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On the Unexpected Ends of Classical Social Contract


Theory: Hobbes, Locke, and their Perceived Contradictions

INTRODUCTION
Social contract theory is undoubtedly one of the most amusing topics of political
philosophy; it asserts that all things are to be done through the consent of society, and then
defines unexpected standards on what constitutes consent, leading to many unintuitive
philosophical and political conclusions. In their lives and beyond, Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke were both accused by some of being hypocritical; those who saw only their starting
premises and their final conclusions were often startled by the latter. I wish to explain the
peculiarities in the writings of Hobbes and Locke from two aspects: First, in regards to the
perceived internal inconsistency of the conclusion of either philosopher with respect to his own
original premise, and Second, in regards to the perceived inconsistency between the conclusions
of both authors and their common original premise. In particular, this essay will explore Hobbes’
Leviathan and Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.

In effort to explain these disparities, I will make two main arguments: first, Hobbes and
Locke hold fundamentally dissimilar views on freedom, equality, and rights and obligations of
man. And second, different definitions of consent in social contracts have an immense impact on
the conclusions. The former argument on the views of Hobbes and Locke will be key in
understanding why each came to his conclusion, and will establish how and where each author’s
logic took an unexpected turn from the starting premise: “All men are born free and equal, and
legitimate government must be based upon consent”. In addition, both arguments combined will
serve to justify the different conclusions that Locke and Hobbes arrived at from the same
premise.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE STARTING STATE


A social contract is the formulation of some AGREEMENTS which an existing group of
peoples express CONSENT towards. As such, any social contract theory is heavily influenced by
the starting state for that group of peoples, as supposed by the theorist. In the case of a political
theory about man and society, the starting state we ought to be concerned about is the natural
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state of man; how we imagine this state affects what contract a hypothetical man living in such
state would consent to and enter1. As Locke puts it:

“To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in,”
— [CITATION Joh80 \p 8 \n \y \l 1033 ]

According to both Hobbes and Locke, all men are born free and equal, and legitimate
government must be based upon consent. While this is the starting premise for both, each uses
different observations to explain it, revealing their views on the meaning of freedom and
equality. The ways Hobbes and Locke define freedom and justify man’s equality affect their
views of man’s rights and liberties, thus the character of the state of natures. While the starting
premise is the same, its different bases make the starting state of man himself very different, and
thus the optimal political trajectories that man should take ought to differ.

I. FREEDOM AND LIBERTY


For Hobbes, freedom and liberty is the same2, defined as “the absence of external
impediments” [CITATION Tho96 \p 91 \y \l 1033 ], or “the absence of Opposition” where
opposition refers only to “external impediments of motion” [CITATION Tho96 \p 145 \y \l 1033
]. Thus, for Hobbes, freedom and liberty both refer to physical freedom, and even citizens under
slavery or despotism society still have absolute freedom, so long as they are not physically
restricted (via imprisonment, etc.). Hobbes also sees freedom in the state of nature as
unrestricted and unlimited.

For Locke, who also uses freedom and liberty interchangeably 3, perfect freedom is the
ability “to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any
other man.” [CITATION Joh80 \p 8 \y \l 1033 ] Therefore, Locke sees that freedom and liberty

1
Note, however, that while opponents of social contract theory criticize the state of nature as an impossible state that
never could have existed, Locke dismisses such criticisms on two accounts: (1) to the present day, all men are born
in the state of nature and only exit it through their own consent, (2) per the previous point, the question if man
collectively ever was in such state becomes irrelevant, because we are in the present and are concerned with what
decisions to take at the present day. Locke believes that his theory, starting from a hypothetical starting state of man,
does not require such starting state to ever have happened; its possibility is the most important.
2
See [CITATION Tho96 \p 145 \y \l 1033 ] where, in defining the concepts, he states “liberty, or freedom”, before
applying the definition to it.
3
See [CITATION Joh80 \p 8-9 \y \l 1033 ] where, the state of nature is described as “a state of perfect freedom” in
p. 8, then referred to in p. 9 by saying “although this be a state of liberty”.
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does not and cannot exist for citizens under a despotic society. Locke, however, introduces the
concept of a ‘bounded freedom’, where man is not free to violate his duties in the law of nature.

II. EQUALITY
When it comes to the equality of man, Thomas Hobbes uses a physiological explanation,
suggesting that man is made “so equal, in the faculties of body, […] [as] the weakest has the
strength enough to kill the strongest” [CITATION Tho96 \p 86-7 \y \l 1033 ] in a natural state.
Man is also equal in the faculty of mind, Hobbes says, as shown by the fact that almost all men
are “content with [their] own share” of intelligence [CITATION Tho96 \p 87 \y \l 1033 ].
Hobbes uses both equalities to suggest that there is no basis on the discrimination between men.
This purely physical and aspiritual interpretation and justification of equality will have an
immense impact on the rights and liberties of man in a Hobbesian world.

Locke’s views on the equality of man, however, are more spiritual, particularly religious.
To Locke, man is by God equal, for two reasons: first, because God did not, “by any manifest
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by any evident clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty”, and second, because God gave
man the “obligation to mutual love amongst [all] men” [CITATION Joh80 \p 8 \y \l 1033 ]. In
other words, Locke bases equality on the lack of evident natural inequality amongst man, and on
man’s God-given duties towards other men.

III. THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF MAN


Man’s equality for both Hobbes and Locke, implies that the rights and liberties of all men
shall be equal. Yet, the extent of these liberties is differs between both authors. For Hobbes, a
man in a natural state, who is both free (to do whatever he wishes as permitted by the physical
laws) and equal (in faculties of mind and body), and possesses the original right of self-
preservation, must therefore hold the rights and liberties for all things. These rights include the
violation of the rights of other men, and restricting them. 4

Locke’s view on freedom is bounded by the freedom of others. This is justified by his
views on equality: since man is equal by God and by his duty to honor the rights of others, a man

4
Hobbes’ original RIGHT OF NATURE is the right of men to self-preservation, as shown in p. 91 of Leviathan.
However, given the argument raised by Hobbes in p. 87, which will be discussed in ‘HOBBES’ STATE OF NATURE’,
the right to self-preservation immediately implies the right to violate the rights of all men in anticipation of their
violation to your rights. Hobbes elegantly explains on p. 91 of Leviathan, directly following the bit on the right of
nature, that man has the right to everything.
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has the right to all things given he fulfills his duties towards others. Man’s original right of
nature is self-preservation; and not only a right but an obligation. In other words, a man who
disregards his duties towards others no longer fits the definition of an equal to others in society.
Thus the rights of man shall end when the rights of another begin.

IV. CONSENT FOR HOBBES AND LOCKE


For all social contracts, and in particular for the litmus-test for legitimate government,
giving consent is necessary. The nature of consent that can validate a social contract, and
legitimize a government is unclear, however. For both Hobbes and Locke, one can give tacit
consent to express their consent towards a contract or government. Still, both writers have
slightly different views of tacit consent, which impacts their theories.

Hobbes refers to tacit consent by stating: “Signs of contract are either express or by
inference”, which are “sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes the consequence of
silence; sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an
action”[CITATION Tho96 \p 94 \n \y \l 1033 ]. Locke also endorses the existence of tacit
consent, and that it can be binding, but expands the concept from a mere vague, side-mention
into a theory of tacit consent, placing more restrictions on what constitutes tacit consent. In the
Second Treatise, Locke refers to historical developments such as private property and currency
[CITATION Joh80 \p "27, 29" \n \y \t \l 1033 ] as examples of tacit consent.

Locke does realize, however, that tacit consent can introduce complexities and
inconsistencies if one is not careful, especially when it concerns a civil government and its
legitimacy. “The difficulty is,” says Locke, “what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and
how far it binds” [CITATION Joh80 \p 64 \n \y \l 1033 ]. As John Simmons notes, Locke was
extremely careful about what constitutes tacit consent. Simmons states that tacit consent, to
Locke, is a necessary condition for obligation; one can “bind himself to an unjust institution
through [an act] of consent”, but the opposite is untrue: tacit consent is not a sufficient condition
for creating obligation [CITATION Sim76 \p 278 \l 1033 ]. Simmons instead indicates that, from
a Lockean perspective5, the following conditions must also hold to create obligation through tacit
consent:

5
While Simmons does not directly and explicitly mentions these criteria as a summary or interpretation of Locke’s
views on tacit consent, his introduction, specifically the text at the top of p. 275 shows that Simmons’ article is
meant to analyze and elaborate on Locke’s writing and his senses of consent.
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(1) The situation must be such that it is perfectly clear that consent is appropriate and that
the individual is aware of this. […] (2) There must be a definite period […] when objections
[…] are invited or clearly appropriate, and the acceptable means of expressing this dissent
must be understood by […] the potential consenter. (3) The point at which [objections] are no
longer allowable must be made clear […] to the potential consenter. […] (4) The means
acceptable for indicating dissent must be reasonable and reasonably easily performed. (5)
The consequences of dissent cannot be extremely detrimental to the potential consenter. —
[CITATION Sim76 \p 279-80 \l 1033 ]

Therefore it is interesting to note that, even though Locke is credited as the thinker
behind the idea of tacit consent, his discussion of the concept and appreciation of the difficulty in
applying at all times led Locke to use tacit (inferred) consent in a weaker way than Hobbes, and
only applied it in special cases on governments.

HOBBES’ STATE OF NATURE


If we now turn to Hobbes, we can visualize a distinctive Hobbesian state of nature, with
its unique set of laws of nature. Man’s physical equality, and his unlimited freedom, means that
the state of nature is a state of chaos, where each man is entitled to whatever he may wish, and
two men, entitled over the same thing, may challenge one another and kill one another
[CITATION Tho96 \p 87 \y \l 1033 ]. This is only possible through Hobbes’ lack of moral,
spiritual, and religious justification for freedom and equality; only physical.

But since this is possible, then man’s freedom also indicates that he may, and ought to,
attack other men in anticipation of such conflict [CITATION Tho96 \p 87 \y \l 1033 ], thus
making a state of nature a state of war. For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war, and a
state of war is a state of constant fear of physical conflict. Therefore, we can already begin to see
how undesirable the state of nature is, and how man and society ought to do whatever is
necessary to exit such state. One can already draw parallels between Hobbes’ state of nature and
Machiavelli’s anarchy, as well as Hobbes’ eventual justification of an absolute sovereign, and
Machiavellian views that a despotic society is still better than an anarchic society.

To Hobbes, the Laws of Nature are founded upon pure reason in the state of nature, and
are statements that every man will follow by reason because it is in his best interest. Man is
bound by the laws of nature by virtue of the fact that violating them does him harm. The laws of
nature are outlined as “doing what is best to preserve your life”, and are enumerated as: (1)
Every man is to seek peace, and do whatever is necessary to preserve his existence whenever
peace is unattainable, and (2) Every man should be willing, when others are also, to lay down his
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rights to all things and “be contended with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow
other men against himself” [CITATION Tho96 \p 92 \y \l 1033 ].

In particular, the Second Law of Nature is the exact point where things can be said to take
an unexpected turn towards the final conclusion of defending absolute sovereignty. While all
characteristic stances of Hobbes, including his definitions of basic concepts as freedom, equality,
and the rights of man, can be clearly seen to contribute to this point, 6 this is where Hobbes finally
makes the argument that man must give up his right to all things, leading right to his final claim.

HOBBES’ ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN


The Second Law of Nature indicates that it is always desirable for man to give the right
to all things to a sovereign. Hobbes couples the activation of the second law with the beginnings
of the formation of a civil system, where citizens are obliged to keep the contract, have the duty
to do so, and are committing injustice if they don’t [CITATION Tho96 \p 93 \y \l 1033 ].
Hobbes states that the only inalienable right of man under a sovereign is the liberty7 to follow the
first rule of nature, i.e. to be able to resist death or assault as it is about to be executed upon him.
In all other things, the Sovereign, who now possesses the rights to all things for all people, will
be supreme.

The execution of the Second Law of Nature is the SOCIAL CONTRACT according to
Hobbes. This social contract does not need to be expressly given, but can be tacitly given
(inferred). This is because Hobbes realizes that it is practically impossible for mankind to have
ever expressed in the past, or to ever express in the future, unanimous consent to give up their
rights to all things. Hobbes refers to tacit consent, giving it as much weight and status as
expressed consent. As such, Hobbes is comfortable giving many rights to a sovereign through
tacit consent. This is also why Hobbes is comfortable in indicating that all men must give their
rights to all things.

At this point, a society is formed and is to institute a common-wealth, by selecting a man


or assembly of man to be its sovereign, by possessing the rights of all men to all things. A
commonwealth thus formed has the consent of all men, even if not all men voted for it; this is
because in the social contract where man exits the State of Nature, man consents to the sovereign
man or assembly elected by a majority vote of society.
6
In that sense, the unexpected turn is a smooth transition, not an abrupt change in argumentation.
7
As defined by Hobbes as the absence of physical impediments to motion.
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According to Williamson M. Evers, Hobbes did not concern himself much with justifying
a government for future generations, unlike Locke [CITATION Eve77 \p 189 \l 1033 ]. Yet,
from Hobbes’ discussion of succession, especially in monarchies, in which he views the
instituted commonwealth and sovereignty as a long-term effect that will bind multiple
generations, we can see that Hobbes does indeed already assume that a government, once
justified to be instituted with the current generation, shall be forever legitimate. This leads to two
possible explanations: it is either that, to Hobbes, the starting premise ‘all men are free and
equal, and a legitimate government must be based upon consent” only applies in the state of
nature, or that Hobbes gives too much power to tacit consent, stating that being born into a
government implies legitimate consent to your parents’ decision, or their inherited decision.

LOCKE’S STATE OF NATURE


Locke’s state of nature contrasts with Hobbes by being a less harsh condition. As man is
equal by God, and because the liberties of man are bounded by the liberties of other men,
Hobbes’ problem of competition becomes less relevant. Further, Locke states self-preservation is
not only a right but also an obligation, and that it is also an obligation of man to protect the rights
of other men in self-preservation, insofar as it doesn’t conflict with his own. This duty is Locke’s
law of nature, which Locke describes as follows:

“The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; […] sent into the
world by his order, and about his business; they are his property […]. Every one, as he is
bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station [willfully], so by the like reason, when
his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the
rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair
the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.” —[CITATION Joh80 \p 9 \y \l 1033 ]

Why does Locke give such law of nature that is so expansive in scope compared to
Hobbes’? Also, while Locke explains why it is just and righteous to have such law of nature,
why is it binding? It is certainly intuitive why such laws are just and unobjectionable, but the
reason they are binding in Locke’s view, is more difficult to explain. A simple explanation could
be that the law of nature is also given by God, which is hinted at by Locke. Still, I can offer a
contending (or, complementary) explanation: since, according to Hobbes, laws of nature must be
binding because it is in each individual’s best interest not to violate them, one can make this
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argument: this Law of Nature ensures a stable, peaceful, un-anarchic society within the state of
nature, and living in a state of peace as opposed to a state of war is in the best interest of all
individuals.8

Still, Locke believes that some will go against the law of nature, and as such the law of
nature needs an enforcer, and that enforcer is everyone. Locke acknowledges that, for some
individuals, it will be in their best interests—on rare occasions—to violate the law of nature. Yet,
at any point in time, the majority of the individuals in any given area will have a vested interest
in the enforcement of the law of nature, thus become the enforcers, Locke thinks.

Furthermore, Locke declares that “every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be
executioner of the law of nature”, since, by “transgressing the law of nature, the offender
declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity,” thereby
forfeiting his right to preservation, and removing his preservation from the duty of all other men
[CITATION Joh80 \p 10 \n \y \l 1033 ]. But furthermore, in accordance with the obligations of
men in the state of nature, Locke believes that men should engage in retribution against the
offender. Further, retribution may be bounded only by the gravity of the transgression, not any
right of the offender [CITATION Joh80 \p "10, 12" \y \l 1033 ]. Yet, any transgression against
another, in which one man attempts to subject his will onto another (including taking another’s
property, etc.) is of such gravity that punishment by death is justifiable [CITATION Joh80 \p 14-
5 \y \l 1033 ].

Locke’s state of war is unlike that of Hobbes: it is a state an individual experiences


transiently9, either as a result of his violation of the law of nature, or a transgression made against
his rights of preservation [CITATION Joh80 \p 14 \y \l 1033 ]. Society is therefore more stable
and is never in a total state of war, where everyone is at war against all, unlike Hobbes. By
having a strong execution of the law of nature with punishment and retribution, the stability of
the state of nature is guaranteed, thinks Locke.

8
An interesting question comes up, which is: if this latter statement is true, how compatible is it with Hobbes’ first
law of nature, on seeking peace? If it is compatible, then does it at all affect the correctness of the rest of Hobbes’
theory?
9
See “but when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases” in Second Treatise, p. 15, par 20.
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LOCKE’S POLITICAL SOCIETY AND COMMONWEALTH


Locke believes that man cannot, under any condition, surrender his freedom, as it is
contrary to his obligation of preservation; “the freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so […]
closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it[…]: for a man […] cannot,
by COMPACT, or his own CONSENT, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under absolute
arbitrary power of another, or take away his life, when he pleases.” [CITATION Joh80 \p 17
\y \l 1033 ] Furthermore, since Locke defines freedom as the ability to dispose one’s actions, as
opposed to Hobbes’ physical definition of freedom, the option of absolute autocratic sovereignty
becomes impermissible. Perhaps now, it becomes clear that Locke’s account took an ‘unexpected
turn’ as he defined preservation of oneself and mankind as an obligation.

Locke establishes that “the power to preserve property”, and to punish the offenses of
transgressors are necessary ends of a political society [CITATION Joh80 \p 46 \y \l 1033 ]. To
facilitate this, upon entering a political society, all men must give up their natural power 10 to the
hands of the community. From this comes a commonwealth, having two powers: making laws,
and war and peace: legislative and executive power [CITATION Joh80 \p 47 \y \l 1033 ].

A commonwealth must comply with its ends to remain legitimate. For Locke, the end is
“to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature” [CITATION Joh80 \p 48
\y \l 1033 ], and thus the execution of the law of nature, and the preservation of the natural
rights of men to preservation, and all it entails. Locke’s government also inherits the obligation
to protect the natural rights of all members of society, and as a result it is a LIMITED government.

Locke is aware of the considerations on tacit consent, as per Simmons’ limitations on


obligation by tacit consent, yet he justifies the continuity of a commonwealth through
generations by tacit consent. Locke is therefore careful that the advantages of the commonwealth
continue throughout its lifetime, so that men continue to be obliged to obey to its laws. The
ultimate end of a commonwealth is to protect life, liberty11, and property. To remain legitimate, a
government needs to guarantee these rights and preserve them. It thus must be Limited and

10
Lock says “quitted this natural power”, as opposed to “natural right”. This is important, because Locke believes
men must keep their rights and duties of self-preservation, but quit their powers: being the executioner of the law of
nature.
11
Liberty however is differently defined in a political society: “The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other
legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or
restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it.” [CITATION Joh80 \p
17 \y \l 1033 ]
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subject to separation of powers, safeguarding it against any potential drift into despotism or
otherwise illegitimate rule.

CONCLUSION
We can see that the ‘unexpected turn’ in the reasoning of both Hobbes and Locke takes
place either right before or at the moment the Social Contract is discussed. For both authors, the
unexpected turn lies in their formulation of the Law of Nature, and how human nature and the
state of nature were set up. While the starting premises of both authors are similar, Hobbes paints
the state of nature as a cruel place, where “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short” [CITATION Tho96 \p 89 \y \l 1033 ], yet Locke paints a more positive, stable picture of
the state of nature, only lacking in protection of private property, and including the risk of a state
of war. The difference between the two is due to, on the one hand, Hobbes’ view of a competing
man, and his materialistic conception of values as freedom and liberty, and Locke’s expansive
laws of nature that safeguard stability other the other hand. Locke’s expansive laws of nature,
specifically on the obligation of preservation, lead directly to a strong call for a limited
government with separation of powers. The lack of any binding laws for Hobbes means that the
safest choice for a stable civil society is one with an absolute sovereign.12

Social contract theory and the meaning of consent had a huge impact on how to enter the
contract and how to allow a government to survive across generations, acting as a magnifying
lens of Locke and Hobbes’ fundamental differences. One can also see how the Social Contract is
a legitimate, consistent tool of political philosophy, where thinkers of different beliefs, as
Hobbes and Locke, may produce radically different end results, just as Machiavelli and
Montesquieu did so with reason and empirical observations.

WORKS CITED
Evers, W. M. (1977). Social Contract: A Critique. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1(3), 185-195.

Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan (Revised Student Edition ed.). (R. Tuck, Ed.) Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, J. (1980). Second Treatise of Government. (C. B. Macpherson, Ed.) Indianapolis, United
States of America: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
12
Locke himself takes a few unexpected turns in the Second Treatise that were not discussed. These include his
justification of slavery and the colonization of the Americas. While these are very important point to consider about
Locke’s works, it is the product of Locke’s formulation of the law of nature and its implications, and also are
products of Locke’s understanding of fundamental concepts such as property. I believe that the issue of slavery can
be ‘fixed’, while still being reconciled with Locke’s work, but showing that is of secondary importance to this paper.
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Simmons, J. (1976, Spring). Tacit Consent and Political Obligation. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 5(3), 274-291.

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