politics, an example that Toc -
queville explicitly says obscures the natural state of human beings with regard
to religion (287). The accidental union of politics and religion in the ancien
regime led to a passionate renunciation of faith and an attack on those who
continued to profess belief. In France, this attack was both sweeping and mis -
directed. The real object of animosity was not, or at least should not have been,
religion, but the partisan identification of religion with the ancien regime. 14 In
this case, which provides the immediate context for Tocqueville's own writing
on the subject of religion and politics, the natural religiosity of human beings
is not eradicated but redirected. Religious fervor is harnessed in the attempt to
throw off the yoke of political oppression. For Tocqueville, this was especially
apparent in revolutionary France, where the attempt to set up a purely secular
state took on the attributes of a religious revival (Tocqueville 1955, 10-13).
The godlessness of the revolutionaries did not succeed in revealing a pristine
human nature, but further obscured it. The revolutionary cause itself became a
truncated "species of religion," one bereft of God, ritual, and future life (Toc -
queville 1955, 13). Despite the bizarre character of a movement that was simul -
taneously secular and religious, it nevertheless overran "the whole world with
its apostles, militants, and martyrs" (Tocqueville 1955, 13).

Between these two virulent examples of the relationship between religion and
politics stands a third, the one that captivated Tocqueville's attention from the
outset of his study of America. In a very revealing letter to Louis de
Kergorlay in 1831, Tocqueville confides he has become especially fascinated
by the state of religion in America (Tocqueville 1985, 45-59). As he clarifies
his impres sions, it turns out that the widespread religiosity of Americans is not
quite what it first appears to be. The strong impetus given to religion by
America's found ers has become increasingly attenuated in succeeding
generations. The result is a paradoxical combination of pervasive exactitude
in the practical observance of religion and simultaneous, if hidden, doubt
about its truth. Preoccupation with dogma has given way to teachings on
morality, and the dynamism of faith

"Kessler (1992) argues that elements within Puritan theology (ultimately

traceable to Luther) eventually led to the subordination of religious to
secular tendencies within Puritanism.
14
TocqueviIle maintains that Christians were attacked in Europe "as
political enemies rather than as religious adversaries." Faith was the
object of hatred "as the opinion of a party much more than as an erroneous
belief," and the priest was rejected less as the "representative of God" than
as the "friend of power" (287-88).
1146 Aristide Tessitore

has been replaced by tolerance. For Tocqueville, the benign tolerance that char-
acterizes religion in America also conceals "a huge indifference" (Tocqueville
1985, 48).
Tocqueville likens the remarkable number of religious sects he finds in America
to so many concentric circles defining themselves against the fixed point of
Catholicism and approaching, in the outer rings, a purely rational deism (Toc-
queville 1985, 49-52). Catholicism continues to attract a small number of be-
lievers who, Tocqueville asserts, are at core as intolerant as they have always
been. This intolerance, however, is not entirely evident because they live in the
midst of society as beneficiaries of Protestant largesse and constitute only a
poor minority of the population. It is nevertheless suggested by the fact that
they fervently impose a kind of religious quarantine upon themselves, choosing
to have no real engagement with the Protestant denominations that surround
them. At the other end of the spectrum is a kind of deism that attaches itself to
reason. Although Tocqueville's experience of Unitarianism in America leads
him to concede that such a "natural religion" could, given the proper circum-
stances, suffice for the "superior classes of society," he is far less sanguine
about its prospects for the majority.15 If most people are unable to direct them-
selves by belief in an afterlife, they are likely to suffocate their noblest aspira-
tions by circumscribing them within a narrow understanding of the doctrine of
self-interest (Tocqueville 1985, 52).

Everywhere along the spectrum delineated by the two extremes of vibrant

faith and secular rationalism, Tocqueville encounters the dominant American
religion of Protestantism in its various forms. At core, Tocqueville understands
(rightly or wrongly) Protestantism to be a kind of "compromise," that is, an
attempt to preserve and hold together both faith and reason, belief and toler-
ance, the goal of heaven and the goods of earth. But it is precisely this effort at
compromise that, Tocqueville believes, is inextricably tied to the kind of doubt
he thinks he sees "ruling in the depths of almost everyone's soul" (Tocqueville
1985, 48; cf 287). Hence, Tocqueville concludes that the dominant manifesta-
tion of religion in America is by and large comprised of a "church-going and
indifferent population," one that is intellectually and spiritually impoverished
but enjoys the day-to-day benefits of domestic tranquility and prosperity (Toc-
queville 1985, 50).

The American Paradigm

In light of this analysis of the dominant expression of religion in America,
we return to our earlier question: What, then, is the natural state for human

S
The contrast with Jefferson, who expected Unitarianism to become the
dominant religion in America, is revealing. Whereas Jefferson's expectation
was based on high hopes for Enlightenment progress, Tocqueville is
considerably more sober in this regard. His distinction between the many
and the few in matters of religion reflects a pre-Enlightenment, indeed
classical, sensibility.
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1147

beings with regard to religion in the dawning democratic epoch? Certainly it is

not the now diminished sectarian fervor that led to the wars of religion in Eu-
rope and elicited Tocqueville's criticism of the early Puritans. Toward the end
of his life, Tocqueville confesses that he has "always thought that there was
danger even in the best of passions when they become ardent and exclusive"
(Tocqueville 1985, 357). This is especially true of religious passion "because,
pushed to a certain point, it, more than anything else, makes everything disap-
pear that is not religion, and creates the most useless or the most dangerous
citizen in the name of morality and duty" (Tocqueville 1985, 357). Nor is it the
kind of hatred of religion, what might be called "secular fervor," which reacts
against faith and seeks to eradicate it from the human heart in its zeal to estab-
lish a flourishing public life. This, as we have noted, degenerates into a strange
kind of political religion that obscures rather than reveals the natural condition
of human beings.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that for Tocqueville, the natural state with
regard to religion is one characterized by indifference, albeit of a certain
kind.16 Whether one considers the "natural religion" of deism that Tocqueville
attaches to "the superior classes of society" or the various kinds of Protestant-
ism that pervade the religious culture of America, both are characterized by a
sort of tolerance that for Tocqueville bespeaks indifference to the deepest ques-
tions of religious belief. It is at the same time, however, an indifference to
matters of dogma that retains a keen appreciation for the moral precepts deriv-
ing from religion.'?
The combined effect of an absence of passionate interest in differences of
dogma and a shared appreciation for morality results in a unique and complex
mix of religious practice in American society at large. ]$ There is no obstacle for
believers to an open profession of faith, something that is encouraged even by
those for whom doubt has eroded firm conviction. In such a state, believers

Manent ([1982] 1996) offers a brilliant and provocative account of

16

democratic religion that also emphasizes the progress of indifference in

America. The most far-reaching difference in our accounts concerns the
status of "natural religion." For Manent, this is either "provisional" or char-
acterized by "total dependence on the democratic order" (106). I argue that
the natural state of religion, as it is presented by Tocqueville, is
characterized by a persistent, often uncomfortable tension with prevailing
political orders, including democratic ones.
' Manent ([1982] 1996) also notes that religion in America is appreciated
7

especially for its public utility (esp. 86-97). His interpretation of this
phenomenon, however, requires a more pervasive and self-conscious
hypocrisy on the part of Americans than Tocqueville's remarks seem to
warrant.
' Koritansky (1986) and Kessler (1994) both interpret Tocqueville's
8

teaching on American religion as a species of "civil religion" that derives

from Rousseau's famous discussion in the fourth book of the Social Contract.
American religion is characterized by a nondoctrinal tolerance predicated
on the sovereign authority of individual conscience. While I agree in large
part with this assessment, I differ in emphasizing the persistence of an
unresolved tension, albeit often submerged, in the American practice of
religion. The blandness of civil religion endangers but also conceals those
resources for religious renewal that have periodically asserted themselves
throughout the course of American history.
1148 Aristide Tessitore

are not hostile to unbelievers but are more inclined to view them as unfortu-
nate. The reciprocal influence of these two groups creates a public opinion
favorable to religion, something that Tocqueville considers to be good for the
political health of a nation; it is only by looking into the depths of a man's soul
that one can see the wounds it has suffered (287). Although Tocqueville be-
lieves that religious hypocrisy is likely to be common in America, he neverthe-
less affirms that,

America is, however, still the place in the world where the Christian
religion has most preserved genuine powers over souls; and nothing
shows better how useful and natural to man it is in our day (278,
emphasis added).

Religion persists, although it is not immune from doubt concerning the fondest
hopes of the human heart. It would appear that most Americans are character-
ized by melancholy or anxiety regarding the metaphysical underpinnings of
faith, a melancholy or anxiety that is submerged beneath a less troubled and
more pervasive belief in and appreciation for the moral precepts of religion.
In what sense could such a state be considered natural? In the first volume of
his study, Tocqueville had spoken of the natural human tendency to try to har-
monize heaven and earth. When he returns to the subject of religion in Vol-
ume II, he explains that one of the most familiar weaknesses of the human
mind is to want to reconcile conflicting principles and so buy peace at the cost
of logic (425). The Christian religion poses a particular problem since it is not
possible to reconcile completely the demands of the world with those of heaven.
If the Protestant attempt to hold together heaven and earth without radically
subordinating one to the other is ultimately unsuccessful, it is a failure that
preserves a tension that may itself be both natural and useful. Protestantism
resists the temptation to collapse this tension by surrendering earthly well-
being for the sake of a heavenly good or denying heaven altogether in the in-
terests of improving life on earth. The dominant form of religion in America
may not be able to effect a fully satisfying compromise between the goods of
heaven and those of earth, but its very lack of success enables it to avoid the
two politically dangerous, albeit more logically consistent, extremes of radical
Catholicism and godless secularism (cf 424-25).

Tocqueville is not entirely confident that such a compromise can be sus-

tained, but his advice is intended to help it persist.19 He counsels Catholics in
America to become more like their Protestant counterparts (420-24), and his
discussions of religion as a whole warn against the dangers of practical atheism
in democratic societies (among many passages, 417-24; 425-26; 518-21). Toc-
queville consistently points to the political usefulness of American religiosity, a
quality that would be jeopardized by either sectarian or secular "enthusiasms":

'°Kessler (1994) acknowledges Tocqueville's uncertainty on this issue but

goes on to argue that Toequeville is much more pessimistic about
Christianity's prospects in the new democratic order than is generally
recognized. See esp. Chapter 8; cf Manent ([ 1982] 1996) Chapter 8 and
Kraynak (1987).
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1149

that is, radical attempts to subordinate earth to heaven or heaven to earth. Al-
though the pursuit of radical consistency is feasible and even admirable for
certain individuals, such lofty aspiration is, on a mass level, a recipe for political
disaster.20 Indeed, popular expressions of the universal desire to harmonize
what is naturally in tension are not only politically destructive, they may also
deprive the human soul of its capacity for human freedom. 21 For Tocqueville,
Pascal's rare and profound metaphysical restlessness is a sublime, if problematic,
expression of human freedom that finds its more popular analogue in the
characteristic restlessness of the American people.22 In both cases, unresolved
tension is the gadfly that awakens the human capacity for freedom.23

Although the circumstances surrounding the Puritan foundation in America

were unique and unrepeatable (a homogeneous society comprised of highly ed-
ucated, middle-class individuals, bound together by shared religious convic-
tions), this legacy is crucial for understanding the nature and possibilities of
democracy. The discussion that provides "the key to almost the whole work" is
part of a study in which Tocqueville claims to see more than America. Toc-
queville thought he could make out the shape of democracy itself and, partic-
ularly, the kind of guidance it needed to endure in a way compatible with human
freedom. The lessons furnished by his study of America were not limited to
America. Anticipating that some might regard his treatment of religion and
politics as uniquely American, Tocqueville, in an earlier draft of his book, in-
vokes the experience of the English middle class.

Who has ever been more eager in the pursuit of material well-being
than those people and, at the same time, more attached to religious
feeling? So the heart of man is larger than we suppose. It can enclose
at the same time the love of this world and the next. People can
deliver themselves alternatively to these two inclinations without letting
themselves be exclusively carried away by either.24 (Cf 520)

20
One example of such consistency is provided by Pascal. In the Pensees, he
radically subordinates earth to heaven with the consequence that his
profound reflections on the human condition contain scarcely any political
philosophy.
Z
' One should consider Tocqueville's condemnation of the "secret charms"
of pantheism in this light (425-26). Tocqueville describes pantheism as an
anodyne that soothes the perception of discomfiting or oppressive
distinctions. A seductive and almost obsessive desire to reduce everything
to a comprehensive and divine unity, it flatters the pride and absolves the
complacency of the democratic mind. Tocqueville also points out that it
destroys human individuality and the struggle to achieve the kind of
excellence characteristic of genuine human greatness.
This theme is developed by Lawler (1993), who provides the best and
22

most comprehensive study of Tocqueville from a Pascalian perspective.

"This was, in any case, true for Tocqueville himself. His profound
partisanship for the cause of human liberty was accompanied by lifelong
anguish regarding the metaphysical implications of faith. Boesche (1987) is
particularly effective in bringing to light the relationship between Toc-
queville's political teaching and personal experience. See esp. 27-41; 185-
89. Hinckley (1990) takes issue with a pervasive interpretation of
Tocqueville as a religious skeptic. She maintains that he suffered "the
anguish of a believer" deprived, however, of "the unwavering certitude that
characterizes faith of the highest order" (esp. 42-43).
As quoted by James T. Schleifer (1982, 312-13).
24
1150 Aristide Tessitore

These observations about the fate of religion among the English are reaffirmed
during Tocqueville's final visit to England toward the end of his life. In contrast
to the Catholic countries of Europe where the great bulk of people do not think
about religion at all, Tocqueville is once again struck by the way in which
religious sentiment has conserved itself in England without destroying other
motives for human action. He confides to his lifelong friend and correspon-
dent, Louis de Kergorlay (1857), that

A certain preoccupation with religious truths which does not go to the point of absorbing
thought in the other world, has therefore always seemed to me the state that conforms best to
human morality in all its forms (Tocqueville 1985, 357, emphasis added).

Conclusion
The natural condition of human beings in the dawning democratic age is
characterized especially by the presence of two distinct elements—biblical
faith and secular rationalism.25 It was this tension that accounted for the un-
precedented and healthy dynamism of the American republic, and it is this
tension that is constitutive of the new political science that Tocqueville offers
for a new democratic world. The great danger to human freedom and the
future of democracy lurks in the complete triumph of one of these elements to
the exclusion of the other. On the one side lies the narrow and potentially
violent intolerance of religious sectarianism and, on the other, the loss of any
pervasive moral compass and consequent withering of human spirit. The new
kind of social and political morality that Tocqueville wished to bring to the
attention of his contemporaries was in fact a novel expression of the ancient
antagonism between biblical faith and the pre-biblical flourishing of political
life.26 Unlike Europe, America had revealed a way to maintain this tension
without tearing itself asunder in the process. Tocqueville seeks to preserve
rather than extinguish the tension at the heart of the Western tradition. It is in
the restive combination of biblical religion and secular philosophy, rather than
in the triumph of either one, that he finds the best, if still precarious, hope for
the dawning age ahead.

Manuscript submitted 11 September 2001

Final manuscript received 7 December 2001

25
Although Tocqueville sometimes speaks of Christianity as a precious heritage from a fading
aristocratic era, it is more revealing that he locates the origin of political equality—the fundamental
principle of the dawning age of democracy—in the cultural triumph of Christianity in the West.
26
In his correspondence with Arthur de Gobineau on the distinctive character of modern thought,
Tocqueville insists that "almost all that we call modern principles should be considered as new
consequences drawn from the old Christian principles" (Tocqueville 1959, 211).
 Alexis de Tocqueville on the Natural State of Religion 1151

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Aristide Tessitore is professor of political science, Furman

University, Greenville, SC 29613-1206.