Individualism, Communitarianism and Consensus

Author(s): Keith Lehrer

Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2001), pp. 105-120
Published by: Springer
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 KEITH LEHRER

INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITARIANISM AND CONSENSUS*

(Received 27 October 2000; accepted 15May 2001)

ABSTRACT. There is a contemporary conflict between individualistic and communitarian

of rationality. Robert Goodin describes it as a conflict between an enlighten
conceptions
ment individualistic conception of a "sovereign artificer" and "a socially unencumbered
self as contrasted with the communitarian conception of a "socially embedded self
whose identity is formed by his or her community. Should we justify and explain rationality
individualistically or socially? This is a false dilemma when consensus is reached by a
model articulated by Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner. According to this model, the con
sensus results from the positive weights individuals give to others and use to continually

average and, thus, aggregate their allocations. Aggregation converges toward a consensus
in which the social preference and the individual preferences become identical. The truth
of communitarianism is to be found in the aggregate and the truth of individualism in the

aggregation. The original conflict dissolves in rational consensus.

KEY WORDS: aggregation, communitarianism, connectedness, consensus, convergence,

Enlightenment, individualism, interpersonal unity, liberalism, Robert Gordin, self, weights

There is a contemporary conflict concerning the role of the individual and

society in the theory of rationality. On one side there is the enlighten
ment account of individualistic rationality. Robert Goodin describes it as
follows:1

The Enlightenment model of social life is a seductive one. It depicts rational (or anyway
reasoning) individuals choosing goals and plans and projects for themselves, with those
autonomous individuals then coming together, of their own volition, in pursuit of shared
interests and common ... From Pico della Mirandola Kant and the early
goals. through
Rawls, this vision of modern man as a "sovereign artificer" has reigned supreme throughout
mainstream Western moral and political thought.2

*
This paper was presented to the World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, 1998, under
the title "Individualism versus Communitarianism: A Consensual It was
Compromise."
written while the author was a fellow of the Australian National University, Institute for
Advanced Study. A version of this paper was presented to the Society for Ethics in 1999.
1
Robert E. Goodin, "Review Article: Communities of Enlightenment," British Journal

of Political Science 28 (1998), p. 531. All quotations from Goodin are to this article and
footnotes within quotations are due to Goodin.
2
Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" The Philosophy of Kant, trans, and ed.
Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949; originally published 1784), pp. 132
139, esp. Section 2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard

?* The Journal of Ethics 5: 105-120,2001.

^T ? 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
 106 KEITH LEHRER

This Goodin describes as the enlightenment view of the unencumbered

self.
Goodin describes the opposing communitarian view as follows:

Familiar old Hegelian themes have recently been refashioned into a full-dress "communi
tarian critique" of liberalism and,
through it, of
the Enlightenment conception of man
as a whole.3 In place of the socially "unencumbered self of Enlightenment mythology
and Kantian ethics, we are asked to substitute a 'socially embedded' self. In place of the
autonomous individual, we are asked to substitute an agent constituted and constrained in

important respects by communal attachments and cultural formations.4

The communitarian view is, as Goodin remarks, the view of the socially
embedded self.
Both enlightenment and the communitarian views concern the correct

perspective to take on the individual but also on society. According to the

enlightenment view as Goodin elaborates it:

Ex hypothesi, there are no affective sentiments binding them together. Ex hypothesi, each
is indifferent to the well-being of the other. Ex hypothesi, each is pursuing his or her own

goals to the exclusion of all else.

Despite their utter indifference to one another in all those respects, such individuals do
nonetheless find themselves embedded in "communities of interests". They share certain
concerns which can be better pursued jointly than separately. Each finds that others have
s/he wants or needs. Without coordination, they find themselves cutting across
something
one another unnecessarily, or they find themselves missing opportunities for mutually
beneficial collaboration.

University Press, 1971) and "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1980), pp. 515-572. Theodor W Adorno andMax Horkheimer, Dialectic
of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1979).
3 was a conception of man, and man
The Enlightenment conception indeed alone,
however.
4 see Michael
Goodin, p. 532. For some articulations of communitarianism, Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
and "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984),
pp. 81-96. Alasdair C. Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: HarvardUniversity Press, 1989). Cf. also, Michael Walzer,
Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The
communitarian argument has been reviewed effectively in many other
places already, e.g.:
Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs
14 (1985), pp. 308-322; Will Kymlicka, "Communitarianism," Contemporary Political

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam
Philosophy
Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth
Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal
Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important

collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel (ed.), Liber

compilations
alism and Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit
(eds.), Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
 INDrVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISMAND CONSENSUS 107

That story is as familiar as Hobbes and Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment. Some
times those stories are presented in terms of an overarching social contract;5 other times

they are couched in terms of more diffuse conventions underlying social institutions or

particularised exchange relations.6 What all those stories nonetheless have in common
is that they all depict a "community of interests" arising among individuals without any
antecedent communal sentiments. Interests, and interests alone, here beget community.7

By contrast, Goodin avers, the communitarian argues that we belong to

communities of meaning, experience, regard and subsumption to social
norms. To quote Goodin again, the communitarian view is characterised in
terms of identity as follows:

Communitarian critics of the Enlightenment model are looking for something beyond any
of that, however. Their talk of communities of generation, or meaning, experience or even
of regard points to something that stands above and before any calculation of enlightened
self-interest. Communitarians themselves would phrase this in terms of the social construc
tion of identity, of the communal "sources of the self."8 Whereas the Enlightenment fiction
is that sovereign artificers make communities, the communitarian emphasis is upon
the
various ways in which communities make individuals: literally, in the case of communities
of generation; figuratively, in communities of meaning, experience and regard.9

He continues later as follows:10

So too, for communitarians, are our collective conversations and deliberations partly
constitutive of who we are and what we want.11 Where the Enlightenment model sees
conversations among
independently constituted interlocutors, who
the pooling through
of information come
to some shared judgments, the communitarian model sees conver
sations constituting and reconstituting interlocutors who are partly made and remade

through them. Where the Enlightenment model sees independent assessors converging on
certain facts and values, premises and conclusions, the communitarian model sees inter

dependent agents constituted at least in part by that which they share in the course of their
conversations.12

Goodin examines the conflict in detail and after noting the various
ways in which the unencumbered self of the enlightenment will inevi
5
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651). John Locke, Second
Treatise of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960;
originally published 1690).
6
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, eds.
R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and WB. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; originally
published 1776). David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739)
and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Cadell, 1777).
7
Goodin, p. 535.
8
Taylor, Sources of the Self, Part I.
9
Goodin, p. 551.
10
Goodin, p. 554.
11
Taylor, p. 181.
12
Thus, Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), pp. 175-181.
 108 KEITH LEHRER

tably become involved in and. constrained by communities to which he

or she belongs, Goodin concludes concerning the sovereign artificers of
the enlightenment model:

Thus, while participating happily in all sorts of "communities of enlightenment," sovereign

artificers should, by the same token, strictly limit themselves to "communities of enlight
-
enment." Communities of darkness all-consuming attachments, of the sort which has so
race or nation or religion -
powerfully seized the recent world, to one's cannot pass their
muster. But that fact and the reasons behind it seem to tell more powerfully against such
communities than against the Enlightenment model itself.13

It is clear that after a lucid

account of the conflict, Goodin thinks
that the sovereign artificers, however encumbered they might become by
communities, should not sacrifice their sovereignty to the community.
This leaves us with a paradox at the core of the issue, namely, that as
rational agents we must retain our sovereignty within the communities
which might define our identities.
In the end, Goodin states his position by
contrasting "communities of enlightenment" with "communities of dark
ness." Of course, we all deplore communities which define membership in
ways that require that we be destructive to those outside the communities
which us. However,
define the powers of darkness are not restricted to
communities of darkness. Individuals acting as sovereign artificers seeking
their own personal goals and interests have done enough harm to others,
sometimes by organising communities that subsume others, sometimes by
acts of personal destruction, so that we must not blame darkness exclu
sively on communities. There is plenty of sovereign individual evil in the
world. My own impression is that communities are much like individuals.
Some are benevolent or, at least, just, while others are malevolent, or, at
least, unjust. Moreover, Goodin sees clearly that this is so.
I propose that we confront the paradox of individual sovereignty and
social identity as a paradox that should be treated initially as a problem of
explaining how we can offer an account of a sovereign individual with a
social identity and how within the social situation we can have a sovereign
individual. How can we resolve the conflict between individual autonomy
and social identity? How can the interests of the individual conform to the
interests of the social groups to which he or she belongs without the group
co-opting the interests of the individual? How can the interests of the social
group conform to the interests of the individual without decomposing in
the conflict of individual interests? The answer to all these questions is that
individual interests may converge toward consensus at the same time in
the ideal case and by the same process that the consensus socially defines
the identity of the individual. We do not need to suppose, at least in the
13
Goodin, p. 558.
 AND CONSENSUS
INDIVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISM 109

ideal case, that there is a chicken and the egg problem of whether the
egg of individualism comes before the chicken of communitarianism or
vice versa. The individual and society fry and fly together. The society
is defined by a consensus aggregated by individuals and individuals are
defined by the consensus they aggregate. The truth of communitarianism is
to be found in the aggregate, the truth of individualism in the aggregation.
I shall construe the problem as the problem of individualism versus
communitarianism. It is clear, as Goodin illustrates, that the conflict
between individualism and communitarianism is an ongoing ethical and
political conflict. The resolution of it, if one is to be found, is more than
a solution of an abstract logical puzzle. We may, however, find a solution

by means of an abstract logical or mathematical representation of it, and

that is what I shall suggest. Before turning to mathematical representation,
we shall need as much clarification of the problem that we can obtain, and
that requires that we distinguish different problems that may be confused
under a single heading. We may murder to dissect, but some confusions
must meet their justified demise before precise articulation is possible.
The first distinction is between a conflict of fact and methodology, on
one hand, and conflict of value and deontology, on the other. Some value
individualism above communitarianism and think we all ought to, while
others value communitarianism above individualism and think we all ought
to. This dispute of value and deontology is easily confused with one of fact
and methodology. The latter dispute concerns whether, on one hand, we are
to explain the thought and action of an individual in terms of the influence
of social groups or communities to which he or she belongs or whether, on
the other hand, we are to explain the thought and action of social groups in
terms of the individuals belonging to them.
Of course, most of us are inclined to the latitudinarian view that some
times we can explain the thought and actions of an individual in terms
of the social groups to which he or she belongs and sometimes we can

explain the thought and actions of social groups in terms of the individuals
belonging to them, but that does not end the dispute. For the question
remains as to which explanations are basic. The individualistically oriented
or economist be committed to the - the
psychologist may methodology
individual is basic for explanation -
while the socially oriented sociologist
or political to the methodology - the
scientist may be committed social
group is basic for explanation. The first may think of the goals and interests
of individuals as providing the basic explanation of why social groups
think and act as they do in terms of the personal minds of individuals
belonging to the group. The second may think of the goals and interests
of groups as providing the basic explanation of why individuals think and
 110 KEITH LEHRER

act as they do in terms of the social mind of the individuals belonging

to the social group. Both kinds of explanations are useful, but the ques
- what is basic to explanation in the social sciences - the
tion remains
individual or society?
There is a parallel
dispute when we turn from the explanation of what
is the case to the question of what ought to be the case. Ought the interests
and goals of the social groups be derived from the interests and goals of
the individuals belonging to them, or ought the goals and interests of indi
viduals from the interests and goals of the groups to which
be derived they
belong? Again, it is clear that sometimes an individual should respect the
goals and interests of a group to which he or she belongs, and sometimes
a groups should respect the goals and interests of an individual belonging
-
to them, but the question is what is basic to justification? Are the goals
and interests of individuals basic to justifying what ought to be pursued
by individuals and groups, or are the goals and interests of groups basic to
justifying what ought to be pursued by groups and individuals?
The similarity of the form of the questions suggests that there may
be a similarity in the form of the answer, and so there is. Moreover, the
answer is the same in both cases. There is an ideal case in which neither
the individual nor the society is basic, namely, the case in which the goals
and interests are consensual, for in that case the individual and social goals
and interests are identical with the consensual goals and interests. There is
a fundamental mistake in both the perspective of individualism and that of
communitarianism, namely, the assumption that one must be basic, just as
there is a common insight in both, namely, that each is essential. But how
can consensus resolve the conflict of individualism and communitarianism
in either the domain of explanation or justification? Either the consensus
is formed by individuals consenting to some common interest or goal
expressing nothing more than their individual interests and goals, which
is individualism, or commitment to the consensual goals and interests is
required of the individuals, which is communitarianism. How can we slip
between the horns of the dilemma?
The crux of the answer is that ideal consensus is a commitment of
consenting individuals to consensual goals and interests. The commitment
to the consensual goals and interests is what the communitarian requires
for social identity, but because it is the consensus of consenting individuals,
it is formed from their individual goals and interests as the individualist
requires. The consensus is the consensus of individuals, and, therefore,
the individual and communal goals and interests coincide within it.What
we require to solve the two problems of explanation and justification is a
 AND CONSENSUS
INDIVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISM 111

theory of a consensus that articulates the double solution. Let us turn to the
articulation of it.
As a first step toward the solution to the problem, let us consider conflict
between two persons. One favourite articulation of a two person problem is
the prisoners dilemma, but it is a poor model for social intercourse between
two people because it precludes communication and negotiation between
them to solve the problem. Let us instead consider a problem where two

people need to resolve their conflict and see how a consensus might arise.
George and Mary are left $1,000 in a will which they may divide among
their favourite charities provided they can agree on how to divide the
money. George wishes to give $1,000 to the American Cancer Society, A,
because his father died of cancer. Mary wishes to give $1,000 to Planned
Parenthood, P, because of her commitment to that cause. How are they to
reach agreement? One way, would be for each to think of himself or herself
as having a unit of weight to divide between himself or herself and the
other. Suppose that George gives a weight of 0.1 toMary, 0.9 to himself,
and Mary does the same. Consistency requires that each modify his or
her allocation in terms of the weight
assigned to himself or herself and the
other, and the way to do so is to average or aggregate the allocations, so that

George modifies his allocation to 0.9 X $1,000 to A and 0.1 X $1,000 to P

with result that he now agrees to allocate $900 to A and $100 to P, while
Mary agrees to allocate $900 to P and $100 to A. They have not reached
agreement by a single aggregation, but suppose they continue to give a
weight of 0.1 to the other, 0.9 to themselves, and average or aggregate
again. They will continue to move closer to each other in their allocations,
and iterated aggregation will drive them to converge toward the allocation
of $500 to each charity. This will then become the consensual allocation
of the group consisting of George and Mary.
This is a very simple example of consensus. The process of forming
a consensus violates the principles of extreme individualism. It is not the
case that each is pursing his or her goals to the exclusion of all others.
Each is giving some weight to the goal of the other. The motive might be
egoistic, or it might not be. There may be an affective sentiment binding
them which influences what weight each gives to the goal of the other,
and they may be concerned about the well-being of each other. We cannot
exclude the possibility that George and Mary have arrived at consensus
by exercising pure egoism, but once the aggregation process begins each
party is sacrificing the egoistically preferred position of giving $1,000 to
his or her favourite charity. Moreover, once that aggregation begins, each
party begins to form a preference that is partly social in nature. George and
Mary may begin by assigning an allocation without concern for the other.
 112 KEITHLEHRER

But afterthe first aggregation, Mary's allocation is an aggregation of her

own allocation and George's. Her allocation, like his, is intrinsically social.
Each person has an allocation, a charitable position, if you will, that is an
aggregation of his or her own and that of the other. At the second aggrega
tion, each arrives at an allocation that is an aggregation of an aggregation
of his or her own and that of the other, and, in that way, doubly social.
As the process iterates and converges toward consensus, each converges
toward an allocation that is an inextricable amalgamation of their original
allocation and an increasingly dominant social factor.
We may, in fact, consider the solution in mathematically equivalent
terms that articulates the social component in a precise manner. The
consensual allocation is mathematically equivalent to finding a consen
sual weight to give to George, wg, a consensual weight to give to Mary,
wM, and multiplying these weights times the original allocations to obtain
the consensual allocation resulting from aggregation convergence. In the
example we imagined, the consensual weights would be 0.5, but the
weights could have been any positive pair that sums to 1. For example,
if George had given Mary a weight of 0.3 and Mary had given George
a weight of 0.1 and both had aggregated to convergence, the consensual
allocation would have been $250 to A and $750 to P which is equivalent
to assigning a consensual weight of 0.25 to George and 0.75 toMary and
multiplying these weights times their original allocations. So, we may look
at the process as mathematically equivalent to one by which George and
Mary seek to agree to consensual weights to assign to each other.
Notice, however, that the consensual allocations are both communal
and individual. They are both individual and communal because the indi
vidualsare committed to the social process of aggregation resulting in the
communal allocation. George and Mary are committed to iterated aggrega
tion and the allocation of $500 to each charity is their resulting communal
allocations. These
allocations are individual, on the other hand, because the
consensus results from the weights and allocations of individuals and are,
in the end, also allocations of individuals. The communal allocation results
from the original individual allocations of George and Mary of $1,000 to
each of their respective charities and of the weights of 0.1 that each assigns
to the other (and of 0.9 to themselves) used in the iterative aggregation
process. The crux is that $500 to each charity is the communal allocation
to which George and Mary are committed as members of the group they
have formed. At the same time, however, each of them individually has
modified his or her individual allocation to $500 to each charity. Consensus
identifies the individual and the communal allocations.
 AND CONSENSUS
INDIVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISM 113

It is important to notice that the allocation of $500 to each charity

might have resulted from different processes without consensus. One
possibility is George and Mary might have been told that if they did not
reach consensus about the allocation, the allocation would be randomly
chosen by an unidentified third party. Suppose that they do not reach
consensus, each refusing to give positive weight to the other in the negoti
ation, and the third party chooses the allocation of $500 to each charity.
The actual allocation is the same as in the case of consensus, but the
allocation, though it is to some extent the result of a failure of the pair
to reach consensus, is neither an individual nor a communal allocation
but is, instead, imposed. They are subsumed under an imposed allocation.
Neither of them is committed to that allocation communally or individu
ally, though they each bear some responsibility for the outcome and will
have to accept the result. Finally, suppose that instead of aggregating to
consensus, George and Mary each guess at an allocation they think the
other will accept without negotiation or aggregation, and they each pick the
allocation of $500 to each charity. Each of them is individually committed
to that allocation, but there is no communal commitment to that allocation
because it is not the result of social consensus.
In the example of George and Mary we can solve our two problems,
the problem of fact and methodology, on one hand, and the problem of
value and deontology, on the other. Consider first of all the problem of
fact and methodology. Should we explain the allocations in our example
in terms of the goals and purposes of the individuals or in terms of the
goals and purposes of the group when George and Mary reach consensus?
Are we to explain the thought and action of an individual, George or Mary,
in terms of the influence of the social group to which he or she belongs
or are we to explain the thought and action of the social group composed
of George and Mary in terms of them? We certainly can explain the first
step of aggregation in terms of the preferences of George and Mary and
the weights they give to each other. The movement from the initial state,
state 0, to the next state, state 7, is fully explained in terms of individual
preferences, goals and interests. The transition from state 1 to state 2, the
second step of aggregation, brings in a social factor, however. Consider
a formal representation of George's aggregation from state 0 to state 1
and from state 1 to state 2, where the subscripts mark the person and
the superscripts mark the state, followed by the representation of Mary's
aggregations for these states:

George,
-
AG AMWGM + AGWGG
=
AG AMWGM + AGWGG;
 114 KEITH LEHRER

and Mary,

Al -_
AM A0 0 + ,A0
AGWMG
0
AMWMM
=
AM ^G^MG + AMWMM'

I assume as in the example that George holds the weights he assigns

constant from state / to state 2 as does Mary, but that is for them to decide
in each state. It is clear, however, that even at state 1, the allocations of
George and Mary are already socially embedded. The allocation of each
is embedded in the allocation of the other and a social factor is introduced
into the allocations of the individuals.
The most important social element is introduced in the second aggrega
tion, however, and extreme individualism vanishes therein. This is revealed
when we substitute in the state 2 allocations what the state 1 allocations
equal. We obtain the following for George:

=
A% (AGw?MG + A0Mw?MM)wGM +
(A?MwGM+AGwGM)wGG.

Now when we consider this formula, it is clear that the weight that George
gives toMary in state 2 reflects his evaluation of the weight thatMary gave
to his allocation as well to her own in the original state. So the weight that
he gives to her is, in part, an evaluation of the weight that she gave to him.
Similarly, the weight thatMary gives to George in state 2 reflects her evalu
ation of the weight he gave to her in the original state. Moreover, when the
aggregation progresses to state 3, the weight that George gives toMary will
reflect his evaluation of the weight that she gave to the weight he gave to
her just as the weight that she gives to him will reflect her evaluation of the
weight that he gave to the weight she gave to him. Thus, though the weights
might remain constant from state to state, what is evaluated by the assigned
weight changes and becomes socially more complicated from state to state.
The allocations of George and Mary at state 2 are already a mixture of
social and individual factors. The allocation of each is socially embedded
in the allocations of the other, the weights the other has assigned, and the
weight one assigns to those weights. At this point, George's allocation is
encumbered with Mary's allocations and evaluations and hers with his. The
innocence of the unencumbered self is lost.
Should we explain the allocations of the individuals in terms of
consensus toward which they have converged and to which they have
agreed? It seems that we must. Neither would allocate $500 to each charity
except as a member of a group who has amalgamated his or her prefer
ences and interests with the other to form a consensus. It is commitment
to the consensus which explains the $500 allocations that each makes.
 AND CONSENSUS
INDIVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISM 115

But remains a caveat. Each of them has allocated

there $500 to each
charity as a result of a process of aggregation that each engaged in to
reach his or her goal. The consensus is the solution to a coordination
problem that each confronts as an individual. However, to reach the solu
tion, each must amalgamate his or her interests with the other to reach a
consensus that is communal and commit themselves to it. The
sovereign
artifice is immediately lost in the second state of aggregation, and the
individuals become socially encumbered. Moreover, once they are socially
encumbered, the distinction between the communal allocation and the
individual allocations vanishes in magic of mathematics. The individual
allocation of each "sovereign artificer" becomes the "communal norm" of
consensus. Individual interests become communal interests and communal
interests remain individual. The individual allocations and the communal
allocations are identical and symmetrical.
To turn from
fact and methodology to value and deontology, should
we agree that the interests and goals of the group ought to be derived
from the interests and goals of the individuals justified by them, or ought
the interests and goals of the individuals be derived from the interests
and goals of the group and justified by them? As we have formulated
the example, the interests and goals of the group require that $500 be
allocated by each individual to each charity, for it is in the interests and
goals of the group that a fixed sum be consensually allocated to each
charity and, therefore, that the individuals allocate $500 to each charity.
The individual allocations are justified by the consensual allocations of
the group. The individuals ought to conform to the consensual allocations
as a social or communitarian norm. On the other hand, the interests and
goals of the group are justified by and derived from the interests and goals
of the individuals, namely, to do what they must to obtain an allocation
for their preferred charity by reaching consensus. What is and what ought
to be coincide in the symmetry and identity of individual and communal
interests.

There is an ambiguity in the meaning of "derive" that should not lead

us astray. The word is here used in the senses of both explanation and
justification. We have argued for the symmetry of individual and social
explanation and justification. There is, of course, also a temporal notion
of derivation in which to say that one thing is derived from another is to
imply that the derived thing was caused by the antecedent occurrence of
the thing from which it was derived. In our example, one has the impres
sion that the consensus is derived in this sense from the earlier states
of aggregation. Though this might be the case, it need not be, and the
justification for the consensual allocation does not depend upon it. We
 116 KEITH LEHRER

need only imagine that state 1 is a state in which each individual modifies
his or her allocation by aggregating his and her original allocation on the
basis of assigning 0.5 to himself and herself. The individuals reach their
own modified allocations at the same time that they create a consensual
allocation. The symmetry of the individual and the communal allocation
is instantaneous and synchronic. Thus, temporal symmetry and identity of
the individual and social allocation may be conjoined to that of explanation
and justification.
The two person example that we have described above can be extended
to larger groups with more interesting results. The introduction of a third
person, Jean, into the decision making group would exhibit most of the
consequences of the extension of the model to groups of any finite size.
The most interesting consequence of introducing a third party is that such
a person might mediate conflict between the other two. For example, if
George and Mary each refuse to assign positive weight to each other and
each, consequently, assigns zero weight to the other, then each will remain
stubbornly fixed with his or her original allocation. If, however, Jean is
added to the group, and Jean assigns positive weight to each of them and
is assigned positive weight by each them, then aggregation will converge
toward consensus as a result of Jean's role when the weights assigned by
the three remain constant through iterated aggregation. So a third party
can connect parties who are otherwise disconnected. This is a powerful
alteration of the original example.
Moreover, as more parties are added the possibility of more indirect
connection arises. If every pair of members of the group is connected by
some sequence of members each of whom
assigns positive weight to the
next, then, again, convergence will result from constancy through iterated
aggregation. This means, for example, that if all members of the group
are thought of as forming a circle in which each person assigns positive
weight to the person to his or her left and to no one else except himself
or herself, convergence would result from constancy of weight through
iterated aggregation. This allows for the creation of a communal allocation
in a large group where each person's individual allocation is identical to the
communal allocation even though each person in the group gives positive

weight to only one other member of the group!

Let us consider a more formal
representation of the addition of more
parties. Each person, y, would assign a weight, w^, to each other person, k,
at each state s. Thus the allocation for person j resulting from aggregating
from state s to s + 1 is as follows:
 AND CONSENSUS
INDIVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISM 117

The consensualallocation Ac is the value to which the aggregation

converges for all j as s goes to infinity. The major implication of adding
a third person is that it permits us to obtain convergence toward consensus
even when some members of the group assigns a weight of 0 to other
members of the group. If all members of the group assign some positive
weight to themselves and all are connected by vectors of positive weight
and all remain constant in the weights they assign through iterated aggreg
ation, convergence toward consensus will result (these conditions are not
necessary for convergence, but they are sufficient).14 Two members of the
group j and k are connected in this way just in case there is a sequence
of members of the group such that j is the first member and k is the last
member and each member in the sequence assigns positive weight to the
next member in the sequence. It is possible for all members to be connected
in this way even though each member gives positive weight to only one
other member of the group. Ifmembers of the group are connected, iterated
positive aggregation will converge toward a consensual allocation when
weights are held constant.
There is obviously no reason to suppose that weights will remain
constant through the process of aggregation. However, it is plausible to
suppose that after extended aggregation weights would remain constant,
and, assuming that members of the group are connected at that state,
iterated aggregation will again converge toward consensus. Nevertheless,
it should not be assumed that connectedness is assured, for the process as
described in the example, and as assumed so far, allows for an individual to
opt out of the process by assigning all others a weight of zero. This insures
that the individual cannot be co-opted by other members of the group, and
it is necessary that he not be co-opted if the consensual allocation is to
carry moral commitment. If an individual assigns all others a weight of
zero, then either they must reciprocate or face the prospect of making that
individual a dictator by converging toward his or her allocation. Of course,
as a result of individuals assigning others zero weight the group may
decompose into a major group and an outsider or into various subgroups
having diverse allocations.
We may now define a basic difference between an individualistic and a
communal perspective. The individualistic perspective is one that requires
the right of the individual to opt out of the consensual process and to
become an outsider to the group. A communal perspective might mandate
some weighting procedure requiring individuals to give positive weight to

14
For weaker sufficient conditions for convergence, see Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner,
Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel Publishing Co., 1980).
 118 KEITHLEHRER

others to insure convergence toward consensus. Such a perspective might

be democratic requiring that each assign at least some minimal weight to
all the others or more autocratic requiring that each member assign some
specified weight to some leader or leading subgroup. The required weight
assignment might be a condition of communal membership.
Assuming that membership is not coerced, however, there remains the
argument that the individual allocation and the communal allocation are
the same, though in the case in which an individual assigns positive weight
to others as a condition of membership in the community, he or she may
be aware of an alternative allocation representing the allocation he or she
would make as an outsider. Nevertheless, having chosen to meet the condi
tion of group membership by assigning a positive weight to others and
participating in the aggregation process, the allocation of the individual
will, through aggregation, converge toward the communal allocation. Even
in this case, the communal allocation and the individual allocation will be
identical. The commitment to the communal allocation will coincide with
the communal allocation at the time at which each emerges as the outcome
of aggregation.
The foregoing reflections us with an understanding
provide of how
individual and communal justification and explanation can be symmetrical
and identical. They show us how disparate individual allocations can be

aggregated toward consensus by means of the constancy of positive weight

given to others in a group. A question arises, however, since the model
does not appear to describe actual behaviour. What light can the model
of aggregation shed on actual conflict between individual and communal
interests, goals, thought and action? First of all, the aggregation model
can be applied to arrive at consensus concerning anything that can be

represented mathematically. So if interests, for example, can be repre

sented by utilities, the model can be applied to them. Moreover, the use
of the model avoids the usual problems resulting from an attempt to find
some interpersonal or intersubjective measure of utility. It is not needed.
The personal utilities of members of the group need not conform to any

interpersonal measure. The reason is that each individual can correct for
differences in the way others represent their utilities in terms of the weights
they assign. Thus, for example, if I think that the utility assignment of
another exaggerates his intensity of interest in comparison to others, I can

assign him a proportionately lower weight to discount the exaggeration in

his utility assignment. Moreover, the model might be indirectly applied to
cases where a conflict could be first concerned with question of how much

weight to give to each person in the dispute, and once that is resolved

by finding consensual weights to be assigned to each person, the weights

 AND CONSENSUS
INDIVIDUALISM,COMMUNITARIANISM 119

could be used as votes to resolve a conflictthat is represented qualitatively.

Itmust be conceded, however, that the model as articulated above can be
directly applied only in cases in which the dimension of conflict can be
represented mathematically.
The second and more important reply to the question of what light the
model can shed on actual conflict is that the model may be realised by
many instances of actual conflict without members to the dispute reflec
tively assigningweights to others. Their behaviour might be explained by
the assumption that they give weight to others and modify their position
in terms of these weights even though they do not do so reflectively or
in a way that introspection reveals. Moreover, as is apparent from our

example of George and Mary, the convergence point may be obvious to all
parties after only one or two aggregations rendering the extended iteration
unnecessary. The intention to continue giving a positive weight to others
in a constant manner will be seen to commit one to a consensual point of
convergence.
There are many features of actual negotiation that are well
explained
by the model. The first in reaching consensus.
is the role of mediators
That is explained by their role in connecting members that are a party
to the dispute. Another feature is the rejection of the influence of medi
ators when one or more parties to a dispute does not want to compromise.
That is explained by the need to assign zero weight to those mediating in
order to avoid being connected to others and driven to agreement by the
connection. Yet another feature is that increasing the size of a group may
facilitate reaching consensus. That by an increase
is explained in ways
in which individuals can be connected
by adding individuals to the group.
Perhaps most important is the fact that respect for a central figure or mutual
respect among parties to a conflict is so important in reaching agreement
and maintaining community. That is explained by the way in which such
respect connects the members permitting aggregation toward consensus.
There is also the fact that negotiated agreement is so much more satis
factory than imposed agreement. That is explained by the identification of
individual and social commitment resulting from connection, constancy
and aggregation toward consensus. By contrast, there is the anger that
is displayed when negotiation fails to reach consensus. That is explained
by the assignment of zero weight to others needed to avoid being slowly
driven to consensus. Finally, there is the happy occurrence of consensus
yielding surprising shifts in norms and social paradigms arising in a group
with dissenting subgroups. That is explained by mutually respected indi
viduals who connect the dissenting group with others in the aggregation to
consensus.
 120 KEITHLEHRER

We began by considering the contrast Goodin described between the

enlightenment view of individuals as socially unencumbered sovereign
artificers and the communitarian view of individuals socially embedded
in communities which require commitment from them. The consensual
model I have proposed provides an alternative that shares something with
both views. It shares the fundamental idea of the enlightenment view
that social agreement and community can be explained by the action of
individuals seeking to further their goals and interests, namely, by giving
positive weight to others and aggregating toward consensus. It shares the
fundamental idea of the communitarian that there should be an iden
tification of the interests and goals of the individual with those of the
community.
On the other hand, the model departs in an equally fundamental way
from each view. It departs from the fundamental idea of the individual
istic model that the individual interests
and goals, though they may be
coordinated with others belonging to a community, are not identical to
them. It departs from the fundamental idea of the communitarian model
that communal commitment to the goals of the community
and interests
can not be the result of individuals pursuing their own goals and interests.
The model is, however, closer to the enlightenment view and the position
Goodin espouses because the process of aggregation to consensus is based
on individuals pursuing their goals and interests. My own view, however,
is that egoism, however enlightened, would fail to produce harmony and
commitment a community without
within social interests and goals within
the individuals motivating them to give positive weight to others with suffi
cient constancy to form a community among them. We are social beings,
as Thomas Reid noted in the Scottish enlightenment, and were we not,
life would, in spite of occasional short-term coordination of small groups
seeking some common interest, remain what it is when the social impulse
fails in times of war, namely, hostile, hateful and horrific. Benevolence and
respect are the engines of the vehicle of social aggregation.

Department of Philosophy
University of Arizona
Tucson AZ 85721
USA
E-mail: lehrer@email.arizona.edu