Jimmy T. Go, petitioner, vs.
The Clerk of Court and Ex- Officio Provincial ISSUE: Did CA err in reversing the ruling of the RTC-Pasig granting
Sheriff of Negros Occidental, Ildefonso M. Villanueva, Jr., and Sheriff
Dioscoro F. Caponpon, Jr. and Multi-luck Corporation, respondents.
(G.R. No. 154623 | March 13, 2009)
FACTS: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J: This is a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA, which reversed and
set aside the Orders of the RTC of Pasig City which in turn, granted
petitioner's motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denied
respondents' motion to dismiss, respectively.
The present controversy stemmed from the execution of the Decision of RTC,
in a complaint for collection of a sum of money.
RTC (Petitioner) CA (reversed) | MR(Petitioner) : denied  SC (Affirmed
CA)
Respondent Multi-Luck Corporation filed a COLLECTION SUIT against
Alberto T. Looyuko as sole proprietor of Noah's Ark Merchandising Inc.
(NAMI). The complaint pertained to 3 dishonored UCPB checks with an
aggregate amount of P8,9M issued by Looyuko/NAMI to Mamertha General
Merchandising. These checks were indorsed to Multi-Luck, who claimed to
be a holder in due course of such checks.
Upon Multi-Luck's MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, the
Bacolod RTC rendered a Decision ordering Looyuko/NAMI TO PAY Multi-
Luck the value of the three (3) UCPB checks. Looyuko/NAMI did not file an
appeal; the Decision became FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
Upon Multi-Luck's MOTION, the Bacolod RTC issued a WRIT OF
EXECUTION over a house and lot registered in the name of Looyuko and one
share in the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. in the name of
NAMI.
PETITIONER filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction alleging that he is a "business
partner" of Looyuko and that he co-owned the properties subject of the
aforementioned auction sales. That the intended public auction of the subject
properties WOULD UNDULY DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS SHARE OF THE
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW considering that he was
not impleaded as a party in the Civil Case.
RESPONDENT Multi-Luck filed a motion to dismiss on the ground THAT
THE PASIG RTC HAD NO JURISDICTION over the subject matter of
petitioner's claim and over the public respondent sheriffs as well as over
Multi-Luck.
The Pasig RTC GRANTED PETITIONER'S PRAYER for issuance of a TRO.
Thereafter the Pasig RTC issued a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
enjoining public respondent sheriffs Caponpon, Jr. and Villanueva, Jr. from
holding the public auction.
Subsequently the Pasig RTC DENIED respondents' MOTION TO DISMISS.
Multi-Luck filed an MR but were also DENIED by the Pasig RTC.
Multi-Luck ELEVATED the case to the CA via a petition for CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION with prayer for the issuance of restraining order and/or
injunction.
As stated, the CA GRANTED MULTI-LUCK'S PETITION AND REVERSED
THE RULING OF THE PASIG RTC.
The CA ruled that Order issued by the Pasig RTC INTERFERED with the
order of the Bacolod RTC. The CA held that the Pasig RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it granted the injunctive relief prayed for by petitioner despite
the glaring lack of a clear legal right on the part of the latter to support his
cause of action. Petitioner filed an MR but the CA denied the same.
Petitioner theorizes that since he was a "stranger" to the Civil Case, he should
be considered a "THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT" pursuant to Rule 39, Section 16
of the ROC. Hence, whatever judgment or decision rendered in the Case did
not bind him or his properties. Petitioner adds that as a co-owner of all
properties and monies belonging to Looyuko/NAMI, he was unduly
prejudiced by the Decision in the Civil Case. PETITIONER INSISTS THAT
HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPLEADED IN THE CIVIL CASE SO THAT
THERE COULD BE A FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE ACTION AS TO
HIM.
He argues that the principle on "non-intervention of co-equal courts" does
not apply where, as here, a third party claimant is involved.
temporary relief to petitioner? YES. <RTC-Pasig has no jurisdiction>
HELD: The DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE means that no court
has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by injunction. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may
not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
Since the BACOLOD RTC HAD ALREADY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE COLLECTION SUIT and rendered judgment in relation thereto,
IT RETAINED JURISDICTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER
COORDINATE COURTS OVER ITS JUDGMENT, including all incidents
relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely public
respondent sheriffs. THUS, THE ISSUANCE BY THE PASIG RTC OF THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 68125 WAS A
CLEAR ACT OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE JUDGMENT OF BACOLOD
RTC.
The jurisprudential "exception" made in, Santos v. Bayhon, finds no
application in this case. In Santos, SC allowed the implementation of a writ of
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter to be enjoined by order of the RTC
where a THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT had filed his action to recover property
involved in the execution sale, since the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to
decide matters of ownership of property and the civil courts are the proper
venue therefor. In the case at bar, THE BACOLOD RTC HAD
JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED HAD PETITIONER FILED
HIS CLAIM WITH THE SAID COURT.
To reiterate, a case, in which an execution order has been issued, is still
pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the
suit. Hence, any questions that may be raised regarding the subject matter of
Civil Case filed in Bacolod or the execution of the decision in said case is
properly threshed out by the Bacolod RTC.
Petitioner cannot be unduly prejudiced by the Decision in the Bacolod Case as
a co-owner of all properties and monies belonging to Looyuko/NAMI.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the ROC enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance
of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to
be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Pursuant to the above provision, A CLEAR AND POSITIVE RIGHT
ESPECIALLY CALLING FOR JUDICIAL PROTECTION MUST BE SHOWN.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never
arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
THERE MUST EXIST AN ACTUAL RIGHT.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish
the following requisites:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.
To bolster his claim of interest on the attached properties, petitioner presented
their Agreement. BUT the authenticity and the due execution of these
documents are presently under litigation in other proceedings which are not
pending before the Pasig RTC. There appears to be a pending case, wherein
Looyuko claims that his signatures on these Agreements were a forgery.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the CA, NAMI had already been in
existence as early as the middle part of the 1970's. NAMI has been doing
business as a registered single proprietorship with Looyuko as single
proprietor.
CA finds it very unlikely that for more than twenty-years of the existence of
the business, and considering Private Respondent's purported personal interest
in the business, he would risk allowing third persons to deal with and
consequently have the business liable as a single proprietorship when Private
Respondent, assuming a valid partnership indeed existed, could have easily
compelled Alberto Looyuko to cause the registration of the business as a
partnership to afford legitimate protection to Private Respondent's property
interests therein as a partner thereof. In any event, PRIVATE RESPONDENT
IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM DISAVOWING THE STANDING OF NOAH'S
ARK MERCHANDISING AS A REGISTERED SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP
AND FROM CLAIMING THAT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION BELONG
TO A PURPORTED PARTNERSHIP.
RTC therefore, gravely abused its discretion in granting Private Respondent
the injunctive relief sought for in the face of OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
OF LACK OF A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT ON THE PART OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO SUPPORT ITS CAUSE OF ACTION. Jurisprudentially
settled is the rule that:
It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking
it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought — in other words, that he shows no equity.
Want of equity on the part of the plaintiff in attempting to use the
injunctive process of the court to enforce a mere barren right will
justify the court in refusing the relief even though the defendant
has little equity on his side. The complainant's right or title,
moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a rule,
will not take cognizance of suits to establish title, and will not lend
its preventive aid by injunction where the complainant's title or
right is doubtful or disputed. He must stand on the strength of his
own right or title, rather than on the weakness of that claimed by
his adversary. (Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion versus Margarito
Gervacio, Jr., G.R. No. 115741, March 9, 1999, 304 SCRA 322,
330.)
The institution of the instant injunction suit, however, is definitely not the
proper forum.
THE ATTACHED REAL PROPERTIES ARE REGISTERED SOLELY IN
THE NAME OF LOOYUKO AND NAMI. Corollarily, PETITIONER HAD
NO STANDING TO QUESTION THE BACOLOD RTC'S JUDGMENT
AS HE IS A STRANGER TO THAT CASE AND HE HAS NO CLEAR
RIGHT OR INTEREST IN THE ATTACHED PROPERTY.
Moreover, the checks subject of the Bacolod Case were made in payment for
obligations incurred by Looyuko in the course of the business operation of
NAMI.
To recapitulate, once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in
certain cases, as when subsequent events would render execution of the
judgment unjust. The present case does not fall within the recognized
exceptions. In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, SC declared that A COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN THE EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS IN
ANOTHER COURT WITH CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
AMA Computer College-East Rizal, Amable C. Aguiluz and Anthony
Jesus R. Vince Cruz, petitioners, vs. Allan Raymond R. Ignacio,
respondent.
(G.R. No. 178520 | June 23, 2009)
FACTS: CHICO-NAZARIO, J: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Rule 45) seeking to set aside the Decision and the Resolution of the CA. The
CA, in its assailed Decision, ruled that respondent Allan Raymond R. Ignacio
was illegally dismissed by petitioners AMA Computer College, thus,
reversing and setting aside the Resolution of the NLRC, which affirmed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The appellate court denied in its assailed
Resolution the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners.
LA (ruled in favor of AMA)  NLRC(affirmed LA)  CA (reversed)  SC
(affirmed CA)
Petitioner is engaged in the business of providing computer education. AMA
Computer College-East Rizal (ER) is one of its branches. Petitioners Aguiluz
and Cruz are President and Human Resource Director, respectively, of
petitioner AMACCI.
Respondent was employed at another branch (Fairview), as Management
Trainee (Maintenance Supervisor) with a monthly salary of P7,700.00. Three
months after (29 December 1998), he was granted permanent status and his
monthly salary was increased to P11K.
Upon recommendation of school officials, respondent was transferred to ER
(16 August 1999). The transfer was made because of the pressing deadline
brought about by the preparation for ISO 9000. ER was scheduled to be
inspected in the first week of September 1999.
On his first day of transfer to ER, respondent went to the Head Office to
consult Assistant Vice President for Construction, Engineer Noel Nobleza
(Nobleza), on the renovation plan for the ER school facilities. The renovation
of the ER school facilities was to be undertaken as part of the ISO 9000.
Nobleza told respondent that since the renovation was a major one, approval
of AMA Educational System (AMAES) Vice President Zenaida Carpio
(Carpio) is needed. Since Carpio was out of her office, respondent went to
consult ER School Director/COO Taganguin, and then to secure the approval
of the owner of the JL Domingo Building in which the ER school facilities
were located. It was Taganguin who brought the renovation plan to Carpio,
who approved the same. Thereafter, respondent conducted an emergency
officers' meeting to discuss the approved renovation plan. Present at the said
meeting were the two college deans and all the department heads of AMACC-
ER.
Respondent started demolishing the concrete partition wall of the computer
laboratory (18 August 1999). In the morning of the following day, the
maintenance crew, following respondent's order, brought plywood to cover
the unfinished door opening of the computer laboratory. Carpio and Assistant
Vice President came to ER to conduct an inspection.
However, the Audit Department of AMACCI filed a complaint against
respondent (25 August 1999), charging him with "(t)hreatening to damage
company property, negligence or failure to exercise adequate asset control
measures within one's area of responsibility".
Respondent then received (3 September 1999) a Memorandum from petitioner
Cruz, (Human Resource Director), informing the respondent that A
COMPLAINT WAS FILED AGAINST HIM FOR INEXCUSABLE GROSS
NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS DAMAGE to 35 computers and
loss of class records/exams, and instructing him TO SUBMIT HIS WRITTEN
EXPLANATION AND EVIDENCE ON THAT SAME DAY. Respondent was
likewise placed on preventive suspension.
In a Memorandum (6 September 1999), the HR Dept of AMACCI reported
the result of its investigation:
PRESPONDENT ALLEGED:
• He taken into consideration the precautionary measures needed to
cover the computers inside the room.
• The computer units did not sustain any damage. As attested by the
certification issued by the IT Supervisor.
Other witness alleged:
• The IT Department and the property department were not informed
of the said demolition, which resulted to the exposure of thirty-five
(35) computer units to possible loss and damages.
• that the computers were not moved away from the falling debris
coming from the concrete walls.
• that some of the computers have debris from the smashed
cemented walling.
It was recommended that respondent be duly sanctioned for his offense. He
has clearly violated Rule E Section 4 of the company code of conduct. The
corresponding sanction for this is DISMISSAL. Respondent was terminated
from employment on 9 September 1999.
He filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
salaries and wages, overtime pay, holiday pay and rest day damages against
petitioners (27 October 1999).
Petitioners denied that respondent was illegally dismissed. They presented the
finding of their HR Dept. They also alleged that respondent was charged with
a VERY SERIOUS OFFENSE, i.e., damaging company property thru gross
negligence, or threatening to damage company property either willfully or
thru negligence. The corresponding penalty for such an offense is dismissal,
as provided for in the Employees Manual. Petitioners further insisted THAT
THEY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS.
LABOR ARBITER held that respondent was legally dismissed. The Labor
Arbiter found that there was substantive ground to justify respondent's
dismissal favoring the investigation report conducted by petitioners. Saying
that “We should not lose sight of the fact that [respondent] is a supervisor and
not an ordinary laborer whose lapses may be more easily condoned. His is
not a mere lapse but a serious misconduct.” Finding further that there was no
bad faith or illegality on the part of the management in effecting the dismissal.
Respondent appealed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which
issued a Resolution DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S APPEAL as it found
no cogent reason to modify and reverse the factual findings of the LA. MR
was also denied.
Respondent elevated the case to CA via a Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65). CA
ruled that RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. It cannot
consider respondent's transgression as serious misconduct when his actuation
was not willful and deliberate, there appearing to be no intention on his part
to cause damage. And although the CA adjudged that respondent was guilty
of negligence, IT WAS NOT GROSS OR HABITUAL AS WOULD WARRANT
THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT. CA ordered petitioners to pay
respondent separation pay equivalent to one month for every year of service to
be reckoned from the end of his thirty-day suspension up to the finality of this
decision, in addition to his full back wages allowances and other benefits.
Petitioners' MR was denied.
ISSUES: Did CA go beyond its jurisdiction when it re-evaluated the findings
of fact of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC? NO.
HELD: The GENERAL RULE is that findings of fact of an administrative
agency, which has acquired expertise in the particular field of its endeavor,
are accorded great weight on appeal. The rule is NOT ABSOLUTE AND
ADMITS OF CERTAIN WELL-RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS. Thus, when
the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC are not supported by substantial
evidence or their judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, the
APPELLATE COURT MAY MAKE AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF
THE FACTS OF THE CASE, which procedure the CA adopted in this case.
The CA, in view of its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated to it
through a petition for certiorari may look into the records of the case and re-
examine the questioned findings if it considers the same to be necessary to
arrive at a just decision.
Hence, the Court of Appeals was acting within its jurisdiction when, on
certiorari, it did not merely adopt the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC and, instead, made its own findings, which were contrary to the
former.
SC now discusses its own jurisdiction in reviewing findings of fact in a
petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45
of the ROC, this Court being BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE
BY THE CA. Exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the CA is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
In this case, the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court or an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, SC must
make its own factual findings.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that
the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and
legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a
case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
And the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. An employee's dismissal due to serious
misconduct must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise.
RE DUE PROCESS: The chance afforded to respondent, although limited, is
a clear opportunity to be heard on the issue at hand.
RE JUST CAUSE FOR THE TERMINATION: Petitioner AMACCI
terminated respondent's employment because of gross negligence resulting to
the loss of important documents.
Among the just causes in the Labor Code is serious misconduct. The
misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code must be of
such a GRAVE AND AGGRAVATED CHARACTER AND NOT MERELY
TRIVIAL OR UNIMPORTANT. Such misconduct, however serious, must
nevertheless be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just
cause for his separation.
After a thorough examination of the records of the case, however, the Court
finds THAT PETITIONER AMACCI MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ITS CHARGES AGAINST RESPONDENT. There
is no showing at all that respondent's actions were motivated by a perverse
and wrongful intent, as required by Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code.
Respondent's actions, at their worse, reveal his negligence, but said negligence
can hardly be deemed gross and habitual, as to constitute a just ground for his
dismissal under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code.
Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of even slight care
or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting
any effort to avoid them. To constitute a just cause for termination of
employment, the neglect of duties must not only be gross but habitual as well.
THE SINGLE OR ISOLATED ACT OF NEGLIGENCE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A JUST CAUSE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEE.
Respondent exercised enough diligence in his renovation of the computer
laboratory as to pass the inspection of two officials of petitioner AMACCI.
Also, other than the incident at the computer laboratory, NO OTHER
NEGLIGENT ACT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO RESPONDENT TO ESTABLISH
HABITUALITY.
THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IMPOSED ON RESPONDENT IS
DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS OFFENSE.
What is at stake here is not simply the job itself of the employee but also his
regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED, with the
CLARIFICATION/MODIFICATION that only petitioner AMA Computer
Colleges, Inc. is held liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent Allan
Raymond R. Ignacio, and the latter's complaint against petitioners Amable C.
Aguiluz and Anthony Jesus R. Vince Cruz is DISMISSED.
Apolonia Banayad Frianela, petitioner, vs. Servillano Banayad, Jr.,
respondent. (G.R. No. 169700 | July 30, 2009)
FACTS: NACHURA, J: This is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) of
the ROC assailing the Decision of the CA, and the Resolution denying the
motion for partial reconsideration thereof.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises's
estate.
Thus, FROM A READING OF THE ORIGINAL PETITION FILED, IT
CANNOT BE DETERMINED WHICH COURT HAS ORIGINAL AND
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS.

RTC (respondent)  CA (affirmed/mod)  SC (RTC ruling is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction)
Following the death of her uncle (Moises F. Banayad), petitioner, who was
named as devisee <someone to whom property (especially realty) is devised by will;
beneficiary> in the will (November 18, 1985), filed before the RTC- Pasay
City. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left to her the
following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated in Pasay City; (2)
images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown; and (3) all
personal belongings.
The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed
jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not
call for the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Further, the
CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is
the doctrine that THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED BY ANY
OF THE PARTIES OR MAY BE RECKONED BY THE COURT, AT ANY
STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN ON APPEAL, AND IS NOT LOST
BY WAIVER OR BY ESTOPPEL.

Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter- Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down
petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills <a document written in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People cannot
wholly in the handwriting of the person whose signature it bears> of the decedent, be applied. First, because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches
dated September 27, 1989 and September 28, 1989. cannot lie against the government. No injustice to the parties or to any third
person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the over the instituted probate proceedings.
September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18,
1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as administrator of Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack
Moises's estate. of jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final and
executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized that
On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial court and ruled that the estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18, milieu in Tijam.
1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moises's real property
was concerned. In Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the
execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial court's denial of the
With the denial of her MR in the further assailed Resolution, petitioner surety's motion to quash the writ of execution has been brought to the
elevated the case before SC via the instant petition. appellate court for review.
ISSUE: Here, the trial court's assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the
HELD: The trial court focused all of its attention on the merits of the case probate proceedings has been discovered by the Court during the appeal
WITHOUT FIRST DETERMINING WHETHER IT COULD HAVE stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of a final and executory
VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE ON decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply.
THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein,
THE CA ALSO OVERLOOKED THE ISSUE ON THE JURISDICTIONAL including the decision rendered, are null and void. With the above
COMPETENCE OF THE TRIAL COURT OVER THE SAID CASE. disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other
issues raised in the petition.
SC after a meticulous review of the records, finds that the RTC OF PASAY
CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law
in force at the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof. Jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations or averments in the complaint or petition.
In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance of Moises's holographic
will was instituted, Sections 19 and 33 of B.P. Blg. 129 were in force,
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate,
where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. —
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the demand does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but
inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must
be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; and
The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction over probate proceedings
depending on the gross value of the estate, which value must be alleged in
the complaint or petition to be filed.