SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND

MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD.,
Petitioners,

-versus- G.R. No. 120077

October 13, 2000

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J.
DIOSANA AND MARCELO G. SANTOS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] to annul the
following orders of the National Labor Relations Commission
(hereinafter referred to as “NLRC”) for having been issued without or
with excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion:[2] chanroblespublishingcompany

(1) Order of May 31, 1993.[5] Reversing and setting aside its
earlier resolution of August 28, 1992.[4] The questioned order
declared that the NLRC, not the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (hereinafter referred to as
“POEA”), had jurisdiction over private respondent’s complaint;
 (2) Decision of December 15, 1994.[5] Directing petitioners to
jointly and severally pay private respondent twelve thousand
and six hundred dollars (US$ 12,600.00) representing salaries
for the unexpired portion of his contract; three thousand six
hundred dollars (US$3,600.00) as extra four months salary for
the two (2) year period of his contract, three thousand six
hundred dollars (US$3,600.00) as “14th month pay” or a total of
nineteen thousand and eight hundred dollars (US$19,800.00)
or its peso equivalent and attorney’s fees amounting to ten
percent (10%) of the total award; and chanroblespublishingcompany

(3) Order of March 30, 1995.[6] Denying the motion for

reconsideration of the petitioners.

In May, 1988, private respondent Marcelo Santos (hereinafter

referred to as “Santos”) was an overseas worker employed as a printer
at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently, in
June 1988, he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, People’s
Republic of China and later terminated due to retrenchment. chanroblespublishingcompany

Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (hereinafter referred to

as “MHC”) and the Manila Hotel International Company, Limited
(hereinafter referred to as “MHICL”).

When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a government-owned
and controlled corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines.chanroblespublishingcompany

MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of

Hong Kong.[7] MHC is an “incorporator” of MHICL, owning 50% of its
capital stock.[8]

By virtue of a “management agreement”[9] with the Palace Hotel

(Wang Fu Company Limited), MHICL[10] trained the personnel and
staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China. chanroblespublishingcompany

Now the facts.

During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the
Sultanate of Oman, respondent Santos received a letter dated May 2,
1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel,
Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent Santos that he was
recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend of his. chanroblespublishingcompany

Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position as printer,

but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits. The position
was slated to open on October 1, 1988.[11]

On May 8, 1988, respondent Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and

signified his acceptance of the offer. chanroblespublishingcompany

On May 19, 1988, the Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Hans J. Henk
mailed a ready to sign employment contract to respondent Santos.
Mr. Henk advised respondent Santos that if the contract was
acceptable, to return the same to Mr. Henk in Manila, together with
his passport and two additional pictures for his visa to China. chanroblespublishingcompany

On May 30, 1988, respondent Santos resigned from the Mazoon

Printing Press, effective June 30, 1988, under the pretext that he was
needed at home to help with the family’s piggery and poultry
business.

On June 4, 1988, respondent Santos wrote the Palace Hotel and

acknowledged Mr. Henk’s letter. Respondent Santos enclosed four (4)
signed copies of the employment contract (dated June 4, 1988) and
notified them that he was going to arrive in Manila during the first
week of July 1988. chanroblespublishingcompany

The employment contract of June 4, 1988 stated that his employment

would commence September 1, 1988 for a period of two years.[12] It
provided for a monthly salary of nine hundred dollars (US$900.00)
net of taxes, payable fourteen (14) times a year.[13]

On June 30, 1988, respondent Santos was deemed resigned from the
Mazoon Printing Press. chanroblespublishingcompany

On July 1, 1988, respondent Santos arrived in Manila.

On November 5, 1988, respondent Santos left for Beijing, China. He
started to work at the Palace Hotel.[14]
chanroblespublishingcompany

Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended “employment

agreement” with the Palace Hotel, effective November 5, 1988. In the
contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the Palace Hotel. The Vice
President (Operations and Development) of petitioner MHICL Miguel
D. Cergueda signed the employment agreement under the word
“noted”.

From June 8 to 29, 1989, respondent Santos was in the Philippines

on vacation leave. He returned to China and reassumed his post on
July 17, 1989.

On July 22, 1989, Mr. Shmidt’s Executive Secretary, a certain Joanna

suggested in a handwritten note that respondent Santos be given one
(1) month notice of his release from employment. chanroblespublishingcompany

On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by

letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel
print shop would be terminated due to business reverses brought
about by the political upheaval in China.[15] We quote the letter:[16]

“After the unfortunate happenings in China and especially

Beijing (referring to Tiannamen Square incidents), our business
has been severely affected. To reduce expenses, we will not
open/operate printshop for the time being. chanroblespublishingcompany

“We sincerely regret that a decision like this has to be made, but
rest assured this does in no way reflect your past performance
which we found up to our expectations.”

“Should a turnaround in the business happen, we will contact

you directly and give you priority on future assignment.” chanroblespublishingcompany

On September 5, 1989, the Palace Hotel terminated the employment

of respondent Santos and paid all benefits due him, including his
plane fare back to the Philippines.
On October 3, 1989, respondent Santos was repatriated to the
Philippines.chanroblespublishingcompany

On October 24, 1989, respondent Santos, through his lawyer, Atty.

Ednave wrote Mr. Shmidt, demanding full compensation pursuant to
the employment agreement.

On November 11, 1989, Mr. Shmidt replied, to wit:[17]

His service with the Palace Hotel, Beijing was not abruptly
terminated but we followed the one-month notice clause and
Mr. Santos received all benefits due him. chanroblespublishingcompany

“For your information the Print Shop at the Palace Hotel

is still not operational and with a low business outlook,
retrenchment in various departments of the hotel is going
on which is a normal management practice to control
costs. chanroblespublishingcompany

“When going through the latest performance ratings,

please also be advised that his performance was below
average and a Chinese National who is doing his job now
shows a better approach. chanroblespublishingcompany

“In closing, when Mr. Santos received the letter of notice,

he hardly showed up for work but still enjoyed free
accommodation/laundry/meals up to the day of his
departure.”

On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He
prayed for an award of nineteen thousand nine hundred and
twenty three dollars (US$19,923.00) as actual damages, forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) as exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the damages prayed for.
The complaint named MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr.
Shmidt as respondents. chanroblespublishingcompany
 The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with
summons and neither participated in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter.[18]

On June 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, decided

the case against petitioners, thus:[19] chanroblespublishingcompany

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

“1. directing all the respondents to pay

complainant jointly and severally;

“a) $20,820 US dollars or its equivalent in

Philippine currency as unearned salaries; chanroblespublishingcompany

“b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

“c) P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

“d) Ten (10) percent of the total award as

attorney’s fees.

“SO ORDERED.”

On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the
POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. chanroblespublishingcompany

On August 28, 1992, the NLRC promulgated a resolution, stating:[20]

“WHEREFORE, let the appealed Decision be, as it is hereby,

declared null and void for want of jurisdiction. Complainant is
hereby enjoined to file his complaint with the POEA. chanroblespublishingcompany

“SO ORDERED.”

On September 18, 1992, respondent Santos moved for

reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He argued that the
case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an “overseas
contract worker.”[21] chanroblespublishingcompany
On May 31, 1993, the NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself.
The NLRC directed Labor Arbiter Emerson Tumanon to hear the case
on the question of whether private respondent was retrenched or
dismissed.[22]chanroblespublishingcompany

On January 13, 1994, Labor Arbiter Tumanon completed the

proceedings based on the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented to and heard by him.[23]

Subsequently, Labor Arbiter Tumanon was re-assigned as trial

Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Arbitration Branch, and the
case was transferred to Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera.[24] chanroblespublishingcompany

On November 25, 1994, Labor Arbiter de Vera submitted his

report.[25] He found that respondent Santos was illegally dismissed
from employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages
equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract.[26]

On December 15, 1994, the NLRC ruled in favor of private

respondent, to wit:[27] chanroblespublishingcompany

“WHEREFORE, finding that the report and recommendations

of Arbiter de Vera are supported by substantial evidence,
judgment is hereby rendered, directing the respondents to
jointly and severally pay complainant the following computed
contractual benefits: (1) US$12,600.00 as salaries for the
unexpired portion of the parties’ contract; (2) US$3,600.00 as
extra four (4) months salary for the two (2) years period (sic) of
the parties’ contract; (3) US$3,600.00 as “14th month pay” for
the aforesaid two (2) years contract stipulated by the parties or
a total of US$19,800.00 or its peso equivalent, plus (4)
attorney’s fees of 10% of complainant’s total award. chanroblespublishingcompany

“SO ORDERED.”

On February 2, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

arguing that Labor Arbiter de Vera’s recommendation had no basis in
law and in fact.[28] chanroblespublishingcompany
On March 30, 1995, the NLRC denied the motion for
reconsideration.[29] chanroblespublishingcompany

Hence, this petition.[30]

On October 9, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court an urgent motion

for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction and a motion for the annulment of the entry of
judgment of the NLRC dated July 31, 1995.[31] chanroblespublishingcompany

On November 20, 1995, the Court denied petitioner’s urgent motion.

The Court required respondents to file their respective comments,
without giving due course to the petition.[32]

On March 8, 1996, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating

that after going over the petition and its annexes, they can not defend
and sustain the position taken by the NLRC in its assailed decision
and orders. The Solicitor General prayed that he be excused from
filing a comment on behalf of the NLRC.[33] chanroblespublishingcompany

On April 30,1996, private respondent Santos filed his comment.[34]

On June 26, 1996, the Court granted the manifestation of the Solicitor
General and required the NLRC to file its own comment to the
petition.[35]
chanroblespublishingcompany

On January 7, 1997, the NLRC filed its comment.

The petition is meritorious.

I. Forum Non-Conveniens

The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.

We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign
jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only
link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is
a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign
corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. — Respondent Santos was hired directly
by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent
to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then
employed. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any
authorized recruitment agency of the government.[36] chanroblespublishingcompany

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency

may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that
the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.[37] The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar. chanroblespublishingcompany

Not Convenient. — We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient

forum given that all the incidents of the case — from the time of
recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the
Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of
the Philippines. Neither .are they “doing business in the Philippines.”
Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-
residents of the Philippines.chanroblespublishingcompany

No power to determine applicable law. — Neither can an intelligent

decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as
such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract was made).[38]

The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines.

Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while
he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace
Hotel in the People’s Republic of China. chanroblespublishingcompany

No power to determine the facts. — Neither can the NLRC determine

the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts
complained of took place in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. The
NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen
Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace
Hotel as to justify respondent Santos’ retrenchment. chanroblespublishingcompany
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. — Even
assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such
would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace
Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its
person was not acquired. chanroblespublishingcompany

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power
to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we
saying that we do not have power over an employment contract
executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an “overseas contract
worker”, a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC,
would protect him.[39] He is not an “overseas contract worker” a fact
which he admits with conviction.[40] chanroblespublishingcompany

Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the
merits, the NLRC’s decision cannot be sustained.

II. MHC Not Liable

Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction over
the case, and (2) that MHICL was liable for Santos’ retrenchment,
still MHC, as a separate and distinct juridical entity cannot be held
liable.

True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns fifty percent (50%)

of its capital stock. However, this is not enough to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction between MHICL and MHC. chanroblespublishingcompany

Piercing the veil of corporate entity is an equitable remedy. It is

resorted to when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend a crime.[41] It is
done only when a corporation is a mere alter ego or business conduit
of a person or another corporation. chanroblespublishingcompany

In Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[42] we held that “the mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a
sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.”

The tests in determining whether the corporate veil may be pierced

are: First, the defendant must have control or complete domination of
the other corporation’s finances, policy and business practices with
regard to the transaction attacked. There must be proof that the other
corporation had no separate mind, will or existence with respect the
act complained of. Second, control must be used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong. Third, the aforesaid control or breach of duty
must be the proximate cause of the injury or loss complained of. The
absence of any of the elements prevents the piercing of the corporate
veil.[43]
chanroblespublishingcompany

It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct

from those composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity
to which it may be related.[44] Clear and convincing evidence is
needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.[45] In this case, we find
no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one and the same
entity.

III. MHICL not Liable

Respondent Santos predicates MHICL’s liability on the fact that

MHICL “signed” his employment contract with the Palace Hotel. This
fact fails to persuade us. chanroblespublishingcompany

First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and Development)

of MHICL, Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment contract as a
mere witness. He merely signed under the word “noted”.

When one “notes” a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or

approval, as a party would.[46] In Sichangco vs. Board of
Commissioners of Immigration,[47] the Court recognized that the term
“noted” means that the person so noting has merely taken cognizance
of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a
judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.

Mr. Cergueda merely signed the “witnessing part” of the document.

The “witnessing part” of the document is that which, “in a deed or
other formal instrument is that part which comes after the recitals, or
where there are no recitals, after the parties (emphasis ours).”[48] As
opposed to a party to a contract, a witness is simply one who, “being
present, personally sees or perceives a thing; a beholder, a spectator,
or eyewitness.”[49] One who “notes” something just makes a “brief
written statement”[50] a memorandum or observation. chanroblespublishingcompany

Second, and more importantly, there was no existing employer-

employee relationship between Santos and MHICL. In determining
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following
elements are considered:[51]

“(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;

“(2) the payment of wages; chanroblespublishingcompany

“(3) the power to dismiss; and

“(4) the power to control employee’s conduct.”

MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the aforementioned
powers. It did not select respondent Santos as an employee for the
Palace Hotel. He was referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend,
Nestor Buenio. MHICL did not engage respondent Santos to work.
The terms of employment were negotiated and finalized through
correspondence between respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr.
Henk, who were officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and
not MHICL. Neither did respondent Santos adduce any proof that
MHICL had the power to control his conduct. Finally, it was the
Palace Hotel, through Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that terminated
respondent Santos’ services.

Neither is there evidence to suggest that MHICL was a “labor-only

contractor.”[52] There is no proof that MHICL “supplied” respondent
Santos or even referred him for employment to the Palace Hotel. chanroblespublishingcompany

Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and

MHICL are one and the same entity. The fact that the Palace Hotel is
a member of the “Manila Hotel Group” is not enough to pierce the
corporate veil between MHICL and the Palace Hotel.
 IV. Grave Abuse of Discretion

Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and

considering further that no employer-employee relationship existed
between MHICL, MHC and respondent Santos, Labor Arbiter
Ceferina J. Diosana clearly had no jurisdiction over respondent’s
claim in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90. chanroblespublishingcompany

Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original jurisdiction only over the
following:[53]

“1. Unfair labor practice cases;

“2. Termination disputes; chanroblespublishingcompany

“3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases

that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment;
“4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations;
“5 Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving legality of strikes and
lockouts; and chanroblespublishingcompany

“6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social

Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer-employee relations, including those
of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.”

In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an

indispensable jurisdictional requirement.

The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of
the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreements.[54]chanroblespublishingcompany

“To determine which body has jurisdiction over the present

controversy, we rely on the sound judicial principle that
 jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.”[55]

The lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was obvious from the
allegations of the complaint. His failure to dismiss the case amounts
to grave abuse of discretion.[56] chanroblespublishingcompany

V. The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for

certiorari and ANNULS the orders and resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated May 31, 1993, December 15, 1994
and March 30, 1995 in NLRC NCR CA No. 002101-91 (NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-02-01058-90). chanroblespublishingcompany

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-

Santiago, JJ., concur. chanroblespublishingcompany

chanroblespublishingcompany

[1] Under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court.

[2] Rollo, pp. 2-6. chanroblespublishingcompany

[3] In NLRC NCR CA No. 002101-91 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90),
Commissioner Vicente S. E. Veloso, ponente, concurred in by Commissioners
Edna Bonto Perez and Alberto R. Quimpo.
[4] Penned by Commissioner V. S. E. Veloso and concurred in by Commissioners
Bartolome S. Carale and Romeo B. Putong.
[5] Penned by Commissioner V. S. E. Veloso and concurred in by Commissioners
B. S. Carale and A. R. Quimpo.
[6] Ibid. chanroblespublishingcompany

[7] With principal office at 18094 Swire House Charter Road, Hongkong, as
shown by its Articles of Association dated May 23, 1986.
[8] MHC represented by its President Victor Sison and the Philippine Agency
Limited represented by its Director, Cheung Kwoh-Nean are MHICL’s
incorporators (Rollo, p. 76).
[9] The management agreement was terminated on April 1, 1990.
[10] Rollo, p. 71.
[11] Ibid., p. 65.
[12] Ibid., p. 96.
[13] Rollo, p. 65.
[14] Ibid., p. 97.
[15] Rollo, pp. 8-14.
[16] Rollo, p. 66.
[17] Ibid., pp. 66-67.
[18] Rollo, p. 72.
[19] Ibid., p. 126.
[20] Rollo, p. 99.
[21] Ibid., pp. 91-92.
[22] Ibid., pp. 81-83.
[23] Rollo, p. 52.
[24] Ibid., p. 63.
[25] Ibid.chanroblespublishingcompany

[26] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[27] Ibid., pp. 79-80.
[28] Rollo, pp. 51-62.
[29] Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[30] Filed on May 22, 1995, Rollo, pp. 42-48. On October 7, 1997, we resolved to
give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 217). Petitioners filed their
memorandum on December 1, 1997. The petition involves pure questions of
law; thus, we except this case from the ruling in San Martin Funeral Homes
vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 [1998]. Rather than refer the case to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision would be appealable to the Supreme Court, our
ruling would finally put an end to the litigation.
[31] Rollo, pp. 127-133.
[32] Rollo, p. 140.
[33] Rollo, pp. 148-149.
[34] Rollo, pp. 156.
[35] Rollo, p. 157.
[36] Rollo, p. 82.
[37] Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA
673, 695 (1996). chanroblespublishingcompany

[38] Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608, 618 (1998).
[39] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, 170 SCRA 54, 57 (1989), There we
stated that, “the POEA shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas employment, including seamen.”
[40] Rollo, pp. 91-92. chanroblespublishingcompany

[41] San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 296
SCRA 631, 649-650 (1998); Complex Electronics Employees Association vs.
NLRC, 310 SCRA 403, 417-418 (1999).
[42] 269 SCRA 15, 29-30 (1997).
[43] Rufina Luy Lim vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000.
[44] ARB Construction Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126554, May 31,
2000. chanroblespublishingcompany

[45] Laguio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 SCRA 715, 720-721
(1996); De La Salle University vs. De La Salle University Employees
Association, G.R. Nos. 109002 and 110072, April 12, 2000.
[46] Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 140 SCRA 73, 91 (1985).
[47] 94 SCRA 61, 69 (1979).
[48] Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979), p. 1438.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Supra, p. 956.
[51] Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 642, 654 (1996).
[52] “(a) the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, work
premises, among others; and “(b) the workers recruited and placed by such
person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal
business of the employer.” Asia Brewery, Inc. vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 185, 189-
190 (1996). chanroblespublishingcompany

[53] Labor Code of the Philippines, Article 217.

[54] Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. Jose S. Roque, 308 SCRA 215, 220 (1999).
[55] Marcina Saura vs. Ramon Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465, 472 (1999).
[56] Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, supra, p. 657.